ML20214L057
| ML20214L057 | |
| Person / Time | |
|---|---|
| Site: | Waterford  |
| Issue date: | 08/20/1986 |
| From: | LOUISIANA POWER & LIGHT CO. |
| To: | |
| Shared Package | |
| ML20214L055 | List: |
| References | |
| NUDOCS 8608250051 | |
| Download: ML20214L057 (50) | |
Text
POTENTIAL TECHNICAL SPECIFICATIC'I CHANGES Revision 2, 8/20/86 U01/86)
( /21/86)
( 9/ / 6) 0l/84 (3)
CROUP A (2)
GROUP B (7)
GROUP C (5)
GROUP D (10/0_1/86)
(11121/86)
(12/25/86)
(01/01/8Q TECH SPEC NATURE OF TECH SPEC MATURE OF TECH SPEC NATURE OF TECH SPEC NATURE OF SECTION CHANGE SECTION CHANGE
' SECTION CHANGE SECTION CHANGE 3.l.3.4 CEA Drop Time 3.1.2.1 Change in BAM Tank 3.1.1.1 Shutdown Margin for 2.1.1.1 Redefine the Limit, 18 month Surveillance Concentration MODES 1-4 may change Reactor Core DNBR (Submitted to NRC (Submitted to NRC on 6/24/86) on 8/20/86) 5.3.1 Fuel enrichment limit 3.1.2.2 Change in BAM Tank 3.1.1.2 Shutdown Margin for 2.2.1 DNBR trip limit increases from 3.7 Concentration MODE 5 may change w/o to = >4.10 w/o (Submitted to NRC (Submitted to NRC on 8/20/86) on 6/24/86) e 5.6.1 Update to reflect new 3.1.2.7 Change in BAM Tank 3.1.2.4 See MODE 5 Shutdown 3.2.4 Revise Figure and Change fuel storage criti-Concentration Margin Change Format. DNBR Margin cality analyses for (Submitted to NRC Cycle 2 ca 8/20/86)
(Submitted to NRC on 6/24/86) 3.1.2.8 Change in BAM Tank 3.1.2.6 See MODE 5 Shutdown 3.3.1 Table 3.3-1 ACTION 6b Concentration Margin Change may be revised, (Submitted to NRC Reactor Protective on 8/20/86)
Instrumentation 3.1.2.9 Table 3.1-1 may 3.1.3.6 Revise Insertion change, Shutdown Limit Figure margin s
3.2.4 Delete Surveillance Requirement 4.4.4.4 3.10.1 Surveillance Require-ment 4.10.1.2 to 1e relaxed 3.10.3 Special Test Exception to allow low power physics test - credit V0li NS20546 860easoo31 scoaao PDR ADOCK 05000382 P
POTENTIAL TECHNICAL SPECIFICATIC3 CHANGES Reviaios 2, 8/22/86
.f,f/l fyffII8 86 fl/22/85 (7)
GROUP E (7)
CROUP F (1)
CROUP G (8)
CROUP H j
fg j,
TECH SPEC NATURE OF TECH SPEC MATURE OF TECH SPEC NATURE OF TECH SPEC NATURE OF SECTION CHANGE SECTION CHANGE SECTION CHANGE SECTION CHANGE 3.1.l.3 NTC will become more 3.1.3.1 CEA Misalignment 2.2.2 Removal, requested,
- 3. 3.1/ 3. 3.2 --
RPS/ESFAS Surveillance negative at EOC and ACTION statement SIFR 10465, 3/26/86 (01/01/87)
Interval (dependent more positive at BOC need to be modified CPC Addressable '
on NRC review of (Submitted to NRC on constant Topical Report) 7/15/86)
(Tech Spec change received) 3.3.3.7 Add curve and change 3.3.3.8 Change Table 3.3.3.8 6.2.2 -
Staffing short-term and tran-to list smoke detector (Submitted to NRC on sient insertion limits in Control Room 6/24/86)
(Submitted to NRC on 7/15/86) 3.2.7 ASI ranges will 3.3.1 RPS, Allow Dypass change SC Level High Trip (Submitted to NRC on (Submitted to NRC on 7/15/86) 6/24/86) 3.3.3.6 Add RVLMS per License 5.3.1 Correct mistake re-Conditions and CEDG characterizing 1807 gr (Submitted to NRC on uranium as maximum fuel 7/15/86) rod loading (Submitted to NRC on 3.10.2 Add 3.1.3.7 for
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part-length CEAs (Submitted to NRC on 7/15/86)
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DESCRIPTION AND SAFETY ANALYSIS OF PROPOSED CHANGE NPF-38-29 This is a request to revise Technical Specification 3.1.2.1, "Boration Systems, Flow Path - Shutdown", and 4.1.2.1 the associated Surveillance Requirements.
Existing Specification See Attachment A.
Proposed Specification See Attachment B.
Description The proposed change would revise Technical Specification 3.1.2.1, "Boration Systems, Flow Path - Shutdown", and 4.1.2.1 the associated Surveillance Requirements.
The reason for this change is to delete the requirement for a heat tracing circuit in Section 3.1.2.la and to modify surveillance requirement 4.1.2.1 to verify the boric acid makeup tank solution tempera-ture when the Reactor Auxiliary Building air temperature is less than 55*F.
The heat tracing requirements for the boric acid makeup tanks and associated flow paths are no longer necessary because the maximum boron concentration i
in the tanks has been reduced to less than or equal to 3.5 weight percent.
Chemical analyses have shown that a 3.5 weight percent solution of boric acid will remain dissolved (i.e., will not precipitate or " plate out") at solution temperatures above 50 F.
Reducing the boron concentration in these tanks requires that they maintain an increased water volume to meet the shutdown margin requirements of Technical Specification 3.1.1.2.
The volume of borated water that must be maintained is given in the proposed change to Technical Specification 3.1.2.7 (See NPF-38-31) and is equal to approximately 4150 gallons of 2.25 weight percent boric acid.
This amount of boron is sufficient to maintain the required shutdown margin during a Xenon-free cooldown from 200 F to 140 F.
By reducing the maximum boron concentration in the boric acid makeup tanks, chemical analyses have shown that there is no longer the possibility of the boron precipitating out of solution as long as the temperature of the boric acid remains above 50*F.
Thus, surveillance requirement 4.1.2.1 will be modified to require verification that the boric acid makeup tank solution is at a temperature greater than 55 F whenever the Reactor Auxiliary Build-ing air temperature is less than 55 F.
This change is consistent with other Technical Specification surveillance requirements for the Reactor Auxiliary Building (e.g., surveillance requirements 4.1.2.8 and 4.5.4) and provides approximately 5 F margin before precipitation of the boron is possible.
Similarly, changing the frequency of the surveillance from every 7 days to only when the Reactor Auxiliary Building air temperature is less than 55 F is justified because it is unlikely that the temperature in the tank (s) would fall below 55 F if the building air temperature is above 55 F.
NS41125
Safety Analysis The proposed change described above shall be deemed to involve a significant hazards consideration if there is a positive finding in any of the following areas:
1.
Will the operation of the facility in accordance with this proposed change involve a significant increase in the probability or conse-quences of any accident previously evaluated?
Response
No.
Deleting the requirement for a heat tracing circuit by reducing the Boric Acid Makeup Tank boron concentration is accounted for by in-creasing the volume of borated water that must be maintained in the tanks. The amount of boron that must be available to the operators is given in the proposed change to Technical Specification 3.1.2.7 and is equal to approximately 4150 gallons of 2.25 weight percent boric acid.
This amount of boron is sufficient to maintain the shutdown margin requirements of Technical Specification 3.1.1.2 during a Xenon-free cooldown from 200 F to 140 F.
In addition, controls on the boric acid makeup tank temperature ensure that the lack of heat tracing does not result in precipitation of the boron.
The effect of the proposed change, therefore, does not significantly increase the probability or consequences of any accident previously evaluated.
2.
Will the operation of the facility in accordance with the proposed change create the possibility of a new or different kind of accident i
from any accident previously evaluated?
l
Response
No.
The reason for requiring a heat tracing circuit was to ensure that the dissolved boric acid was in solution and hence, available for injection into the Reactor Coolant System in the event of an acci-dent.
By lowering the boric acid concentration to a maximum of 3.5 weight percent, chemical analyses have shown there is no possibility of the boron precipitating out of solution as long as the temperature of the borated water remains above 50 F; thus, there is no longer a need for heat tracing.
Since the boron will be in solution when this flow path is credited and will therefore be available for emergencies, the proposed change does not create the possibility of a new or dif-ferent kind of accident from those previously evaluated.
3.
Will the operation of this facility in accordance with this proposed change involve a significant reduction in the margin of safety?
Response
No.
The intent of this Technical Specification is to ensure there is a flowpath for highly borated water available to achieve and maintain the required shutdown margin during an emergency.
In order for the flowpath to be credited, the boron must remain in solution from the NS41125
time it leaves the boric acid makeup tanks until it reaches the Reactor Coolant System.
Previous analyses have shown that by reduc-ing the boric acid concentration to a maximum of 3.5 weight percent, the boron will remain in solution down to temperatures below 50*F.
By compensating for the reduction in boron concentration by increas-ing the amount available in the boric acid makeup tanks (per the proposed change to Technical Specification 3.1.2.7) there is a sufficient amount of boron to maintain the shutdown margin require-ments of Technical Specification 3.1.1.2.
Surveillance requirement 4.1.2.1 retains the requirements to verify that the flow path is in its correct position and has been amended to ensure that the boric acid solution in the boric acid makeup tanks is greater than 55*F when crediting this flowpath. Therefore, the proposed change does not involve a significant reduction in the margin of safety.
Safety and Significant Hazards Determination Based upon the above safety analysis, it is concluded that (1) the proposed change does not constitute a significant hazards consideration as defined by 10 CFR 50.92; (2) there is reasonable assurance that the health and safety of the public will not be endangered by the proposed change; and (3) this action will not result in a condition which significantly alters the impact of the station on the environment as described in the NRC Final Environmental Statement.
NS41125
NPF-38-29 ATTACHMENT A
REACTIVITY CONTROL SYSTEMS 3/4.1.2 B0 RATION SYSTEMS FLOW PATHS - SHUTOOWN LIMITING CONDITION FOR OPERATION 3.1.2.1 At least one of the following boron injection flow paths shall be OPERABLE and capable of being powered from an OPERABLE emergency power source:
A flow path from the boric acid makeup tank via either a boric acid a.
makeup pump or a gravity feed connection with one associated heat tracing circuit and charging pump to the Reactor Coolant System if the boric acid makeup tank in Specification 3.1.2.7a. is OPERABLE, or b.
The flow path from the refueling water storage pool via either a charging pump or a high pressure safety injection pump to the Reactor Coolant System if the refueling water storage pool in Specification 3.1.2.7b. Is OPERABLE.
APPLICABILITY:
MODES 5 and 6.
ACTION:
With none of the above flow paths OPERABLE or capable of being powered from an OPERABLE emeroency power source, suspend all operations involving CORE ALTERATIONS or positive reactivity changes.
SURVEILLANCE REQUIREMENTS 4.1.2.1 At least one of the above required flow paths shall be demonstrated OPERABLE:
At least once per 7 days by verifying that the temperature of the a.
heat traced portion of the flow path is above the temperature limit line shown on Figure 3.1-1 when a flow path from the boric acid makeup tanks is used.
b.
At least once per 31 days by verifying that each valve (manual, power-operated, or automatic) in the flow path that is not locked, sealed, or otherwise secured in position, is in its correct position.
WATERFORD - UNIT 3 3/4 1-6
NPF-38-29 ATTACIDENT B i
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REACTIVITY CONTROL SYSTEMS 3/4.1.2 BORATION SYSTEMS FLOW PATHS - SHUT 00WN LIMITING CONDITION FOR OPERATION As 4 minimum, 3.1.2.1
^t k::t one of the following boron injection flow paths shall be OPERABLE and capable of being powered from an OPERABLE emergency power source:
A flow path from the boric acid makeup tank via either a boric acid a.
makeup pump or a gravity feed connection ith :n :::::i t:d h::t tr;;in; circuit andg harging pump to the Reactor Coolant System if theboricacidmakeulptankinSpecification3.1.2.7a.isOPERABLE, or b.
The flow path from the refueling water storage pool via either a charging pump or a high pressure safety injection pump to the Reactor Coolant System if the refueling water storage pool in Specification 3.1.2.7b. is OPERABLE.
APPLICABILITY:
MODES 5 and 6.
ACTION:
With none of the above flow paths OPERABLE or capable of being powered from an OPERABLE emeroency power source, suspend all operations involving CORE ALTERATIONS or positive reactivity changes.
SURVEILLANCE REQUIREMENTS 4.1.2.1 At least one of the above required flow paths shall be demonstrated OPERABLE:
a.
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At least once per 31 days by verifying that each valve (manual, power-operated, or automatic) in the flow path that is not locked, sealed, or otherwise secured in position, is in its correct position.
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, ne Ac<ic esid ssexeq we is used) t l WATERFORD - UNIT 3 3/4 1-6 t NPF-38-30 t DESCRIPTION AND SAFETY ANALYSIS OF PROPOSED CHANGE NPF-38-30 This is a request to revise Technical Specification 3.1.2.2, "Boration Systems, Flow Paths - Operating", ACTION statement "a" to this Specification and Surveillance Requirement 4.1.2.2. Existing Specification See Attachment A. Proposed Specification See Attachment B. Description The proposed change would revise Technical Specification 3.1.2.2, "Boration Systems, Flow Paths - Operating", ACTION statement "a" to this Specification and the associated Surveillance Requirement 4.1.2.2. The proposed change would also reference a revised Figure 3.1-1 which shows the minimum Boric Acid Makeup Tank (BAMT) water volumes as a function of BAMT concentration and Refueling Water Storage Pool (RWSP) concentration. The reason for this change is to delete the requirement for a heat tracing circuit in the BAMTs and associated flow paths by reducing the maximum boron concentration in the tanks to less than or equal to 3.5 weight percent. Chemical analyses have shown that a 3.5 weight percent solution of boric acid will remain dissolved (i.e., will not precipitate or " plate out") at solution temperatures above 50 F. Reducing the boron concentration in the BAMTs requires that they maintain a higher water volume in order to meet the safe shutdown requirements of Branch Technical Position (RSB) 5-1. The volume of borated water that is required from these tanks is shown in the revision to Figure 3.1-1 (Attachment B). During a natural circulation cooldown with no letdown available, this figure shows the minimum volume of borated water necessary to maintain the required shutdown margin during the initial stages of plant cooldown and depressurization. Once this volume of water has been depleted, the plant has cooled down and depressurized to the point where the High Pressure Safety Injection (HPSI) pumps can deliver RWSP water to the RCS. The HPSI flow will inject sufficient borated water to meet the shutdown margin requirements for the remainder of the cooldown by drawing its suction from the RWSP.
- Thus, both the BAMT(s) and the RWSP are required to maintain the shutdown margin requirements of Technical Specifications 3.1.1.1 and/or 3.1.1.2 during the natural circulation cooldown.
Since both these sources of borated water are being credited, Figure 3.1-1 shows a smaller volume of BAMT water necessary when there are higher boron concentrations in the RWSP. Previously, this specification has required at least one of the BAMTs to meet the requirements of Figure 3.1-1. The proposed change will add the flexibility of meeting the Limiting Conditions for Operation (LCO) by NS41128 combining the contents of both BAMTs. This option was added because the proposed revision to Figure 3.1-1 allows the boron concentration in the BAMTs to go as low as 2.25 weight percent. In this case the volume requirement of approximately 14,000 gallons cannot be met with just a single tank.
- However, if the combined contents of both tanks are used to comply with the LCO, it must be shown that both Boric Acid Makeup pumps and both gravity feed valves are OPERABLE.
This ensures that both BAMTs have two independent flow paths for injecting their contents into the RCS. The proposed change to ACTION statement "a" of this specification is being submitted in anticipation of obtaining revised shutdown margin requirements for Cycle 2. The proposed change, which is scheduled for submittal by September 25, 1986, will simply refer to the actual shutdown margin Specification (either 3.1.1.1 or 3.1.1.2) instead of requiring the core to be at least 2% subcritical at an RCS temperature of 200 F. By reducing the maximum boron concentration in the BAMTs to equal to or less than 3.5 weight percent, chemical analyses have shown there is no longer the possibility of the boron precipitating out of solution as long as the temper-ature of the boric acid remains above 50 F. Thus, surveillance requirement 4.1.2.2 will be modified to require verification that the BAMT solution is at a temperature greater than 55 F. This change is consistent with other Technical Specification surveillance requirements for the Reactor Auxiliary Building (e.g., surveillance requirement 4.1.2.8 and 4.5.4) and provides approximately 5 F margin before precipitation of the boron is possible. Similarly, changing the frequency of the surveillance from every 7 days to only when the Reactor Auxiliary Building (RAB) air temperature is less than 55 F is justified because it is unlikely that the temperature in the tank (s) would fall below 50 F when the RAB air temperature is above 55 F. Safety Analysis The proposed change described above shall be deemed to involve a significant hazards consideration of there is a positive finding in any of the following areas: 1. Will the operation of the facility in accordance with the proposed change involve a significant increase in the probability or conse-quences of any accident.
Response
No.
Deleting the requirement for a heat tracing circuit by reducing the boron concentration in the BAMTs is accounted for by increasing the volume of boric acid solution that must be contained in the tanks and by also crediting borated water from the RWSP.
During a natural circulation cooldown with no letdown available (Branch Technical Position (RSB) 5-1), sufficient borated water is available in the BAMTs to maintain the required shutdown margin while the plant is depressurized to the point where safety injection flow from the HPSI pumps can be delivered to the RCS.
The HPSI flow will provide sufficient borated water to ensure the shutdown margin requirements of Specification 3.1.1.1 and/or 3.1.1.2 are satisfied by drawing its suction from the RWSP.
Since the safe shutdown requirements of Branch Technical Position (RSB) 5-1 are satisfied, this change does not significantly increase the probability or consequences of any accident previously evaluated.
NS41128
2.
Will the operation of the facility in accordance with the proposed change create the possibility of a new or different kind of accident from any accident previously evaluated?
Response
No.
The reason for requiring a heat tracing circuit was to ensure that the dissolved boric acid was in solution and hence, available for injection into the Reactor Coolant System in the event of an acci-dent.
By lowering the maximum boric acid concentration in the BAMTs to 3.5 weight percent, chemical analyses have shown that the boron would remain in solution at temperatures above 50 F.
Since requirements are in place to ensure that the BAMT solution remains above 55*F when crediting this source of borated water, there is no longer a need for the heat tracing circuit.
Therefore, since the proposed change still ensures that the required boration flow paths are OPERABLE, it does not create the possibility of a new or dif-ferent kind of accident from those previously evaluated.
3.
Will the operation of the facility in accordance with this proposed change involve a significant reduction in the margin of safety?
Response
No.
The intent of this Technical Specification is to ensure that there are two redundant flow paths from the borated water sources (BAMTs and/or RWSP) to the Reactor Coolant System and that both these flow paths remain OPERABLE.
Surveillance requirement 4.1.2.2 retains the requirement to verify that each valve in the flow path is in its cor-rect position and has been amended to verify that the borated water in the BAMTs is greater than 55 F whenever the Reactor Auxiliary Building air temperature is less than 55 F.
Since chemical analyses have shown that a 3.5 weight percent solution of boric acid will remain in solution at temperatures above 50 F, this Specification assures that the boric acid will remain in solution and will be able able to be delivered to the RCS even if a single failure is assumed.
Thus, the effect of the proposed change does not involve a signifi-cant reduction in the margin of safety.
Safety and Significant Hazards Determination Based upon the above safety analysis, it is concluded that (1) the proposed change does not constitute a significant hazards consideration as defined by 10 CFR 50.92; (2) there is reasonable assurance that the health and safety of the public will not be endangered by the proposed change; and (3) this action will not result in a condition which significantly alters the impact of the station on the environment as described in the NRC Final Environmental Statement.
NS41128
NPF-38-30 ATTACllMENT A 1
l i
INDEX LIST OF FIGURES FIGURE PAGE 3.1-1 MINIMUM BORIC ACID STORAGE TANK VOLUME AND TEMPERATURE AS A FUNCTION OF STORED BORIC ACID CONCENTRATION.................................
3/4 1-13 3.1-2 CEA INSERTION LIMITS VS THERMAL P0WER..............
3/4 1-27 3.2-1 ALLOWABLE PEAK LINEAR HEAT RATE VS BURNUP..........
3/4 2-2 3.2-2 DNBR MARGIN OPERATING LIMIT BASED ON COLSS.........
3/4 2-8 3.2-3 DNBR MARGIN OPERATING LIMIT BASED ON CORE PROTECTION CALCULATORS (COLSS OUT OF SERVICE)......
3/4 2-9 3.4-1 DOSE EQUIVALENT I-131 PRIMARY COOLANT SPECIFIC ACTIVITY LIMIT VERSUS PERCENT OF RATED THERMAL POWER WITH THE PRIMARY COOLANT SPECIFIC ACTIVITY >1.0 pCi/ GRAM DOSE EQUIVALENT I-131.......
3/4 4-27 3.4-2 REACTOR COOLANT SYSTEM PRESSURE / TEMPERATURE LIMITATIONS FOR 0-8 EFFECTIVE FULL POWER YEARS (HEATUP)...........................................
3/4 4-30 3.4-3 REACTOR COOLANT SYSTEM PRESSURE / TEMPERATURE LIMITATIONS FOR 0-8 EFFECTIVE FULL POWER YEARS (C00LDOWN).........................................
3/4 4-31 3.6-1 CONTAINMENT PRESSURE VS TEMPERATURE...............
3/4 6-12 4.7-1 SAMPLING PLAN FOR SNUBBER FUNCTIONAL TEST..........
3/4 7-26 5.1-1 EXCLUSION AREA.....................................
5-2 5.1-2 LOW POPULATION Z0NE................................
5-3 5.1-3 SITE BOUNDARY FOR RADIOACTIVE GASEOUS AND LIQUID EFFLUENTS...................................
5-4 6.2-1 0FFSITE ORGANIZATION FOR MANAGEMENT AND TECHNICAL SUPP0RT.................................
6-3 6.2-2 PLANT OPERATIONS ORGANIZATION......................
6-4 WATERFORD - UNIT 3 XIX
j REACTIVITY CONTROL SYSTEMS l
FLOW PATHS - OPERATING LIMITING CONDITION FOR OPERATION 3.1.2.2 At least two of the following three boron injection flow paths shall be OPERABLE:
One flow path -from the boric acid makeup tanks via a boric acid a.
makeup pump with one associated heat tracing circuit and a charging pump to the Reactor Coolant System, or b.
One flow path from the boric acid makeup tanks via a gravity feed valve with one associated heat tracing circuit, and a charging pump to the Reactor Coolant System, or The flow path from the refueling water storage pool via a charging c.
pump to the Reactor Coolant System.
APPLICABILITY: MODES 1, 2, 3, and 4.
ACTION:
With only one of the above required baron injection flow paths to the Reactor Coolant System OPERABLE, restore at least two boron injection flow paths to tne Reactor Coolant System to OPERABLE status within 72 hours8.333333e-4 days <br />0.02 hours <br />1.190476e-4 weeks <br />2.7396e-5 months <br /> or be in at least HOT STANDBY and borated to a SHUTDOWN MARGIN equivalent to at least 2.0% delta k/k at 200 F within the next 6 hours6.944444e-5 days <br />0.00167 hours <br />9.920635e-6 weeks <br />2.283e-6 months <br />; restore at least two flow paths to OPERABLE status within the next 7 days or be in COLD SHUTDOWN within the next 30 hours3.472222e-4 days <br />0.00833 hours <br />4.960317e-5 weeks <br />1.1415e-5 months <br />.
SURVEILLANCE REQUIREMENTS 4.1.2.2 At least two of the above required flow paths shall be demonstrated OPERABLE:
At least once per 7 days by verifying that the temperature of the a.
heat traced portion of the flow path from the boric acid makeup tanks is above the temperature limit line shown on Figure 3.1-1.
b.
At least once per 31 days by verifying that each valve (manual, power.-operated, or automatic) in the flow path that is not locked, sealed, or otherwise secured in position, is in its correct position.
At least once per 18 months during shutdown by verifying that each c.
automatic valve in the flow path actuates to its correct position on an SIAS test signal.
d.
At least once per 18 months by verifying that the flow path required by Specification 3.1.2.2a. and 3.1.2.2b. delivers at least 40 gpm to
(
i WATERFORD - UNIT 3 3/4 1-7 l
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NPF-38-30 ATTACEfENT B i
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INDEX LIST OF FIGURES FIGURE' M"N U#
" A# #"
PAGE AS A FUNcnoN of CDNCENTRATION 3.1-1
"!"!"U" SOPIC ^.CIO STOP".CZ T^"% VOLU"C ".M0 TC"PCRATURC A A IUNCTION Oi STORCO 002 0 "CIO 00MCCMTP",T!0".................................
3/4 1-13 3.1-2 CEA INSERTION LIMITS VS THERMAL POWER..............
3/4 1-27 3.2-1 ALLOWABLE PEAK LINEAR HEAT RATE VS BURNUP..........
3/4 2-2 3.2-2 DNBR MARGIN OPERATING LIMIT BASED ON COLSS.........
3/4 2-8 3.2-3 DNBR MARGIN OPERATING LIMIT BASED ON CORE PROTECTION CALCULATORS (COLSS OUT OF SERVICE)......
3/4 2-9 3.4-1 DOSE EQUIVALENT I-131 PRIMARY COOLANT SPECIFIC ACTIVITY LIMIT VERSUS PERCENT OF RATED THERMAL POWER WITH THE PRIMARY COOLANT SPECIFIC ACTIVITY >1.0 pCi/ GRAM DOSE EQUIVALENT I-131.......
3/4 4-27 3.4-2 REACTOR COOLANT SYSTEM PRESSURE / TEMPERATURE LIMITATIONS FOR 0-8 EFFECTIVE FULL POWER YEARS (HEATUP)...........................................
3/4 4-30 3.4-3 REACTOR COOLANT SYSTEM PRESSURE / TEMPERATURE LIMITATIONS FOR 0-8 EFFECTIVE FULL POWER YEARS (C00LDOWN).........................................
3/4 4-31 j
3.6-1 CONTAINMENT PRESSURE VS TEMPERATURE...............
3/4 6-12 4.7-1 SAMPLING PLAN FOR SNUBBER FUNCTIONAL TEST..........
3/4 7-26 5.1-1 EXCLUSION AREA.....................................
5-2 5.1-2 LOW POPULATION Z0NE................................
5-3 5.1-3 SITE BOUNDARY FOR RADIOACTIVE GASEOUS AND LIQUID EFFLUENTS...................................
5-4 6.2-1 0FFSITE ORGANIZATION FOR MANAGEMENT AND i
TECHNICAL SUPP0RT.................................
6-3 6.2-2 PLANT OPERATIONS ORGANIZATION......................
6-4 I
l WATERFORD - UNIT 3 XIX
o REACTIVITY CONTROL SYSTEMS FLOW PATHS - OPERATING LIMITING CONDITION FOR OPERATION
.2 At least two of the following three boron injection flow paths s be OP a.
One flow p from the boric acid makeup tanks a boric acid makeup pump wit associated heat traci ircuit and a charging JrA/52T/07' I pump to the Reactor Coo
- System, O'/
b.
One flow path from the bor cid ma tanks via a gravity feed valve with one associ heat tracing cir and a charging pump to the Reactor ant System, or c.
The f path from the refueling water storage pool via a char ~
to the Reactor Coolant System.
APPLICABILITY:
MODES 1, 2, 3, and 4.
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ACTION:
w With only one of the above required boron injection flow paths to che Reactor Coolant System OPERABLE, restore at least two boron injection flow paths to tne Reactor Coolant System to OPERABLE status within 72 hours8.333333e-4 days <br />0.02 hours <br />1.190476e-4 weeks <br />2.7396e-5 months <br /> or be in at least HOT STANDBY and borated to a SHUTDOWN MARGIN equivalent to :t ?:::t 2.0% delt: h/k
- t 2^0*r within the next 6 hours6.944444e-5 days <br />0.00167 hours <br />9.920635e-6 weeks <br />2.283e-6 months <br />; restore at least two flow paths to OPERABLE status within the next 7 days or be in COLD SHUTDOWN within the next 30 hours3.472222e-4 days <br />0.00833 hours <br />4.960317e-5 weeks <br />1.1415e-5 months <br />.
SURVEILLANCE REQUIREMENTS 4.1.2.2 At least two of the above required flow paths shall be demonstrated OPERABLE:
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At least once per 31 days by verifying that each valve (manual, l
power.-operated, or automatic) in the flow path that is not locked, sealed, or otherwise secured in position, is in its correct position.
c.
At least once per 18 months during shutdown by verifying that each automatic valve in the flow path actuates to its correct position on an SIAS test signal.
d.
At least once per 18 months by verifying that the ficw path required by Specification 2.1.2.20.,;nd 3.1.2.25. delivers at least 40 gpm to j
& / 2.2a,) and.3. l.1Ja. 2 WATERFORD - UNIT 3 3/4 1-7
INSERT 1 3.1.2.2
- At least two boron injection flow paths to the RCS via the charging pumps shall be OPERABLE. The following flow paths may be used:
-a.
With the contents of either boric acid makeup tank in accordance with Figure 3.1-1, at least 2 of the following 3 flow paths shall be OPERABLE:
1 1.
One flow path from the boric acid makeup tank via 4
its boric acid makeup pump; or 2.
One flow path from the boric acid makeup tank via its gravity feed valve; or 3.
One flow path from the Refueling Water Storage Pool.
b.
With the combined contents of both boric acid makeup tanks in accordance with Figure 3.1-1, both of the following flow paths shall be OPERABLE:
1.
One flow path consisting of both boric acid makeup pumps, and 2.
One flow path consisting of both gravity feed valves.
INSERT 2 a.
At least once per 24 hours2.777778e-4 days <br />0.00667 hours <br />3.968254e-5 weeks <br />9.132e-6 months <br /> when the Reactor Auxiliary Building temperature is below 55'F by verifying that the temperature of the boric acid makeup tank (s) is above 55'F.
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1 NPF-38-31
DESCRIPTION AND SAFETY ANALYSIS OF PROPOSED CHANGE NPF-38-##
This is a request to revise Technical Specification 3.1.2.7, " Borated Water Sources - Shutdown", and 4.1.2.7 the associated Surveillance Requirements.
Existing Specification See Attachment A.
Proposed Specification See Attachment B.
Description The proposed change would revise Technical Specification 3.1.2.7, " Borated Water Sources - Shutdown", and 4.1.2.7 the associated Surveillance Requirement.
The reason for the change is to delete the requirement for a heat tracing circuit and the reference to Figure 3.1-1 in Section 3.1.2.7, and to modify surveillance requirement 4.1.2.7 to verify the boric acid makeup tank solution temperature when the Reactor Auxiliary Building air temperature is less than 55 F.
In place of the reference to Figure 3.1-1, this specification will provide the minimum and maximum boron concentrations as well as the minimum borated water volumes that must be maintained in the boric acid makeup tanks (BAMTs).
The heat tracing requirements for the boric acid makeup tanks and associated flow paths are no longer necessary because the maximum boric acid concentration in the tanks has been reduced to less than or equal to 3.5 weight percent.
Chemical analyses have shown that a 3.5 weight percent solution of boric acid will remain dissolved (i.e., will not precipitate or " plate out") at solution temperatures above 50 F.
Reducing the boron concentration in these tanks requires that they maintain an increased water volume to meet the shutdown margin requirements of Technical Specification 3.1.1.2.
The volume of borated water necessary to be meet this this requirement is approximately 4150 gallons of 2.25 weight percent boric acid.
This amount of boron is sufficient to maintain the required shutdown margin during a Xenon-free cooldown from 200 F to 140 F.
By reducing the maximum boron concentration in the boric acid makeup tanks, chemical analyses have shown that there is no longer the possibility of the boron precipitating out of solution as long as the temperature of the boric acid remains above 50 F.
Thus, surveillance requirement 4.1.2.7a will be modi-fied to require verification that the boric acid makeup tank solution is at a temperature greater than 55 F whenever the Reactor Auxiliary Building air temper-ature is less than 55 F.
This change is consistent with other Technical Specifi-cation surveillance requirements for the Reactor Auxiliary Building (e.g.,
surveillance requirements 4.1.2.8 and 4.5.4) and provides approximately 5 F margin before precipitation of the boron is possible.
Similarly, changing the frequency of the surveillance from every 7 days to when the Reactor Auxiliary Building air temperature is less than 55 F is justified because it is unlikely that the temperature in the tank (s) would fall below 55 F if the building air temperature is above 55 F.
NS41126
Safety Analysis The proposed change described above shall be deemed to involve a significant hazards consideration if there is a positive finding in any of the following areas:
1.
Will the operation of the facility in accordance with this proposed change involve a significant increase in the probability or consequences of any accident previously evaluated?
Response
No.
Deleting the requirement for a heat tracing circuit by reducing the Boric Acid Makeup Tank boron concentration is accounted for by increasing the volume of borated water that must be contained in the tanks.
The amount of borated water that must be available to the operators is eoual to approximately 4150 gallons of 2.25 weight percent boric acid.
This amount of boron is sufficient to maintain the shutdown margin requirements of Technical Specification 3.1.1.2 during a Xenon-free cooldown from 200 F to 140 F.
In addition, controls on the boric acid makeup tank temperature ensure that the lack of heat tracing does not result in precipitation of the boron.
The proposed change, therefore, does not significantly increase the probability or consequences of any accident previously evaluated.
2.
Will the operation of the facility in accordance with the proposed change create the possibility of a new or different kind of accident from any accident previously evaluated?
Response
ho.
1 The reason for requiring a heat tracing circuit was to ensure that the dissolved boric acid was in solution and hence, available for injection into the Reactor Coolant System in the event of an accident.
By lowering the boron concentration to a maximum of 3.5 weight percent, chemical analyses have shown there is no possibility of the boron precipitating out of solution as long as the temperature of the boric acid remains above 50 F; thus there is no longer a need for heat tracing.
Since the boron will be in solution when the BAMT flowpaths are credited and will there-fore be available for emergencies, the proposed change does not create the possibility of a new or different kind of accident from those previously evaluated.
3.
Will the operation of this facility in accordance with this proposed change involve a significant reduction in the margin of safety?
Response
No.
The intent of this Technical Specification is to ensure there is enough boron available to achieve and maintain the required shutdown margin during an emergency when the BAMT flowpaths are credited.
In order for the boron to be available, it must remain in solution from the time it leaves the boric acid makeup tanks until it reaches the Reactor Coolant System.
Previous analyses have shown that by reducing the boric acid concentration to a maximum of 3.5 weight percent, NS41126
the boron will remain in solution at temperatures above 50 F.
By compen-sating for the reduction in baron concentration by increasing the volume available in the boric acid makeup tanks there is always a sufficient amount of boron to maintain the shutdown margin requirements of Technical Specification 3.1.1.2.
Surveillance requirement 4.1.2.7 retains the requirements to verify the boron concentration and water volume of the tanks and has been amended to ensure that the boric acid solution is always greater than 55 F.
Therefore, the effect of the proposed change does not involve a significant reduction in the margin of safety.
Safety and Significant Hazards Determination Based upon the above safety analysis, it is concluded that (1) the proposed change does not constitute a significant hazards consideration as defined by 10 CFR 50.92; (2) there is reasonable assurance that the health and safety of the public will not be endangered by the proposed change; and (3) this action will not result in a condition which significantly alters the impact of the station on the environment as described in the NRC Final Environmental Statement.
NS41126
NPF-38-31 ATTACIDIEh"r A
REACTIVITY CONTROL SYSTEMS BORATED WATER SOURCES - SHUTDOWN LIMITING CONDITION FOR OPERATION 3.1.2.7 As a minimum, one of the following borated water sources shall be OPERABLE:
One boric acid makeup tank and at least one associated heat tracing a.
circuit with the tank contents in accordance with Figure 3.1-1.
b.
The refueling water storage pool (RWSP) with:
1.
A minimum contained borated water volume of 65,465 gallons (12%
indicated level), and 2.
A minimum boron concentration of 1720 ppm.
APPLICABILITY:
MODES 5 and 6.
ACTION:
With no borated water sources OPERABLE, suspend all operations involving CORE ALTERATIONS or positive reactivity changes.
SURVEI'_ LANCE REQUIREMENTS 4.1.2.7 the above required borated water source shall be demonstrated OPERABLE a.
At least once per 7 days by:
1.
Verifying the boron concentration of the water, 2.
Verifying the contained borated water volume of the tank, and 3.
Verifying the boric acid makeup tank solution temoerature when.it is the source of borated water.
WATERFORO - UNIT 3 3/4 1-12
i NPF-38-31 ATTACHMENT B 4.
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REACTIVITY CONTROL SYSTEMS 80 RATED WATER SOURCES - SHUTOOWN i
LIMITING CONDITION FOR OPERATION 1
l 3.1.2.7 As a minimum, one of the following borated water sources shall be OPEK48LE:
o # e konn ameeshkos bducen.g.15 and One boric acid makeup tank =;d :t 1:=t =: = =:i:t:d 5::t tr=in; a.
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b.
The refueling water storage pool (RWSP) with:
('S6 3. Mdicated le*# -
1 1.
A minimum contained borated water volume of 65,465 gallons (12%
indicated level), and 2.
A minimum boron concentration of 1720 ppa.
APPLICABILITY:
MODES S and 6.
ACTION:
With no borated water sources OPERABLE, suspend all operations involving CORE ALTERATIONS or positive reactivity changes.
SURVEI' LANCE REQUIREMENTS 4.1.2.7 The above required borated water source shall be demonstrated OPERABLE p4, At least once per 7 days by:
1.
Verifying the boron concentration of the water, and l
2.
Verifying the contained borated water volume of the tank, and 3.
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DESCRIPTION AND SAFETY ANALYSIS OF PROPOSED CHANGE NPF-38-32 This is a request to revise Technical Specification 3.1.2.8, " Borated Water Sources - Operating", ACTION statement "a" to this Specification and Surveillance Requirement 4.1.2.8.
Existing Specification See Attachment A.
Proposed Specification See Attachment B.
Description The proposed change would revise Technical Specification 3.1.2.8, " Borated Water Sources - Operating", ACTION statement "a" to this Specification, the associated Surveillance Requirement 4.1.2.8 and the Bases section related to Boration Systems (3/4.1.2).
The proposed change would also reference a revised Figure 3.1-1 which shows the minimum Boric Acid Makeup Tank (BAMT) water volumes as a function of BAMT concentration and Refueling Water Storage Pool (RWSP) concentration. The reason for this change is to delete the requirement for a heat tracing circuit in the BAMTs and asso-ciated flow paths by reducing the maximum boron concentration in the tanks to less than or equal to 3.5 weight percent.
Chemical analyses have shown that a 3.5 weight percent solution of boric acid will remain dissolved (i.e., will not precipitate or " plate out") at solution temperatures above 50 F.
Reducing the boron concentration in the BAMTs requires that they maintain a higher water volume in order to meet the safe shutdown requirements of Branch Technical Position (RSB) 5-1.
The volume of borated water that is required from these tanks is shown in the revision to Figure 3.1-1 (Attachment B).
During a natural circulation cooldown with no letdown available, this figure shows the minimum volume of borated water necessary to maintain the required shutdown margin during the initial stages of plant cooldown and depressuri-zation.
Once this volume of water has been depleted, the plant has cooled down and depressurized to the point where the High Pressure Safety Injection (HPSI) pumps can deliver RWSP water to the RCS.
The HPSI flow will inject sufficient borated water to meet the shutdown margin requirements for the remainder of the cooldown by drawing its suction from the RWSP.
Thus, both the BAMT(s) and the RWSP are required to maintain the shutdown margin requirements of Technical Specifications 3.1.1.1 and/or 3.1.1.2 during the natural circulation cooldown.
Since both these sources of barated water are being credited, Figure 3.1-1 shows a smaller volume of BAMT water necessary when there are higher boron concentrations in the RWSP.
Previously, this specification has required at least one of the BAMTs to meet the requirements of Figure 3.1-1.
The proposed change will add the flexibility of meeting the Limiting Conditions for Operation (LCO) by combining the contents of both BAMTs.
This option was added because the NS41128A
proposed revision to Figure 3.1-1 allows the boron concentration in the BAMTs to go as low as 2.25 weight percent.
In this case the volume requirement of approximately 14,000 gallons cannot be met with just a single tank.
- However, if the combined contents of both tanks are used to comply with the LCO, it must be shown that both Boric Acid Makeup pumps and both gravity feed valves are OPERABLE.
This ensures that both BAMTs have two independent flow paths for injecting their contents into the RCS.
The proposed change to ACTION statement "a" of this specification is being submitted in anticipation of obtaining revised shutdown margin requirements for Cycle 2.
The proposed change, which is scheduled for submittal by September 21, 1986, will simply refer to the actual shutdown margin Specifi-cation (either 3.1.1.1 or 3.1.1.2) instead of requiring the core to be at least 2% subcritical at an RCS temperature of 200 F.
By reducing the maximum boron concentration in the BAMTs to equal to or less than 3.5 weight percent, chemical analyses have shown there is no longer the possibility of the boron precipitating out of solution a long as the tempera-ture of the boric acid remains above 50 F.
Thus, surveillance requirement 4.1.2.8a will be modified to require verification that the BAMT solution is at a temperature greater than 55 F.
This change is consistent with other Technical Specification surveillance requirements for the Reactor Auxiliary Building (e.g., surveillance requirement 4.1.2.8 and 4.5.4) and provides approximately 5 F margin before precipitation of the boron is possible.
Similarly, changing the frequency of the surveillance from every 7 days to when the Reactor Auxiliary Building (RAB) air temperature is less than 55 F is justified because it is unlikely that the temperature in the tank (s) would fall below 50 F when the RAB air temperature is above 55 F.
Safety Analysis The proposed change described above shall be deemed to involve a significant hazards consideration of there is a positive finding in any of the following areas:
1.
Will the operation of the facility in accordance with the proposed change involve a significant increase in the probability or conse-quences of any accident.
Response
No.
Deleting the requirement for a heat tracing circuit by reducing the boron concentration in the BAMTs is accounted for by increasing the volume of boric acid solution that must be contained in the tanks and by also crediting borated water from the RWSP.
During a natural circulation cooldown with no letdown available (Branch Technical Position (RSB) 5-1), sufficient borated water is available in the BAMTs to maintain the required shutdown margin while the plant is depressurized to the point where safety injection flow from the HPSI pumps can be delivered to the RCS.
The HPSI flow will provide sufficient borated water to ensure the shutdown margin requirements of Specification 3.1.1.1 and/or 3.1.1.2 are satisfied by drawing its suction from the RWSP.
Since the safe shutdown requirements of Branch Technical Position (RSB) 5-1 are satisfied, this change does not significantly increase the probability or consequences of any accident previously evaluated.
NS41128A
2.
Will the operation of the facility in accordance with the proposed change create the possibility of a new or different kind of accident from any accident previously evaluated?
Response
No.
The reason for requiring a heat tracing circuit was to ensure that the dissolved boric acid was in solution and hence, available for injection into the Reactor Coolant System in the event of an acci-dent.
By lowering the maximum boric acid concentration in the BAMTs to 3.5 weight percent, chemical analyses have shown that the boron would remain in solution at temperatures above 50 F.
Since require-ments are in place to ensure that the BAMT solution remains above 55 F when crediting this source of borated water, there is no longer a need for the heat tracing circuit.
Therefore, since the boron will be in solution and therefore available for emergencies, it does not create the possibility of a new or different kind of accident from those previously evaluated.
3.
Will the operation of the facility in accordance with this proposed change involve a significant reduction in the margin of safety?
Response
No.
The intent of this Technical Specification is to ensure that there is enough boron available to maintain the required shutdown margin during an emergency.
In order for the boron to be available, it must remain in solution from the time it leaves the boric acid makeup tanks until it reaches the Reactor Coolant System.
Reducing the maximum boric acid concentration to 3.5 weight percent ensures that all the boron will remain in solution (as long as the solution temperature is greater than 50 F) while increasing the required volume in the tanks ensures there is a sufficient amount of boron available.
Surveillance requirement 4.1.2.8 retains the requirements to verify the boron concentration and water volume of the tanks and has been amended to ensure the boric acid solution is greater than 55 F.
Therefore, the proposed change does not involve a significant reduction in the margin of safety.
Safety and Significant Hazards Determination Based upon the above safety analysis, it is concluded that (1) the proposed change does not constitute a significant hazards consideration as defined by 10 CFR 50.92; (2) there is reasonable assurance that the health and safety of the public will not be endangered by the proposed change; and (3) this action will not result in a condition which significantly alters the impact of the station on the environment as described in the NRC Final Environmental Statement.
NS41128A
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REACTIVITY CONTROL SYSTEMS BORATED WATER SOURCES - OPERATING LIMITING CONDITION FOR OPERATION 3.1.2.8 Each of the following borated water sources shall be OPERABLE:
a.
At least one boric acid makeup tank and at least one associated heat tracing circuit per tank with the contents of the tank in accordance with Figure 3.1-1, and b.
The refueling water storage pool with:
1.
A minimum contained borated water volume of 475,500 gallons (82% of indicated level), and 2.
A boron concentration of between 1720 and 2300 ppm of boron, and 3.
A solution temperature between 55*F and 100*F.
APPLICABILITY:
MODES 1, 2, 3, and 4.
ACTION:
a.
With the above required boric acid makeup tank inoperable, restore the tank to OPERABLE status within 72 hours8.333333e-4 days <br />0.02 hours <br />1.190476e-4 weeks <br />2.7396e-5 months <br /> or be in at least HOT STANDBY within the next 6 hours6.944444e-5 days <br />0.00167 hours <br />9.920635e-6 weeks <br />2.283e-6 months <br /> and borated to a SHUTDOWN MARGIN equivalent to at least 2% delta k/k at 200*F; restore the above required boric acid makeup tank to OPERABLE status within the next 7 days or be in COLD SHUTDOWN within the next 30 hours3.472222e-4 days <br />0.00833 hours <br />4.960317e-5 weeks <br />1.1415e-5 months <br />.
b.
With the refueling water storage pool inoperable, restore the pool to OPERABLE status within 1 hour1.157407e-5 days <br />2.777778e-4 hours <br />1.653439e-6 weeks <br />3.805e-7 months <br /> or be in at least HOT STANDBY within the next 6 hours6.944444e-5 days <br />0.00167 hours <br />9.920635e-6 weeks <br />2.283e-6 months <br /> and in COLD SHUTDOWN within the following 30 hours3.472222e-4 days <br />0.00833 hours <br />4.960317e-5 weeks <br />1.1415e-5 months <br />.
SURVEILLANCE REQUIREMENTS 4.1.2.8 Each borated water source shall be demonstrated OPERABLE:
a.
At least once per 7 days by:
1.
Verifying the boron concentration in the water, 2.
Verifying the contained borated water volume of the water source, and 3.
Verifying the boric acid makeup tank solution temperature.
b.
At least once per 24 hours2.777778e-4 days <br />0.00667 hours <br />3.968254e-5 weeks <br />9.132e-6 months <br /> by verifying the RWSP temperature when the Reactor Auxiliary Building air temperature is less than 55 F or greater than 100 F.
WATERFORD - UNIT 3 3/4 1-14 i
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(15,750)
(17,500)
(19,250)
(21,000)
STORED 80RIC ACIO CONCENTRATION WT. % (PPM 8)
FIGURE 3.1-1 MINIMUM BORIC ACID STORAGE TANK VOLUME AND TEMPERATURE AS A FUNCTION OF STORED BORIC ACID CONCENTRATION WATERFORD - UNIT 3 3/4 1-13
REACTIVITY CONTROL SYSTEMS BASES 3/4.1.1.4 MINIMUM TEMPERATURE FOR CRITICALITY This specification ensures that the reactor will not be made critical with the Reactor Coolant System cold leg temperature less than 520*F.
This limitation is required to ensure (1) the moderator temperature coefficient is within its analyzed temperature range, (2) the protective instrumentation is 1
within its normal operating range, (3) the pressurizer is capable of being in an OPERABLE status with a steam bubble, (4) the reactor pressure vessel is j
above its minimum RT temperature, and (5) the ECCS analysis remains valid NOT 4
for the peak linear heat rate of Specification 3.2.1.
i l
3/4.1.2 BORATION SYSTEMS The boron injection system ensures that negative reactivity control is available during each mode of facility operation.
The components required to perform this function include (1) borated water sources, (2) charging pumps, (3) separate flow paths, (4) boric acid makeup pumps, (5) associated heat tracing systems, and (6) an emergency power supply from OPERABLE diesel generators.
With the RCS average temperature above 200*F, a minimum of two separate and redundant boron injection systems are provided to ensure single functional i
capability in the event an assumed failure renders one of the systems j
Allowable out-of-service periods ensure that minor component
~
repair or corrective action may be completed without undue risk to overall facility safety from injection system failures during the repair period.
The boration capability of either system is sufficient to provide a SHUTDOWN MARGIN from expected operating conditions of 2.0% delta k/k after xenon decay and cooldown to 200*F.
The maximum expected boration capability requirement occurs at E0L from full power equilibrium xenon conditions assuming the most reactive CEA stuck out of the core and requires boric acid solution from the boric acid makeup tanks in the allowable concentrations and volumes of Specification 3.1.2.8 or 53,494 gallons of 1720 ppm borated water from the i
refueling water storage pool.
The higher limit of 447,100 gallons is specified t
j to be consistent with Specification 3.5.4 in order to meet the ECCS requirements.
With the RCS temperature below 200*F one injection system is acceptable without single failure consideration on the basis of the stable reactivity condition of the reactor and the additional restrictions prohibiting CORE ALTERATIONS and positive reactivity changes in the event the single injection j
system becomes inoperable.
l The boron capability required below 200*F is based upon providing a 2%
delta k/k SHUTDOWN MARGIN after xenon decay and cooldown from 200*F to 140*F.
This condition requires either 5,465 gallons of 1720 ppm borated water from l
the refueling water storage pool or boric acid solution from the boric acid makeup tanks in accordance with the requirements of Specification 3.1.2.7.
WATERFORO - UNIT 3 B 3/4 1-2 i
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REACTIVITY CONTROL SYSTEMS BORATED WATER SOURCES - OPERATING LIMITING CONDITION FOR OPERATION 1
3.1.2.8 Each of the following borated water sources shall be OPERABLE:
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The refueling water storage pool with:
1.
A minimum contained borated water volume of 475,500 gallons (82% of indicated level), and 2.
A boron concentration of between 1720 and 2300 ppm of baron, and 3.
A solution temperature between 55*F and 100*F.
APPLICABILITY:
MODES 1, 2, 3, and 4.
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a.
With the above required boric cid makeup /4,sx(s) 4ank inoperable, restore I
the;4enk to OPERABLE statu ithin 72 hours8.333333e-4 days <br />0.02 hours <br />1.190476e-4 weeks <br />2.7396e-5 months <br /> or be in at least HOT f,,g(s)
STANDBY within the next 6 ours and borated to a SHUTOOWN MARGIN equivalent to a4A :::t.. d:lt: h/h :t 200 f; restore the above required boric acid makeup-4,e# to OPERABLE status within the next 7 days or be in COLD SHUTOOWN within_the next 30 hours3.472222e-4 days <br />0.00833 hours <br />4.960317e-5 weeks <br />1.1415e-5 months <br />.
b.
With the refueling water stora inoperable, restore the pool to OPERABLE status within 1 hour1.157407e-5 days <br />2.777778e-4 hours <br />1.653439e-6 weeks <br />3.805e-7 months <br /> or be in at least HOT STANDBY within the next 6 hours6.944444e-5 days <br />0.00167 hours <br />9.920635e-6 weeks <br />2.283e-6 months <br /> and in COLD SHUTDOWN within the following 30 hours3.472222e-4 days <br />0.00833 hours <br />4.960317e-5 weeks <br />1.1415e-5 months <br />.
SURVEILLANCE REQUIREMENTS 4.1.2.8 Each borated water source shall be demonstrated OPERABLE:
- c. At least once per 7 days by:
g 1.
Verifying the boron concentration in the water, a,vd l
2.
Verifying the contained borated water volume of the water source -end
-3.
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Are.. At least once per 24 hours2.777778e-4 days <br />0.00667 hours <br />3.968254e-5 weeks <br />9.132e-6 months <br /> by verifying the RWSP temperature when the Reactor Auxiliary Building air temperature is less than 55 F or greater than 100*F.
b.
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INSERT a.
At least one of the following sources:
- 1) One boric acid makeup tank, with the tank contents in accordance with Figure 3.1-1, or
- 2) Two boric acid makeup tanks, with the combined contents of the tanks in accordance with Figure 3.1-1, and 1
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BASES 3/4.1.1.4 MINIMUM TEMPERATURE FOR CRITICALITY This specification ensures that the reactor will not be made critical with the Reactor Coolant System cold leg temperature less t 1an 520*F.
This limitation is required to ensure (1) the moderator tempera'ure coefficient is within its analyzed temperature range, (2) the protective instrumentation is within its normal operating range, (3) the pressurizer is apable of being in an OPERABLE status with a steam bubble, (4) the reactor p essure vessel is above its minimum RT temperature, and (5) the ECCS an ysis remains valid NDT for the peak linear heat rate of Specification 3.2.1.
3/4.1.2 B0 RATION SYSTEMS The boron injection system ensures that ne ive reactivity control is available during each mode of facility operati The components required to perform this function include (1) borated wa r sources, (2) charging pumps, (3) separate flow paths, (4) boric acid ma up pumps, (5) associated heat tracing systems, and (6) an emergency pc r supply from OPERABLE diesel generators.
With the RCS average temperatu above 200*F, a minimum of two separate and redundant boron injection syst ms are provided to ensure single functional capability in the event an assumgd failure renders one of the systems inoperable.
Allowable out-of-s f vice periods ensure that minor component repair or corrective action ma' be completed without undue risk to overall facility safety from injectio system failures during the repair period.
The boration capability of either system is sufficient to provide a SHUTDOWN MARGIN from expect d operating conditions of 2.0% delta k/k after xenon decay and cooldown t 200*F.
The maximum expected boration capability requirement occurs at EOL rom full power equilibrium xenon conditions assuming the most reactive CEA stug out of the core and requires boric acid solution fromtheboricacidmakeugtanksintheallowableconcentrationsandvolumes of Specification 3.1.2.8 g 2, G gallons of 1720 ppm borated water from the refueling water storage poo The higher limit of 447,100 gallons is specified to be consistent with Spec o
3.5.4 in order to meet the ECCS requirements.
t.o e 00*F one injection system is acceptable With the RCS temperature b o without single failure consideration on the basis of the stable reactivity condition of the reactor and the additional restrictions prohibiting CORE ALTERATIONS and positive reactivity changes in the event the single injection system becomes inoperable.
The boron capability required below 200 F is based upon providing a 2%
l delta k/k SHUTDOWN MARGIN after xenon decay and cooldown from 200 F to 140 F.
This condition requires either 5,465 gallons of 1720 ppm borated water from the refueling water storage pool or boric acid solution from the boric acid makeup tanks in accordance with the requirements of Specification 3.1.2.7.
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DESCRIPTION AND SAFETY ANALYSIS OF PROPOSED CHANGE NPF-38-33 This is a request to modify Technical Specification 3.11.1, Radioactive Effluents by adding further clarification to the action statement.
Existing Specification See Attachment A.
Proposed Specification See Attachment B.
Description Technical Specification 3.11.1 addresses the release of liquid radioactive effluents to unrestricted areas.
The proposed change will include the additional action requirement to " describe the events leading to this condition in the next Semiannual Radioactive Effluent Release Report".
This requirement already exists in the action statement concerning the release of gaseous effluents, Technical Specification 3.11.2, and is there-fore requested in order to establish consistency in the Technical Specifi-cations.
Safety Analysis The proposed change described above shall be deemed to involve a significant hazards consideration if there is a positive finding in any of the following areas:
1.
Will operation of the facility in accordance with this proposed change involve a significant increase in the probability or consequences of any accident previously evaluated?
Response
No.
This change does not alter the operation of the plant; it only adds the requirement of reporting the circumstances of any uncontrolled or abnormal release in the Semiannual Radioactive Release Report.
Therefore, there is no increase in the probability or consequences of any accident previously analyzed.
2.
Will operation of the facility in accordance with the proposed change create the possibility of a new or different kind of accident from any accident previously analyzed?
Response
No.
Since the proposed change does not modify the plant, the creation of a new or different kind of accident is not possible.
3.
Will operation of the facility in accordance with this proposed change involve a significant reduction in a margin of safety?
Response
No.
Since this change has no impact on the plant operation and involves no plant modifications, the margin of safety will remain unaffected.
The Commission has provided guidance concerning the application of standards for determining whether a significant hazards consideration exists by providing certain examples (48 FR 14870) of amendments that are considered not likely to involve significant hazards considerations.
Example (i) relates to a purely administrative change to Technical Specifications (i.e.,
a change to achieve consistency throughout the Technical Specifications, correction of an error, or a change in nomenclature).
In this case, the proposed change is similar to Example (i) since its purpose is to establish consistency with Technical Specification 3.11.2.
Safety and Significant Hazards Determination Based upon the above Safety Analysis, it is concluded that (1) the proposed change does not constitute a significant hazards consideration as defined by 10 CFR 50.91; (2) there is a reasonable assurance that the health and safety of the public will not be endangered by the proposed change; and (3) this action will not result in a condition which significantly alters the impact of the station on the envir.anment as described in the NRC Final Environmental Statement.
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3/4.11 RADI0 ACTIVE EFFLUENTS 3/4.11.1 LIQUID EFFLUENTS CONCENTRATION LIMITING CONDITION FOR OPERATION 3.11.1.1 The concentration of radioactive material released in liquid effluents to UNRESTRICTED AREAS (see Figure 5.1-3) shall be limited to the concentrations specified in 10 CFR Part 20, Appendix 8, Table II, Column 2 for radionuclides other than dissolved or entrained noble gases.
For dissolved or entrained noble gases, the concentration shall be limited to 2 x 10 4 microcurie /ml total activity.
APPLICABILITY:
At all times.
ACTION:
With the concentration of radioactive material released in liquid effluents to UNRESTRICTED AREAS exceeding the above limits, immediately restore the concentration to within the above limits.
SURVEILLANCE REQUIREMENTS 4.11.1.1.1 Radioactive liquid wastes shall be sampled and analyzed according to the sampling and analysis program of Table 4.11-1.
4.11.1.1.2 The results of the radioactivity analyses shall be used in accor-dance with the methodology and parameters in the ODCM to assure that the concentrations at the point of release are maintained within the limits of Specification 3.11.1.1.
WATERFORD - UNIT 3 3/4 11-1
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es NPF-38-33 ATTACHMENT B t
y-3/4.11 RADIOACTIVE EFFLUENTS 3/4.11.1 LIQUID EFFLUENTS CONCENTRATION LIMITING CONDITION FOR OPERATION 3.11.1.1 The concentration of radioactive material released in liquid effluents to UNRESTRICTED AREAS (see Figure 5.1-3) shall be limited to the concentrations specified in 10 CFR Part 20, Appendix B, Table II,' Column 2 for radionuclides other than dissolved or entrained noble gases.
For dissolved or entrained noble gases, the concentration shall be limited to 2 x 10 4 microcurie /ml total activity.
APPLICABILITY:
At all times.
ACTION:
With the concentration of radioactive material released in liquid effluents to UNRESTRICTED AREAS exceeding the above limits, immediately restore the concentration to within the above limits, SURVEILLANCE REQUIREMENTS 4.11.1.1.1 Radioactive liquid wastes shall'be sampled and analyzed according to the sampling and analysis program of Tab e 4.11-1.
4.11.1.1.2 The results of the radioactiv y analyses shall be used in accor-dance with the methodology and parameter in the ODCM to assure that the concentrations at the point of release re maintained within the limits of Specification 3.11.1.1.
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