ML20214K854
| ML20214K854 | |
| Person / Time | |
|---|---|
| Site: | Byron, 05000000 |
| Issue date: | 05/20/1987 |
| From: | COMMONWEALTH EDISON CO. |
| To: | |
| Shared Package | |
| ML20214K830 | List: |
| References | |
| 3025K, NUDOCS 8705290072 | |
| Download: ML20214K854 (7) | |
Text
e ATTACHMENT A PROPOSED CHANGE TO APPENDIX A TECHNICAL SPECIFICATIONS OF FACILITY OPERATING LICENSES NPF-37 AND NPP-66 Revised Pages:
3/4 3-10 3/4 3-37 3/4 3-38 l
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e
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TABLE 4.3-2 (Continued) m ENGINEERED SAFETY FEATURES' ACTUATION SYSTEM INSTRUMENTATION z
SURVEILLANCE REQUIRENENTS c
TRIP d
ANALOG ACTUATING MODES T2 CHANNEL DEVICE MASTER' SLAVE FOR WHICH s
CHANNEL CHANNEL OPERATIONAL OPERATIONAL ACTUATION RELAY RELAY SURVEILLANCE e-FUNCTIONAL UNIT CHECK CALIBRATION TEST TEST LOGIC TEST TEST TEST IS REQUIRED
- 7. Automatic Opening (Continued) a.
Automatic Actuation Logic and Actuation Relays N.A.
N.A.
N.A.
N.A.
M(1)
M(1)
Q 1, 2, 3, 4 b.
RWST Level-Low-Low S
R H
N.A.
N.A.
N.A.
N.A.
1,2,3,4 i
Irnncident With Safety Injection See Item 1. above for all Safety Injection Surveillance Requirements
)
D 8. Loss of Power M(2[3)
[
a.
ESF' Bus Undervoltage N.A.
R N.A.
N.A.
N.A.
N.A.
1, 2, 3,.4 b.
Grid Degraded Voltage N.A.
R N.A.
M(3)
N.A.
N.A.
N.A.
1, 2, 3, 4 9.
Engineered Safety Featur'e s'"
Actuation
- System Interlocks a.
Pressurizer Pressure, N.A.
R H
N.A.
N.A.
N.A.
N.A.
1, 2, 3 P-11 l
b.
Reactor Trip, P-4 H. A.'
N.A.
N.A.
R N.A.
N.A.
N.A.
1, 2, 3 Low-Low T,yg, P-12 N.A.
R H
N.A.
M. A.
N.A.
N.A.
1, 2, 3 c.
d.
Steam Generator Water S
R H
N.A.
M(1)
M(1)
Q 1, 2
}
Level, P-14 (lligh-High) 4
' TABLE NOTATION I
i (1)
Each train shall be tested at least every 62 day's on a STAGGERED TEST BASIS.
3 (2)
Undervoltage relay operability is to be verlfled independently.
An inoperable channel may be bypassed for up to 2 hours2.314815e-5 days <br />5.555556e-4 hours <br />3.306878e-6 weeks <br />7.61e-7 months <br /> for survelliance testing of the OPERA 8LE channel per Specification 4.3.2.1.
l' (3)
Verify underv;1tes r:.1:y eperfi; Ry..J ;!:= : r rictien enly.
0; ::t r !ntri; sa ; der;;1t:g:
=
i eend44-ica Leyend th: ::tpcist for the t!=: delry re!:y.
1 1
.Se+ paint veriRcqHm i a n& appl;caiols.
f TABLE 4.3-2 (Continued) m 35 ENGINEERED SAFETY FEATURES ACTUATION SYSTEM INSTRUNENTATION E!
SURVEILLANCE REQUIRENENTS c:
TRIP 35 ANALOG ACTUATING MODES O!
CHANNEL DEVICE MASTER SLAVE FOR WHICH ro CHANNEL CHANNEL OPERATIONAL OPERATIONAL ACTUATION RELAY RELAY SURVEILLANCE
- e. FUNCTIONAL UNIT CHECK CALIBRATION TEST TEST LOGIC TEST TEST TEST IS REQUIRED n,
S. Turbine Trip and Feedwater (Continued) b.
Steam Generator Water S
R H
N.A.
N.A.
N.A.
N.A.
1, 2 Level-liigh-High (P-14) c.
Safety Injection See Item 1. above for all Safety Injection Surveillance Requirements.
~
g, a.
Manual Initiation N.A.
N.A.
N.A.
R N.A.
N.A.
N.A.
1, 2, 3 b.
Automatic Actuation N.A.
N.A N.A.
N.A.
M(1)
M(1)
Q 1, 2, 3
},'
Logic and Actuation Relay
'd c.
Steam Generator Water S
R H
N.A.
N.A.
N.A.
N.A.
1, 2, 3 Level-Low-Low d.
Undervoltage-RCP Bus N.A.
A N.N.
M (3)
N.A.
N.A.
N.A.
1, 2 e.
Safety Injection See Item 1. above for all Safety Injection Surveillance Requirements.
f.
Division 11 for Unit 1 N.A.
'R N.A-M(2f3)
N.A.
N.A.
N.A 1,2,3,4 (Division 21 for Unit 2)
ESF Bus Undervoltage g.
R H
N.A.
N.A.
N.A.
N.A.
1, 2, 3 Pump Suction Pressure-Low
- 7. Automatic Opening of Containment Sump Suction Isolation Valves o
i
')
TABLE 4.3-1 (Continued)
REACTOR TRIP SYSTEM INSTRUMENTATION SURVEILLANCE REQUIREMENTS TRIP g
ANALOG ACTUATING N00ES FOR CHAN!iEL DEVICE WillCN q
m CHANNEL CHANNEL OPERATIONAL OPERATIONAL ACTUATION SURVEILLANCE M FUNCTIONAL UNIT CHECK CALIBRATION TEST TEST LOGIC TEST IS REQUIRED 12.
Reactor Coolant flow-Low S
R Q
N.A.
N.A.
1 13.
Steam Generator Water Level-S R
Q**
N.A.
N.A.
1, 2 Low-Low 14.
Undervoltage-Reactor Coolant N.A.
R N.A.
Q**(jo)
N.A.
1 Ptaps (Above P-7)
,15.
Underfrequency-Reactor N.A.
R N.A.
Q(10)
N.A.
1 g
Coolant Pumps (Above P-7)
Z16.
Turbine Trip (Above P-7)
O a.
Emer0ency Trip Header N.A.
R N.A.
S/U(1, 10)
N.A.
1 Pressure b.
Turbine Throttle Valve N.A.
R N.A.
S/U(1,10)
H.A.
1 Closure 17.
Safety Injection Input from N.A.
N.A.
N.A.
R N.A.
1, 2 ESF 18.
Reactor Coolant Pump Breaker N.A.
N.A.
N.A.
R H.A.
1 Position Trip (Above P-7) 19.
Reactor Trip System Interlocks a.
Intermediate Range Neutron Flux, P-6 N.A.
R(4)
Q N.A.
N.A.
2##
b.
Low Power Reactor Trips Block, P-7 N.A.
R(4)
Q (8)
N.A.
N.A.
I c.
Power Range Neutron Flux, P-8 N.A.
R(4)
Q (8)
N.A.
N.A.
1
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ATTACISBNT B SUP99LRY OF PROPOSED CHANGES The proposed changes clarifiy that a setpoint verification is not required when performing the monthly or quarterly Trip Actuating Device Operational Test for the undervoltage and underfrequency relays. These changes are necessary to more explicitly indicate in the. Technical ~
Specifications that setpoint verification is not required as understood from' conversations with the'NRC.'
Prior to receipt of the Byron Unit 1 License, a note was added to the Monthly Trip Actuating Device Operational Test for the Grid Degraded Voltage indicating that setpoint verification was not required. The intent of the note was to apply to all undervoltage and underfrequency relays to' indicate that setpoint verification was not required. Since this was not explicit in the Technical Specifications, the NRR reviewer was contacted and he verified-the intent was not to perform a setpoint verification monthly.
If the setpoint verification was done monthly, the period of time the plant is in a degraded condition would increase. There is not a significant advantage to performing a monthly setpoint verification since the instrument drift is minimal. The setpoint verification will be performed every eighteen (18) months.
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ATTACHMENT C i'
EVALUATION OF SIGNIFICANT HAZARDS CONSIDERATIONS Commonwealth Edison has evaluated this proposed amendment and has determined that it involves no significant1 hazards considerations.
According to 10 CPR 50.92(c), a proposed amendment to an operating license involves no significant hazards considerations if operation of the facility in accordance with the proposed amendment would not:
1 (1)
Involve a significant increase in the probability or consequences of an accident previously evaluated; or (2)
Create the possibility of a new or different kind of accident ~
from any accident previously evaluated; or 4
(3)
Involve a significant reduction in a margin of safety.
1 The proposed amendment adds notes to Tables 4.3-1 and 4.3-2, to clarify the requirements of the Trip Actuating Device Operational Test as it pertains to undervoltage and underfrequency relays. The proposed amendment more explicitly defines the requirements of the Trip Actuating Device i-Operational Test as it pertains to undervoltage and underfrequency relays.
l The relay operability verification remains unaffected. The actual procedural-execution remains unchanged. The amount of time that the plant is'in.a degraded condition would be increased if setpoint verification was done i
monthly. Therefore, this does not increase the probability or consequences of an accident previously evaluated.
)
The proposed amendment does not involve any hardware changes. The type and frequency of the surveillance remains unchanged.
PSAR analyses and system design envelop the loss of Engineered Safety Feature or Reactor i
Protection System Functions. Therefore, this does not create the possibility l
of a new or different kind of accident previously evaluated.
1 I
The intent of the requirement does not encompass setpoint verification at a frequency greater than eighteen (18) months. The proposed amendment serves to clarify our understanding of the. surveillance frequency.
Therefore, this does not involve a significant reduction in a margin of safety.
l Therefore, based on the above considerations, Commonwealth Edison has determined that these changes involve no significant hazards considerations.
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EVALUATION OF AEROSOL MIXING TEST DATA On 3-23-87 an air-aerosol mixing uniformity test was performed on the Braidwood Control Room (VC) system B train recirculation charcoal filter unit. This test was re-performed on 4-8-87 with results that were consistent with those of the earlier test. These results show that high concentration readings are seen on one side of the filter unit (door side) and low readings on the other side (wall side). The related airflow distribution test performed on this unit on 4-8-87 shows a random distribution across the charcoal filter face.
ANSI M510 guidance for mixing uniformity suggests changing mixing injection port location'to achieve acceptable mixing results. At Braidwood, the injection ports are upstream of the return fan'.
With this arrangement 100%. mixing is achieved. The Braidwood A train and B train return fan and filter unit design and physical configuration are identical and similar mixing results are expected to occur.
Between the return fans and the charcoal filters, there are charcoal bypass dampers. The blade position of the dampers could potentially contribute to separation of heavier aerosol particles such as DOP used as the tracer gas. This could be a reason for particle separation and concentration towards one side of the housing.
The use of DOP aerosol is not representative of the iodine gas that would be entering the charcoal cells. Based upon the characteristics of the iodine gas, we except a more uniform distribution across the charcoal filters. The airflow distribution results are considered to be a much better indication of the actual condition inside of the filter. unit. In our opinion, further testing will yield no new information to evaluate the B train filter unit and that acceptability should be based on the airflow distribution.
3025K L