Text

Amend 221 to License DPR-68,installing Oscillation Power Range Monitor Trip Function Fulfills Unit 3 Requirements Re GL 94-02
	ML20212G215
Person / Time
Site:	Browns Ferry
Issue date:	09/27/1999
From:	Peterson S; NRC (Affiliation Not Assigned)
To:	;
Shared Package
ML20212G221	List: ML20212G215; ML20212G224;
References
	GL-94-02, NUDOCS 9909290163
	Download: ML20212G215 (36)
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t UNITED STATES j.

j NUCLEAR REGULATORY COMMISSION t

WASHIPGTON, D.C. 2055tKX)01

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TENNESSEE VALLEY AUTHORITY DOCKET NO. 50- 296 BROWNS FERRY NUCLEAR PLANT. UNIT 3 AMENDMENT TO FACILITY OPERATING LICENSE Amendment No. 221 License No. DPR-68

1. The Nuclear Regulatory Commission (the Commission) has found that:

A.

The application for amendment by Tennessee Valley Authority (the licensee) dated July 28,1999, complies with the stanoards and requirements of the Atomic Energy Act of 1954, as amended (the Act), and the Commission's rules and regulations set forth in 10 CFR Chapter I; 8.

The f acility will operate in conformity with the application, the provisions of the Act, and the rules and regulations of the Commission; C.

There is reasonable assurance (i) that the activities authorized by this amendment can be conducted without endangering the health and safety of the public, and (ii) that such activities will be conducted in compliance with the Commission's regulations; D.

The issuance of this amendment will not be inimical to the common defense and security or to the healtii and safety of the public; and E.

The issuance of this amendment is in accordance with 10 CFR Part 51 of the Commission's regulations and all applicable requirements have been satisfied.

9909290163 990927 PDR ADOCK 05000296 p

PDR

f 2

2.

Accordingly, the license is amended by changes to the Technical Specifications as indicated in the attachment to this license amendment and paragraph 2.C.(2) of Facility Operating License No. DPR-68 is hereby amended to read as follows:

(2)

Technical Soecifications The Technical Specifications contained in Appendices A and B, as revised through Amendment No. 221, are hereby incorporated in the license. The licensee shall operate the facility in accordance with the Technical Specifications.

3.

This license amendment is effective as of its date of issuance and shall be implemented at the end of the Cycle 9 outage.

FOR THE NUCLEAR REGULATORY COMMISSION

$M bh-Sheri R. Peterson, Chief, Section 2 Project Directorate 11 Division of Licensing Project Management Office of Nuclear Reactor Regulation

Attachment:

Changes to the Technical Specifications Date of issuance: September 27, 1999

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I ATTACHMENT TO LICENSE AMENDMENT NO. 221 FACILITY OPERATING LICENSE NO. DPR-68 DOCKET NO. 50- 296 Replace the following pages of the Appendix A Technical Specifications with the attached revised pages. The revised pages are identified by amendment number and contain marginal lines indicating the areas of change.

REMOVE INSERT 3.3-1 3.3-1 3.3-2 3.3-2 3.3-3 3.3-3 3.3-6 3.3-6 3.3 8 3.3-8 3.3-9 3.3-9 3.4-1 3.4-1 3.4-2 3.4-2 3.4-3 3.4-3 3.4-4 3.4-4 B 3.3-9 B 3.3-9 B 3.3-9a B 3.3-14 B 3.3-14 B 3.3-15 83.315 B 3.3-15a B 3.3-15b B 3.3-30 B 3.3-30 B 3.3-32 B 3.3-32 B 3.3-34 83.334 B 3.3-35 8 3.3-35 B 3.3-35a B 3.3-44 8 3.3-44 B 3.3-45a B 3.3-46 B 3.3-46 B 3.3-46a B 3.4 4 8 3.4-4 B 3.4-5 B 3.4-5 B 3.4-Sa B 3.4-6 B 3.4-6 B 3.4-7 B 3.4-7 8 3.4-8 8 3.4-8 8 3.4-9 B 3.4-9 B 3.4-10 B 3.4-10 l

RPS instrumentation 3.3.1.1 3.3 INSTRUMENTATION 3.3.1.1 Reactor Protection System (RPS) Instrumentation

)

LCO 3.3.1.1 The RPS instrumentation for each Function in Table 3.3.1.1-1 shall be OPERABLE.

APPLICABILITY.

According to Table 3.3.1.1-1.

ACTIONS

N OTE-----

Separate Condition entry is allowed for each channel.

CONDITION REQUIRED ACTION COMPLETION TIME A. One or more required A.1 Place channel in trip.

12 hours1.388889e-4 days 0.00333 hours 1.984127e-5 weeks 4.566e-6 months channels inoperable.

OR A.2

-NOTE Not applicable for Functions 2.a, 2.b, 2.c, 2.d, or 2.f.

l Place associated trip 12 hours1.388889e-4 days 0.00333 hours 1.984127e-5 weeks 4.566e-6 months system in trip.

(continued)

BFN-UNIT 3 3.3-1 Amendment No. 242,213,221

I.

I RPS Instrumentation 3.3.1.1 ACTIONS (continued)

CONDITION REQUIRED ACTION COMPLETION TIME B. ---------N OTE B,1 Place channel in one trip 6 hours6.944444e-5 days 0.00167 hours 9.920635e-6 weeks 2.283e-6 months Not applicable for system in trip.

Functions 2.a,2.b,2.c, 2.d, or 2.f.

OR l

B.2 Place one trip system in 6 hours6.944444e-5 days 0.00167 hours 9.920635e-6 weeks 2.283e-6 months One or more Functions trip.

with one or more required channels inoperable in both trip systems.

C. One or more Functions C.1 Restore RPS trip 1 hour1.157407e-5 days 2.777778e-4 hours 1.653439e-6 weeks 3.805e-7 months with RPS trip capability capability.

not maintained.

D. Required Action and D.1 Enter the Condition immediately associated Completion referenced in Time of Condition A, B, or Table 3.3.1.1-1 for the C not met.

channel.

E. As required by Required E.1 Reduce THERMAL 4 hours4.62963e-5 days 0.00111 hours 6.613757e-6 weeks 1.522e-6 months Action D.1 and POWER to < 30% RTP.

referenced in.

Table 3.3.1.1-1.

F. As required by Required F.1 Be in MODE 2.

6 hours6.944444e-5 days 0.00167 hours 9.920635e-6 weeks 2.283e-6 months Action D.1 and referenced in Table 3.3.1.1-1.

(continued)

BFN-UNIT 3 3.3-2 Amendment No. 242 243-221 7

F l

RPS Instrumentation

'g 3.3.1.1 ACTIONS (continued)

CONDITION REQUIRED ACTION COMPLETION

{

TIME G. As required by Required G.1 Be in MODE 3.

12 hours1.388889e-4 days 0.00333 hours 1.984127e-5 weeks 4.566e-6 months l

Action D.1 and referenced in Table 3.3.1.1-1.

H. As required by Required H.1 Initiate action to fully Immediately Action D.1 and insert all insertable referenced in control rods in core cells Table 3.3.1.1-1.

containing one or more fuel assemblies.

l l.

As required by Required 1.1 Initiate alternate method 12 hours1.388889e-4 days 0.00333 hours 1.984127e-5 weeks 4.566e-6 months Action D.1 and to detect and suppress referenced in Table thermal hydraulic

3. 3.1.1 -1.

instability oscillations.

AND i

l.2 Restore required 120 days channels to OPERABLE.

l J. Required Action and J.1 Be in MODE 2 4 hours4.62963e-5 days 0.00111 hours 6.613757e-6 weeks 1.522e-6 months associated Completion Time of Condition I not I

met.

j i

l a

BFN-UNIT 3 3.3-3 Amendment No. 242-243r 221

{

t I

RPS Instrumentation 3.3.1.1 SURVEILLANCE REQUIREMENTS (continued)

SURVEILLANCE FREQUENCY SR 3.3.1.1.10 Perform CHANNEL CALIBRATION.

184 days SR 3.3.1.1.11 (Deleted)

SR 3.3.1.1.12 Perform CHANNEL FUNCTIONAL TEST.

24 months SR 3.3.1.1.13 NOTE Neutron detectors are excluded.

Perform CHANNEL CAllBRATION.

24 months SR 3.3.1.1.14 Perform LOGIC SYSTEM FUNCTIONAL 24 months TEST.

SR 3.3.1.1.15 Verify Turbine Stop Valve - Closure and 24 months Turbine Control Valve Fast Closure, Trip Oil Pressure - Low Functions are not bypassed when THERMAL POWER is 2 30% RTP.

SR 3.3.1.1.16 NOTE For Function 2.a, not required to be performed when entering MODE 2 from MODE 1 until 12 hours1.388889e-4 days 0.00333 hours 1.984127e-5 weeks 4.566e-6 months after entering MODE 2.

Perform CHANNEL FUNCTIONAL TEST.

184 days SR 3.3.1.1.17 Verify OPRM is not bypassed when APRM 24 months Simulated Thermal Power is 2 25% and recirculation drive flow is < 60% of rated recirculation drive flow.

BFN-UNIT 3 3.3-6 Amendment No. 242-243-245 221 7

e RPS Instrumentation o

3.3.1.1 Table 3 31.1 1 (page 2 of 3)

Reactor Protection System Instrumentation APPLICABLE CONDITIONS MODES OR REQUIRED REFERENCED FUNCTION OTHER CHANNELS FROM SURVEILLANCE ALLOWABLE SPECIFIED PER TRIP REQUIRED REQUIREMENTS VALUE CONDITIONS SYSTEM ACTION D 1 2.

Average Power Range Monitors (continued) d.

Inop 1,2 3(b)

G SR 3.3.1.1.16 NA e 2 Out-Of-4 Voter 1.2 2

G SR 3.31.1.1 NA SR 3 31.1.14 SR 3.31.1.16 f.

OPRM Upscale 1

3(b) 1 SR 3 3.1.1.1 NA SR 3.3.1.1.7 SR 3 31.1.13 SR 3.3.1.1.16 SR 3 31.1.17 3.

Reactor Vessel Steam Dome 1,2 2

G SR 3.3.1.1.1 s 1090 psig Pressure High SR 3.3.1.1 B SR 3 31.1.10 SR 3 31.1.14 4 Reactor Vessel Water Level -

1,2 2

G Sr 3.3.1.1.1 2 528 inches Low, level 3 SR 3 3.1.1.8 above vessel SR 3.3.1.1.13 zero SR 3.3.1.1.14 5.

Main Stearn isolation Valve -

1 8

F SR 3.3.1.1.8 s 10% closed Closure SR 3.3.1.1.13 SR 3.3.1.1.14 6.

Drywell Pressure - High 1,2 2

G SR 3.3.1.1.8 s 2.5 psig SR 3.3.1.1.13 l

SR 3.3.1.1.14 7.

Scram Discharge Volume Water Level - Hgh a.

Resistance Temperature 1,2 2

G SR 3.3.1.1.8 s 50 gallens Detector SR 3 3.1.1.13 SR 3 3.1.1.14 i

5(a) 2 H

SR 3.3.1.1.8 5 50 gallons I

SR 3.3.1.1.13 l

{

SR 3.3.1.1.14 (continued)

(a) With any control rod withdrawn from a :: ore cell containing one or more fuel asst mbi==

(b) Each APRM channel provides inputs to both inp systems.

I l

BFN-UNIT 3 3.3-8 Amendment No. 221 242 243,214,249 7

.T

I RPS Instrumentation i

3.3.1.1

)

i Table 3 31.1 1 (page 3 of 3)

Reactor Protection System Instrumentation APPLICABLE -

CONDITIONS MODES OR RFOUIRED REFERENCED FUNCTION OTHER CHANNELS FROM SURVEILLANCE ALLOWABLE SPECIFIED PER TRIP REQUIRED REQUIREMENTS VALUE CONDITIONS SYSTEM ACTION D.1 7.

Scram Discharge Volurne Water Level - High (continued) 1 b.

Float Switch 1.2 2

G SR 3.31.18 s 50 gallons SR 3.3.1.1.13 SR 3.31.1.14 I

5(a) 2 H

SR 3 31.18 s 50 gallons SR 3.3.1.1.13 SR 3.3.i.1.14

8. Turbine Stop Valve - Closure 2 30% RTP 4

E SR 3 3.1.1.8 s 10% closed SR 3.31.1.13 SR 3.3.1.1.14 SR 3 3.1.1.15

9. Turbine Control Valve Fast 2 30% RTP 2

E SR 3.3.1.1.8 2 550 psig Closure Trip Oil Pressure -

SR 3.3.1.1.13 Low SR 3.3.1.1.14 SR 3.3.1.1.15

10. Reactor Mode Switch -

1.2 1

G SR 3 31.1.12 NA Shutdown Position SR 3.31.1.14 5(a) 1 H

SR 3.31.1.12 NA SR 3.3.1.1.14

11. Manual Scram 1,2 1

G SR 3.3.1.1.8 NA SR 3.3.1.1.14 5(a) 1 H

SR 3.3.1.1.8 NA SR 3.31.1.14

12. RPS Channel Test Switches 1.2 2

G SR 3.3.1.1.4 NA I

5(a) 2 H

SR 3.3.1.1.4 NA

13. Low Scram Pilot Air Header 1,2 2

G SR 3.3.1.1.13 2 50 psig Pressure SR 3.3.1.1.14 SR 311.1.16 5(a) 2 H

SR 3.3.1.1.13 2 50 psig SR 3.3.1.1.14 SR 3 3.1.1.16 ta) With any control rod withdrawn from a core cell containing one or more fuel assemblies.

BFN-UNIT 3 3.3-9 Amendment No. 242d4% 221

L Recirculation Loops Operating 3.4.1 l3.4 - REACTOR COOLANT SYSTEM (RCS) 3.4.1 Recirculation Loops Operating LCO 3.4.1 -

Two recirculation loops with matched flows shall be in operation,

.QB One recirculation loop may be in operation provided the following l'

limits are applied when the associated LCO is applicable:

a. LCO 3.2.1," AVERAGE PLANAR LINEAR HEAT GENERATION RATE (APLHGR)," single loop operation limits specified in the COLR-I

b. LCO 3.2.2, " MINIMUM CRITICAL POWER RATIO (MCPR),"

single loop operation limits specified in the COLR;

c. ' LCO 3.3.1.1, " Reactor Protection System (RPS)

Instrumentation," Function 2.b (Average Power Range Monitors Flow Biased Simulated Thermal Power - High), Allowable Value of Table 3.3.1.1-1 is reset for single loop operation; l

APPLICABILITY:

MODES 1 and 2.

i BFN-UNIT 3 3.4-1 Amendment No. 212,216r 221 I

!=

.4' e

l I

1 Recirculation Loops Operating 3.4.1 ACTIONS CONDITION REQUIRED ACTION COMPLETION TIME A. Requirements of the LCO A.1 Satisfy the requirements 24 hours2.777778e-4 days 0.00667 hours 3.968254e-5 weeks 9.132e-6 months not met.

of the LCO.

I B. Required Action and B.1 Be in MODE 3.

12 hours1.388889e-4 days 0.00333 hours 1.984127e-5 weeks 4.566e-6 months associated Completion Time of Condition A not l

met.

OR No recirculation loops in operation.

l i

l l

J i

a BFN-UNIT 3 3.4-2 Amendment No. 242-246 221 7

Recirculation Loops Operating 3.4.1 SURVEILLANCE REQUIREMENTS SURVEILLANCE FREQUENCY SR 3.4.1.1 NOTE--

Not required to be performed until 24 hours2.777778e-4 days 0.00667 hours 3.968254e-5 weeks 9.132e-6 months after both recirculation loops are in operation.

Verify recirculation loop jet pump flow 24 hours2.777778e-4 days 0.00667 hours 3.968254e-5 weeks 9.132e-6 months mismatch with both recirculation loops in operation is:

a. s 10% of rated core flow when operating i

at < 70% of rated core flow; and j

b. s 5% of rated core flow when operating at 2 70% of rated core flow.

i BFN-UNIT 3 3.4-3 Amendment No. 242-243,221

Recirculation Loops Operating 3.4.1 Figure 3.4.1-1 (Deleted Per TS 398) 1 I

4 1

i i

l BFN-UNIT 3 3.4-4 Amendment No. 242A,221

RPS Instrumentation B 3.3.1.1 BASES

' APPLICABLE Averaoe Power Ranae Monitor SAFETY ANALYSES, LCO, and The APRM channels provide the primary indication of neutron APPLICABILITY flux within the core and respond almost instantaneously to (continued) neutron flux increases. The APRM channels receive input signals from the local power range monitors (LPRMs) within the reactor core to provide an indication of the power distribution and local power changes. The APRM channels average these LPRM signals to provide a continuous indication of average reactor power from a few percent to greater than RTP. Each APRM also includes an Oscillation Power Range Monitor (OPRM) Upscale Function which monitors small groups of LPRM signals to detect thermal-hydraulic instabilities.

The APRM System is divided into four APRM channels and four 2-out-of-4 voter channels. Each APRM channel provides inputs to each of the four voter channels. The four voter channels are divided into two groups of two each, with each group of two providing inputs to one RPS trip system. The system is designed to allow one APRM channel, but no voter channels, to be bypassed. A trip from any one unbypassed APRM will result in a " half-trip" in all four of the voter channels, but no trip inputs to either RPS trip system. APRM trip Functions 2.a,2.b,2.c and 2.d are voted independently from OPRM Upscale Function 2.f. Therefore, any Function 2.a,2.b,2.c, or 2.d trip from any two unbypassed APRM channels will result in a full trip in each of the four voter channels, which in turn results in two trip inputs to each RPS trip system logic channel (A1, A2, B1, or B2).

Similarly, a Function 2.f trip from any two unbypassed APRM channels will result in a full trip from each of the four voter channels. Three of the four APRM channels and all four of the voter channels are required to be OPERABLE to ensure that no single failure will preclude a scram on a valid signal. In addition, to provide adequate coverage of the entire core, consistent with the design bases for the APRM Functions 2.a, 2.b, and 2.c, at least twenty (20) LPRM inputs, with at least (continued) l BFN-UNIT 3 8 3.3-9 Amendment No. 24% 221 l

Revision 4

]

m:

RPS Instrumentation 8 3.3.1.1 BASES APPLICABLE Averaae Power Ranae Monitor (continued)

SAFETY ANALYSES, LCO, and three (3) LPRM inputs from each of the four axial levels at APPLICABILITY which the LPRMs are located, must be operable for each APRM i

channel. For the OPRM Upscale Function 2.f, LPRMs are I

assigned to " cells" with either 3 or 4 detectors, with a total of 33

" cells" assigned to each OPRM channel. A minimum of 23 cells, each with a minimum of 2 LPRMs must be OPERABLE for the OPRM Upscale Function 2.f to be OPERABLE.

)

i I

J (continued)

BFN-UNIT 3 8 3.3-9a Amendment No. 221

e RPS Instrumentation B 3.3.1.1 BASES APPLICABLE 2.d. Averaae Power Ranae Monitor -Inog SAFETY ANALYSES, LCO, and Three of the four APRM channels are required to be APPLICABILITY OPERABLE for each of the APRM Functions. This Function (continued)

(Inop) provides assurance that the minimum number of APRMs are OPERABLE. For any APRM channel, any time its mode switch is in any position other than " Operate," an APRM module is unplugged, or the automatic self-test system detects a critical fault with the APRM channel, an Inop trip is sent to all four voter channels. Inop trips from two or more unbypassed APRM l

channels result in a trip output from all four voter channels to their associated trip system.

This Function was not specifically credited in the accident analysis, but it is retained for the overall redundancy and diversity of the RPS as required by the NRC approved licensing basis.

There is no Allowable Value for this Function.

This Function is required to be OPERABLE in the MODES where the APRM Functions are required.

(continued)

BFN-UNIT 3 B 3.3-14 Amendment No. 243r 221 Revismo

RPS Instrum:ntation B 3.3.1.1 BASES APPLICABLE 2.e. 2-Out-Of-4 Voter SAFETY ANALYSES, LCO, and The 2-Out-Of-4 Voter Function provides the interface between APPLICABILITY the APRM Functions, including the OPRM Upscale Function, (continued) and the final RPS trip system logic. As such, it is required to be OPERABLE in the MODES where the APRM Functions are required and is necessary to support the safety analysis applicable to each of those Functions. Therefore, the 2-Out-Of-4 Voter Function needs to be OPERABLE in MODES 1 and 2.

{

i All four voter channels are required to be OPERABLE. Each voter channel includes self-diagnostic functions. If any voter channel detects a critical fault in its own processing, a trip is issued from that voter channel to the associated trip system.

The 2-Out-Of-4 Voter Function votes APRM Functions 2.a,2.b, 2.c, and 2.d independently of Function 2i The voter also includes separate outputs to RPS for the two independently voted sets of Functions, each of which is redundant (four total outputs). The Voter Function 2.e must be declared inoperable if any of its functionality is inoperable. However, due to the independent voting of APRM trips, and the redundancy of

)

outputs, there may be conditions where the Voter Function 2.e is inoperable, but trip capability for one or more of the other APRM Functions through that voter is still maintained. This may be considered when determining the condition of other APRM Functions resulting from partial inoperability of the Voter Function 2.e.

There is no Allowable Value for this Function.

(continued)

BFN-UNIT 3 B 3.3-15 Amendment No. 244 221 Revision 4

RPS Instrumsntation

'e B 3.3.1.1 BASES APPLICABLE 2 f. Oscillation Power Rance Monitor (OPRM) Upscale SAFETY ANALYSES, LCO, and The OPRM Upscale Function provides compliance with GDC 10 APPLICABILITY and GDC 12, thereby providing protection from exceeding the (continued) fuel MCPR safety limit (SL) due to anticipated thermal hydraulic power oscillations.

References 13,14, and 15 describe three algorithms for detecting thermal hydraulic instability related neutron flux oscillations: the period based detection algorithm, the amplitude based algorithm, and the growth rate algorithm. All three are implemented in the OPRM Upscale Function, but the safety analysis takes credit only for the period based detection algorithm. The remaining algorithms provide defense in depth and additional protection against unanticipated oscillations.

l OPRM Upscale Function OPERABILITY for Technical l

Specification purposes is based only on the period based detection algorithm.

The OPRM Upscale Function receives input signals from the local power range monitors (LPRMs) within the reactor core, j

which are combined into " cells" for evaluation of the OPRM algorithms.

1 The OPRM Upscale Function is required to be OPERABLE when the plant is in a region of power flow operation where i

anticipated events could lead to thermal hydraulic instability and related neutron flux oscillations. Within this region, the autamatic trip is enabled when THERMAL POWER, as i

indicated by the APRM Simulated Thermal Power, is 2 25%

RTP and reactor core flow, as indicated by recirculation drive flow is < 60% of rated flow, the operating region where actual thermal hydraulic oscillations may occur. Requiring the OPRM Upscale Function to be OPERABLE in MODE 1 provides consistency with operability requirements for other APRM functions and assures that the OPRM Upscale Function is OPERABLE whenever reactor power could increase into the region of concern without operator action.

(continued)

BFN-UNIT 3 8 3.3-15a Amendment No. 221

I I

RPS Instrumentation I

e B 3.3.1.1 l

l BASES APPLICABLE 2.f. Oscillation Power Ranae Monitor (OPRM) Upscale SAFETY ANALYSES, (continued)

LCO, and APPLICABILITY An OPRM Upscale trip is issued from an APRM channel when the period based detection algorithm in that channel detects oscillatory changes in the neutron flux, indicated by the combined signals of the LPRM detectors in a cell, with period confirmations and relative cell amplitude exceeding specified setpoints. One or more cells in a channel exceeding the trip conditions will result in a channel trip. An OPRM Upscale trip is also issued from the channel if either the growth rate or amplitude based algorithms detect growing oscillatory chant as in the neutron flux for one or more cells in that channel.

i Three of the four channels are required to be OPERABLE.

Each channel is capable of detecting thermal hydraulic instabilities, by detecting the related neutron flux oscillations, and issuing a trip signal before the MCPR SL is exceeded.

There is no allowable value for this function.

l l

(continued) l BFN-UNIT 3 B 3.3-15b Amendment No. 221 l

!E

RPS Instrumentation a

B 3.3.1.1 BASES ACTIONS A.1 and A.2 (continued)

Because of the diversity of sensors available to provide trip signals and the redundancy of the RPS design, an allowable out of service time of 12 hours1.388889e-4 days 0.00333 hours 1.984127e-5 weeks 4.566e-6 months has been shown to be acceptable (Ref. 9 and 12) to permit restoration of any inoperable channel to OPERABLE status. However, this out of service time is only acceptable provided the associated Function's inoperable channel is in one trip system and the Function still maintains RPS trip capability (refer to Required Actions B.1, B.2, and C.1 Bases). If the inoperable channel cannot be restored to OPERABLE status within the allowable out of service time, the channel or the associated trip system must be placed in the tripped condition per Required Actions A.1 and A.2. Placing the inoperable channelin trip (or the associated trip system in trip) would conservatively compensate for the inoperability, restere capability to accommodate a single failure, and allow operation to continue.

Alternatively, if it is not desired to place the channel (or trip system) in trip (e.g., as in the case where placing the inoperable channel in trip would result in a full scram),

Condition D must be entered and its Required Action taken.

As noted, Action A.2 is not applicable for APRM Functions 2.a, 2.b,2.c,2.d, or 2.f. Inoperability of one required APRM channel l affects both trip systems. For tnat condition, Required Action A.1 must be satisfied, and is the only action (other than restoring operability) that will restore capability to accommodate a single failure.

Inoperability of more than one required APRM channel of the same trip function results in loss of trip capability and entry into Condition C, as well as entry into Condition A for each channel.

(continued)

BFN-UNIT 3 B 3.3-30 Amendment No. 244 221 Revision-0 L

RPS Instrumentation 9

B 3.3.1.1 BASES ACTIONS B.1 and B.2 (continued)

The 6 hour6.944444e-5 days 0.00167 hours 9.920635e-6 weeks 2.283e-6 months Completion Time is judged acceptable based on the remaining capability to trip, the diversity of the sensors available to provide the trip signals, the low probability of extensive numbers of inoperabilities affecting all diverse Functions, and the low probability of an event requiring the initiation of a scram.

Alternately, if it is not desired to place the inoperable channels (or one trip system) in trip (e.g., as in the case where placing the inoperable channel or associated trip system in trip would result in a scram or RPT), Condition D must be entered and its Required Action taken.

As noted, Condition B is not applicable for APRM Functions 2.a,2.b,2.c,2.d, or 2.f. Inoperability of an APRM channel l

affects both trip systems and is not associated with a specific trip system as are the APRM 2-out-of-4 voter and other non-APRM channels for which Condition B applies. For an inoperable APRM channel, Required Action A.1 must be satisfied, and is the only action (other than restoring operability) that will restore capability to accommodate a single failure.

Inoperability of a Function in more than one required APRM channel results in loss of trip capability for that Function and entry into Condition C, as well as entry into Condition A for each channel. Because Conditions A and C provide Required Actions that are appropriate for the inoperability of APRM Functions 2.a, 2.b, 2.c, 2.d, or 2.f, and these functions are not l

associated with specific trip systems as are the APRM 2-out-of-4 voter and other non-APRM channels, Condition B does not apply.

I (continued)

BFN-UNIT 3 8 3.3-32 Amendment No. 243,221 Revisione l

RPS Instrumentation 9-B 3.3.1.1 BASES ACTIONS D.1 (continued)

Required Action D.1 directs entry into the appropriate Condition

, referenced in Table 3.3.1.1-1. The applicable Condition specified in the Table is Function and MODE or other specified condition dependent and may change as the Required Action of a previous Condition is completed. Each time an inoperable channel has not met any Required Action of Condition A, B, or C and the associated Completion Time has expired, Condition D will be entered for that channel and provides for

{

transfer to the appropriate subsequent Condition.

E.1. F.1. G.1. and J.1 If the channel (s)is not restored to OPERABLE status or placed in trip (or the associated trip system placed in trip) within the allowed Completion Time, the plant must be placed in a MODE or other specified condition in which the LCO does not apply.

The allowed Completion Times are reasonable, based on operating experience, to reach the specified condition from full power conditions in an orderly manner and without challenging plant systems. In addition, the Completion Time of Required Action E.1 is consistent with the Completion Time provided in LCO 3.2.2, " MINIMUM CRITICAL POWER RATIO (MCPR)."

l

{

l (continued)

BFN-UNIT 3 8 3.3-34 Amendment No. 244 221 Revision 4

O RPS Instrumentation 8 3.3.1.1 BASES ACTIONS H.1 (continued)

If the channel (s)is not restored to OPERABLE status or placed in trip (or the associated trip system placed in trip) within the allowed Completion Time, the plant must be placed in a MODE or other specified condition in which the LCO does not apply.

This is done by immediately initiating action to fully insert all insertable control rods in core cells containing one or more fuel assemblies. Control rods in core cells containing no fuel assemblies do not affect the reactivity of the core and are, therefore, not required to be inserted. Action must continue until all insertable control rods in core cells containing one or more fuel assemblies are fully inserted.

L1 If OPRM Upscale trip capability is not maintained, Condition i exists. Reference 12 justified use of alternate methods to detect and suppress oscillations for a limited period of time.

The alternate methods are procedurally established consistent with the guidelines identified in Reference 17 requiring manual operator action to scram the plant if certain predefined events occur. The 12 hour1.388889e-4 days 0.00333 hours 1.984127e-5 weeks 4.566e-6 months allowed action time is based on engineering judgment to allow orderly transition to the alternate methods while limiting the period of time during which no automatic or alternate detect and suppress trip capability is formally in place. Based on the small probability of an instability event occurring at all, the 12 hours1.388889e-4 days 0.00333 hours 1.984127e-5 weeks 4.566e-6 months is judged to be reasonable.

(continued)

BFN-UNIT 3 B 3.3-35 Amendment No. 221 Revision 4

m o

RPS Instrumentation B 3.3.1.1 i

BASES ACTIONS 12 (continued)

The alternate method to detect and suppress oscillations implemented in accordance with I.1 was evaluated (Reference

12) based on use up to 120 days only. The evaluation, based on engineering judgment, concluded that the likelihood of an instability event that could not be adequately handled by the alternate methods during this 120 day period was negligibly small. The 120 day period is intended to be an outside limit to allow for the case where design changes or extensive analysis might be required to understand or correct some unanticipated characteristic of the instability detection algorithms or equipment. This action is not intended and was not evaluated as a routine alternative to returning failed or inoperable equipment to OPERABLE status. Correction of routine equipment failure or inoperability is expected to normally be accomplished within the completion times allowed for Actions for Conditions A and B.

SURVEILLANCE As noted at the beginning of the SRs, the SRs for each RPS j

REQUIREMENTS instrumentation Function are located in the SRs column of Table 3.3.1.1-1.

The Surveillances are modified by a Note to indicate that when a channel is placed in an inoperable status solely for 4

performance of required Surveillances, entry into associated Conditions and Requireo Actions may be delayed for up to 6 hours6.944444e-5 days 0.00167 hours 9.920635e-6 weeks 2.283e-6 months , provided the assocmted Function maintains RPS trip capability. Upon completion of the Surveillance, or expiration of the 6 hour6.944444e-5 days 0.00167 hours 9.920635e-6 weeks 2.283e-6 months allowance, the channel must be returned to OPERABLE status or the applicable Condition entered and Required Actions taken. This Note is based on the reliability analysis (Ref. 3) assumption of the average time required to perform channel Surveillance. That analysis demonstrated that the 6 hour6.944444e-5 days 0.00167 hours 9.920635e-6 weeks 2.283e-6 months testing allowance does not significantly reduce the probability that the RPS will trip when necessary.

(continued)

BFN-UNIT 3 8 3.3-35a Amendment 221

.m.

RPS Instrumentation 3

B 3.3.1.1 BASES.

SURVEILLANCE SR 3.3.1.1.11 -

REQUIREMENTS (continued)

(Deleted)

SR 3.3.1.1.14 The LOGIC SYSTEM FUNCTIONAL TEST demonstrates the OPERABILITY of the required trip logic for a specific channel.

The functional testing of control rods (LCO 3.1.3), and SDV vent and drain valves (LCO 3.1.8), overlaps this Surveillance to provide complete testing of the assumed safety function.

The 24 month Frequency is based on the need to perform this -

Surveillance under the conditions that apply during a plant outage and the potential for an unplanned transient if the Surveillance were performed with the reactor at power.

Operating experience with these components supports performance of the Surveillance at the 24 month Frequency.

The LOGIC SYSTEM FUNCTIONAL TEST for APRM Function 2.e simulates APRM and OPRM trip conditions at the 2-out-of-4 l voter channel inputs to check all combinations of two tripped inputs to the 2-out-of-4 logic in the voter channels and APRM related redundant RPS relays.

(continued)

BFN-UNIT 3 B 3.3-44 Amendment No. 213, 215r 221 RevisiorW

RPS Instrumentation o

B 3.3.1.1 BASES SURVEILLANCE SR 3.3.1.1.17 REQUIREMENTS (continued)

This SR ensures that scrams initiated from OPRM Upscale Function (Function 2.f) will not be inadvertently bypassed when THERMAL POWER, as indicated by the APRM Simulated Thermal Power, is 2 25% RTP and core flow, as indicated by recirculation drive flow, is < 60% rated core flow. This normally involves confirming the bypass setpoints. Adequate margins for the instrument setpoint methodologies are incorporated into the actual setpoint. The actual surveillance ensures that the OPRM Upscale Function is enabled (not bypassed) for the correct values of APRM i

Simulated Thermal Power and recirculation drive flow. Other surveillances ensure that the APRM Simulated Thermal Power and recirculation flow properly correlate with THERMAL POWER and core flow, respectively.

If any bypass setpoint is nonconservative (i.e., the OPRM Upscale Function is bypassed when APRM Simulated Thermal Power 2 25% RTP and recirculation drive flow < 60% rated), then the j

affected channel is considered inoperable for the OPRM Upscale Function. Alternatively, the bypass setpoint may be adjusted to place the channel in a conservative condition (unbypass). If placed in the unbypassed condition, this SR is met and the channel is considered OPERABLE.

The frequency of 24 months is based on engineering judgment and reliability of the components.

(continued)

BFN-UNIT 3 B 3.3-45a Amendment No. 221

RPS Instrumentation B 3.3.1.1 s

BASES (continued)

REFERENCES 1.

FSAR, Section 7.2.

2.

FSAR, Chapter 14.

3.

NEDO-23842, " Continuous Control Rod Withdrawal in the Startup Range," April 18,1978.

4.

FSAR, Appendix N.

5.

FSAR, Section 14.6.2.

6.

FSAR, Section 6.5.

7.

FSAR, Section 14.5.

8.

P. Check (NRC) letter to G. Lainas (NRC), "BWR Scram.

Discharge System Safety Evaluation," December 1,1980.

9.

NEDC-30851-P-A, " Technical Specification improvement Analyses for BWR Reactor Protection System,"

March 1988.

10. NRC No.93-102, " Final Policy Statement on Technical Specification improvements," July 23,1993.

11. MED-32-0286, " Technical Specification improvement Analysis for Browns Ferry Nuclear Plant, Unit 2," October 1995.

12. NEDC-32410P-A," Nuclear Measurement Analysis and Control Power Range Neutron Monitor (NUMAC PRNM)

Retrofit Plus Option 111 Stability Trip Function," October 1995.

13. NEDO-31960-A, "BWR Owners' Group Long-Term Stability l

Solutions Licensing Methodology," Novembar 1995.

l' l

(continued)

BFN-UNIT 3 8 3.3-46 Amendment No. 24h 221 Revision 4 t

RPS Instrumentation B 3.3.1.1 BASES REFERENCES 14.' NEDO-31960-A, Supplement 1, "BWR Owners' Group (continued)

Long-Term Stability Solutions Licensing Methodology,"

November 1995.

15. NEDO-32465-A, "BWR Owners' Group Long-Term Stability Detect and Suppress Solutions Licensing Basis Methodology and Reload Applications," August 1996.-

16. NEDC-32410P-A, Supplement 1, " Nuclear Measurement 1

Analysis and Control Power Range Neutron Monitor (NUMAC PRNM) Retrofit Plus Option lli Stability Trip Function," August 1996.

17. Letter, L.A. England (BWROG) to M.J. Virgilio, "BWR Owners' Group Guidelines for Stability Interim Corrective Action," June 6,1994.

t I

BFN-UNIT 3 8 3.3-46a Amendment No. 221

e; 0

Recirculation Loops Operating B 3.4.1

+-

BASES APPLICABLE Plant specific LOCA analyses have been performed assuming SAFETY ANALYSES only one operating recirculation loop. These analyses have (continued) demonstrated that, in the event of a LOCA caused by a pipe break in the operating recirculation loop, the Emergency Core Cooling System response will provide adequate core cooling, provided the APLHGR requirements are modified accordingly (Refs. 7 and 8).

The transient analyses of Chapter 14 of the FSAR have also been performed for single recirculation loop operation (Ref. 7) and demonstrate sufficient flow coastdown characteristics to maintain fuel thermal margins during the abnormal operational transients analyzed provided the MCPR requirements are modified. During single recirculation loop operation, modification to the Reactor Protection System (RPS) average power range monitor (APRM) instrument setpoint is also l

required to account for the different relationships between recirculation drive flow and reactor core flow. The APLHGR and MCPR setpoints for single loop operation are specified in the COLR. The APRM Flow Biased Simulated Thermal Power-High setpoint is in LCO 3.3.1.1, " Reactor Protection System (RPS) Instrumentation."

I Recirculation loops operating satisfies Criterion 2 of the NRC Policy Statement (Ref. 6).

(continued)

BFN-UNIT 3 B 3.4-4 Amendment No. 246 221 7

Revisiono,-3

Recirculation Loops Operating e.

B 3.4.'i BASES (continued)

LCO Two recirculation loops are required to be in operation with their flows matched within the limits specified in SR 3.4.1.1 to ensure that during a LOCA caused by a break of the piping of one recirculation loop the assumptions of the LOCA analysis are satisfied. With the limits specified in SR 3.4.1.1 not met, the recirculation loop with the lower flow must be considered not in operation. With only one recirculation loop in operation, modifications to the required APLHGR Limits (LCO 3.2.1,

" AVERAGE PLANAR LINEAR HEAT GENERATION RATE (APLHGR)"), MCPR limits (LCO 3.2.2, ' MINIMUM CRITICAL POWER RATIO (MCPR)"), and APRM Flow Biased Simulated Thermal Power-High Setpoint (LCO 3.3.1.1) may be applied to allow continued operation consistent with the assumptions of References 7 and 8.

APPLICABILITY In MODES 1 and 2, requirements for operation of the Reactor Coolant Recirculation System are necessary since there is considerable energy in the reactor core and the limiting design basis transients and accidents are assumed to occur.

l in MODES 3,4, and 5, the consequences of an accident are reduced and the coastdown characteristics of the recirculation loops are not important.

i i

(continued)

BFN-UNIT 3 B 3.4-5 Amendment No. 243-244 246 221 7

7 7

Revisione l

R:: circulation Loops Operating 5

B 3.4.1 BASES (continued)

ACTIONS A.1 With the requirements of the LCO not met, the recirculation loops must be restored to operation with matched flows within 24 hours2.777778e-4 days 0.00667 hours 3.968254e-5 weeks 9.132e-6 months . A recirculation loop is considered not in operation; when the pump in that loop is idle or when the mismatch between totaljet pump flows of the two loops is greater than required limits. The loop with the lower flow must be considered not in operation. Should a LOCA occur with one recirculation loop not in operation, the core flow coastdown and i

resultant core response may not be bounded by the LOCA j

analyses. Therefore, only a limited time is allowed to restore the inoperable loop to operating status.

Alternatively, if the single loop requirements of the LCO are applied to the operating limits and RPS setpoints, operation with only one recirculation loop would satisfy the requirements of the LCO and the initial conditions of the accident sequence.

i l

l (continued)

BFN-UNIT 3 8 3.4 4 Amendment No. 246 221 7

RevisioM) l

_ Recirculation Loops Operating 5

B 3.4.1 BASES ACTIONS A.1 (continued)

The 24 hour2.777778e-4 days 0.00667 hours 3.968254e-5 weeks 9.132e-6 months Completion Time is based on the low probability of an accident occurring during this time period, on a reasonable time to complete the Required Action, and on frequent core monitoring by operators allowing abrupt changes in core flow conditions to be quickly detected.

This Required Action does not require tripping the recirculation pump in the lowest flow loop when the mismatch between total jet pump flows of the two loops is greater than the required limits. However, in cases where large flow mismatches occur, low flow or reverse flow can occur in the low flow loop jet pumps, causing vibration of the jet pumps. If zero or reverse j

flow is detected, the condition should be alleviated by changing pump speeds to re-establish forward flow or by tripping the pump.

1 4

(continued)

BFN-UNIT 3 8 3.4-7 Amendment No. 24

'!21 RevistoM)

1 i

Recirculation Loops Operating B 3.4.1 BASES ACTIONS 8.1 (continued)

With no recirculation loops in operation while in MODES 1 or 2 or the Required Action and associated Completion Time of Condition A not met, the plant must be brought to a MODE in which the LCO does not apply. To achieve this status, the plant must be brought to MODE 3 within 12 hours1.388889e-4 days 0.00333 hours 1.984127e-5 weeks 4.566e-6 months . In this condition, the recirculation loops are not required to be operating because of the reduced severity of DBAs and minimal dependence on the recirculation loop coastdown characteristics. The allowed Completion Time of 12 hours1.388889e-4 days 0.00333 hours 1.984127e-5 weeks 4.566e-6 months is reasonable, based on operating experience, to reach MODE 3 from full power conditions in an orderly manner and without challenging plant systems.

i 1

(continued)

BFN-UNIT 3 8 3.4-8 Amendment No. 246 221 7

Revision 4

Recirculation Loops Operating B 3.4.1 BASES (continued)

SURVEILLANCE SR 3.4.1.1 REQUIREMENTS This SR ensures the recirculation loops are within the allowable limits for mismatch. At low core flow (i.e., < 70% of rated core flow), the MCPR requireme'nts provide larger margins to the fuel cladding integrity Safety Limit such that the potential adverse effect of early boiling transition during a LOCA is reduced. A larger flow mismatch can therefore be allowed when core flow is

< 70% of rated core flow. The recirculation loop jet pump flow, as used in this Surveillance, is the summation of the flows from all of the jet pumps associated with a single recirculation loop.

The mismatch is measured in terms of percent of rated core I

flow. If the flow mismatch exceeds the specified limits, the loop with the lower flow is considered inoperable. The SR is not required when both loops are not in operation since the mismatch limits are meaningless durir.g single loop or natural circulation operation. The Surveillance must be performed within 24 hours2.777778e-4 days 0.00667 hours 3.968254e-5 weeks 9.132e-6 months after both loops are in operation. The 24 hour2.777778e-4 days 0.00667 hours 3.968254e-5 weeks 9.132e-6 months Frequency is consistent with the Surveillance Frequency for jet pump OPERABILITY verification and has been shown by cperating experience to be adequate to detect off normal jet pump loop flows in a timely manner.

j (continued)

BFN-UNIT 3 8 3.4-9 Amendment No. 221 RevisiorW

E i

e Recirculation Loops Operating 3

8 3.4.1 BASES (continued)

REFERENCES 1.

FSAR, Section 14.6.3.

2.

FSAR, Section 4.3.5.

3.

Deleted.

4.

Deleted.

5.

Deleted.

6. NRC No.93-102, " Final Policy Statement on Technical Specification Improvements," July 23,1993.

7. NEDO-24236, " Browns Ferry Nuclear Plant Units 1,2, and 3, Single-Loop Operation," May 1981.

8. NEDC-32484P, " Browns Ferry Nuclear Plant Units 1,2, and 3, SAFER /GESTR-LOCA Loss-of-Coolant Accident Analysis," Revision 2, December 1997.

l i

BFN-UNIT 3 B 3.4-10 Amendment No. 243r246r 221 Revision 4) i m

ML20212G215

Text

Attachment:

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