ML20213G771
| ML20213G771 | |
| Person / Time | |
|---|---|
| Site: | Oyster Creek |
| Issue date: | 01/29/1982 |
| From: | Holland D GENERAL PUBLIC UTILITIES CORP. |
| To: | Lombardo J NRC |
| References | |
| NUDOCS 8611180321 | |
| Download: ML20213G771 (26) | |
Text
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GPU Nuclear NggIgf 100 Interpace Parkway Parsippany, New Jersey 07054 201 263-6500 TELEX 136-482 Wnter's Direct Dial Number:
January 29, 1982 Mr. J. Lombardo Oyster Creek Program Manager U. S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission 7920 Norfolk Avenue Bethesda, MD 20034
Dear Mr. Lombardo:
The responses to the six questions raised by the staff regarding the new Core Spray Sparger are enclosed.
In the event that any questions or comments arise, please contact me at (201) 299-2213.
Sincercly, a
gy)<
Drew G. IIolland BWR Licensing dls Enclosure cc:
J. Knubel l
J. Mancinelli file I
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8611180321 820129 00 DR ADOCK 05000219 PDR
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l GPU Nuclear is a part of the General Pubhc Utihties System I
1
%h,s RESPONSES TO NRC ON CORE SPRAY SPARGER REPLACEMENT PROGRAM QUESTIONS Question 1:
Identify the material to be used for each component of the new core spray system.
Provide supporting evidence to demonstrate that the new system including the support structures manuf actured from the selected materials will not deteriorate under the service condition.
Response
Identification of Materials:
The materials used f or each canponent of the new core spray system are described below. Refer to Figures 1-3 f or identification of parts.
In Figure 1, the support ring, supports, piping, fittings and nozzles are Type 316 or 316L stainless steel material with 0.02% maximum carbon. The cruci f orms are Type CF3 stainless steel casting material.
In Figure 2, the disconnect housing and spring retainer are Type 316 or 316L stainless steel material with 0.02% maximum carbon. The spring is Ni-Cr-Fe Alloy X-750 material.
In F igure 3, the thermal sleeve, pipe, fittings and support flange are Type 316 or 316L stainless steel material with.02% maximum carbon.
The anti-vibration spring and connector seal are Ni-Cr-Fe Alloy X-750 material. The connector,
s
-2 connector ring and disconnect flange are Type CF3 stainless steel casting material.
For wear resistance and anti-galling, specific parts are chrome plated or hardfaced with Stellite 6.
Parts which are hardfaced include the connector and connector ring at their interf ace surf aces, and the sur f ace of the disconnect flange (F igure 3).
Threads of the flange bolts (Figure.3) and the outside diameter of the spring retainer (Figure 2) are chrome plated. The use of chrome plating and Stellite 6 is based on favorable experience gained from their extensive use in existing BWR applications.
General Corrosion The general corrosion rates of stainless steel are low for the BWR environment.
These rates are primarily determined by the overall alloy content and the env i ronm e nt. The rates for stainless steel are not significantly influenced by minor variations in chemistry or processing control. Corrosion is accounted for by conservative design allowances for a 40 year life. There is no applicable difference in rates for base metal, weld metal, or weld heat affected zones.
Intergranular Stress Corrosion Cracking (IGGSCC)
Numerous steps have been taken to eliminate material susceptibility to IGSCC.
All wrought stainless steel is Type 316 or 316L purchased with special requirements.
These include chemistry control (
0.02% carbon), solution heat treatment control, examination for intergranular attack, testing for sensitizaton, and control of hardness, in addition, fabrication is controlled
3 s
In the areas of weld heat input, cold deformation limits, processing materials, and elimination of welded crevices in the design. All of these factors together have been shown to make Type 316 or 116L virtual ly immune to IGSCC in the BWR environment.
Some parts of the sparger are Type CF3 (cast 304L) with ferrite content controlled to an 8% minimum.
The presence of this amount of ferrite, in conjunction with the low carbon content, assures that IGSCC in the BWR environment is not a concern f or this material. Ferrite has been shown to be.
very effective in preventing crack initiation and growth.
Likewise, the stainless steel weld f i l l er metal is Type 308L, with ferrite controlled to 8%
minimum. The IGSCC resistance resulting from low carbon and high ferrite is enhanced by the fine grain structure inh'erent in weld metal deposits.
The material for some of the bolting in the sparger system is Type XM-19.
Stress corrosion cracking resistance of XM-19 has been found to be excellent due to the alloy's high chromium content, stabilizing elements and controlled carbon content. The widest BWR application of XM-19 is in control rod drive components where the nitriding process requires high resistance to sensitization.
Type XM-19 al so perf orms very well as a bolting alloy due to its high strength and resistance to galIing.
Ni-Cr-Fe Alloy X-750 is used for the spring material.
Heat treatment temperatures for this alloy are controlled to produce a metallurgical condition that is resistant to IGSCC.
In summary, the materials used in this system have been selected on the basis of
4 extensive operating and test experience in the BWR environment. These materials are expected to provide adequate corrosion and wear resistance for the intended application.
All materials and material processes are identical to those utilized in the latest GE BWR plants.
Question 2: Discuss in detail the inservice inspection or surveillance program for the new core spray system including the support structures. Do you intend to follow the requirements of both Section XI Code and IE Bulletin 80-13?
Response
Applicable rules for inservice inspection of reactor internals attached to the vessel are specified in Section XI of the ASME Code,1974 Edition, with addenda
-to and including the Sumer 1975 addenda.
Additional requirements are specified in IE Bulletin No. 80-13.
Section XI requires visual inspection of core support structures and reactor pressure vessel wclded attachments.. Thus, inspection of the removable overhead sparger is not required by-Section XI.
However, IE Bulletin No. 80-13 requires
' visual examination of core spray spargers and core spray lines.
A proposed inspection program has been developed which satisifies the requirements of IE Bulletin 80-13 for a representative portion of the piping.
The proposed inspection program is summarized in Table 1.
Onsite remote visual i
equipment availability and access may limit. actual examinations.
It is recommended that the proposed inspection program be performed during the first 5
i refueling outage following sparger installation.
The frequency of subsequent i
L
~
.S-Inspections will be in accordance with the inspection schedule defined in Section XI paragraph IWB-2400 and the Oyster Creek ISI Program. The extent of examinations shall include 331/3% each 40 months for those areas shown in Table 1.
k Discussion:
The intent of this plan is to accomp lish inservice inspection which is the same, or better than required for core support structures, for a specifled sampiing of locations.
Locations are selected on the basis of operating stresses, and consideration of the original sparger cracking.
Sampling is used for some locations because of the very large number of repetitions of the same t
j configuration, and the desire to limit personnel radiation exposure. Thus, for l
low stressed parts, small samples are inspected, while all parts of a type with higher stresses are inspected.
Initial remote visual inspections may be limited due to access restrictions and remote equipment capability. Pre-installation baseline inspections with photographic records will support areas / locations that may not be accessible pending development of remote visual equipment.
The pre-service inspection (PSI) will include representative areas to be examined inservice.
Representative areas will be pre-serviced to characterize i
them (remote visual) for future reference during inservice examination.
- Also, PSI will include areas identified during fabrication shop final visual examination as potential problem areas for interpreting remote visual displays.
The f irst-outage examination is intended to provide early confirmation that no areas of high-cycle fatigue occur, which would be evident af ter one operating i
t
)
-6 period.
Subsequently, tile recommended inspection frequency and reporting requirements is as spectfled in Sect. ion XI, rather than at each outage, as required by IE Bulletin 80-13.
In the event that reportable items are found during ISI, notification will occur within 24 hours2.777778e-4 days <br />0.00667 hours <br />3.968254e-5 weeks <br />9.132e-6 months <br /> as required by IE Bulletin 80.13.
The basis for this recommendation is that the material s, fabrication, and design methods which are used in the replacement sparger represent a substantial improvement in operating reliability. This has been demonstrated by test and operating experience in the BWR environment.
It is believed that the mechanism which caused cracks in the original sparger will not occur in the replacement sparger. This is expected to be confirmed by the examination and evaluation of samples of cracked sections from the original spar'ger prior to the first-outage inspectlon.
Question 3: Considering the possibility of a loss of coolant accident; provide assurance that.it is acceptable not to have spray capability during refueling
~
operations with the sparger removed in a non-ref loodable BWR.
Response
During ref ueling operations, -the core spray sparger overhead grid will be removed, and will not be available to provide core spray heat transf er in.the event of a loss-of-coolant accident.
Since the vessel is totally depressurized, and is in the refueling mode while tne sparger is removed, a pipe rupture leading to a design basis loss-of-coolant accident is not considered a credible event. Moreover, the following shows that adequate core cooling can be maintained in the unlikely event of a pipe break or operator error during refueling, without a core spray sparger grid in place.
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7 A.
G.E. has designed a flow diverter cap to clamp onto the core spray inlet piping when the sparger is removed. This device has been designed to serve dual purposes. First, it will function to redirect flow from the piping of the core spray system into the core region rather than upwards.
Secondly, the flow diverter prevents dropping of foreign objects into the piping.
The design of the cap also helps to assure satisf actory operation of the core spray pumps by having a loss coef ficient comparable to that of the sparger it replaces.
It should be noted that the flow diverters will not be classified as
" essential-to-safety." The minimum water level presently required by Technial Specifications (4'8" above the top of the active fuel) will assure that the
' water injected by the core spray system (s) will return by gravity back into the vessel even if the flow diverters are inadvertently not installed.
B.
Although the likelihood of opening unacceptable leak paths below the core during maintenance is considered very low, limitations on such operations will be imposed. These limitations assure that even if such an operator error is assumed while fl$e core spray sparger is removed, adequate core cooling will be provided by flooding of the core bypass region and/or maintaining suf ficient j
makeup capability to keep the. core covered.'
4 Generally, maintenance limitations will consist of requirements involving the following:
1.
One'or two isolation bondaries for protection against loss of reactor 4
coolant depending on availability of' core spray.
i
2,. onn or both core spray systems operable depending upon the potential leak siza resulting from the maintenance item.
3.
deferral of the maintenance item until the overhead grid is reinstalled if tha potential leak rate would be in exceis of the combined capacity of both core spray systems.
4.
In addition, normal or Infrequent maintenance operations isolated by two or more boundaries does not require the availability of either or both core spray systems.
C.
In the event of operator error, the above limitation assure that adequate core cooling w'ill be provided by flooding of the core bypass region and/or maintaining sufficient makeup capability to keep the core covered.
In addition, analyses and qualitative tests have shown that even if the core was not u
maintained in a covered condition, the spray flow which enters the core from th'e flow diverters or the water returning back to the core by gravity would be sufficient to cool each bundle. The reason for this is that in the refuelir.g condition, the cooling flow required for each bundle is less than 2% of the average flow per bundle provided by a single core spray system.
In addition, water level in the fuel pool / cavity / equipment pool is kept full for virtually, the entire outage.
In the event of a leak, the core would be retained in a
~
covered stat'e, and suf f icient time would be provided for operator actions to maintain core cooling.
Question 4: ~ Provide' assurance that the new core spray sparger design modification will not impact any established operating or safety limits for y
-,.....g_.
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',hysterCreek. Address the potential effects that additional carryunder may have on the critical power ratio core safety limit or on the uncertainties used in datormining the saf ety limit.
Provide the results of any transients that evaluate the effects of the new sparger design.
Response
installation of an overhead core spray sparger will produce very small and inconsequential changes in reactor performance under normal, transient, and cccident conditions because reactor internal changes are smail:
Added smalI leakage path at the shroud / shroud head flange.
Additional two-phase pressure loss of 2 psid at rated conditions.
4-Reactor free volume reduced 0.4% due to the addition of the sparger and
- support structure.
The offects of those changes were evaluated on a typical BWR (a BWR/3) and are t-representative of the changes expected for Oyster Creek. The significance of the reactor internal changes are described below:
l EFFECT OF LEAK AT SHROUD HEAD FLANGE Analysis was performed to bound the effect of additional steam carryunder due to a new and conservatively modeled leakage path at the shroud / shroud head flange resu l t ing f rom removal of the steam skirt. Results showed added carryunder,of
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',less than 0.03% which would s l i ghtl y increase core inlet enthalpy and correspondingly, core inlet temperature (by 0.04*F).
An underestimate of 0.04*F in the core inlet temperature will result in overpredictions of the MCPR by approximately 0.01 percent ( ATLAS test data shows + 1 *F change will decrease the critical power by 0.3 percent at 1000 psia and 1.00 Mlb/hr-ft
),
which can be translated into 0.0002 in MCPR overprediction, which is negligible. The cdditional uncertainty resulting.from a 0.04*F change in core inlet temperature would have an adverse impact on Saf ety Limit MCPR (SLMCPR) of approximately 0.000001, which is negligible. This is because the uncertainty in core inlet temperature contributes less than 1% to the total CPR uncertainty used in establishing the SLMCPR.
The design basis carryunder is 0.25% which was established as a steam separator performance criterion.
It is concluded that a 0.03% increase in carryunder (if it were to be realized) would have little, if any, impact on recirculation system performance. Thus it is concluded that removal of the steam skirt, with a possible small increase in shroud / shroud head flange leakage, will have an inconsequential effect on reactor performance.
s RECIRCULATION SYSYEM HYDRAULIC RESISTANCE Addition of the sparger and support structure in the upper plenum above the core adds an internal two-phase pressure loss. At rated conditions, a conservative assessment shows approximately a 4% pumping power increase which is well within system capability. At natural circulation on the 100% rod line, a stability eva'l uation was per f ormed by conservatively modeling the core spray sparger hydraulic loss as an additional upper tie plate loss for all fuel bundles.
The
.. - ~ -
_11-r'asults show a 7% increase in the coro decay ratio. 'However,.the decay ratio remains significantly below the ultimate performance Ilmit of 1.0.
Thus it is concluded that addition of a two-phase pressure loss in the upper plenum does not produce any unacceptable changes in reactor or core performance.
REACTOR VOLUt/E CHANGE The net etfect of metal volume addition is to cause a small change in transient 2
l peak pressure, heat flux, and their respective times.
Results of sensitivity studies performed on a similar size BWR/3 plant are shown in Table 2.
Comparison of the results shows the overhead sparger has a negligible ef f ect on transient performance.
In conclusion, the results of studies performed as part of this reactor retrofit f
provide ampie assurance that the new core spray sparger design wili not significantly impact established operating or safety limits for Oyster Creek.
Question 5: Provide assurance that normal operation and removal / installation of the new sparger will not change nozzle position or spray pattern. Provide datails of any periodic inspection to be performed on the sparger assembly to cssure integrity and proper nozzle position.
(See Figs. A-D).
i 4
Rasponse:
Normal operating conditions wiII not cause any signifIcant change in nozzle position or spray 'attern. The sparger piping, support structure, and nozzle p
i 4
',c'ttachment are all-waldad construction using materials which have been shown to be highly resistant to stress corrosion cracking in the BWR environment.
Support Structure The sparger is a highly redundant rigid structure which will provide dimensionally stable nozzle positioning.
It is located in a relatively low Irradiation field, so that dimensional changes due to irradiation growth are nngligible. Further, positioning changes in excess of 0.60 inches due to the most severe thermal gradients during core spray actuation have been evaluated,
'end are accommodated by the spray design.
i Spray Characteristics
~ ~ ~
The spray nozzles are arranged to provide a large amount of overlap in spray coverage. Spray tests in air and steam have shown adequate spray distribution with any or all of the nozz les disp laced horizontally up to 2.0 inches f rom nominal positioning. This allowance provides design margin in excess of that required for the above thermal gradients, for fabrication tolerances, and installation tolerances and clearances.
l Rsmoval or Installation Removal or installation of the sparger in the reactor can be performed with the sparger attached to the shroud head or handled separately. When attached to the shroud head, the assembly is guided into position using the shroud head lug fit to the guide rod. As the shroud head nears the shroud, two 3.0 inch diameter
s
. guide pins which pilot and position the sparger also engage the shroud lugs.
These features assure the sparger will not inadvertently contact any reactor intsrnal parts until it is seated in its proper located positlon on the shroud flenge.
Whsn the sparger is handled separately, a special lifting fixture is used which i
contains the same two guide rod engagement lugs and guide pin features as the shroud head. This guides the sparger into the same position on the shroud, until it is pinned and clamped in place by subsequent installation of the shroud head.
When the sparger is transferred to the equipment storage pool during ref ueling, it is placed on a special storage platform.
The platform provides the same support for the sparger as the shroud flange, i.e.,
a full circumferential seating face for the sparger support ring, open to the center.
It also provides the same positioning f eatures as in the reactor, using two vertical guide rod sections which must be engaged when the sparger is lowered. This same platform is used either at the bottom of the equipment pool when the sparger and shroud head are handled as a unit, or placed in top of the shroud head when the sparger f
is handled separately. Thus, any time the sparger is positioned in the reactor or the storage pool, it is positively guided into place, preventing damage to l-spray nozzles and other parts.
l l
Datails of sparger. inspections to assure mechanical integrity, end proper nozzle positioning, were previously described in response to Question 2.
i Question 6: Provide estimates of occupational radiation exposure during the
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~
removal of the old system, disposal of the old system, and replacement of the new system.
Response
The occupational radiation exposures for removal of the existing core spray sparger and internal piping, and installation of the replacement parts, is estimated to be as follows:
1.
Core spray piping replacement (drywell) 150 man-rem based on the latest general area survey of 50 Mr/hr.
2.
Feedwater Sparger removal / replacement
- 120 man-rem based on an average in vessel exposure of 150 mr/hr.
3.
Shroud Head bolt disposal 50 man-rem with the general area reading of 30 mr/hr in the vicinity of the equip. pool.
4.
Core Spray Sparger replacement 150 man-rem with an expected cavity exposure of 25 mr/hr and without the use of face masks.
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SUPPORT SUPPORTS I
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, Shroud Penetration Figure J
- Overhead Grid Sparger Ini'et Piping, Disconnect Joint and Coupling
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TABt.E 1.
INSERVICE I!!SPECTION PROGRN1 1
LOCATION:
NO. PLACES PARAMETER METHOD 1.
Spray Nozzles All Relative llorizontal position
. Remote visual (camera) 3 and displacement due to damage
-Socket Welds 15 Weld Integrity VT-1 2.
Support Undercarriage 5
Weld Integrity VT-1
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3 Header-Support Brackets All Weld Integrity VT-1
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TABLE 1.
-(Cont'd)
LOCATION NO. PLACES PARAMETER PETHOD l
'4 315 Inch. Sparger Pipe (Full Length) 4 Integrity VT PER IEB 80-13 and Elbows 5.
5 Inch Header Pipe (Full Length)
Both Integrity VT PER l
IER 80-13 and Tees i
l I
VT PER 6.
Cruciforms and 1 inch Nozzle Piping Assemblies 10 Integrity IEB 80-13 7.
Leaf Support Beams F
Vertical 2
Weld Integrity VT-1 V
Angled 12 l
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TABLE 1.
(Cont'd)
LOCATION
.NO. PLACES PARAMETER METHOD
- 8.
Support Beam Joint 4
Held Integrity VT-1
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9 Support Ring Seismic Spacers All Integrity VT-3 10.
Disconnect Joint Assembly Both Integrity VT-3 11.
Internal Pipe Coupling Both Integrity VT-3
- Methods ss defined in ASME Section XI, IWA-2200 (Remote)
NOTE:
1.
For items I thru 11 - surfaces to be inspected shall be those which are accessible at the locations noted.
2 Inspcetions will be performed with the sparger installed in the vessel or while in storage in the equipment pool depending on access requirements and radiation exposure considerations.
I TABLE 2 OPERATING TRANSIENT COMPARISON
- 4 PEAK PEAK PEAK PEAK TRANSIENT VESSEL BOTTOM VESSEL BOTTOM llEAT
!! EAT EVENT PRESSURE TIME PRESSURE TIME FLUX / TIME FLUX / TIME (PSIA)
(SEC)
(PSIA)
(SEC)
(%)
(SEC)
(*6)
(SEC)
W/ EXISTING CSS W/ GRID CSS W/ EXISTING CSS W/ GRID CSS Tr W/0 1250/4.68 12S1/4.70 106.0/1.80 106.1/1.83 BYPASS LR W/0 BYPASS 1248/4.71 1249/4.64 106.S/1.88 106.7/1.7S J
FWCF 1181/22.80 1181/22.78 107.4/20.06 107.S/21.86 i
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- Calculated wtih REDY transient model j
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