ML20212N184
| ML20212N184 | |
| Person / Time | |
|---|---|
| Site: | Clinton  |
| Issue date: | 08/22/1986 |
| From: | NRC OFFICE OF INSPECTION & ENFORCEMENT (IE REGION III) |
| To: | |
| Shared Package | |
| ML20212N159 | List: |
| References | |
| TASK-1.C.6, TASK-2.K.1, TASK-TM 50-461-86-48, NUDOCS 8608280118 | |
| Download: ML20212N184 (1) | |
Text
NOTICE OF DEVIATION Illinois Power Company Docket No. 50-461 Based on the results of an NRC inspection conducted on July 1-28, 1986, it appears that one of your activities was not conducted in conformance with your commitments to the Commission as indicated below:
The Clinton Power Station Final Safety Analysis Report (FSAR) identifies commitments to provide independent verification of safety-related system lineups, as follows:
1.
FSAR Chapter 6, Paragraph 6.3.2.8 states in part:
"The position of each manually operated valve will be identified in a valve lineup sheet.
For safety-related systems / components, this lineup will have independent verification.
2.
FSAR Chapter 13, Paragraph 13.5.2.1.1 states in part:
" Independent verification of safety-related system valve and electrical lineups for isolation of components for maintenance, for restoration of components following maintenance, and for surveillance procedures shall be performed. This verification shall normally consist of functional testing where conditions such as radiction levels dictate."
3.
FSAR Appendix D, NRC Action Plan Items I.C.6, II.K.1.5 and II.K.1.10 state in part:
"Clinton Power Station Procedure No. 0AP1014.01N, Safety Tagging Procedure, and No. 0AP1405.01N, Performance of Operational Activities, assure that independent verification of system line-ups is applied to valve and electrical line-ups for all equipment important to safety, to surveillance procedures, and to restoration following maintenance."
Contrary to the above commitments, NRC review of CPS No. 1401.01, Conduct of Operations, CPS No. 3312.01, Residual Heat Removal (RHR) System Operations, and CPS No. 3313.01, Low Pressure Core Spray System (LPCS) Operations identified that independent verification of system lineups was not required for all equipment important to safety.
In particular, independent position verification was provided for only 19 of approximately 53 valves in the LPCS system.
I In addition, discrepancies existed between system valve lir.eups such that valves of similar function required independent verification in one ECCS system and not in the other.
J G