ML20214G920
| ML20214G920 | |
| Person / Time | |
|---|---|
| Site: | Columbia  |
| Issue date: | 04/19/1978 |
| From: | Ippolito T Office of Nuclear Reactor Regulation |
| To: | Varga S Office of Nuclear Reactor Regulation |
| References | |
| CON-WNP-0216, CON-WNP-216 NUDOCS 8605230043 | |
| Download: ML20214G920 (9) | |
Text
_ _ _ _ _
D1 J Era 14040RANDUM FOR:
S. Yarga. Chief, Light Water Reactors Branch tio. 4, OPM FROM:
T. Ippolito, Chief, Instrimentation and control Systans Branch, DSS
SUBJECT:
ACCEPTANCE REVIEW OF APPLICATION FOR WASHINGTON PUBLIC POWER SUPPLY EXITEM NUCLEAR PROJECT 2 Plant Name:
Washington Public Power Supply System Huclear Project 2 Docket Number:
50-397 Licensing Stage:
Acceptance Review 1111estone Number:
22-01 Responsible Branch:
LWR-3 and Project Leader; M. Lynch Requested Completion Date:
April 19,1978 Review Status:
Complete A memorandum dated April 5,1970. from fi. Lynch to R. Tedesco requested evaluation of the completeness of the FSAR for the Washington Power Supply Systen Nuclear Project 2.
The DSS:PS Instrumentation and Control Systems Branch has reviewed Sections 1, 3.1, 3.8.2.1, 3.10, 3.11, 5.2, 5.4, G,
7, 8.3, 9.2, 9.5.1, 15 and Appendix 15A of the FSAR.
The " Standard Format and Content of Safety Analysis Reports for Nuclear Power Plants," Revision 2. dated September 1975 and the " Standard Review Plan for the Review of Safety Analysis Reports for Nuclear Power Plants -
LWR Edition," dated September 15, 1975, were used as the basis for detemin-ing the completeness of the FSAR. Our Acceptance Review Report for the Washington Public Power Supply System Nuclear Project 2 is enclosed.
As a result of the review of this material wo have concluded that tie applicant has "addrwssed" a sufficient number of topics in the FSAR to insee the minimum requirements for dockdfing an Acepptance Review.
Contact:
R. Scholl X27233 0605230043 780419 PDR ADOCK 05 7
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We conclude that the Washington Public Power Supply Syston Nuclear Project 2 FSAR is ibh same as the SAR for the similar plants. We recoednd that the applicant be required to provide the information listed in Item 3 of the enclosed Acceptance Review Report for our evalu-ation and acceptance when the application is docketed.
Item 3 contains questions appropriate to an acceptanco review and those required to correct the FSAR to a level suitable for review.
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Thomas A. Ippolito, Branch Chief Instrumentation and Control Systems Branch, DSS
Enclosure:
As stated cc:
S. Hansuer R. Mattson R. Boyd R. Tedesco T. Ippolito M. Lynch J. Glynn F. Rosa C. F. Hiller M. Srinivasan W. Mcdonald R. Scholl DISTRIBUTION:
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ACCEPTANCE REVIEW REPORT FOR WASHINGTON PUBLIC POWER SUPPLY SYSTEM NUCLEAR P30 JECT 2
- 1. SPECIFIC SECTIONS R EVIEWED The following sections of the FSAR were reviewed for completeness on the basis of tne " Standard Format and Content of Saf ety Analysis Reports for Nuclear Power Plants", Revision 2,
dated September 1975:
1 3.11 5.4 6.4 9.5.1 3.1 4.4 6.1 6.5 15 3.8.2.1 4.6 6.2 7
App. ISA
- 3. 10 5.2 6.3 9.2 2.
ASSES $5ENI 0F COMPLETENESS OF AREAS REVIEWED The areas reviewed are estimated to be 805 comolete.
3.
IDENIIFICATION OF DEFICIENCIES The following deficiencies dere noted during the review of the WPPS-2 SAR. The numbers in the left margin are the IS CS Branch and Section number (031) followed by the question number and the FSAR Section in parenthesis. If the question contains a Regulatory Staf f Position, "BSPa is appended to the question number.
031.055 Identif y all Class 1E equipment which was not qualified
( 3.10.1. 2 )
by test and, for each item, provide the basis for
( 0031. C 01) assuming that it will not be spuriously operated or (Q031.004) f ail to operate when required during and arter a seismic event.
031.056 Describe the environmental qualification procedures (3.11) and the limits of qualification for which tne following Class 1E components inside of the dry well were qualified in the WPPSS-2 station:
(1) Splices, (2) Terminal blocks, (3) Termination cabinets, and (4) Conne c t o r s.
031.057 Identif y all Class 1E equipment inside of the drywell (3.11) and summa rize the environmental qualification. The identification and summa ry f o r each item shall include:
(1) The safety function and f unctional celuirements, (2) The manufacturer, model numrer, type number, etc.,
(3) The location, (4) The method of qualification, (5) The environmental extremes :or which it is qualified (including time), and
. 031.C 57 (6) Identifica tion of the documents vnich are available (and tne location of these documents) to perrit an independent evaluation o f the adequacy of the environmental qualification.
031.058 Augment the response to Question 031. 001 (e) to (0031.001) include the passive design features which prevent valve motion which could otherwise result from damage to the hydraulic system during a LOCA.
031.059 The response to Question 031. 001 (h) presents a new (F7.3-4) design for the logic of the Main Steam Line Isolation (Q O31.001)
Valves. Provide the results of the engineering (QO31.006) analysis and the manufacturing drawings and test (T 1. 6-1) results which demonstrate that ASCO valve 8832320:
(1) Is qualified for the accident environment in the drywell (see Question 031.006),
(2) Is seismically qualified, (3) seets the physical separation and electrical independence requirements of Regulatory Guide 1.75, (4) Satisfies the single failure criterion (Please note that the previous designs have used two separate valves in a one-out-of two to trip configuration), and (5) Is a justifiable enange to the design which was previously reviewed and approved by the staff in our evalua tion of APED-5750, 031.06C (hSP) It is the sta f f's position that the response to
( QO 31. 001)
Question 031.001(i) is unacceptable because it (Q031.012) contradicts information which is provided in Reference (2) to tne cited response.(e.g. See Reference (2) pages 3.1-5 and E3.1-5 Item 3.1b.2 first paragraph.) Therefore, provide a response which is consisten t witn the material vnica has been submitted by General Ilectric to the staff for our AI'4S review.
031.061 The response to Question 031.039 is incomplete. Descrioe (a031.039) tae design provisions which obviate the use of jumpers (other than test instrumenta tion leads) in order for you to satisf y the staf f's position as sta tef in guestion 031.039.
0 31.06 2 (E SP) It is the staff's position that the responsea to (Q O 31. 031) guestions 0 31. 001 (f :),031. 0 0 2, and 031.u23 do not (Q031.092) provide the detailed design inf ormation daica is (JC31.023) required by the Standsed Format for the review of an a
a pplication f or an operstin) license. Therefore, provide amended responses to tae cited questions.
031.063 Provide a schedule for completing the responses to (Q031.005)
Questions 031.005, 031.006, 031.014, 031.016, (a031.000) 031.026, and 031.047.
( Q O 31. 014)
(Q O 31.016)
(QO31.026)
(Q O31.04 7 )
031.064 The response to Question 031.009 is incomplete.
(Q O31.C 09 )
Describe the consequences of a turbine trip without bypass which is coincident with a f ailure of the " relief" f unction electrical supply (including all other loads which are powered from this supply.)
031.065 The response to Question 031.010 is incomplete.
(Q031.010)
Identify the specific recirculation flow control valve components which would be damaged.
031.066 The response to Question 031.01a appears to be (0031.009) based on design provisions which are not a part of (QO31.018) the BWP-5 design. Therefore, provide the following additional information to support the validity of the response:
(1) Describe the differences between the control rod scram speed and resultant reactivity changes between your plant and STN 50-447.
(2) clarif y the discrepancy between the relief vsive system design vnich is described in tae response to Question 031.009 and the Class 13 relief valve design which is provided in GESS AR.
(3) Describe the consequences of the differences between your core size and the size of the Zimmer core on toe validity of referencing the Zimmer study.
0 31.067 (K SP ) The response to Question 031.025 indicates that (QC31.C25) the single f ailure of instrument bus 1A will result in a total loss of direct indication to tne operator of a safe reactor shutdown. It la tne staff's position that this is an unacceptable design. provide a modified design which will satia:y the single f ailure crit erion.
031.066 Provide the wiring diagrams f or the instrument racks (QC31.C32) for your plant which are similar to the diagrams cited in Question 031.032.
031.069 The description of the Vacuum 2elief SyJtem is (3. 8. 2.1; incomplete. Descrice the air supply, proscure
( 6. 2.1.1) centrol, and position indication f or the (JC31.CJ1) butter:ly valves in accordance wits tne requirements of Section 7.3 of Regulatory Guide 1.70. Also, b
-q.
031.069 clarify the reference to FSAR Section 6. 2.1.1. 2 in the response to Questien 031.CC (p).
0 31.0 70 (asp) It is the staf f'sposition that insufficient time
( 6. 2. 2. 2 )
is available for the operator to reliably take
( 6. 5. 2. 2) the manual actions which are necessary to initiate (7.3.1.1) suppression pool spray during a small break. Therefore, (Q031.001) provide an automatic control system for each (Q031.011) suppressicn pool spray system which will satisfy the requirements for Class IE equipment.
031.071 The staf f notes that the primary containment and
( 7. 3.1.1) reactor vessel isolation control system receives power (QO31.001) from the reactor protection s ystem motor genera to r se ts.
Augment the response to Question 031. 001 (r) to describe how the reactor operator determines the. position of each motor operated and each solenoid operated or controlled isolation valve a f ter a loss of the motor generator sets.
(We understand that your presert design de-energizes taase sets during a loss of of fsite power and does not include automa tic re-star t of the motors. )
031.072 The response to Question C S1.001 (t) is unacceptable.
( 7. 6.1. 5)
Clarif y the discrepancier between FS AR Taole 7.1-11 and (F7.1-1)
FSAR Figures 7.1-1 and 7.2-5 and FS AR Section 7.6.1.5.
(F7.2-5)
Specifically, clarity the number of instruments and
( Q 0 31.0 01) the designation of these ihstruments with regard to
(!7.1-11) their trip channel assignments. Also, justify tunning redundant signals tnrough the same penetra tions.
031.073 Clarif y the descrepancy between the responses to (9.3. 5.3)
Questions 031.007 and 031.045. In this regard, the
( F 9. 3 - 13) staff notes that:
(Q031.007)
(Q O 31. 0 4 5)
(1) FSAE Section 9.3. 5.3 states, "The pumps and valves are powered and controlled f rom separa te buses and circuits so tnat a single failure will not prevent system operation",
( 2) The separate buses see powered from onsite sources, (3) PSAR Figure 9.3-13 shows both heaters to be powered from a single source, and (4) The heaters in The Zimmer station are powered from two separate Class 1E buses.
031.074(1S2) The response to Questions 031. 001 ( ab ) is inconple te.
i (7. 7.1. 2)
The staf f notes that additional inrormation on ne l
(F7.7-3) reactor manual control sy stem is provided in FSAR I
(2031.001)
Section 7.7.1.2 and FSA2 Figure 7.7-3.
This figure does not present a design which is technically f easible. It is t he staf f's poattion that Figure 7.7-3 must be replaced with a set of drawings which accurately I
presents the implementation of tais system for l
your plan t.
i m_,
. 031.075 The response to Question 031.008 and the additional
( 7. 7.1. 3) information which is presented in FSAR Figure 7.7-7 (F7.7-7) and FSAR Section 7.7.1.3 is incomplete. In this (GC31.008) regard, the sta f f notes that the design includes an interlock which prevents the transfer of one pump f rom high speed operation to low speed operation when the second pump is operating at high speed and the control switch is noved to the MG position.
Explain why this interlock is provided and justify not providing a similar interlock in the pump start circuitry inorder to prevent a similar occurance under the same conditions if the switch should be placed in the start position.
0 31.0 76 (R SP) It is the staff's position that neither the
( 6. 7) information which is provided in response to
( 7. 3. 2. 3)
Question 031.019 nor the information which is (0031.019) presented in PSAR Sections 6.7 and 7. 3.2. 3 provides sufficient information on the main steamline isolation valv e lea kage control system. Describe this system in accordance with the requirements of Section 7.3 of aegulatory Guide 1.70, including a process and instrumenta tion drawing, an electrical schematic, and a f ailure mode and ef fects analysis vnich is sufficientLy detailed to address failures at the component level.
(e.g. Describe the consequences of a spurious closing of the contacts of relay K4 under all plant operating modes, including testing.)
G 31.0 77 The responses to Questions 0 31.0 21 and 0 31. 037 are (0C31.021) unacceptable because the accuracy of the instrumentation
( Q C 31. C 37) sensors is not provided. (Only the technical (T 7. 2-1) specification requirement for sensor accuracy is provided.) As an example of the sta f f's concern, p lea se note that item 1 of FGAK Taole 7.2-1 indicates that a pressure switch whica has an error of less than one part in 115 is required. In past applications, this instrument in stated to have an accuracy of plus or minus one percent of full scale. Therefore:
( 1) Provide an amended response to Question 031.021 which includes tse accuracies of the sensors which are installed in your plant, and (2) Provile an amended response to Question 031.037 which defines such general terms as " adequate margia" and describes the criteria and procedures for determining and adjusting the instrument test frequencies.
0 31.C 78 Cisrify the discrepancy between the response to guestion (QC31.(5v) 031. 0 5 v la) and FSAR Taole 7.3-5. 3 pecifically, explain (T7.3-5) how the temperature trips, 4hich are usually set at 135 t o ISS de ;.
T., can reliably detect s 50 ;pa leak from tae nHR systom durin; a prolonged cold snutdo vn, when tse crimary coolant temperature may be less than 135 de;.
F.
. 031.079 Provide the f ollowing additional inf o rma tion with (7.3) regard to the control of the minimum flow bypass (Q O 31.0'39 )
control for each ECCS pump:
(1) Describe how the flow sensor is calibrated and
- tested, (2) Describe how proper operation of the relay it controls is tested, (3) Describe how proper functioning of the bypass valve is verified during.the periodic test (Please note that these valves will cycle in less than one minute under the test conditions),
and
( u) Describe how the design of the oypass valve control sub-systems satisfy the requirements of:
(a) GDC - 21, (b) IEEE Std 279 - 1971 Sections 4.10, 4.12, and 4.20, (c) IEEE Std 338 - 1971, (d) Regulatory Guide 1.22, and (e) R egula tory Guide 1.118.
4 CONCLUSION ASD RECO3MENDATIONS We have concluded that those sections within the area of responsibility of the ISCS Branch present replications of the same problems and deficiencies as those found in tne Wm.
B.
Zimmer FSAR. We also conclude that the review of tae FSAE should be started as soon as the applicant provides acceptable responses to the enclosed and previoua questions.
Therefore, we recommend tha t the ? OPS-2 FSAE be accepted for docketing whon the questions presented loove are responded to in an acceptable manner.
- 5. IDENIIFICAIl0N OF SIGNIFICANT RE7'EW ARIAS I
A. Seismic and Environmental Qualification of Class 1E equipment.
2.
Physical separation and Electrical Independonce of redundant Class 1E equipment.
C.
Use of non-Class IE equipment for the protection of public health and satety.
D.
Tae designs of and/or modification in the designs of:
1.
had Sequence control System 2.
Main steamline Isolation valve Control Systen
- 3. Other Systems required f or saf ety, and 4
E33.
E.
Incication of Sypass F.
Satuty-rela ted display f or post-accident and operational occurrence monitoring.
J.
Odaign proviatons for ATWS.
H.
Ilectrical schematics.
I.
Technical Specitications.
J.
Testing of Clasa 12 Systems
6.
RESOLVED CONCIENS During the acceptance review, the applicant has committed to implement the same modifications of the RCIC transfer controls as was implemented during the Zirr.er revie v. The staff finds this commitment to be acceptable. However, the location of the sensors for the HPCS and ECIC transfer functions has not been a=termined by the applicant.
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