ML20212F581

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Rev 4 to TVA Employee Concerns Special Program Sequoyah Nuclear Plant Element Final Rept MC-40512-SQN, Containment Vessel Plate
ML20212F581
Person / Time
Site: Sequoyah  Tennessee Valley Authority icon.png
Issue date: 02/24/1987
From: Russell J, Smith F, Stewart D
TENNESSEE VALLEY AUTHORITY
To:
Shared Package
ML20212F190 List:
References
MC-40512-SQN, MC-40512-SQN-R04, MC-40512-SQN-R4, NUDOCS 8703050118
Download: ML20212F581 (8)


Text

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r-9 TVA EMPLOYH CONCHNS REPORT NUMBER: NC-40512-SQN

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. SPECIAL PROGRAN REPORT TYPE: Sequoyah Nuclear Plant Element REVISION NUB ER: 4 (Final Report)

TITLE: Containment Vessel Plate PAGE 1 0F 8 REASON FOR REVISION:

Revision 1: Revised to incorporate Technical Assistance Staff (TAS) and Senior Review Panel (SRP) comuments.

Revision 2: Revised for' minor format and grammar corrections, wording clarification, incorporation of corrective action, and the addition of Attachment A.

Revision 3: Revised to incorporate SRP comments.

Revision 4: Revised to incorporate NRC comments for clarification.

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  1. ', TVA EMPLOYEE CONCERNS REP 0tf IRNIBEtt NC-40512-SQN
  • SPECIAL PROGRAN REVISION NUNBER: 4 PAGE 2 OF 8 I. Introduction This element report addresses concern XX-85-120-003 and is specific to Sequoyah Nuclear Plant (SQN),

II. Summary of Perceived Problem Heat numbers were placed on approximately five plates on the containment vessel, without Quality Control's knowledge, when it was discovered there were no heat numbers on the plates.

III. Evaluation Methodology A. Reviewed expurgated file to determine if any additional information

. ( was available.

B. Determined if any other reports exist which deal with the subject concern.

C. Reviewed Nuclear Safety Review Staff (NSRS) Report I-85-865-SQN to determine if findings and conclusions were adequate.

D. Reviewed documentation researched in the NSRS report to verify findings.

E. Contacted NSRS Investigator for additional information.

F. Contacted individual E for clarification of information (individual E designated in NSRS report).

G, . Observed support pads for heat numbers.

H. Reviewed certification documentation and contracts for heat number  ;

traceability and correct material usage.

I. Reviewed TVA storeroom requisitions forms (575s) for structural steel other than American Society for Testing and Material (ASTN)

A-36 issued from Power Stores to ensure correct material was issued for generic applicability purposes.

IV. Summary of Findings A. A review of expurgated file XX-85-120 revealed no additional information.

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.;; TVA EMPLOYEE CONCERNS REPORT NERIBERL NC-40512-SQN

'- SPECIAL PROGRAN REVISION NUMBER: 4 PAGE 3 OF~8-f IV .' Summary of Findings (Continued)

[ B. A review of Employee Concern. Task Group-(ECTG) file 1X-85-120-003 reveeled NSRS Report I-85-865-SQN, Improper Placement of Heat-Numbers.

C. A review of'the NSRS report revealed that the-plates in question-were installed in the summer of 1980. This information was t

provided by individual E of the report whose name was revealed by the concerned individual (CI) as the foreman over the crew which.

installed the plates in question. A conversation between NSRS and individual E revealed the installation location of the plates in question. Drawing 47W2500-35 Revision 13. " Mechanical Pipe Support Pads for Containment' Liner," detailed the location of five steel support plates. Mark numbers 124 through 128 twee welded to the unit 1 containment vessel liner for support of piping hangers.

( These plates were added by workplan 8434 to support piping in the ice condenser system. The work accomplished by the workplan, the foreman involved.-and the timing of the work match the information given by the CI.

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A reFleW of the workplan by the NSRS-investigator.was initiated and was found to contain the Quality Control (QC) Inspection Records for.the welding of these five plates to the containment vessel.

This information was found on pages 107 through 127 of workplan l

n 8434. Although TVA construction procedures did require that heat numbers be attached to material used in the containment vessel structure construction, the procedure used by Office of Nuclear Power (ONP) outage and plant maintenance did not. *A TVA American i, Society of Nechanical Engineering (ASME) code specialist indicated F that this latter practice is an acceptable interpretation of the code. However, (ONP) procedures do require that the heat number for such material be traceable to its source material, b Traceability for workplan 8434 was verified by the QC inspector and i- cognizant engineer when they signed the QC Inspection Record.

! The NSRS report concluded that, "This employee concern is not

! substantiated. The records of the work done to add five plates to j the centainment vessel in 1980 indicate that the heat numbers for l- the plates were checked by the QC inspectors and documented in i_ inspection reports. There was no requirement ta add heat numbers

to the plates welded to the containment vessel in w,rkplan 8434;

! and thus no requirement for QC inspection of heat number transfer.

, The differing requirements used in the construction of the containment vessels and what ONP used to add these pads are the l

l result of acceptable interpretations of ASME code requirements."

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L Through review and verification of the NSRS report findings, the conclusions of the report were found to be adequate.

  • Editorial comment: Documentation traceability to installation is l_

, adequate.

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TVA EMPIAYEE CONCERNS REPORT NUMBER: MC-40512-SQN

  • SPECIAL PROGRAM REVISION NUMBER: 4 PAGE 4 0F 8 F

l D. Review of denwing 47W2500-35 Revision 14, found that five support (i pads were installed on the interior containment vessel liner in

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1980. The pads were idontified by the drawing as mark numbers 124,

& 125, 126, 127, end 128 and located by azimuth and elevation. Pad l

!' azimuth and elevation are uniquely noted on the weld data sheets for IR4 l each pad in workplan 8434. A review of workplan 8434 found the l material storeroom requisitions (form TVA 575) indicating heat numbers for structural steel issued from Power Stores, and the QC weld data sheets which indicated the heat numbers for the five pads lR4 used. These numbers do coincide. The inspection records, found on  ;

i pages 107 through 127 of workplan 8434, were signed off by the IR4 j

! inspector for material verification and approved by the " cognizant

[ engineer."

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f E. Telecon with the NSRS investigator revealed the name of the foreman

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indicated by the CI. It was also indicated by the NSRS investigator that the material used for the pad was questioned by the QC inspector i for heat number traceability. During initial fabrication of the pads, QC questioned the validity of one of the heat numbers. It was discovered at that time that no certification documentation was

> available for the steel. Documentation was obtained from the vendor and the material was verified by QC. This information was obtained from the foreman by the NSRS investigator.

F. Telecon with the crew foreman revealed that the responsible engineer would order material on a form 575. The material would then be picked up at the Power Stores warehouse by the craft. At that time, y the material would be taken to the machine shop for cutting

. (fabrication). QC personnel, at the time of fabrication, would I- transfer the heat number from the original piece of steel to the I fabricated pieces. The foreman stated that he was sure that the-h material in question had heat numbers inscribed, and that the correct

heat numbers are on the steel. He stated that the heat numbers may not

[ be visible because the plates had to be pressed to meet the curvature of the containment liner. These plates could have been pressed, 4

whereas the heat number would be against tht containment liner.

G. Upon visual observation of tha support pads, it was found that there was no evidence of heat numbers on pads 124, 125, 126, and 128, although indentations were observed on pad 127. Due to the thickness of paint, the number inscribed could not be verified.

H. A review of the certification documentation Certified Material Test Report (CMTRs), for heat numbers 8013226 and 432E0141 recorded on lR4 8

weld data sheets (described in Section D above), for the 1-1/4-inch I thick steel plate used for fabrication of the support pads found

! the material to be ASTM A516, grade 70 as required by note one of lR4

[ drawing 47W2500-35 Revision 14 "All pad material shall be ASTM I A516 Grade 60 or 70 carbon steel plate, Level 1, in accordance with i

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_p TVA INPIAYEE CONCERNS REPORT NWBER: NC-40512-SQN

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i SPECIAL PROGRAM.

T REVISION NUMBER: 4

< PAGE 5 OF 8 I

IV. Summary of Findings (Continued) f ..

SQN Construction Specification N2G-877." However, review of the y CNTE for the 1-1/4 inch plat *, heet number 7487540 for pad 125, IR4

. which was also requisitioned from storage for use in fabrication

[' of one of the pads in question, identified the material as being certified to ASIN A36 only. The CNTR also identified the purchase contract as 771841. Through review of the contract it was discovered that the material procured was ASIN A36.

I. A random review of all 575s on file for structural material other than ASTN A36 requisitioned from storage from November 30, 1979, i .

through January 8, 1981, was performed to determine if the correct

. material was issued and if the incident involving the issuance of incorrect material on 575 number 1256 was isolated or common. The review revealed that three heat numbers were issued other than the

- ( three mentioned in paragraph F that were structural materials other than ASTN A36.- The storeroom requisitions 575s involved the issue of ASTN A572 steel plate (HT 7420328) ASTN A240, type 304 stainless

! steel plate, and ASTN A588. Grade A plate. A-review of the heat

' code sort revealed that the material was properly issued.

c Therefore, the issuance of incorrect material on 575 number 1256 was determined to be an isolated incident and was not determined

, to be generically applicable to all storeroom issues.

Conclusions

1. No requirement was found to place heat numbers on the plates at

. Fabrication or Installation.

2. No requirement was established for Quality Assurance to validate the placement of heat numbers on the plates.
3. DurinE the concern evaluation, it was discovered that the incorrect type of structural steel. (A36) NT 7487540, was used for the fabrication of support pad mark number 125 (reference drawing 47W2500-35 Revision 14. note 1). This material was issued from the SQN construction warehouse as ASTN A516. grade 60 material. After review of the procurement and certification documentation, the material was found to be ASTN A36 and did not meet the material requirements of as-constructed configuration of the previously referenced drawing (reference Corrective Action Tracking Document (CATD) No. 40512-SQN-01).

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TVA EMPIDfEE CONCERN 8 REPOET NUMBER: NC-40512-SQN

. SPECIAL PEDGRAN

' REVISION NUMBER: 4 PAGE 6 0F 8 Y. Root Cause:

1. None
2. None
3. Inadequate inspection of material by the QC inspector and warehouse clerk upon issuance from storage.

Note:

Natorial is traced by use of the storeroom requisition (form TVA 575) at Sequoyah Nuclear Plant, Office of Nuclear Power. This material is verified by the field inspectors by cross-checking the 575 description j to an identifying mark on the material. JFery seldom, if at any time, between issuance fram storage and installation is the heat number or

,- [ material description verified by use of the heat sort printout or the material certification documentation. This method, in which the 575 is used for material verification, can allow incorrect material to be issued from storage and installed.

VI. Corrective Actions:

The following corrective actions will be taken by Sequoyah Nuclear Plant Office of Nuclear Power as a result of Conclusion 3 in Section IV -

of this report:

.; A. Netallurgical Test will be performed on the support pad in question to determine the material type and grade.

B. If material is verified as being the incorrect type and grade, material will be removed and replaced with the correct type and l -

grade material.

Reference:

CATD No. 40512-SQN t VII. Generic Applicability None - (Concern was specific to SQN and was determined to be isolated for structural materials.)

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f*. REPORT IRIIIBEtt NC-40512-SQN l .

TVA INPIAYEE COIICERNS

  • SPECIAL PROGRAN REVISION NUMBER: 4 PAGE 7 0F 8 j VIII. Attachments Attachment A: Concerns Printout (Identifies relationship of Nuclear l

Safety and Generic Applicability).

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XX 120-003 NC 405 SQN , N N , H' W I-85-865-SQN SS !$EQUDYAH HEAT NUMBERS HAVE BEEN PLA -

T50191 -K-FORM CED ON APPROX. 5 PLATES ON THE C0llTA 6 INMENT VESSEL HHEN IT HAS DISCOVERED #

THERE HERE NO HEAT nlUMBERS ON THESE PLATES. THIS HAS DONE HITH OUT QUAL

  • 'ITY'S KNOWLEDGE AND VIOLATED TI:E QA

. PROCEDURE. CI HAS NO FURTHER INFORM

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