Text

Proposed Tech Specs Removing Request to Add New Figure 3.5-1 for Periodic Testing of Containment Recirculation Pumps
	ML20211P654
Person / Time
Site:	Millstone
Issue date:	10/15/1997
From:	; NORTHEAST NUCLEAR ENERGY CO.
To:	;
Shared Package
ML20211P650	List: B16802, Application for Amend to License NPF-49,removing Request to Add New Figure 3.5-1 for Periodic Testing of Containment Recirculation Pumps.Proposed Revs to Amend License NPF-49 & 0530,should Be Withdrawn; ML20211P654;
References
	NUDOCS 9710210079
	Download: ML20211P654 (24)
	v • d • e

_ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _

Docket No. 50-423 B16802 Millstone Nuclear Power Station Unit No. 3 Proposed Revision to Technical Specification Emeroency Core Coolina System Surveillances (PTSCR 3-35-97)

Marked Up Paoes s

October 1997 j

9710210079 971015 '

PDR ADOCK 05000423 P

PDR;

U.S. Nucl:ar Regul: tory Commission B16802%ttachment 2\\Page 1 MARKUP OF PROPOSED REVISION Refer to the attached markup of the proposed revision to the Technical Specifications.

The attached markup reflects the currently issued version of the Technical Specifications listed below. Pending Technical Specification revisions or Technical Specification revisions issued subsequent to this submittal are not reflected in the enclosed markup.

The following Technical Specification changes are included in the attached markup.

The required indicated differential pressure for the centrifugal charging pump is being replaced by the requirement that "the developed head at the test flow point is greater than or equal to the required developed head," in Surveillance Requirements:

4.1.2.3.1 4.1.2.4.1 The required indicated differential pressure for the centrifugal charging pump, safety injection pump, RHR pump, and containment recirculation pump is being deleted. It is replaced by the requirement that "the developed head at the test flow point is graater than or equal to the required developed head," in Surveillance Requirement:

4.5.2.f The required individual centrifugal charging pump injection lines flow rate sum, excluding the highest flow rate, is being decreased from 339 gpm to 310.5 gpm in Surveillance Requirement:

4.5.2.h.1.a The required individual safety injection pump injection lines flow rate sum, excluding the highest flow rate, is being decreased from 442.5 gpm to 423.4 gpm in Surveillance Requirement:

4.5.2.h.2.a The maximum 4 awed individual safety injection pump total flow rate is being increased for P map A from 670 gpm to 675 gpm and for Pump B from 650 gpm to 675 gpm in Surveillance Requirement:

4.5.2.h.2.b

/____.________..

y sumw... -

U.S. Nuclear Reguistory Commission B16802%ttachment 2\\Page 2 -

The required indicated differential pressure for the containment quench spray pump is being replaced by the requirement that "the developed head at the test flow point is greater than or equal to the required developed head," in Surveillance Requirement:

4.6.2.1.b The required indicated differential pressure for the recirculation spray pump e

is being replaced by the requirement that "the developed head at the test flow point is greater than or equal to the required developed head," in Surveillance Requirement:

4.6.2.2 b

',f.

t j

March 11, 1991 REACTIVITY CONTROL SYSTEMS

,k CHARGING' PUMP - SHUTDOWN LIMITING CONDITION FOR OPERATION 3.1.2.3 One charging pump in the boron injection flow path required by Specification 3.1.2.1 shall be OPERABLE and capable of being powered from an OPERABLE emergency power source.

~

APPLICABILITY: MODES 5 and 6.

ACTION:

With no charging pump OPERABLE or capable of being powered from an OPERABLE emergency power source, suspend all operations involving CORE ALTERATIONS or positive reactivity changes.

SURVEILLANCE REOUIREMENTS 4.1.2.3.1~ The_above required charging pump shall be demonstrated OPERABLE by verifyingf on-r+c4rcuhtien #1ce, th:t a dffferentiel

re:,:ere :cre:: thg]

r e r a-Yt e- + %n ce

~

egg Q te 2411 psid is developed (wien tested pursuant to specification 4.0.5.

4.1.2.3.2 All charging pumps, excluding the above required OPERABLE pump, shall be demonstrated inoperable at least once per 31 days, except when the reactor vessel head is removed, by verifying that the motor circuit breakers are secured in the open position y} }s jen/op A b v 0 "S N b' d $l*"' ? *'

,, 7w o,.apJ -h 4L upJ:rd Aul d U*{

y

, g.

i MILLSTONE - UNIT 3 3/4 1-15 Amendment No. 50,60 3007 m

e March 11, 1991 REACTIVITY CONTROL SYSTEMS CHAR'ING PUMPS - OPERATING

)

G LIMITING CONDITION FOR OPERATION 3.1.2.4 At least two* charging pumps shall be OPERABLE.

APPLICABILITY: MODES 1, 2, 3, and 4.

ACTION:

With only one charging pump OPERABLE, restore at least two charging pumps 'n OPERABLE status within 72 hours8.333333e-4 days 0.02 hours 1.190476e-4 weeks 2.7396e-5 months or be in at least HOT STANDBY and borated to a SHUTDOWN MARGIN equivalent to at least the limit as shown in Figure 3.1-4 p_ -

at 200*F within the next 6 hours6.944444e-5 days 0.00167 hours 9.920635e-6 weeks 2.283e-6 months ; restore at least two charging pumps to OPERABLE status within the next 7 days or be in COLD SHUTDDWN within the next 30 hours3.472222e-4 days 0.00833 hours 4.960317e-5 weeks 1.1415e-5 months .

SURVEILLANCE REOUIREMENTS 4.1.2.4.1 At _least two_ charging _ pumps _ shall be demonstrated OPERABLE by verifying 5 en recircuhtier ?!ce, that a differenti:1 pre::ure acre : e::D

@92 ef treeter then er e ual te 2411 psid is develepedjwhen tested pursuant to Specification 4.0.5.

I 4.1.2.4.2 All charging pumps, except the above allowed OPERABLE pump, shall i

be demonstrated inoperable at least once per 31 days whenever the temperature of one or more of tho' Reactor Coolant System (RCS) cold legs is less than or equal to 350*F by verifying that the motor circuit breakers are secured in the open position.

A maximum of one centrifugal charging pump shall be OPERABLE whenever the temperature of one or more of the RCS cold legs is less than or equal to t

350*F.

A N hPY fd cad yJmy5 0.gicg n

s ynde % < gd 40 -IL rquD

&algoD GD

)

MILLSTONE - UNIT 3 3/4 1-16 Amendment No. 60 y

0007

o December 28,1995 EMERGENCY CORE COOLING SYSTEMS

'g SURVEILLANCE REQUIREMENTS (Continued) 2)

A visual inspection of the containment sump and verifying that the subsystem suction inlets are not restricted by debris and

't that the sump components (trash racks, screens, etc.) show no evidence of structural distress or abnormal corrosion.

At least once each REFUELING INTERVAL by:

7 e.

3)

Verifying that each automatic valve in the flow path actuates to its correct position on a Safety Injection actuation test signal, and 2)

Verifying that each of the following pumps start automatically upon receipt of a Safety Injection actuation test signal:

t</ h a)

Centrifugal charging pump, L-Ud f

b)

Safety Injectic,n pump, and

'hid it f *bh 6"f^l l

4 4 sp ne 4kM M La4 c)

RHR pump.

3)

Verifying that the Residual Heat Removal pumps stop automatically

(

upon receipt of a low-Low RWST Level test signal.

f.

By verifying that each of the following pumphev:10:: the'ndi44teDd Q m a'^ m a! ;er:=: :: d:f-u!sMas_ Dw/sihen tested pursuant to Specification 4.0.5:

r 1)

Centrifugal charging pump 1 241 1sid, 2)

Safety Injection pump 1348 3)

RHR pump 5 psid 4)

Containment racirculation pump (11 psid.

g.

By verifying the correct position of each electrical and/or mechanical position rier fer the folle*:ir.g ECCS throttle valves:

1)

Within 4 hours4.62963e-5 days 0.00111 hours 6.613757e-6 weeks 1.522e-6 months following completion of each valve stroking operation or raintenance on the valve when the ECCS subsystems are required to be OPERABLE, and 2)

At least once each REFUELING INTERVAL.

F ECCS Throttle Valves Valve Numb.tr Valve Number i

351H*V6 351H*V25 351H*V7 351H*V27 1

K1tl 570K - 2:!T :

3/4 5 5 hatnch:nt He. fC. 3 m

December 28,1995 EMERGENCY CORE COOLING SYSTEMS

,t SURVEILLANCE REQUIREMENTS (Continued) d 5:3D _.

ICCS Tirettle Valves Valve Number Valve Number 3S1H*V8 3SlH*V107 331H*V9 351H*V108 3SIH*V21 351H*V109 3SIH*V23 351H*V111 h.

By performing a

flow balance test following completion modifications to the ECCS subsystems that alter the flow characteristics and verifying that:

subsystem l of 1)

For centrifugal charging pump lines, with a single pump running:

a)

The sum of the injection line flow rates, exclu in

'he highest flow rate, is greater than or equal to and

gpm, W.5 b)

The total pump flow rate is less than or equal to 560 gpm.

2)

For Safety Injection pump lines, with a single pump running:

a)

The sum of the injection lire flow rates, exc1 sing the highest flow rate, is greater than or equal to and H..

gpm, 423 4 b)

The t_otal pump flow rate is less than or equal to gpm Q:r tr.: " pump-ent-MO-9pMoe-the-6-9 ump 3 3)

For RHR pump lines, with a single pump running, the sum of the injection line flow rates is greater than or equel to 3076 gom.

?Aji jlsTONE - UNIT '3 3/4 5 M Amendment No. 79,124 o(T

December 28,1995 CONTAIMMENT SYSTEMS 3/A.s.t DEPRrssDRIZAff 0N AND COOLING SYSTEMS

)

CONTAINNENT 00ENCH SPRAY SYSTEM LIMITING CONDITION FOR OPERATION 3.6.2.1 Two independent Containment Quench Spray subsystems shall be OPERABLE.

APPLICABILITY: MODES 1, 2, 3, and 4.

EJJQN:

With one Containment Quench Spray subsystem inoperable, restore the inoperable system to OPERABLE status within 72 hours8.333333e-4 days 0.02 hours 1.190476e-4 weeks 2.7396e-5 months or be in at least HOT STANDBY within the next 6 hours6.944444e-5 days 0.00167 hours 9.920635e-6 weeks 2.283e-6 months and in COLD SHUTDOWN within the following 30 hours3.472222e-4 days 0.00833 hours 4.960317e-5 weeks 1.1415e-5 months .

SURVEILLANCE REQUIREMENTS 4.6.2.1 Each Containment Quench Spray subsystem shall be demonstrated OPERABLE:

a.

At least once per 31 days:

power operated, or path (manual, each valve 1)

Verifying) that I

is not locked, sealed, or automatic in the flow otherwise secured in positien, is in its correct position; and 2)

Verifying the temperature of the borated water in the refueling water storage tank is between 40'F and 50'F.

By verifyp;r:hatfcn :::ir:ul:ti:n f1;Ch::h p=!!4 ;;id

4: v:le;; a b.

.i f f:r:r.t,..

nur: Of gr::t:r th=

r :;ni t:

en este Q ursuant to 5pecificaM on 4.0.51 c.

At least once each REFUELING INTERVAL, by:

1)

Verifying that each automatic valve in the flow path actuates to its correct position on a COE test signal, and 2)

Verifying that each spray pump starts automatically on a CDA test signal, d.

At least once per 10 years by performing an air or smoke flow test through each spray header and verifying each spray no:;le is unobstructed.

g [,,, ', Cao. lop.a D hud d

Ten db ?o.nt s's9' O h" A y rta- % o e.ep \\

-+o

+Ln n$o; ed <0**d C

NILL 5 TONE - UNIT 3 3/46-12 Amendment No. 7, JP, JPP,12c em

December 28,1995 CONTAINMENT SYSTEMS

\\'

RECIRCULATION SPRAY SY1JIH LINITING CONDITION FOR OPERATION 3.6.2.2 Two independent Recirculation Spray Systems shall be OPERABLE.

APPLICABILITY: MODES 1, 2, 3, and 4.

EIIB:

With one Recirculation Spray System inoperable, restore the inoperable system to OPERABLE status within 72 hours8.333333e-4 days 0.02 hours 1.190476e-4 weeks 2.7396e-5 months or be in at least HOT STANDBY within the next 6 hours6.944444e-5 days 0.00167 hours 9.920635e-6 weeks 2.283e-6 months ; restore the inoperable Recirculation Spray System to OPERABLE status within the next 48 hours5.555556e-4 days 0.0133 hours 7.936508e-5 weeks 1.8264e-5 months or be in COLD SHUTDOWN within the following 30 hours3.472222e-4 days 0.00833 hours 4.960317e-5 weeks 1.1415e-5 months .

SURVEILLANCE REQUIRENENTS 4.6.2.2 Each Recirculation Spray System shall be demonstrated OPERABLE:

At least once per 31 days by verifying that each valve (manual, a.

power-operated, or automatic) in the flow path is not locked, sealed, or otherwise secured in position, is in its correct position; b.

By vertfying *=rier"4 tion flow, each pri develops )

+a am w en

_fdifferentfa9! pressure of ---"-

^=- --

-a"='

/' tested pursuant to specification 4.0.5; At least once each REFUELING INTERVAL by verifying that on a CDA.}"

c.

test signal, each recirculation spray pump startt automatically after a 660 120 second delay; d.

At least once each REFUELING INTERVAL, by verifying that each }'

automatic valve in the flow path actuates to its correct position on a CDA test signal; and At least once per 10 years by performing an air or smoke flow test e.

through each spray header and verifying each spray nozzle is unobstructed.

b luab 4 Y E$N P'b 'E g [A c,c 9.>o / % 44 y:rd cbt J b' A q

ps, 9

I HILLSTONE - UNIT 3 3/46-13 Amendment No. 77,177,122 em

Docket No. 50423 B16802 Millstone Nuclear Power Station Unit No. 3 Proposed Revision to Technical Specification Emeroency Core Coolina System Surveillances

@_TSCR 3-35-97)

Retvoed Paaes October 1997

U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission B16802%ttachment 3\\Page1 RETYPE OF PROPOSED REVISION Refer to the attached retype of the proposed revision to the Technical Specifications.

The attached retype reflects the currently issued version of the Technical

- Specifications. Pending Technical Specification revisions or Technical Specification revisions issued subsequent to this submittal are not reflected in the enclosed retype.

The enclosed retype should be checked for continuity with Technical Specifications prior to issuance.

NNECO letter dated August 29,1997, Proposed revision to Technical Specifications -

Reduction in the Cold Overpressure Protection System Enabling Temperature (PTSCR 3-21-97) is pending and affects page 3/41-15.

1 l

REACTIVITY. CONTROL SYSTENS CHARGING PUNP - SHUTDOWN LINITING CONDITION FOR OPERATION 3.1.2.3 One charging pump in the boron injection flow path required by Spr;cification 3.1.2.1 shall be OPERABLE and capable of being powered from an OPikABLE emergency power source.

APPLICABILITY: MODES 5 and 6.

ACTION:

With no charging pump OPERABLE or capable of being powered from an OPERABLE emergency power source, suspend all operations involving CORE ALTERATIONS or positive reactivity changes.

SURVEILLANCE REQUIRENENTS 4.1.2.3.1 The above required charging pump shall be demonstrated OPERABLE by verifying that its developed head at the test flow point is greater than or equal to the required developed head when tested pursuant to Specification 4.0.5.

4.1.2.3.2 All charging pumps, excluding the above required OPERABLE pump, shall-be demonstrated inoperable at least once per 31 days, except when the reactor vessel head is ren.oved, by verifying that the motor circuit breakers are secured in the open position.

i NILLSTONE - UNIT 3 3/4 1-15 Amendment No. pp, pp, 0667

E &GTIVITY CONTROL SYSTEMS CHARGING PUNPS.- OPERATING LINITING CONDITION FOR OPERATION a

3.1.2.4 At least two* charging pumps shall be OPERABLE.

APPLICABILITY: MODES 1, 2, 3, and 4.

ACTION:

With only cne charging pum) OPERABLE, restore at least two charging pumps to OPERABLE status within 721ours or be in at least HOT STANDBY and borated to a SHilTDOWN MARGIN equivalent to at least the limit as shown in Figure 3.1-4 at 200'F within the next 6 hours6.944444e-5 days 0.00167 hours 9.920635e-6 weeks 2.283e-6 months ; restore at least two charging pumps to OPERABLE status within the next 7 days or be in COLD SHUTDDWN within the next 30 hours3.472222e-4 days 0.00833 hours 4.960317e-5 weeks 1.1415e-5 months .

SURVEILLANCE REQUIRENENTS 4.1.2.4.1 At least two charging pumps shall be demonstrated OPERABLE by verifying that each pump's developed head at the test flow point is greater than or equal to the required developed head when tested pursuant to Specification 4.0.5.

4.1.2.4.2 All charging pumps, except the above allowed OPERABLE pump, shall be demonstrated inoperable at least once per 31 days whenever the temperature of one or more of the Reactor Coolant System (RCS) cold legs is less than or equal to 350'F by verifying that the motor circuit breakers are secured in the open position.

A maximum of one centrifugal charging pump shall be OPERABLE whenever the temperature of one or more of the RCS cold legs is less than or equal to 350'F.

NILLSTONE - UNIT 3

3/4 1-16.

Amendment No. pp,-

0667

ENERGENCY CORE COOLING SYSTENS SURVEILLANCEREQUIRENENTS(Continued) 2)

A visual inspection of the containment sump and verifying that the subsystem suction inlets are not restricted by debris and that the sump components (trash racks, screens, etc.) show no evidence of structural distress or abnormal corrosion, e.

At least once each REFUELING INTERVAL by:

1)

Verifying that each automatic valve in the flow path actuates to its correct position on a Safety injection actuation test signal, and 2)

Verifying that each of the following pumps start automatically upon receipt of a Safety Injection actuation test signal:

a)

Centrifugal charging pump, b)

Safety Injection pump, and c)

RHR pump.

3)

Verifying that the Residual Heat Removal pumps stop automatically upon receipt of a Low-Low RWST Level test

signal, f.

By verifying that each of the following pump's developed head at the test flow point is. greater than or equal to the required developed head when tested pursuant to Specification 4.0.5:

1)

Centrifugal charging pump 2)

Safety Injection pump 3)

RHR pump 4)

Containment recirculation pump g.

By verifying the correct position of each electrical and/or mechanical position stop for the following ECCS throttle valv u:

1)

Within 4 hours4.62963e-5 days 0.00111 hours 6.613757e-6 weeks 1.522e-6 months following completion of each valve stroking operation or maintenance on the valve when the ECCS subsystems are required to be OPERABLE, and 2)

At least once each REFUELING INTERVAL.

ECCS Throttle Valves Valve Numbet Valve Number 3SIH*V6 3SIH*V25 3SIH*V7 3SIH*V27 NILLSTONE - UNIT 3 3/4 5-6 Amendment No. pp Up, one

o ENERRENCY CORE COOLING SYSTENS SURVEILLANCEREQUIREMENTS(Continued)

ECCS Throttle Valves Valve Niamher Valve Niamher 3SIH*V8 3SIH*V107 3SIH*V9 3SlH*V108 3SIH*V21 3SIH*V109-3SIH*V23 3SlH*V111 h..

By-performing a flow balance test following completion of modifications to the ECCS subsystems that alter the subsystem flow characteristics and verifying that:

1)

For centrifugal charging pump lines, with a single pump running:

a)

The sum of the injection line flow rates, excluding the highest flow rate, is greater than or equal to 310.5 gpa, l and b)

The total pump flow rate is less than or equal to 560 gpm.

2)

For Safety Injection pump lines, with a single pump running:

a)

The sum of the injection line flow rates, excludh.g the highest flow rate, is greater than or equal to 423.4 gpm, l and b)

The total pump flow rate is less than or equal to 675 gpm.

3)

For RHR pump lines, with a singic pump running, the sum of the injection line flow rates is greater than or equal to 3976 gpm.

A MILLSTONE - UNIT 3 3/45-6 Amendment No. pp, 17%

esu

CONTAIMENT SYSTEMS 3/4.6.2 DEPRESSURIZATION AND COOLINQ_5YSTEMS CONTAINNENT QUENCH SPRAY SYSTEN LINITING CONDITION FOR OPERATION 3.6.2.1 Two independent Containment Quench Spray subsystems shall be OPERABLE.

AP111CABILITY: MODES 1, 2, 3, and 4.

ACTION:

With one Containment Quench S) ray subsystem inoperable, restore the inoperable system to OPERABLE status wit 11n 72 hours8.333333e-4 days 0.02 hours 1.190476e-4 weeks 2.7396e-5 months or be in at least HOT STANDBY within the next 6 hours6.944444e-5 days 0.00167 hours 9.920635e-6 weeks 2.283e-6 months and in COLD SHUTDOWN within the following 30 hours3.472222e-4 days 0.00833 hours 4.960317e-5 weeks 1.1415e-5 months .

SURVEILLANCE REQUIRENENTS 4.6.2.1 Each Containment Quench Spray subsystem shall be demonstrated OPERABLE:

a.

At least once per 31 days:

1)

Verifying that each valve (manual, power

operated, or automatic) in the flow path is not

locked, sealed, or otherwise secured in position, is in its correct position; and 2).

Verifying the tem)erature of the borated water in the refueling water storage tan ( is between 40*F and 50*F.

b.

By verifying that each pump's developed head at the test flow point is greater than or equal to the required developed head when tested pursuant to Specification 4.0.5; c.

At least once each REFUELING INTERVAL, by:

1)

Verifying that each automatic valve in the flow path actuates to its correct position on a CDA test signal, and 2)

Verifying that each spray pump starts automatically on a CDA test

signal, d.

At least once per 10 years by performing an air or smoke flow test through each spray header and verifying each spray nozzle is unobstructed.

NILLSTONE - UNIT 3 3/4 6-12 Amendment No. 7, pp, Jpp, J77, w4

CONTAINNENT SYSTEMS RECIRCULATION SPRAY SYSTEM LINITING CONDITION FOR OPERATION 3.6.2.2 Two independent Recirculation Spray Systems shall be OPERABLE.

APPLICABILITY: MODES 1, 2, 3, and 4.

atllDH:

With one Recirculation Spray System inoperable, restore the inoperable system to OPERABLE status within 72 hours8.333333e-4 days 0.02 hours 1.190476e-4 weeks 2.7396e-5 months or be in at least HOT STANDBY within the b

next 6 hours6.944444e-5 days 0.00167 hours 9.920635e-6 weeks 2.283e-6 months ; restore the inoperable Recirculation Spray System to OPERABLE status within the next 48 hours5.555556e-4 days 0.0133 hours 7.936508e-5 weeks 1.8264e-5 months or be in COLD SHUTDOWN within the following 30 hours3.472222e-4 days 0.00833 hours 4.960317e-5 weeks 1.1415e-5 months .

$URVEILLANCE REQUIREMENTS 4.6.2.2 Each Recirculation Spray System shall be demonstrated OPERABLE:

a.

At least once per 31 days by verifying that each valve (manual, power-operated, or automatic) in the flow path is not locked, sealed, or otherwise secured in position, is in its correct position; b.

By verifying that each pump's developed head at the test flow point is greater than or equal to the required developed head when tested purcuant to Specification 4.0.5; c.

At least once each REFUELING INTERVAL by verifying that on a CDA test signal, each recirculation spray pump starts automatically after a 660 120 second delay; d.

At least once each REFUELING INTERVAL, by verifying that each automatic valve in the flow path actuates to its correct position on a CDA test signal; and Y

e.

At least once per 10 years by performing an air or smoke flow test through each spray header and verifying each spray norele is unobstructed.

NILLSTONE - UNIT 3 3/4 6-13 Amendrent No. pp, Jpp, J77, 0559

4 Docket No. 50-423 B16802 i:

Millstone Nuclear Power Station Unit No. 3 Proposed Revision to Technical Specification Emeroency Core Coolina System Surveillances (PTSCR 3-35-97)

Backaround and Safety Assessment October 1997 l

U.S. Nuclear Regul; tory Commission B16802%ttachment 4\\Page1 Backaround Throttle valves are used in the Charging and Safety injedion lines. These throttle valves are positioned to limit the maximum injection flow to preclude pump run-out, to balance the resistance in the lines, and to ensure the minimum injection flow to support design basis analyses. High velocities through the throttle valves in their current throttled position can cause valve erosion. An additional flow resistance, restricting orifice, is being added to eight of the twelve iniedion lines so that the throttle valves can be opened farther. Opening the throttle will reduce the velocity through the valves so that valve erosion will not be a concom. The blzing of the restricting orifices and the associated re-throttling of the throttle

- valves will be in accordance with Regulatory Guide 1.82, Sumps for Emergency Core Cooling And Containment Spray Systems, in that the openings will be larger than the sump screen mesh opening size.

The surveillance requirements in Sectim 3/4.5.2,3/4.1.2, and 3/5.6.2 are being modified.

The minimum flow requirements for the Safety irjection and Centrifugal Charging pumps are being reduced and the maximum flow allowed for the Safety injection pumps is being increased The numerical surveillance acceptance criteria for the Charging pumps, Safety injection pumps, RHR pum;)s, Containment Recirculation Spray pumps and Quench Spray pumps are being removed from the Technical Specifications. The control of these pump developed head surveillance acceptance criteria is being transferred from the Technical Specification to the inservice Test program. The acceptance criteria used in the inservice Test program will still, at a minimum, provide assurance that the assumptions in the design basis analyses are valid. The following table summarizes the changes.

t

- Technical Specification Current Requirement Proposed Requirement Section 4.5.2.f Centrifugal Charging pu,np Each Centrifugal Charging 4.1.2.3.1 differential pressure on pump's developed head at the 4.1.2.4.1 recirculation flow testflowpointis greaterthan 22411 psid or equal to the required developed head 4.5.2.f Safety injection pump Each Safety injection pump's differential pressuru on developed head at the test recirculation flow 11348 psid flow point is greater than or equal to the required developed head 4.6.2.1.b Quench Spray pump Each Quench Spray pump's differential pressure on developed head at the test recirculation flow flow point is greater than or 1114 psid equal to the required

-__.-____a--_-

U.S. Nuclear Regul: tory Commission B16802%ttachment 4U> age 2 developed head 4.5.2.f Residual Heat Removal pump Each Residual Heat Removal differential pressure on _

pump's developed head at the recirculation flow 1165 psid test flow point is greater than or equal to the requirM developed head 4.5.2.f Containment Recirculation Each Containment 4.6.2.2.b pump differential pressure on Recirculation pump's recirculation flow 3130 psid developed head at the test flow pr*1 tis greater than or equal to the required developed head 4.5.2.h.1.a Single Centnfugal Charging Single Centnfugal Charging pump flow, excluding the pump flow, excluding the -

highest flow rate, t 33g opm highest flow rate, t 310.5 apm 4.5.2.h.2.a Singis Safety triection pump Single Safety inie@on pump flow, excluding the highest flow, excluding the highest flow rate,1442.5 apm flow rate, t 423.4 apm 4.5.2.h.2.b Safety injection Pump A total Safety Iriection Pump A total flow 1670 gpm flow $ 675 gpm Safety injection Pump B total Safety injection Pump B total flow 5650 opm flow 5675 opm The proposed changes, for minimum flows are consistent with the design basis analyses.

The increase in the allowed Safety Iriection pump flow is the maximum continuous runout flow limitation from the pump vendor. These changes to the required flows widen the band of silowable flows. This widening of the band will provide additional flow margin. The minimum flow requirements are established by the ir$ection phase of a Loss of Coolant Accident (LOCA) when the pump suction source is the Refueling Water Storage Tank (RWST). The maximum flow requirements are established during the recirculation phase of a LOCA when the suction source of the pumps is the recirculation spray pumps that provide a head boost to the pumps. This increase in flow between maximum and minimum requirements caused by widening tha band will increase the design window, thereby, allowng for adequate pump performance margin which had been limited because the original design did not adequately evaluate the head boost.

SAFETY ASSESSMENT The proposed transferring of control of the pump developed head surveillance requirements from the Technical Specification to the inservice Test program does not change the fact that the surveillance acceptance criteria will assure that the design basis analyses are valid.

'The proposed Technical Specification changes to the flow requirements are consistent with the design basis analyses and the design runou' I

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.*a U.S. Nucle:r Regul: tory Commission B16802\\ Attachment 4\\Page 3 limitations of the pumps. Modifying the maximum and minimum flows can not cause an accident. Also, since the minimum flows are consistent with the design basis analyses requirements, there can not be any mfverse impact on the consequences of any accident.

The safety injection pumps are disabled such that they can not be a potential mass addition source when the cold Overpressure Protection System is required to be operable.

Therefore, the increase in Safety injection pump maximum flow can not impact the cold overpressure accident analysis.

The changes do not involve any changes to the way that the pumps are operated, only changes to where the developed head surveillance requirement is controlled and the required flow surveillance criteria of the pumps. The pumps will be used post-accident the same way as they are used prior to the d1ange. The surveillance requirements are consistent with the design basis requirements. Therefore, the changes do not modify plant response to any accident.

The changes modify the flow requirements of the Charging and Safety injection pumps.

Tha change transfer control of the pump developed head requirement from the Technical Specifications to the Inservice Test program. The acceptance criteria will, at a minimum, assure that the assumptions of th" safety analysis are met. The maximum flow for the Safety injection pump is consisten, with the runout limitations established by the pump vendor. Safety injection pump operation at a higher allo.ved maximum flow requires a larger pump Net Positive Suction Head (NPSH). The higher NPSH required is below the minimum NPSH available both during injection when the suction source is the RWST and during recirculation when the suction source is the recirculation spray pumps.

The installation of the restricting orifices and the resetting of the throttle valves will result in their opening size being larger than the sump screen size. Therefore, the proposed changes can not introduce a new failure mode.

Based on the above, the proposed Technical Specification change is safe.

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a Docket No. 50-423 B16802-Millstone Nuclear Power Station Unit No. 3 Proposed Revision to Technical Specification Emeroency Core Coolina System Surveillances (PTSCR 3-35-97)

Signjficant Hazards Consideration and Environmental Considerations October 1937

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U.S. Nucl:ar Regulitory Commission B16802\\ Attachment 5\\Page 1 Sionificant Hazards Consideration NNECO has reviewed the proposed revision in accordance with 10CFR50.92 and has concluded that the revision does not involve a significant hazards consideration (SHC).

The basis for this conclusion is that the three criteria of 10CFR50.92(c) are not satisfied. The proposed revision does not involve an SHC because the revision would not:

1.

Involve a significant increase in the probability or consequence of an accident previously evaluated.

The Technical Specification changes transfer control of the pump developed head requirements for the Centrifugal Charging, Safety injection, Quench Spray, Residual Heat Removal, and Recirculation Spray pumps from the Technical Specifications to the inservice Test program. The acceptance criteria will still assure that the safety analysis assumptions are valid. The Technical Specification changes reduce the minimum flow requirements for the Charging and Safety injection pumps and increase the maximum allowed flow for the Safety injection pumps. Modifying the surveillance requirements can not cause an accident and, therefore, can not increase the probability of an accident. The revised minimum required flows are consistent with the flows used in the accident analyses and, therefore, the change can not increase the consequences of any accident. The safety injection pumps are disabled such that they can not be a cource of mass addition to the RCS whenever the cold overpressure system is required to be operable. Tnerefore, the increase in the allowed maximum safety injection pump flow has no effect on the cold overpressure accident analysis.

Therefore, the proposed revision does not involve a significant increase in the probability or consequence of an accident previously evaluated.

2.

Create the possibility of a new or different kind of accident from any accident previously evaluated.

The proposed changes transfer control of the pump developed head requirements from the Technical Specifications to the Inservice Test program and rnodify the required flow surveillance values. The surveillance values that are used in the Inservice Test program and the Technical Specification are consistent with the accident analysis. The increase in the allowed maximum safety injection pump flow does not impact the cold overpressure accident analysis. The changes do not involve any changes to the way that the pumps are operated. The pumps will be used post-accident the same way as they are used prior to the change.

Therefore, the proposed revision does not create the possibility of a new or different kind of accident from any accident previously evaluated.

3.

Involve a significant reduction in a margin of safety.

U.S. Nucirr Regul tory Commission C

B16802%ttachment 5\\Page 2 The control of the pump developed head acceptance criteria is being transferred from the Technical Specification to the Inservice Test program. The acceptance criteria, at a minimum, will assure that the design basis analyses are valid. The minimum pump flow surveillance requirements in Specification 4.5.2.h are consistent with the assumptions of the accident analysis.

The maximum alloved Safety triection flow does not exceed the vendor recommendation for_ maximum continuous runout flow. The NPSH available to the pumps during both the iniedion and reci;culation phases post-accident exceeds the NPSH required at the higher allowed j

flow. Also, the safety injection pumps are disabled so that they can not be an-injection source when the cold overpressure system is required to be operable whid1 means that the increase in maximum flow does not affect the cold overpressure accident analysis. Restricting orifices c,re being installed in the injection lines from he safety injection and charging pumps to the Reactor Coolant System as required lhe restricting orifices and the changes to tne required flows will allow for resetting the throttio position of the existing throttle valves.. The sizing of the restricting o-ifices and the associated re-throttling of the throttle valves will be in accordance with Regulatory Guide 1.82. The proposed changes allow for the setting of the throttle valve positions so that the openings will be larger than the sump screen mesh opening size while assuring that the design basis flow values are valid.

Therefore, the proposed revision does not iny)lve a significant reduction in a margin of safety, in conclusion, based on the information provided, it is determined that the proposed revision does not involve an SHC.

Environmental Considerations NNECO has reviewed the proposed license amendment against the criteria of 10CFR51.22 for environmental considerations. The proposed revision does not involve an SHC, does not significantly increase the type and amounts of effluents that may be released offsite, nor significantly increase individual or cumulative' occupational radiation exposures. Based on the foregoing, NNECO concludes that the proposed revision meets the criteria delineated in 10CFR51.22(c)(9) for categorical exclusion from the requirements for environmental review, 1

ML20211P654

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