ML20214J545
| ML20214J545 | |
| Person / Time | |
|---|---|
| Site: | Beaver Valley |
| Issue date: | 08/05/1986 |
| From: | Imbro E, Wang H NRC OFFICE OF INSPECTION & ENFORCEMENT (IE) |
| To: | |
| Shared Package | |
| ML20214J540 | List: |
| References | |
| 50-412-86-17, NUDOCS 8608150065 | |
| Download: ML20214J545 (13) | |
See also: IR 05000412/1986017
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U.S. NUCLEAR REGULATORY COMMISSION
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OFFICE OF INSPECTION AND ENFORCEMENT
Division of Quality Assurance, Vendor, and Technical Training Center Programs
Report No:
50-412/86-17
Docket No:
50-412
Licensee:
Duquesne Light Company
Facility Name:
Beaver Valley, Unit 2
Inspection At:
Stone & Webster Engineering Corp., Boston, MA
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Inspection
Conducted:
June 2-6, 1986
Inspection Team Members:
Team Leader:
H. Wang, Inspection Specialist, IE
Mechanical
Systems:
T. DelGaizo, Consultant, WESTEC Services
Mechanical
Components:
B. Gupta, Consultant, Harstead Engineering
Electrical:
S. Athavale, Electrical Engineer, IE
Instrumentation
and Controls:
J. Kaucher, Consultant, WESTEC Services
Structural:
G. Harstead, Consultant, Harstead Engineering
E.V. Imbro, Chief, Licensing Section, IE
Prepared by:
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Hai-Boh Wang
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Team Leader, IE
Approved by:
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8608150065 860013
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ADOCK 05000412
Eugene V. Imbro, Chief
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Licensing Section
Quality Assurance Branch
- Attended Fxit Meeting Only
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Beaver Valley Unit 2
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Technical Audit Implementation Inspection
June 2 to 6, 1986
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1.
Background
In a meeting with the NRC on March 15, 1986, the licensee, Duquesne Light Company
(DLC), proposed a two phase program for the completion of the engineering assurance
The first phase
in-depth technical audits of the Beaver Valley 2 (BV-2) project.
provides for completion of four in-depth technical audits, three of which had been
The fourth and final audit will assess the adequacy of the
previously completed.
design process by evaluating the design of the Safety Injection System (SIS) and
the adjoining portion of the Recirculation Spray System (RSS), used to supply
water to the core to provide long term cooling, and associated interfaces. The
fourth audit will be performed by Stone & Webster Engineering Corporation (SWEC)
by qualified engineers who have not worked on the Beaver Valley Unit 2 Project.
The scope of this program was limited in recognition of the supplemental audits
previously performed by SWEC and DLC, particularly SWEC EA Audit #50 of the BV-2-
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hazards analysis program, SWEC EA Audit #44 covering the fuel pool cooling and
cleanup system plus portions of the fuel building, and DLC's design bases
endorsement program and resulting confirmation programs. The second phase pro-
vides for and evaluation and assessment of the results of the four audits in
order to form a conclusion as to the adequacy of the SWEC design process as imple-
mented for BV-2.
2.
Purpose
The purpose of this inspection was to evaluate implementation of the program
plan and procedures for the final in-depth technical audit. Specifically,
implementation of the audit was evaluated to ensure that the audit was being
conducted in accordance with the program plan and procedures and also that the
audit was being conducted in sufficient technical depth to draw meaningful
conclusions regarding the adequacy of the SWEC design process.
In addition,
action taken in responses to concerns from the previous NRC inspections were
evaluated.
3.
Personnel Contacted
A large number of DLC and SWEC personnel were contacted throughout the course
of the inspecticn. The following is a listing of the key personnel contacted:
Name
Organization
Position
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R. Martin
DLC
Manager, Regulatory Af fairs
D. King
Deputy Director of Engineering
W. Eifert
Chief Engineer, Engineering Assurance
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R. Twigg
Audit Team Leader
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C. Miczek
Deputy Director of Engineering
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4.
General Conclusions
The NRC team found that the In-Depth Audit was being conducted in accordance
with the approved program plan and implementing procedures. The team also
found that the audit was generally being conducted in sufficient technical
depth to draw meaningful conclusions regarding the adequacy of the SWEC design
process. Io certain technical specialty areas (e.g., mechanical component and
equipment supports) a large amount of the audit remained to be completed at
the time of the NRC visit. Although procedures and inspection review sheets
in those areas were found to be in sufficient detail and technical depth, the
NRC was unable to draw conclusions regarding the adequacy of audit implementation
due to the state of completion of the audit. The NRC will reassess those areas in
a later inspection.
On completion of the inspection, the NRC provided the SWEC audit team with
specific comments on a discipline Aar discipline basis. These ccaments are
included in Enclosure 1.
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5.
Previous Inspection Concerns
Daring the course of this inspection, the NRC team evaluated action taken in
response to NRC concerns raised during the previous inspection of the program
scope (Inspection Report 50-412/86-09 dated June 17, 1986). The NRC found
that the EA team had taken action to resolve the prior inspection concerns.
Details of this action are provided in Enclosure 2.
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Enclosure 1
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BEAVER VALLEY UNIT 2 ENGINEERING ASSURANCE PROGRAM
Discipline Specific Conunents
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Enclosure 1
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Discipline Specific Comments
Mechanical Systems / Power Discipline
1.
An audit of completed and partially completed review plans was conducted.
This effort included an independent check of fourteen design calculations,
the Recircuiation Spray System (RSS) overpressure protection analysis,
Westinghouse NSSS interface information, and three equipment
specifications.
Based on the information which was audited in the
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mechanical systems area, the NRC concluded:
a.
The Mechanical System EA audit is being conducted in accordance with
the review plans.
b.
Action Item P05 (beta / gamma source term calculation) could have a
broad impact on environmental qualification of electrical components;
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The NRC will monitor the resolution of this action item.
Mechanical Components / Engineering Mechanics
1.
The NRC team conducted an independent assessment of the review plans which
have been completed or are in progress. The results of the NRC assessment
indicate:
a.
Review Plan 1903-2, states that the calculation for the analysis and
design of the Recirculation Spray Cooler support / restraints is
satisfactory. However, the design calculation for the tapered
cantilever support plate was omitted. This finding resulted in the
issuance of a new action item which will be followed by the NRC.
b.
Review Plan 1904-2, pipe stress isometrics, was found acceptable by
the EA team. However, the isometrics do not contain the type of branch
connections used, as required by the review plan. An action item will
be issued to address this concern.
c.
No explanation was given for the lack of branch point stress
intensification factors (SIF). SIFs should have been considered as
part of pipe stress calculations. The licensee concurs with the
team's concern and a new action item will be issued.
Structural Discipline
1.
The In-Depth Audit being performed is being conducted in accordance with
the intent of the audit plans. However, some changes have been made to
make the audit more representative. For example, 6 N&Ds and 6 E&DCRs
were reviewed rather than the 10 specified in the original plan. This
was reasonable considering the time period of the audit, and the
additional audit items that had been added to the plan.
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2.
Of the action items which have been produced, two are of particular
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interest because of the potential for broader impact. These items, listed
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below, will be reassessed during the next NRC inspection.
a.
Action Item S10 indicates that the seismic model of cable trays and
supports has all masses lumped on the vertical members of the support
trapeze instead of at midspan of the cable trays and horizontal members
of the trapeze. This could lead to an under-estimate of vertical
seismic effects. The project response did not fully address the action
item.
b.
Action Item S14 indicates that a steel beam subject to torsional moments
was checked caly for St. Venant torsional shear stresses. Longitudinal
stresses in the flanges due to warping were neglected. This warping
effect should be investigated to ensure that the beam was ,r.roperly
designed.
Electrical Discipline
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1.
The NRC team was informed that the review of all documents related to the
review plans, except for Review Plan #1908, had been completed. The NRC
team reviewed samples of calculations to verify that the audit was being
conducted in accordance with the approved audit plan. The NRC found that
the following inconsistencies were not addressed by the EA auditors:
a.
The equalizing battery voltage, during the recharging cycle, can be as
high as 2.4 volts / cell. This exceeds the FSAR commitment of 2.33
volts / cell (maximum). The team found no evidence of how the voltage
will be limited, or an evaluation of the effects of the higher
voltage on equipment qualification and operation.
b.
Several calculations were found to have unverified assumptions. The
NRC team was informed that programs (" Confirmation Program to Key
Documents," 2BVM-117 and " Engineering Confirmation Update
Program", 2BVM-122) are in progress which will verify all such
assumptions prior to fuel load. The NRC will monitor the
rezolution of these unverified assumptions when the programs are
completed.
2.
The NRC team reviewed all action items which had been produced as of
June 3, 1986. The following items are significant and the NRC will
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continue to monitor the resolution of these items.
a.
Action Item E03 indicates that certain class 1E devices located
below flood level in the containment may not be qualified for
submergence.
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b.
Action Item E04 indicates that cables furnished prior to May 1984
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may not meet the fire testing qualification requirements described
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in FSAR section 8.3.3.
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c.
Action Item E09 indicates that the separation requirements committed
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to in FSAR section 8.3.1 for redundant electrical penetrations may
have been violated.
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d.
Action Item E16 indicates that failure of non-Category 1 equipment
could damage Category 1 equipment in the same area.
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e.
Action Item E19 indicates that the lack of separation may disable
redundant buses by a common-mode failure due to a connection between
the redundant buses.
Instrumentation and Controls Discipline
1.
The NRC's review of the controls section of the BV-2 Engineering audit,
included an independent review of selected specifications, calculations,
E&DCRs and diagrams. Additionally, a review of the action item list of
June 3, 1986, including the items resolved to that point, was conducted.
During the review of Calculations SP-2RSS-10 and RSS*10-0-C, a question
regarding the setpoint of the reset for the recirculation spray pump
recirculation valves was identified. With the present setpoint as cal-
culated, it appears that in certain plant configurations the recirculation
valves could continuously cycle. The NRC will review the resolution to
this item during the next inspection.
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2.
Based on this review the NRC team concluded that the audit was conducted in
accordance with the approved audit plans.
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Enclosure 2
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STATUS OF CONCERNS FROM NRC INSPECTION 50-412/86-09
Dated June 17, 1986
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Enclosure 2
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STATUS OF NRC INSPECTION ITEMS FROM
INSPECTION 50-412/86-09
OBS.NO.
SUMMARY OF CONCERN OR QUESTION
STATUS
COMMENT
MECHANICAL SYSTEMS / POWER
1.1
Closed
FSAR commitments were
vs. FSAR commitments should be
verified.
verified.
1.2
Single-failure review should
Closed
Review of single-
include measures taken to prevent
failure criteria con-
freezing of the RWST supply line
firmed suitable measures
to the SI pumps.
through the existence-
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of a redundant heat-
trace system.
1.3
Verification of the basis for
Closed
Review of radiation
radiation levels in the RSS
calculations resulted
cubicle should be performed.
in initiation of Action
Items P05 and P06.
ELECTRICAL POWER
2.1
Review of derating factors for
Closed
As part of the review of
cables should be added to the
safety-related cable
scope of the EA audit.
ampacity calculations,
the application of
appropriate derating
factors were checked.
2.2
Review of power supplies to NSSS
Closed
Power supply panels and
distribution boards were
equipment, including isolation of
reviewed as part of the
non-Class IE from Class 1E
review plan.
inverters should be performed.
Calculations for the voltage
between the distribution
panels and the SIS and
ESFAS equipment had been
reviewed.
2.3
Review of electrical protective
Closed
Several components
devices, including components
located below the post-
located below post-accident flood
accident flood levels
levels should be performed.
were reviewed relative
to electrical system
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2.4
A review of equipment specifi-
Closed
NSSS vendor supplied
cations for selected NSSS vendor
equipment have been
supplied equipment should be
reviewed as part of the
performed.
review plan.
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OBS.NO.
SUMMARY OF CONCERN OR QUESTION
STATUS
COMMENT
2.5
Review of technical details
Closed
The electrical instal-
of the electrical installation
lation specification was
specification should be included
reviewed by the EA team
in the scope of the EA audit.
during the site visit,
including a walkdown of
selected equipment.
INSTRUMENTATION & CONTROLS
3.1
A review of NSSS vendor require-
Closed
NSSS vendor supplied
ments for SIS should be performed.
elementary, wiring, and
logic diagrams for the
SIS were reviewed.
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3.2
A review of RWST level
Closed
Drawings and
instrumentation should
specifications
be performed.
for RWST
level instruments
2QSS*LSL104A-D were
reviewed.
3.3
A review of specifications
Closed
A specification for
for electronic pressure
electronic pressure
transmitters should be
transmitters was
included as part of review plan
reviewed. This in-
1906-2.
cluded instrument
data sheets for
Rosemount model
1153 B and D.
3.4
NSSS Vendor supplied setpoints
Closed
Westinghouse document
should be reviewed for
" Precautions, Limitations
interface requirements.
and Setpoints" was
reviewed for consistency
with BV2 requirements.
3.5
A review of the I&C equipment
Closed
The EA team reviewed the
instu11ation specification should
I&C equipoent
be included in the scope of the
installation specifi-
audit.
cation (2BVS-977)
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during the site visit,
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including a physical
walkdown of selected
equipment.
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OBS.NO.
SUMMARY OF CONCERN OR QUESTION
STATUS
COMMENTS
3.6
The vendor document review should Closed
Calibration data,
include MOV torque switch settings
including torque switch
and calibration data.
settings, were reviewed
for MOVs purchased
under specification
MECHANICAL COMPONENTS
4.1
Review of a Class 1 stress
Closed
The scope of the EA
analysis package should
audit was expanded to
be performed.
include the review of'i
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Class 1 stress analysis
package.
4.2
Review of the method of
Closed
Review Plan 1901 was
selecting thermal transients
modified to include
in Class 1 stress analysis for
a review of the
compliance with FSAR commitments
method of selecting
should be included in the audit.
thermal transients in
Class 1 stress analysis
to ensure compliance
with FSAR commitments.
4.3
Stress Design Group interface
Open
Verification of the
with the Power Engineering
interface between the
discipline should be evaluated.
Stress Design Group and
Power Engineering
concerning stress
intensification factors
has not been completed.
This item will be
followed during the
next NRC inspection.
4.4
Supports welded to Class 1
Closed
The EA team has
piping should be analyzed.
determined that there
are no welded supports
to Class 1 piping.
4.5
A review should be performed
Closed
The audit now includes
for each type of pipe support.
an analysis of each
type of pipe support
used on the BV2
proj ect.
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OBS.NO.
SUMMARY OF CONCERN OR QUESTION
STATUS
COMMENTS
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4.6
The interface between the Pipe
Closed
The scope of Review
Support Group and Pipe Stress
Plan 1909 haa been
Group should be evaluated.
expanded to include an
evaluation of the
interface between the
Pipe Support Group
and the Pipe Stress
Group.
4.7
The considerations of vendor
Closed
The vendor supplied
seismic qualification information
seinmic qualification
for the RSS pump should be
information for the
evaluated.
RSS pump was evaluated
and found to be
satisfactory.
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4.8
RSS cooler support design should
Open
Review of the analysis
be analyzed.
of the cooler support
design has not been
completed.
It will be
reviewed by the NRC
team during the next
inspection.
CIVIL / STRUCTURAL
5.1
The effect of nonsafety-related
Closed
The effect of non-
equipment structural failure on
safety related doors
adjacent safety-related equipment
in the hazards program
should be considered in the EA
was reviewed as part of
review.
the audit.
5.2
The design of a two-way rein-
Closed
A calculation for a
forced concrete slab should
concrete slab was
be analyzed,
added to the
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calculations being
reviewed.
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5.3
Effect of RSS cooler support
Closed
An analysis of the
reactions on the structural
embedment plate in the
design of walls or slabs should
wall supporting the
be reviewed.
RSS cooler was
performed and found
to be adequate.
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5.4
Effect of RSS pump and motor
Closed
RSS pump and motor
support reactions on slab
support reaction was
design should be analyzed.
analyzed for its
,
effects on the design
of the supporting slab.
The analysis is
satisfactory.
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