ML20211M713

Forwards FEMA 861021 Final Rept, Crystal River Nuclear Power Plant Exercise, on 860619.No Deficiencies Noted. Several Areas Require Corrective Action & Other Areas Recommended for Improvement.W/O Encl

ML20211M713
Person / Time
Site:	Crystal River
Issue date:	02/17/1987
From:	Verrelli D NRC OFFICE OF INSPECTION & ENFORCEMENT (IE REGION II)
To:	Wilgus W FLORIDA POWER CORP.
References
NUDOCS 8702270346
Download: ML20211M713 (1)

Text

D&Chtl FEB1 7 W/

Florida Power Corporation

-(ATTN: Mr. W. S. Wilgus Vice President Nuclear Operations P. O. Box 14042, M.A.C. C-2-M

-St. Petersburg, FL 33733 Gentlemen:

SUBJECT:

FEMA FINAL REPORT - CRYSTAL RIVER EMERGENCY EXERCISE OF JUNE 19, 1986 Enclosed is a copy of the Federal Emergency Management Agency's Final Report for the Crystal River Nuclear Power Plant Emergency Exercise of June 19, 1986.

As described in the enclosure, FEMA did not identify any deficiencies; however, there were several areas recognized which required corrective actions. FEMA also identified several areas recommended for improvement.

We encourage you to assist the appropriate organizations in resolving the weaknesses identified by FEMA.

Resolution of these items should be completed prior to the next full scale emergency preparedness exercise.

We also encourage you to work closely with the State and counties in the decelement of a scenario for the next full scale exercise that will effectively test the areas in which the above items were disclosed.

Your cooperation in this matter is appreciated.

Sincerely, Ol'igl luk St0Md by David M. Verrelli, Chief Reactor Projects Branch 2 Division of Reactor Projects

Enclosure:

FEMA Final Report cg w/ encl:

W. F. McKee, Director, Nuclear Plant Operations t,R. C. Widell, Manager, Nuclear Operations Licensing and Fuel Management h702270346870217ADocK05 coq 2 bec w/ encl:

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I Region IV 1371 Peachtree Street, NE Atlanta, Georgia 30309 CRYSTAL RIVER NUCLEAR POWER PLANT EXERCISE Conducted on June 19, 1986 Exercise Report October 21, 1986 Utility:

Florida Power Corporation Plant Location:

Crystal River, Citrus County, Florida Participating State and local governments:

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CONTENTS l

ABB R EVI ATIONS AN D A C RON YM S..........................................

Iv E X E R C IS E S U M M A R Y......................................................

y 1 I NT R O D U C TIO N........................................................

1 1.1 Ex e rc is e Ba c kg ro u n d.................................................

1 1.2 Ex e rcis e Obs e rve rs..................................................

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1.3 E valua tio n C rit e ria..................................................

3 1.4 Ex e rc is e O bj e c tiv es.................................................

3 1.5 Ex e rc is e Sc e nario...................................................

7 2 E X E R C I S E E VA L U ATIO N................................................ 13 2.1 Flo rida Sta t e Ope ratio ns............................................. 13 2.1.1 State Emergency Operations Center............................. 13 2.1.2 Emergency Operations Facility.................................. 13 2.1.3 E m e rge ncy Ne ws C e nt e r....................................... 14 2.2 Loc al Gove rn m e n t Ope ra tio ns......................................... 16 2.2.1 C i trus C o u n t y................................................ 16 2.2.1.1 C i t rus C o u n t y EO C..................................... 16 2.2.1.2 Traf fic and Access Control............................. 17 2.2.1.3 Vehicle Decontamination............................... 18 2.2.1.4 Registration, Monitoring and Sheltering of Evacuated, Mobility-Impaired Individuals........................... 20 2.2.1.5 Health, Medical and !!ospital Worker Exposure Control De monstration................................. 21 2.2.2 LevyCounty..................................................

23 2.2.2.1 Levy Coun ty EO C..................................... 23 2.2.2.2 Traf fic and Access Control............................. 24 2.2.2.3 Vehicle Decontamination............................... 24 2.2.2.4 Registration, Monitoring and Sheltering of Evacuees....... 25 2.3 Utility Support:

Medical.............................................

26 3 TRACKING SCIIEDULE FOR STATE / LOCAL ACTIONS TO CORRECT DEFICIENCIES AND AREAS REQUIRING CORRECTIVE ACTIONS............ 27 TABLES 1 Crystal River Nuclear Power Station -- Remedial Actions....................

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ABBREVIATIONS AND ACRONYMS i

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4 CCEOC Citrus County Emergency Operations Center

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CRNPS Crystal River Nuclear Power Station 4

DEM Florida Division of Emergency Management i

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'1 EBS Emergency Broadcast System

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ENC Emergency News Center EOC Emergency Operations Center

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EPZ Emergency Planning Zone

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FDA Food and Drug Administration 4

' FEMA Federal Emergency Management Agency

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FPC Florida Power Corporation 4

i HHS Health and Human Services

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j LCEOC Levy County Emergency Operations Center NRC Nuclear Regulatory Commission PAR Protective Action Recommendations PIO Public Information Officer RAC Regional Assistance Committee RACES Radio Amateur Civil Emergency Service l

1 SEOC State Emergency Operations Center SOP Standard Operating Procedure TCP Traffic Control Point

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EkERGENCY OPERATIONS FACILITY Ugq' The full cbm'plement.of trained and knowledgable State staff was present at the

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EOF, consistent with the plan. Procedures to notify key staff and direct activation at any hour of the day were in place, as described in the plan.

The all-weather EOF hellity had adequate space and equipment set aside for

'sta'te and local response personnel. Clearly displayed were all required maps, status tiards, and charts to be used by the utility EOF staff.

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\\Coordirlation, communiestions, and overall interaction among the representatives

.froia the State of Florida and the Florida Power Corporation was excellent.

Communtenit'ont y dedicated hot-line were demonstrated between the EOF, the b

SEOC, and the county EOCs. Back-up communications were also available. A hard-copy device was used for transmission of messages to and from the ENC.

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During the simulated emergency, the State and FPC representatives rapidly and 6

Independently developed'similar assessments of the plume. They jointly developed and implemented appropriate protective actions in a timely fashion. Overall, the members of f

the State Emergency Respense Team perform'ed their responsibilities according to the

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existing, approved Emergency Plan in a professional and well-organized manner.

i EMERGENCY Nidis CENTER The ENC facility was adequate, although the physical separation of State and w

county staff from the licensee's staff may present problems in a real accident.

State' and county P!Os were knowledgeable of their duties and responsibilities.

The cooperation and-fateraction with the !!censee staff was excellent. However, the PIOS wefe,r.ot aiste of EDS message content until after the broadcast because there was sy not ent.n,gh equipment to adequately monitor the broadcast media. County PIO staff and telepnone facilitles were too limited to handle and distribute the volume of messages to be expected in a real emergency. Only one press release was generated and no calls were takmt af ter the single press conference.

Tht> P!Os Old not have enough activity for training purposes.

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Citrus County Emergency Operations Center The Citrus County Emergency Operations Center (CCEOC) had adequate space, lighting, furniture, and communications to support emergency operations.

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showers, kitchen space, and back-up power were available to permit continuous operation during a prolonged emergency. The CCEOC was fully staffed, but a 24-hour staffing capability was not an exercise objective and therefore not demonstr ated.

The communications capabilities of this facility were especially outstanding; there were redundancies within the system and extensive involvement of the Radio Amateur Civil Emergency Service (RACES) operators.

Simulated siren activation, EBS message formulation, and transmission were accomplished within the 15-minute time limit. These activities were fully coordinated

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with Levy County officials. Protective action decisions were more conservative than utility recommendations with respect to evacuation. Coordination of public information activities among the County PIO in the EOC, the EOC liaison at the Emergency New Center, and Rumor Control operations in the EOC was superior. However, it was noted that the ENC liaison's performance could have been improved by the availability of an extra telephone and a staff assistant.

Traffic and Access Control Citrus County adequately demonstrated the capability to control access to an i

evacuated area. However, dosimetry for traffic control personnel was incomplete, and there appeared to be a need for a formal operating plan fo. traffic / access control to provide information on registration, decontamination, and shelter location.

Vehicle Decontamination Vehicle monitoring and decontamination were demonstrated at two locations.

Although appropriate procedures were generally followed, the washdown areas were not effectively segregated to control the spread of contamination. Exposure control for monitoring personnel was faulty at the boat decontamination site. A need for additional training in special monitoring problems (i.e., marine craft) was indicated. Noise levels at both locations could be reduced by provision of a reservoir / tank truck for washdown w ater.

Reception Center Transportation, registration, and shelter provisions for evacuees, including the mobility-impaired, were demonstrated at the reception center in the regional vocational technical school.

Both infrastructure and registration procedures were entirely adequate. However, there appeared to be a need for a detailed layout and operations plan for each of the three functions (monitoring / decontamination, registration, mass care) to be performed at that location.

Storeover, the full complement of supplies needed for some of these functions was lacking. Communications were adequate, with RACES providing back-up radio.

Stonitoring of personnel was generally well demonstrated, although survey meter probes were not protected from contamination by a plastic cover.

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j Medical Drill Emergency Medical Service (EMS) ambulance personnel performed adequately, exhibiting knowledge of equipment and proper procedures.

Information exchange regarding patient and situation status among utility responders, EMS personnel, and hospital staff was timely and accurate. Because the hospital portion of the exercise was terminated prematurely, the objective "...to demonstrate the ability of Citrus County to provide adequate health and medical services to contaminated individuals" could not be completely demonstrated.

i LEVY COUNTY The Levy County EOC (LCEOC) was an adequate facility with the capability for supporting extended operations located nearby. LCEOC leadership and elected official support was excellent. The staff was knowledgeable. However, some minor improve-ments in the EOC's displays and in the internal message-handling system are recommended.

Not all of the Levy County outside activities, as stated in the exercise objectives, were demonstrated. A school that was to be used as one of the shelters was evaluated and found to be adequate. However, the staff was insufficient to demonstrate the county's ability to operate a shelter facility. The washdown demonstration was unavoidably limited due to a severe thunderstorm. Participants did appear knowledge-able of their responsibilities and enthusiasm was excellent.

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1 INTRODUCTION 1.1 EXERCISE BACKGROUND

. On December 7,1979, the President directed the Federal Emergency Manage-ment Agency (FEMA) to assume lead responsibility for all off site nuclear planning and response.

FEMA's immediate basic responsibilities in Fixed Nuclear Facility Radiological Emergency Planning include:

Taking the lead in off site emergency planning and in the review and evaluation of State and local government emergency plans for adequacy.

Determining whether the plans can be implemented on the basis of observation and evaluation of exercises conducted by emergency-response jurisdictions.

Coordinating the activities of volunteer organizations and other involved Federal agencies:

- Environmental Protection Agency (EPA)

- U.S. Department of Agriculture (U.S.D.A.)

- U.S. Department of the Interior (U.S.D.O.I.)

- U.S. Department of Energy (U.S.D.O.E.)

- Nuclear Regulatory Commission (NRC)

- U.S. Department of Health and Human Services (HHS)

- U.S. Food and drug Administration (FDA)

- U.S. Department of Transportation (DOT)

Representatives of these agencies serve as members of the Regional Assistance Committee (RAC), which is chaired by FEMA.

Formal submission of emergency plans to FEMA Regional office by the State and relevant local jurisdictions was followed by a critique and evaluation of these plans. The radiological emergency exercise was conducted on June 19, 1986, between the hours of 8:30 a.m. and 5:30 p.m. The purpose of the exercise was to reassess the capability of the State and local emergency preparedness organizations to protect the public in the event of a radiological emergency at the Nuclear Power Plant in Crystal River, Florida.

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2 An evaluator team consisting of personnel from FEMA Region IV and the RAC evaluated the June 19, 1986, exercise. A total of nine observers trained in radiological emergency response were assigned to evaluate state, local, and field activities.

Following the exercise, a critique for participating State and local officials was held at 1:00 p.m. on Friday, June 20,1986, at the Citrus County Courthouse in inverness, Florida. This critique was followed at 2:00 p.m. with a meeting for the public.

The findings presented in this report are the result of a review of Federal l

evaluations and were reviewed by the RAC chairman for FEMA Region IV. The FEMA Region IV Director is responsible for certifying to the FEMA Associate Director of State and Local Programs and Support that any deficiencies and areas requiring corrective actions observed during the exercise have been corrected, and that such corrections have been incorporated into State and local plans as appropriate. Therefore, FEMA requests that the State complete a schedule for correction of the areas requiring corrective actions included as Section 3 of this report.

1.2 EXERCISE EVALUATORS

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Nine Federal evaluators participated in this exercise. These individuals, their agencies, and their observation locations are given below.

Observer Agency Location Virginia Baker FEMA Levy County (Vehicle Decontamination; Relocation Center)

Brad Eichorst HHS/FDA Medical Services / Mobile Radiological Health Jack Glover FEMA Emergency News Center Al Hall DOT Citrus County Transportation / Evacuation Tom Hawkins FEMA Levy County EOC John Heard FEMA Citrus County EOC Cheryl Stovall FEMA Citrus County (Vehicle Decontamination; Relocation Center)

Bob Trojanowski NRC Emergency Operations Facility Glenn Woodard FEMA Chief of Evaluators, RAC Chairman

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1.3 EVALUATION CRITERIA The exercise evaluations presented in Section 2 of this report are based on applicable planning standards and evaluation criteria set forth in NUREG-0654-FE31A-REP-1, Rev.1 (Nov.1980),Section II. For the purpose of exercise assessment, FEMA uses an evaluation method to apply the criteria of NUREG-0654. FEMA classifies exercise inadequacies as Deficiencies or Areas Requiring Corrective Actions.

'f Deficiencies are demonstrated and observed inadequacies that would cause a finding that i

off site emergency preparedness was not adequate to provide reasonable assurance that appropriate protective measures can be taken to protect the health and safety of the public living in the vicinity of a nuclear power facility in the event of a radiological emergency. Because of the potential impact of deficiencies on emergency preparedness, they are required to be promptly corrected through appropriate remedial actions including remedial exercises, drills, or other actions.

Areas Requiring Corrective Actions are demonstrated and observed inadequacies of performance, and although their correction is required, they are not considered, by themselves, to adversely impact public health and safety.

In addition to these inadequacies. FEMA identifies Areas Recommended For Improvement, which are problem areas observed during an exercise that are not considered to adversely impact public health and safety. While not required, correction of these would enhance an organization's level of emergency preparedness.

1.4 EXERCISE OBJECTIVES The licensee, Florida Power Corporation (FPC), the State of Florida, and Citrus and Levy counties planned a coordinated exercise of their respective emergency plans for both the on site and off site support agencies which took place on June 19, 1986. The exercise involved activation and participation of the staff and response facilities of Crystal' River Nuclear Power Station (CRNPS) as well as emergency organizations and emergency facilities of the State of Florida and Citrus and Levy counties. The purpose of the exercise was to demonstrate and evaluate local emergency response and communications capabilities among state government, local government, and the licensee in accordance with 44 CFR Parts 350.2(k) and 350.9(c)(3).

Exercise objectives included partial participation by the State of Florida and full participation by Citrus and Levy counties. The State of Florida participated in the exercise for the purpose of demonstrating public information activities at the ENC and decision making at the EOF. The State EOC was partially staffed by the Division of Emergency Management (DEM) personnel only for the purpose of providing the necessary support for other participants in the exercise and was not evaluated. The Department of Health and Rehabilitative Services (DHRS) Field Teams and the MERL were not deployed, but the DHRS personnel simulated field activities from the EOF through the use of control messages. The counties of Citrus and Levy participated through full activation of their emergency response organizations. The warning system sirens and Emergency Broadcast System (EBS) notification system for the Emergency Planning Zone (EPZ) were not activated during the exercise, but messages for the EBS were developed and siren activation was simulated.

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The objectives of the exercise, as agreed to by FEMA Region IV are described below.

For the purpose of movement toward a standard set of nationally uniform objectives, this exercise report uses 35 FEMA National Standardized Objectives. To accomplish this form of reporting, the State's exercise objectives have been correlated with FEMA Objectives below.

Corresponding FEMA Exercise Objectives Standardized Objective (s)

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Emergency Operations, Facilities and Resources A.

To demonstrate point-to-5.

Demonstrate ability to com-point communication be-municate with all appropriate tween State and local locations, organizations, and emergency response organi-field personnel.

zations and FPC emergency personnel at the CRNPS.

B.

To determine the adequacy 4.

Demonstrate adequacy of facili-of the Citrus and Levy ties and displays to support counties' EOCs to support emergency operations.

emergency operations.

II. Alerting and Mobilization of Officials and Staff A.

To demonstrate the proce-1.

Demonstrate ability to mobilize dures for the alert and staff and activate facilities notification of key e mer-promptly.

gency response peraonnel.

All State, Citrus and Levy county staff will be pre-positioned for the purposes of alert and notification.

III. Emergency Operations Manage-ment 3.

Demonstrate ability to make decisions and to coordinate A.

To demonstrate the ability emergency activities.

of key individuals within principal emergency response organizations to coordinate and direct the response operations and activities of their respective

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Corresponding FEMA Exercise Objectives Standardized Objective (s)

IV. Public Alerting and Notification A.

To demonstrate the systems

13. Demonstrate ability to alert the and procedures for notifica-public within the 10-mile EPZ, tion of the public that a and disseminate an initial radiological emergency Instructional message, within 15 exists. The means of notifi-minutes.

cation to be demonstrated was to be the capability to activate the siren systems.

Messages were to be deve-loped but not transmitted to the broadcast system. Siren system activation was to be simulated as necessary during the emergency.

V.

Public and Media Relations A.

To demonstrate the organi-

14. Demonstrate ability to formulate zation and procedures for and distribute appropriate the coordinated and timely instru6tions to the public, in dissemination of information timely fashion.

to the public and media.

This will include coordina-24.

Demonstrate ability to brief the tion of news releases among media in a clear, accurate, and the FPC, State, and county timely manner.

Public Information Officials (PIOS).

The ENC will be

25. Demonstrate ability to provide fully staffed and opera-advance coordination of informa--

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tion released.

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Demonstrate ability to establish trol capabilities in Citrus and operate rumor control in a and Levy counties.

coordinated fashion.

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VI. Accident Assessment A.

To demonstrate the proce-

10. Demonstrate ability to project dures for determining the dosage to the public via plume radiological consequences of exposure, based on plant and y r the emergency. Field teams field data, and to determine and sample analysis will be appropriate protective measures, simulated. Sample analysis based on PAGs, available shelter, with the MERL not present evacuation time estimates, and will also be simulated.

all other appropriate factors.

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34. Demonstrate ability to estimate total population exposure.

VII. Health, Medial, and Exposure Control Measures A..To demonstrate the ability

30. Demonstrate adequacy of of Citrus county to provide ambulance facilities and proce-adequate health and medical dures for handling contaminated services to contaminated individuals.

Individuals. A contaminated injury will 'be transported

31. Demonstrate adequacy of hospi-from the plant site by tal facilities and procedures for county emergency medical handling contaminated indivi-personnel to Citrus duals.

Memorial Hospital.

B.

To demonstrate the ability

20. Demonstrate ability to continu-to monitor and control ously monitor and control emergency worker exposure emergency worker exposure.

In Citrus and Levy counties.

VIII. Actions to Protect the Public A.

To demonstrate the ade-

10. (See VI.A above.)

quacy of the decision-making process with regard to determining the appro-priate protective actions to protect the public.

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Exercise Objectives Standardized Objective (s) l B.

To demonstrate the ability

17. Demonstrate the organizational of Citrus and Levy counties ability and resources necessary to implement recommended to control access to an evacuated protective actions. This will area.

Include a demonstration of the decontamination of

27. Demonstrate adequacy of proce-vehicles and sheltering of dures for registration and radio-evacuees in Citrus and Levy logical monitoring of evacuees.

counties; demonstration of control of access to an 28.

Demonstrate adequacy of facili-evacuated area in Citrus and ties for mass care of evacuees.

Levy counties; and demon-stration of procedures for

29. Demonstrate adequate equipment registration and radiological and procedures for decontamina-monitoring of evacuees in tion of emergency

workers, Citrus and Levy counties.

equipment and vehicles.

IX.

Recovery and Reentry A.

To test the joint recovery

35. Demonstrate ability to determine and reentry plans and proce-and implement appropriate mea-dures made by the State and sures for controlled recovery and counties to relax protective reentry.

actions. This was a training (Note: Not an evaluated objec-activity and not for the pur-tive.)

poses of demonstration and evaluation.

1.5 EXERCISE SCENARIO At 8:45 a.m. a report was received from the south coal yard that the coal train had derailed while approaching the generating complex. Ten cars were off the track, seven of them had overturned and the access road was completely blocked by spilled coal. The rear 1/4 of the train was stopped across U.S.19, blocking north and southbound traffic. Equipment was dispatched to remove coal in order to provide access to the site. At 9:00 a.m., an UNUSUAL EVENT was declared based on the train derailment that affected plant access.

At 9:00 a.m. the Florida Highway Patrol provided a roadblock at SR 40 and U.S.

19 for southbound traffic. All traffic southbound was diverted to Dunnellon to U.S. 41 south. Northbound traffic on U.S.19 was diverted to Dunnellon on CR 488 to U.S. 41 north to SR 40 west.

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At 9:05 a.m., the State Warning Point received the Notification of UNUSUAL EVENT.

i At 9:10 a.m., workers proceeded to clear coal and debris from the access road.

U.S.19 was still blocked, and efforts were underway to move railroad cars away from-that intersection. Preliminary investigation of the cause indicated that a section of track appeared to have been damaged by an explosion while the train was passing over.

The Citrus County Sheriffs Dep'artment and State Warning Point were notified.

, [

At 9:30 a.m., an explosion occurred in the area of the Reactor building purge j'.

duct penetration area on 143' elevation of the Auxiliary Building. There were no injuries observed in the area of the explosion. Fire Brigade and/or damage assessment personnel l

l were dispatched to the area. During the above explosion, a work crew member working at a 119' elevation in the Auxiliary Building, directly below the area of the explosion, was startled and fell from a ladder and was injured. His left thigh was bleeding heavily and his left arm was broken. After receiving the report of the injury at 9:32 a.m., the Emergency Medical Team was dispatched to the scene. It was determined at 9:38 a.m.

that the injury victim was contaminated and would require off-site medical treatment.

Citrus County Emergency Medical Services was notified to transport the victim to Citrus Memorial Hospital.

t' At 9:40 a.m.' the Control Room received a report that the access road had been -

h cleared and the coal cars had been pulled away from the U.S.19 intersection. It was determined that a small' explosive charge was placed on the track and detonated as the train passed over.

The Citrus County Sheriffs Department was on the scene and I

searching the area.

An ALERT was declared at 9:45 a.m. based on the explosion in the Auxiliary Building. Activation of the Technical Support Center began. At 10:00 a.m. the State Warning Point received the notification of the ALERT. The state agencies were placed t

on stand-by. Levy and Citrus counties activated their EOCs and notified personnel to report to the EOC immediately.

F At 10:00 a.m. the control room received a damage assessment of the Reactor Building purge duct area. Fragments of the hydrogen bottle were on the floor. The i

ductwork at the exterior purge valve was damaged. The penetration area right at the Reactor Building wall did not appear to be damaged.

i Area radio and television stations reported at 10:05 a.m. that an explosion had i

damaged the nuclear power plant. Vehicular traffic increased greatly around Crystal

. River. A spontaneous evacuation was in progress. At 10:15 a.m. the Technical Support Center was manned and operational. At 10:20 a.m. the Control Room received the following alarm:

LOW MAKEUP TANK PRESSURE.

The makeup tank level was decreasing at a rate of 2 in./ min which indicated a Reactor Coolant System leak of approximately 60 gpm. At 10:25 a.m. the Control room received the following alarm:

RM-A6 WARNING (GAS). This indicated an increase in airborne radioactivity in the Reactor Building.

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9 At 10:45 a.m. the EOF / ENC was activated, and the SEOC was activated and began operations. At 10:50 a.m. the Levy and Citrus County EOCs were operational. At 10:50 a.m. the Control Room received the following alarm: RM-A6 HIGH RAD.

At 10:55 a.m. a five-car traffic accident was blocking the intersection of U.S.19 and SR 44. Traffic was routed through residential areas.

At 11:00 a.m. a complete double-ended rupture of the Reactor Coolant System (RCS) cold leg pipe took place. The RCS leak rate was approximately 7000 gpm. The

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Reactor tripped and cooling water to the core had to be supplied by the Core Flood Tanks and the Borated Water Storage Tank (BWST).

Numerous annunciator alarms were received. The Reactor Building pressure reached 45 psi and caused the interior Reactor Building purge valve to unseat. This created a release path from the Reactor building to the Auxiliary Building.

At 11:10 a.m. the Control Room received the following alarms:

RM-A2 WARNING (GAS); RM-A4 WARNING (GAS). These alarms indicated that small amounts of radioactivity were being released to the environment.

At 11:15 a.m. a GENERAL EMERGENCY was declared based on the loss of two fission product barriers with a potential loss of the third. Activation of the Emergency Operations, Facility began. At 11:25 a.m. the State Warning Point received notification of the GENERAL EMERGENCY.

At 11:30 a.m. Citrus County and Levy County activated the siren systems to notify the public. (NOTE: Siren activation procedures were demonstrated up to, but not including, the actual sounding of the sirens.)

At 11:35 a.m. the following Day Centers requested evacuation assistance in Crystal River:

1.

Mary's Day Care Center 2.

It's A Small World 3.

Little Acorn Preschool 4.

Happy Children Child Care.

At 11:45 a.m. FPC issued PARS from 0-2 miles to evacuate all sectors and shelter from 2-5 miles in Sectors F, G, H.

Wind speed was 4.5 mph from 328*. Law enforcement staffing problems were noted at 11:45 a.m. due to scheduled vacation leave.

At 11:30 a.m., FPC issued PARS from 0-2 miles to evacuate all sectors and shelter from 2-5 miles in Sectors G and H. Wind speed was 5.6 mph from 337*. Citrus and Levy counties issued these PARS at 11:50 a.m.

At 11:55 a.m. wind speed was 3.4 mph from 310.

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10 At 11:55 a.m.- the Ccntrol-Room received the following alarm: BWST LOW LEVEL. This indicated that the source of core cooling water was at a level where an alternative source must be determined.

At 12:00 noon the Control Room received the following alarm: BWST LO LO LEVEL. At 12:02 p.m., after the Centrol Room received this alarm, the operators q -

switched over to the Reactor Building Sump for a source of cooling water by using the l'

"A" Decay Heat Pump. At that time the Decay Heat Pump failed to start and an operator was dispatched to the "A" DHP Breaker in the 4160 volt switchgear room to investigate. At 12:00 noon the Seven Rivers Community Hospital and.the Southern Adult Residency Administrators requested immediate evacuation of their facilities.

At 12:10 p.m. the operator dispatched to the 4160 volt switchgear room reported that there i

was physical damage to the breaker. The Emergency Repair Team was dispatched to the breaker.

At 12:10 p.m. wind speed was 6.5 mph from 300 *. At 1:00 p.m. FPC issued PARS from 0-5 miles to evacuate all sectors and shelter in Sectors A, B, C, D 5-10 miles. Wind speed was 9.0 mph from 220*. Citrus and Levy counties issued the above PARS at 1:05 p.m.

At 1:05 p.m., with no core cooling available, in core temperatures began to increase.

At 1:10 p.m., a telephone cable had been cut by a construction crew between Crystal River and Inverness. The location was CR 491 and Croft Road. Telephone communication from Lecanto west was lost to Crystal. River. Hot Ring Down was not affected. At 1:15 p.m., the Emergency Repair Team reported that there was extensive damage to the breaker. Estimated time of repair was 3-4 hours.

At 1:15 p.m., the monitoring and washdown stations located at the intersection of CR 488 and CR 495 and the Cross Florida Barge Canal were abandoned due to a Protective Action Recommendation.

At 1:30 p.m., FPC issued PARS from 0-5 miles to evacuate all sectors and shelter in Sectors R through G.

Windspeed was 5.6 mph from 157*. At 1:35 p.m. Citrus and Levy counties issued the recommended PARS.

The telephone cable was restored to service at 1:40 p.m.

1.

At 1:45 p.m., the monitoring and washdown Stations located at the intersection of SR 44 and N.E.10th and intersection of U.S.19/98 and State Park Road were abandoned due to a Protective Action Recommendation. At 1:50 p.m., the Waddinton Estate ACLF Home and the Crystal River Geriatric Center requested evacuation assistance.

At 2:00 p.m., major fuel damage began. The cladding began to fail and GAP activity was released. At 2:15 p.m., FPC issued PARS from 0-10 miles to evacuate in Sectors R, A, B and evacuate 0-5 miles in all remaining sectors. Windspeed was 5.6 mph from 160*.

Citrus and Levy counties concurred with the recommended PARS at 2:25 p.m. At 2:30 p.m., windspeed was 6.7 mph from 155*.

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11 At 2:35 p.m., a grass fire was reported in Crystal River. The fire was spreading towards the NORGAS LPG facility.

At 2:50 p.m., fuel melt began, increasing the release into the Reactor Building and subsequently, the environment. The "A" Decay Heat Pump was returned to service at 3:00 p.m., restoring cooling water to the core. Recovery efforts began.

At 3:15 p.m., the interior purge valve did reseat, thus terminating the release to the Auxiliary Building. Plant vent radiation monitors began to decrease. At 4:00 p.m.,

windspeed was 7.8 mph from 160*.

At 4:30 p.m., the exercise was terminated on site, and at 5:30, the Exercise was terminated.

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r 12 GENERAL SEQUENCE OF OFF SITE SCENARIO EVENTS Approximate Time Emergency Levels p

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9:00 AM UNUSUAL EVENT declared (Based on train derailment that affected plant access) 9:45 AM ALERT declared (Based on explosion in the Auxiliary Building) 11:10 AM Control Room alarms indicated that small amounts of radioactivity were being released to the environment 11:15 AM GENERAL EMERGENCY declared (Based on the loss of two fission product barriers with a potential loss of the third) 11:30 AM Citrus County and Levy County activated the siren systems to notify the public 2:50 AM Fuel melt began, ine'reasing the release into the Reactor Building and subsequently, the environment 3:00 PM Ccoling water to the core restored 3:15 PM Interior purge valve reseated. Plant vent radiation monitors began to decrease 5:30 PM Exercise terminated s

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13 2 EXERCISE EVALUATION On the basis of general criteria set forth in NUREG-0654-FEMA-REP-1/Rev.1 (November 1980), and exercise objectives and observations, an evaluation has been I

prepared for the June 19,1986 exercise of the Crystal River Nuclear Power Plant. This evaluation, including Areas Requiring Corrective Actions and Areas Recommended for Improvement, is presented herein. No Deficiencies were observed during this exercise.

7.,

"i FEMA Region IV will maintain close liaison with the State in determining the required corrective actions (including time frames for accomplishing the corrections) in

i accordance with established criteria and guidelines.

2.1 FLORIDA STATE OPERATIONS The following sections include evaluations of the State of Florida operations C

within the licensee's Emergency Operations Facility (EOF) and within the joint State of Florida / multi-county Emergency News Center (ENC) but not in the State Emergency Operations Center (SEOC). The State limited its participation in the exercise with only minimal staffing of the SEOC. Evaluation, and demonstration of the SEOC's capabilities was not a goal of this exercise. Since the State of Florida participated on a limited basis, field monitoring activities and sample analyses were simulated.

This exercise included only Plume Exposure Pathway EPZ activity. Levy and Citrus counties, both in the Plume Exposure Pathway EPZ, had public information officers (PIOS) at the ENC, as did the State of Florida. Counties not in the Plume Exposure Pathway EPZ, but in the 50-mile Ingestion Exposure Pathway EPZ, did not participate in this exercise.

l 2.1.1 State Emergency Operations Center (SEOC)

Consistent with the pre-exercise agreements and the goals of the exercise, no evaluation of the SEOC took place.

2.1.2 Emergency Operations Facility (EOF)

A full complement of trained, knowledgeable State staff was present at the EOF, as prescribed in the plan. The State staff included members of the Florida Division of j

Emergency Management (DEM) and the Department of Health and Rehabilitative Services (DHRS). A State representative with responsibility for press releases was also present at the EOF.

Consistent with pre-exercise agreements, the staff was prepositioned and mobilization procedures were not demonstrated. Procedures to receive l

a call directing activation and to call up staff at any hour of the day were in place, as l;

described in the plan. Demonstration of 24-hour staffing capability was not an objective of the exercise, p

The EOF is located on West Seven River Drive, in Crystal River, Florida, next to

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the Crystal River Airport. The all-weather facility had adequate space and equipment t.

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14 set aside for state and local response personnel. Clearly displayed were all required' maps, status boards, and charts used by the EOF staff.

~ Coordination and communication between the DEM, and the DHRS were excellent. Similarly, the overall interaction between the representatives of the State of Florida and the Florida Power Corporation officials was also exceptional.

Good communications systems are available between the EOF, SEOC, and county EOCs. Primary communications by dedicated hot-line were demonstrated. Radio and E

commercial telephones were available as back-up communications. Conferencing was also available. A reliable and reasonably fast hard-copy device was used for transmission of messages to and from the ENC.

During the simulated emergency, the State and FPC representatives jointly developed and implemented appropriate protective action recommendations in a timely fashion. These protective action recommendations were based on dose projections, including total population exposure, which were made by EOF personnel.

Representatives of the DHRS performed a rapid and independent assessm,ent of the accident in a timely and professional manner. They immediately coordinated the results of these assessments witn the Governor's authori. zed representative. The results of the State's assessments were in good agreement with the results of the assessments performed by the FPC. This greatly facilitated overall emergency management since the need to reconcile major differences was eliminated.

Overall, the members of the State Emergency Response Team performed their responsibilities according to the existing approved Emergency Plan, and fulfilled the exercise objectives in a professional and well-organized manner.

DEFICIENCIES None.

AREAS REQUIRING CORRECTIVE ACTION 4

None.

AREAS RECOMMENDED FOR IMPROVEMENT None.

2.1.3 Emergency News Center (ENC)

The ENC facility was generally adequate, although the physical separation of State and county public information staff from the licensee staff may present problems in a real accident. Only one PIO from each of the two risk counties was on duty at the

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15 exercise and at least two will be needed. PIOS had only one telephone and line to work with, creating the possibility of bottlenecks in the acquisition of information from the county EOC.

State and county PIOS were knowledgeable of their duties and responsibilities.

The cooperation and interaction with FPC's staff was excellent. However, the PIOS were advised, only after EBS activation, of the informational content of the message which was broadcast. Not enough equipment was present to adequately monitor the broadcast media to ensure that accurate and timely information was being aired.

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I By the 12:20 p.m. press conference, announcements were made about two explosions, a radiation release to the atmosphere, and the evacuation of residents near the plant. After that single briefing, there were no questions asked and no phone calls.

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The exercise scenario did not provide sufficient activity for the PIOS at the ENC to fully test their capability to deal with the intense media and public demands for information which would occur in a real radiological emergency.

DEFICIENCIES None.

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- AREAS REQUIRING CORRECTIVE ACTION 1.

==

Description:==

PIOS had only one telephone and line to work with, creating the possibility of bottlenecks in the acquisition of information from the county EOC (NUREG-0654, F.1, G.4.a).

Recommendation: PIOS should have a telephone system capable of assuring access to all necessary information. Separate incoming and outgoing lines are suggested.

i AREAS RECOMMENDED FOR IMPROVEMENT l

1.

==

Description:==

The PIOS were advised only after EBS activation of l

the content,of the message which was broadcast. Equipment was inadequate to properly monitor the broadcast media to ensure that accurate and timely information was being aired.

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Recommendation: The PIOS at the ENC should be advised before each EBS activation, including coordination on the informational l

message content to be broadcast. Provision should be made in the l

ENC to monitor the broadcast media to ensure that accurate and timely information is being alred. This should include TV monitors tuned to the three or four most-viewed stations serving the area and appropriate radio stations.

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Description:==

Only one PIO from each of the two risk counties was on duty during the exercise. Another staff person will be needed to assist county PIOS.

Recommendation: Counties need to assign two PIOS to the ENC per shift.

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==

Description:==

The separation of State and county public information staff from the licensee staff would present problems f,

in a real accident.

O Recommendation: The PIO staffs should not be separated and should work in a common workroom to facilitate coordination.

4.

==

Description:==

As a result of a lack of play, the ENC staff still needs to demonstrate that it is capable of dealing with the intense media and public demands for information in such an accident.

Recommendation: The use of carefully controlled mock media in the ENC is strongly recommended.

2.2 LOCAL GOVERNMENT OPERATIONS

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2.2.1 Citrus County 4

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2.2.1.1 Citrus County EOC The Citrus County EOC was activated and fully staffed in a timely manner, with a demonstration of the prescribed notification / call-up procedures. However, real-time arrival of response staff was simulated due to a prior agreement that they would be prepositioned.

Seventy individuals from all elements of Citrus County government having emergency responsibilities were present in the EOC. Support by elected public officials was evident throughout the exercise.

' Excellent leadership was displayed during the exercise by the Disaster Preparedness Director. The number and scope of briefings held was adequate to provide the EOC staff with updated situational information and to solicit input from appropriate staff at key decision points.

The EOC had an outstanding communications capability. The Communications Center is operated on a 24-hour basis. There were primary and back-up systems for all communications links. RACES personnel participated as yet another communications back-up. EOC amenities, including furniture, space, lighting, maps, displays, and other provisions for extended operation were excellent.

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..,..:_.2 17 Simulated siren activation and EBS message transmission met the 15-minute criterion and were fully coordinated with Levy County officials. This public instruction was thorough and appropriate for the situation. Public information activities were coordinated with the ENC and the EOC Rumor Control staff by the County PIO. The PIO performed his. functions in an outstanding manner.

DEFICIENCIES h

None.

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AREAS REQUIRING CORRECTIVE ACTION None.

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AREAS RECOMMENDED FOR IMPROVEMENT None.

2.2.1.2 Traffic and Access Control Citrus County established one traffic control point (at the intersection of State Route 44 and County Road 486) utilizing a Caputy sheriff. This individual demonstrated adequate knowledge of his responsibilities and procedures under the access and traffic control provisions of the REP plan. However, no SOP for radiological emergency traffic control has actually been developed for the county. As a result, the location of the

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reception centers were not known by the deputy. It is recommended that an SOP be developed and incorporated with training for TCP staff.

The objective to demonstrate the ability to monitor and control emergency worker exposure was not fully achieved due to the failure to provide the field worker with a (real or simulated) film badge or TLD. Additional training in monitoring personnel exposure to radiation appears to be needed. The deputy did know the procedures for reading and recording values from his self-reading dosimeter and where he should report for monitoring and possible decontamination following his shift. The deputy was not issued a permanent record dosimeter and only a mid-range, self-reading dosimeter was issued.

DEFICIENCIES None.

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18 AREAS REQUIRING CORRECTIVE ACTION 1.

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Description:==

Permanent record dosimeter devices were not

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provided to emergency workers potentially exposed to contamination (NUREG-0654, K.3.a).

Recommendation:

Equip all field workers with TLDs or film 1) badges in future exercises.

,b 2.'

==

Description:==

Specific SOPS and/or operations plans appear to be lacking for traffic / access control (NUREG-0654, J.10.j).

Recommendation: Formalize such plans and have them available for use by workers at the appropriate response sites. Ensure the TCP operations plan lists registration and shelter locations and information.

AREAS RECOMMENDED FOR IMPROVEMENT 1.

==

Description:==

County knowledge of exposure control procedures appeared to be incomplete at the traffic control point.

4 Recommendation:

Continue, and expand, emergency worker training in radioprotective measures.

i 2.2.1.3 Vehicle Decontamination t.

A motor vehicle washdown operation was demonstrated by the Citrus Springs Volunteer Fire Department.

A 6-person team conducted the demonstration, which E

involved the monitoring and washing of a pumper truck. The demonstration was held at a location near a water supply and had a driveway loop accessing the road. Signs were posted on the adjacent highway directing traffic to the washdown site. While the access and traffic flow concept was generally good, it would have been helpful if control lines had been established to prevent spread of possible contamination from the washdown area.

Firefighters took readings to establish background radiation levels prior to beginning the operation. The pumper truck then entered the staging area and was monitored by'two firefighters. During this procedure, the monitoring probes were not prote.cted by plastic covering and contamination could have occurred. Following this check, the truck moved to the washdown area. The water source was a lake with a floating pump. This equipment functioned well but the pump was very loud in operation, preventing effective oral communication. The designated primary water supply system (a reservoir truck) would have been more practical. Vinegar / water solution as well as soap and water were employed for decontamination.

Once washed, the truck was remonitored to verify washdown effectiveness. All procedures were generally performed 1

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7 in an effective manner, except tha't there was no explicit provision for. disposal of-L

. contaminated equipment or other nonliquid materials.

All firefighters were equipped with self-reading dosimetry and were aware of the 3-30-minute Interval for checking and recording readings. Radio communications were established with the Citrus County EOC.

f"

. A boat monitoring and washdown operation was demonstrated by a 9-person team from the Crystal River Volunteer Fire Department at a boat ramp designated in the plan

• p as the site for decontaminating small marine craft. The Fire Department response d' f included a boat equipped with pump and hose, a pumper truck, and a rescue unit. Boats could be decontaminated from. shore by the pumper truck,~ or in the water by the boat pumping equipment. Both methods were demonstrated.

_.p Two -firefighters performed initial monitoring of the boat, but no procedures -

were followed to segregate this potentially contaminated craft from other boats.

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Monitoring procedures indicated a lack of appropriate training. Only the sides of the l-boat were checked; not the interior flooring which could have contaminated the workers as they walked on board. Communication regarding monitored levels was relayed via headset. These values may not have been clearly heard above the noise generated by the pump. Readings were taken every 30 minutes and the response personnel were dressed in appropriate turnout gear.

In summary, the objective to demonstrate equipment and procedures for decontamination of equipment and vehicles was only partially met. Emergency worker

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exposure-monitoring and control was only partially demonstrated. Permanent record devices were not in use.

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DEFICIENCIES None.

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- AREAS REQUIRING CORRECTIVE ACTION

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1.

==

Description:==

Permanent record devices were not provided to emergency workers potentially exposed to contamination (NUREG-i 0654, K.3.a).

I Recommendation: Equip all emergency workers with TLDs or film i~

badges in future exercises.

ll 2.

==

Description:==

Worker knowledge af exposure control procedures

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appeared to be incomplete at the vehicle decontamination site.

Personnel and vehicle monitoring demonstrations exhibited a need j

for better training and procedures (NUREG-0654, K.5.a, K.5.b, O.4.d).

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Continue, and expand, emergency worker

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. training in radioprotective measures. Establish control lines to prevent spread of contaminated material from vehicles; protect survey probes with plastic cover to prevent contamination; ensure adequate waste disposal facilities at alllocations.

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f AREA RECOMMENDED FOR IMPROVEMENT h.

1. -

Description:

Noise levels were unacceptably high at vehicle decontamination sites due to continuous operation of a loud pump.

Recommendation: Minimize need for use of pump by utilizing the reservoir truck which is available for the county to use.

2.2.1.4 Registration, Monitoring and Sheltering of Evacuated, Mobility-Impaired Individuals The Withlacoochee Vocational Technical Center was activated as a reception and snelter operation. Staff participating included the Center Director acting as Shelter Manager and representatives of, the American Red Cross, the County Fire Prevention r

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Office, the Count'y' Health Department, and RACES. Shelter space was adequate to support the operation and accommodate the anticipated number of evacuees. However, an operations plan needs to be developed to est'ablish specific locations and floor plans for. monitoring, registration, and mass care functions. Also, there did not appear to be procedures in place for securing the. full complement of equipment and supplies that would be required to perform all designated functions of this facility. Checklists and prepacked kits could solve this problem. Headsets were not available to be used in conjunction with the survey meters. The adequacy of supplies for the decontamination function (soap, brushes, towels, clothing, wast.e disposal bags and gloves) was not demonstrated.

The Key Pine Village, a congregate living facility for mentally retarded and handicapped individuals, was evacuated to the Vocational Technical Center as part of the

' demonstration. This permitted Citrus County to demonstrate capabilities concerning vacuation of mobility-impaired individuals even though this was not an exercise objective.

This operation. included departure from the Key Pine Village buildings, boarding of buses, and transportation of residents to the reception center. Upon their j.

arrival, Center staff exhibited enthusiasm and knowledge of their specific responsibilities.

Five Key Pine residents were monitored for radiological contamination. Monitoring procedures were generally adequate except that personnel did i:

not _ use plastic, gloves and the survey meter probe was not protected from potential contamination. Registration forms were properly filled out for each " evacuee."

Adequate restroom and shower facilities are available at the Center, and " clean"

. Individuals could be effectively segregated from those found to be contaminated. A lunch room with staff was available to provide meal service on an extended basis.

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RACES personnel established radio communications with the EOC through an antenna erected at the site. This effectively backed up the primary communications system of commercial landline.

DEFICIENCIES None.

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4 gm AREAS REQUIRING CORRECTIVE ACTIONS i',

1.

==

Description:==

Evacuee monitoring demonstrations indicated a need for additional training in these procedures (NUREG-0654, J.12, K.5.a,0.4.c).

I^

c Recommendations:

Expand training in radiological survey procedures.

2.

==

Description:==

Specific SOPS and/or operations plans appear to be lacking for layout of reception and mass care center (NUREG-0654, J.10.h, J.12).

Recommendation:

Develop and formalize such plans and have them available for consultation by workers at the appropriate response sites.

t.

AREAS RECOMMENDED FOR IMPROVEMENT None.

2.2.1.5 Health, Medical and Hospital Worker Exposure Control Demonstration Citrus County Emergency Medical Services (EMS) and Citrus Memorial Hospital participated in a demonstration of transportation, treatment and decontamination of a FPC employee with simulated injury and radiological contamination. The EMS vehicle was prepositioned at the power plant in accordance with prior agreement. The team received radio dispatch regarding the incident and waited approximately 15 minutes to simulate travel time. The EMS crew was well trained and took appropriate actions in the handling of the patient, who had already been wrapped by utility personnel to prevent the spread of contamination. Gurney transfer from the utility premises to the EMS vehicle was good. Proper measures were taken tc control contamination at each step of the procedure while attending to the medical needs of the patient. Communications during the trip to the hospital were maintained by radio through the local law enforcement authority to the EOC.

g

-.4

=

+

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'z f...'., o._ 1 22 The hospital had adequately prepared the reception area and treatment room. Hospital personnel met the EMS vehicle and transfer was rapid. Staff appeared ready to treat the patient. U Initial actions were appropriate to the simulated injury. Arterial bleeding was treated first followed by Initiation of wound decontamination procedures. However, the demonstration was abruptly terminated at this point. The termination was premature E. since the decontamination demonstration had just begun. Moreover, staff monitoring was inadequate because no one in the room was acting in the capacity of full-time monitor. {c Survey operations indicated a need for more training in proper procedures with live sources. Required medical supplies shown would have been inadequate for a long-term or difficult procedure. I' There was a question of what to do with samples taken from the patient (e.g., nasal swab). Perhaps due to the abrupt termination, samples originally designated by hospital staff to go to the utility for analysis were simply disposed of with contaminated refuse. In summary, a full demonstration of the adequacy of ambulance facilities and procedures was achieved during this operation. However, demonstration of the adequacy of hospital facilities and procedures was incomplete. DEFICIENCIES None. AREA REQUIRING CORRECTIVE ACTION None. AREAS RECOMMENDED FOR IMPROVEMENT 1.

== Description:== A complete demonstration of the adequacy of hospital facilities and procedures for handling contaminated individuals was not accomplished due to premature termination of the activities. Recommendation: A complete demonstration' of this capability should be conducted in a future exercise. 4 f k A t

^ ~ ' c...' 2 u y.

7..!.i.-

l' .i .v i t 23 2.2.2 Levy County ,2.2.2.1 Levy County EOC The Levy County EOC has been expanded into a larger area of the basement of I. the Courthouse building since the last exercise in 1984. The facility is generally b adequate with sufficient space, good communication equipment, and low noise levels. Facilities for an extended operation are available in the adjacent Sheriff's Department {~' and across the street at the Bronson High School. The Civil Defense Director provided very capable leadership and demonstrated an excellent knowledge of the plan and implementing procedures. Briefings of the EOC staff by the Director were frequent and clearly expressed. The operations room representatives appeared knowledgeable of their responsibilities. Support by elected officials appeared excellent; the chairman of the County Commissioners and a member of the Commission were present and active during the entire exercise. Displays of maps and status boards were generally good, although the principal status board contained some technical data and some plant information which probably could be eliminated or simplified. The shelter status board contained space to indicate the number of evacuees which were housed and/or processed, but was not utilized. Commu'nications at the EOC were above average, with the hot ring-down being the primary communication link with the SEOC, CCEOC, the plant, the EOF, and Radiological Health in Orlando. Three redundant systems were available, i.e., NAWAS, LGR, and commercial telephone. However, the message-han211ng system was, at times, confusing because of (1) the several different forms utilized and (2) the nonsequential numbering employed. e The Levy County EOC played a role in public alerting by simulating activation of sirens at the ALERT and GENERAL EMERGENCY levels. Some instructional messages for the public were also drafted at the EOC. ~ DEFICIENCIES None. AREAS REQUIRING CORRECTION ACTION None. AREAS RECOMMENDED FOR IMPROVEMENT 1.

== Description:== The principle status board contained some technical ~ data and some plant information which probably could be t eliminated. 9 6 e -w

(J..?.y..... 1 j- =. =.. -... r,. 24 . b Recommendation: Simplify status board entries. Decrease the .F amount of technical data on status board. l L 2.

== Description:== The shelter status board contained space to indicate the number of evacuees which were housed and/or processed,but was not utilized. ~ Recommendation: Utilize shelter status board. u 3.

== Description:== The message-handling system was, at times, 1 confusing because of the several different forms utilized and the nonsequential numbering system. Recommendation: Develop a good message-handling system. l f 2.2.2.2 Traffic and Access Control The capability of Levy County Traffic and Access Control was not demonstrated l during this exercise. l' DEFICIENCIES None. l-AREAS RECOMMENDED FOR IMPROVEMENT g'; .I ' None. b. A',REAS REQUIRING CORRECTIVE ACTIONS L.' 1.

== Description:== The capability for Levy County Traffic and Access r-n Control, which was an exercise objective, was not demonstrated [; during this exercise. l L'c Recommendation: The next exercise should require that o (( deployment of _ traffic and access control measures be demonstrated. i L: Li 2.2.2.3 Vehicle Decontamination I A: [; A vehicle decontamination facility was set up and a washdown opera, tion was demonstrated at the Lebanon Station in Levy County, Florida. Participation level by the

e Yankeetown Volunteer Fire Department was good. Unfortunately the demonstration took l- [I place during a severe thunderstorm so the demonstration was understandably limited.

l 5:

s ~. h. '. ~ P 2 T 1 C...a.1 0..T'! : L. a.... ef,., .y 25 1 1 m l Participants appeared knowledgeable of their responsibilities as outlined in the County Plan. Confusion existed as to where evacuees and/or emergency workers were to be C monitored and decontaminated, if applicable (i.e., washdown station, shelter, etc.). Actual decontamination of personnel was not demonstrated but was discussed by the participants; all agreed that decontaminating personnel at this location would be a problem. d :_ Il DEFICIENCIES 3 lr None. AREA REQUIRING CORRECTION ACTIONS None. AREAS RECOMMENDED FOR IMPROVEMENT 1.

== Description:== The vehicle decontamination process took place during a severe thunder and lightning storm and was not fully demonstrated. Recommendation: The next exercise should require that vehicle monitoring and decontamination procedures be fully demonstrated. 2.2.2.4 Registration, Monitoring, and Sheltering of Evacuees 3 The shelter, located at Bronson High School, was an adequate shelter facility. However, only two persons were prepositioned there: the school custodian and the registrar. A weak radiological monitoring demonstration was provided. The registration demonstration was similarly weak because the person had received no prior orientation. Shelter response capabilities were not adequately. demonstrated. Access control to the shelter also was not demonstrated. L lt was clear that additional training of personnel in all procedures related to shelter operations is needed before the capabilities in registration and radiological monitoring of evacuees can be adequately demonstrated. The proposed objectives assigned to Levy County relating to the Relocation Center were not demonstrated successfully. DEFICIENCIES None. h* ] p

W. 22 &.L.:;2T.: R.w. } .. :. J 'a ~ L.i-1 .p . () y 26 6: ,e e W AREAS REQUIRING CORRECTIVE ACTION g_ [ 1.

Description:

Shelter response capabilities, which were objectives t. of this exercise,' were not demonstrated (NUREG-0654, J.10.h, J.12). I ,) Recommendation: The next exercise should require an adequate i~- demonstration of sheltering, monitoring and decontamination .c 4 j,, capability, as well as full activation of trained shelter staff ti [ including shelter manager, registrars, health personnel, food ~ service staff, and law enforcement personnel. 4 P i AREAS RECOMMENDED FOR IMPROVEMENT [ _ J one. 2.3 UTILITY SUPPORT: MEDICAL s..;t 2 A radiological emergency at the Crystal River nuclear power plant can present Md actual or potential radiological health hazards to individuals within the affected area. It )- is imperative that capabilities exist for emergency care and transportation of victims of zon-site accidents. The exercise scenario involved an injured plant w'orker who suffered a broken lef t leg and lacerations of the left thigh. It was determined that the injury victim was contaminated and would require off site medical treatment. The Emergency Medical Services (EMS) vehicle was prepositioned at the power plant. Simulated notification was ~ issued to EMS and the victim actually transported to Citrus Memorial Hospital. (See < report Section 2.2.1.5.) i o I~ Utility personnel on site at Crystal River had prepared the injury victim for transfer to the EMS crew. The victim was wrapped; a proper measure to mitigate the spread of contamination to the ambulance and crew. The crew was well-trained and took appropriate actions in addressing the medical needs of the victim. 1 DEFICIENCIES /,L None. i s AREAS REQUIRINO CORRECTIVE ACTION + None. AREAS RECOMMENDED FOR IMPROVEMENT None. ~ e g = p -= ~

h;.% llu.. 5 :..:; % - z.. ~ l.: hg5,.34 27 3

SUMMARY

OF DEFICIENCIES AND AREAS g i REQUIRING CORRECTIVE ACTIONS No deficiencies were observed during the Crystal River exercise conducted on June 19,1986. Section 2 of this exercise report has provided a listing of Areas Requiring l-Corrective Action with recommendations noted by Federal evaluators. The evaluations 1 b were based on the applicable planning standards and evaluation criteria set forth in [ _ objectives. Section II of the NUREG-0654, FEMA-1, Rev.1 (November 1980) and the exercise 1 E 'E The FEMA Region IV Director is responsible for certifying to the FEMA i Associate Director, State and Local Programs and Support, Washington, D.C., that any b Areas Requiring Corrective Actions noted during the exercise will be corrected and such i corrections will also be inea porated into the emergency response plans as appropriate. iv FEMA Region IV will request that the State of Florida and local jurisdictions participating in the Crystal River exercise submit measures that they intend to take to correct those problems identified by the Federal evaluators. If corrective actions are necessary, FEMA Region IV will request that a detailed plan, including dates for ' scheduling and implementing corrective actions, be provided if such actions cannot be instituted immediately. The following table provides, by jurisdiction, a consolidated summary of all Areas v.; Requiring Corrective Action. The table has been designed with spaces provided to add: (1) the proposed corrective actions that have been recommended and (2) the projected and actual dates of completion. h r.- i f l i' s I l \\ i i Y I x m

3 - D' u, ; .,: c. s -ps 'y -e, .y r ,,,s s.. b{,- TAtl2 I CRYSTAL RIVf.3 NUCl2AR PONER STITION - CDERECTIVE ACTIONS (June 19, 1986) g Q n' i' 2 ". n" a u .o. 333 ?. .1; . S S I _ ~1 - a un ~ \\ on aaw I b FEMA Recommendetton @I* EA N h State (S)/ County (C) Response (ACTION) U8$ FEMA Evaluatton of State / County Response jj d }< u{wh U for Corrective Acttons p; o b

e. "

STATE mesaGENCY OPERATIONS CENTER [ None. h stERGENCY OrttATIONS FACILITT None. i assRceNCT NavS CawfEa t .fi F.3, I.

== Description:== Plos had only one e, C.4.s telephone and line to work with, creating the possibility of bottle-necks in the acquisition of informa-tion from the county EOC. Rec - adation: Plus should have a telephone system capable of assuring access to all necessary information. Separate incoming and outgoing lines

• are suggested.

CITRUS G UWTY EOC p Nonee o 4-t ,b h.. O t G + I 4

3. 2 7 7. m 7.. . j 7-1 . s... g-, ' s i J ~.

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t-1 4 -;t 'b # 1 TAstA I CRYSTAL RIVER IeUCl2AR POWER STATiool - CDBRBCrlVE ACTloseS (June 19. 1986) ' t, C e q" 2 a f i. u e,o v.e. e , we se G & W W e M le g ee e sa 3 v4

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F[,) g%o @ g.*, E 'r 4 %$"I FEMA Recosusendation State (S)/ County (C) Response (ACTION) U0$ FEMA Evaluatton of State / County Response UUI8 d for Corrective Acttons i OM08

9 t.

Traffic and Accese Coatro! .t.' K, l. a 1.

== Description:== Permanent record dostseter devices were not provided to emergency workers potentially fj 't{ exposed to contamination. J L Recommendettom: Equip att field 'l 'I workers with TLDs or film badges in future esercises. iI. J.10.] 2.

== Description:== Specific SOPS and/or f'l operations plans appear to be tacking for traffic / access control. Recommendattom: Formaltre such plans and have them available for use by workers at the appropriate response sites. Ensure the TCP operations plan itste registration and shelter locations and informa- + tion. 4e t 0 -., l H a 1 F

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..' s F TA582 1 CRYSTAL RIVER IIUC8 8AM POWEN STAT 1000 - CDeRECTIVE ACTIOftS (June 19,19M) Tg a Q 3: ,,.O. U !Y ~ u

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I os L FEMA Recommendation cee a u-SIE EN 0{< we ],, h for Corrective Actions State (S)/ County (C) Itemponse (ACTION) $08 FEMA Evaluation of State / County Response jjE i U g pj h VeIntele Secontamination k t. K.1. a 1. Bescription: Permanent record a devices were not provided to tq emergency workers potenttally exposed to contamination. Rec - edetton: Equip sit field i workers with TI.Ds or film badges in . j,o future exercises. 'I s K.S.a. 2. Desc ript ion: Worker knowledge of 'j' K.5.b. exposure control procedures appeared (,,, 0.4.d to be incoeptete at the vehtete decontaetnation site. Personnel and t* vehicle monitoring demonstrations exhibited a need for better training and procedures. [. Beca==endations Continue and expand emergency worker knowledge and training in radioprotective a measures. Establish control lines to prevent spread of contaminated material (som vehicles; protect survey probes with plastic cover to b prevent contamination; ensure adequate waste disposal facilities at att locations. + p',+ .s 4 6 a I,

'.q,TQ ..s ,I 4 ..s., a ..,e -g _ a r--,, m-, 'm , "qr j,, I' ' ' ' ~ ' ..,1 ,u + .O'.,., TASIA B CRYSTA1. CIVER IfuCt. EAR F0WER STAT 1000 - CORRECTtVE ACT10183 (June 19, 1986) I '/ ,.e

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n" U 8 m .o 4 ,, e .. ~. .g-a ,i og. . a. ..s as Feta Recommendetton H 8' & *

8. fr4 5

for Correcttwe Acttona. 0 <o$ E84 State (S)/ County (C) Response (ACTION) MO3 FEMA Evaluation of State / County Response E48 i 0U s"t m; < s c uw gj $dj k. Registrattoa Deonttoring and Shelterlag of Evacuated. Mobility-Impaired ledividuals fg . $d t J.l2 1.

== Description:== Evacuee munttoring K.S.a. demonstrations exhibited a need for -1 0.4.c additional training in these procedures. .-5 I Recommendations: Espand training in P radiological survey procedures. J.10.h, 2.

== Description:== Specific SOPS and/or I-J.12

• operations plans appear to be lacking for layout of reception a nd r

mass care center. Recommendet toe: Develop and formalize such plans and have them available for consultation by workers at the appropriate response attes. Health. Medical and Hospital Worker Esposure Control Demonstration

None, e.

9 3 MW e w 9 f '. I i

L. 6: Q 'd-g? r.-- c ___.~ ,i.. :; ,a ~ _., .-e t i. --i s. v; e. ~ 1- ., i e'.... ,,(: TAstA B CRTSTAL RtTER IIUCt2AR FOIIER STATION - COREACTIVE ACTIONS (Jeam 19, 1986) if,

l:

v e au 3 c- :f. < a.. i aga u un a 1e4 I *{'^l FBIA Recomendettoe Q for Coyrective Actices State (S)/ County (C) Response (ACTI(EI) M c1 FEMA Sveluettee.f State / County Response jj E U .m y.o '.AWT COOWTT (; soc Ilone. .E5 ?i Tehicle toe.atasteettee IIone. Regletrettee, Meettertog and Sheltertag [ .f Evacuses J.10.h. ,l. Seecripeteet Shelter response J.12 capahttttles, which were objectives of thte

exercise, were not demonstrated.

Recomenadettom: The next future exercise should require an adestuste demonstration of sheltering and monitoring (as well as decontaetna-tion) capability, as well as futt acttwatton of trateed shelter staff to include shelter management, resistrare, health personnel, food service staff, and law enforcement. e O e

1 i_ l_, I_. l._- I l .' l.,. 1 r. l. - i.. .- i .,a 4 .J { TAB 12 i CRYSTAI. RIVER NUCtJuut p0W.R ST!.TTON - CDERECTIVE ACTIONS (June 19, 1986) 1 L..l ^ k eU f'.' g a 3.

3. 3-a.

a o FDIA Recomunendation @$3 E$4

85 I 0 < On{e State (S)/ County (C) Response (ACTION)

MOS FEMA Evaluation of State / County Response jjj Uj% g d for Corrective Actions 8 e stility Supports Medical None. Traffic and Access Control [p 1.

== Description:== The capa-f. bility for Levy County i; i Traffic and Access Con-trol, which was an exercise objective, was not demonstrated during this exercise. Recommendation: The next exercise should require that deployment of traffic and access control measures be demonstrated. 1 9 .}}