ML20214T839

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Safety Evaluation Supporting Amend 5 to License NPF-58
ML20214T839
Person / Time
Site: Perry 
Issue date: 05/29/1987
From:
Office of Nuclear Reactor Regulation
To:
Shared Package
ML20214T823 List:
References
NUDOCS 8706100446
Download: ML20214T839 (4)


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    • .y s 9'o't UNITED STATES 8

NUCLEAR REGULATORY COMMISSION E

WASHINGTON, D. C. 20666

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SAFETY EVALUATION BY THE OFFICE OF NUCLEAR REACTOR REGULATION SUPPORTING AMENDMENT NO. 5 TO FACILITY OPERATING LICEriSE NO. NPF-58 CLEVELAND ELECTRIC ILLUMINATING COMPANY, ET AL PERRY NUCLEAR POWER PLANT, UNIT NO. 1 DOCKET NO. 50-440

1.0 INTRODUCTION

By letter dated May 4, 1987, Cleveland Electric Illuminating Company (CEI),

Duquesne Light Company, Ohio Edison Company, Fennsylvania Power Company, and Toledo Edison Company (the licensees) requested an amendment to Facility Operating License No. NPF-58 for the Perry Nuclear Power Plant, Unit No.1.

The proposed amendment would grant a one-time exception to Technical Specification (TS) 4.6.1.2.f to extend the leak testing interval of the Main Steam Isolation Valves (MSIVs) in steamline "A" until July 12, 1987.

Per current TS, the surveillance interval for the Type C leak tests for the MSIVs is 18 months; however, TS 4.0.2 allows this interval to be extended up to 22 months as long as the combined interval for three consecutive intervals does not exceed 3.25 times 18 months.

The MSIVs on main steamline "A" were pre-operationally leak tested on July 13, 1985 with acceptable results for both the valves.

The current TS requires leak testing by May 31, 1987.

In their submittal, the licensees proposed to postpone the testing date until July 12, 1987; i.e., to extend the surveillance interval between two consecutive leak tests for the MSIVs on main steamline "A" to 24 months.

The licensees stated that without approval of their extension request, the unit would require a shutdown on May 31, 1987.

Our evaluation based on the above submittal is given below.

2.0 EVALUATI0tl The current leak test interval for the MSIVs, i.e.,18 months, is sufficient to allow testing during the refueling outage of an average fuel cycle for a BWR.

These tests are conducted to insure that the leakage rate for any one main steamline through the MSIVs when tested at Pa, 11.31 psig, is less than or equal to 25 scf per hour, the value assumed in the loss of coolant accident (LOCA) dose evaluation in the plant Safety Evaluation Report (SER).

The intent of TS 4.6.1.2.f is to require a leakage test for the MSIVs during each refueling outage as required by Appendix J for Type C tests.

The refueling outage has been specified in Appendix J because it represents a time period which occurs at regular time intervals throughout the life.of a plant and is of sufficient duration to accommodato all the Type C tests without requiring a unique plant shutdown for normal maintenance.

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In support of their requested extension for conducting Type C tests for the two MSIVs on main steamline "A", the licensees stated that they

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l-received the low power operating license for Perry, Unit 1, on l

March 10, 1986, and commenced nuclear heatup in August 1986. The licensees pointed out that as a result, the MSIVs for Unit I have seen only nine months of active service.

The licensees further ststed that since they had recently experienced a forced outage to repair the main steamline drain header during which time they modified ~some reactor vessel water level steam taps, they do not need the previously scheduled May/ June 1987 outage.

In a telephone conversation with the NRC staff on May 14, 1987, the licensees stated that they currently plan to have a maintenance outage in July 1937 during which time they would complete the above leak tests as well as other leak tests which are required to be -

completed in 1987 per the unit TSs.

Also, in the telephone conversation, the licensees stated that they do not expect the first refueling outage for the unit any earlier than the last quarter of 1988.

The licensees' proposed change to TS 4.6.1.2.f requires a leak test of the two MSIVs on main steamline "A" prior to July 12, 1987.

The NRC staff notes that the proposed schedule for leak testing the two MSIVs will not exceed the time interval'of two years since they were last tested.

Therefort., the staff finds that the proposed change still meets the l

Appendix J requiren:ent for Type C test interval.

Based on the above, the staff concludes that the licensees' proposed change to Perry, Unit 1, TS 4.6.1.2.f, which applies only to the two MSIVs on main steamline "A" for one time, is acceptable.

3.0 EXIGENT CIRCUMSTANCES

On April 10, 1987, CEI was granted an earlier TS exception for the operability of the Reactor Core Isolation Cooling (RCIC) system, which expires on May 31, 1987.

The basis for the May 31st date was that mod-ifications to the water level instruments which had proved successful during RCIC system testing were to be installed on all reference legs.

These modifications were to be installed during a planned May-June 1987 maintenance outage; and it was planned that the steamline "A" MSIVs would be leak tested in accordance with the TS 4.6.1.2.f test time interval at that time.

However, during a recent unplanned forced outage, the RCIC system instrument modifications were completed. Therefore, the only item which would force the plant to enter into a planned outage on May 31, 1987, is the leak testing of the MSIVs in steamline "A."

Since CEI only recently determined (letter dated May 1,1987) that the post-modification testing on all of the reactor vessel water level instrumentation was performed successfully prior to the planned maintenance outage, there was insufficient time to process this amendment in the normal manner, which allows 30 days for public comment following publication of a notice of the proposed action in the Federal Register.

However, there was sufficient time for a two-week comment period.

Therefore, CEI requested that this amendment be processed under exigent circumstances, in accordance with 10 CFR 50.91(a)(6).

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3 The staff has reviewed the circumstances associated with the licensees' request and agrees that the amendment is necessary for continuation of startup testing and that failure to act upon the request in a timely mannar would require the licensees to unnecessarily interrupt startup testing and require the unit to shut down.

The staff concluded that this situation could not have been avo.ded and, therefore, valid exigent circumstances exist, as defined by 10 CFR 50.91(a)(6).

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3.1 FINAL NO SIGNIFICANT HAZARDS CONSIDERATION

DETERMINATION The Commission has provided standards for determining whether a significant hazards consideration exists as stated in 10 CFR 50.92. A proposed amendment to an operating license for a facility involves no significant hazards considerations if operation of the facility in accordance with a proposed amendment would not: (1) involve a significant increase in the probability or consequences of an accident previously evaluated; or (2) create the possibility of a new or different kind of accident from any accident previously evaluated; or (3) involve a significant reduction in a margin of safety.

The licensees have provided an snalysis of their proposed amendment request-in relation to the above standards and have concluded that it involves no significant hazards considerations.

The Commission also has made a final

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determination that the amendment request involves no significant hazards considerations, based on the above standards and the following considerations:

The proposed change does not increase the probability or consequences of an accident previously evalustted.

CEI is proposing L

to perform leak testing of the MSIVs in steamline "A" six weeks later than presently required in the Plant TSs. The Commission's regulations in 10 CFR 50, Appendix J, " Primary Containment Leakage Testing for Water-Cooled Power Reactors," requires Type C tests to be conducted at intervals no greater than two years.

The MSIVs in steamline "A" were last leak tested on July 13, 1985.

Therefore, by postponing the leak tests until July 12, 1987, CEI will still be within the testing frequency interval required in 10 CFR 50, Appendix J.

The proposed change does not create a new or different kind of accident from any accident previously evaluated.

CEI is proposing to postpone leak testing of the two MSIVs in steamline "A" from i

i May 31, 1987, to July 12, 1987, and that by no later than July 12, 1987, CEI will perform all required testing on the MSIVs in 1

accordance with the Commission's regulations.

In addition, the change does not result in any modification to the plant design or l

systems operation.

The proposed change does not involve a significant reduction in a I

margin of safety.

As is stated above, the two MSIVs in steamline "A" were leak tested on July 13, 1985, and the results of thosa tests were found to be well within the acceptance criteria established for,each MSIV.

CEI was issued a low power operating license (No. NPF-45) for Unit 1 on March 18, 1986, and commenced nuclear heatup in August 1986.

As such, the MSIVs in question have i

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only seen approximately nine months of service; and the MSIVs would only have been in service for one year since last being tested, with approval of the test interval extension proposed.

Accordingly, the amendment does not involve significant hazards considerations.

3.2 STATE CONSULTATION

The staff consulted with the State of Ohio by telephone on May 20, 1987.

There were no comments on this amendment.

4.0 ENVIRONMENTAL CONSIDERATION

This amendment involves a change to a requirement with respect to the installation or use of a facility component located within the restricted area as defined in 10 CFR Part 20 and changes to the survefilance requirements. The staff has determined that the amendment involves no

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significant increase in the amounts, and no significant change in the types of any effluents that may be released offsite and that there is no signifi-cant increase in individual or cumulative occupational radiation exposure.

The Commission has previously issued a proposed finding that this amendment involves no significant hazards consideration and there has been no public comment on such finding.

Accordingly, this amendment meets the eligibility criteria for categorical exclusion set forth in 10 CFR 51.22(c)(9).

Pursuant to 10 CFR 51.22(b), no environmental impact statement nor environmental assessment need be prepared in connection with the issuance of this amendment.

5. 0 CONCLUSION The staff has* concluded, based on the considerations discussed above, that:

(1) there is reasonable assurance that the health and safety of the public will not be endangered by operation in the proposed manner, and l

(2) such activities will be conducted in compliance with the Commission's regulations and the issuance of this amendment will not be inimical to the common defense and security or to the health and safety of the public.

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Prinicipal Contributors:

T. Colburn T. Chandrasekaran Dated: May 29, 1987 i

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