Text

Insp Rept 50-285/86-34 on 861201-31.Violations Noted: Failure to Identify Auxiliary Bldg as Radioactive Matls Area,Install Fire Barrier Per Installation Instructions & Follow Procedure for Operation of Waste Gas Sampling Sys
	ML20213A324
Person / Time
Site:	Fort Calhoun
Issue date:	01/27/1987
From:	Harrell P, Hunter D; NRC OFFICE OF INSPECTION & ENFORCEMENT (IE REGION IV)
To:	;
Shared Package
ML20213A296	List: ML20213A294; ML20213A304; ML20213A324;
References
	50-285-86-34, NUDOCS 8702030218
	Download: ML20213A324 (18)
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APPENDIX B

U. S. NUCLEAR REGULATORY COMMISSION

REGION IV

r ' NRC Inspection Report: 50-285/86-34 License: DPR-40

Docket: 50-285

Licensee: Omaha Public Power District

1623 Harney Street

Omaha, Nebraska 68102

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Facility Name: Fort Calhoun Station

Inspection At: Fort Calhoun Station, Blair, Nebraska

Inspection Conducted: December 1-31, 1986-

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Inspector: WAA I 'd-N

P.\Hj 'MarM 1," Senior Resident Reactor Date *

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Approved: m I/E !I7

D. R. Hunter, Chief, Project Section B, Date

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Reactor Projects Branch

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8702030218 870129

PDR ADOCK 05000285

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Inspection Summary

Inspection Conducted December 1-31, 1986 (Report 50-285/86-34)

Areas Inspected: Routine, unannounced inspection including operational safety

verifications, maintenance, surveillance, plant tours, safety-related system

walkdowns, security observations, inoffice review of periodic and special

reports, followup on previously identified items, cold weather preparations,

and followup on an allegation related to dismissal of an individual for

incompetence. -

Results: Within the ten areas inspected, three violations (failure to identify

the auxiliary building as a radioactive materials area, paragraph 4; failure to

install a fire barrier / security door in accordance with documented installation

instructions, paragraph 4; and failure to follow procedure for operation of the

waste gas sampling system, paragraph 6) were identified.

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DETAILS

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1. Persons Contacted

- R. Andrews, Division Manager - Nuclear Production

W. Gates, Plant Manager

C. Brunnert, Supervisor - Operations Quality Assurance

M. Core, Supervisor - Maintenance

J. Fisicaro, Supervisor - Nuclear Regulatory and Industry Affairs

- J. Fleuhr, Supervisor - Station Training

J. Foley, Supervisor - I&C and Electrical Field Maintenance

S. Gambhir, Section Manager - Generating Station Engineering (GSE)

J. Gasper, Manager - Administrative Services

L. Gundrum, Manager - GSE Nuclear

M. Kallman, Supervisor - Security

L. Kusek, Supervisor - Operations

- D. Munderloh, Licensing Engineer

T. McIvor, Supervisor - Technical

R. Mueller, Plant Engineer

A. Richard, Manager - Quality Assurance

G. Roach, Supervisor - Chemical and Radiation Protection

F. Smith, Plant Chemist

J. Tesarek, Reactor Engineer

S. Willrett, Supervisor - Administration Services and Security

Others Attending Exits ,

J. Pellet, Operator Licensing Examiner, Region IV, NRC

R. Hall, Deputy Director, Division of Reactor Safety and Projects,

Region IV, NRC

Denotes attendance at the monthly exit interview held on January 2,

1987.

Denotes attendance at the senior reactor operator walkthru examination

exit held on December 17, 1986.

The inspector also contacted other plant personnel, including operators,

technicians, and administrative personnel.

2. Followup on Previously Identified Items

(Closed) Open Item 285/8602-06: Replacement of RTV seals during

maintenance or modification activities.

To establish equipment environmental qualification for terminal

blocks installed in the plant, the licensee applied RTV to the

blocks to form a vapor seal. However, the licensee had not

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established a method to ensure the seal was maintained during

subsequent maintenance or modification activities.

The licensee issued maintenance procedure HP-RTV-1, " Application

of RTV Silicon. Sealant on Terminal Blocks," Revision 0, dated

November 6, 1986, to establish the requirements for replacement

of RTV if the vapor seals are broken. The NRC resident

inspector reviewed.the procedure and it appeared to establish

the necessary controls and provide the appropriate instructions

for reapplication of RTV.

(Closed) Open Item 285/8614-03: Section 5.9.5 of the updated safety

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i analysis report (USAR) requires licensee review to verify-

information was correct.

The licensee performed a review of USAR Section 5.9.5,

Table 5.9-1, and figure 5.9-19 and verified that the information

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provided in the USAR was correct. The NRC inspector performed a

review of selected information and noted no problems.

. Subsequent to the review performed by the licensee, Table 5.9-1

and Figure 5.9-19 were replaced in the USAR by Figure 5.9-13,

Sheets 1 thru 64 during the annual update to the USAR. The NRC

inspector reviewed selected sheets for accuracy of the

information provided and noted minor errors of an editorial

nature. The licensee stated that the errors would be corrected

in the next scheduled USAR update.

(Closed) Deviation 285/8618-01: The safety parameter display system

(SPDS) does not monitor all parameters as stated in the safety

evaluation report (SER).

On September 29, 1986, the licensee submitted a letter to the

NRC's Office of Nuclear Reactor Regulation (NRR) requesting

changes to the approved SPDS parameter monitoring list. The

letter submitted by the licensee included justification as to

why the list should not include containment temperature, primary

system boron concentration, and primary system average

temperature.

NRR reviewed the licensee's submittal and on November 28, 1986,

issued a revised SER for the SPDS. The SER stated that NRR

concluded that monitoring of the three parameters listed above

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was not required.

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(Closed) Severity Level IV Violation 285/8621-01: Storage of boric acid

to prevent damage or deterioration.

The licensee has stored the boric acid in a permanent critical

j quality equipment (CQE) area inside the auxiliary building. The

CQE area consisted of an enclosed wire cage to prevent stacking

l of extraneous material on the bags of boric acid.

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, The NRC inspector verified that the boric acid had been placed

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other selected areas of the plant to verify that other CQE

material was properly stored to prevent damage or deterioration.

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No additional problems were noted.

(Closed) Severity Level IV Violation 285/8621-02: A report was not

submitted for a nonfunctional fire barrier.

The licensee revised and reissued Procedure 50-58. " Fire Barrier

Penetrations," on September 19, 1986. The revision to S0-58

included a new requirement for any person working in the plant

to report to the plant engineer, any fire barrier that is not

. functional for greater than seven days.

The NRC inspector reviewed the procedure change issued by the

licensee. It appeared that the procedure change adequately

addressed the requirements for reporting nonfunctional fire

barriers to the NRC.

(Closed) 11nresalved Item 285/8623-04: Organizational changes made prior

to updating the Technical Specifications (TS) and quality

assurance manual (QAM).

NRR issued Amendment 101 to the TS to incorporate the

organizational changes made by the licensee into Section 5 of

the TS. The NRC staff concluded that the organizational changes

made by the licensee were acceptable.

The licensee changed the organizational charts and issued the

charts as a revision to the QAM. Prior to the change, an

evaluation was performed by the licensee. The results of the

evaluation indicated that the organizational changes made by the

licensee did not reduce the level of commitments stated in the

current NRC-approved quality assurance program.

(Closed) Open Item 8624-05: Operator assigned to shift after failing NRC

annual requalification examination.

The NRC inspector interviewed the operator that failed to pass

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the requalification examination to determine what duties the

operator performed while assigned to an operating onshift crew

after the examination failure. The operator stated that he did

not perform any licensed duties and that he had been instructed

by licensee supervision not to perform license duties. The NRC

inspecter also interviewed other personnel onshift with the

operator during the time period. No individual could recall

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, whether or not the operator performed licensed duties. The NRC

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inspector interviewed licensee management and management

confirmed that the operator was instructed not to perform

licensed duties.

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The NRC inspector reviewed documentation generated in the

control room during the time the operator was onshift after

failing the requalification examination. The documentation

review did not indicate that the operator had performed licensed

duties. The NRC inspector also reviewed the security computer

printout for the control room access during the time the

individual was assigned to the operating crew. The printout

indicated that there was at least one other licensed individual

in the control room at all times during this refueling period (a

licensed individual other than the operator who failed the

examination).

3. Operational Safety Verifications

The NRC inspector conducted reviews and observations of selected

activities to verify that facility operations were performed in

conformance with the requirements established under 10 CFR, administrative

procedures, and the TS. The NRC inspector made several control room

observations to verify:

. Proper shift staffing

. Operator adherence to approved procedures and TS requirements

. Operability of reactor protective system and engineered safeguards

equipment

. Logs, records, recorder traces, annunciators, panel indications, and

switch positions complied with the appropriate requirements

. Proper return to rervice of components

. Maintenanceorders(MO)initfatedforequipmentinneedof

maintenance

. Appropriate conduct of control room and other licensed operators

No violations or deviations were noted.

4. Plant Tours

The NRC inspector conducted plant tours at various times to assess plant

and equipment conditions. The following items were observed during the

tours:

. General plant conditions

. Equipment conditions, including fluid leaks and excessive vibration

. Plant housekeeping and cleanliness practices including fire hazards

and control of combustible material

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. Adherence to the requirements of radiation work permits

. Work activities performance in accordance with approved procedures

During tours of

the auxiliary the plant,)the

building (AB wereNRCnotinspector

properly noted

postedthat all entrances

to indicate to

that the

AB was a radioactive materials area. The doors identified by the NRC

inspector as not being properly posted were the emergency exit from the AB

and the door from the AB to the AB roof. Both doors provide access from

the clean area outside the AB to the radioactive materials area inside the

AB.

Section 20.203(e) of 10 CFR Part 20 requires that each area or room in

which licensed material is used or stored be conspicuously posted with a

sign bearing the radiation caution symbol and the words

" Caution-Radioactive Materials Area." Paragraph 3.1.9 of Section 3.0 to

the licensee's radiation protection manual defined a radioactive materials

area as an area where licensed material is used or stored. The AB has

been designated by the licensee as a radioactive materials area. This

paragraph also stated that each radioactive materials area will be posted

with a sign bearing the radiation colors and symbol with the words

" Caution-Radioactive Materials Area". The licensee failed to post all

entrances to the AB with the appropriate sign. This is an apparent

violation. (285/8634-01)

Upon notification by the NRC resident inspector, the licensee promptly

posted the doors identified by the inspector with the appropriate sign.

In addition, the licensee reviewed other possible entrances to the AB and

posted signs where appropriate. The licensee also reviewed other

locations inside the AB to verify signs had been appropriately posted. No

other problems were noted.

The NRC inspector reviewed the actions taken by the licensee in response

to notification of the apparent violation. It appeared the licensee had

adequately addressed the criteria for response to the apparent violation.

Based on the actions taken by the licensee and the review performed by the

NRC inspector no further information is required regarding Violation

285/8634-01, and the violation is considered closed.

During a plant tour, the NRC resident inspector noted that a fire

barrier / security door (1025-4) for the cable spreading room had been

recently installed with an excessive gap between the bottom of the door

and the threshold plate. The gap was approximately one-eighth of an inch

at one end and approximately five-eighths of an inch at the other end.

The National Fire Protection Association (NFPA) specification states that

the gap for a door with a threshold should not be greater than

three-eighths of an inch. Upon notification by the NRC inspector, the

licensee reviewed the situation and determined that an hourly roving fire

watch had been in effect since installation of door 1025-4 as required by

the TS for a nonfunctional fire barrier. The establishment of the hourly

fire patrol was not due to the door being a nonfunctional fire barrier,

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but was established for.the cable spreading room in general. The licensee

-had not submitted a 30-day special report for this nonfunctional fire-

barrier as required by the TS. The licensee is reviewing the

reportability requirements for this fire barrier.-

The NRC resident inspector reviewed the instruction package

(MR-FC-85-38A/B) for installation of door.1025-4. In addition to door

1025-4, this installation package also installed two additional doors

(1036-2 and 1011-28). Door 1011-28 was not a fire door but was installed

as a security door. Door 1036-2 was installed as a fire barrier / security

door. During review of this package, the NRC inspector noted a number of

anomalies associated with the completion of the documentation used for

installation activities. The anomalies are listed below.

. For installation of doors 1025-4 and 1036-2, the procedural step

requiring the engineer to verify the doors had been installed in

accordance with Underwriter Laboratory (UL) and manufacturer

standards was signed off. However, the doors.did not meet these and

NFPA standards in that the gap at the bottom of door 1025-4 was

excessive and door 1036-2 had six holes in it that exposed the core

of the door. The holes in door 1036-2 were ? eft unplugged when the

door closing mechanism was relocated. These conditions were noted

after the verification of installation step was signed on December

10, 1986. No specific information was provided in the installation

instructions as to the acceptance criteria (e.g., maximum

door-to-threshold plate gap, exposure of door core not allowed, etc.)

required to meet the referenced standards. In addition, the engineer

had signed the step verifying door 1025-4 had been painted blue when,

in fact, the door had not yet been painted. During review of the

installation package and actual door installation, the NRC inspector

noted, as stated above, that door 1036-2 was also a nonfunctional

fire barrier. The licensee has established that an hourly roving

fire patrol was in effect for this door since installation. The-

licensee is reviewing, in conjunction with door 1025-4,.whether a

special 30-day report required by the TS is also appropriate for door

1036-2.

. For installation of doors 1036-2 and 1011-28, quality control (QC)

hold points were included for verification of acceptable

installation, yet the QC hold points were not signed prior to

completing additional work beyond the hold points.

. The " work completed" signature for installation of all three doors

had been signed even though all steps in the installation procedure

were not completed.

Criterion V of Appendix B to 10 CFR Part 50 requires that activities

affecting quality be described in documented instructions, installed in

accordance with the instructions, and appropriate quantitative and

qualitative acceptance criteria be provided. Section A.6 of the

licensee's quality assurance plan amplifies this requirement and states

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that quality-related activities for plant operations, fabrication,

processing, assembly, inspection, and test be accomplished in accordance

with instructions and that such documentation adequately reflect all

applicable quality requirements and contain the appropriate quaatitative

acceptance criteria (such as dimensions, tolerances, and samples) for

determining that important activities have been satisfactorily

accomplished. The failure to install fire barrier / security doors 1036-2,

1011-28, and 1025-4, in accordance with documented instructions, to

provide the appropriate acceptance criteria in the instructions and the

failure to honor the specified QC hold points is an apparent violation.

(285/8634-02)

During plant tours, the NRC resident inspector also noted the following.

. Dry, unused ion exchange resin was stored in an area that was not

protected by an automatic detector / sprinkler installation. Upon

notification by the NRC resident inspector, the resin was moved to an

area with an automatic detector / sprinkler installation.

. On four separate occasions during this inspection period, the NRC

resident inspector noted that gas cylinders located in the AB were

not properly stored. In each case, cylinders were stored in an

upright position without being properly secured to a structure.

Without proper securing, the cylinders could be overturned and

damaged, causing the cylinder to become a missile hazard and

endangering personnel and/or safety-related equipment. Upon

notification after each of the four occasions by the NRC resident

inspector, the licensee secured the cylinders.

. The NRC inspector noted that two fire doors (1007-36 and 1011-1) were

not functioning properly in that the doors would not always latch

thus making the fire barrier. nonfunctional. The licensee stated that

an hourly fire patrol had been established in accordance with the TS.

The licensee issued a maintenance order for repair of the door

closers. The closers were adjusted and the door returned to a

functional status within the seven-day period allowed by the TS;

therefore, a special report is not required to be submitted.

. The licensee has been in the process of replacing old fire doors with

new fire doors. After replacement of the fire doors, the licensee

has not reinstalled the signs that were installed on the original

fire doors. The signs included information such as no smoking; halon

system installed, evacuate if alarm sounds; and no two-way radio

transmission allowed. The licensee stated that the signs would be

replaced. The signs were not replaced by the end of this inspection

period.

. A container of lubricating oil was stored adjacent to low pressure

safety-injection pump (SI-2B). The flammable oil was stored in a

plastic bottle rather than an NFPA-approved container. The amount of

oil did not present a fire load for the affected fire area greater

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than what had been analyzed for that area. The NRC inspector

notified the licensee; however, the oil had not been placed in a

proper container or stored in a flammable storage cabinet prior to

the end of this inspection period.

. Room 81 was found to be messy and needed additional licensee

housekeeping attention. The NRC inspector notified the licensee;

however, additional housekeeping attention was not provided prior to

the end of the inspection period.

5. Security Observations

The NRC inspector verified the physical security plan was being

implemented by selected observation of the following items:

. The security organization is properly manned.

. Personnel within the protected area (PA) display their identification

badges.

. Vehicles are properly authorized, searched, and escorted or

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controlled within the PA.

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. Persons and packages are properly cleared and checked before entry

into the PA is permitted.

. The effectiveness of the security program is maintained when security

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equipment failure or impairment requires compensatory measures to be

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No violations or deviations were identified.

6. Safety-Related System Walkdowns

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The NRC inspector walked down accessible portions of the following

safety-related systems to verify system operability. Operability was

determined by verification of selected valve and switch positions. The

systems were walked down using the' procedures noted:

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. Reactor startup locked valves (Procedure OI-RC-28, Revision 45)

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. Waste gas sampling system (Procedure 01-WDG-3, Revision 3)

During the walkdowns, the NRC inspector noted minor discrepancies of an

editorial nature between the procedures and plant as-built conditions for

selected areas checked in the waste gas sampling systen. No problems were

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noted during walkdown of the reactor startup locked valves procedure.

None of the conditions noted during walkdown of the waste gas sampling

system appeared to affect the safe operation of the system. Licensee

- personnel stated that the editorial errors would be corrected.

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On December 4, 1986, the NRC resident inspector walked down portions of

the waste gas sampling system in preparation for closecut of licensee

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event report (LER)86-003. LER 86-003 reported the release of radioactive

gas to the auxiliary building due to misoperation of the waste gas system.

During the walkdown, it was noted that two valves in the system were not

aligned as required by Procedure 01-WDG-3. This procedure contained

specific instructions that required the sampling system to be placed in

, the standby mode upon completion of sampling activities. In discussion

with licensee personnel, it was determined that the-chemistry technician

using the sampling system failed to return the system to the standby mode

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upon completion of sampling activities. The licensee stated that the

system valves would be realigned to the required positions.

-During a plant tour on December 29, 1986, it was again noted that the

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waste gas sampling system had not been left in the standby mode as

required by Procedure OI-WDG-3. Two valves were'found to be in a position

! other than required by the procedure. This was the second example during

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this inspection period where a chemistry technician failed to follow

. instructions for operation of the system as stated in the operating

procedure. Licensee personnel- stated that the valves would be realigned

to the position required by the procedure.

. On December 31, 1986, the NRC inspector checked the waste gas sampling

system for co. rect alignment. During this check, the NRC inspector noted -

that five valves were left in a position other than required by Procedure

01-WDG-3. This is the third example of a failure to follow the procedure

-for operation of the waste gas sampling system identified during this

inspection period. All three examples discussed above involve the failure

of chemistry technicians to operate the waste gas sampling system in

accordance with an approved, documented operating procedure.

TS 5.8.1 requires that written procedures be established and implemented

that meet or exceed the procedures listed in Appendix A to Regulatory

4 Guide 1.33. Section 7.c of Appendix A to Regulatory Guide 1.33 requires ;

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that procedures be established-and implemented for sampling and monitoring

the gaseous effluent system. Fracedure 01-WDG-3 has been established for

operation of the waste gas sampling system. Procedure OI-WDG-3 was not

properly implemented in that on three occasions during this inspection

i period, the system was not operated as required by the operating

instructions. This is an apparent violation. (285/8634-03)

Towards the end of this inspection period, the licensee began actions to

correct this identified problem. The actions included review of the ,

procedure for possible revision and discussions with the individuals

involved and appropriate management personnel. None of the actions had

been completed at the end of this inspection period.

7. Monthly Maintenance Observations

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, The NRC inspector reviewed and/or observed selected station maintenance

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maintenance was conducted ir. accordance with approved procedures,

regulatory requirements, and the TS. The following items were considered

during the reviews and/or observations:

. The TS limiting conditions for operation were met while systems or

components were removed from service.

. Approvals were obtained prior to initiating the work.

. Activities were accomplished using approved M0s and were inspected,

as applicable.

. Functional testing and/or calibrations were performed prior to

returning components or systems to service.

. Quality control records were maintained.

. Activities were accomplished by qualified personnel.

. Parts and materials used were properly certified.

. Radiological and fire prevention controls were implemented.

The NRC inspector reviewed and/or oiserved the following maintenance

activities:

. Replacement of a fire door (M0 853383)

. Repair of containment isolation valve, PCV-7420 (M0 864493)

. Repair of the flow controller for the hydrogen analyzer (M0 864422)

. Repair of the emergency diesel generator brush holders (M0 864539)

No violations or deviations were noted.

8. Monthly Surveillance Observations

The NRC inspector observed selected portions of the performance of and/or

reviewed completed documentation for the TS required surveillance testing

on safety-related systems and components. The NRC inspector verified the

following items during the testing:

. Testing was performed by qualified personnel using approved

procedures.

. Test instrumentation was calibrated.

. The TS limiting conditions for operation were met.

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. Removal and restoration of the affected system and/or component were

accomplished.

. Test results conformed with TS and procedure requirements.

. Test results were reviewed by personnel other than the individual

directing the test.

. Deficiencies identified during the testing were properly reviewed and

resolved by appropriate management personnel.

The NRC inspector observed and/or reviewed the documentation for the

following surveillance test activities. The procedures used for the test

activities are noted in parenthesis.

. Testing of the electric-driven fire water pump (01-FP-6)

. Measurement of the moderator temperature coefficient using center

control element assently (ST-MTC-1-F.2)

. Measurement of a containment isolation valve leakrate

(ST-CONT-3-F.4)

. Monthly test of emergency diesel generator, D-1 (ST-ESF-6-F.3)

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Calibration of component cooling) water flow indication for the

containmentcoolingunit(CP-416

No violations or deviations were identified.

9. Cold Weather Preparations

During plant tours, the NRC inspector observed plant systems susceptible

to extreme col! weather to verify the systems were operating properly.

The observations were performed to verify the following:

. Heat tracing for the appropriate systems was energized and operating

properly.

. Cold weather protective measures had been reinstalled for systems

where maintenance and/or modification had been performed during the

past year.

The NRC inspector did not identify any problems from the effects of the

cold weather on any safety-related systems.

No violations or deviations were identified.

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10. Inoffice Review of Periodic and Special Reports

Inoffice review of periodic and special reports was performed by the NRC

resident inspector and/or the Fort Calhoun project inspector to verify the

following, as appropriate.

. Reports included the information required by appropriate NRC

requirements.

. Test results and supporting information were consistent with design (

predictions and specifications.

. Determination that planneo corrective actions were adequate for

resolution of identified problems.

. Detennination as to whether any information contained in the report

should be classified as an abnormal occurrence.

During review of special reports, it was noted that a 10 CFR Part 21

report was submitted by the Validyne Corporation to the NRC on

September 17, 1986. The review indicated that the subject discussed in

the report may be applicable to the licensee's equipment. The NRC

resident inspector provided the report to the plant licensing engineer on

December 9,1986, for review of applicability by the licensee.

No violations or deviations were identified.

11. Followup on An Alleoation (Reference 4-86-A-062)

An allegation was received by the NRC related to the discharge of an

individual working as a nuclear engineer in the licensee's generating

station engineering (GSE) department. The individcal making the

allegation stated that the nuclear engineer was fired for incompetence and

that the work performed by the engineer should be checked to verify that

the work was performed correctly.

The NRC inspector met with the Section Manager - GSE and the Manager - GSE

Nuclear to determine the circumstances associated with the dismissal of

the engineer. These two managers were in direct supervision cf the

safety-related activities performed by the engineer.

During the discussion, the two managers stated that the dismissal was

based on continuing problems management had with the engineer during the

months preceding his dismissal on March 28, 1986. The managers also

stated that the dismissal was in no way related to the tech '. ul competence

of the engineer.

The NRC inspector reviewed documentation contained in the engineer's

personnel file. The documentation confirmed that the engineer had

previously exhibited actions that had been a concern to his supervisors.

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The actions consisted of doing personal business on the telephone during

working hours, not getting along well with his coworkers and management,

consistent tardiness, and not meeting established deadlines for work

completion. These concerns were documented in a performance improvement

program written expressly for the individual in November 1985.

Management supervision stated that all safety-related work performed by

the engineer was independently reviewed and approved. In many cases, an

independent third-party review was performed by a licensee contractor,

Stone and Webster. The reviews performed on the work generated by the

engineer seldom noted any technical errors.

Based on discussions with licensee management and the documentation

reviewed, it appears that the engineer was not discharged due to technical

incompetence, but was discharged due to personnel reasons. Therefore, no

evidence was found that substantiated this allegation.

No violations or deviations were identified.

12. Exit Interview

The NRC inspector met with you and other members of the OPPD staff at the

end of this inspection. At this meeting, the NRC inspector sumarized the

scope of the inspection and the findings.

On December 17, 1986, an exit meeting was held to provide the licensee

with the results of the walkthru examinations given to a selected group of

senior reactor operators (SRO) by an NRC operator licensing examiner. The

results of the examinations indicated that all the SR0s examined

satisfactorily passed the walkthru examinations. Those in attendance at

the exit are shown in paragraph 1 of this inspection report.

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