ML20212M469
| ML20212M469 | |
| Person / Time | |
|---|---|
| Site: | Zion File:ZionSolutions icon.png |
| Issue date: | 08/21/1986 |
| From: | Varga S Office of Nuclear Reactor Regulation |
| To: | Farrar D COMMONWEALTH EDISON CO. |
| References | |
| NUDOCS 8608260212 | |
| Download: ML20212M469 (11) | |
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August 21, 1986 DISTRIBUTION Docket Nos. 50-295 Doctet F11e B. Grimes and 50-304 NRC PDR'~~^
J. Partlow
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Local PDR N. Thompson PD#3 Rdg.
J. Norris T. Novak C. Vogan i
Mr. D. L. Farrar' OGC-B ACRS(10)
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Director of Nuclear Licensing E. Jordan Tech Branch Comonwealth Edison Company R. Eckenrode R. Ramirez Post Office Box 767 Chicago,. Illinois 60690 Mr.-Farrar:
SUBJECT:
DETAILED CONTROL ROOM DESIGN REVIEW (DCRDR) -
ZION NUCLEAR POWER STATION, UNITS 1 AND 2 By letter dated May 1, 1986, the Commonwealth Edison Company (CECO) submitted ir. formation on Zion DCRDR.
Science Applications International Corporation (SAIC), our contractor for DCRDR, has reviewed that information and identified a number of human engineering discrepancies (HED).
SAIC recommended a meeting with NRC and CECO to discuss their findings. The enclosed agenda lists items for discussion.
Please, promptly review the Enclosure and contact NRC project manager to arrange the meeting.
Sincerely, Original signed tY:
Steven A. Varga, Director Project Directorate #3 Division of PWR Licensing-A
Enclosure:
As stated cc: See next page PD#3 h CVoaan Jyor 1 ar 8/d/86 8/4 4 [86 8
8608260212 860821 PDR ADOCK 05000295 P
PDR -
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Mr. D. L. Farrar Commonwealth Edison Company Zion Station cc:
Robert J. Vollen, Esquire Mr. Michael C. Parker, Chief 109 North Dearborn Street Division of Engineering Chicago, Illinois 60602 Illinois Department of Nuclear Safety Dr. Cecil Lue-Hing 1035 Outer Park Drive, 5th Floor Director of Research and Development Springfield, Illinois 62704 Metropolitan Sanitary District of Greater Chicago 100 East Erie Street Chicago, Illinois 60611 Mr. Michael I. Miller Isham, Lincoln and Beale Counselors at Law Three First National Plaza 51st Floor Chicago, Illinois 60602 Susan N. Sekuler, Esquire Assistant Attorney General Environmental Control Division 188 West Randolph Street, Suite 2315 Chicago, Illinois 60601 Mayor of Zion Zion, Illinois 60099 Illinois Department of Nuclear Safety ATTN: Manager, Nuclear Facility Safety 1035 Outer Park Drive, 5th Floor Springfield, Illinois 62704 U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission Resident Inspectors Office 105 Shiloh Blvd.
Zion, Illinois 60099 Regional Administrator, Region III U.S. Nuclear Pegulatory Commission 799 Roosevelt Road Glen Ellyn, Illinois 60137
Proposed Agenda for Meeting Between NRC Staff and Commonwealth Edison Company to Resolve Issues Concerning the Detailed Control Room Design Review of Zion Station - Units I and 2 1.
Introductory Remarks 2.
Use of Color Coding and Background Shading 3.
Verification that Selected Design Improvements Will Provide the Neces-sary Corrections and Will Not Introduce New HEDs 4.
Implementation Schedule for HED Resolutions 5.
Proposed Control Room Changes i
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1.
Introductory Remarks Science Applications International Corporation (SAIC) has reviewed all available information on the DCRDR at Zion Station, Units 1 and 2 to date.
The purpose of this review was to evaluate whether the DCRDR requirements of Supplement I to NUREG-0737 have been satisfied.
The evaluation of Ceco's DCRDR Summary Report for Zion Station revealed some discrepancies.
To resolve these discrepancies, SAIC recommends a meeting be held between the NRC and representatives of CECO. The following elaborates on the agenda for this meeting, identifying the concerns to be discussed and the documentation that will be required.
2.
Use of Color Codina and Backaround Shadina There is a concern associated with the use of background shading for-resolving HEDs that address functional grouping of control panel instrumen-tation.
Independently of the six colors used in the licensee's color-coding standard, which is within the NUREG-0700 guidelines (n=ll) for color usage j
with enhancements, the background shading program appears to introduce an additional 28 colors that are to be associated with various systems found in the control room. CECO's excessive use of color is unacceptable since it is not in keeping with reasonable human engineering practice.
This overuse of color could lead to a reduction in the effectivenes of this technique and possibly introduce operator confusion and error.
The licensee should reexamine the proposed use of color, particularly in conjunction with the background shading at Zion Station and be able to provide assurance that the proposed applications will not be counter productive.
The following HEDs are to be corrected by the proposed background shading enhancements and the color-coding standard.
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EAM M
ELM 0332, 0413, 0156, 0329 284 0221, 0328, 0352 307 0376 285 0355 309 0150 291 0159 312 0333, 0395, 0166, 0432 294 0160 313 0335 296 0161 314 0354 298 0163 316 t
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tied hsa tLED hsa 0393 299 0165 317 0389 301 0145 338 3.
Verification That Selected Desion Imorovements Will Provide the Neces-sary Corrections and Will Not Introduce New HEDs 4
The Zion in-progress audit report indicated that when accomplished, the proposed verification process should meet the requirements of Supplement I to NUREG-0737. However, having reviewed the proposed use of color and back-ground shading, there is a concern with the high number of colors to be used and the excessive application of the background shading technique.
The review team is concerned that this problem may stem from an ineffective application of the verification process.
The licensee should provide docu-mentation to assure that a formal plan has been applied for accomplishing a rigorous and integrated verification of design improvements.
4.
Imolementation Schedule for HED Resolutions Proposed schedules for implementing HED corrections were provided in the cover letter which accompanied the Summary Report when it was f
transmitted to the NRC.
As noted, this information is a correction to the dates supplied on page 8-2 of the Summary Report.
Ceco also indicates that proposed schedules are predicated upon NRC approval of Ceco's disposition of each of the HEDs, as the schedule is sensitive to the scope of work.
The schedules are also subject to the availability of equipment, outage time, and engineering design lead time.
Furthermore, schedules may shift in order to ensure that all affected emergency response activities are correctly integrated.
As a result, it is the review team's understanding that the proposed schedules submitted will be finalized after receipt of NRC confir-mation on HED resolutions.
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l As proposed, the schedules for completion of the corrective actions l
have been designated as the completion of the first refueling outage or the second refueling outage for Zion Station, Units 1 and 2.
Ceco identifies i
October 1987 and March 1989 as the' expected first and second refueling l
outage dates for installation of DCRDR modifications at Unit 1.
September i
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1988 and January 1990 are the anticipated refueling outage dates for installation of modifications at Unit 2.
CECO further notes that due to the nine-month lead time required to plan for an outage, Unit I would require NRC approval prior to January 1987 in order to consider the October 1987 refueling outage.
While the Summary Report does meet the NUREG-0737, Supplement I requirement by providing proposed schedules for implementing HED corrective actions, the completion dates, which extend to January 1990 for Unit 2, appear to represent an excessive delay for resolving the identi-fied deficiencies.
The reviewers recommend that the NRC evaluate the licensee's implementation schedule, particularly for Unit 2, and negotiate a mutually acceptable compromise with the licensee.
5.
Proposed Control Room Chanaes The discrepancies discussed below are HEDs listed in Volume 2 of the CECO Zion Station DCRDR Final Summary Report (April 1986),
that were found not to be satisfactory.
A.
HEDs for which the assigned implementation dates are not satisfac-tory.
This group is primarily Category I and II HEDs which should be implemented by the first refueling outage.
While the licensee intends to correct these HEDs, the delayed implementation schedule appears to be unjustified. The licensee should further justify the delay in implementation.
lied EaB 0281, 0345, 0356, 0402, 0097, 0337 4
0284, 0405, 0365, 0287, 0148, 0323 5
0330, 0362, 0390 6
0343, 0315 10 0363, 0403 14 0285, 0186, 0188, 0151, 0367 22 0124 108 0054 283 0336, 0167 297 0412 308 0421 322 1
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1 t![Q Easg 0372 323 -
0420, 0261 324 B.
The NRC has maintained that the absence of information in the control room is unacceptable; therefore, the licensee should resolve these deficiencies with temporary labels rather than wait until the permanent label plates are applied.
lifD EASE 0114 102 0193 190 0194 212 0180 227 0195 234 0206 254 0437 255 0176 344 C.
The following HEDs have labels that are described as misplaced, confusing, or incorrect. The licensee should implement temporary corrective measures in the interim before the scheduled implementa-tion date of the permanent corrective action.
t!LD EA9!1 0224 236 0267 237 0288, 0436 239 0349 242 0200 246 0383 252 5
D.
The following HEDs should not require excessive lead time prior to implementing the corrective action and should be considered for the first refueling outage.
HEQ EASA HEQ EASA 0371 55 0121 68 0071, 0296 73 0299 66 0217 74 0397 167 0340 76 0416 196 0112 65 E.
This section contains HEDs with proposed corrective actions that are not judged to be satisfactory or that require additional infor-mation to make an evaluation.
HiQ EASA Comment 0339 26 Hands-on training prior to the control room modifica-tions becoming operational is more appropriate, especially considering the number of control room changes due to DCRDR.
0069 64 Some measure should be taken in the interim such as the establishment of a procedure to improve communications.
0309 112 The operator survey has identified that some annuncia-tors' character heights are not large enough.
While a new annunciator standard will be implemented on all new annunciator tiles, it is suggested that Ceco apply this standard to all tiles required for performing time-critical tasks by the first refueling outage.
0084 144 The licensee should verify that the use of color coded plates will resolve this discrepancy without introducing new HEDs.
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HEQ Eagg Comment i
0290 202 The licensee ~should describe which of Jhe options presented will be used to correct this HED.
This Category IB HED should be addressed during the first refueling outage.
0406 210 This HED appears to be contrary to control room color coding where white indicates activation.
0147 289 If operators no longer rely on this system to throttle flow, what do they use to perform this function? If the operators still use this system to throttle flow, then this equipment should be functionally grouped.
0273 336 If reactor operators are scheduled to work at both units, then it is recommended that this HED be corrected by the first refueling outage.
0025, 183 The display standard being implemented should be used to
- 0023, correct these HEDs.
Additionally, the replacement
- 0024, displays in the photograph appear to be covering label 0026 information.
F.
This section contains HEDs with no proposed corrective actions where the justification for not correcting them was unsatisfactory.
HED Elga Comment 0319 24 What was meant by "all of the 54ft '.y injection, valves" on the operator survey, and WUt l' hydrogen monitoring post-accident status light r.sett his discrepancy?
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t HEQ Elgg Comment
- 0122, 69 These HEDs refer to problems with communications. While 0305 the sound-powered phones are not used during normal plant evolutions, the discrepancies described could complicate the communications during abnormal evolu-tions. HED 0305 does not address the problem with noise in the plant.
0133, 101 The review team needs to know which annunciator tiles
- 0322, are referred to in this HED and how close they are to
- 0391, the related control and displays.
0134 0326 105 The review team is concerned that the standby pump auto start may not be an adequate redundant indication of EHC pressure status.
If the auto pump fails to start, how would the operator determine that pressure is too low?
0098, 137 The licensee should identify any of these lights that
- 0099, are required during the E0Ps.
These lights should then 0100 be corrected.
1 0244 155 The reviewers are concerned that these Category I valve l
control switches are only one-half (.31") of the recom-4 i
mended height of.625," and suggest replacement.
0346 191 The. meter and technical specifications for both units should be consistent if these specifications are used by operators.
0307 241 While cach replacement fuse is appropriately labeled, the licensee should address the need to 7 abel the equip-I
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ment in order to prevent the delays that have occured.
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lE P_ age Comment 0424 288 What is the distance between CBIO and CB077 - If this is a time critical task, then these items must be close enough to permit required operator actions.
0394 300 Further explanation is needed as to why these auxiliary feedwater pump 1A steam supply stop valves are closed during an accident.
0425 305 Finding and response are contradictory as to whether abnormal alignment of blowdown is easily identifiable.
Without additional justification that indicates tha.t the present location of the status light is appropriate, the licensee should relocate this status light.
0316, 318 The operator survey finding indicating that the location 0411 of the alarms and gauges are not close together is contradictory to the Ceco response. The licensee should provide additional clarification.
0259 329 No date is set for the corrective action indicated in the response.
0182 218 Photographs support need to correct since green ink is not visible.
0225 337 No "H"
series photographs were included in the note-books.
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