ML20211J465
| ML20211J465 | |
| Person / Time | |
|---|---|
| Site: | Vogtle  |
| Issue date: | 10/30/1986 |
| From: | Jape F, Schnebli G NRC OFFICE OF INSPECTION & ENFORCEMENT (IE REGION II) |
| To: | |
| Shared Package | |
| ML20211J427 | List: |
| References | |
| 50-424-86-83, IEB-85-003, IEB-85-3, NUDOCS 8611110141 | |
| Download: ML20211J465 (8) | |
See also: IR 05000424/1986083
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UNITE 3 5TATES
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NUCLEAR REGULATORY COMMISSION
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101 MARIETTA STREET,N.W.
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ATL ANT A, GEORGI A 30323
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Report No.:
50-424/86-83
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Licensee: Georgia' Power Company
P.~ 0. Box 4545
Atlanta, GA 30302
Docket No.:
50-424
License No..
CPPR-108
Facility Name: Vogtle 1
Inspection Conducted:
September 8-12, 1986
Inspector:jhkW
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G. A. Schneb
Dat6 Signed
Approved by:
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F. Jape, $cction Chief
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Date-Signed
Engineering Branch
Division of Reactor Safety
SU!?1ARY
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' Scope:
This routine, unannounced int,pection was coriducted in the areas of
preoperational test procedure review, preoperational test witnessing, preopera-
tional test results review, and witness of . testing required in response to IE
Results:
No violations or~ deviations were identified.
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8611110141 861103
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ADOC% 05000424
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REPORT DETA LS
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Persons Contacted
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Licensee Employees
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G. Aufdenkampe, Lead Integrated Test Supervisor
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- C. E. Belflower, Quality Assurance Site Mana'ger - Operations
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"R. M. Bellamy, Test and Outage Manager
- W. E. Burns, Nuclear Licensing Manager
M. E. Chance, Test Supervisor
- C. L. Cross, Senior Regulatory Specialist
K. Glandon, Engineer
B. Kaplin, Test Supervisor
B. Lide, Preoperational Procedures Supervisor
- A. L. Mosbaugh, Superintendent Engineering Services
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M. Slivka, Test Supervisor
- G. E. Spell, Quality Assurance Engir,eering Support Supervisor *
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Other Organizations
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~M. Bagale, System Engineer - Westinghouse
F. Black, Test Supervisor - Westinghouse
G. L. Greenwood, Lead Test Superintendent - Bechtel
J. McCormick, Preoperational Precedures Writer - Westinghouse
NRC Resident Inspectors
H. H. Livermore, Senior Resident Inspector - Construction
- J. F. Rogge, Senior Resident Inspector - Operations
R. J. Schepens, Resident Inspector - Operations
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- Attended exit interview
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2.
Exit Interview
The inspection scope and findings were summarized on September 12, 1986,
with those persons indicated in paragraph 1 above. The inspector described
the areas inspected and discussed in detail the inspection findings. No
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. dissenting comments were received from the- licensee. The licensee did.not
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identify as proprietary any of the materials provided to or. reviewed by the
inspector during this inspection.
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3.
Licensee Action on Previous Enforcement Matters
This subject was not addressed in the inspection.
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4.
Unresolved Items
Unresolved items were not identified during .this inspection.
5.
Preoperational Test Procedure Review (70300, 70311, 70305)
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The inspector reviewed 1-3SB-01, Reactor Protection System (RPS)
Preoperational Test to verify it was consistent with applicable sec-
tions of the Final Safety Analysis Report (FSAR) and Regulatory Guide (RG) 1.68.
The procedure was reviewed for the following:
Conformance to administrative controls. This included verifying
that pertinent prerequisites are identified.
Acceptance criteria against which the test will be judged are
clearly identified.
Initial test conditions are specified such as electrical power and
control requirements.
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The procedure includes reference to appropriate FSAR sections,
drawings, specifications, codes and other requirements.
Procedure provides for independent verification of critical steps
or parameters.
Provision is made for recording details of the test including
observed deficiencies, their resolution, and retest.
b.
Review of this procedure indicated that all the requirements contained
in Chapter 14 of the FSAR were not present in'the procedure. Discus-
sions with responsible licensee personnel indicated the portions not
present in 1-358-01 were included in 1-3SB-02 and 1-300-01.
At the
' time of this inspection these two additional procedures were not
approved.
The licensec was informed they would be reviewed in a
subsequent inspection.
The licensee provided the following background
information to show how the three preoperational tests overlapped to
satisfy the requirements of the FSAR in the area of RPS testing.
Reactor Protection and Engineering Safety Features Actuation System
(ESFAS) testing is accomplished in several overlapping preops.
The
individual system preops verify sensor operations and ESFAS actuation
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of components by simulating an actuation signal at the output of the
Solid State Protection System (SSPS). The Reactor Protection and ESFAS
preops verify the instrumentation and logic as detailed below.
The
Integrated ESFAS preop simulates inputs to the SSPS and verifies proper
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operation of the equipment.
(1) Preop 1-3SB-01 performs the following test on the Reactor
Protection and ESFAS:
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Veri fies all instrument channel setpoints which input into
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the Reactor Protection and ESFAS SSPS.
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Verifies all combinations of trip logic in SSPS to the output
terminal of the SSPS.
Verifies the test block functions of the Safeguards Test
Cabinet (STC). This demonstrates that the STC can test the
actuation of the slave relays without actuating components
which cannot be tested during plan operation.
The circuits are verified from the sensor. input -test point in
the 7300 protection panels to the output terminals of the
SSPS.
Operation of all ESFAS slave relay contacts are verified.
Reactor trip is verified by measuring the voltage across the
-reactor trip breaker UV coils.
tbnual trip switches and reactor trip breaker operation is
verified.
(2) Preop 1-3SB-02 performs the following tests on the ESFAS:
Veri fies that each ESFAS slave relay in the SSPS can be
tested individually.
Since actuation of all slave relay contacts are verified in
1-3SB-01 only one contact for each relay is monitored to
verify relay actuation by the STC.
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For components where overlap testing has not occurred via
another preop the non-conducting hardware is removed and the
component actuated by the STC.
(3) Preop 1-300-01 performs the following tests on the ESFAS:
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Non-conducting hardware is removed from the SSPS output
terminals and the external wiring permanently installed.
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SI signals are simulated and equipment operations is veri-
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fied.
No violations or deviations were identified in the areas inspected.
6.
Preoperational Test Witnessing (70312, 70317, 70443)
The inspector witnessed portions of the following preoperational tests in
progress during this~ inspection:
1-3BK-01, Containment Spray Preop, Section 6.5, which demonstrates the
proper suction flow from the refueling water storage tank for the
simultaneous operation of the safety injection, centrifugal charging,
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residual heat removal, and core spray pumps.
In addition, the
inspector attended the pretest briefing for this evolution and con-
sidered the briefing went very well with all aspects being covered.
1-3EF-01, Nuclear Service Cooling Water System, Section 6.2, Train B
Circuit Verification.
1-3KJ-05, Diesel Generator Preop, Section 6.5, Diesel Generator 1A Fuel
Oil Consumption Rate.
1-3SB-01, RPS Preop, Section 6.14, System Logic Checks.
The above tests were witnessed to verify the following:
Tests were performed in accordance with approved procedures.
Latest revision of the approved test procedures were available and in
use by personnel performing the tests.
Test equipment required by the procedures was calibrated and installed.
Test data were properly collected and recorded.
Adequate coordination existed among personnel involved in the test.
Test prerequisites were met.
Proper plant systems were in service.
Temporary modifications such as jumpers were i'nstalled and tracked in
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accordance with administrattve controls.
Problems encountered during testing were properly documented.
No violaticns or deviations were identified in the area inspected.
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7.
Preoperational Test Procedure Results Evaluation (70329)
-The inspector evaluated the preoperational test results obtained per test
Procedure 1-3JE-01 for the Diesel Generator Fuel Oil Preop.
The data
packages were reviewed to verify that test changes were approved in accor-
dance with administrative procedures, actions required by test changes had
been completed, deficiencies and exceptions had been resolved, individual
test steps and data sheets were completed properly, and test objectives and
acceptance criteria were met.
A review of the Test Review Boards (TRB)
comments indicate the TRB had performed a thorough review of the procedure
prior-to approval.
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The inspector raised a concern to GPC management over the small number of
preoperational' test procedures that had been. approved by the TRB and turned
over to Document Control. At the close of this inspection only 20 test
procedures were approved by the TRB. 0.f these procedures, only 3 require
NRC . review, the remaining 17 deal with non-safety-related systems.
NRC
review of the three procedures dealing 'with safety-related systems and
equipment were completed during this inspection and previous inspections.
No violations or deviations were identified in the area inspected.
8.
Followup on IE Bulletin 85-03 (92703, 25573)
The inspector held discussions with responsible licensee engineers con-
cerning their program to ' meet the requirements IEB 85-03.
The licensee is
using -the Motor Operated Valve Analysis Test System (MOVATS) to provide
demonstrated operability of the valves identified by the bulletin.
The
testing involves both static and dynamic tests to verify that the switch
setpoint criteria established will ensure that these valves will perform
their design function when exposed to maximum differential pressure (d/p)
conditions.
Initial testing includes evaluation of static signatures for
valve degradation, incorrect adjustments, and other abnormalities in the
motor operated valves. Additional demonstrated operability testing includes
evaluation of dynamic signatures for optimizing setpoint criteria, such that
appropriate protection margins may be adjusted to ensure valve operability
when subjected to maximum d/p conditions, without unduly jeopardizing valve
protection against catastrophic failure during normal plant operations.
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addition, the inspector witnessede static testing in progress for valve
1-HV-8105, Charging Pump to RCS isolation. The valve is a 3-inch gate valve
with a Limitorque SB-00 actuator.
The testing was conducted in accordance
with Procedure 26859-C, Motor Operated Valve Testing Using MOVATS 2150
Analysis and Test System (MOVATS).
No violations or deviations were identified in the area inspected.
9.
Followup on Previously Identified Inspection Findings (92701)
a.
(Closed) IFI 424/85-30-01, concerning the applicant's statement that a
. commitment to RG 1.95 was included in Module 7A, Plant Operations.
It
should also be listed as a commitment in Module 3A, Initial Test
Program.
Commitment No. 828 commits VEGP to RG 1.95 and is in the scope of
Module 7 (formerly 7A). Although, there is no direct commitment to RG 1.95 listed in Module 3A, the requirements of this RG are essentially
met by Commitment No. 2792 which covers the preoperational testing of
the control building heating, ventilating, and air conditioning system,
including the chlorine detection system. This commitment ~is contained
in Module 3A and is. implemented by Procedure No. 1-3GK-01, Control Room
Ventilation.
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b.
(Closed) IFI 424/85-30-02, concerning the applicant's. statement that
RG 168 was applicable to both Module 3A, Preoperational Test Phase,
and 3B, Startup Test Phase, and that the same entry would appear in
both modules.
The remarks in each module should be limited to those
appropriate for each test phase.
Commitment No. 3206 covers RG~1.68 and is included in Module 3A.
Applicable portions of RG 1.68 (regarding the -startup test program)
appear in Commitment No. 808 of the Module 7 matrix. Module 7 absorbed
the full scope of what was formerly Module 38.
c.
(Closed)
IFI 424/85-30-07, concerning the applicant's statement that
the FSAR would be revised to provide criteria that are consistent with
the ANSI /ASME OM-3 standard " Requirements. for Preoperational and
Initial Startup of Vibration Testing of Nuclear Power Plant Piping
Systems." This FSAR change has resulted from the review of Commitment
No. 3231.
The response to NRC Question 210.40 in the FSAR.was revised
by Amendment 19 (9/85) to' cover this item.
d.
(Closed)
IFI 424/85-30-08, concerning the applicant's agreement to
include a general statement in each module that would apply the appro-
priate quality assurance controls including the FSAR referenced quality
related regulatory guides, exceptions, and alternatives thereto to
'those activities expressed in each module. This statement would apply
to toe program in general and to each module submitted. -Modules that
have been issued (or which are in printing) do not have to be revised-
to include this statement.
Such a general statement was included in each module issued af ter
October 21, 1985. On November 11, 1985, Revision 1, to the Readiness
Review Program Procedures was issued which added Section 10.3.2, called
the Module. Assessment Statement, that mandates the inclusion of ~this
general . statement.
An open issues tracking program has been esta-
blished to help assure the inclusion of this statement in each report,
as well as, the accomplishment of all other Readiness Review committed
actions.
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(Closed)
IFI 424/85-30-09, concerning the applicant's agreement to
include the commitment to the Code and Standards Rule 10 CFR 50.55a in
Module 16 and the statement that the response'to Q210.47 with regard to
preservice examination of snubbers has been ' included in Module 7.
These commitments will be pursued in the review of Modules 7 and 16.
Commitment No. 2405 includes this portion of the response to Q210.47
and is assigned to Module 7.
The commitment to the Code and Standards
Rule 10 CFR 50.55a is contained in Commitment No. 188 which is assigned
to Module 16.
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(Closed)
CDR 424/86-117 concerning improper ring setting on Crosby
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I&E Information - Notice 86-05, Main Steam
Safety Valve Test Failures and Ring Setting Adjustments, was issued by
the . NRC to alert recipients of a potentially significant problem
pertaining to spring actuated main steam safety valves.
Each main
steam- line at the Vogtle Electric Generating Plant is provided with
five (5) spring loaded safety valves. The relief capacity of these
valvis is designed 'to protect the steam generator and the main steam
system from overpressurization.
The main steam safety valves used at
the_Vogtle Electric Generating Plant are Crosby Model 6R10. The valves
are required to be in compliance with ASME Section III, Division 1, as
defined in the' 1974 Code Edition, and Addenda through Winter 1975.
This code states, in part, that safety' valves shall operate.without
chattering and attain full lif t at pressure less than 3% above the
setpoint pressure.
As a result of the I&E Notice, Georgia Power Company tested 5 of the 20
main steam safety valves for Unit 1.
Testing was performed to deter-
mine the appropriateness of the as-shipped ring. settings (+150 for the
guide ring and approximately -45 for the nozzle ring). The results of
the test indicated that with the as-shipped ring settings, the alves
would not attain sufficient lift.to provide full rel.ief capacity.
The
reduction.in relief capacity resulting from the incorrect adjustmer of
the valves represents an unanalyzed condition and could have ress,'.d -
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in the loss of the capability to provide full relief capacity.
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Subsequently, all twenty, . Unit 1 valves were shipped 'to Crosby's high
flow test facility for testing and adjustment. The ring settings were
adjusted to increase the disc travel and to enable the valves to
achieve their design relief capacity.
No violations or deviations were identified in the area inspected.
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