ML20211F387
| ML20211F387 | |
| Person / Time | |
|---|---|
| Site: | Crystal River  |
| Issue date: | 10/09/1986 |
| From: | Elrod S, Stetka T, Tedrow J NRC OFFICE OF INSPECTION & ENFORCEMENT (IE REGION II) |
| To: | |
| Shared Package | |
| ML20211F340 | List: |
| References | |
| 50-302-86-27, NUDOCS 8610310145 | |
| Download: ML20211F387 (16) | |
See also: IR 05000302/1986027
Text
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UNITED STATES
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NUCLEAR REGULATORY COMMISSION
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101 MARIETTA STREET, N.W.
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ATLANTA, GEORGI A 30323
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Report No.: 50-302/86-27
Licensee:
Florida Power Corporation
3201 34th Street, South
St. Petersburg, FL 33733
Docket No.: 50-302
Licensee No.: DPR-72
Facility Name: Crystal River 3
Inspection Dates:
st 2 - September 5, 1986
Inspectors:
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Approved by:
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Date signed
Division of Reactor Proj
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SUMMARY
Scope: This routine inspection was conducted by two resident inspectors in the
areas of plant operations, security, radiological controls, Licensee Event
Reports and Nonconforming Operations Reports, facility modifications, and
licensee action on previous inspection items.
Numerous facility tours were
conducted and facility operations observed. Some of these tours and observations
were conducted on backshifts.
Results: One violation was identified:
(Failure to have an adequate equipment
control procedure, paragraph 5.b.(1)).
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REPORT DETAILS
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1.
Persons Contacted
- F. Bailey, Superintendent of Projects
- W. Bandhauer, Assistant Nuclear Plant Operations Manager
- P. Breedlove, Nuclear Records Management Supervisor
J. Buckner, Nuclear Security Superintendent
- J. Colby, Manager Nuclear Mechanical / Structural Engineering Services
- M. Collins, Nuclear Safety and Reliability Superintendent
M. Culver, Senior Nuclear Reactor Specialist
B. Hickle, Manager Nuclear Plant Operations
- M. Jacobs, Public Relations
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- M. Mann, Nuclear Compliance Specialist
- P. McKee, Director, Nuclear Plant Operations
R. Murgatroyd, Nuclear Maintenance Superintendent
V. Ropnel, Manager, Nuclear Plant Technical Support
- W. Rossfeld, Nuclear Compliance Manager
- P. Small, Maintenance Department Coordinator
- E. Welch, Manager Nuclear Electrical /I&C Engineering Services
K. Wilson, Manger Site Nuclear Licensing
- R. Wittman, Nuclear Operations Superintendent
Other personnel
contacted included office, operations, engineering,
maintenance, chemistry / radiation and corporate personnel.
- Attended exit interview
2.
Exit Interview
The inspectors met with licensee representatives (denoted in paragraph 1) at
the conclusion of the inspection on September 5,1986. During this meeting
the inspectors summarized the scope and findings of the inspection as they
are detailed in this report with particular emphasis on the Violation,
Unresolved Item, and Inspector Followup Items (IFI).
The licensee representatives acknowledged the inspector's comments and did
not identify as proprietary any of the materials provided to or reviewed by
the inspectors during this inspection.
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3.
Licensee Action on Previous Inspection Items
(0 pen)
Unresolved Item (302/82-28-04):
The
licensee has revised
Surveillance Procedure (SP)-187, which tests the Auxiliary Building
ventilation system. This procedure has been completely rewritten per the SP
writer's guide to enhance the procedure's clarity. The inspector recently
reviewed the latest revision (Revision 12) to this procedure and noticed
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that the procedure's acceptance criteria was confusing when checked against
the Technical Specification (TS) surveillance requirements.
Also, step
9.2.9.9 of this procedure references a step 9.2.12 which does not exist.
These items were discussed with licensee engineering personnel who agreed to
make applicable changes. The licensee also plans to perform another review
of procedures SP-185 and SP-186 to check for the existence of similar
problems.
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(Closed) IFI (302/85-42-04):
The licensee has revised Administrative
Instruction (AI)-1000, Good Housekeeping, and AI-1803, Safety Standards for
Ladders, Scaffolds, and Ancillary Equipment, to include precautions and
requirements to insure that safety related equipment is protected from
ancillary items such as ladders and scaffolding. These revisions satisfy
the concerns identified in IE Information Notice 80-21.
(Closed) Violation (302/86-07-01):
In an Interoffice Correspondence dated
August 1,1986, the maintenance superintendent stated that the review of
activities associated with the incorrectly classified Work Request (WR) was
conducted on the WR in use on the job. A review of this WR indicates that
the chief electrician and the electrical supervisor signed the WR (#73433)
on October 9,
1985, which was after the incorrect classification was
identified, thus indicating that they had reviewed the work. Action on this
item is considered to be complete.
(Closed) Unresolved Item (302/86-23-09?:
The itcensee has completed their
investigation to determine why the missing wire for valve FWV-15 had been
removed.
This wire was removed during the performance of a plant
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modification procedure (MAR 82-10-19-06) which relocated several electrical
components. This modification failed to provide instructions to reconnect
the wire upon completion.
The function of this wire was to provide
feedwater pump protection during maintenance activities by interlocking this
valve's position with the corresponding condensate booster pump's discharge
valve. This non-saftey related function is not required by the Technical
Specifications and is not required to be tested during routine surveillance
activities. The modification functional testing did not test this feature.
The missing wire has been replaced and the valve continues to operate
satisfactory.
(Closed) Violation (302/86-09-05):
The licensee has completed and the
inspector has verified the completion of the following items:
Operating Procedure (0P)-404 has been revised (revision 58, dated
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July 29, 1986) to require either valve RWV-32 or RWV-33 to be open at
all times, and,
An Immediate Temporary Change (ITC) was made to OP-407-A which required
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valve RWV-33 to be returned to its required position upon radioactive
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liquid release termination.
Action on this item is considered to be complete.
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(Closed) Violation (302/84-12-02):
The licensee has completed and the
inspector has verified the completion of the following items:
The cables in cable tray 522 were properly secured;
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Covers were properly installed on cable trays 171 and 183;
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Contractor personnel were instructed in the importance of returning
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systems back to their previous status as documented in a memo dated
9/4/84. Additionally, this memo stated that such instruction is now
included in maintenance operating procedure (M0P)-410 and that all
contractor personnel are trained in this procedure.
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Action on this item is considered to be complete.
(Closed) Deviation (302/84-09-02): Based upon a supplemental response by
the licensee dated 11/13/84, the NRC agreed that a Deviation to a commitment
did not occur. This item is closed for record purposes.
(Closed) Violation (302/86-09-04):
The licensee has completed and the
inspector has verified the completion of the following items:
Preventative Maintenance Procedure (PM)-123 has been revised in
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revision 6 dated 8/11/86 to include all the provisions identified as
deficient in the NRC letter of 7/8/86;
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A review of other preventative maintenance procedures was completed on
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8/5/86 to insure that similar procedure problems-do not exist;
Counseling of the electrician involved in the performance of PM-123 was
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documented as completed on 4/22/86.
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Action on this item is considered to be complete.
(Closed) Deviation (303/85-21-01):
The licensee has completed and the
inspector has verified the completion of the following items:
Procedures SP-300, SP-301, SP-354A, and SP-354B were revised so that
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the minimum allowed Emergency Diesel Generator (EDG) starting air
pressure is now 225 psig.; and,
Modification (MAR) 85-07-05-01A, which was completed on 5/28/86,
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installed new switches to provide the correct setpoint for the EDG
starting air pressure alarm.
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Action on this item is considered to be complete.
(Closed) Deviation (302/84-26-01):
Items for this Deviation were verified
as complete in NRC Inspection Report 50-302/85-11 except for revision of the
nuclear operations policy procedure (N00). This procedure, N00-10, was
revised and implemented on May 31, 1985. It appears that the new policy has
improved the licensee's commitment tracking system.
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Action on this item is considered to be complete.
(Closed) Violation (302/84-02-03):
The licensee has completed and the
inspector has verified the completion of the following items:
Health Physics Violation Reports and Non-Conforming Operations Reports
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(NCOR's) were written as stated in the licensee's response letter and
each involved individual was counseled as to the requirements of
Radiation Protection procedure (RP)-101;
The chemistry section's shift turnover sheet was revised to require
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signatures of both the on-coming and off going shifts and log keeping
practices were changed to insure that a proper turnover is conducted;
Chemistry Procedure (CH)-338 was revised as revision 8 on 7/24/84 to
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clarify the purging steps and to make the valve lineup applicable to
procedure requirements. Additionally, use of the revised procedure was
observed in the field;
In a memo dated 3/15/84 the training department reaffirmed that their
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training stresses procedure compliance and will continue to do so.
Action on this item is considered to be complete.
(Closed) Violation (302/85-08-01):
The licensee has completed and the
inspector has verified that the Operations Section Implementation Manual
(OSIM) has had the instructions involving safety or license compliance
removed and incorporated into revision 50 of AI-500, Conduct of Operations,
that was issued on 9/16/85.
Action on this item is considered to be
complete.
(Closed) Violation (302/85-08-02):
The licensee has completed and the
inspector has verified that administrative guidelines were added to the OSIM
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on 6/25/85. These guidelines, called "Special Lineups" restricted the use
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of Compliance Procedure (CP)-115, In-Plant Equipment Clearance and Switching
Orders, and clarified when clearances, test procedures, or procedure changes
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must be used to change system lineups. At a later date this OSIM change was
deleted and the requirements were incorporated into procedure CP-115 as step
5.2.25 where they presently exist. Action on this item is considered to be
complete.
(Closed) Violation (302/85-08-07):
The licensee has completed and the
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inspector has verified the completion of the following items:
Initial guidance to operations personnel concerning the use of N/A (Not
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Applicable) on procedural step signoff was transmitted via Short Term
Instruction (STI) 85-18 dated 3/19/85;
An Interoffice Correspondence dated 7/31/85 was issued by the
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Operations Superintendent to further clarify when the use of an N/A on
a procedure step is appropriate;
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A determination was made by plant management in a memo dated 8/6/85
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that no further procedure changes are necessary.
Based upon the inspector's observations concerning the use of N/A in
facility procedures, the inspector concurs with the licensee's determination
and action on this item is considered to be complete.
(Closed) Violation (302/84-29-01):
The licensee has completed and the
inspector has verified the completion of the following items:
(Item 1)
Personnel were reminded to adhere to procedures as documented in the
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minutes of a maintenance personnel shop meeting conducted on 1/18/85;
Procedure SP-154 " Testing and Calibration of Seismic Monitors" was
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revised as revision 13 on 7/10/85 to delete the requirement to have
operations personnel restore the system to normal (it can now be
restored by maintenance personnel) and to delete the reference to
procedure SP-336.
(Item 2)
The data sheets for procedure SP-317 dated 9/28/84 were corrected on
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10/10/84 to reflect the correct data and to confirm that TS
requirements were not exceeded;
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Personnel were re-instructed on procedure SP-317 regarding data
placement and post data review as documented in an Interoffice
Correspondence dated 12/7/85;
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Procedure SP-317, enclosure (3), was revised in revision 23 to clarify
when valve RCV-150 is open or closed.
Action on this item is considered to be complete.
(Closed) Violation (302/84-09-06):
The licensee has completed and the
inspector has verified the completion of the following items:
Procedure SP-186 was revised in revision 11 by adding a new Enclosure
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(4A) that verifies that the ventilation dampers are placed in the
recirculation mode positions prior to running the test and added steps
to insure that the proper flow is attained;
Revision 11 to procedure SP-186 was successfully performed on May 1,
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1984.
Action on this item is considered to be complete.
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(Closed) Violation (302/83-18-01):
The licensee has completed and the
inspector has verified the completion of the following items:
Procedure reviewers were instructed to perform a system walk down
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whenever valve checklists are being reviewed. This instruction was
documented in an Interoffice Correspondence dated 9/6/83;
System walkdowns were conducted to verify the accuracy of the valve
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lineups and flow diagrams.
Based upon this verification and the observations made by the inspectors
during their own system walkdowns, action on this item is considered to be
complete.
(Closed) Violation (302/85-11-01):
Items for this Violation were verified
as complete in NRC Inspection Report 50-302/85-26 except for revision of
AI-401.
This instruction was revised as revision 8 and implemented on
10/7/85.
It appears that this revision, which requires Interdepartmental
reviews for all applicable procedures, will prevent recurrence. Action on
this item is considered to be complete.
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(Closed) Violation (302/85-19-05): The licensee completed and the inspector
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verified that STI 85-27 dated 5/7/85 was written to remind personnel to
adhere to the requirements of procedure SP-601 as they relate to the
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refueling bridge startup and shut down. Based upon the issuance of this STI
and observations by the inspectors of refueling bridge operations at that
time, action on this item is considered to be complete.
(Closed) Violation (302/85-19-01): The licensee completed and the inspector
verified that independent walk downs of the annunciator panels were
completed by 7/26/85 and that the procedures were revised to correct the
identified discrepancies.
The inspector's walk down of the annunciator
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panels verified the accuracy of the procedures and action on this item is
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considered to be complete.
(Closed) Unresolved Item (202/84-22-06):
The closeout of Violation
(302/85-19-01) above resolves this item and this item is closed for record
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purposes.
(0 pen) Violation.(302/83-17-04): The licensee completed and the inspector
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verified that responsible personnel were made cognizant of the need to
identify and report precedural and design inadequacies during a series of
on-shift seminars conducted during the period of October 17-21, 1983. This
item remains open pending verification of:
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Completion of the modification to valves WDV-3 and WDV-60 to provide
for testing in the post accident direction of flow;
Revision to procedure SP-179 (the type B and C leakrate testing
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procedure) that provided for the proper testing of valves WDV-94,
WDV-406, WSV-5, and WSV-6; and,
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Completion of the proper testing of these valves.
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(0 pen) Violation (302/84-30-03):
The licensee completed and the inspector
verified that STI 84-96 was issued on 11/30/84 to emphasize the requirement
of procedure SP-442 to noti fy appropriate personnel of all applicable
surveillance requirements.
This item remains open pending review and
verification of the chemistry technician counseling and training that was
described in the licensee's response letter dated 1/31/85.
4.
Unresolved Items
Unresolved items are matters about which more information is required to
determine whether they are acceptable or may involve violations or
deviations. A new unresolved item is identified in paragraph 5.a of this
report.
5.
Review of Plant Operations
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The plant remained in power operation (Mode 1) for the duration of this
inspection period.
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a.
Shift Logs and Facility Records
The inspector reviewed records and discussed various entries with
operations
personnel
to verify compliance with the Technical
Specifications (TS) and the licensee's administrative procedures.
The following records were reviewed:
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Shift
Supervisor's
Log;
Reactor
Operator's
Log;
Equipment
Out-Of-Service Log;
Shift Relief Checklist; Auxiliary Building
Operator's Log; Active Clearance Log; Daily Operating Surveillance Log;
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Work
Request
Log;
Short
Term
Instructions;
and
Selected
Chemistry / Radiation Protection Logs.
In addition to these record
reviews, the inspector independently verified clearance order tagouts.
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On September 4, while observing plant operations, the inspector noted
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that two of the annunciators, Q-7-10 and -Q-8-10,
had open links
(thereby making the annunciators inoperable) but were not listed in the
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annunciator's Equipment-Out-Of-Service
log.
These
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entitled " PERIMETER FENCE INTRUSION" and "CC (Control Complex) ACCESS
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DOOR OPEN" respectively, were disabled years ago and were not needed
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since the security system had appropriate alarms.
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While these alarms were not needed, the inspector expressed concern as
to whether there were other annunciators that had been made inoperable
and were not properly logged as required by the licensee's procedures.
Licensee personnel acknowledged the inspector's concern and will
conduct a review of the annunciators to verify whether any additional
annunciators have been disabled and not properly logged.
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Unresolved Item (302/86-27-01): Review the annunciator panel status to
verify that the annunciator Equipment-Out-Of-Service log is current.
b.
Facility Tours and Observations
Throughout the inspection period, facility tours were conducted to
observe operations and maintenance activities in progress.
Some
operations and maintenance activity observations were conducted during
backshifts.
Also, during this inspection period, licensee meetings
were attended by the inspector to observe planning and management
activities.
The facility tours anti observations encompassed the fol wwing areas:
security perimeter felce; control room; emergency diesel generator
room; auxiliary building; intermediate building; battery rooms; and,
electrical switchgear rooms.
During these tours, the following observations were made:
(1) Monitoring Instrumentation - The following instrumentation was
observed to verify that indicated parameters were in accordance
with the TS for the current operational mode:
Equipment operating status; area atmospheric and liquid radiation
monitors; electrical system lineup; reactor operating parameters;
and auxiliary equipment operating parameters.
On August 20, at approximately 3:30 P.M., the inspector noted that
power was available to four containment isolation valves (CAV-429,
CAV-430, CAV-433, and CAV-434).
Procedure SP-341, Monthly
Containment Integrity Check, requires these valves to normally
have power removed by having switch #27 on electrical panel
DPDP-5A locked open during plant operations because these valves
do not receive an automatic containment isolation signal in the
event of an accident. When operations personnel were notified of
this finding, they immediately opened switch #27 that supplies
power to these valves. The valves were de-energized by approxi-
mately 3:40 P.M.
The inspector's investigation into this event indicated that the
licensee had just completed testing another containment isolation
valve, CAV-431, and had just released equipment clearance 8-95 to
restore the system to the normal status. Circuit breaker #27 was
listed on this clearance to insure personnel safety and was
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" restored" at approximately 2:18 P.M.
While the circuit breaker
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was tagged in the "0FF" position and should have been restored
(i.e., only the tag removed) so that it was left in the "0FF"
position, it was incorrectly directed to be restored to the "0N"
position by clearance 8-95.
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Equipment clearances are issued and controlled in accordance with
procedure
(CP)-115,
In-Plant
Equipment
Clearance
and
Switching Orders.
Step 5.3.5.h of this procedure specifies that
the return-to-normal position of the valve, switch, or breaker
after removal of a tag should be obtained from the applicable
operating procedure (0P) and not from system flow diagrams. The
licensee's Administrative Instruction AI-400, Plant Operating
Quality Assurance Manual Control Document (P0QAM), specifies in
paragraph 4.1.3 that the word "shall" denotes a requirement and
that the word "should" denotes a recommendation.
Since the word
"should" only provides a recommendation and not a requirement, the
use of a procedure was only an option.
In addition, since it
appears that if CP-115 had directed the use of an appropriate
procedure (in this case procedure SP-341) to determine the lineup,
an incorrect restoration lineup would not have occurred.
As a
result of this investigation, procedure CP-115 is considered to be
inadequate.
Failure to have an adequate procedure for equipment control is
contrary to the requirements of TS 6.8.1.a and is considered to be
a violation.
Violation (302/86-27-02):
Failure to have an adequate procedure
for plant equipment control.
(2) Safety Systems Walkdown - The inspector conducted a walkdown of
the Nuclear Services and Decay Heat Seawater (RW) system to verify
that the lineup was in accordance with license requirements for
system operability and that the system drawing and procedure
correctly reflect "as-built" plant conditions.
No violations or deviations were identified.
(3) Shift Staffing - The inspector verified that operating shift
staffing was in accordance with TS requirements and that control
room operations were being conducted in an orderly and
professional manner.
In addition, the inspector observed shift
turnovers on various occasions to verify the continuity of plant
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status,
operational
problems,
and other pertinent
plant
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information during these turnovers.
No violations or deviations were identified.
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(4) Plant Housekeeping Conditions - Storage of material and components
and cleanliness conditions of various areas throughout the
facility were observed to determine whether safety and/or fire
hazards existed.
No violations or deviations were identified.
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(5) Radiation Areas - Radiation Control Areas (RCAs) were observed to
verify
proper
identification
and
implementation.
These
observations included selected licensee-conducted surveys, review
of step-off pad conditions, disposal of contaminated clothing, and
area posting.
Area postings were independently verified for
accuracy.
The inspector also reviewed selected radiation work
permits and observed the use of protective clothing, respirators,
and personnel monitoring devices to assure that the licensee's
radiation monitoring policies were being followed.
No violations or deviations were identified.
(6) Security Control - Security controls were observed to verify that
security barriers were intact, guard forces were on duty, and
access to the Protected Area (PA) was controlled in accordance
with the facility security plan.
Personnel within the PA were
observed to verify proper display of badges and that personnel
requiring escort were properly escorted. Personnel within vital
areas were observed to ensure proper authorization for the area.
No violations or deviations were identified.
(7) Fire Protection - Fire protection activities, staffing and
equipment were observed to verify that fire brigade staffing was
appropriate and that fire alarms, extinguishing equipment,
actuating controls, fire fighting equipment, emergency equipment,
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and fire barriers were operable.
No violations or deviations were identified.
(8) Surveillance - Surveillance tests were observed to verify that
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approved procedures were being used; qualified personnel were
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conducting the tests; tests were adequate to verify equipment
operability;
calibrated equipment,
was utilized;
and TS
requirements were followed.
The following tests were observed and/or data reviewed:
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SP-146, Emergency Feedwater Initiation and Control (EFIC)
Monthly Functional Test;
SP-160B, Functional and Operability Check of the Containment
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Hydrogen Monitor WS-10-CE;
Waste
Gas
Hydrogen /0xygen
Analyzer
Channel
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Functional Test;
SP-312, Heat Balance Calculations;
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SP-317, Reactor Coolant System Water Inventory Balance;
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SP-341, Monthly Containment Integrity Check;
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SP-712, Core Flood Tank "B" Monthly Surveillance Program.
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As a result of these reviews, the following items were identified:
(a) During a review of the plant logs, the inspector noted that
operations personnel had determined that the plant's computer
generated heat balance calculation was in error and that
action was being taken to correct the situation.
The
inspector also noted that this error existed for about three
days before it was identified.
Subsequent discussions with these personnel indicated that
this error was identified by personnel when they noted that
the heat balance results appeared to be inconsistent with the
value for generated megawatt output. These discussions, in
addition to the review of completed data for procedure SP-312
by the inspector, indicated that the errors were in the
conservative direction
(i.e.,
the nuclear instrumentation
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(NI's) power was higher than the heat balance calculated
power).
The licensee performs a daily heat balance calculation in
accordance with procedure SP-312.
This procedure did not
identify the erroneous heat balance calculation because the
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procedure only requires action to be taken if the heat
balance shows that the NI's are not conservative with respect
to the heat balance. Additionally the inspector noted that
the procedure only compares the computer generated values for
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the NI's with the computer generated values for the heat
balance thus raising the possibility that a computer
malfunction may not be readily detected.
These findings were discussed with licensee personnel. As a
result the licensee will revise procedure SP-312 to provide a
limit for the conservative direction and to direct a check of
the computer generated NI indications with other plant
indications.
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IFI (302/86-27-03):
Review the revision to procedure SP-312
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to provide a limit for conservative NI drift and an
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additional check of computer data with plant instrumentation.
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(b) During the performance of SP-163B on September 3,1986, the
inspector noted that step 9.4.4 requires data to be recorded
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when
two
switches (WD-21-FIS#1 and WD-21-FIS#2) are
activated. The technicians indicated that only one switch
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existed but this switch operated two relays, therefore only
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one data point was required to be recorded. The inspector
also observed that the nitrogen purge established in step
9.4.3 was not required to be secured. A temporary change to
the procedure was made to secure the nitrogen purge.
Finally, step 10.1 of this procedure required the technicians
to open valves WDV-575 or WDV-576 if not already opened per
section 9.4.
However section 9.4 does not address operation
of these valves. The discrepancies noted in these steps were
discussed with licensee management personnel. The licensee
will revise this procedure to clarify these steps.
IFI (302/86-27-04): Review the revision to procedure SP-1638
to clarify steps.
(9) Maintenance Activities - The inspector observed maintenance
activities to verify that correct equipment clearances were in
effect; work requests and fire prevention work permits, as
required, were issued and being followed; quality control
personnel were available for inspection activities as required;
and TS requirements were being followed.
Maintenance was observed and work packages were reviewed for the
following maintenance activities:
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Troubleshooting of sluggish pressurizer heater controls in
accordance with Maintenance Procedure (MP)-531;
Repacking of a nuclear services seawater pump (RWP-2A) in
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accordance with procedure MP-150;
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Replacement and post maintenance testing for valve CAV-431 in
accordance with procedures MP-132, MP-531, SP-370, and
During the post maintenance testing on valve CAV-431 (a Target
Rock solenoid-operated valve) the licensee discovered that the
valve had been installed backwards. Investigation into the cause
for this situation revealed that this valve has no markings to
identify the flowpath and that the electrical cable penetration
orientation is not the same for each valve (workmen utilized the
cable penetration as a reference and installed the replacement
valve in the same orientation as the valve removed). The valve
was again replaced and orientation of the new valve checked by
referencing the valve's internals.
Post maintenance testing was
subsequently completed satisfactory. The licensee plans on making
changes to procedures and purchasing requirements to delineate
flowpath markings on these types of valves.
IFI(302/86-27-05):
Review the licensee's activities to establish
correct orientation for Target Rock valves.
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(10) Radioactive Waste Controls - Solid waste compacting and selected
liquid and gaseous releases were observed to verify that approved
procedures were utilized, that appropriate release approvals were
obtained, and that required surveys were taken.
No violations or deviations were identified.
(11) Pipe Hangers and Seismic Restraints - Several pipe hangers and
seismic restraints (snubbers) on safety-related systems were
observed to insure that fluid levels were adequate and no leakage
was evident, that restraint settings were appropriate, and that
anchoring points were not binding.
No violations or deviations were identified.
6.
Review of Licensee Event Reports and Nonconforming Operations Reports
a.
Licensee Event Reports (LERs) were reviewed for potential generic
impact, to detect trends, and to determine whether corrective actions
appeared appropriate. Events, which were reported immediately, were
reviewed as they occurred to determine if the TS were satisfied.
LERs 86-10, 86-11, and 86-12 were reviewed in accordance with current
NRC policy. LER's 86-10 and 86-11 are closed.
(1) (Closed)
LER 86-10
reported
the violation
of Technical Specification (TS) 6.2.2.a which requires two Senior Reactor
Operator licensees on watch during plant operation in the hot
standby mode (Mode 3). Licensee corrective action on this matter
has been completed
including
the
remedial
training
and
requalification of the backup licensee involved.
(2) (0 pen) LER 86-12 reported that the heat balance calculation
surveillance procedure (SP-312) had not been performed within the
required TS surveillance interval. This matter is considered to
be a licensee identified violation in which adequate corrective
actions have been taken to prevent recurrence.
This LER will
remain open pending the inspectors verification that all shift
supervisors have reviewed this LER.
b.
The inspector reviewed Nonconforming Operations Reports (NCORs) to
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verify the following:
compliance with the TS, corrective actions as
identified in the reports or during subsequent reviews have been
accomplished or are being pursued for completion, generic items are
identified and reported as reautred by 10 CFR Part 21, and items are
reported as required by TS.
All NCORs were reviewed in accordance with the current NRC Policy.
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(1) NCOR 86-103 reported that procedure SP-417, Refueling Interval
Integrated Plant Response to Engineered Safeguards Actuation, was
inadequate to implement the surveillance requirements of TS 4.8.1.1.2.c.3.a
in that the load shedding of the 480 volt
emergency busses was not being tested. The licensee is revising
procedure SP-417 to incorporate a new method to verify this 1 cad
shedding capability and will submit an LER on this matter. This
l
matter is considered a licensee identified violation in which
adequate corrective actions will be taken to prevent recurrence.
This item will be reviewed further when the LER is issued.
(2) NCOR 86-139 reported the failure to comply with TS 3.3.3.1 in that
the automatic functions of the control room radiation monitor
instrument (RMA-5) were disabled and the control complex emergency
ventilation system was not placed in the
recirculation mode
within one hour. The licensee plans to submit an LER to document
this event. This matter is considered to be a licensee identified
violation in which adequate corrective actions were taken to
prevent recurrence. This item will be reviewed further when the
LER is issued.
(3) NCOR 86-142 reported that DJ-11-TS, a temperature switch for the
Jacket Water Cooling system on the "A" Emergency Diesel Generator,
was improperly calibrated. The licensee discovered this condition
,
during routine followup of a field problem report which identified
a problem with the operation of the switch.
The miscalibrated
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switch did not affect the operability of the diesel. The licensee
attributed the cause for the improper calibration to be the use of
an instrument calibration data sheet which was not revised
i
following a plant modification (MAR 80-11-28-02) which established
new higher operating setpoints for the switch. The calibration of
the switch to lower setpoints still maintained the temperature of
the system within -manufacturer's recommendations.
As part of
their corrective action, the licensee has reassigned control of
the instrument calibration data sheets to site engineering who
will review and revise these sheets for future changes. Also new
plant modifications will include new instrument calibration data
sheets as part of the modification package. The licensee plans to
recalibrate the temperature switch prior to the next monthly
diesel generator surveillance test. The inspector has reviewed the
work package used to perform this job and has verified that the
correct instrument calibration sheet was included in this package.
This matter is considered to be a licensee identified violation in
which adequate corrective action has been taken to prevent
recurrence.
7.
Design, Design Changes and Modifications
Installation of new or modified systems were reviewed to verify that the
changes were reviewed and approved in accordance with 10 CFR 50.59, that the
changes were performed in accordance with technically adequate and approved
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procedures, that subsequent testing and test results met acceptance criteria
or deviations were resolved in an acceptable manner, and that appropriate
drawings and facility procedures were revised as necessary. This review
included selected observations of modifications and/or testing in progress.
The following modification approval records (MARS) were reviewed and/or
associated testing observed:
Testing of the replacement air handling dampers AHD-34 and AHD-35 in
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accordance with MAR 80-07-13-01;
Installation of a waste gas decay tank sampling bypass to the waste gas
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analyzer in accordance with MAR 86-07-03-01; and,
Temporary repairs to nuclear services seawater piping in accordance
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with MAR T86-08-09-01.
No violations or deviations were identified.
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