ML20215C204
| ML20215C204 | |
| Person / Time | |
|---|---|
| Site: | Seabrook  |
| Issue date: | 10/07/1986 |
| From: | Harbour J, Luebke E, Wolfe S Atomic Safety and Licensing Board Panel |
| To: | NRC OFFICE OF THE GENERAL COUNSEL (OGC), PUBLIC SERVICE CO. OF NEW HAMPSHIRE, SEACOAST ANTI-POLLUTION LEAGUE |
| References | |
| CON-#486-1017 82-471-02-OL, 82-471-2-OL, LBP-86-34, OL-1, NUDOCS 8610100153 | |
| Download: ML20215C204 (11) | |
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DOCKETED l @ "$6-34 UNITED STATES OF AMERICA NUCLEAR REGULATORY COMMISSION g g _g g g ATOMIC SAFETY AND LICENSING BOARD OFFICE OF ", !!a Before Administrative Judges:
00cKEimc ' n.40 BN Sheldon J. Wolfe, Chairman Emmeth A. Luebke Jerry Harbour SERVED OCT -818
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Docket Nos. 50-443-GL-1 In the Matter of
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50-444-0L-1
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PUBLIC SERVICE COMPANY
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(On-Site Emergency Planning 0F NEW HAMPSHIRE, et al.
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and Safety Issues)
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(ASLBP No. 82-471-02-0L)
(Seabrook Station, Units 1 and 2)
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October 7, 1986 MEMORANDUM AND ORDER (Granting Applicants' Motion For Authorization To Issue License To Conduct Fuel Load and Precriticality Testing)
Memorandum On August 22, 1986, Applicants filed a motion for authorization to issue license to conduct fuel load and precriticality testing. On August 29, Seacoast Anti-Pollution League (SAPL) filed its response and objection,I and on September 3, the Comonwealth of Massachusetts 1
This response and objection was captioned as being that of SAPL and New England Coalition on Nuclear Pollution (NECNP), but only counsel for SAPL signed this submission.
SAPL's counsel did not explain the basis for SAPL's standing to respond and object to the motion on NECNP's behalf. An intervenor's status as a party to the proceeding does not of itself make it a spokesman for others.
(Footnote Continued) 861010o153 861007
{DR ADOCK 05000443 PDR dA
_ (Mass.) filed its objection. On September 8, the Staff filed its
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response, which was supplemented by the filing of an affidavit on September 18, 1986.
Discussion Applicants' motion is based upon 10 C.F.R. 550.57(c), and relies upon attached affidavits.2 Applicants urge that none of the parties' admitted contentions pending either before the Hoyt Board (re off-site emergency planning issues) or before this Board (re on-site emergency planning and safety issues) are relevant to the instant motion as required by 650.57(c).3 Other than referring to arguments previously (FootnoteContinued)
Puget Sound Power and Light Company (Skagit Nuclear Power Project, Units 1 and 2), ALAB-556, 10 NRC 30, 33 (1979). Accordingly, we treat the response and objection as having been filed only by SAPL upon its own behalf.
2 The affiants are: Vincent J. Esposito, Manager of the Core Engineering Section of the Nuclear Fuel Divisions Section of the Nuclear Fuel Divisions Business Unit of Westinghouse; George S.
Thomas, Vice President of Nuclear Production at the Seabrook Station; Joseph M. Salvo, Senior Mechanical Engineer at Yankee Atomic Electric Company, assigned to the Seabrook project; James A.
MacDonald, Radiological Assessment Manager at Seabrook Station.
Their professional qualifications satisfy us as to their expertise.
3 10 C.F.R. 650.57(c) provides:
An applicant may, in a case where a hearing is held in connection with a pending proceeding under this section, make a motion in writing, pursuant to this paragraph (c), for an operating license authorizing low-power testing (operation at not more than 1 percent of tull power for the purpose of (Footnote Continued)
N s advanced by SAPL, NECNP and by Mass. in opposing Applicants' motion of June 17, 1986 whichhadreque$tedthattheBoard'spartialinitial decision should authorize operation of Seabrook Unit I up to and including 5% of rated power, neither SAPL nor Mass. argue that any off-site emergency planning issues are relevant to the instant motion.
In its Memoranda and Orders of July 25, July 30, and September 15, 1986 (the last of which was unpublished), the Board had rejected those arguments. In any event, as Applicants point out, the off-site contentions pending before the Hoyt Board are not relevant to the instant motion because 550.47(d) states that "...no NRC or FEMA review, findings, or determinations concerning the state of off-site emergency preparedness or the adequacy of and capability to implement State and local off-site emergency plans are required prior to issuance of an (FootnoteContinued) testing tlye facility), and further operations short of full l
power operation. Action on such a motion by the presiding officer shall be taken with due regard to the rights of the parties to the proceedings, including the right of any party to be heard to the extent that his contentions are relevant to the activity to be authorized.
Prior to taking any action on such a motion which any party opposes, the presiding officer shall make findings on the matters specified in paragraph (a) of this section as to which there is a controversy, in the form of an initial decision with respect to the contested activity sought to be authorized. The Director of Nuclear Reactor Regulation will make findings on all other matters specified in paragraph (a) of this section.
If no party opposes the motion, the presiding officer will issue an order pursuant to 62.730(e) of this chapter, authorizing the Director of Nuclear Reactor Regulation to make appropriate findings on the matters specified in paragraph (a) of this section and to issue a license for the requested operation.
i i operating license authorizing only fuel loading and/or low power operations (up to 5% of the rated power)." (Underscoringadded). The instant motion is for a low power operating license of less than 5% of rated power - i.e., for 0%.
With respect to the second part of the first argument, i.e., that none of the parties' admitted on-site emergency planning and safety issues pending before this Board are relevant pursuant to 650.57(c),
Applicants argue as follows:
(Applicants' motion, at 5, 6).
...As set forth in the Affidavit of Vincent J. Esposito (attached hereto as Exhibit A), the maintenance of a boron concentration of 2000 ppm or greater precludes criticality in the Seabrook Unit 1 core even if it is assumed that all
-Exh. A at 11 4-5.
As set forth control rods are withdrawn.
in the Affidavit of George S. TEomas (attached hereto as Exhibit B), special procedures will be in place during the contemplated fuel loading and precriticality testing to assure that the boron concentration does not go below 2000 ppm. Exh. 8, 1 5.
These procedures consist of periodic sampling of the water in the reactor and make-up supply; sampling of the contents of make-up water whenever water is added to verify the concentration; and locking (by chains and padlocks) all valves, the opening of which could permit the entry of nonborated water into the reactor coolant system. M. This being the case no control room operation is needed to assure a boron concentration of greater than 2000 ppm and thus the preclusion of criticality. As a result the issues raised by SAPL Contention Supp. No. 6 (Detailed Control Room Design Review) (formerly N.H. ho.10) are irrelevant to the activities contemplated under the authorization sought.
i Similarly, the issues raised by NECNP Contention I.B.2 (environmental qualification of electrical equipment) are also irrelevant to the contemplated activities. The presence of elevated boron concentrations renders unnecessary the use of any electrical control equipment or control circuitry important to safety to prevent criticality or provide safe shutdown. Affidavit of Joseph M. Salvo (attached hereto as Exhibit C) at 14; see also Exh. 8 at l
1 4.
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$ In addition, the Esposito Affidavit (Exhibit A) also demonstrates that in the highly unlikely event that a break should occur which resulted in an entire loss of the reactor coolant from the core, there still would be no need for reliance upon control room operations or electrical systems or circuitry to maintain subcriticality because the resulting loss of neutron generation capability of the fuel
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dominates the accompanying loss of neutron absorption capability of the borated coolant. Exh. A at 1 6 et seq.
Finally, the Affidavit of James A. MacDonald (attached hereto.as Exhibit D) demonstrates that there will be no need, during fuel load and precriticality testing, to implement the emergency classification system, which is the subject of Contentions NH-20 and NECNP III.I. This is so because the reactor will not go critical and thus there is no potential for release of radioactive material. Thus, the issues raised by these contentions are likewise irrelevant to the activities sought to be authorized.
Only SAPL urges that a specific on-site contention pending before this Board is relevant to the activity to be authorized. With respect
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to its Supplemental Contention 6, SAPL argues that "since it involves the control room and certain of the issces such as human engineering discrepancies" it ought be resolved before any level of operation is authorized, including subcritical operation." (SAPL's response at 5).
However the Memorandum and Order of September 15, 1986, LBP-86-30, 24 NRC __, in partially granting Applicants' motion for summary disposition, dismissed that part of Supplemental Contention 6 which adverted to the control room and human / engineering discrepancies (HEDs).
Thus, SAPL's argument lacks a basis and is rejected.4 4
SAPL does not specifically urge that the second matter of its concern as set forth in this contention is relevant to the activity (Footnote Continued)
r i Both SAPL and Mass. urge that the proposed draft low power license dated August 20, 1986, in exempting applicants "from the provisions of 10 C.F.R. 670.24 insofar as this section applies to materials held under this license," raises a controversy which, pursuant to 550.57(c),
requires that this Board make findings on the matters specified in paragraph (a) in the form of an initial decision prior to authorizing the contested activity. They assert that this exemption allows the Applicants to avoid monitoring criticality of the core in the reactor.
As a threshold matter, we find that SAPL and Mass. have misinterpreted
%50.57(c) in thinking that this section requires a two-step procedure -
i.e., first, the Board should consider the position of any party and take action on a motion to the extent that his contentions are relevant to the action to be authorized, and, second, the Board should make findings upon certain matters set forth in 50.57(a) as to which there is (FootnoteContinued) to be authorized and thus also ought be resolved before any level of operation is authorized, including subcritical operation. This second concern, which was not dismissed in the above-cited Memorandum and Order, related to the Safety Parameter Display System (SPDS). Even if SAPL's bread reference to " human engineering discrepancies" were taken to include any that might be present in the SPDS, SAPL has made no showing that any issues pertaining to the SPDS are relevant to fuel loading and precriticality testing, during which activities no self-sustaining nuclear chain reaction will take place. Absent nuclear criticality, there is no requirement for a system (the SPDS) whose function is to assess whether abnormal conditions warrant corrective action by operators to avoid a degraded core.
NUREG-0737, Supplement 1 at 14.1.a.
See also Pacific Gas and Electric Company (Diablo Canyon Nuclear Power Plant, Units 1 and 2), CL1-83-27, 18 NRC 1146, 1149 (1983).
i a controversy. We construe that section as calling for a one step procedure - i.e., the Board should consider the position of any party to the extent that his contentions are relevant to the activity to be authorized, and, prior to taking any action on a motion, should make findings upon certain matters set forth in 10 C.F.R. $57.57(a) as to which there is such a relevant issue in controversy.
Since the Part 70 exemption is not the subject of an existing contention of either SAPL or Mass., the exemption is not a relevant issue in controversy with respect to the activity to be authorized.
Moreover, a motion filed by an applicant pursuant to 550.57(c) does not automatically present an opportunity to file new contentions (i.e.,
contentions not previously filed in response to the Commission's original notice of opportunity for hearing) specifically aimed at low power testing.5 Any submission proposing late-filed contentions must address certain factors.6 No such submission is before us.
In any 5
Pacific Gas and Electric Company (Diablo Canyon Nuclear Power Plant, Units 1 and 2), CL1-01-5, 13 NRC 361, 362 (1981); Pacific Gas and Electric Company (Diablo Canyon Nuclear Power Plant, Units 1 and 2), ALAB-728, 17 NRC 777, 801 n. 72 (1983).
6 On at least two occasions the Board has warned that late-filed l
l contentions, as well as late-filed amendments, are admissible only if they meet all of the five factors in 10 C.F.R. Q2.714(a)(1),
including the Appeal Board's three part test for good cause. Duke Power Company (Catawba Nuclear Station, Units 1 and 2), CLI-83-19, 17 NRC 1041,1045 (1983). Such a submission requesting leave to file contentions or amendments out-of-time must address these factors and affirmatively demonstrate that on balance the factors favor the granting of the request. See Duke Power Company (Perkins (Footnote Continued)
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J event, while for unspecified reasons the Staff included the Part 70 exemption in the Part 50 draft operating license, Part 70 controls the possession, storage and use of special nuclear materials, which encompasses reactor fuels, but only Part 50 controls the use of special nuclear materials in a utilization facility (i.e., as fuel in a nuclear reactor).7 Thus, even if, for the sake of argument, it is assumed that their interpretation of 650.57(c) is well taken, SAPL's and Mass.'s reliance upon the exemption from Part 70 is misplaced and there is no real issue in controversy.
Only SAPL urges that, while the proposed draft low power license of August 20, 1986 requires that Applicants submit the results of leakage rate measurements to demonstrate that their leakage reduction program has been implemented successfully prior to proceeding above 5% rated power, at the precriticality testing stage (at 0% power) any make-up water added to the reactor coolant system through some error might (Footnote Continued)
Nuclear Station, Units 1, 2 and 3), ALAB-615,12 NRC 350, 352 (1980).
7 For examples of the use of reactor fuels outside the reactor core that are regulated by Part 70, see 670.22(i).
In addition the I
Commission's Statements of Consideration, 39 Fed. Reg. 39020 (1974), stated that the criteria for the alarm systems were being amended to provide greater conformity with American National t
Standard N16.1-1969, " Nuclear Criticality Safety in Operations with l
Fissionable Materials Outside Reactors." On the other hand, 10 C.F.R. 550.1 states that Part 50 provides for the licensing of production and utilization facilities and $50.10(a) states, in pertinent part, that a license is required in order to use a production or utilization facility. Once licensed, the Seabrook reactor would be a utilization facility subject to Part 50.
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\\ dilute the boron concentration below the standard of 2000 ppm.
SAPL's attempt to place in controversy the leakage and dilution of borated water in the reactor coolant system falls short on two grounds.
- First, there simply is no admitted contention that questions any aspect of the j
Applicants' leakage reduction program; hence no relevant issue in controversy exists here. Second, SAPL's vague concerns about possible errors asscciated with addition of borated makeup water, and possible analytical errors in monitoring boron concentration, do not challenge any of the physical and administrative controls, or their implementation, devised by the Applicants to assure maintenance of boron concentration in the~ reactor coolan't system sufficient to prevent occurrence of criticality in the reactor fuel.8 Applicants' motion at 5; Thomas affidavit at 1-3, see supra n. 3.
The Staff advises that it has reviewed Applicants' in-depth evaluations of every connection to the reactor coolant system and connected systems for potential sources of non-borated water.
In contrast to SAPL's vague concerns, the Staff reported that Applicants had specifically evaluated potential sources of non-borated water and comitted to their isolation from the reactor coolant system by mechanically locking closed the appropriate valves with chains and padlocka, and by, in addition, locking open the electrical breaker of l
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l See Pacific Gas and Electric Company (Diablo Canyon Nuclear Power l
Plant, Units 1 and 2), CLI-83-27, 18 NRC 1146, 1149 (1983).
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r i the one motor-operated valve when it is necessary to lock this valve closed. Further, Applicants' procedures provide that any system so isolated from the reactor coolant system will be tested for boron concentration prior to its alignment with the reactor coolant system.
The Applicants' evaluation of the procedures included valve leak rates, timing of boron concentration sampling, and administrative procedures.
The Staff concluded that the Applicants procedures in this regard will provide reasonable assurance that boron concentration in the reactor coolant system will be maintained at, or greater tnan, 2000 ppm throughout the fuel loading and precritical testing activities for which the Applicants have requested authorization. The Staff further concluded that public health and safety will not be threatened by the activities for which the Applicants seek authorization. Lyon affidavit, 114-10.9 Finally, SAPL and Mass. argue that there is no compelling reason for Applicants to load fuel and begin precriticality testing at this time and thus there is no good cause why the hearing and a partial initial decision on the on-site emergency planning and safety issues should not be concluded prior ';o the Board's decision upon the instant As a supplement to its response of September 8, 1986, the Staff, on 9
September 18, filed the affidavit of Warren C. Lyon in which the Staff's review of Applicants' proposed methods to maintain boron f
concentration at acceptable levels during fuel loading and precriticality testing was explicated. Mr. Lyon's professional qualifications were presented in 151-2 of his affidavit and we are satisfied as to his qualifications.
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I motion. The short answer is that 6 50.57(c) does not require an applicant, which requests an operating license authorizing low power testing at not more than one percent of full power, to show a compelling reason or good cause in support of such a request.
Order In light of the foregoing discussion, pursuant to 592.730(e) and 50.57(c), the Board grants Applicants' motion for authorization to issue an operating license to conduct fuel load and precriticality testing, and authorizes the Director of Nuclear Reactor Regulation to make appropriate findings on the matters-specified in 5 50.57(a) and to issue the requested license.
THE ATOMIC SAFETY AND LICENSING BOARD 156Lu DCkh SheldonJ.WolfdeChairman ADMINISTRATIVE UUDGE
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IS VE JUDGE s y aAk. h.
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Emmeth A. Luebke l
ADMINISTRATIVE JUDGE Dated at Bethesda, Maryland this 7th day of October,1986.
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