ML20214G709
| ML20214G709 | |
| Person / Time | |
|---|---|
| Site: | Columbia |
| Issue date: | 04/20/1977 |
| From: | Bunch D Office of Nuclear Reactor Regulation |
| To: | Varga S Office of Nuclear Reactor Regulation |
| References | |
| CON-WNP-0170, CON-WNP-170 NUDOCS 8605220424 | |
| Download: ML20214G709 (4) | |
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APR 2 0 '.977 i
Docket No. 50-397
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MEMORANDUM FOR:
S. A. Varga. Chief. Light Water F.eactors Branch No. 4. DFM i
FROM:
D. F. Bunch Chief, Accident Analysis Branch, DSE
SUBJECT:
ACCEPTANCE REVIEW OF 'WPPSS UNIT NO. 2 FSAR Pt. ANT NAME: WPPSS Unit No. 2 LICENSING STAGE: OL DOCKET NUMBER: 50-397 MILESTONE NUMCER: 01-31 RESPONSIBLE BRANCH: LWR No. 4 PROJECT MANAGER:
M. Lynch REQUESTED COMPLETION DATE: April 20,1977 REVIEW STATUS: AAB Acceptance Review Complete The Accident Analysis Branch has completed its acceptance review of the WPPSS Unit No. 2 FSAR. We find that sufficient information is presented and recosamend that it be accepted for docketing.
This review was coordinated by P. Tam, Nuclear Engineer, Section B, Accident Analysis Branch.
Oiiginal s4nea by:
Delbert F. Bunch D. F. Bunch, Chief Accident Analysis Branch Division of Site Safety and Environmental Analysis
Enclosure:
Distribution:
Acceptance Review Questions Docket Files for WPPSS Unit No. 2 NRR Rdg. File DSE Rdg. File cc: wo/ enclosure AAB Rdg. File W. Mcdonald AAB Files i
J. Panzarella P. Shuttleworth w/ enclosure See next page
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31 2-1 312.0 SE,CTj00 2. ACCIDENT ANALYSIS BRANCH 312.1 Section 2.2.1 states that there is an explosives and ordnance (2.2.1) test site located approximately 13 miles from WPPSS Unit No. 2.
Indicate if any explosive waste materials from this area are in the WYE burial ground located adjacent to the western edge of the,WFPSS Unit No. 2 property line as shown in Figure 2.1-3.
312,2 Section 10.3.4 indicates that the use of four main steam lines 5
(3.5.1.3) allows the testing of the main steam line isolation valves and turbine stop valves. Contrary to the description in Section 3.5.1.3.7, Section 10.3.4 does not appear to discuss the inspec-tion and testing requirements or procedtres which could confirm that all.overspeed detection and turbine trip actuation functions are operative.
Proyide a brief description and indicate the frequency of the inspection and testing procedures that will be applied to the turbine overspeed protection system.
Include such items as turoins steam acTission valves, emergency stop valves, and the crcss-oser int.ercept valves.
312.3 List all structures, systems, and components that will be pro-(3.5.1.4.1) tected against design basis. tornado missiles. Describe the location cf eact. structure, system, and component and indicate hQw each is to b6 protected against design basis tornado missiles.
312.4 It is the staff's position that plants undergoing construction (3.5.1.4.1) permit review prior to 1973 should provide adequate protection at least against missiles "C" and "F" described in item 4 of Standdrd Rev{aw Plan Section 3.5.1.4 Describe the degree of pcotectico that will be provided for the items discussed in question 312.3 above against missiles "C" and "F".
Alternatively, the ap$licant should provide adequate protection against the Revisicri 1 Tornado Missile Spectrum of the Standard Review Plan.
31 2.5 Provide the amounts of paints and cther organic materials which (6.1.2) do r.ot meet Regulatory Guide 1,54 requirements, and justify that these materials are not present in significant amounts.
312.6 Tne control roma leakage characteristics as described in i
(6.4)
Section 6.4.2.3 of the FSAR indicate that the infiltration rate at 3/8-inch water gauge is 168 cfm, or 0.05 air changes per hour.
In accordance with Regulatory Guide 1.95, item C.5, i
periodic verification testing is required for air exchange rates below 0.06 hr-7 Hence, clarify the statement at the end of Section 6.4.4.2 of the FSAR, wherein periodic verifica-tion testing is indicated as not required.
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312.7 Clarify if the seco c'olur,p heading in Table 6.5-1 is supposed (6.4) to. be " Quantity" rather than " Quality.d Also clarify the discrep-ancy in the pressurization value of 1/8-inch versu:; 0.25-inch water gcuge inx7able 6.4-1.
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312.8 Describe ?.he physical location of the manual ~ purge blind (6.4) flanges indicated in Figure 9.4-1 whbh are connected to the air ducts near the remote air intaker. Describe the provisions for precluding remote air intake bypass due to flange's inad-vertently being left open.
312.9 A failure to closs of either of the motor-operated da[npers (6.4)
WMA-AD-51A-1 or WMA-AD-51B-1 -(see Figure 9.4-1) under emergency LOCA.conditio is would provide an emergency filter train bypass path. Discuss br,iefly additional protection, if any, which.
will be provided to prevent potential unfiltered inleakage via' this pathway.
312.10
~ Indicate the degree of leaktightness with respect to the check (6.4)
- valves in the emergency filter train deluge water drain con-nections under emergency LOCA conditions. Similarly, describe the leaktightness of the pathway through the water drains for the air han<iling discharge duct electric pan-type humidifiers.
312.11 Indicate the provisions for controlling access through the (6.4) non-vestibular door through the control room north wall, between column sections 10 and 11 in the event of a LOCA.
312.12 Provide the following information with respect to a postulated (15.6.5)
LOCA:
1.
Provide a quantitative assessment of the maximum amount of containment leakage which may bypass the SGTS and is released directly to the atmosphere.
2.
Provide a description of the sequence of events (SGTS actuation, spray actuation, peak annulus pressure, etc.)
with the respective times at which these occur.
3.
You have claimed credit for collection of activity by the secondary containment during the initial post-LOCA period.
In order to give such credit, we require that a pressure of -0.25-inch wg be maintained in the annulus. Provide a curve describing the post-LOCA annulus pressure versus time.
4.
Provide an analysis of post-LOCA ESF leakage as outlined in Standard Review Plan 15.6.5, Appendix B.
31 2-3 312.13 Provide an analysis of a radioactive liquid waste system leak (15.7.2) as outlined in Standard Review Plan 15.7.2.
312.14 Provide the following information with respect to a postulated (15.7.4) fuel handling accident:
1.
Describe the radiation monitoring instrumentation which will detect a fuel handling accident inside of the con-tainment structure and in the spent fuel storage building.
Provide drawings of the containment and spent fuel pool area exhaust systems which show the location of the radia-tion detectors relative to the exhaust inlets and isolation valves.
2.
Describe the response time of the containment isolation dampers.
Indicate closure times which will be included in your technical specifications.
3.
Indicate the transit time of a radiation release from the radiation monitor to the isolation valve based on the maximum velocity of the air in the exhaust system.