ML20214R535
| ML20214R535 | |
| Person / Time | |
|---|---|
| Site: | Seabrook  |
| Issue date: | 09/19/1986 |
| From: | Macdonald J, George Thomas PUBLIC SERVICE CO. OF NEW HAMPSHIRE |
| To: | |
| Shared Package | |
| ML20214R528 | List: |
| References | |
| OL-1, NUDOCS 8609290202 | |
| Download: ML20214R535 (37) | |
Text
.
Dated:
September 19, 1986 UNITED STATES OF AMERICA I
NUCLEAR REGULATORY COMMISSION before the l
ATOMIC SAFETY AND LICENSING BOARD
)
In the Matter of
)
)
PUBLIC SERVICE COMPANY OF
)
Docket Nos. 50- 443-OL-1 NEW HAMPSHIRE, et al.
)
50-444-OL-1
)
On-site Emergency Planning (Seabrook Station, Units 1 and 2) )
and Safety Issues
)
)
TESTIMONY OF J.A. MACDONALD AND G.S.
THOMAS i
NECNP CONTENTION III. 1 and NH-20 Introduction and Purpose i
i The Seabrook Station Radiological Emergency Plan (SSREP) describes the response of the Applicant to a radiological emergency at Seabrook Station.
Included in Chapter 5.0 of
)
the SSREP (Exhibit 1 to this testimony) is a detailed description of the method used by station personnel to recognize and classify emergency conditions into one of the four established emergency categories:
unusual event; alert; site area emergency; or general emergency.
Emergency i
8609290202 860919 PDR ADOCK 05000443 T
O condition recognition and declaration triggers emergency response of the station organization which includes notification to offsite authorities so that federal, state and local radiological emergency response plans can be activated.
The purpose of this process is to ensure emergency response, both onsite and offsite, appropriately matches the severity of the event.
Station personnel implement emergency response procedures and provide the emergency information necessary for the offsite authorities to implement their emergency response arrangements specific to Seabrook Station.
Seabrook Station Classification System The methodology and details of the station classification system are given in Exhibit 1.
This material explains the manner in which station personnel use information associated with off-normal operating conditions in the form of challenges to Critical Safety Functions (CSFs), other emergency occurrences or some combination of both to reach a decision to classify an emergency into one of the four emergency categories.
Also shown is a summary of the entire classification system in the form of an Emergency Classification System Flow Chart.
Exhibit 1; Figure 5.6.
This chart gives all of the emergency conditions and events, whether represented by CSF challenges, other emergency conditions or a combination of
?
events.
The chart also summarizes the event indicators (emergency action levels), and shows how each is categorized into one of the emergency classes.
This system makes use of the symptom-based emergency operating procedures that have been developed to govern station operator actions for emergency events.
As indicated in Exhibit 1, Section 5.4, the status trees associated with the CSFs display various degrees of safety margin reduction which the classification system converts to an emergency category.
These CSF status trees are available on the Safety Parameter Display System through the station computer.
For each of the other emergency events, i.e.
emergencies not represented by CSF challenges, specific emergency action level indicators are specified to direct station personnel to the correct classification conclusion.
All the information associated with the classification system is complete.
As indicated in Exhibit 1, Section 5.6, the emergency event listing shown in Figure 5.6 is incorporated into an emergency response procedure that specifies in detail the specific emergency action levels (meter indications or alarms, CSE status tree displays, etc.) which are used as indicators of the various emergency events.
This classification system is ready to be implemented at Seabrook Station and all station personnel 6
responsible for its implementation have been trained in its use.
Training on the Seabrook Station emergency classification system has also been provided to representatives of the State of New Hampshire Civil Defense Agency and Department of Public Health Services.
Both agencies have indicated their agreement with the procedure used to classify emergency conditions.
Items Completed Since 1983 l
At the time the hearings before the Atomic Safety and Licensing Board in August of 1983 ended, there were incompleted aspects to the Seabrook Station classification system.
One group of missing items was the Seabrook-specific setpoints, i.e.
threshold values for some of the CSF status tree indications.
As shown in Exhibit 1, Figure 5.1, all of the status tree branches have Seabrook-specific parameter determinations.
Another then unrealized goal was the fuller utilization of in-station radiation monitor indications within the i
classification system.
The emergency response procedure i
that implements the emergency classification system 3
incorporates indications and alarms from six different i
radiation monitors as emergency action levels.
-4_
j
I f
Also not accomplished as of August of 1983 was a comparison of the Seabrook Station classification system with the guidance of the NUREG - 0654, Appendix 1 example I
emergency events.
This has now been done and the results of j
this review are contained in Exhibit 2 to this testimony (which is a portion of SBN-985).
Exhibit 2 demonstrates that all the example events listed in NUREG - 0654 are satisfactorily addressed by the Seabrook Station emergency classification system.
Conclusion i
The Seabrook Station emergency classification system has been developed to specify the indications station personnel i
are to use to classify emergency conditions, initiate onsite 4
response and notify offsite authorities.
The system makes use of the symptom-based emergency operating procedure development which specifies operator response to an emergency.
The CSF challenges are supplemented by many other emergency events to form the complete emergency classification system.
All unresolved items outstanding as of August 1983 have now been resolved.
s f
---e
-m,,,-
y-
SB 1 & 2 Amendment 55 g
FSAR July 1985 5.0 EMERGENCY CLASSIFICATION SYSTEM 5.1 Summary The Seabrook Station Emergency Classification System categorizes a wide spectrum of component or system failures and other occurrences that would reduce station safety margins.
One of four emergency classifications is made upon the recognition of an initiating condition which indicates a degraded station status. Many of these initiating conditions are defined by five Critical Safety Function (CSF) color coded status trees which indicate the severity of an off-normal condition and are available to operators on the Safety Parameter Display System. Other initiating conditions are defined by quantitative or observable indications of station conditions called Emergency Action Levels (EAL's).
5.2 Emergency Classifications Seabrook Station utilizes the four emergency classifications as specified in NUREG-0654/ FEMA-REP-1 (November, 1980).
In order of increasing severity these are: UNUSUAL EVENT, ALERT, SITE AREA EMERGENCY, and GENERAL EMERGENCY. The following definitions and descriptions of these emergency classes are used at Seabrook Station.
UNUSUAL EVENT -
AN UNUSUAL EVENT INDICATES A POTENTIAL DEGRADATION OF STATION SAFETY MARGINS.
NO RELEASE OF RADIOACTIVE MATERI AL REQUIRING OFF-SITE RESPONSE OR MONITORING ARE EXPECTED.
ALERT -
AN ALERT INDICATES AN ACTUAL OR POTENTIAL SUBSTANTIAL DEGRADATION OF STATION SAFETY MARGINS. ANY RELEASES ARE EXPECTED TO BE LIMITED 10 SMALL FRACTIONS OF THE EPA PROTECTIVE ACTION GUIDELINE EXPOSURE LEVELS.
SITE AREA EMERGENCY -
A SITE AREA EMERGENCY INDICATES AN EVENT WHICH INVOLVES LIKELY OR ACTUAL MMOR FAILURES OF STATION FUNCTIONS NEEDED FOR THE PROTECTION OF THE PUBLIC. ANY RELEASES ARE NOT EXPECTED TO EXCEED EPA PROTECTIVE ACTION GUIDELINE EXPOSURE LEVELS EXCEPT NEAR THE SITE BOUNDARY.
GENERAL EMERGENCY -
A GENERAL EMERGENCY INVOLVES ACTUAL OR IMMINENT SUBSTANTIAL CORE DEGRADATION OR MELTING WITH THE POTENTIAL FOR THE LOSS OF CONTAINMENT INTEGRITY.
RELEASES CAN BE REASONABLY EXPECTED TO EXCEED EPA PROTECTIVE ACTION GUIDELINE EXPOSURE LEVELS OFF-SITE FOR MORE THAN THE IMMEDIATE AREA.
E~xWZ8If /
l 5-1
i SB 1 & 2 Amendment 55 e
FSAR July 1985 5.3 Scope of Classification System The classification system for Seabrook Station provides the ability to classify approximately sixty discrete symptom-based or miscellaneous events.
The system considers and classifies events specified in Appendix 1 of NUREG-0654/ FEMA-REP-1; upset conditions defined by the Critical Safety Functions, snd the discrete accidents contained in the Seabrook Station Final Safety Analysis Report, Chapter 15, Accident Analysis.
5.4 Symptomatic Approach to Classification A symptomatic approach has been developed to assist operators in emergency recognition and classification. Critical station process data are condensed on color-coded status trees which allow the operator to recognize an off-normal condition and take appropriate actions.
Symptomatic status trees are available to the operator and at the emergency response facilities on the plant process computer displays and on hardcopy.
A wide spectrum of events that represent varying degrees of safety margin reduction are illustrated on the color-coded status trees.
The status trees (Figures 5.1 - 5.5) are based on the following five Critical Safety Functions:
S - Subcriticality C - Core Cooling H - Heat Sink P - RCS integrity Z - Containment Integrity Color coding is used to identify event priorities for the individual branches of the status trees as follows:
CREEN - The Critical Safety Function is satisfied - No operator action is called for.
YELLOW - The Critical Safety Function is not fully satisfied - Operator action may eventually be needed.
ORANGE - The Critical Safety Function is under severe challenge - Prompt operator action is necessary.
RED -
The Critical Saf ety Function is in jeopardy - Immediate operator action is required.
If a status tree is coded in a color other than green, the control room operators will take corrective action consistent with the Emergency Operating Procedures.
In addition, if a status tree (or combination of status trees) is in a condition other than green, the Shift Superintendent will use the Emergency Classification Flowchart (Figure 5.6) to determine whether an Emergency must be declared.
{$
5-2
f SB 1 & 2 Amendment 58 I
FSAR April 1986 1
i Figure 5.6 presents the critical safety functions in descending order of Laportance as one reads down the figure.
If more than one classification is reached, the emergency will be classified according to the most severe.
5.5 Miscellaneous Station Conditions The capability also exists for the classification of emergencies based on conditions that do not challenge a Critical Safety Function.
Based on the guidance of Appendix 1 of NUREG-0654/ FEMA-REP-1, aiscellaneous emergency conditions (e.g., fire, electrical, security, natural events) have been evaluated, initiating conditions identified and Emergency Action Levels developed. The specific miscellaneous initiating conditions are indicated on Figure 5.6.
In some cases a combination of miscellaneous conditions or a complication of a miscellaneous condition with a critical safety function are an indication that an emergency classification has been reached. These combinations and compli-cations are also on Figure 5.6.
]
5.6 Classification of Emergencies j
Classification of an emergency at Seabrook Station is made based on one or more of the conditions listed in Figure 5.6.
Specific EAL's (color status trees, meter indications, alarms, or limits) for initiating conditions are provided in an emergency response procedure and in operator training. The specific emergency response procedure is ERI.1 " Classification of l
Emergencies." This procedure contains the specific EAL's that serve as the l
basis for an emergency condition classification into one of the four emergency i
categories. This includes specific definitions of the events (i.e. natural phenomena, man-made occurrences, security threats and discretionary items)
I under category 18 of Figure 5.6.
In all cases, if several emergency classifications are indicated, the most severe emergency classification will 51 be made whether based upon status trees or miscellaneous initiating conditions.
5.7 Sample Classifications 1
To ensure understanding of the emergency classification system, the following sample classifications are presented. These examples explain the process by which the operators would come to the decision to classify an emergency.
EXAMPLE 1 - Condition - Critical Safety Function Core Cooling (Figure 5.2) indicates orange.
First locate C, Core Cooling under the Critical Safety Function column on the left of Figure 5.6.
Then moving to the right, find C Orange under the appropriate emergency class, Site Area Emergency.
EXAMPLE 2 - Condition - Critical Safety Functions, Heat Sink (Figure 5 3) indicates red, and Core Cooling (Figure 5.2) indicates orange.
55 5-3
SB 1 & 2 Amendscne 59 FSAR N:y 1986 Combinations of separate Critical Safety Function indicators sometimes warrant a higher level emergency classification.
First locate C, Core Cooling under the Critical Safety Function column on Figure 5.6.
Moving to the right, find C Orange (Site Area Emergency), then C Orange plus R Red (General Emergency).
Then locate H, Heat Sink. Moving to the right, find H Red (Site Area Energency). Using the moet severe classification, select General Emergency.
EXAMPLE 3 - Condition - Critical Safety Function Heat Sink (Figure 5.3) indicates red and bus E5 and bus E6 cannot be powered from the diesels or an offsite source within 15 minutes to the operable train.
6'l Complications of other miscellaneous emergency conditions along with Critical Safety Function indicators may also warrant increased levels of emergency i
classification. From Example 2 recall that H Red indicated a Site Area Emergency.
To consider the electrical problem, locate category 6.
Electrical Failures under the Miscellaneous Emergency Conditions column on the left of Figure 5.6.
Moving to the right, locate condition 6e (Site Area Energency).
To consider the complication, follow the Heat Sink line to the right and find H Red plus 6e (General Energency).
Using the most severe classification, select General Emergency.
EXAMPLE 4 - Condition - Indication of a steam generator tube rupture by procedure E-3.
First locate the category of condition, Steam Generator Tube Leakage / Rupture under the column labeled Miscellaneous Emergency Conditions on Figure 5.6.
Moving to the right, locate condition 7b (Alert).
The condition is classified as an Alert.
EXAMPLE 5 - Condition - Indication of a steam generator tube rupture by procedure E-3 and bus E-5 and E-6 cannot be powered from an off-site source.
First locate the classification for the steam generator tube rupture, 7b, as in Example 4 (Alert).
Then locate the category, Electrical Failures, and move to the right to condition 6a (Unusual Event). Following either category 6 or j
7, find the combination 6a plus 7b (Site Area Emergency).
Using the most severe classification, select Site Area Emergency.
55 I
5-4 i
i
Amendment 59 May 1986 RED ORANGE N
INTERMEDIATE YELLOW RANGE SUR ZERO NEUTRON FLUX N
LESS THAN 5%
(RTP)
Y INTERMEDIATE N
RANGE SUR MORE NEGAT:VE THAN -0.2 DPM Y
INTERMEDIATE N
RANGE LESS THAN 1.0E - 3%
Y GREEN YELLOW INTERMEDIATE N
RANGE SUR NEGATIVE OR ZERO Y
NOTE: USE GAMMA-METRICS GREEN PUBLIC SERVICE COMPANY OF NEW HAMPSHIRE STATUS TREE FOR CRITICAL SAFETY FUNCTION SEABROOK STATION - UNITS 1 & 2 NUMBER S - SUBCRITICALITY FINAL SAFETY ANALYSIS REPORT RADIOLOGICAL EMERGENCY PLAN
Amandment 59 May 1986 i
RED RED RVLIS FULL N
RANGE GREATER THAN 40'/o Y
CORE EXIT N
TCs LESS THAN 1200*F ORANG!
N CORE EXIT TCsLESS THAN 72S'F y
ORANG!
N RWS FULL N
j AT LEAST ONE RCP GR AT R RUNNING Y
THAN 40'/o Y
YELLOW SUBCOOLING GREATER THAN 30'F Y
ORANGf RVLIS DYNAMIC HEAD GREATER THAN 44% 4 RCP 30% 3 RCP 20% 2 RCP Y
13% 1 RCP YELLOW GREEN PUBLIC SERVICE COMPANY OF NEW HAMPSHIRE STATUS TREE FOR CRITICAL SAFETY FUNCTION SEABROOK STATION - UNITS 1 & 2 NUMBER C - CORE COOLING FINAL SAFETY ANALYSIS REPORT RADIOLOGICAL EMERGENCY PLAN l
FIGURE 5 2
Amsndmeet 59 May 1986 RED TOTAL N
FEEDWATER FLOW TO SGs GREATER y
THANSoo GPM YELLOW PRESSURE LESS y
YELLOW NON-ADVERSE ADVERSE NARROW RANGE N
AT LEAST TWO AT LEAST ONE LEVEL LESS SGs GREATER SG GREATER THAN 86 % IN Y
THAN 65'/o WR TH AN 25'/o NR ALL SGs YELLOV.
N PRESSURE LESS THAN 1185 PSIG CONTAINMENT IN ALL SGs N
BUILDING Y
PRESSURE
~
GREATER THAN y
YELLOV NARROW RANGE N
LEVELS GREATER THAN 25% IN ALL SGs Y
GREEN PUBLIC SERVICE COMPANY OF NEW HAMPSHIRE STATUS TREE FOR CRITICAL SAFETY FUNCTION SEABROOK STATION - UNITS 1 & 2 NUMBER H-HEAT SINK FINAL SAFETY ANALYSIS REPORT RADIOLOGICAL EMERGENCY PLAN l
FIGURE 5.3
Am2ndment 59 l
May 1986 i
a f
a
~
o.
Ti T2 COLO LEG TEMPERATURE RED ALL RCS PRESSURE N
COLD LEG TEMPERATURE POINTS TO Y
RIGHT OF LIMIT A ORANGE ALL RCS N
COLO LEG TEMPERATURES GREATER THAN y
250* F (Tj)
YELLOW TEMPERATURE ALL RCS DECREASE IN N
N COLD LEG ALL CCLD LEGS LESS THAN 100* F TEMPERATURES GREATER THAN IN THE LAST Y
y GO MIN 2
GREEN ORANGE ALL RCS COLD LEG N
TEMPERATURES GREATER THAN Y
250* F (T )i YELLOW RCS N
PRESSURE LESS THAN LTOP y
PRESSURE LIMIT RCS N
TEMPERATURE GREATER THAN GREEN 342*F*
Y GREEN
- ARMING BISTABLE SETPOINT PUBLIC SERVICE COMPANY OF NEW HAMPSHIRE STATUS TREE FOR CRITICAL SAFETY FUNCTION SEABROOK STATION - UNITS 1 & 2 NUMBER P - RCS INTEGRITY FINAL SAFETY ANALYSIS REPORT RADIOLOGICAL EMERGENCY PLAN l
FIGURE 5.4
Amendment 59 May 1986 RED CONTAINMENT N
PRESSURE LESS THAN 52 PSIG y
ORANGE N
CONTAINMENT PRESSURE LESS THAN 18 PSIG y
ORANGE CONTAINMENT N
BUILDING LEVEL LESS THAN 5 FT.
Y YELLOW CONTAINMENT N
POST ACCIDENT MONITOR LESS THAN 5 Rem /Hr.
Y
)
GREEN PUBLIC SERVICE COMPANY OF NEW HAMPSHIRE STATUS TREE FOR CRITICAL SAFETY FUNCTION NUMBER Z - CONTAINMENT SEABROOK STATION - UNITS 1 & 2 FINAL SAFETY ANALYSIS REPORT RADIOLOGICAL EMERGENCY PLAN l
FIGURE 5.5
I J
l 1
m.,n, EMERI.,ENCY CLASSIFICATION FLOW CHART Camca. sartti MOTIONS hrevis. E VE%t a
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eu.aumes 40 U i.O 99 s
m April 2, 1986 Now Hampshire Yanke e Divh SBN-985 T.F.
B7.1.8 United States Nuclear Regulatory Commission Washington, DC 20555 Attention:
Mr. Vincent S. Noonan, Project Director PWR Project Directorate No. 5
References:
(a) Construction Permit CPR-135 and CPR-136, Docket Nos.
50-443 and 50-444.
(b) PSSH Letter SBN-962, dated March 6, 1986, " Revision to Radiological Emergency Plan," J. DeVincentis to V.S. Noonan (c) USNRC Letter, dated March 17,1986, "Reques t for Additional Information - Emergency Action Levels,"
V. Nerses to R.J. Harrison
Subject:
Emergency Classification System
Dear Sir:
In Reference (c) above, the Staff requested additional inforcation and clarification regarding the description of our Emergency Classitication System and E:ergency Action Levels as specified in Section 5.0 of the Seatrook Station Radiological E=ergency Plan (SSREP).
Specifically, the enclosure to Reference (c) provides the results of the Staff's review of that SSREP section against the guidance of Appendix 1 to NUREG-0654.
In response to the Staf f's request and the results of its review, enclosed please find a revised SSREP Figure 3.6 and a cross reference of our Emergency Classification System against the Emergency Classification Examples listed in Appendix 1 to NUREG-0654.
It should be noted, however, that a number of the issues identified in the review had been addressed previously by us in Reference (b).
Tne changes to Figure 5.6 will be incorporated into the SSREP by a future revison.
E~X HI~ BIT &
P O Box 300 Secbrock.NH 03874. Torechone (603)474 9521
United States Nuclear Regulatory Commission April 2,1986 Attention:
Mr. Vincent S. Noonan Page 2 As you will note in the material provided in the cross-reference, there are a number of NUREG-0654 example events that involve Seabrook's Technical Specifications. For these events Technical Specification Limiting Conditions for Operation (LCO) would be exceeded with the ultimate action of station shutdown to the cold shutdown condition being required. As requested by the Staff, for each of the example events where a Technical Specification LCO applies, the applicable section or sections from the current draf t of the Seabrook Station Technical Specifications has been noted in the cross-reference.
We believe the enclosed addresses each of the requested clarifications.
However, if you have any questions or require any further information, please contact our Mr. James A. MacDonald at (603) 474-9521, extension 2754.
Very truly yours, l-A.,b'WA l
John DeVincentis, Director Engineering and Licensing cc: ASLB Service List
Dians Curecn Potsr J. Mathsws, Msyor Harren & Weiss City Hall 20001 S. Street, N.W.
Newburyport, MA 01950 Suite 430 Washington, D.C.
20009 Calvin A. Canney City Manager Sherwin E.
Turk, Esq.
City Hall Office of the Executive Legal Director 126 Daniel Street U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission Portsmouth, NH 03801 Washington, DC 20555 Stephen E. Merrill Robert A. Backus, Esquire Attorney General 116 Lowell Street Dana Bisbee, Esquire P.O. Box 516 Assistant Attorney General Manchester, NH 03105 Office of the Attorney General 25 Capitol Street Philip Ahrens, Esquire Concord, NH 03301-6397 Assistant Attorney General Department of The Attorney General Mr. J. P. Nadeau Statehouse Station #6 Selectmen's Office Augusta, ME 04333 10 Central Road Rye, NH 03870 Mrs. Sandra Gavutis Designated Representative of Mr. Angie Machiros the Town of Kensington Chairman of the Board of Selectmen RFD 1 Town of Newbury E-st Kingston, NH 03827 Newbury, MA 01950 Jo Ann Shotwell, Esquire Mr. William S. Lord Assistant Attorney General Board of Selectmen Environmental Protection Bureau Town Hall - Friend Street Department of the Attorney General Amesbury, MA 01913 One Ashburton Place, 19th Floor Boston, MA 02108 Senator Gordon J. Humphrey 1 Pillsbury Street Senator Gordon J. Humphrey Concord, NH 03301 U.S. Senate (ATTN: Herb Boynton)
Washington, DC 20510 (ATTN: Tom Burack)
H. Joseph Flynn office of General Counsel Diana P. Randall Federal Emergency Management Agency 70 Collins Street 500 C Street, SW Seabrook, NH 03874 Washington, DC 20472 Richard A. Ha=pe, Esq.
Matthew T. Brock, Esq.
Hampe and McNicholas Shaines, Madrigan & McEachern 35 Pleasant Street 25 Maplewood Avenue Concord, NH 03301 P.O. Box 360 Portsmouth, NH 03801 Donald E. Chick Town Manager Gary W. Holmes, Esq.
i Town of Exeter Holmes & Ells 10 Front Street 47 Winnacunnet Road Exeter, NH 03833 Hampton, NH 03841 Brentwood Board of Selectnen Ed Thomas RFD Dalton Road FEHA Region I Brentwood, NH 03833 John W. McCormack PO & Courthouse Boston, MA 02109
SEARR10K STATIM Fhrrh 19R6 FNFW;FNCY CIASSIFICATIrH SYS1TN page 1 of IR
_CRmS REFTRFNCE WIDI APPFNDIX 1 OF MR%0654 INIGilAI, FVFNT NUREG - 0654
- EXAPfly, SEARROOK STATION FNFRCFNrY CINDITION DISCIESI(N 1.
Beergency Core Cooling System (Fins) initiatal 14a. (*) Reactor trip or nafety injection See Attachment I ant discharge to vennel.
WI1MTT retum to nomal plant procelures 2.
Radiological effluent tecinical specification 12a. Site hotevlary dele body dose rate Gnnaistent with MR%0654 cumple, limits exceeded 2 0.06 mR/hr "Ihin done rate in the inntantanemn tectmical specification Rancous effluent limit for Seabrnoir Station.
3.
Ebel dmage indication. Drmples:
a.
High offgas at LWR air ejector annitor (greater than 500,000 tCt/sec; correnpnnling Fbt applicable to 16 isotopes decayed to 30 minutes; Tf or an increene of 100.000 tri/see within a 3 minute time period) b.
High coolmit activity neple (e.g.,
Ra.
Reactor coolant gronn activity 160 Seabroolc Station emergency conlition exceeding coolant teclnical spectileations uC1/ce, an Indicated by letdown connervatively addresses the for iodine spike) monitor anl chemistry smpling MRWO654 exmpieg.
results.
c.
Failed fuel monitor (IVR) indicates increase greater than 0.1% equivalent fuel failures within 30 minutes
(*) 1hese designations are from Fhergmcy Response Proenlure ER-1.1 " Classification of Fhergencies".
11/M%50.1
i Pane 7 of IR UNtEUA1. FVFNr (Contimml)
NURFU - 0654 EXAPFIE.
SFABR0nK RFATION FWJIGFNCY CGfDITIM DISCIESION 1
4.
Ahnomal coolant tesaperature and/or prev ure or lla. Initiation of shutdown to rannintent with MR%06% exarnple atmonnel fuel temperatures outside of technical the cold coralition an requir npecificatim limits by technical specificatlonal
,)
5.
Exceed 1:w either primary / secondary leak rate lla. Initiation of shutdown to the cold ronalatent with Mm%06% cxanple technical specification or primary system leak cemittion requirg)by technical specification 32(
rate technical specification 6.
Failure of a safety or relief valve in a safety 14a. Renetor trip or safety injection consistent with MREM % cumple related system to close following reduction of Wl1N0lfr retypg)to normal plant applicable pressure proceduresA 7.
Ioss of offsite power or loss of onsite AC power 6a.
Ibn E5 AND Fn cannot he powered frm consistent with MmFC-M% cxample capability an offatte nource 6h. Hun E5 and FA carmot he powered from the dieneln.
8.
loss of contalment integrity requiring shutdown lla. Initiation of nhut<*own to the cold consistent with MmFE-M% cumnple by technical specifications condition as r
[redbytechnical specificationa4 J
9.
loss of engineered safety feature or fire protection lla. Initiation of shutdown to the cold Ornetstent with MmEM% cxanple system fmetion requirism shutdown by technical cmdition an ryggjted by technical specifications (e.g., because of malfmet ton, specifications W >
personnel error or procedural inad wuncy)
NITTE: Seabrook Station technical specifi-cations do not require shutdown due to fire protection malftswtim.
I
(**) See page 18 for footnotes listing specific technical specification sections.
11/Pt%50.7 4
4
Paste 3 of 1R INISilA1. EVFNf (Continued)
NIRFC - 0654 EXAMPif.
SFMROOK STATIM FNERCFNnf CNDITim DISCtESim
- 10. Fire within the plant lasting more than 10 minuten 16a. Fire in protected area > 10 minuten connintent with MRm-06% exmple Willi no impact on nafety related equipnent.
- 11. Indications or alanns in procens or effluent 9a. Inns of VAS g hardwired alam system Consistent with MRFC-06% example parameters not ftmettonal in control roma to an extent requirtrg plant shutdown or other 9h. Failure of qualified FIM9 panel (CP-180) sign 111 cant loss of asnessnent or countmi-cation capability (e.g., plant computer, 9c. Inns of local swl resnote met tower data Safety Paraneter Display Systen, all meteorological inst rumentation) 9d.
Inns of automatic and manual SPOS 10a Ions of all control room cmentmication
- 12. Security threat or attempted entry or 18a. Hazards experienced or prolceted ditch Consistent with MRFC-06% example attempted nabotage involve pntmtial degradation of station nafety. Nrim: Incitslat here for necurity related evmta are a security threat in a vital area, an attempted mtry in a vital area (with malicious intent) or an attenpted nahotage in a vital area
- 13. Natural phenanmon being experienced or projected 1Ra Ilazards experienced or projected which Consistent with MRm-06% exanple beyent tatml levels involve potential der.radat ion of sta-tion safety. MTE: Inclinfed here for
- a. Any earthquake felt in-plant or detectel on natural pherwinena are meinmic activity station seinmic instrunentation lenn than OflE leveln, torn.vlo ohnerval to strike the site, a hurri-
- h. 50 year flood or low water, taisunni, hurricane cane m rning in effect for t he si t e surge, neich environn, or a tidal wve mming for tiernpton anil Seahrook heachen.
- c. Any torn.vlo on site
- d. Any hurricane 11/"V M.1
l Par.e 4 of 18 tlNtlStlAI, IMNT (Continued)
NURFE-0654 ID(amp!E SEABROOK STATIfN FNERGFNrY ONDITIfN I)lSCUSS!(N
- 14. Other hazards being experimced or projecteil 18a. Ilazards experienced or prnlected which Connintent with NIRFE-0654 example involve porent tal negradatim of
- a. Aircraf t crash on-site or tunnual activity station saf et y.
NITIT.: Inclisted here for over facility other hazanin are aircraft crash m-site or temnual aircraft activity over
- h. Train derailment on-atte the site, train derailment m-nite, near alte or mette explosion, near site or
- c. Near or on-alte explonim malte toxic or flaunable gas release or plant nhutdown due to turbine danage
- d. Near or on-ette toxic or flaunable gas release without caning penetration.
I
- e. 'nirbine mtatirg component failue causing rapid plant shutdown Critical Safety Pbnctions (GF)
Constatent with NIRFD-0654 example Statun tree indicators;
- 15. Other plant conditions exist that terrant increened C Yellow awareness on the part of a plant operating staff or H Yellow (Except % H.5)
State arwt/or local offatte authoritten or require P Yellow plant shutdown tester technical specification require-Z Yellow ments or involve other than nonnel controlled shut-down (e.g., cooldown rate exceeding technical speel-lla. Initiation of shutdown to the cold fication limits, pipe cracking fotni during operatim) condition as r specificattmsgvlyed by technical 14a. Reactor trip or nafety injection WI1Holfr return to mrmal plant proceduren
(**) See page 18 for footnotes listing specific technical specificatim sectims 11/WVM.4 i
Pnee 5 of 1R tMEIRI. mWT (Contimml)
NURFC-0654 F2AMPIE SFABRnnK STATI(M FMFRCFNCY (IMDITI(M DISCIESIGN 1Ra. Hazards experienced or projected a lch involve potential der,radation of station i
nafety. MnE: Inclisted here in the discretion of the Shif t Superintedmt that an event is in proe,renn or han occurred sich indienten a potential degradation of the level of nafety of the station.
- 16. Transportation of contminated injured individual 19a. anergency transport of contaminated and Connintent with MfRFT:-0654 cumple from site to offsite hospital injured person to local mtpport hospital
- 17. Rapid depresstrization of IWR secondary side.
GF ntatim tree indicators; Consistent with MRFr;-0654 cumple H Yellow P Yellow 144. Reactor trip or nafety inlection W11NOUT return to normal plant proceduren 11/tf%50.5 1
1
I 4
Page 6 of IR AIFRT MfR&06%
EXAMPLE SFABROOK STATION FNFRGFNrY CfNDITION DISCUSSI(N 1.
Severe loss of fuel claddiry,
- a. High offgan at IWR air elector monitor (greater Pht applicable than 5 ci/nec; corresponti 1g to 16 inotogwa decayed 30 minutes)
- b. Very high coolant activity assple (e.g.,
Bh.
Reactor conlant gross activity Constatet with MmFE-0654 cumple 300 tC1/cc equivalmt of I-131)
> 600 sci /cc or done equivalent T-1112 300 uCt/ce.
- c. Failed fuel monitor (IMR) indientes increase greater than 1% fuel failures within 30 minuten or total fuel failures 2.
Rapid groas failure of one stem generator tthe 6a.
Na E5 an! F4 camot be powred consintent with Mm%06% cumple with loss of of fsite powr from e offsite source.
E 7a. Primary to necondary leakage greater than 500 gpd. or stem gmerator specifte activity greater than 0.1 uC1/cc done equivalmt 1-131 3.
Rapid failure of stewn generator tthes (e.g.,
7h.
Inification of a stem Rmerator tube Constatent with Mm%06% exmple several hinired gpn primary to secondary rupture by mergmcy procedure E-1 leak rate) 4.
Stem line break with significant (e.g.. greater 7b.
Indication of a stem gmerator tihe Consintmt with MmFR-06V. exmple t han 10 gre) primary to necoextary leak rate (INR) rupt ure by mergmcy procefore E-1 or PtsIV malfiswtion causing leakage (IWR) 11/PW.50.6 i
1 I
' Paste 7 of la AIERT (Continued)
NURFC,-06%
FJAMPIE SFARM10K KTATifN FNFRGFNrY CrNDITION DISCIESifM Primary coolant leak rate greater than 50 gin 15h. Reactor coolant leak > 50 Rgn Conalmtent with Mm%06% exmple 6.
Rm!!ation levels or althorne contmination elch 17h. Site Inswiary sole bruly done rate Cnnnintent with MRFY;-06s4 cumple irsticate a nevere degradation in the control of
> 0.6 mR/hr or increnne in onw or radioactive materials (e.g., increase of factor of more area radiation awmitorn by >
1000 in direct radiatirm readtryts within facility).
1000 7.
Ines of offatte power and loss of all onsite AC 6c.
Bun F.5 and F4 camot he pnwered remaintent with Mm%06% cumple power (see Site Area ISergency for extended tons) fran the dieneln or an offnite nource to the operable train.
8.
loss of all onsite DC power (see Site Area thergmey 6d. Simultaneous loan of vital DC Connintent with Mm%06% exmple for extended loss) ininnen 11A. IIR,11C fi 11D 9.
Coolant pop seizure leading to fuel failure Rh. Reactor coolant gross activity >
Consintent with Mm%06% exmple 600 uCl/cc done equivalmt 1-13T
> 300 uC1/cc 17a. Control Rrne evacuation anticipated Connintent with Mm%(%% exmple or required with safe shutdown capability entablished.
- 10. Complete lons of any function needed for plant 18h. Harards experienced or protected cold shutdown sich involve substant tal degralatim of station safety.
11/tt%50.7
Par.e R of IR AIFKr (Continumi)
M1RFE-0654 EXAMPIF.
SEABROOK STATI(N DERCFNrY CrNDITI(N DISC 11SSirW
- 11. Failure of the reactor protection synte to CSF status tree indicator; Connintent with N1m%06% example initiate and ccuplete a neran dich brings the reactor atheritical S Orange
- 12. Fbel damage accident with relcane of radioactivity 13a. Fbel danage accident with release Consintent with Ntm%06% exanple.
to contatrument or fuel harmiling building of relioactivity
- 13. Fire potentially affecting safety systems 16b. Fire potentially affecting safety Constatent with MJR%06% exanple.
related syntms
- 14. ftist or all alarms (anmswiators) lost 9e. VAS AND hardwired alarm nynte not constatent with MmLO6% exanple, fmet'ITinal for greater than 2 hours2.314815e-5 days <br />5.555556e-4 hours <br />3.306878e-6 weeks <br />7.61e-7 months <br /> Contingent on stable plant cen11 tion t
arwl with stable plant con 11tions.
throughout rentoratim perirwi, a period of twn hours providen for restoring the lost nynte.
- 15. Radiolological effluenta greater than 10 timen I?h. Site hotswlary sole iniy done rate Consistent with NURWO6% exampic, technical specifications instantaneous limita
> 0.6 mR/hr or increase in me or Site boisidary donc rate in ten timen (an instantaneous rate e tch, if continued over more area rallation nuxiitorn by >
the instantaneous technical npecif t-2 hours,sculd result in about 1 mr at the nite 1000 cation gaseous effliwmt Ilmit.
toinfary tswier average metemrological conditionn)
- 16. Orgoing security ccinprcaise 18h. Itazards experimced or projected consintent with Mm%06% exmple.
e lch involve nthstantial degradation of station safety. N(IIV.: Irm listed here for necurity events in an on-Roing necurity comprmine in a vital area.
11/M4450.R
Paee 9 of IR AIERT (Omtinued)
NIRfD-06%
EXAMPtf.
SEARMOK STATION FNFJtGNrY CONDITION I)lscir;c;1(w
- 17. Several natural phenrumena heirg experiencel 18h. Hazarda experimced or projected Consistent with NtmFr;-06V. exeple or projected s ich involve substantial degradation of station safety. NrrrE: Inclisted natural a.
Earthrpmke greater than OBE leveln pherwunma are ORE earthquake, tomado st riking arwl d; unaging facility, nits-b.
Flood, low wter, tsievuut, hurricane surge, tained hurricane force winds exceeding neiche near design levels 90 mph or nite flonding mter level approaching the top of the sea unit, c.
Any tornado strikirg facility d.
Hurricane winda near destRn banin level
- 18. Other hazards being experienced or projected 18h. Hazards experienced or pmjected ronalatent with Ntm%06V. example elch involve nuhntantial degra-a.
Aircraft crash on facility dation of station safety. N[Y17.:
Incitated here are aircraft crash or b.
Minnile impacts frcus eatever source on minnie impact on plant atriu tiren or facility ccuponents. neation damage enused by explosion, toxic or flaunable Ranes c.
Krxwn explosion damage to facility affecting e lch may he or are in concentrations plant operation eich may af fect station operations, or turbine failure with caning ;-me-d.
Entry into facility environs of mcontrollel t rat im.
toxic or flaunable gases e.
'lirbine failure catming canirm penetration
- 19. Other plant conditions exist that w rrant pre-18h. Hazards experienced or projected s ich Consistent with Ntm%06V. example cautionary activation of technical support may involve nuhntantial dee,radatim cmter and placing near-site Dnergmcy Operations of stat lon safety. NITRE: Inclisted here Facility arsi other key energency personnel m standhy in the Shift Superintendent discretion that an evmt han occurred sich involves an actual or potential nuhntantial degrada-t ion of the level of safety of the stat ion.
I 1/m'.50. 0
._m._
i I
l 1
i j
Pape 10 of 1R AIFRr (Omtinual)
NtRh06% EXA Mtf
)
SFAMnIR STATI(M IMDGENFY ONDITim DISOESim i
- 20. Evacustice of Control Ronum ettelpated or 17a. Anticipated or rerrstrel with safe Omnintent with Mm%fw% exmple required with control of shutdown syntes shutdown cap.1billey establinhed established fr<a local stations i
i l
1 f
I i
4 4
11/450.10 1
4 1
1
Page 11 of 1R SITE ARFA FwJONN N1R&O6%
EXAPfif.
SEARRnnK STATIfN FNFPGFNN OrmIT10N DISCIEiSI(N 1.
Frumn loss of coolant accident greater thm GF status tree Irwllcator; Connintent with MfR%06% exmple, makeup pump capacity C Orane,e 15c. lons of Reactor or Secorwfary Coolant (E-1) 7.
Degraded core with poesthle loan of coolable CF ntatus tree irmlicator; Constatent with MR%06% exmple geometry (trulicators should incitsfe inntns-C Orange mmtatim to detect inm!cquate core cooling activity arul/or contairment radioactivity Ac. Omtatracnt pont-IfrA monitors resting levels) 2,2.5E3R/hr 3.
Rapid failure of stem generator tubes (neveral 6a.
Run E5 and F6 camot he powered Consintent with Mm%06% cumple htsstred gpa leakage) with loss of of fnite prwer from offatte nource.
AND 7h.
Indicatinn 7 a neem generator tube rupture by mergency procedure E-3 4.
leJR stem line break outside contairment with-out isolation Nnt applicable 5.
IMR stem line break with greater than 50 gpn 7h.
Trufication of a stem Renerator tube Consistent with NUR&O6% ewmple primary to secondary leakage arul indication rupture by mergency procedure E-3.
of f uel dannge M
8h.
Reactor coolant gross activity > 600 td:l/cc or done equivalent todir@ - 131 activity},300iCi/cc.
6.
Insa of off atte power and loss of onsite AC prwer 6e.
Bun E5 arwl FA cannot he powered from Connintent with MmWO6% exmple f or more than 15 minutes the dienets or an offnite nenirce with-in 15 minutes to the operable train.
11/tt M O.II
Page 12 of 1R SITE ARFA FNN.TMN (Cnntintmi)
NUR&O654 EXAMPIE SFABROOK STATirN FNFRCFNN (INDITim DISC 119Sim 7.
Inna of all vital onsite DC pnwer for more than 6f. Simultaneous inns of vital DC twinnen Connintent with mR%06% example 15 minutes IIA. IIR. IIC & 11D for mnre than 15 minuten 8.
Complete loss of any ftmetton needed for plant hot shutdown CSF neatus tree trulicator; H Rei. S Red Connistent with NURE06% exmple 9.
Transient requiring operation of shutdown CSF statun tree irwlicator; Consistent with MR&O6% exmple, synten with failure to scran (continual power generation but no core damage S Rei immaliately evident)
- 10. Major damage to spent fuel in contatrument or fuel 13h. Dropping heavy object onto irradiated fuel Consistent with MlR%06% exmple, handling tmilding (e.g., large object danages or loan of water in spent fuel pool or fuel or water loan below fuel level) reactor cavity and irradiated fuel present.
II.
Fire ccuspannising the ftsictions of safety syntens 16c. Fire affecting one train of safety Cennistent with MIR%06% exmple, related equirunent.
- 12. Itwt or all alarian (amteciators) lost armi plant 9 f.
lons of VAS AND hardwired alam synte trannimt initiated or in progress with an tsianticipated tranntet in Constatent with NIR%06% exmple, progreen.
134. Effluent annitors detect levels corresporviing to 12c. Site hrnswfary i. hole twwly done rate >-
Connistet with NUR&O6%.
greater than 50 mr/hr for Ih hour or greater 50 mR/hr or thyroid done rate >
Actual meteoroinev in unel for more than 500 mr/hr W.B. for two minutes (or five times 250 mran/hr accurate real time done estimates, the se levels to the thyroid at the site tantary for afverne meteorology 11/MMO.17
Page 11 of 1R SITE ARFA INERCFNCY (Continued)
NtRIE-06%
EXMfiI SFARROOK STATION FM3tGNCY GNDITim DISCIESim
- h. These done rates are projected haned on other plant paranetern (e.g., radiation level in crmtaimmt with leak rate appropriate for existing contaimmt pressure) or are measured in the environn.
- c. EPA Protective Actice Widelines are projected to be excented outelde the site botrufary.
14.
Imminent loan of hysical control of the plant 18c. Hazartin experienced or projected Connintent with NtfRFR-06V. ex e ple, I
which involve major failuren of station firrtions neednt for public protection. !#7IE: Inclin!cd here in a eletennination by the Shift Superintendent or noti fication by the Security Super-vinor that a physical attacle or the station is in progrens ditch will result in ineinent occupation of vital areas.
- 15. Severe natural phmmmal betry experiences or 18c. Hazards experienced or projected which Consistent with NIRFR-06% exmple projected with plant not in cold shutdom involve major failures of station fme-tions neeled for public protection. NI7tEr
- a. Earthquake greater the SSE levels Natural phentnens evmen incituie SSE earthquake, tornado or burricane force
- b. Flond, low water, tommel, hurricane surge winits exceeting 100 mph; or alte floiwi-neiche greater than design leveln of failure Ing an Inificatal by meer level over the of proteifetion of vital epilgnent at lcwer sea mil.
levels
- c. Sustained winds or tornadon in excess of itcaign t weln i f /t9%V).11 l
1 Par.e 14 of la SITE ARFA FNFJIGFMN NIRm-0654 EXMfiF.
SFABRn0K STATIM FERCFNry CrNDITION DISCIESI(N 4
- 16. Other hazards being experienced or projectel with 18c. Hazards experienced or projected Onnalatent with Mmm.06% exmple plet not in cold shutdown A lch involve major failures of station functions nealat for puh11e
- a. Aircraft crash affecting vital structuren by protection. MTIE: 1his inclisten air-impact or fire, craf t cranh causing dmage or fire in any vital ntructuren. nevere danage to
- h. Severe dmange to safe shutdown equipment frm safety related equipment from minalen minsten or explonton or explonim. or mcontrolled release of fissenable or toxic ganen into the
- c. mery of mcontrolled fimunable manen into vital vital areas, areas. mtry of mcontrolled toxic genen into vital arcan dere lack of access to the area constituten a safety problem.
- 17. Other plet com!!tions exist that wrret activation 18c. Hazards experienced or projected Omnintent with Ntm%06% exmple of energency centers and monitoring teman or a pre-4tch involve major failures of s
cautionary notification to the public near the site station fmettons needed for puhile protection. NIFIE: Incitxted here in Shift Siperintendent dincretion ths.t an event in in progress elch involves accial or lilrely failuren of statim (met tons needed for pihlic protection.
- 18. Wacuation of control ronm and control of shutdown 17b. Wacuation without safe shutdown Connistent with MRE06% exanple syntaan not established from local stations in capability establinhed within 15 minutes 15 minuten.
1 11/ Mms 0.14 1
Par.e 1% of 1R QM'RAL FNFMacL7 NtRh06%
EMAPetF.
STARHOOK STATION FNFMMW7 (Y1NDITION DISCIESION 1.
a.
Effliwnt annitore detect levele correspnruling 17d. Site Pvweviary dele body done rate > I consistent with MmFC-06% cumple, i
to I rm/hr W.B. or 5 rne/hr thyroid at the rm/hr or thyroid done rate > 5 rm7hr.
nite bomdary tswier accial imeteorological i
corutit lonn b.
"Ihese done rates are projected based on other plant parmeeters (e.g., radiation levels in contairument with leak rate appropriate for existing containment prenure with ersee confir-l mation f rom cilluent monitors) or are measured in the environe CFS statun tree indicatorn; Conalntent with MR%06% exople, 2.
Ines of 2 or 3 fieston product barriers with a C Orange AND Z Red potential lose of 3rd barrier, (e.g.. loan of
~
primary coolant botswiery, clad failure, armt high Z Red AND 20a Failure to isolate contalrusent rutential for loss of contatrument) 3.
Ioss of physical control of the facility 18d. Hazards experienced or projected i.hich Consintent with MR%06% cumple.
involve suhntantial core degradation e d/or grons loss of contairvemt integrity. N[717:
Incitsled here for a necurity event in a determination by the Shift Superintendent or notification by the Security Supervisor that a physical attack on the plant has resulted in mauthorizal personnel occupying a vital area.
4.
Other plant cornfitions exist, fras diatever nource, CSF statun tree Irwlicators; rnnsintent with MR%O6V. example.
stut make release of large momts of radioactivit y met t ni t mt a on. ' See t h!osalbl in a short !!me peritwf C Red specI. Ic Ivit. any cNre I e.1 anil IG i
nopmucen below.
C Oranp,e g 7. Rat C Orane,e g 11 Rei II/PU'.G.15
Page 16 of 1R CFMM FM3K73CY (Continued)
NtRfr.-06%
EXA MIE SFARRnnK STATI(N FM3K7N'Y OrNDITI(N DISCit'iSY(N 5.a. Small awl large IDCA's with failure of HIS to c;F statim tree indicator; Connintent with MR%%% exmple perforin leading to severe core degradatim or melt in frcan minutes to hours. tJltimate failure C Red of contairsomt likely for melt sequences.
(Several hnurs likely to be available to emplete protective actions miens contairveent is rut isolated)
- b. TYannient initiatest by loan of feedunter mi condm-nate syntann (principal heat renovat nystem) follmed if Red AND 6e. Fhergency power M7F restored Connistent with MREM % cumple by f ailure of mergency feeduster synten for extendel to at TFint one train of operaW nafety perlo1. Cor melting possible in neveral hourn.
relatal equipnmt within 15 mimiten.
Ultimate fauure of contairunet likely 11 core melta,
- c. Transient requiring operation of shutdown syntann C Red Constatent with NIREM% cumple with failure to serm which results in core dmage or H Rai AND 6e. Ilus E5 mrwi FA cenot he aMitional failure of core cooling and makeup syntann pwreTTrm the diesels or an offsite (editch could lead to core melt) nource within 15 minutes.
Consistent with NIREM% cumple
- d. Failure of offsite and onsite power aloru with total H Red AND C Orarme loan of energency feeduster makew capability for H Red AND 6e. Ihne E5 a wi FA comot be
~
neveral hours. Would lead to eventual core melt pwreTTrom the dieneln or an offsite ami likely failure of contairement.
nource within 15 mimiten.
- c. Sanll IDCA arid initially successful FOCS. Subsequent C Orange _AND Z Red Connistent with MR%M% exmple f ailure of contairummt heat renoval syntens over several hours could lead to cc,re melt arut likely failure of contairummt.
PsTfE: Ptut likely contalrunent failure unde is melt-throsy,h with release of gases only for dry contalment; quicker auf larRer releases likely for fee condmner cmtairunmt for melt sequences. Quicker releasen expected for fatture of contairunent isolat ton mystm f or any IMR.
Ii/t9%so, t6
CDf3tAL FM3tGJefY (Continued)
MNtFE-06%
DUN'tE SFAME10K STATIfM FNF3tCFFY (YNDITION I11t;fut;SifN
- 6. Dummple of fut Sequmece Nnt applicable
- a. Tranatet (e.g.. lose of offnite pnwr) plim failure of requisite core shutdom syntana (e.g.. scram).
Quald temt to core melt in several hourn with contaltsomt failure likely, mre nevere emnequmees it pisaps trip does not fisxtion.
- h. ibiall or large IDCA's with failure of FECn to perfona lemitrg to core melt degradation or emelt in minutes to hours, loss of contairveent integrity may be insninmt.
- c. Small or large IDrA occurs and cmtalrunent performance la annuccessf ul af fect!rg larger term success of the BX3. Could lead to core degradation or melt in several hours without containment txxsvlary.
- d. Shutdone occurs but requisite decay heat renoval syntans (e.g., IIHR) or rinn-safety systeen heat renoval means are rendered tsusvallable. Core degraint ton or mett could occur in about ten hours with nuhnequent contatrument fatture.
- 7. Any major internal or enternal ev ets (e.g., firen.
16d. Fire affecting both tratna of nafety Conalatent with MRFr;-fMV. exenple, earthquakes, nthetantially beyond design basin) d ich related equigunent could cause massive crumann damage to plant systens results in any of the above.
18d. Hararda experienced or prniected dich involve ni6stantial core degradation and/or gross lona of contalrunent integrity. M7IE:
Inclinied in Shift Siperintmtmt discretion t hat an evmt is in progress or has occurred which involves actual or insninent nuhstantial core degralat ion or meltine, with pormtlal loss of contalrvemt inter,ritv.
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.j Footnotes foc Specific Tecimical Specification Sectims:
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Tectmical Spectfication 3.4.6.2 3'
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Tecimical Specification 3.4.6.2 4.
Tecimical Specification 3.6.1.1 5.
Tecimical Specificatlans 3.5.3, 3.5.4, 3.6.2.1, 3.6.3, 3.6.2.2 l.
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Tectmical Specifications 3.1.1.1, 3.1.2.2. 3.1.2.4, 3.1.2.6 I
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3.4.11, 3.5.3, 3.5.4, 3.6.1.I, 3.6.1.3, 3.6.1.4. 3.6.1.5, 3.6.1.1, 3.6.2.1, 3.6.2.2, 3.6.3, 3.6.5.1, 3.6.5.2 3.6.5.3, 3.7.1.1, 3.7.1.4, 3.7.3, 3.7.4, 3.7.5, 3.8.1.1, 3.8.2.1, 3.8. 3.1, 3.8.4.2 1
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o Page 1 of 1 ATTA0MNT 1 We station recognizes that the subject EAL does not classify inadvertent safety injection (without degraded plant conditions) as an Unusual Event under the plan. We do consider however, that such declarations in the absence of an actual or potential degraded safety state, to be contrary to the purposes set forth in NUREG 0654 in that such classifications tend to desensitize both onsite and offsite participants to bonified emergency conditions and create unwarranted and inappropriate stress in the population at large.
Potential reduction of plant safety does not result from inadvertent safety injection alone when other degraded conditions are absent. Bnergency response procedures, ES-0.1 and ES-I.1 based on Westinghouse Owners Group Guidelines, assure the continued safety state of the plant through verification of reactor coolant subcooling, steam generator heat sink, reactor coolant pressure either stable or increasing and that the pressurizer level is on span. De evaluation of these and other conditions, indicates that the plant is in a safe con-figuration and that safety injection flow can be terminated. W e technique of sequential flow reduction assures that positive control of the plant safety state is maintained during the recovery from safety injection actuation.
Degraded conditions if detected during the performance of the emergency response procedures disallow return to normal plant procedures and by definition result in the declaration of an thusual Event at minimm. More serious degraded con-ditions such as faulted or ruptured stem generators, as well as the full spectrin of loss of coolant events are appropriately classified by other EAls defined in Procedure ER-1.1.
In addition, it is important to note that inadvertent safety injection actuation is a required NRC imediate notification report as defined in the New Hampshire Yankee Production reporting Manual (NPRE) section 6.0 (10CFR50.72). Also spe-cified in the NPRE is the submittal of a Licensee Event Report for safety injec-tion actuation (10CFR50.73 report). his report provides the NRC with a cceplete narrative description of the event including an assessment of the safety consequences and implications.