ML20211D660
| ML20211D660 | |
| Person / Time | |
|---|---|
| Site: | Paducah Gaseous Diffusion Plant |
| Issue date: | 07/23/1999 |
| From: | UNITED STATES ENRICHMENT CORP. (USEC) |
| To: | |
| Shared Package | |
| ML20211D658 | List: |
| References | |
| NUDOCS 9908270108 | |
| Download: ML20211D660 (122) | |
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Page 1 of122 SAFETY ANALYSIS REPORT UPDATE -
CERTIFICATE AMENDMENT REQUEST JULY 23,1999 REVISION Remove Pages Insert Pages SARUP Revision Log SARUP Revision Log i, ii.
i, ii,iii SARUP List of EfTective Pages SARUP List of Effective Pages SARUP-1 through SARUP-13 SARUP-1 through SARUP-14 SARUP Section 3.15 Table of Contents SARUP Section 3.15 Table of Contents i, ii.
i, ii.
SARUP Section 3.15 SARUP Section 3.15 3.15-16,3.15-20,3.15-21,3.15-22,3.15-25, 3.15-16,3.15-20,3.15-21,3.15-22,3.15-25,
- 3. I 5-27a, 3.15-28, 3.15-29, 3.15-30, 3.15-33, 3.15-27a, 3.15-28, 3.15-29, 3.15-30, 3.15-33, 3.15-34,3.15-35,3.15-54,3.15-58,3.15-59, 3.15-34, 3.15-35, 3.15-54, 3.15-54a, 3.15-58, 3.15-62,3.15-82,3.15-83 3.15-59, 3.15-59a, 3.15-62, 3.15-62a, 3.15-82, Table 3.15-1 pages 3,7, and 8 3.15-82a,3.15-83 Os Table 3.15-2 pages 2,5, 6, and 22 Table 3.15 1 pages 3,7, and 8 Table 3.15-3 page 3.
Table 3.15-2 pages 2,5,6,22,22a, Table 3.15-3 page 3.
SARUP Section 4.1 SARUP Section 4.1 4.1 - 1, 4.1-2 4.1-1, 4.1-2 SARUP Section 4.2 SARUP Section 4.2 4.2-12,4.2-13,4.2-17, and Table 4.2-5.
4.2-12,4.2-13,4.2-17, and Table 4.2-5.
SARUP Section 4.3 SARUP Section 4.3 4.3-72,4.3-76,4.3-82,4.3-83,4.3-84, 4.3-72,4.3-76,4.3-82,4.3-83,4.3-84, 4.3-85, 4.3-86,4.3-104,4.3-105,4.3-106, 4.3-84 a, 4.3-85, 4.3-85a, 4.3-86, 4.3-104, 4.3-105, 4.3-108,4.3 109,4.3-110,4.3-128,4.3-129, 4.3-106,4.3-108,4.3-109,4.3-110,4.3-128, 4.3-130,4.3-131,4.3-132,4.3-133 4.3-129, 4.3-130, 4.3-131, 4.3-132, 4.3-132a, 4.3-132b,4.3 133 SARUP TSRs SAR TSRs 2.2-30d ix, 2.2-30d, 2.3-4, 2.3-7 through 2.3-9a,2.3-11, 2.3-13,2.3-15,2.3-17,2.3-18,2.3-20,2.3 22, 2.3 22b,2.3-25,2.3-27,2.3-29,2.3-31,2.3-32, 2.3-34,2.3 37 through 2.3-44,2.3-46 through 2.3-51,3.0-4.
O 9908270108 990817 PDR ADOCK 07007001 B
l United States Enrichment Corporation Paducah Gaseous Diffusion Plant l
Safety Analysis Report Update REVISION LOG 1
l Date Description 8/18/97 Initial Issue. Included: changes to SAR Chapter 2 (changed pages only); new SARUP Sections 4.1,4.2.1 through 4.2.5,4.3.1,4.4.
10/31/97 Submittal of completely SARUP (including 8/18/97 sections unchanged), with the exception of changes to Application SAR Chapter 3. Included: changes to SAR Chapters 1 and 2 and Sections 5.2,5.4, and 5.6 (changed pages only); complete replacement of Section 3.15, Chapter 4, and the TSRs; new Section 5.2, Appendix A.
3/31/98 Submittal to remove the fixed fire suppression sprinkler systems within the C-333-A, C-337-A, and C-360 facilities and the sanitary and fire water system (SFWS), including it's distribution and elevated storage tank as safety (AQ) systems. Sections revised include: Section 3.15.7.2, Table 3.15-2. Table 4.2-5, Table 4.2-11, Section 4.3.2.2.16,
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TSR Table of Contents, TSR 2.2.3.3, TSR 2.4.3.1.a TSR 2.4.3.1.b, TSR 2.4.3.2.a, V
TSR 2.4.3.2.b, and TSR 2.6.3.2. SARUP List of Effective Pages added.
10/19/98 Submittal to define the codes and standards applied to the process building cranes.
Sections revised include: Chapter 1, Appendix A, Sections 3.15.6.2.2, 3.15.6.2.3, 3.15.9.2.2, 3.15.9.2.3 and TSRs 2.2.4.1, 2.3.4.2, 2.5.4.2, and 2.6.4.2.
11/6/98 Submittal to incorporate miscellaneous SARUP revisions. SARUP Sections affected are:
1.1 of Chapter 1 Appendix A, Chapter 2 Table of Contents, 2.1.2.4, 3.15.3.3.3, 3.15.3.7.2.1, 3.15.4.5.3, 3.15.6.2.3, 3.15.7.7.3, 3.15.10.1.3.1, Table 3.15-1, Table 3.15-2, Table 3.15-8, Table 3.15-9, Table 3.15-10, Table 4.2-7, 4.3.2.2.15, 4.3.2.2.16, 4.3.2.5.3, Table 4.3-11, Table 4.3-12, able 4.3-13, Table 4.3-14, Table 4.3-15, Figure 4.3-38, Figure 4.3-39, Figure 4.3-40, Figure 4.3-41, Figure 4.3-42, Figure 4.3-43, Figure 4.3-44, TSR 2.1.3.6 Basis, TSR 2.3.3.6 Basis, TSR SR 2.4.3.1.a-2, TSR 2.4.3.1 Basis, TSR 2.4.3.3 Title, TSR 2.4.3.3.b Applicability, and TSR 2.4.3.3.b Basis.
6/30/99 Submittal to incorporate the necessary changes for incorporation of the current USEC-01 TSRs and the associated changes to SARUP Section 3.15 and Chapter 4 for the cascade and balance of plant facilities. The following sections are affected: Section 3.15 Table of Contents, 3.15.1, 3.15.3.1, 3.15.3.1.1, 3.15.3.1.2, 3.15.3.1.3, 3.15.3.1.4, 3.15.3.1.5, 3.15.3.2, 3.15.3.2.1, 3.15.3.2.2, 3.15.3.2.3, 3.15.3.2.4, 3.15.3.3.3,, 3.15.3.3.4, 3.15.3.4.1, 3.15.3.4.3, 3.15.3.4.4, 3.15.3.6.3, 3.15.3.7.2.1, 3.15.3.7.2.5, 3.15.3.8.1, i
g July 23,1999 Safety Analysis Report Update REVISION LOG (continuation) 3.15.3.8.2, 3.15.3.8.3, 3.15.7.2.1, 3.15.7.2.2, 3.15.7.2.3, 3.15.7.2.4, 3.15.7.2.5, Table 3.15-1, Table 3.15-2, Table 3.15-3,4.3.2.1.1,4.3.2.1.2,4.3.2.1.3,4.3.2.1.4,4.3.2.1.5, 4.3.2.1.6, 4.3.2.1.7, 4.3.2.1.8. All SARUP TSRs are deleted by this change and replaced with the following "first set" of revised TSRs from USEC-01 Volume 4: TSR Table of Contents page x, TSR 1.6.2.2.g, TSR 2.4.2.1 Basis, TSR 2.4.2.2 Basis, TSR 2.4.3.1 Basis, TSR 2.4.3.2 Basis, TSR 2.4.3.3 Basis, TSR 2.4.3.4 Basis, TSR 2.4.4.1 Basis, TSR 2.4.4.2 Basis, TSR 2.4.4.3 Basis, TSR 2.4.4.4 Basis, TSR 2.4.4.5 Basis, TSR 2.4.4.6 Basis, TSR 2.4.4.7 Basis, TSR 2.4.4.8 Basis, TSR 2.4.4.9 Basis, TSR 2.4.4.11 Basis, TSR 2.4.4.12 Limiting Condition for Operation (LCO), Actions, Surveillance Requirements (SR), and Basis, TSR 2.4.4.13 LCO, Actions, and Basis, TSR 2.4.4.14 Basis, TSR 2.4.4.15 (all new), TSR 2.5.4.1 Basis. TSR 2.5.4.2 Basis TSR 2.5.4.3 Basis, TSR 2.5.4.4 Basis, TSR 2.6.4.1 Basis, TSR 3.9.1.b, and TSR 3.10.4.b.
7/15/99 Submittal to incorporate the necessary changes for incorporation of the current USEC-01 TSRs and the associated changes to SARUP Section 3.15 and Chapter 4 for the feed and toll transfer and sampling plant facilities. The following sections are affected: Section 3.15 Table of Contents, 3.15.2.1.3, 3.15.2.2, 3.15.2.2.1, 3.15.2.2.2, 3.15.2.2.3, 3.15.2.2.4, 3.15.2.2.5, 3.15.2.3.1, 3.15.2.3.3, 3.15.2.6.1, 3.15.2.6.3, 3.15.2.6.4, 3.15.2.7.1, f
3.15.2.7.3, 3.15.2.8, 3.15.2.8.1, 3.15.2.8.2, 3.15.2.8.3, 3.15.5.1.3, 3.15.5.3.1,
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3.15.5.3.3, 3.15.5.6.1, 3.15.5.6.3, 3.15.5.6.4, 3.15.5.7.1, 3.15.5.7.3, 3.15.5.8, 3.15.5.8.1, 3.15.5.8.2, 3.15.5.8.3, 3.15.6.4.1, 3.15.7.3.2, 3.15.7.3.3, 3.15.7.3.4, Table 3.15-1, Table 3.15-2, 4.3.2.2.2, 4.3.2.2.4, 4.3.2.2.6, 4.3.2.2.7, 4.3.2.2.9, 4.3.2.2.10, 4.3.2.2.13, 4.3.2.2.14, 4.3.2.2.15, Figure 4.3-16, 5.2.2.3, TSR Table of Contents, TSR 2.1.2.1 Basis, TSR 2.1.2.2 Basis, TSR 2.1.3.1 SR, TSR 2.1.3.1 Basis, TSR 2.1.3.2 Basis, TSR 2.1.3.3 Basis, TSR 2.1.4.1 BasisTSR 2.1.4.2a Basis, TSR 2.1.4.2b Basis, TSR 2.1.4.3 SR and Basis, TSR 2.1.4.4 Basis, TSR 2.1.4.5a Basis, TSR 2.1.4.5b Basis, TSR 2.1.4.5c Basis, TSR 2.1.4.6 Basis, TSR 2.1.4.8 Basis, TSR 2.1.4.9 Basis, TSR 2.1.4.10 Basis, TSR 2.1.4.11 Basis, TSR 2.1.4.12 Basis, TSR 2.1.4.13 Basis,, TSR 2.1.4.14 Basis, TSR 2.1.4.15 Basis, TSR 2.1.4.16 Basis, TSR 2.1.4.17 Basis, TSR 2.1.4.19 Basis, TSR 2.1.4.20 Basis, TSR 2.1.4.21 Basis, TSR 2.1.4.22 (all new), TSR 2.1.5.1 Basis, TSR 2.1.5.2 Design Feature (DF), SR, and Basis, TSR 2.1.5.3 Basis TSR 2.1.5.4 Basis, TSR 2.1.5.5 Basis, TSR 2.1.5.6 Basis, TSR 2.1.5.7 Basis, TSR 2.1.5.8 Basis, TSR 2.1 Appendix A, TSR 2.2.2.1 Basis, TSR 2.2.2.2 Basis, TSR 2.2.3.1 SR and Basis, TSR 2.2.3.2 Basis, TSR 2.2.3.3 Basis, TSR 2.2.4.1 Basis, TSR 2.2.4.2 SR and Basis, TSR 2.2.4.3a Basis, TSR 2.2.4.3b Basis, TSR 2.2.4.3c Basis, TSR 2.2.4.4 Basis, TSR 2.2.4.6 Basis TSR 2.2.4.7 Basis, TSR 2.2.4.8 Basis, TSR 2.2.4.10 Basis, TSR 2.2.4.11 Basis, TSR 2.2.4.12 Basis, TSR 2.2.4.13 Basis, TSR 2.2.4.14 (all new), TSR 2.2.5.1 Basis, TSR 2.2.5.2 DF, SR, and Basis, TSR 2.2.5.3 Basis, TSR 2.2.5.4 Basis, and TSR 2.2 Appendix A.
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Safety Analysis Report Update REVISION LOG (continuation) i 7/23/99 Submittal to incorporate the necessary changes for incorporation of the current USEC-01 TSRs and the associated changes to SARUP Section 3.15 and Chapter 4 for the cascade and balance of plant. The following sections are affected: Section 3.15 Table of Contents, 3.15.3.1.3, 3.15.3.3.3, 3.15.3.4.1, 3.15.3.4.3, 3.15.3.6.3, 3.15.4.1, 3.15.4.1.1, 3.15.4.1.2, 3.15.4.1.3, 3.15.4.1.4, 3.15.4.1.5, 3.15.4.2, 3.15.4.2.1, 3.15.4.2.3, 3.15.4.7, 3.15.4.7.1, 3.15.4.7.2, 3.15.4.7.3, 3.15.4.7.4, 3.15.4.7.5, 3.15.4.8, 3.15.4.8.1, 3.15.4.8.2, 3.15.4.8.3, 3.15.4.8.4, 3.15.4.8.5, 3.15.6.5, 3.15.6.5.1, 3.15.6.5.2, 3.15.6.5.3, 3.15.7.3.1, 3.15.7.3.3, 3.15.7.3.4, 3.15.7.9.1, 3.15.7.9.2, 3.15.7.9.3, 3.15.10.4.8.1, 3.15.10.4.8.2, 3.15.10.4.8.3, 3.15.10.4.8.4, 3.15.10.4.9, 3.15.10.4.9.1, 3.15.10.4.9.4, 3.15.10.4.9.5, 3.15.10.4.10, 3.15.10.4.10.1, 3.15.10.4.10.4,3.15.10.4.10.5, Table 3.15-1, Table 3.15-2, Table 3.15-3,4.1,4.2.5.3, 4.2.6.3.4, Table 4.2-5, 4.3.2.2.1, 4.3.2.2.4, 4.3.2.2.11, 4.3.2.2.12, 4.3.2.2.16, 4.3.2.2.17 TSR Table of Contents, TSR 2.2.4.14 Basis, TSR 2.3.2.2 Basis, TSR 2.3.3.2 Basis, TSR 2.3.4.1 Limited Condition of Operation (LCO), Actions and Basis, TSR 2.3.4.2 Basis, TSR 2.3.4.3 Basis, TSR 2.3.4.4 Basis. TSR 2.3.4.5 Basis, TSR 2.3.4.6 Basis, TSR 2.3.4.7 Basis, TSR 2.3.4.8 Basis, TSR 2.3.4.9 Basis, TSR 2.3.4.10 Basis, TSR 2.3.4.11 Basis, TSR 2.3.4.12 Basis, TSR 2.3.4.14 Basis, TSR 2.3.4.15 Basis, TSR 2.3.4.16 Basis, TSR 2.3.4.17 Basis, TSR 2.3.4.18 Basis, TSR 2.3.4.19 Basis, TSR Q
2.3.4.20 Basis, TSR 2.3.4.21 Basis, TSR 2.3.4.23 Basis, TSR 2.3.4.24 (all new) TSR 2.3.4.25 (all new), TSR 2.3.5.1 Basis, TSR 2.3.5.2 Basis, TSR 2.3.5.3 Basis, TSR 2.3.5.4 Basis, TSR 2.3.5.5 Basis, TSR 2.3.5.6 Basis and TSR 2.3 Appendix A, TSR Section 3.0, Administrative Controls, Table 3.2.2.1.
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I 97C128 4.2-24 97C127 (RI) v 97C123 (RI) 4.2-25 97C127 (RI) 97C127 4.2-26 97C127 (RI) 97C128 4.2-27 97C127 (RI) vi 97C123 (RI) 4.2-28 97C127 (RI) 97C127 4.2-29 97C127 (R1) r 97C128 4.2-30 97C127 (RI) vii 97C123 (RI) 4.2-31 97C127 (RI) l 97C127 97C128 T4.2-1 97C127 T4.2-2, Sht.1 97C127 4.1-1 97C127 T4.2-2, Sht. 2 97C127 99C029 (RO)
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T4.2-5 97C127 (PJ) l 99C029 (RO) 4.2 1 97C127 T4.2 97C127 (RI) 4.2-2 97C127 T4.2-7, Sht.1 97C127 (RI) l 4.2-3 97C127 T4.2-7, Sht. 2 97C127 (RI) 4.2-4 97C127 97C255 (RO) l 4.2-5 97C127 T4.2-7, Sht. 3 97C127 (RI) 4.2-6 97C127 T4.2-7, Sht. 4 97C127 (RI) 4.2-7 97C127 T4.2-7, Sht. 5 97C127 (RI) 4.2-8 97C127 T4.2-7, Sht. 6 97C127 (RI) 4.2-9 97C127 T4.2-7, Sht. 7 97C127 (RI) l 4.2-10 97C127 T4.2-7, Sht. 8 97C127 (RI) l 4.2-11 97C127 T4.2-7 Sht. 9 97C127 (RI) l 4.2-12 97C127 97C255 (RO) l 99C029 (RO)
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T4.2-7, Sht.13 97C127 (R1) 4.3-2 97Cl27 T4.2-7, Sht.14 97C127 (RI) 4.3-3 97C127 T4.2-7, Sht.15 97C127 (RI) 97C128 T4.2-8, Sht. I 97C127 (R1) 4.3-4 97C128 T4.2-8, Sht. 2 97Cl27 (RI) 4.3-5 97C128 T4.2-9, Sht.1 97Cl27 (R1) 4.3-6 97C128 T4.2-9, Sht. 2 97Cl27 (RI) 4.3-7 97C128 T4.2-9, Sht. 3 97C127 (RI) 4.3-8 97C128 T4.2-9, Sht. 4 97C127 (RI) 4.3-9 97C128 T4.2-9, Sht. 5 97Cl27 (RI) 4.3-10 97Cl28 T4.2-9, Sht. 6 97C127 (RI) 4.3-11 97Cl28 T4.2-10, Sht. I 97C127 (RI) 4.3-12 97Cl28 T4.2-10. Sht. 2 97Cl27 (RI) 4.3-13 97C128 T4.2-11, Sht.1 97Cl27 (RI) 4.3-14 97C128 T4.2-11, Sht. 2 97C127 (RI) 4.3-15 97Cl28 T4.2-11, Sht. 3 97C127 (RI) 4.3-16 97C128 T4.2-11, Sht. 4 97Cl27 (RI) 4.3-17 97C128 T4.2-11, Sht. 5 97C127 (RI) 4.3-18 97Cl28
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T4.2-11, Sht. 7 97C127 (RI) 4.3-20 97Cl28 T4.2-11, Sht. 8 97C127 (R2) 4.3-21 97C128 T4.2-11, Sht. 9 97Cl27 (RI) 4.3-22 97C128 T4.2-11, Sht.10 97C127 (RI) 4.3-23 97C128 T4.2-11, Sht.11 97C127 (RI) 4.3-24 97C128 T4.2-11. Sht.12 97Cl27 (RI) 4.3-25 97Cl28 T4.2-11, Sht.13 97C127 (R1) 4.3-26 97C128 T4.2-11, Sht.14 97C127 (RI) 4.3-27 97C128 T4.2-11, Sht.15 97Cl27 (RI) 4.3-28 97C127 T4.2-11, Sht.16 97C127 (RI) 4.3-29 97C127 T4.2-11, Sht.17 97C127 (RI) 4.3-30 97Cl27 T4.2-11, Sht.18 97Cl27 (RI) 4.3-31 97C127 T4.2-11, Sht.19 97Cl27 (RI) 4.3-32 97C127 T4.2-11, Sht. 20 97Cl27 (R1) 4.3-33 97C127 T4.2-11, Sht. 21 97C127 (RI) 4.3-34 97C127 T4.2-11, Sht. 22 97C127 (RI) 97Cl23 (RI)
T4.2-11, Sht. 23 97C127 (RI) 4.3-35 97C123 (RI)
T4.2-12 97C127 (R1) 99C028 (RO) 4.3-36 97C123 (RI)
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SARUP-PGDP July 23,1999 SARUP LIST OF EFFECTIVE PAGES SARUP Page RAC/Date/ Revision SARUP Pane RAC/Date/ Revision 4.3-38 97C123 (RI) 99C028 (RO) 99C028 (RO) 4.3-65 97C123 (RI) 4.3-39 97C123 (R1) 99C028 (RO) 99C028 (RO) 4.3-66 97C123 (RI) 4.3-40 97C123 (RI) 4.3-67 97C123 (RI) 99C028 (RO) 99C028 (RO) 4.3-41 97C123 (RI) 4.3-68 97C123 (RI) 99C028 (RO) 99C028 (RO) 4.3-42 97C123 (RI) 4.3-69 97C123 (RI) 99C028 (RO) 4.3-70 97C123 (RI) 4.3-43 97C123 (RI) 4.3-71 97C123 (RI) 4.3-44 97C123 (R1) 4.3-72 97C124 99C028 (RO) 99C029 (RO) 4.3-45 97Cl23 (RI) 4.3-73 97C124 99C028 (RO) 4.3-74 97C124 4.3-46 97C123 (RI) 4.3-75 97C124 99C028 (RO) 4.3-76 97C124 4.3-47 97Cl23 (RI) 99C029 (RO) 99C028 (RO) 4.3-77 97C124 p
4.3-48 97C123 (RI) 99C030 (RO) 4.3-49 97C123 (RI) 4.3-78 97C124 99C028 (RO) 99C030 (RO) 4.3-50 97Cl23 (RI) 4.3-79 97C124 4.3-51 97Cl23 (RI) 4.3-80 97C124 99CO28 (RO) 4.3-81 97C124 4.3-52 97Cl23 (R1) 4.3-82 97Cl24 4.3-53 97C123 (RI) 99C029 (RO) 4.3-54 97C123 (RI) 4.3-83 97C124 99C028 (RO) 99C030 (RO) 4.3-55 97C123 (R1) 99C029 (RO) 99C028 (RO) 4.3-84 97C124
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SARUP LIST OF EFFECTIVE PAGES SARUP Page RAC/Date/Retision SARUP Pane RAC/Date/Revician 4.3-89 97Cl24 4.3-115 97C124 99C030 (RO) 99C030 (RO) 4.3-90 97Cl24 4.3-116 97Cl24 (RO) 4.3-91 97C124 97C200 (RO) 99C030 (RO) 4.3-117 97C124 (RO) 4.3-92 97C124 97C200 (RO) 4.3-93 97Cl24 4.3-118 97Cl24 99C030 (RO) 4.3-119 97C124 4.3-94 97C124 4.3-120 97C124 4.3-95 97Cl24 4.3-121 97Cl24 99C030 (RO) 4.3-122 97C124 4.3-96 97Cl24 4.3-123 97Cl24 4.3-97 97Cl24 4.3-124 97Cl24 4.3-98 97Cl24 4.3-125 97Cl24 4.3-99 97C124 99C030 (RO) 4.3-100 97Cl24 4.3-126 97Cl24 (R1) 4.3-101 97C124 97C200 (RO) 99C030 (RO) 4.3-127 97C124 (R1) 4.3-102 97C124 4.3-128 97Cl24 O
99C030 (RO) 99C029 (RO) 4.3-103 97C124 4.3-129 97Cl24 99C030 (RO) 99C029 (RO) 4.3-104 97Cl24 4.3-130 97Cl24 99C029 (RO) 99C029 (RO) 4.3-105 97C124 4.3-131 97Cl24 (R1) 99C029 (RO) 99C029 (RO) 4.3-106 97C124 4.3-132 97Cl24 99C029 (RO) 99C029 (RO) 4.3-107 97C124 4.3-132a 97Cl24 4.3-108 97C124 99C029 (RO) 99C029 (RO) 4.3-132b 97C124 4.3-109 97C124 99C029 (RO) 99C029 (RO) 4.3-133 97C124 4.3-110 97C124 97C125 99C030 (RO) 99C029 (RO) 99C029 (RO) 4.3-134 97C125 4.3-111 97Cl24 4.3-135 97Cl25 99C030 (RO) 4.3-136 97C125 4.3-112 97C124 4.3-137 97C125 4.3-113 97Cl24 4.3-138 97C125 (RO) 99C030 (RO) 98C068 (R1) 4.3-114 97C124 99C030 (RO)
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SARUP LIST OF EFFECTIVE PAGES SARUP Page RAC/Date/ Revision SARUP Pane RAC/Date/ Revision 4.3-139 97Cl25 (RO)
T4.3-14 97C125 (RO) 98C068 (RI) 98C068 (RI) 4.3-140 97C125 T4.3-15 97C125 (RO) 4.3-141 97C125 (RO) 98C%8 (RI) 98C068 (R1)
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SARUP-PGDP July 23,1999 SARUP LIST OF EFFECTIVE PAGES SARUP Page RAC/Date/ Revision SARUP Pane RAC/Date/ Revision F4.3-35 97C125 F4.3-36 97C125 F4.3-37 97C125 F4.3-38 97C125 (RO) 98C068 (RI)
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SARUP Page RAC/Date/ Revision SARUP Page RAC/Date/ Revision Chautatl 5.2A-39 97C126 5.2A-40 97C126 5.2-5 97C238 (RI).
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SIRUP tiSr or tersCrive PiceS SARUP Page RAC/Date/ Revision SARUP Page RAC/Date/ Revision Technical Safetv Requirements 2.1-45a 99C030 (RO) 2.1-45b 99C030 (RO)
Cover Page 99C028 (RO) 2.1-46 99C030 (RO) 2.1-47 99C030 (RO) vii 99C030 (RO) 2.1-48 99C030 (RO) viii 99C030 (RO) 2.1-49 99C030 (RO) ix 99C029 (RO) 2.1-50 99C030 (RO) x 99C028 (RO) 2.1-51 99C030 (RO) 2.1-52 99C030 (RO) 1.0-8 99C028 (RO) 1.0-9 99C028 (RO) 2.2-3 99C030 (RO) 2.2-4 99C030 (RO) 2.1-4 99C030 (RO) 2.2-6 99C030 (RO) 2.1-5 99C030 (RO) 2.2-7 99C030 (RO) 2.1-7 99C030 (RO) 2.2-9 99C030 (RO) 2.1-8 99C030 (RO) 2.2-11 99C030 (RO) 2.1-10 99C030 (RO) 2.2-12 99C030 (RO) 2.1-12 99C030 (RO) 2.2-13 99C030 (RO) 2.1-14 99C030 (RO) 2.2-14 99C030 (RO)
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2.3-38 99C029 (RO) 2.4-41b 99C028 (RO) 2.3-39 99C029 (RO) 2.4-42 99C028 (RO) l 2.3-40 99C029 (RO) 2.4-43 99C028 (RO) 2.3-41 99CO29 (RO) 2.4-44 99C028 (RO) 2.3-42 99C029 (RO) 2.4-45 99C028 (RO) 2.3-43 99C029 (RO) 2.4-45a 99C028 (RO) 2.3-44 99C029 (RO) 2.4-45b 99C028 (RO) 2.3-46 99C029 (RO) 2.3-46a 99C029 (RO) 2.5-3 99C028 (RO) 2.3-46b 99C029 (RO) 2.5-4 99C028 (RO) i l
2.3-46c 99C029 (RO) 2.5-5 99C028 (RO) 2.3-46d 99C029 (RO) 2.5-6 99C028 (RO) l 2.3-46e 99C029 (RO) 2.3-46f 99C029 (RO) 2.6-5 99C028 (RO) 2.3-47 99C029 (RO) 2.6-7 99C028 (RO) i 2.3-48 99C029 (RO) 2.3-49 99C029 (RO) 3.0-4 99C029 (RO) 2.3-50 99C029 (RO) 3.0-6 99C028 (RO) 2.3-51 99C029 (RO) 3.0-9 99C028 (RO) i 2.4-3 99C028 (RO) 2.4-4 99C028 (RO) 2.4-7 99C028 (RO)
J SARUP-14
[
F1 SAR-PGDP PROPOSED July 23,1999 RAC 97C238 (RI), 99C028 (RO), 99C030 (RO), 99CO29 (RO)
SECTION 3.15 TABLE OF CONTENTS 3.15 SAFETY SYSTEM CLASSIFICATION................................ 1 I
3.15.1= Introduction
.................................................1 3.15.2 UF. Feed Facilities............................................. 2 3.15.2.1 Autoclave High Pressure Isolation System
....................2 3.15.2.2-Autoclave Manual Isolation System......................... 5 3.15.2.3 Autoclave Prunary Containment System...................... 6 3.15.2.4 UF. Primary System.................................. 9 3.15.2.5 Autoclave Water Inventory Control System..................
10 3.15.2.6 High Cylinder Pressure System..........................
11 3.15.2.7 Autoclave Steam Pressure Control System
...................13 l
3.15.2.8 Autoclave Pressure Relief System.........................
14 l 3.15.3 Enrichment Facilities............... -............................ 14a l
'3.15.3.1 UF. Compressor Motor Manual Trip Systems................. 14a 3.15.3.2 DC Power Distribution System
..........................18 3.15.3.3 UP. Primary System.................................
19 i
d 3.15.3.4 High-Pressure Relief Systems...........................
21 3.15.3.5 Freezer /Sublimers High-Hir*: Weight Trip System..............
23 3.15.3.6 Motor Load Indicators.................................
24 3.15.3.7 Datum Systems.....................................
26
_l 3.15.3.8 Freezer /Sublimers R-114 High-Pressure Relief System............
27 l 3.15.4 Withdrawal Facilities..........................................
27a 3.15.4.1 UF. Release Detection and Isolation System - Low Voltage ("New") System At The UF Withdrawal Stations........................
27a
- 3.15.4.2
. Compressor Motor Manual Trip System......................
30 3.15.4.3 DC Power Distribution System
..........................31 3.15.4.4 Motor Load Indicators................................
31 3.15.4.5 UF Primary System.................................
31 3.15.4.6 High-Pressure Relief Systems...........................32 3.15.4.7 Section Deleted....................................
33 3.15.4.8 _
UF. Release Detection System-Normetex Pump................
34 3.15.5 Toll Transfer and Sampling Facility.................................
35
-l 3.15.5.1-Autoclave High Pressure Isolation System _..................
35 3.15.5.2 UF6 Release Detection System - Zone 1 and Zone 4.............
39 3.15.5.3 Autoclave Primary Containment System.....................
41 O
1 b i
p SAR-PGDP PROPOSED July 23,1999 RAC 97C238 (RI), 99C030 (RO), 99C029 (RO) q SECTION 3.15 TABLE OF CONTENTS 3.15.5.4 UF. Primary System.
...............................43 3.15.5.5 Autoclave Water Inventory Control System...................
44 3.15.5.6 High Cylinder Pressure System...........................
46 3.15.5.7 Autoclave Steam Pressure Control System
...................47 3.15.5.8 Autoclave Pressure Relief System..............
..........48 3.15.6 Cylinder and Cylinder Handling Equipment...........................
48a l
' 3.15.6.1 UF6 Cylinders...................................
48a 3.15.6.2 Liquid UF6 Cylinder Handling Cranes...
..................50 3.15.6.3 Liquid UF6 Cylinder Handling Equipment 52 3.15.6.4 Cylinder Weighing System.............................
53 l
3.15.6.5 Cylinder Scale Cart Movemen: Prevention System..............
54 l 3.15.7 General Facility Safety Support.................................... 54a l
3.15.7.1 Criticality Accident Alarm System........................ 54a 3.15.7.2 Fire Protection System................................
55 3.15.7.3 UF6 Release Detection System...........................
58 3.15.7.4 Inventory Instrumentation Required for Nuclear Material
'~')
l Accountability..................................... 59a (N,_)
3.15.7.5-Public Warning System...............................
60 3.15.7.6 Onsite Warning / Evacuation System...............
61
{
3.15.7.7 Seismic Instrumentation '...............................
61 1
3.15.7.8 Surge Drum Pressure / Room Temperature Instrumentation.........
62 l
3.15.7.9 Mass Spectrometers
.................................62 l
l l 3.15.8 Non-Radiological Chemical Systems................................. 62a l
3.15.9 Building Structures and Confinement.................................
64 3.15.9.1 Process Buildings...................................
64 i
3.15.9.2 Cell Floor Process Building Cranes.......................
66 j
3.15.9.3 Cascade Equipment Housings
...........................68 3.15.9.4 Miscellaneous Waste Storage & Handling and Support Structures.....
69 3.15.10 Nuclear Criticality Safety Active Engineered Features (AEFs).................
71 3.15.10.1 UF6 Enrichment Facilities............................
71 3.15.10.2 C-360 UF6 Sampling and Transfer Facility...................
74 3.15.10.3 C-400 Decontamination and Uranium Recovery Facility...........
76 3.15.10.4 Product and Side Withdrawal System.......................
78 3.15.10.5 UF6 Feed Facilities..................................
84 1
3.15.11 Nuclear Criticality Safety Passive SSCs.............
85
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ii l
l l
l
SAR-PGDP PROPOSED July 23,1999 RAC 97C238 (RI), 99C028 (RI) compressors within the enrichment cascade. The fault tree analysis indicates that all of the cell compressor motors, the P&E booster compressor motors, and some of the interbuilding booster compressor motors l can be tripped from the ACR (except for the compressors in C-310) and the CCF. Some of the interbuilding booster compressor motors can be tripped from the CCF but not the ACR. Therefore, with the exception of the compressors in C-310 and some of the interbuilding booster compressors, the l functional requirements for these systems are met. The amount of UF. material at risk in the purge cascade and the portion of the enrichment cascade in C-310 is small. The threshold analyses indicate that a UF. release for 30 min from a failure of the discharge piping of the Normetex withdrawal pumps in the product withdrawal facility in C-310 will not exceed 10 mg U intake at the site boundary (See Section 4.3.2.2.12). A UF. release from the cascade processes in C-310 would be much smaller because these cells operate below atmospheric pressure. The exposure of workers within the building from these small releases will be minimized by evacuation. In addition, compressor motors in C-310 can be stopped by tripping the C-310 cells at the cell panels, and process gas flow to and from C-310 may be stopped by splitting the cascade between C-335 and C-310. Thus, it is not essential to trip the compressors in C-310 l from the ACR or CCF. Additional trip capabilities for all of the compressor motors are also provided at the applicable switchgear; however, these additional locations are not required to accomplish the safety function.
The interbuilding boosters are part of the enrichment process and are typically fed from an operating cell and then discharged to another operating cell. Therefore, for the purpose of accomplishing a reduction of UF. primary system pressure, tripping of cells upstream and downstream of the interbuilding booster corspressors from the ACR can accomplish the required safety function for those D
interbuilding boosters that do not have trip capability in the ACR. In addition, if necessary, tripping of b
the boosters can be accomplished from the CCF. Additional trip capabilities are also provided at the local cell panel (LCP) and the applicable switchgear, if necessary, to accomplish the safety function in emergency situations. However, these additional locations are not required to accomplish the safety function.
In addition, there are several locations available to trip a cell or booster station including feeder breakers upstream of the cell or booster station feeder breakers. If a cell or booster station breaker failed to trip, the probability of the failure of the next breaker in series becomes multiplicative. Thus the probability is reduced to a low value. In addition, the probability of the failure occurring at the same time and in the same area where the UF release occurs is multiplicative. If a cell or booster station cannot be tripped, the compressor motors in the cells upstream and downstream can be tripped, which will also reduce the pressure in the area of concern.
The air circuit breakers have individual air reservoirs to provide the pneumatic force needed to open the breaker if the normal air supply provided by the compressed air stations for the switchgear is lost. If air is lost in an air reservoir for one of the air circuit breakers, other circuit breakers in that feed path may be tripped.
One specific area of concern associated with this system that could impact the system's ability to accomplish its required function is the location of some of the circuits in the tunnels from the process buildings to the CCF, These areas have the potential for some localized flooding during large storms. The electrical circuits associated with the compressor trip circuit are the control circuits that are 250 VDC and lower and the power circuits that are 2.4 kV and higher. The motive power circuits are typically routed 3.15-16
SAR-PGDP PROPOSED July 23,1999 RAC 97C238 (RI), 98C068 (RI), 99C028 (RI)
The UF. primary system is required to provide integrity for the cascades and the supporting processes that handle UF.. This safety function is accomplished by retaining UF primary system integrity during normal operating temperatures / pressures.
The UF primary system in the enrichment cascade which is intended to operate above atmospheric pressure is also required to maintain UF. primary system integn - during evaluation basis natural phenomena events. The effects of evaluation basis natural phenomena events on the UF. primary system of the enrichment cascade in C-310, C-331, C-333, C-335, C-337, and the tie lines were evaluated. The results indicate that the UF. primary system integrity is maintained in evaluation basis high wind and flood events. As indicated in the flood and high wind event scenarios in Section 4.3.2.5.1 and 4.3.2.5.2, the UF. primary system will not have any significant UF. release during these evaluation basis events. Some of the equipment and piping in the cascade facilities does not meet the performance criteria for the 250-yr return evaluation basis earthquake (EBE) (see Section 4.3.2.5.3). Tables 3.15-4 through 3.15-9 list the equipment, piping, and components with high-confidence-low-probability-of-failure (HCLPF) capacities less than the EBE for buildings C-310, C-315, C-331, C-333, C-335, and C-337.
The HCLPF capacities were determined by seismic database comparison methods. For each item, the seismic capacity, annual probability of failure, location, and comments are provided. The capacities reponed in the tables are the capacities of the weakest member (s) whose failure could potentially cause a UF. release in the process gas systems. These items were evaluated further using finite element analysis and empirical test data to determine if a loss of pressure boundary was likely and to estimate the hole size that would result, if the pressure boundary was breached. In some cases, this further analysis indicated that akhough some deformation could be experienced, the defonnation would not be sufficient pI to affect the pressure boundary. Equipment, piping, and components with capacities less than the 5O evaluation basis earthquake but that still maintain pressure boundary integrity are noted in the tables with an asterisk (*). In addition, potential seismic interactions of the cell housings and the stage compressors were evaluated. Failure of the cell housings did not adversely impact a UF. pressure boundary.
The analysis of the canhquake event in Section 4.3.2.5.3 assumed failure of the remaining components listed in the tables (i.e., those without an asterisk). The portions of the enrichment cascade operating above atmospheric pressure may release some UF., while the ponions operating at subatmospheric pressure will result in inleakage with a negligible loss of UF.. The most significant failures associated with this event are failures at the booster stations that supply the tie line between the l "000" and "00" buildings. These failures were evaluated in the earthquake event scenario in Section 4.3.2.5.3, and the potential consequences were assessed. With the exception of the failures identified and evaluated, the portions of the enrichment cascade that are intended to operate above atmospheric pressure will accomplish the safety function of not having gross failures of the UF, primary system integrity in evaluation basis natural phenomena events. For the portions of the enrichment cascade l that are operated only at subatmospheric pressure, the purge cascade, and the Hononspheres, the capacity to retam their UF. primary system integrity is not required in evaluation basis natural phenomena events.
This is based on the subatmospheric pressure and minimal releases should the UF. primary system fail.
Based on these evaluations, the UF. primary system can accomplish the required safety functions with the exceptions noted.
r 3.15-20
r 4
SAR-PGDP PROPOSED July 23,1999 RAC 97C238 (RI), 99CO28 (RO), 99C029 (RO) 3.15.3.3.4 System Classincation The essential functions of the UF. primary system are to (1) maintain UF. primary system i
l integrity during normal operating temperatures and pressures, and (2) prevent failures in the above atmospheric portions of the enrichment cascade beyond those assumed in the evaluation basis earthquake
]
l analysis. The system provides no additional protection once a release occurs. The UF. primary system i
is classified as AQ in accordance with the criteria in Section 4.2.2. This classification applies to process piping 2 inches and larger, expansion joints, valves, and process equipment that provide the UF.
containment pressure boundary. Process piping less than 2 inches is classified as NS.
3.15.3.3.5 Boundan' The AQ boundaries for the UF. primary system for the enrichment processes are defined in Table 3.15-2, 3.15.3.4 High-Pressure Relief Systems l
3.15.3.4.1 Safety Function l
The R-114 coolant overpressure control system in the enrichment cascade and in the purge cascade, the R-114 coolant overpressure control system in the withdrawal process, and the UP. high-pressure relief system in the F/S and UF / coolant separation processes provide pressure relief to prevent overpressurizing the interfacing UF. primary system. The potential for a release of UF. from an O
overpressure failure of the UF primary system is minimized. This minimizes the potential for the 6
exposure of on-site personnel.
3.15.3.4.2 Functional Requirements Each system shall be designed in accordance with the following functional requirements to ensure the capability to accomplish the required safety functions:
Each relief system shall provide pressure relief for the primary UF system or the coolant system to minimize the potential for the failure of the UF. primary system integrity of these systems.
l*
Each relief device shall be rated at or below the design pressure rating of the equipment it is protecting.
Each relief system shall be capable of providing overpressure 1 totection without control signals, i
3.15.3.4.3 System Evaluation i
The R-114 coolant overpressure control system for each cell coolant system consists of a manual block valve, one or two rupture disks, associated piping, and diffuser (if applicable). All of the rupture disk assemblies are separated from the coolant system by the manual block valve that must be sealed in the open position when the coolant system is in operation.
The F/S UF.high-pressure relief system for each F/S system consists of a rupture disk, a block valve, and associated piping that provides a relief path to the A-line of the cascade.
O\\
3.15-21
l l
SAR-PGDP PROPOSED July 23,1999 O
a^c 97c238 (nt) 99co28 (no). 99C029 (RO)
The UF./ coolant separation UF. high-pressure relief system consists of a cold trap rupture disk, three sodium fluoride (NaF) trap rupture disks, block valves, and associated piping that provides a relief path to holding drums.
l The R-il4 coolant overpressure control system at the withdrawal facilities consists of a rupture disk that relieves on high coolant pressure.
1 No support systems are needed for the relief systems to perform their safety functions.
l The R-Il4 coolant overpressure control system in the enrichment cascade and the purge cascade prevents excess coolant pressure from rupturing the coolant system and releasing coolant into the UF.
primary system that could result in the subsequent loss of UF. due to overpressurization of the UF.
system. The coolant system pressure may increase following an event that results in a loss of cooling, such as a loss of RCW to the coolant system. The rupture disks are rated at or below the MAWP of the system being protected. This rating (with its allowable tolerances) will minimize the potential for the failure of the coolant system primary integrity. The accident analysis identified rupture of the coolant system into an off-stream cell as the only credible means for the event to progress to a failure of the UF.
j system integrity. In this condition, the amount of UF. is limited, and there is no potential for exceeding any of the off-site EGs.
The F/S UF high-pressure relief system and the UF./ coolant separation high-pressure UF. relief system prevent overpressurization of the UF. primary system for (1) a release of coolant into the F/S (g
vessel or cold trap vessel or (2) overheating. These events can only threaten the integrity of the UF.
system when the F/S or UF./ coolant separation systems are isolated from the cascade. These systems prevent the pressure from exceeding the capabilities of the UF. primary system. When the F/S or UF./ coolant separation systems are isolated, the systems are operating at subatmospheric pressure which would minimize the mass of UF. released. Thus, there is no potential for exceeding any of the off-site EGs.
l The R-ll4 coolant overpressure control system at the withdrawal facilities was evaluated to assess its ability to accomplish its required safety function. The safety function is to minimize the potential for l failure of the UF. primary system by relieving high coolant pressure before the UF./R-ll4 boundary integrity is threatened. To minimize the potential for failure in the coolant system and a potential UF.
release, the system is designed to relieve at or below the MAWP of the coolant system. This rating (with its allowable tolerances) will minimize the potential for failure of the coolant system primary integrity.
The relief systems do not require control signals or AC or DC power to perform their functions.
Based on the analysis above, the systems can accomplish the required safety functions and functional requirements.
3.1S.3.4.4 System Classification The high-pressure relief systems are used to minimize the potential overpressurization of the l primary UF. or the coolant system. This prevents the potential loss of UF. primary system integrity and minimizes the potential exposure of on-site personnel to UF.. Because the system operates to prevent 3.15-22
l SAR-PGDP PROPOSED July 23,1999
(
j RAC 97C238 (R1), 99C028 (RO), 99C029 (RO)
L/
The cell and interbuilding booster compressor motors in the enrichment and purge cascades in j
the ACR, The cell compressor motors (enrichment cascade only) in the CCF, and; The C-315 high-speed compressor motor in the ACR and C-331.
3.15.3.6.3 System Evaluation The primary function of the motor load indicators is to provide an indication of abnormal compressor operation that could lead to failure. Using ammeter indications in the ACR for the individual compressor motors, operators can quickly identify various malfunctions of process equipment. Any inexplicable change in normal amp load is quickly investigated by the operators. Compressor load changes can be caused by such events as compressor failures, inadvertent B-stream block valve closure (see Section 4.3.2.1.3), stage control valve closure (see Section 4.3.2.1.2), or failures of the UF. primary system pressure boundary that cause inleakage or a release of UF.. Compressor surging will produce large swings in the motor loads. The load swings caused by compressor surging are large enough to be seen even during plant load changes. These early indications alert the operator that one of these events may be occurring and minimize the response time to take mitigative actions. If an ammeter should malfunction, the load changes can be seen on the ammeters for the compressor motors in stages adjacent to the stage that is experiencing the compressor surging.
Monitoring of the C-310 compressors is not considered essential. The amount of UF material (3
at risk in the purge cascade and the portion of the enrichment cascade in C-310 is very small. The tj threshold analyses indicate that a UF. release for 30 min from a failure of the discharge piping of the Normetex withdrawal pumps in the product withdrawal facility in C-310 will not exceed 10 mg U intake l at the site boundary (see Section 4.3.2.2.12). A UF. release from the cascade processes in C-310 would be much smaller because these cells operate below atmospheric pressure. The exposure of workers within the building from these releases will be minimized by evacuation.
Motor load indicators are provided in the ACR for interbuilding booster compressors, however they are not considered essential. Motor load indicators associated with the adjacent enrichment cell compressor motors will provide adequate indication of a booster compressor abnormality that could lead to an analyzed UF. release.
In scenarios involving evacuation of the process buildings, the motor load indicators in the CCF l are used to monitor the compressors for the enrichment cascade and inform the operators to trip their motors if there is an indication of large load changes that could be representative of a pressure increase after the evacuation. The motor load indicators in the CCF monitor the total cell load for all of the compressors in a cell rather than for each individual stage. Although the motor load indicators in the CCF will be less sensitive than those in the ACR, they will be able to indicate significant compressor load changes. In scenarios involving evacuation of the C-315 tails withdrawal facility, the motor load indicators in the C-331 ACR are used to monitor C-315 high-speed withdrawal compressors.
Based on this evaluation, the system can accomplish the required safety function and functional i
l requirements.
l (
)
3.15-25
r SAR-PGDP PROPOSED July 23,1999
[G RAC 97C238 (R1). 99C028 (RO), 99C029 (RO) 3.15.4 Withdrawal Facilities 3.15.4.1 UF. Release Detection and Isolation System - Low Voltage ("New") System at the Withdrawal Stations 3.15.4.1.1 Safety Functiqn The UF release detection and isolation system - low voltage ("new") system at the withdrawal stations shall be capable of isolating the withdrawal station to prevent exceeding the radiological /nonradiological EGs for the EBE category.
3.15.4.1.2 Functional Requirements The UF. release detection and isolation system - low voltage ("new") system at the withdrawal stations includes (1) automatic UF detection and isolation and (2) manual isolation. The system shall be designed in accordance with the following functional requirements to ensure the capability to accomplish the required safety functions:
The systern shall be capable of accomplishing the required safety function independent of the plant air supply.
OV i
l l
nV 3.15-27a L
r-SAR PGDP PROPOSED July 23,1999 i
RAC 97C238 (R1),99CO29 (RO)
The system shall be capable of accomplishing the required safety function independent of the normal AC power supply to the facility.
De automatic detection and isolation portion of the system shall be capable of detecting UF and 6
isolating the withdrawal position pigtail at both ends.
The automatic detection and isolation portion of the system shall close the cylinder valve and isolate the withdrawal header for the station within 30 seconds after actuation of the ionization t
detectors.
The manual isolation portion of the system shall be capable ofisolating the liquid source and shall be accessible outside the withdrawal room.
3.15.4.1.3 Syntaan Evaluation l
De UF. release detection and isolation system - low voltage ("new") system at the withdrawal stations was evaluated to assess its ability to accomplish its required safety function.
In addition, a l
qualitative fault tree analysis was performed to determine the system's capability to accomplish its safety l
function. The results of these evaluations are provided in this section.
Safety finwian analysis. De safety function required of this system is to limit the release of UF.
and its reaction products to less than the radiological /nonradiological EGs for an EBE. A review of the l
withdrawal facility operations determined that the bounding event for this system is pigtail failure at l
withdrawal position, described in Section 4.3.2.2.11. In order for the UF release detection and isolation system - low voltage ("new") system at the withdrawal stations to accomplish its safety function, the system must detect a UF release at the withdrawal position and close the isolation valves before the release lg exceeds these guidelines. In addition, manual isolation must be capable of isolating the withdrawal station.
t l
The hazard and accident analyses assumed that a significant UF, release at a withdrawal position would be detected by the withdrawal position detectors within 15 seconds and the liquid source is l automatically isolated (i.e., the liquid block valves and the cylinder valve close, isolating the pigtail from the accumulator and the cylinder) within 30 seconds after initiation to close. This event was evaluated in Section 4.3.2.2.11 and the consequences were determined to be below the applicable EGs.
i l
The manual isolation capability for the system is provided to permit operational flexibility for j
conditions where the automatic detection capability of the system is out of service. Under this operating I
l condition, a continual surveillance is established to ensure the affected areas are monitored for potential UF releases. If a release is detected, then surveillance personnel will notify the control room operators l
to activate the isolation system as they evacuate the area affected by the release in accordance with the plant's see and flee policy. Once notified, operators can then use switches /pushbunons located in the ACR to manually activate the isolation system. It is expected that the isolation system can be manually activated within the same 15-second time frame nominally assumed for automatic activation of the isolation system.
t Based on this analysis, the UF, release detection and isolation system - low voltage ("new") system j
at the withdrawal stations will prevent exceeding the radiological and nonradiological EGs for the most limiting UF. primary system integrity failure at a withdrawal position provided the system automatically closes the isolation valves within 45 seconds after the release occurs. Events where the cylinder valve can not be closed due to the event are addressed in Section 4.3.2.2.11.
i 3.15-28 l
m
SAR PGDP PROPOSED July 23,1999 O
n^c 97C238 (R1), 99CO29 (RO)
Qualitative fault tree analysis. In addition to the safety function analysis, a qualitative fault tree analysis of the UF. release detection and isolation system - low voltage ("new") system at the withdrawal stations was performed in accordance with Section 4.3.1.1.3 to evaluate the capability of the system to accomplish its required safety function. The ability of the system to meet the functional requirements is described below.
As indicated in the functional requirements, the system is required to accomplish the required safety function independent of plant air and electrical supply. The system configuration can accomplish its required safety function independent of the plant air and electrical distribution system with the exception of the nitrogen bottle backup to the plant air system (valve closers). These nitrogen bottle backups are considered part of this system and are required to be tested periodically to verify their operability. Therefore, the system can accomplish its required safety function independent of plant air.
The UF. detectors are required for the automatic detection system. Should these detectors become inoperable because of the detectors themselves or the power supply, a continuous smoke watch is instituted to allow for quick detection to initiate manual isolation.
In addition to the functional requirements associated with the loss of electric power and air, the automatic operation of the system is required to isolate equipment within 30 seconds after actuation of the UF. detectors. The analysis assumes the detectors will actuate within 15 seconds after a significant release.
Past operational history with the UF detectors has indicated a response time of less than 15 seconds for any significant release due to the significant amount of smoke generated by the release.
l Valve closure time is verified periodically by surveillance tests to ensure the 30-second closure time is met. Therefore, the system can accomphsh the required automatic detection and isolation.
O The manual activation portion of the isolation system is required to be accessible from locations outside of the withdrawal room since a release would necessitate evacuation of the affected area. Upon detection of a release, surveillance personnel notify personnel in the comrol area to initiate activation of the isolation system. Once notified, control room operators can then use switches /pushbuttons located in i
the ACR to manually activate the isolation system. The control room will not be affected by the release in the time frame needed for operators to take mitigative actions. Therefore, the manual isolation functional requirement is achieved by the system configuration.
Based on the capability to detect and isolate a release and the various controls associated with the system, the UF. release detection and isolation system - low voltage ("new") system at the withdrawal i
stations can meet its functional requirements.
3.15.4.1.4 System Classification The UF. release detection and isolation system - low voltage ("new") system at the withdrawal stations is required for mitigation of a pigtail failure at withdrawal station event (see Section 4.3.2.2.11).
This release event is classified as an EBE that could exceed the off-site nonradiological EGs if the UF.
release detection and isolation system - low voltage ("new") system at the withdrawal stations fails to perform its safety function. Therefore, the UF. release detection and isolation system - low voltage
("new") system at the withdrawal stations meets the criteria for classification as a Q system.
This system is also identified as an NCS AEF (see Section 3.15.10.4.10).
3.15.4.1.5 Boundary The Q boundaries for the UF. release detection and isolation system - low voltage ("new") system at the withdrawal stations are defined in Table 3.15-1.
3.15-29
l l.
SAR.PGDP PROPOSED July 23,1999 RAC 97C238 (RI),99C029 (RO) i 3.15.4.2 Compressor Motor Manual Trip System The compressor motor manual trip system provides the capability to rapidly deenergize the high-l speed centrifugal withdrawal compressors m C-315 (there are no centrifugal compressors used in the l
product withdrawal operations performed in C-310). This trip capability can be actuated from the C-315 ACR or the C-331 ACR.
3.15.4.2.1 Safety Function The compressor motor manual trip system for the C-315 high-speed compressors shall shut down all applicable motors connected to the trip circuit to (1) muumize the source of frictional heating associated with a compressor failure that would cause a UF./ hot metal reaction and (2) minimize the amount of UF.
released in events involving failure of the UF primary system.
3.15.4.2.2 Functional Requirements ne compressor motor manual trip system shall be capable of tripping the compressor motors from the C-315 and C-331 ACRs to ensure the system's capability to accomplish the required safety function.
3.15.4.2.3 System Evaluation The compressor motor manual trip system was evaluated to assess its ability to accomplish its required safety function. The results of this evaluation are provided below.
Safety function analysis. A loss of physical integrity associated in the low-speed centrifugal withdrawal compressors would result in air inleakage since both the inlet and outlet sides of the low s O
centrifugal compressors operate at sub-atmospheric pressures. However, should the high-speed ce gal withdrawal compressors suffer a similar type of failure, a UF gas release could be expected since the high speed compressors operate with discharge pressures that are above atmospheric pressure. The accident analysis credited the compressor motor manual trip system for tripping the high-speed compressors to (1) mmimize the source of fnctional heatmg associated with a compressor failure that would cause a UF./ hot metal reaction and (2) muumize the amount of UF released in events involving failure of the UF. primary system. Tripping the compressor will quickly reduce the frictional heating associated with various compressor failures, thereby muumizing the potential for a self-sustanung UF./ hot metal reaction. Should a self-sustammg UF./ hot metal reaction or other primary system failure event occur, then tripping the high-speed withdrawal compressors would also minimize the potential UF release associated with the UF.
prunary system failures. However, release mitigation associated with the system is only required for protecuon of on-site workers since consequence analysis indicates that unmitigated failure events (Sections 4.3.2.2.1 and 4.3.2.2.12) do not exceed off-site exposure guidelines.
Should the C-331 ACR (primary trip location for operations involving the C-315 withdrawal high-speed compressors) be evacuated for any reason, operators would have the capability to trip the compressors from C-315.
Based on the analysis above, the compressor motor manual trip system can accomplish the required safety functions.
3.15.4.2.4 System Classification The compressor motor manual trip is required to minimize UF, exposure to on-site personnel. This meets the criteria for classification as an AQ system.
3.15.4.2.5 Boundarv The AQ boundaries for the compressor motor manual trip are defined in Table 3.15-2.
3.15-30
SAR-PGDP PROPOSED July 23,1999 RAC 97C238 (RI),99C029 (RO) l 3.15.4.7 Section Deleted l 3.15.4.7.1 Section Deleted l 3.15.4.7.2 Section Deleted l 3.15.4.7.3 Section Deleted O
O 3.ls.33
i SAR-PGDP PROPOSED July 23,1999 gQ RAC 97C238 (RI), 99C029 (RO)
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l 3.15.4.7.4 Section Deleted
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O i 3.15.4.7.5 Section Deieted l 3.15.4.8 UF, Release Detection System - Normetex Pump 3.15.4.8.1 Safety Function The safety function of the UF. release detection system - Normetex pump is to: (1) sound an alarm in the ACR upon detection of a UF. release, and (2) automatically trip the compression source to minimize the on-site consequences of the release, 3.15.4.8.2 Functional Requirements l
The UF. release detection system - Normetex pump shall be designed in accordance with the following functional requirements to ensure the capability to accomplish the required safety function:
The system shall monitor the designated areas of the facility for UF. releases outside of the UF.
primary system.
l l*
The system shall provide an alarm indication in the ACR of a UF. release from the UF. primary j
system.
3.15-34 l
SAR-PGDP PROPOSED July 23,1999
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RAC 97C238 (RI), 99C029 (RO)
The system shall provide a means of tripping the compression source upon indication of a UF.
release from the UF. primary system.
The system shall provide a means of isolating the pump (e.g., closing the discharge valve) upon indication of a UF. release from the UF primary system.
3.15.4.8.3 System Evaluation The safety functions of the UF. release detection system - Normetex pump are to detect a UF.
release from the UF. primary system and provide an alarm in the ACR to alert personnel to take appropriate action (i.e., investigate to verify a release occurred and if necessary, evacuate the area affected by the release). The detectors require 200 VDC. and the detector signal conditioners require 115-VAC power to perform their safety functions. The system is designed to detect releases in those areas that have the potential for a UF. release and provide an alarm inside the facility. Operating history has shown the system to be capable of detecting releases and providing an alarm in the ACR. The UF.
release detection system - Normetex pump provides the capability trip the pump and close the discharge valve if any two adjacent detectors alann. Based on these requirements and operating history, the safety function of the system can be accomplished.
3.15.4.8.4 System Classification l
The UF. release detection system - Normetex pump is used to aid in detection of UF. releases q
for several events and to minimize the exposure to on-site personnel. This system is not essential for the V
protection of the off-site public since analysis indicates that an unmitigated release would not exceed off-l site EBE EGs. Therefore, the UF. release detection system - Normetex pump meets the criteria for classification as an AQ system.
This system in C-310 is also identified as an NCS AEF (see Section 3.15.10.4.9). Therefore, this system in C-310 is classified as AQ-NCS.
3.15.4.8.5 Boundary The AQ boundary for the UF. release detection system - Normetex pump is defined in Table 3.15-2. The AQ-NCS boundary for the C-310 UF. release detection system - Normetex pump is defined in Table 3.15-3.
3.15.5 Toll Transfer and Sampling Facility 3.15.5.1 Autoclave IIigh Pressure Isolation System 3.15.5.1.1 Safety Function The autoclave high pressure isolation system is designed to contain a release of UF. inside the autociave. The system detects high autoclave pressure and isolates all active isolation valves to ensure that the following safety objectives are accomplished:
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3.15-35 i
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SAR-PGDP PROPOSED July 23,1999
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RAC 97C238 (R1), 99C029 (RO) 3.15.6.4.3 Safety Evaluation The required safety function of the cylinder weighing system is to provide an accurate measure of cylinder weight. By providing a measure of the cylinder's weight, the system provides a means of indicating the quantity of UF. inside the cylinder. By providing a means to detect a cylinder with a weight exceeding the shipping limit, the likelihood of the cylinder being subsequently heated in this condition is reduced. The accountability scales are required to be calibrated for material tracking i
purposes and to ensure cylinders do not exceed allowable fill and shipping limits. This accuracy requirement is more than adequate for the cylinder weighing system to perform its required safety function. As long as the system is functional, the safety function will be met.
3.15.6.4.4 System Classification The cylinder weighing system is required to:
Provide an accurate measure of cylinder weight and contents; and Categorize a subsequent event (i.e., heating of a cylinder with excessive UF.) as an EBE.
The system provides no mitigation should a cylinder with excessive UF. be heated inside an autoclave. Therefore, this system's safety function meets the criteria for classification as an AQ system.
3.15.6.4.5 Boundarv O
The AQ boundaries for the cylinder weighing system are defined in Table 3.15-2.
3.15.6.5 Cylinder Scale Cart Movement Prevention System 3.15.6.5.1 Safety Function The cylinder scale cart movement prevention system prevents moving a scale cart with a pressurized pigtail attached.
3.15.6.5.2 System Classification Although the cylinder scale cart movement prevention system does not meet the Q or AQ classification criteria specified in Section 4.3.2.2, cylinder scale cart movement prevention system is conservatively classified as Q.
3.15.6.5.3 Boundary The Q boundaries for the cylinder scale cart movement prevention system are defined in Table 3.15-1.
OV 3.15-54
SAR-PGDP PROPOSED July 23,1999 RAC 97C238 (RI), 99C029 (RO)
%s l
3.15.7 General Facility Safety Support l
l 3.15.7.1 Criticality Accident Alarm System The criticality accident alarm system (CAAS) is located in the following facilities:
l 1
l Cascade facilities (C-331, C-333, C-335, and C-337);
Feed facilities (C-333-A and C-337-A)
Withdrawal facility (C-310/310-A);
Toll transfer facility (C-360);
Waste handling facility (C-746-Ql);
i Decontamination / cleaning facility (C-400);
Stabilization building (C-409);
i Technical services building (C-710);
Maintenance and stores building (C-720); and Other areas at the plant that may require temporary coverage.
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U 3.15-54a l
SAR-PGDP PROPOSED July 23,1999 RAC 97C238 (RI), 99C030 (RO), 99C029 (RO) 3.15.7.3 UF Release Detection System I
3.15.7.3.1 Safety Function The UF. release detection system shall detect and annunciate in the ACR, UF. releases in enrichment cascade operating equipment that is operated above atmospheric pressure. The UF release detection system for the feed, withdrawal, and toll transfer and sampling facilities shall detect UF.
releases and provide an alarm to alert personnel to take appropriate action (i.e., investigate to verify a release occurred and, if necessary, evacuate the area affected by the release). Other systems that perform alarm and mitigation functions are discussed in other sections (see Sections 3.15.4.1, 3.15.4.8, and 3.15.5.2).
3.15.7.3.2 Functional Reauirements Each of the UF detection systems in the areas of the enrichment cascade that are intended to be operated above atmospheric pressure, and in the withdrawal, feed, and toll transfer and sampling l (zones 2, 3, and 5-8) facilities shall be designed in accordance with the following functional requirements to ensure the capability to accomplish the required safety function:
The system shall monitor the designated areas of the facility for UF releases outside of the UF.
primary system.
The system shall provide, in the ACR, an alarm indication of a UF. release from the UF primary system.
3.15.7.3.3 System Evaluation Emichmet cascade. The safety function of the system is to detect a UF. release from the UF.
primary system and provide an alarm to alert on-site personnel in the ACR. This facilitates early detection by the operators allowing them to initiate required actions to minmuze the release. The system is designed to detect releases in those areas that have the potential for a large UF release and provide an alarm in the ACR.
The detector heads are located in areas that are intended to be operated above atmospheric pressure in the "00", "000", and interbuilding booster stations. Operation of these detector heads is required during a UF release. The detectors heads would be subjected to an environment associated with the release of UF and its reaction products. However, the response time is relatively quick once the smoke is detected based on operational history. Once a detection signal is generated, the alarm circuit will be sealed in and operator action will be required to clear the alarm. Therefore, the environmental conditions during an event should not cause failure of the detection system. Additionally, there are multiple detector heads in each area to provide detection capability. Normal operation environments can also cause some spurious operations due to various causes and result in detector failures. These are typically detected during the testing process and the detector head will not reset. However, these are typically limited to one detector at a time. With multiple detectors located in each area, additional protection is provided to ensure system operability. Based on these requirements and evaluation, the system can accomplish the required safety function and meet its functional requirements.
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3.15-58
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SAR-PGDP PROPOSED July 23,1999 7(b RAC 97C238 (RI), 99C030 (RO), 99C029 (RO) l Feed, toll transfer (zones 2,3, and 5-8), and withdrawal facilities. The safety functions of the withdrawal, feed, and toll transfer and sampling facility UF release detection systems are to detect a UF.
6 release from the UF primary system and provide an alarm to alert on-site personnel to take appropriate l
6 action (i.e., investigate to verify a release occurred and, if necessary, evacuate the area affected by the j
release). The systems are designed to detect releases in those areas that have the potential for a UF6 release and provide an alarm inside the facility ACR. Operating history has shown the system to be capable of detecting releases and providing an alarm. Based on these requirements and operating history, the safety function of the system can be accomplished.
The withdrawal facilities are equipped with several systems that can detect and annunciate an alarm in the ACR upon a UF release. These systems include: (1) the UF release detection system - low 6
6 voltage system at the UF withdrawal room ceiling, (2) the UF release detection system - high voltage 6
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("old") system for UF condensers, accumulator, and piping heated housings, and (3) UF release 6
detection system - high speed centrifugal pumps (C-315 only). These systems are classified as alarm-only building UF detection systems for operations performed within the withdrawal facilities. Of these 6
systems, only the UF release detection system - high speed centrifugal pumps (C-315 only) is credited 6
as an essential control in the accident analysis scenarios (see the UF / hot metal accident analysis scenario presented in Section 4.3.2.2.1).
3.15.7.3.4 System Classification The UF release detection system that is located in any "000" or "00" areas that are intended to 6
(7 be operated above atmospheric pressure (including inside the cell housings, cell bypass, unit bypass, and h
other piping and equipment housings) and in interbuilding booster stations are required to:
Detect UF releases and annunciate in the ACR; and Be used, in conjunction with the compressor motor manual trip system, to reduce the UF.
primary system pressure and minimize any UF releases.
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Use of this system in this manner will minimize exposure of on-site personnel to UF and ensure 6
the off-site EGs are not exceeded. Credit is taken for this system to prevent exceeding the off-site EBE EGs in the large UF release to atmosphere (Section 4.3.2.1.7) EBE. Therefore, this system meets the 6
criteria for classification as a Q system.
l The UF detection systems in the feed, toll transfer and sampling (zones 2,3, and 5-8), and withdrawal facilities are required to:
Aid in the detection of UF releases for several events, and 6
Minimize the exposure to on-site personnel.
However, these systems are not essential for the protection of the off-site public since for any significant release of UF material that could threaten off-site EBE EGs, other methods of indicating that a release has occurred are also available (i.e., visual detection). These systems only provide an alarm to alert on-site personnel that a potential UF release has occurred enabling them to take appropriate action 6
(i.e., investigate to verify a release occurred and, if necessary, evacuate the area affected by the release).
Therefore, these systems meet the criteria for classification as an AQ system.
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3.15-59
SAR-PGDP PROPOSED July 23,1999 RAC 97C238 (RI), 99C030 (RO), 99C029 (RO) 3.15.7.3.5 Boundary The Q and AQ boundaries for the UF. release detection system are defined in Tables 3.15-1 and 3.15-2, respectively.
3.15.7.4 Inventory Instrumentation Required for Nuclear Material Accountability 3.15.7.4.1 Safety Function The inventory instrumentation performs a safeguards function by providing a means to demonstrate compliance with NMC&A requirements.
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SAR-PGDP PRGPOSED July 23,1999 O.
RAC 97C238 (RI), 99C029 (RO)
V 3.15.7.7.5 Boundary The AQ boundaries for the seismic instrumentation are defined in Table 3.15-2, 3.15.7.8 Surge Drum Pressure / Room Temperature Instrumentation 3.15.7.8.1 Safety Function The surge drum pressure instrumentation and room temperature instrumentation perform a safeguard function to provide pressure and temperature readings utilized in the NMC&A inventory calculations.
3.15.7.8.2 Functional Reauirements See Section 3.3.5.1 and the Fundamental Nuclear Materials Control Plan.
3.15.7.8.3 System Evaluation See Section 3.3.5.1 and the Fundamental Nuclear Materials Control Plan.
3.15.7.8.4 System Classification This system is classified as AQ.
3.15.7.8.5 Boundary The AQ boundaries for the surge drum pressure / room temperature instrumentation are defined in Table 3.15-2.
3.15.7.9 Mass Spectruneters 3.15.7.9.1 Safety Function The C-310 mass spectrometers (one normal and one backup mass spectrometer) function to monitor product assay limits. 'Ihe mass spectrometers in C-331 function to monitor tails assay (one mass spectrometer) and BOL assay (one mass spectrometer). The mass spectrometer in C-335 functions to monitor TOL assay (one mass spectrometer). The C-333 and C-337 (one in each facility) mass spectrometers function to monitor assay limits.
3.15.7.9.2 System Classification Although tne mass spectrometers do not meet the Q or AQ classification criteria specified in Section 4.2.2, the mass spectrometers are conservatively classified as AQ.
3.15-62
T SAR-PGDP PROPOSED July 23,1999 RAC 97C238 (RI), 99C029 (RO) 3.15.7.9.3 Boundary The AQ boundaries of the mass spectrometers are defined in Table 3.15-2, 3.15.8 Non-Radiological Chemical Systens The non-radiological chemical systems provide containment of non-radiological chemicals identified as part of the Chemical Safety Program described in Section 5.6.
The non-radiological chemical systems are defined for the following chemicals:
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3.15-62a
SAR-PGDP PROPOSED July 23,1999
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RAC 97C238 (RI), 99C029 (RO) 3.15.10.4.7.4 System Classification The Normetex pumps high inlet pressure shutdown (HIPS) system is classified as AQ-NCS.
3.15.10.4.7.5 Boundary The AQ-NCS boundaries for the C-310 Normetex pumps high inlet pressure shutdown (HIPS) system are defined in Table 3.15-3.
3.15.10.4.8 C-310 Normetex Pumps High Discharge Pressure Shutdown System (HDPSS) 3.15.10.4.8.1 Safety Function The Normetex pumps high discharge pressure shutdown system trips the pump if discharge pressure reaches 42 psia. An over-pressure condition equal to or exceeding 50 psia could lead to a
condensation of HF. Condensed HF and UF. in nonfavorable geometries have the potential to achieve criticality. The HDPSS also minimizes the likelihood of a breach in the UF primary system due to a blockage in the discharge line. Breachmg the primary UF. system would allow UF, to be released to the atmosphere or within the Normetex pump.
3.15.10.4.8.2 Functional Reauirements The Normetex pump HDPSS shall be capable of detecting and automatically tripping the pump if the discharge pressure reaches 42 psia to preclude conditions that could lead to the condensation of HF in the UF. primary system (i.e., HF condenses at pressures 250 psia) or overpressurization of the UF.
primary system.
3.15.10.4.8.3 System Evaluation j
1 The Normetex pump HDPSS was evaluated to assess its ability to accomplish the required safety function. In addition, a qualitative fault tree analysis was performed to determine the capability of the system to accomplish the safety functions. The results of these analyses are provided in this section.
i Also see Section 5.2, Appendix A for evaluations of specific NCS concerns associated with this system.
Safety function analysis. The safety function of the system is to detect high discharge pressure and trip the associated pump to preclude an over-pressure condition which could result in a breach in the primary UF, system or the condensing HF in the primary UF. system. Condensed HF (a moderator) and UF. in nonfavorable geometries within the product withdrawal system would have the potential to achieve criticality. HF condenses at pressures 250 psia. The Normetex pump high discharge pressure shutdown systems are set to trip the pump at 42 psia or less which would preclude condensing HF in the UF.
primary system.
The Normetex pumps in the C-310 product withdrawal facility use a pneumatic signal between the discharge pressure transmitters and the pressure switches. The discharge pressure transmitters require instrument air to operate. Loss of instrument air will prevent the HDPSS from initiating pump m
3.15-82
SAR-PGDP PROPOSED July 23,1999 RAC 97C238 (RI), 99C029 (RO) shutdown. Therefore, instrument air is required for the HDPSS to properly detect high pressure in the C-310 Normetex pump's discharge piping and initiate pump shutdown. The Normetex pumps will stop operating upon the loss 48 VAC and 480 VAC electric power; thus, power sources are not needed to ensure the safety function of the HDPSS in C-310.
1
. Qualitative fault tne analysis. In addition to the safety function analysis, a qualitative fault tree analysis was performed in accordance with Section 4.3.1.1.3. The analysis was performed to document the required equipment to accomplish the safety function of the system. The analysis identified a local / remote switch in the Normetex pump shutdown circuitry that will disable the HDPSS, yet allow the pump to operate if the switch is in the wrong position. (No local / remote switch was identified for the C 310 west pump that disables the HDPSS.) In addition, no indication is provided to alert the operators that the switch is in the wrong position. Administrative and physicai (bolted-on clear cover) controls have been imposed on the local / remote switch for the C 310 cast pump to ensure that the switch is in the proper position when the pump is operating.
3.15.10.4.8.4 System CI=incation The Normetex pump high discharge pressure shutdown systems in the C-310 product withdrawal facility are required to maintain the pressure of the UF primary system at level that would preclude i
conditions that could lead to the condensation of HF or a breach in the UF. primary system. Therefore, l
l C-310 Normetex pump high discharge pressure shutdown systems are classified as a AQ-NCS systems.
3.15.10.4.8.5 poundary The AQ-NCS boundaries for the Normetex pumps high discharge pressure shutdown system are defined in Table 3.15-3.
l 3.15.10.4.9 C-310 UF. Release Detection System - Normetex Pump 3.15.10.4.9.1 Safety Function l
The UF release detection system - Normetex pump trips the pump to preclude further releases of fissile material and the potential mixing of UF. and oil. Released UF reacts with moisture in the air to form UO F which further absorbs moisture from the air. UO F and water and UF and oil in 2
2 nonfavorable geometries have the potential to achieve criticality.
3.15-82a 1
SAR-PGDP PROPOSED July 23,1999 RAC 97C238 (RI), 99C029 (RO)
'3.15.10.4.9.2 Functional Requimnents See Section 3.15.4.8.2.
3.15.10.4.9.3 System Evaluation See Section 3.15.4.8.3 and Section 5.2, Appendix A.
3.15.10.4.9.4 System Classification l
The UF, release detection system - Normetex pump is classified as an AQ-NCS system. See also Section 3.15.4.8.4.
3.15.10.4.9.5 Boundary l
The AQ-NCS boundaries for the C-310 UF. release detection system - Normetex pump are defined in Table 3.15-3.
3.15.10.4.10 Product UF, Release Detection and Isolation System - 14w Voltage ("New") System at the Withdrawal Stations 3.15.10.4.10.1 Safety Function fN V
The product UF. release detection and isolation system - low voltage ("new") system at the withdrawal stations isolates product cylinders to preclude further releases of fissile material. Released UF reacts with moisture in the air to form UO F which further absorbs moisture from the air. UO F 22 22 and water in nonfavorable geometries have the potential to achieve criticality. This AEF does not include I
the manual isolation system.
3.15.10.4.10.2 Functional Requirements See Section 3.15.4.1.2.
3.15.10.4.10.3 System Evaluation See Section 3.15.4.1.3 and Section 5.2, Appendix A.
3.15.10.4.10.4 System Classification
)
The product UF. release detection and isolation system - low voltage ("new") system at the withdrawal stations is classified as a Q system. See Section 3.15.4.1.4.
i 3.15.10.4.10.5 Boundary The Q boundary for the product UF. selease detection and isolation system - low voltage ("new")
system at the withdrawal stations is defined in Table 3.15-1.
3.15-83
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I SAR-PGDP PROPOSED July 23,1999
(
)
RAC 97C127, 99C029 (RO)
V 4.0 IIAZARD AND ACCIDENT ANALYSIS
4.1 INTRODUCTION
This chapter describes the hazard and accident analysis performed for the Paducah Gaseous Diffusion Plant (PGDP).
l The hazard analysis methodology consists of the identification and evaluation of facility hazards.
Hazard identification is a comprehensive assessment of process-related, natural phenomena and external hazards that may result in onsite or offsite consequences of interest if an accident occurs.
Hazard evaluation generates the largely qualitative consequence and likelihood estimates used to characterize hazards in the context of potential accidents. This method provides a thorough, l
predominantly qualitative evaluation of the spectrum of risks to the public, onsite personnel, and the I
environment resulting from potential accidents involving the identified hazards. The results of the hazard analysis include the identification of a reasonable spectrum of initiating events for evaluation in the accident analysis.
The initiating events that are chosen for evaluation in the accident analysis are defined as limiting initiating events. Limiting initiating events are those initiating events that can result in the most severe accident in a given frequency category (see Section 4.2.5.3). All limiting initiating events are compared with Evaluation Guidelines (EGs) to identify and assess the adequacy of existing SSCs.
/^N l ('j Selection criteria are applied to the results of the hazard and accident analyses to derive the l Technical Safety Requirements (TSRs).'
The hazard and accident analysis uses a graded approach to determine the level of analysis applied to each identified hazard. This approach requires that the level of analysis and documentation for each facility be com/nensurate with the following:
The magnitude of the hazards being addressed.
1 The stage or stages of the facility life cycle.
The complexity of the facility and/or systems being relied on to maintain an acceptable level of risk.
In general, because grading is a function of both hazard potential and complexity, a graded approach dictates an assessment of complex, higher-hazard facilities that is more thoroughly j
documented than assessments of simple, lower-hazard facilities. If a hazard poses a more significant i
threat for the facility (i.e., health consequences), a more detailed analysis is performed. Note that
'Certain TSR Limiting Conditions for Operations were not derived from the hazard and accident analysis and may not satisfy the TSR selection criteria described in Section 4.3.2. These j
" legacy" TSRs are a carryover from previous OSR/TSR documents (i.e., prior to SARUP).
O
\\
l J
i b 't 4.1-1
)
1 SAR-PGDP PROPOSED July 23,1999 f)
RAC 97C127, 99C029 (RO)
V standard industrial hazards for which national consensus codes and/or standards [e.g., Occupational Safety and Health Administration (OSHA) regulations] exist are not in the scope of this SAR except where these hazards are identified as initiators or contributors to accidents in the facility.
Grading was also applied at each of the four major steps of the analysis process:
Hazard 19.entification and screening.
Hazard classification.
Hazard analysis.
Accident analysis and development of safety controls.
Hazard identification and screening was used to review facility hazards to determine whether any safety analysis was required. This was accomplished by comparing the hazards with a screening value as described in Section 4.2.4. If the identified hazards remained below the screening values, the results were documented, and no additional analysis was required for the facility. The second step of the process involved classifying the facility in accordance with DOE-STD-1027-92 (Reference 1).
The third step required analysis of the hazards associated with the facility. One of the elements of the graded approach for hazard analysis is a function of selecting techniques for hazard evaluation depending on the complexity of the process and the significance of the hazard. The techniques used
(
)
for hazard evaluation can range from simple checklists or "What If" analyses to systematic parameter examinations. The technique selected need not be more sophisticated or detailed than is necessary to provide a comprehensive examination of the hazards associated with the facility operations. For example, a simple storage operation may be adequately evaluated by a preliminary hazard analysis or a structured "What If" analysis. The final step of the overall process involved taking the most significant hazards within the facility, determining specific accident scenarios, identifying safety controls that can minimize the frequency of the event, and identifying safety controls that can be used to mitigate the consequences should the event occur.
The hazard analysis methodology and results, presented in Section 4.2, include the hazard identification, classification, and evaluation tasks, including limiting initiating event selection. Section 4.3 describes the accident analysis methodology and results for each of the limiting initiating events identified in Section 4.2. The discussion summarizes the accident scenario development, source-term analysis, and consequence analysis, provides a comparison with guidelines, and summarizes SSCs and TSR controls.
1 I
m )
4.1-2
E 1
l SAR-PGDP PROPOSED July 23,1999 O
RAC 97Cl27 (RI), 99C029 (RO)
V 4.2.5.3 Accident Selection The objective of the accident selection portion of the hazard evaluation was to identify a representative set of events for accident analysis. This representative set of events is termed " limiting l
initiating events" in the remainder of this analysis. Defining the limiting events required consideration of all actions made in response to each initiating event without any mitigative action. If an initiating event could result in a parameter change that might lead to an accident scenario which exceeds any EG, this initiating event is a candidate for a limiting event. For each unmitigated initiating event that could lead to exceeding an EG, the following guidelines were used to determine the set of limiting events:
The initiating events which result in the most limiting change in a process parameter of interest for each frequency category were selected, l
If different facility protection methods were provided for the same process parameter of interest, a limiting event for each frequency category, each parameter of interest, and each facility protection method was selected.
The process for determining the limiting initiating events consisted of five steps (Figure 4.2-3):
1.
Develop facility operating modes 2.
Identify specific hazard states for each hazard 3.
Develop operating mode-hazard-hazard state matrix
/G 4.
Develop initiating event-operating mode-hazard-hazard state matrix
()
5.
Select and define limiting initiating events The development of specific facility operating modes was key to accomplishing this part of the analysis. These operating modes are also used in the TSRs. These modes were used to ensure that all combinations of operations, hazards, and equipment configurations were considered.
The next step of the process was to define the hazard states for each of the hazards that could result in the PSOA threshold being exceeded. For some hazardous materials, the physical state (e.g.,
l solid, liquid, gas) has a direct bearing on the potential consequences should a release occur. Therefore, identification of the hazard state (s) of interest was required. UF is a prunary hazard of interest for the 6
GDPs, and its physical state has a significant impact on potential consequences. The quantity of material at risk was determined by the normal operating mode and the initial conditions at the time of the event.
Once the operating modes and hazard states were identified, a matrix was defined that identified the hazard and hazard state (s) applicable to each operating mode. This matrix was based on facility l
operations and discussions with facility personnel. This matrix was used to ensure that each initiating event considered the hazard condition and operating condition that could be applicable.
Initiating events from the PrHA that could exceed the PSOA consequence thresholds (Table 4.2-3) were considered with each operating mode and hazard state for which they were applicable. This information was used to develop the combinations as illustrated in the example in Table 4.2-5. This l
matrix, which includes the operating modes, hazard states, and initiating events along with the process 1
parameters of interest, provides a systematic method of identifying the complete spectnnn of hazards, IO
! U 4.2-12 a
]
l l
l SAR-PGDP PROPOSED July 23,1999 l
}
RAC 97Cl27 (RI), 99C029 (RO) l hazard states, operating modes, and initiating events that may result in accidents with consequences of interest. The hazard matrix provides the foundation for detailed analysis to determine the TSRs, system classifications, and accident analyses. Each specific combination required analysis to determine whether protective action is required to prevent exceeding an Evaluation Guideline. An example of one combination taken from Table 4.2-5 follows:
Process parameter of interest-pressure increase.
Initiating event-steam control valve fails to open.
i Operating modes-open/out of service, containment, autoclave closed, and heating / feeding /
heeling.
Hazard state for each mode-all states for each operating mode.
The matrix combinations were evaluated to determine the minimum set of controls that could prevent exceeding the Evaluation Guidelines should the event occur. The combination that results in the most severe consequences (i.e., bounds all other initiating events by consequence) is identified as the limiting initiating event for that combination.
Each combination of initiating event, hazard state, and operating mode was reviewed as described for the operational analysis task (Section 4.3.1.1). Defining the limiting initiating events for a facility required consideration of the integrated response of the facility to each initiating event without any mitigative action. If the initiating event could result in a parameter change with unmitigated consequences that exceed any Evaluation Guideline for the applicable frequency category, the initiating event was a
(]
candidate for a limiting initiating event. The definition of a limiting initiating event described above was V
used to finalize the set of limiting initiating events. The resulting set of limiting initiating events was subjected to the detailed accident analysis described in Section 4.3.2. Initiating events that exceed the PSOA thresholds and are not limiting initiating events are documented in the analysis for the facility with justification provided for them-being bounded by the limiting events along with the controls necessary to support meeting the Evaluation Guidelines.
4.2.6 Hazard Analysis Results This section presents the results of the hazard analysis. Most of the results are given in summary form. Details of the analyses are provided in the PrHA reports for the respective facilities.
One of the key elements of the hazard analysis was to identify historical events that resulted in l
accidents of interest. Table 4.2-6 identifies historical release events from 1961 through 1993 at all three l
GDP sites. Historical release events as well as discussions with operational personnel were a key input I
to all of the hazard analyses, t
A comprehensive listing of all facilities that were included in the hazard analysis is presented in Table 4.2-7. The table shows the level of analysis that was applied to each facility based on the graded l
approach. It indicates whether a facility required a PHS, PrHA, and/or PSOA review. The hazard cate-gorization based on DOE-STD-1027-92 is also presented. Facilities that were screened out by the PHS l
did not receive any additional review and are not addressed in the following sections. Facilities that exceeded PHS thresholds but did not exceed PrHA thresholds are documented by an analysis statement (Table 4.2-8). The analysis statement serves as the safety analysis for these facilities, and they are not O
4.2-13 t
SAR-PGDP PROPOSED July 23 4999 RAC 97C127 (RI), 99CO29 (RO)
Source terms for these release scenarios were calculated. Dispersion analyses were performed to estunate the duration of an unmitigated release necessary to exceed EGs. The resulting release durations from the threshold analysis are summarized in Table 4.2-12.
4.2.6.3.3 Preventive / Mitigative Controls The PrHA also identified the facility controls (procedural and equipment) that can be used to prevent and/or mitigate the imtiating events or minimize the consequences of the resulting accidents. The only safety classification that could be made as a result of the PrHA is AQ. The remaining classifications are based on the results of the accident analysis described in Section 4.3. Detailed technical bases for the safety classifications are presented in Section 3.15. In addition to process-specific controls, programs and plans are identified in the PrHA and play an important role in providing worker safety for many of the events evaluated. These programs and plans are described in SAR Chapters 5 and 6 and Volume 3 of
- the Application.
4.2.6.3.4 Accident Selection Accidents selected for the accident analysis are defined by the set of limiting initiating events determined in the hazard evaluation. The limiting initiating events were selected from the events that exceed the PSOA threshold as indicated in Table 4.2-11. The process for selecting the limiting initiating events is described in Section 4.2.5.3.
O Operating modes. A review of operations identified normal operating modes for the various processes that had events exceedmg the PSOA threshold. These operating modes, described in the TSRs, are used to address potential operations for the defined processes and to develop the limiting initiating
)
events. The modes are not mutually exclusive; operations within a facility may simultaneously involve more than one mode. For example, when one cell is in above atomospheriepressure operating mode,
~-
another cell may be in below atmosphericpressure operating mode.
Hazard states. The analysis of normal operation and initiating events must include evaluation of each mode of operation in combination with the hazard states that may be present during that mode.
Hazard states for all hazards were identified as solid, liquid, and gas. Where one hazard state is present with another (e.g., gaseous UF. is always present with both liquid and solid UF ), only one of the hazard 6
states is associated with the analysis, but both conditions are considered in establishing the consequences.
Operadag made-inidasing trent-harmnf state matrix. The consequences of unmitigated initiating events were compared with the PSOA screening thresholds to determine whether an event is carried forward to the PSOA. The comparison of the consequences with the PSOA screening thresholds (Table
. 4.2-3) is provided in the PrHA reports. The evaluation resulted in the set of initiating events indicated in Table 4.2-11.
Limiting initiating events. The set of the initiating events in Table 4.2-11 that were carried forward to the PSOA were evaluated to determine which of these events place the most demand on an essential mitigative system in each initiating event frequency category. Table 4.2-11 indicates the limiting 4.2-17
SAR-PGDP PROPOSED July 23,1999
[
RAC 97C127 (R2), 99C029 (RO) l Table 4.2-5. Example Initiating Event-Operating Mode-Hazard State Matrix.8 l
Autoclave Heating /
l Cylinder open/out of Contain-Autoclave feeding /
l handling service ment closed heeling l
Anticipated operating operating operating operating operating l
initiating event mode mode mode mode mode Hazard state Pressure increase l Autoclave steam All states All states All states All states control valve fails open l
Primary system integrity l Minor leaks of UF All states All states 6
inside autoclave l Minor leaks of UF All states All states All states All states 6
to atmosphere l' Note this table is representative for the feed facilities (C-333-A and C-337-A).
I 1 OV l
T..
SAR-PGDP PROPOSED July 23,1999 RAC 97C124,99C029 (RO) 4.3.2.2 UF, Handling and Storage Facilities i
Table 4.2-11 documents the results of the hazards analysis for each of the UF. handling and storage facilities processes. The UF, handling and storage processes consist of feed vaporization, toll transfer and sampling, product and tails withdrawal, and cylinder storage. The principal hazard evaluated for this group is UF. and its reaction products. The following summarizes the hazards and the results of the accident analysis involving these facilities.
4.3.2.2.1 Compressor Failure - UF./ Hot Metal Reaction (Temperature Increase) 1 a.
Scenario Description l
UF reacts with most metals. Typically, the reaction between UF. and the metals used to fabricate gaseous diffusion process equipment is relatively mild due to: (1) the relatively moderate temperatures associated with the gaseous diffusion processes, and (2) a reaction-inhibiting layer of reaction products that is formed on the metal surfaces. However, if the metal is heated above its solidus temperature (about 1100*F for aluminum) in the presence of UF., then the exothermic reaction is not inhibited and can become self-sustaining. Once the reaction becomes self-sustaining, it can continue as long as UF. and exposed metal are available for the reaction. Due to the localized nature of the event, there is no direct indication that a self-sustaining UF / hot metal reaction is occurring in the process.
6 Therefore, a self-sustaining UF./ hot metal reaction can cause a primary system failure that would result in a loss of primary system integrity.
O An event involving a UF / hot metal reaction is applicable for the centrifugal compressors used in the tails withdrawal facilities (C-315). The product withdrawal facilities (C-310 and C-310-A) use Normetex pumps which are not subject to a UF./ hot metal reaction due to various design considerations (e.g., oil cooling, etc). However, the tails withdrawal facilities (C-315) normally use low-speed centrifugal compressors to remove UF. from the cascade and then use Normetex pumps to move the UF.
gas through the rest of the tails withdrawal process. The tails withdrawal facility also has the capability i
of using high-speed centrifugal compressors instead of the Normetex pumps. The high-speed centrifugal wurs.ecrs are normally maintained in a standby condition (i.e., either standby or not in use operating mode) but procedures exist permitting their use if needed.
The excessive heating required to start a UF./ hot metal reaction can be generated in the centrifugal compressors due to various initiators such as frictional heating generated by misaligned pump parts rubbing together, foreign objects in the compressor's suction, etc. A loss of physical integrity L
associated with a UF./ hot metal reaction in the low-speed centrifugal compressors would result in air l inlealtage into the tails withdrawal process since both the inlet and outlet sides of the low speed centrifugal compressors operate at sub-atmospheric pressures.
However, should the high-speed centrifugal compressors suffer a similar type of failure, a UF. gas release could be expected since the high speed compressors operate with discharge pressures that are above atmospheric pressure.
The UF./ hot metal reaction event is classified in the AE frequency range because a single active failure or operator error could cause the event. The bounding compressor failure involves the UF / hot metal reaction. Past operating experience indicates that many compressor failures have occurred with V
4.3-72 l'
L
l SAR-PGDP PROPOSED July 23,1999
(_s RAC 97Cl24,99C029 (RO)
)
U requirement for EG 6. In the event that the release ultimately affects the habitability of the ACR, this receptor would be able to evacuate the area before EGs 1 and 2 are exceeded and the necessary actions could be accomplished from C-331. In addition, based on the controls identified (i.e., release detection high-speed centrifugal compressor trip, building holdup, evacuation of areas upon detection of the release), EGs 1 and 2 would be met for workers outside the process building. Finally, an analysis was performed which determined that, if no mitigation were provided, off-site exposure would not exceed guidelines.
e.
Summary of SSCs and TSR Controls The essential controls for the UF./ hot metal reaction event associated with meeting EG 3 are to muumize the potential for failing the primary system due tc temperature increase. These controls include detection of the compressor failure and minimizing the source of heat / friction that could lead to the elevated temperatures that allow the UF./ hot metal reaction. Based on the results of this analysis, the essential controls for this event are summarized as follows:
Motor load indicators for the C-315 high-speed compressors in ACR and C-331-early detection of compressor failure (i.e., surging and/or loss of load) (EG 3 only); and Compressor motor manual trip for the C-315 high-speed compressors in ACR and C-331-elimination of heat / friction (EG 3 ).
m Essential mitigation of any UF releases associated with this event (EGs 1, 2, and 6) are summarized as iv!!ows:
Compressor motor manual trip for the C-315 high-speed compressors in ACR and C-331-minimize release to workers outside the process building (EGs 1,2, and 6);
Visual / odor detection of release, worker training, and evacuation of affected area-all on-site workers (EGs I and 2);
UF. release detection associated with the high-speed withdrawal centrifugal pumps - workers outside the process building (EGs I and 2);
Process building holdup-workers outside process building (EGs 1 and 2).
Based on the above essential controls, the resulting important to safety SSCs and TSRs are as follows:
The motor load indicators and the compressor motor manual trip system for the C-315 high-speed l
compressors, UF. release detection system - high speed centrifugal compressors (C-315 only),
and the process buildings are identified as important to safety SSCs. See Section 3.15 for details including safety classification.
TSRs are provided for the motor load indicators and compressor motor manual trip system for the C-315 high-speed compressors, UF. release detection system - high speed centrifugal compressors (C-315 only), and administrative requirements for procedures and training of workers for evacuation actions.
7(,,)
4.3-76
SAR-PGDP PROPOSED July 23,1999 3[O
. RAC 97C124, 99CO29 (RO) e.
Summary of SSCs and TSR Controls Based on the results of this analysis, the essential control for the solid / gaseous release of UF. to the atmosphere event is summarized as follows:
Visual / odor detection of release, worker training, and evacuation of affected area-all on-site e
workers (EGs 1,2 and 6).
Based on the above essential control, TSRs are provided for administrative requirements for procedures and training of workers for evacuation actions in the event of a release.
4.3.2.2.4 Evacuation of the UF. Handling and Storage Facilities (External Event) a.
Scenado Descdption The evacuation of the UF. handling and storage process buildings event is a special event to be evaluated for all operational areas with significant hazardous operations to ensure that evacuation does not result in can==- from process operations. The analysis for this scenario addressed each facility process and associated operating modes to determine the essential controls necessary to prevent failure of the primary system. The initial conditions associated with this event are assumed to be the normal operations carried out within the given facility. The event scenario addresses any essential actions required by the operational staff prior to evacuation of the facility for all conditions except when a release O
of hazardous material within the specified facility (e.g., feed, withdrawal, etc.) is the initiating event.
For a discussion of releases of hazardous material within the cascade process buildings and associated operator actions, refer to the appropriate sections of this chapter for required actions. The evacuation event is an AE because various types of events associated with plant operations could result in a required evacuation of a facility. Some of these events include spurious operation of the criticality accident alarm system, potential releases of hazardous material from another facility, or a fire within the facility.
The primary concem associated with this event is to prevent release of hazardous material (e.g.,
UF ) as a result of an evacuation of the facility. The primary objective of this analysis is to ensure the UF. handling and storage processes are equipped with sufficient controls to prevent or mitigate a failure of the UF. primary system in an evacuation event. The applicable EGs (see Table 4.2-2) associated with this event are all of the EGs for the AE frequency range. EG 4 is addressed by the NCS program (see Section 5.2). EG 6 is addressed by this event scenario (i.e., determme what safety actions are required by the operational personnel and if they can be accomplished for this event). The only safety action required to meet these EGs is to maintam primary system pressure control within EG 3. This action will prevent primary system failure as well as protect both on-site personnel and the off-site public. If EG 3 is not met and a release occurs within the evacuated facility, then controls that operate automatically or that can be operated externally to the evacuated facility are required to ensure EGs 1 and 2 will be met. The evacuation event is considered a limiting event because of the special nature of the analysis.
4.3-82
SAR-PGDP PROPOSED July 23,1999 O
RAC 97C124, 99C030 (RO), 99C029 (RO)
N) b.
Source-Term Analysis The scenario description specified that the initial conditions for the facility evacuation scenario are assumed to be the normal operations carried out within the facilities. Since a specific failure condition that could result in a failure of the UF primary system was not defined in the scenario description, a specific source-term analysis was not performed for the facility evacuation event.
However, the source-term for anticipated events that could result in a UF release within the evacuated facility would be either equivalent to or bounded by other anticipated events (i.e., Sections 4.3.2.2.1 through 4.3.2.2.5, and Section 4.3.2.2.17). Refer to these sections for further discussions of the source-term associated with the specific initiating event, c.
Cot- = =e Analysis As indicated in the source-term analysis, the consequences of anticipated events that could result in a UP release within the evacuated facility would be either equivalent to or bounded by other anticipated events (i.e., Sections 4.3.2.2.1 through 4.3.2.2.5, and Section 4.3.2.2.17). Refer to those sections for further discussions of the consequences associated with the specific initiating event.
d.
Comnarison With GnMa&==
Each process and associated controls are summarized below to describe how primary system pressure and temperature are controlled within EG 3 as applicable.
Feed, Toll Transfer and Sampling Facilities - During the cylinder handling modes (Mode 1 for feed and Mode la and Ib for toll transfer and sampling) of operation, the only identified concern is the movement of cylinders within the facility. If evacuation of the facility is required during the movement of cylinders, the design of the transport devices must ensure that no damage is incurred when an operator evacuates the area. Therefore, the following two controls were identified to accomplish this action:
Cranes are designed so that when the controls are released, only small compensatory movements are allowed to occur to prevent the load from swinging, and Rail stops are provided to prevent cylinder transport cart movement beyond stops at the levelator and on the east end of the loeding docks in the toll transfer and sampling facility.
During all other facility operations, the only concem that could result in a loss of primary system integrity is that excessive temperatures during heating operations in the autoclave could result in a pnmary system pressure increase and potentially a subsequent release of UF.. Control is provided by l the autoclave steam pressure control system. In addition to these active systems, the passive features of the UF cylinders, pigtails, primary system piping outside the autoclave, and the autoclave shell and associated isolation valves would also be required.
The feed facilities are equipped with automatic detection and alarm in the facility OMR and associated "000" ACR for lines outside the autoclave (UF. release detection system). In addition, all l autoclaves can be isolated remotely from the applicable ACR with the autoclave manual isolation system.
AV 4.3-83
F-SAR-PGDP PROPOSED July 23,1999 l']
RAC 97C124, 99C029 (RO) b These systems provide protection for line failures outside the autoclave. In addition, cylinders feeding to the cascade will continue to feed until empty, removing the need for any operator action. Therefore, continued operation of the feed process would be acceptable.
The toll transfer and sampling facility is equipped with automatic detection and isolation systems for lines outside the autoclave (UF release detection system zones 1 and 4). These systems provide protection for line failures outside the autoclave. Another potential concern is the inadvertent movement of a cylinder during the modes of operation in which the cylinder is connected to a transfer position. The cylinder transport carts are designed and administratively controlled so that the cylinder cannot be moved while the pigtail is connected to the cylinder. Therefore, continued operation of the toll transfer process would be acceptable.
Withdrawal Facilities - Evacuation of the withdrawal facilities was evaluated and it was determined to be a special event that was categorized in the AE frequency range because of the various types of events associated with plant operations that could result in a required evacuation of the withdrawal facilities. Dunng the Cylinder Preparation or Removal mode of operation, the only identified concem is the movement of cylinders within the facility. If evacuation of the facility is required during the movement of cylinders, then the design of the transport devices must ensure that no damage is incurred when an operator evacuates the area. Therefore, the following preventative controls were identified to accomplish this action and to ensure that EGs 1 and 2 are met for this event:
The UF cylinder handling cranes shall be designed so that when controls are released (V) the cranes automatically stop except for small compensatory movements associated with activation of the mechanical braking mechanisms, and Rail stops are provided to prevent cylinder transport cart movement beyond stops at the e
head of the cylinder scales to maintain the primary system integrity of the liquid process piping located at the head of the cylinder scales.
In withdrawal mode operations involving the compression loop operation, the additional concerns with the evacuation scenario are events that could result in a failure of the UF. primary system. Process building cranes used in the withdrawal building are designed to prevent dropping the load should the controls be released for any reason. This will assist in meeting EGs I and 2 during an evacuation event by minimizing the potential for a process building crancs dropping a load that could cause a breach in the UF primary system that would result in a UF. release. A failure of the high-speed centrifugal compressors in C-315 could cause a temperature excursion that produces a UF./ hot metal reaction that results in a UF. release (see Section 4.3.2.2.1). Therefore, the C-315 high-speed compressors must have operational monitoring (i.e., motor load indicators) and trip capability external to the evacuated C-315 withdrawal facility (i.e., in C-331) to meet EGs 3. If the UF./ hot metal event progresses to failure of the UF. primary system, the remote trip capability in C-331 can also be utilized to meet EGs 1 and 2 for the UF release. The Normetex pump can generate pressures sufficient to cause a failure of the UF.
j primary system (see Section 4.3.2.2.17). Therefore, the UF. release detection system - Normetex pump is required as a mitigative control to automatically shutdown the Normetex pump in the event of a UF, release to ensure EGs 1 and 2 are met. The withdrawal stations are equipped with automatic detection j
and isolation systems (the UF release detection and isolation system - low voltage ("new") system at the 1
od 4.3-84 r
i
SAR-PGDP PROPOSED July 23,1999 O(d RAC 97Cl24, 99C029 (RO) withdrawal stations). This system is used as a mitigative control to ensure EGs 1 and 2 are met for potential events involving a physical integrity failure of the pigtails during the evacuation event.
This analysis indicates that the UF withdrawal process facilities are equipped with sufficient preventative or mitigative controls to provide adequate protection for potential UF. primary failures that could occur in the withdrawal facilities after an evacuation event. Therefore, continued operation of the withdrawal process in the event of a facility evacuation is acceptable.
e.
Summary of SSCs and TSR Controls The essential controls for the evacuation of the UF handling and storage facilities event are summarized as follows:
Feed, Toll Transfer and Sampling, and Withdrawal Facilities Operator training for required actions-maintain primary system integrity (EG 3 only);
UF. cylinders, pigtails, and primary system piping-maintain primary system integrity (EGs 1, 2, and 3);
The UF. cylinder handling cranes shall be designed so that when controls are released the cranes automatically stop except for small compensatory movements associated with activation of the mechanical braking mechanisms (EG 1, 2, and 3);
Liquid UF. handling cranes-maintain primary system integrity (EG 3 only); and
(,_)'
Liquid UF. cylinder handling equipment (scale carts, C-360 levelator and elevator)-maintain U
primary system integrity (EG 3 only);
n
(
)
4.3-84a v'
1 SAR-PGDP PROPOSED July 23,1999 RAC 97C124, 99C030 (RO), 99C029 (RO)
Feed, Toll Transfer, and Sampling Facilities Autoclave shell and associated isolation valves-maintain primary system integrity (EG 3 only);
l*
Autoclave manual isolation systems (feed facilities only)-maintain primary system integrity (EG 3 only);
UF, release detection systems-maintain pnmary system integrity after facility evacuation (EG 3 only);
Autoclave primary containment system-maintain primary system integrity (EG 3 only);
UF. release detection system zones 1 and 4 (toll transfer and sampling facility only)-maintain primary system integrity (EG 3 only);
Autoclave steam pressure control system-maintain primary system temperature / pressure below allowable values (EG 3 only);
High cylinder pressure system-maintain pnmary system temperature / pressure below allowable
- values (EG 3 only);
Rail stops to prevent cylinder transpon cart movement beyond stops at the levelator and on the east end of the loadmg docks in the toll transfer and sampling facility-maintain primary system integrity (EG 3 only);
Withdrawal Facilities UF. release detection and isolation system - low voltage ("new") system at the withdrawal stations-maintain primary system integrity (EGs 1 and 2);
UF. release detection system - Normetex pump - all on-site workers outside of the process buildings (EGs 1 and 2);
The process bmkhng cranes used in the wnhdrawal facilities shall be designed to prevent dropping the load should the controls be released for any reason (EGs 1 and 2);
C-315 compressor motor manual trip for the C 315 high-speed compressors in the ACR and C-331-mamtam primary system integrity (EG 3) and protect on-site workers outside the process i
building (EGs 1,2 and 3);
C-315 motor load indicators in the C-315 ACR and C-331-maintain primary system integrity (EG 3);
Rail stops to prevent cylinder transport cart movement beyond stops at the head of the cylinder 1
scales in the wahdrawal stations-mamtam primary system integrity of the liquid piping at the head of the cylinder scales (EGs 1 and 2).
Based upon the above essential controls, the resulting important to safety SSCs and TSRs are as follows:
UF. cylinders, pigtails, primary system piping, process building cranes, liquid UF, cylinder handling equipment (cranes, scale carts, C-360 elevator and levelator), autoclave primary containment system, autoclave manual isolation systems, UF, release detection system zones 1 I
and 4, autoclave steam pressure control system, high cylinder pressure system, UF, Release detection and isolation system - low voltage ("new") system at the withdrawal stations, UF, release detection system - Normetex pump, compressor motor manual trip system in C-331 for the C-315 high-speed compressors, and motor load indicators in C-331 for the C-315 high-speed 4.3-85
SAR-PGDP PROPOSED July 23,1999
/
RAC 97C124, 99C030 (RO), 99C029 (RO) compressors are identified as important to safety SSCs. See Section 3.15 for details including safety classification.
TSRs are provided for the UF. cylinders, liquid UF. handling cranes, scale carts, C-360 elevator l
and levelator; autoclave pnmary contamment system, autoclave manual isolation systems, UF. release detection system zones 1 and 4, autoclave steam pressure control system, high cylinder pressure system, UF Release detection and isolation system - low voltage ("new") system at the withdrawal stations, UF. release detection system - Normetex pump, AU 4.3-85a
' SAR-PGDP PROPOSED July 23,1999 RAC 97Cl24, 99CO29 (RO) l compressor motor manual trip system in C-331 for the C-315 high-speed compressors, motor load I
indicators in C-331 for C-315 high-speed compressors, and administrative requirements for procedures and training of workers for evacuation actions.
4.3.2.2.5 United UF. Release to Atmosphere (P
- eif System Integrity) a.
Scenario Descrintion Durmg the withdrawal operating modes, small passive failures in the primary system may result in limited releases of UF. into the process buildings. These could be caused by initiators such as failures of instrument lines, expansion joints, weld joints, etc., that could be caused by vibration, fuigue, or corrosion. These types of failures are expected frequently enough to place them in the AE category.
l The limited UF. release to atmosphere event in the withdrawal facilities was evaluated in the l
PrHA and it was determined that the consequences could result in significant on-site impact in any
)
operating mode if no mitigation were provided.
l The primary concern associated with this event is controlling the UF. release. The applicable EGs (see Table 4.2-2) associated with this event are all the EGs for the AE frequency range. EG 3 is not addressed in this scenario because the prunary system is assumed to fail, and EG 4 is addressed by the NCS Program (see Section 5.2). The safety actions of (1) building holdup, and (2) emergency response by local personnel would be required to maintain the effects of the UF. release within EGs 1, 2, and 6.
D Because of the limited size of the releases for this event, no additional action is required to keep the effects of the UF release within EGs 1,2, and 6 for areas outside the process buildings. These actions protect on-site personnel and will maintain habitability of the required control area in accordance with EG 6 as well.
The limited UF. release to armacphare event is the most limiting primary system integrity failure event for the AE category. Accident scenarios involving larger failures of the withdrawal system's physical integrity are addressed in the pigtail /line failure at withdrawal station scenario (see Section 4.3.2.2.11) and the process line failure at compression discharge scenario (see Section 4.3.2.2.12).
l b.
Source-Term Analysis The limited UF. release to atmosphere event in the withdrawal facilities is categorized as an AE due to the various passive (i.e., fatigue-type) equipment failures and operator errors that could initiate this accident scenario. The UF releases associated with this accident scenario are defined to originate from relatively small failures (i.e., hair-line cracks) in equipment operating above atmospheric pressure.
Bese small physical integrity failures are expected to result in very small UF. release rates. However, as indicated in the scenario description, larger primary system failures can result in significantly larger release rates. Dere are many variables that must be characterized in order to develop a source-tenn for this accident scenario. These variables include the following:
The duration of the release; The size of the failure; 4.3-86
SAR-PGDP PROPOSED July 23,1999 RAC 97Cl24,99C029 (RO) and admmistrative controls, this event was classified in the EBE frequency category because of the low probability that a pigtail /line failure would be caused by deficient pigtails or by multiple operator errors.
This event was evaluated and it was determined that the consequences could result in significant off-site and on-site impact if no mitigation were provided. These consequences are based on a liquid / vapor UF, release from the condenser / accumulator and a liquid / vapor release from the receiving cylinder.
'Ihe primary concern associated with this event is the loss of of primary system integrity and the release of UF.. The applicable EGs (see Table 4.2-2) associated with this event are EGs 1 and 2, as well as EG 6 in the EBE frequency range. EG 3 does not apply since the primary system is assumed to fail.
The essential safety actions associated with meeting these EOs include (1) detection of the release, (2) isolation of the primary system to stop the release (where possible), and (3) emergency response to evacuate the immediate vicinity so that the exposure of on-site personnel is minimized.
b.
Source-Term Analysis The initiators, source-terms, and mitigation associated with a pigtail /line failure event at the withdrawal station vary only slightly from that described for a pigtail /line failure outside autoclave event (see Section 4.3.2.2.10). Only the variations from the autoclave scenarios are presented for the purpose of withdrawal scenario analysis.
O This analysis assumes that the UF. release detection and isolation system - low voltage ("new")
system at the withdrawal stations will significantly limit the amount of UF. released due to a pigtail /line failure by automatically closing isolation valves within 30 seconds after detection of a UF. release. Since large quantities of " white smoke" are produced when relatively small quantities of UF. react with atmospheric moisture, it is assumed for the purpose of this analysis that the UF. detectors used in the withdrawal facilities will sense a significant UF release in 15 seconds. Thus, the UF release associated with a pigtail /line failure in the withdrawal facilities is assumed to last for a 45-second duration before closure of the isolation valves terminating the release.
The source-term for the pigtail /line failure scenario in the withdrawal facilities is generally a function of the estimated release rate over the expected release duration. However, the release rate for this failure would be larger in the toll transfer and sampling facility than in the withdrawal facilities due to the higher operating temperatures. The initial conditions for the autoclave pigtail /line failure event scenario (Section 4.3.2.2.10) assumed that the initial temperature in the cylinder was 240*F (116*C).
The temperature at the withdrawal stations is typically less than 180'F. Assuming all other conditions are constant, the vapor pressure of UF associated with these operating temperatures would result in the toll transfer and sampling facility having a larger release rate than the withdrawal facilities for a pigtail /line failure event. Due to the larger release rate, the total amount of UF released in the toll 6
transfer and sampling facility would be larger than the total amount released in the withdrawal facilities for the maximum 45 second release duration expected for a pigtail /line failure event.
4.3-104 i
SAR-PGDP PROPOSED July 23,1999
/
RAC 97Cl24, 99C029 (RO) c.
Consecuence Analysis l
Based on the source-term analysis, the consequences and mitigative controls associated with a pirail/line failure evem in the withdrawal facilities are bounded by the source-terms and consequences associated with a pigtail / lira failure event outside of the autoclave in the toll transfer and sampling facility (see Section 4.3.2.2.10); thus no additional analysis is required for the pigtail /line failure event in the withdrawal facilities.
d.
Comnarison With Guidelines The comparison with guidelines is subdivided to address the different receptors.
l Local workers in the immediate area - Workers in the immediate area of the release could be exposed to a significant uranium dose and/or HF exposure. In the event of a release, the plant see and flee policy requires personnel to evacuate the area for their own protection. The essential method of detection for workers within the autoclave facilities is (1) visual indication of a " white smoke" (i.e.,
reaction products of UF. and moisture) or (2) the odor of HF, which is a product of the reaction of UF.
and moisture. The visual indication or the odor of HF will provide indication of(1) the occurrence of a release and (2) the need for the workers to evacuate the area of the release.
Opemtionalpersonnelin the ACR - Operational personnel who can take mitigative action in the event of a UF release associated with a pigtail /line failure in the withdrawal facilities are located in the
- q ACR. In the event of a pigtail /line failure, ACR operator action will generally not be required because 6
'y of the automated actions of the UF. release detection and isolation system - low voltage ("new") system at the withdrawal stations. However, if the UF detectors associated with this system are out of service (e.g., for maintenance), then manual actuation of the isolation system is required to minimize the release.
Adequate time is available for operators to perform the required actions prior to any evacuation should the need arise. However, once the essential actions have been accomplished, the essential control to protect these personnel is evacuation, if required, upon detection of the release by sight or by odor.
Workers outside the process buildings - The essential controls for protecting on-site personnel outside the facilities are (1) detection of the release, (2) minimization of the release by initiating isolation, and (3) training of on-site personnel to evacuate areas upon detection of a release by sight or by odor.
The first essential action is to detect the release of UF. The second essential action is accomplished by the manual or automatic isolation to terminate the release. For the withdrawal facility, the UP. release detection and isolation system - low voltage ("new") system at the withdrawal stations will automatically detect the release and initiate primary system isolation. If workers outside of the process buildings have received no other instructions for action to be taken (i.e., shelter in place or take cover), then the essential control for these receptors is to evacuate their areas if a release is detected by sight or by odor.
Of-sitepublic - The off-site consequences of a pigtail /line failure in the withdrawal station are l
bounded by the pigtad/line failure outside the autoclave scenario (see Section 4.3.2.2.10). The essential control for protecting the off-site public is isolation of the breach to minimize the UF release.
(3
(/
4.3-105 i
l J
SAR-PGDP PROPOSED July 23,1999 RAC 97C124,99C029 (RO) e.
Summary of SSCs and TSR Controls Based on the results of this analysis, the essential controls for this event are summarized as follows:
Administrative controls to prevent pigtail /line failure-maintain initial condition (normal operation, EG 5 only);
1.
_ UF, lines are purged and evacuated before the primary system is opened 2.
Only cylinder pigtails that have been inspected and approved are used; 3.
UF. pigtails, when connected for use, are leak-tested before UF, is introduced; 4.
Cylinder cleaning requirements conform to ANSI N14.1 for cylinder cleaning; 5.
Operators disable the scale can's air supply, and place the air supply key holder over the pigtail prior to pigtail connection. This prevents anyone from reconnecting the air supply and ensures that no inadvertent movement of the scale cart occurs while a cylinder is connected to the pigtail; and 6.
UF. cylinders are not filled with UF when there is a >40 lb (18 kg) discrepancy between shipper UF cylinder weight and received cylinder weight until the weight discrepancy is explained.
UF. release detection and isolation system - low voltage ("new") system at the withdrawal stations-closes isolation valves to terminate release (EGs 1,2, and 6 only);
UF. cylinders, pigtails, and primary system piping and associated isolation valves-maintain primary system integrity (EGs 1, 2, and 6 only); and Operator training for required actions-closure of isolation valves to terminate release and evacuation of the area (EGs 1, 2, and 6 only).
Based on the above essential controls, the resulting important to safety SSCs and TSRs are as follows:
The UF. release detection and isolation system - low voltage ("new") system at the withdrawal stations, UF. cylinders, pigtails, and primary system piping and associated isolation valves are idenufied as burni-i to safety SSCs. See Section 3.15 for details including safety classification.
TSRs are provided for the UF. release detection and isolation system - low voltage ("new")
system at the withdrawal stations, UF. cylinders. and administrative requirements for procedures and training of workers for evacuation actions.
4.3.2.2.12 Process Line Failure at Compression Discharge (LRy System Integrity) a.
Scenado Descdotion l
During withdrawal mode operations involving the compression loop, a process line failure at the compression source disd%e (i.e., Normetex or centrifugal pump) could result due to various initiators
' including: (1) UF./ hot metal reaction (see Section 4.3.2.2.1), (2) plugged / blocked process line (see Section (4.3.2.2.17), or (3) heavy equipment drop (see Section 4.3.2.2.8). Of these potential event imuators, the UF./ hot metal reaction and the plugged / blocked process line events will occur in the AE frequency range and are addressed separately. This scenario bounds other events that could result in a process line failure at the compression discharge which are classified in the EBE frequency category; such j
as the heavy equipment drop event.
4.3-106
SAR-PGDP PROPOSED July 23,1999 O
RAC 97C124, 99C029 (RO)
V have been evaluated. This consequence analysis determined that if no mitigation were provided, the hazardous material doses at the nearest site boundary (i.e.,1000 meters) for a 30 minute plume exposure associated with this release would be 8.56 mg of uranium and 5.3 ppm (one hour equivalent exposure) of hydrogen fluoride. The uranium exposure consequence would satisfy the EGs for the EBE category.
The consequences that this exposure level would have on different receptors are discussed below.
Local workers in the immediate area - Workers in the immediate area of the release could be exposed to a significant uranium dose and/or HF exposure. In the event of a release, the plant see and flee policy requires personnel to evacuate the area for their own protection. The essential method of detection for workers within the withdrawal buildings is: (1) visual indication of a " white smoke" (i.e.,
reaction products of UF and moisture) or (2) the odor of HF, which is a product of the reaction of UF.
and moisture. The visual indication or the odor of HF will provide indication of (1) the occurrence of a release and (2) the need for the workers to evacuate the area of the release. All the cascade UF.
processing equipment and major piping that are common with the withdrawal facilities are enclosed in housings to maintain normal operating temperatures. The configuration of the housings required to maintain normal operating temperatures, and therefore to keep UF in the gaseous state, provides an inherent barrier against UF. releases within the housing. Although the housings provide the local worker with additional time to detect the release and evacuate the area, the housings are not considered an essential control for this receptor rather they provide further assurance that workers will be able to evacuate the area in accordance with the plant see and flee policy. Personnel protective equipment (PPE) or other protective measures (e.g., emergency egress capability) must be available for personnel operating cab-controlled process building cranes.
Operationalpersonnelin the ACR - The ACR in C-331 is the primary control location for the high speed compressors used in C-315. The C-331 ACR would not be affected by the release in the time frame required to take mitigative actions (i.e., trip compressors). However, these compressors can also be controlled from the local ACR in C-315 which typically would not be affected by the event.
However, if operating personnel must be evacuated from the local ACR due to the release, then the required mitigative actions can be performed from C-331.
Workers outside the process buildings - The essential controls for protecting on-site personnel outside the process buildings are: (1) detection of the release, (2) minimization of the release by tripping the compression source (e.g., centrifugal motor manual trip for the C-315 high-speed compressors and l the UF release detection system - Normetex pump), (3) temporary holdup of the release by the existing process building structure, and (4) training of on-site personnel to evacuate areas upon detection of a release by sight or by odor. The first essential control is detection of the release of UF.. Motor load indicators provide an indication of abnormal compressor operations that could lead to failure (i.e., surging and/or loss of load). Typically, this indication will be detected, and corrective action will be taken prior i
to primary system failure. However, if a primary system failure does occur and a release is confirmed (e.g., UF. release detection alarms, operator visual / odor indications), then actions can be taken to trip the appropriate motors to minimize the release. The centrifugal compressor motors can be manually tripped from several locations (i.e., ACR and C-331) and the Normetex pump is automatically shut off l by the UF. release detection system - Normetex pump upon detection of a UF. release.
Once the compression source stops operating, the release of material from the compression source is effectively terminated. However, the release from the other process sources (i.e., accumulator and condenser) may GV 4.3-108
SAR-PGDP PROPOSED July 23,1999 f)
RAC 97Cl24,99C029 (RO)
V continue until they are exhausted. Withdrawal process equipment housings outside of the cascade cells are not credited with providing a time delay between a release of UF. from the primary system to release from the building. The existing process building stmeture is expected to reduce the potential hazardous material concentrations to receptors outside of the building by holdup of a portion of the UF released, and by causing most of the UF. that escapes the building to be released at an elevated point. If workers outside of the process buihling have received no other instructions for action to be taken (i.e., shelter in place or take cover), then the essential control for these receptors is to evacuate their areas if a release is detected by sight or by odor.
Off-site public - As indicated above, this scenario event will not result in consequences that would exceed the 30-mg U guideline for the EBE frequency category with no mitigation other than building holdup. However, the smaller source-term expected and the release mitigation actions identified for on-site personnel provide additional assurance that off-site consequences will be minimized.
d.
Comparison With Guidelines The EGs for the EBE frequency category from Table 4.2-2 were compared with the consequences associated with the event scenario. The equipment configuration does not provide for automatic detection and trips on process line failure at compression discharge, so compliance with EG 3 cannot be verified during normal operations. For workers in the immediate area, specific exposures were not calculated because of variables and uncertamties associated with the calculations and because of obvious evacuation actions that would be taken by the worker. However, the controls identified (i.e., see and flee) will maintain exposures within EGs 1 and 2 to the extent practical. Actions required for operating personnel V
in the C-331 and C-315 ACRs were evaluated (i.e., tripping the high-speed centrifugal compressors), and they can be accomplished to meet the requirement for EG 6. In the event that the release ultimately affects the habitability of the C-315 ACR, this receptor would be able to evacuate the area before EGs 1 and 2 are exceeded and the necessary actions could be accomplished from C-331. In addition, based l on the controls identified (i.e., release detection, UF. release detection system - Normetex pump, high-speed centrifugal compressor trip, building holdup, and evacuation of areas upon detection of the release),
EGs 1 and 2 would be met for workers outside the process building. Finally, an analysis was performed which determined that, if no mitigation were provided, off-site exposure would not exceed guidelines.
e.
Summary of SSCs and TSR Controls l
Based on the results of this analysis, the essential controls for this event are summarized as follows:
Motor load indicators in ACR and C-331 for the C-315 high-speed compressors -early detection of compressor failure (i.e., surging and/or loss of load) (EG 3 only);
Compressor motor manual trip in ACR and C-331 for the C-315 high-speed compressors
-elimination of heat / friction (EG 3); and l*
UF release detection system - Normetex pump-all on-site workers outside the process building 6
(EGs 1,2, and 6).
1 4.3-109
SAR-PGDP PROPOSED July 23,1999 RAC 97C124,99C030 (R0), 99C029 (RO)
Essential mitigation of any UF. releases associated with this event (EGs 1, 2, and 6) are summarized as follows:
Compressor motor manual trip in ACR and C-331 for the C-315 high-speed compressors
-minimize release to workers outside the process building (EGs 1,2, and 6) l*
UF. release detection system - Normetex pump-all on-site workers outside the process building (EGs 1,2, and 6);
UF. release detection associated with the high-speed withdrawal centrifugal pumps - workers outside the process building (EGs 1 and 2);
Visual / odor detection of release, worker training, and evacuation of affected area-all on-site workers (EGs 1 and 2);
Administrative control-personnel protective equipment (PPE) or other protective measures is provided to personnel operating cab-controlled process building cranes (EGs 1 and 2); and Process building holdup-workers outside process building (EGs 1 and 2).
Based on the above essential controls, the resulting important to safety SSCs and TSRs are as follows:
The motor load indicators and the compressor motor manual trip system for the C-315 high-speed compressors, UF release detection system - high speed centrifugal compressors (C-315 only),
UF. release detection system - Normetex pump, and the process buildings are identified as j
important to safety SSCs. See Section 3.15 for details including safety classification.
TSRs are provided for the motor load indicators and compressor motor manual trip system for g
the C-315 high-speed compressors, UF release detection system - high speed centrifugal i
compressors (C-315 only), UF. release detection system - Normetex pump, and administrative requirements for procedures and training of workers for evacuation actions, and for protective equipment / measures for personnel operating cab-controlled building process cranes.
4.3.2.2.13 Pigtail Failure Inside Autoclave (Primary System Integrity) a.
Scenario Description During autoclave operations, several manipulations of the cylinder and pigtail connections are made to accomplish the required tasks associated with the heating, sampling, feed, and transfer of UF..
These operations include such activities as rolling the cylinder, connecting and disconnecting pigtails, and l purging and evacuating pigtails. All pigtail operations take place in the autoclave open or out of service mode of operation, which greatly reduces the potential frequency of this event. In addition, administrative controls are required to leak-test pigtails after each connection ensuring proper connections as well as only using inspected and approved pigtails. However, with multiple operator errors, it is postulated that a pigtail failure could occur after the autoclave is closed. This event is an EBE because of the low probability that a pigtail failure will be caused by a deficient pigtail or multiple operator errors during autoclave operations.
This event was evaluated and it was determined that the consequences could result in significant off-site and on-site impact if no mitigation is provided. These consequences are based on a liquid UF.
release.
The primary concern associated with this event is the loss of primary system integrity and the release ofliquid UP.. The applicable EGs (see Table 4.2-2) associated with this event are all of the EGs 4.3-110
SAR-PGDP PROPOSED July 23,1999 v)
/
RAC 97Cl24, 99C029 (RO)
This event was evaluated, and it was determined that the consequences could result in significant on-site impact if no mitigation were provided. These consequences are based on a liquid UF release from a cylinder breach caused by a large fire in the storage yards. Due to preventive measures in place, this event is classified in the EBE frequency category.
The primary concern associated with this event is the loss of primary system integrity and the release ofliquid UF.. The applicable EGs associated with this event are EGs 1 and 2, as well as EG 6 in the EBE frequency range. Since there is no primary containment system for cylinder failures, EG 3 does not apply. The essential safety actions associated with meeting these EGs for a large fire that could result in a loss of cylinder physical integrity include (1) detection of the release, (2) notification of emergency response personnel, and (3) emergency response to evacuate the immediate vicinity and downwind locations so that the exposure of on-site personnel exposure is minimized.
b.
Source-Term Analysis It is assumed that a fire could be initiated during cylinder handling operations (e.g., due to vehicle accidents, etc.) and sufficient heat could be added to the cylinders such that the physical integrity of the cylinders could be compromised. Current cylinder handling equipment are equipped with large fuel tanks
[approximately 450 gal (1703 L) of diesel fuel for the largest equipment] and some of this equipment also j
contams large amounts of hydraulic fluid [approximately 350 gal (1324 L)] as well as some lube oil. For purposes of this analysis, the cylinder haulers were assumed to carry a maximum of 800 gal (3027 L) of flammable or combustible liquids. Depending on the cylinder type, thickness, size, and amount of UF.
(9 present, analyses have been completed indicating that this amount of fuel could rupture a cylinder in less V
than 15 min if optimum conditions are present. Based on this analysis, a scenario for a fire event is presented as a limiting event for the cylinder yards.
Uncertainties in the source-term resulting from a fire induced UF cylinder rupture results from 6
uncertainties in fire characteristics, the portion of a cylinder or cylinders immersed in a fire, the effects of fire fighting activities, the conditions inside the cylinder at the time of rupture, and the cylinder condition after rupture.
The thermal environment associated with a fire depends on fire characteristics including the flame temperature, flame emissivity, flame height, and fire duration. These fire characteristics depend on the amount of fuel released, the fire dimensions and shape, and ambient conditions such as temperature and wind speed. The literature indicates a significant variation in thermal environments associated with fires.
10 CFR 71 provides guidance associated with hypothetical transportation accident conditions.
Section 71.73 provides the following guidance for the hypothetical thermal environment:
l Exposure of the specimen fully engulfed, except for a simple support system, in a hydrocarbon fuel / air fire of sufficient extent, and in sufficiently quiescent ambient conditions, to provide an average emissivity coefficient of at least 0.9, with an average i
I flame temperature of at least 800*C (1475*F) for a period of 30 minutes, or any other thermal test that provides the equivalent total heat input to the package and which provides a time averaged environmental temperature of 800*C. The fuel source must I
extend horizontally at least 1 m (40 in), but may not extend more than 3 m (10 ft),
l n
i U
4.3-128
SAR-PGDP PROPOSED July 23,1999 U)
RAC 97Cl24, 99CO29 (RO) l beyond any external surface of the specimen, and the specimen must be positioned 1 m (40 in) above the surface of the fuel source. For purposes of calculation, the surface absorptivity coefficient must be either that value which the package may be expected to possess if exposed to the fire specified or 0.8, whichever is greater; and the convective coefficient must be that value which may be demonstrated to exist if the package were exposed to the fire specified. Artificial cooling may not be applied after cessation of external heat input, and any combustion of materials of construction, must be allowed to proceed until it terminates naturally.
10 CFR 71 provides an appropriate basis for evaluating and licensing containers of radiological i
materials. The 10 CFR 71 thermal environment was therefore selected as a reasonable basis for conducting the SAR analysis.
Based upon 10 CFR 71, the analysis of postulated fires in the UF cylinder yards will be based on the following assumptions:
The UF. cylinder is fully engulfed in the fire, A fine emissivity of 0.9, An average flame temperature of 1475'F, A surface absorptivity of 0.8, Simulation of convective heat transfer, and A 30-minute fire duration.
[V]
The convective heat transfer was calculated based on the methodology described in Reference 4.7. The analysis assumed that the cylinders are at their fill values [i.e., the mass of 28,000 lb (12,700 kg) UF.
for a 48G; a 48Y would have slightly less but was assumed to also have 28,000 lb (12,700 kg)] and the cylinders are fully engulfed in a 1475*F fire. The analysis indicates that there is a significant variation in the conditions at the time of failure and in the post failure release conditions. An additional range of possible source-term conditions exists because of uncertainties that include the fire duration, the fire temperature, the portion of a cylinder or cylinders immersed in a fire, the effects of fire fighting activities. Because of the considerable uncenainty of the source-term, dispersion analyses considered the initial amount of UF. released from 400 lb (181 kg),4000 lb (1811 kg), and 8000 lb (3629 kg) for this event.
c.
Conseauence Analysis The results for the release are relatively insensitive to the amount of UF. released. For example, the 400-lb (181-kg) release provides the maximum downwind consequences for Class D stability with a 13.1 ft/s (4 m/s) wind velocity between 400 and 800 m (varying from 17.1 mg U intake at 400 m, to 8.4 mg at 800 m). For 1000 to 2000 m downwind, the 400-lb (181-kg) release in D4 conditions provides 6.9 and 3.0 mg U intake respectively. For the 8000-lb (3629 kg) release for F1 conditions, the U intake at 400 m is 2.6 mg, while at 1000 m is 9.5 mg. From 1000 to 2000 m, the 8000-lb (3629 kg) release for F1 conditions remains in the range of 9.5 to 10.6 mg U intake and represents the highest off-site consequences for the releases for all three release amounts for both meteorological conditions. The highest on-site consequences are represented by the D4 conditions for a 8000 lb initial release, falling to 30 mg U intake at about 275 m.
C/
4.3-129
SAR-PGDP PROPOSED July 23,1999 G}
RAC 97C124,99C029 (RO) l After the fire has been extinguished, UF can continue to be released from a failed cylinder due to 6
sublimination and cool down. If the fire is terminated within 15 minutes and no additional means of cooling the cylinder is used (i.e., continued water spray), the sublimination and cool down period where UF will continue to be released from a failed cylinder can last from 1 % to 3 hours3.472222e-5 days <br />8.333333e-4 hours <br />4.960317e-6 weeks <br />1.1415e-6 months <br />. However, the UF 6
6 vapor released during this period is less than the liquid and vapor UF released upon initial failure of the cylinder. The 8000-Ib (3629 kg) initial release is used to bound the creditable cylinder failure scenarios, and it is sufficient to include the amount released even with no forced cool-down for the cylinder after rupture. The scenario for this event is low probability due to the preventive measures in place, the potential on-site resources for mitigation, and the fact that operational personnel would typically be in the area when the event occurred for quick detection and fire department response. Based on these conditions, the probability of this event is significantly lower than the cylinder failure outside autoclave event addressed in Section 4.3.2.2.15. The consequences are bounded by the cylinder failure event. The essential controls for this event are no different with the added requirement for the on-site fire department. Therefore, no additional consequences are addressed.
- d. Comparison With Gt:idelines The comparison with guidelines will be subdivided to address the different receptors.
Iocal workers in the immediate area - Because of the time that lapses before a fire becomes large, workers in the immediate area of the release could evacuate the area prior to being exposed to any release. Therefore, no specific requirements are associated with the local worker.
f]
Workers outside theprocess buildings - The essential controls for protecting on-site personnel outside V
the facilities are (1) detection of the fire and/or release (both worker and operator) and (2) training of on-site personnel to evacuate areas upon detection by sight or odor. The first essential action is to detect the fire and/or release of UF..
If workers outside of the process building have received no other instmetions for action to be taken (i.e., shelter in place or take cover), then the essential control for these receptors is to evacuate their areas if a release is detected by sight or by odor. As indicated in the consequence analysis, on-site consequences could exceed 30 mg U out to about 900 ft (275 m) for the initial release if no mitigative actions were taken.
Of-sitepublic - As indicated in the consequences section, the consequences for this event could vary over a wide range due to the various parameters. The essential controls for mitigation of this event are bounded by the cylinder failure outside autoclave scenario described in Section 4.3.2.2.15 with the added control of the on-site fire department.
e.
Summary of SSCs and TSR Controls Based on the results of this analysis, the essential controls for this event are summarized as follows:
Administrative controls to prevent a large fire-maintain initial condition (normal operation, EG S only);
1.
Presence and introduction of flammable and combustible materials in the cylinder yards is controlled by approved procedures; 2.
Daily inspection (when used) of cylinder handling equipment for obvious visual defects associated with the lifting system and potential fuel / hydraulic leaks; p)
(
4.3-130
F SAR-PGDP PROPOSED July 23,1999 l
RAC 97C124 (RI), 99C029 (RO) 3.
Communication capability between the cylinder handling operators and with the fire department / emergency response personnel is available; 4.
Only approved cylinder handling equipment is used by qualified operators for maneuvering UF. cylinders or other heavy loads; 5.
Operator training for required actions; 6.
Fire Protection Program (which includes on-site fire department); and 7.
Prior to and during tube oil deliveries in the process building truck alley near the feed facilities (1) the Fire Depamnent will be notified, (2) the fire hydrants in the immediate area will be verified operable, and (3) a pumper truck and firefighters will be present during lube oil unloading operations.
Fixed fire suppression systems in withdrawal facilities-prevent large fires (initial condition assumption, EG 5 only).
Based on the above essential controls, the resulting imponant to safety SSCs and TSRs are as follows:
l*
De fixed fire suppression systems in withdrawal facilities are identified as important to safety SSCs.
See Section 3.15 for details including safety classification.
l
- TSRs are provided for the fixed fire suppression systems in withdrawal facilities; and administrative requiremeras for the Fire Protection Program and for procedures and training of workers for actions to be taken.
4.3.2.2.17 Plugged / Blocked Process Une (Pressure Increase)
- a. Scenario Descr11ption l
In the withdrawal mode operations involving the compression loop, a blockage of the Normetex pump discharge line could cause a failure of the primary system due to high pressures that can be generated by j
the Normetex pump. The discharge line of the Normetex pump could become blocked due to initiators such as the fonnation of a solidified UF plug or an inadvertent valve closure. The most likely scenario involves the inadvertent closure of the discharge valve which causes a pressure excursion that results in a failure of the discharge expansionjoint bellows. This event is categorized in the AE frequency range since it could be caused by a single active failure (inadvertent closure of the discharge isolation valve).
This event is also the limiting event for a scenario involving a pressure increase in withdrawal mode o==;cas involving the compression loop. De centrifugal pumps used in the C-315 withdrawal facilities n
are not subject to this failure scenario due to their different design and operating characteristics.
l The primary concem associated with the failure of the plugged / blocked process line is the loss of the l
UF. primary system integrity caused by the pressure increase and the release of UF to the atmosphere.
l De applicable EGs (see Table 4.2-2) associated with this event are all of the EGs for the AE frequency l
category. EG 4 is addressed by the NCS program. The passive design features of the UF primary system piping and 5-nr are the essential preventative controls for maintaining the physical integrity of the UF primary system and meeting EGs 1,2, and 3. If a UF primary system integrity failure occurs due to a plugged / blocked process line event, then the essential safety actions associated with meeting EGs 1 and 2 include: (1) detection of the release, (2) tripping the compression source to muumize the amount of UF released, (3) building holdup, and (4) emergency response to evacuate the 4.3-131
SAR-PGDP PROPOSED July 23,1999
/^
RAC 97C124, 99C029 (RO)
(
immediate vicinity so that the exposure of on-site personnel is minimized. EG 6 is not applicable to this scenario since no required actions were identified for control area personnel.
The plugged / blocked process line event was evaluated and it was determined that the event consequences could result in a significant on-site impact if no mitigation were provided. These consequences are based on a gaseous release of UF..
1
- b. Source-Term Analysis The most likely scenario for this event involves the inadvertent closure of the Normetex pump discharge valve. The continued operation of the positive displacement Normetex pump against the closed discharge valve (or a solidified UF. plug) would produce a pressure transient that could cause the discharge expansion joint to fail releasing UF to the atmosphere. The source-term for this event is conservatively assumed to be equivalent to the output of the Normetex pump. Since the suction side of the Normetex pump operates at subatmospheric pressures, the UF release from this event would be effectively terminated when the UF. release detection system - Normetex pump detected the release and tripped the pump. Although not required as an essential control, automatic isolation of the pump upon activation of the UF. release detection system - Normetex pump would aid in mitigation of the potential UF. release associated with this event.
The output of the Normetex pump is identified as 1.3 lb/s in the source-term analysis presented for the UF./ hot metal reaction scenario (Section 4.3.2.2.1). Backflow from the remainder of the withdrawal o
system would not be a contributor to the source-term for this event since the discharge line is assumed Q
to be blocked (i.e., by a closed discharge valve or a solidified UF plug) and the defm' ed failure of the primary system (i.e., the discharge expansion joint) occurs between the pump and the blockage. The source-term discussion presented for the UF./ hot metal reaction event in the withdrawal facilities (Section 4.3.2.2.1) includes components for both the output of the compression source (i.e., the Normetex pump) and a backflow from the remamder of the withdrawal system. Therefore, the source-term for the UF./ hot metal reaction event in the withdrawal facilities bounds the source-term for the plugged / blocked process line event.
i c.
Consecuence Analysis Based on the source-term analysis, the consequences for the plugged / blocked process line event are bounded by the consequences presented for the UF./ hot metal reaction event in the withdrawal facilities (see Section 4.3.2.2.1). Based upon the bounding consequence analysis, an unmitigated release associated with this event does not exceed AE off-site exposure guidelines. The consequences this event would have on different receptors are discussed below.
Iocal workers in the immediate area-Workers in the immediate area of the release could be exposed to a significant uranium dose and/or HF exposure. In the event of a release, the plant see and flee policy requires personnel to evacuate the area for their own protection. The essential methods of detection for workers within the withdrawal buildings are: (1) visual indication of a " white smoke" (i.e., reaction products of UF and moisture) or (2) the odor of HF, which is a product of the reaction of UF and moisture. The visual indication or the odor of HF will provide indication of (1) the occurrence of a release and (2) the need for the workers to evacuate the area of the release. Personnel protective O
l V 4.3-132 l
l l
l l
I SAR-PGDP PROPOSED July 23,1999 RAC 97C124, 99C029 (RO) equipment (PPE) or other protective measures (e.g., emergency egress capability) must be available for personnel operating cab-controlled process building cranes.
Operationalpersonnelin the ACR-The UF. release associated with plugged / blocked process line event is minimized by automatic activation of the UF, release detection system - Normetex pump.
Therefore, no additional actions are required by ACR operating personnel to mitigate this event. The ACR operating personnel should not be affected by the release associated with this event. However, should the release affect habitability of the control area, the essential control to protect these workers is evacuation upon sight or odor detection of the release.
Workers outside theprocess buildings-The essential controls for protecting on site personnel outside the process buildings are: (1) sight or odor detection of the release, (2) minimization of the release by activation of the UF, release detection system - Normetex pump to trip the compression source, (3) temporary holdup of the release by the existing process building structure, and (4) training of on site personnel to evacuate areas upon detection of a release by sight or by odor. The existing process building structure is expected to reduce the potential hazardous material concentrations to receptors outside of the building by holdup of a portion of the UF. released and by causing most of the UF. that escapes the building to be released at an elevated point. If workers outside of the process building have received no other instructions for action to be taken (i.e., shelter in place or take cover), then the essential control for these receptors is to evacuate the area if a release is detected by sight or by odor.
Of-sitepublic-As indicated in the consequence analysis, the postulated plugged / blocked process line failure event in the withdrawal facilities without any mitigation other than building holdup will not result d
in consequences that exceed the 10-mg off-site exposure EG for the AE frequency category.
- d. Comnarison With GMH-The EGs for the AE frequency category were compared with the consequences associated with the plugged / blocked process line scenario. EG 4 is addressed by the NCS program. The UF. primary system piping and equipment is the essential preventative control for maintaining the physical integrity of the UF. primary system and meeting EGs 1, 2, and 3. If a UF. primary system integrity failure occurs due to a plugged / blocked process line event, then consequence analysis indicates that an unmitigated release associated with this event would not exceed AE off-site exposure guidelines.
Activation of the UF. release detection system - Normetex pump will minimize the release for the protection of workers outside of the process buildings. Activation of this system in conjunction with operator trauung to evacuate the affected area upon sight or odor detection of a release in accordance with the plant's see and flee policy will maintain exposures of on-site workers within EGs 1 and 2. EG 6 is not applicable to this scenario since no required actions were identified for control area personnel.
e.
S- =-v of SSCs and TSR Controls Based on the results of this analysis, the essential controls for this event are summarized as follows:
l j
UF. release detection system - Normetex pump-detection of a UF.and tripping the pump (EGs 1 and 2);
4.3-132a 1
SAR-PGDP PROPOSED July 23,1999 RAC 97C124,99C029 (RO)
Visual / odor detection of release, worker training, and evacuation of affected area - all on-site workers (EGs 1 and 2);
- Administrative control-personnel protective equipment (PPE) or other protective measures is provided to personnel operating cab-controlled process building cranes (EGs 1 and 2);
Procw building holdup-workers outside process building and the off-site public (EGs 1 and 2); and i
l l
r l
l i
l l
l O
4.3-132b i
F SAR-PGDP PROPOSED July 23,1999 O
RAC 97C124, 97Cl25, 99C029 (RO)
V Primary system piping-maintain primary system integrity (EG 3 only).
Based on the above essential controls, the resulting important to safety SSCs and TSRs are as follows:
l*
The UF, release detection system - Normetex pump, the process buildings, and the UF. primary system piping are identified as important to safety SSCs. See Section 3.15 for details including safety classification.
l*
TSRs are provided for the UF release detection system - Normetex pump.
6 4.3.2.3 Miscellaneous Waste Storage and Handling Facilities The miscellaneous waste storage and handling facilities are listed in Table 4.2-9.
4.3.2.3.1 Large Fire (External Event)
- a. Scenario Descrintion The miscellaneous waste storage and handling facilities primarily handle and store RCRA waste as well as uranium bearing compounds. The most significant hazard associated with a fire is the RCRA waste. Fires can be caused by welding and burning operations, electrical failures, vehicle accidents, etc.
The Fire Protection Program (see Section 5.4) provides a high degree of protection from fires that could occur within the miscellaneous waste storage and handling facilities (see Table 4.2-9). The protection provided is both preventive and mitigative. Some facilities contain fixed fire protection systems (e.g.,
sprinklers and fire extinguishers) which provide additional mitigation for fires. Preventive measures (admmistrative practices) reduce the likelihood of any significant fires within facilities by controlling the amount of combustible materials allowed and by maintaining good housekeeping practices. Therefore, j
a large fire is categorized as an EBE.
i This event was evaluated and it was determined that the consequences could result in significant on-site impact if no mitigation were provided. These consequenu are based on a release of toxic material.
The primary concern associated with this event is the loss of primary system integrity and the release of toxic material. The applicable EGs associated with this event are EGs 1 and 2, as well as EG 6 in the EBE frequency range. Since there is no primary containment system for this type of event, EG 3 does not apply. The essential safety actions associated with meeting these EGs for a large fire include (1) detection of the release, (2) notification of emergency response personnel, and (3) emergency response to evacuate the immediate vicinity and downwind locations so that the exposure of on-site personnel is minimized.
This event is considered to result in the worst consequences for the miscellaneous waste storage and handling facilities and is therefore a limiting event for these facilities.
4.3-133 l
TSR-PGDP July 23,1999 RAC 99C029 (RO)
TABLE OF CONTENTS (Continued)
Eags 2.3.4.5 UF, RELEASE DETECTION SYSTEM - HIGH SPEED CENTRIFUGAL PUMPS (C-315 ONLY).... 2.3-16 2.3.4.6 FACILITY ASSAY LIMITS............
2.3-18 2.3.4.7 CRITICALITY ACCIDENT ALARM SYSTEM 2.3-19 2.3.4.8 FIRE PROTECTION SYSTEM - BUILDING SPRINKLER SYSTEM..................... 2.3-23 2.3.4.9 FIRE PROTECTION SYSTEM - HIGH PRESSURE FIRE WATER DISTRIBUTION MAINS......... 2.3-26 2.3.4.10 FIRE PROTECTION SYSTEM - WATER SUPPLY B ASIN................................ 2.3-28 2.3.4.11 FIRE PROTECTION SYSTEM - HIGH PRESSURE FIRE WATER PUMPS..................... 2.3-30 2.3.4.12 FIRE PROTECTION SYSTEM - HIGH PRESSURE FIRE WATER STORAGE TANK.............. 2.3-33 2.3.4.13 FIRE PROTECTION SYSTEM - HOT WORK LIMITATIONS.......................... 2.3-35 2.3.4.14 CYLINDER SCALE CART MOVEMENT PREVENTION SYSTEM.................... 2.3-36 2.3.4.15 CYLINDER FILLING - PRE-FILL WEIGHT...... 2.3-38 2.3.4.16 CYLINDER FILLING - CYLINDER PRE-FILL j
INSPECTION........................... 2.3-39 l
2.3.4.17 CYLINDER FILLING - CYLINDER FILL LIMIT 2.3-40 l
2.3.4.18 CYLINDER HANDLING - CYLINDER l
DISCONNECTION 2.3-41 2.3.4.19 CYLINDER HANDLING - CYLINDER VALVE COVERS.............................. 2.3-42 2.3.4.20 CYLINDER HANDLING - APPROVED CRANES FOR LIQUID CYLINDERS.................. 2.3-43 2.3.4.21 CYLINDER LIITING RESTRICTION.......... 2.3-44 2.3.4.22 HEATING UF, PLUGS..................... 2.3-45 2.3.4.23 SCALES...............................
2.3-46 2.3.4.24 HIGH SPEED COMPRESSOR MOTOR LOAD INDICATORS.......................... 2.3-46a 2.3.4.25 HIGH SPEED UF, COMPRESSOR MOTOR MANUAL TRIP...............................
- 2. 3-46c 2.3.5 GENERAL DESIGN FEATURES 2.3-47 2.3.5.1 UF, CYLINDER LIFTING FIXTURES.......... 2.3-47 2.3.5.2 CRANE DESIGN......................... 2.3-47 2.3.5.3 UF, CYLINDERS........
2.3-49 2.3.5.4 UF, CYLINDER PIGTAILS.........
2.3-49 2.3.5.5 SCALE CART DESIGN........
2.3-50 2.3.5.6 UF, CONDENSER AND ACCUMULATOR MINIMUM WALL THICKNESS.............. 2.3-50 l
l 2.4 SPECIFIC TSRs FOR ENRICHMENT CASCADE FACILITIES......
2.4-1 2.4.1 OPERATIONAL MODES..........................
2,4-2 O
m
TSR-PGDP PROPOSED July 23,1999 RAC 99C030 (R2) p-SECTION 2.2 SPECIFIC TSRs FOR UF, FEED FACILITIES (C-333-A AND
'q)
C-337-A) 2.2.4 GENERAL LIMITING CONDITIONS FOR OPERATION 2.2.4.14 HIGH CYLINDER PRESSURE SYSTEM (continued) l BASIS:
l l
The high cylinder pressure system is required to minimize the potential of primary system l
integrity failures during pressure increase events by tripping the steam supply when the MAWP l
of the cylinder being heated is reached. ' Die 115 psia actuation pressure for heating all cylinders l
is based on the lowest MAWP of these cylinders. This system is a single channel system and l
is capable of performing its safety function independent af support systems. The heating of a l
UF. cylinder containing an excessive amount of light gases at normal heating temperatures could l
result in the internal cylinder pressure exceeding the hydrostatic test pressure and possibly create l
a UF. release in the autoclave.
l l
In addition, in the event an over filled cylinder is heated in the autoclave the high cylinder l
pressure caused by the reduced void volume may be sufficient to exceed the actuation value and l
thereby stop the cylinder heating and prevent a possible rupture of the cylinder. [SAR l
Sections 3.15.2.6, 4.3.2.2.6, 4.3.2.2.7, 4.3.2.2.9].
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c 2.2-30d
TSR-PGDP PROPOSED July 23,1999 l
RAC 99C029 (RO)
(~s SECTION 2.3 SPECIFIC TSRs FOR PRODUCT AND TAILS WITHDRAWAL FACILITIES 2.3.2 SAFETY LIMITS 1
2.3.2.1 TEXT DELETED l
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2.3.2.2 UF CONDENSER COOLANT PRESSURE
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V SL 2.3.2.2: C-310: UF. condenser R-114 coolant pressure shall not exceed 220 psig.
C-315: UF. condenser R-114 coolant pressure shall not exceed 440 psig.
APPLICABILITY: Modes: All BASIS:
The UF condensers in C-310 and C-315 withdrawal areas are designed and manufactured under AShE code regulations with a MAWP of 200 and 400 psig, respectively. These pressure vessels l
were origmally hydrostatically tested at 150 percent of the MAWP and are tested by nondestructive examination every five years to ensure their wall thicknesses meet or exceed the minimum wall thicknesses as specified by code. The safety limits are ultimately based on preserving the structural integrity of the UF condensers. The AShE code requires that the pressure transient during relief from this type ofvessel not exceed 110% ofMAWP. Thus, the safety limit is established at 220 psig and 440 psig for the C-310 and C-315 UF, condenser R-ll4 systems, respectively (110% of MAWP). [SAR Sections 3.15.3.4 and 3.15.4.6]
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TSR-PGDP PROPOSED July 23,1999 RAC 99C029 (RO)
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SECTION 2.3 SPECIFIC TSRs FOR PRODUCT AND TAILS WITHDRAWAL r
FACILITIES 2.3.3 LIMITING CONTROL SETTINGS, LIMITING CONDITIONS FOR OPERATION, SURVEILLANCES 2.3.3.2 R-II4 COOLANT OVERPRESSURE CONTROL SYSTEM LCS 2.3.3.2: C-310: The R-114 coolant rupture discs shall actuate at or below 210 psig.
C-315: The R-114 coolant mpture discs shall actuate at or below 420 psig.
LCO 2.3.3.2: The R-114 coolant overpressure relief system shall be operable.
APPLICABILITY: Modes: 2 ACTIONS:
Condition Required Action Completion Time A.
R-114 coolant overpressure A.1 Place the condenser in Ihour relief systeminoperable.
mode 3.
B.
The R-114 coolant B.1 Open the valve or Immediately.
overpressure relief system verify it is open.
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manualisolation valve ANR found unsealed or closed.
B.2 Reseal the valve.
8 hours9.259259e-5 days <br />0.00222 hours <br />1.322751e-5 weeks <br />3.044e-6 months <br /> C.
Action item B not C.1 Place the UF Immediately.
6 satisfactorily completed.
condenser in mode 3.
SURVEILLANCE REOUIREMENTS:
Surveillance Frequency SR 2.3.3.2-1 Visually inspect the R-114 coolant condenser Quarterly overpressure control system manual isolation valve to ensure it is sealed open.
BASIS:
The AShE code requires that overpressure relief be provided by a device stamped at or below the MAWP and sized such that the subsequent transient pressure will be limited to a maximum of 110%
ofMAWP when a single relief path is used. AShE code allows rupture discs to have a
- 5% burst tolerance. Rupture discs stamped at MAWP will therefore burst at or below 105% of MAWP. Thus, the LCS is set at 105% of MAWP. To comply with these standards, pressure relief devices are purchased and installed on the coolant condensers with stamped ratings at or below the MAWP.
[SAR Sections 3.15.3.4 and 3.15.4.6]
l 2.3-7
c TSR-PGDP July 23,1999 RAC 99C029 (RO)
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SECTION 2.3 SPECIFIC TSRs FOR PRODUCT AND TAILS WITHDRAWAL FACILITIES 2.3.4 GENERAL LIMITING CONDITIONS FOR OPERATION 2.3.4.1 UF, RELEASE DETECTION AND ISOLATION SYSTEM - LOW VOLTAGE
("NEW") SYSTEM AT THE UF, WITHDRAWAL STATIONS LCO 2.3.4.1: The low voltage ("New") withdrawal station UF, release detection and isolation system shall be operable.
APPLICABILITY: Modes: When the applicable withdrawal station is in mode 2.
j ACTIONS:
I Condition Action Completion Time i
A.
The low voltage detector A.1 Ensure the ACRis manned Initiate within I hour l
head at the withdrawal and perform UF smoke and maintain l
6 station is inoperable, watch on area affected by continuously.
PGLD detection head inoperability.
AND 72 hours8.333333e-4 days <br />0.02 hours <br />1.190476e-4 weeks <br />2.7396e-5 months <br /> A.2 Restore operability to the O
iow voiiase detector head.
TSR 1.6.2.2(d)is not applicable.
B.
The low voltage detector B.1 Place the affected Ihour head at the withdrawal withdrawal station in mode station is inoperable and the 3.
ACR manualisolation button is inoperable.
C.
Either the liquid block valve C.1 Restore operability.
72 hours8.333333e-4 days <br />0.02 hours <br />1.190476e-4 weeks <br />2.7396e-5 months <br /> or the emergency liquid block valve is inoperable.
D.
Action item A or C not D.1 Place the affected Ihour satisfactorily accomplished.
withdrawal station in mode 3.
E.
Both the liquid block valve E.1 Place the affected Ihour and the emergency liquid withdrawal station in mode block valve are inoperable.
3.
F.
The cylinder valve closer F.1 Place the affected Ihour mechanism is inoperable.
withdrawal station in mode 3, closing the cylinder valve manually (valve O
closer mav de removed).
2.3-8
TSR-PGDP July 23,1999 RAC 99C029 (RO)
,^
SECTION 2.3 SPECIFIC TSRs FOR PRODUCT AND TAILS WITHDRAWAL FACILITIES 2.3.4 GENERAL LIMITING CONDITIONS FOR OPERATION 2.3.4.I UF, RELEASE DETECTION AND ISOLATION SYSTEM - LOW VOLTAGE
("NEW") SYSTEM AT THE UF, WITHDRAWAL STATIONS (continued)
SURVEILLANCE REQUIREMENTS:
Surveillance Frequency SR 2.3.4.1-1 Functional test by actuating the detector bead with Quarterly i
" smoke." Appropriate drain station valves (liquid block and emergency liquid block) must close within 15 seconds j
of detection. The cylinder valve must close within 30 1
seconds of detection.
SR 2.3.4.1-2 Functional test of the ACR " containment" push-button for Quarterly i
each withdrawal station. Liquid block valve, emergency liquid block valve, and cylinder valve must close.
SR 2.3.4.1-3 Verify that nitrogen is available to power the receiving Quarterly cylinder valve closer air motor in order to close the cylinder valve (pressure check).
SR 2.3.4.1-4 Verify that the antomatic transfer from plant air to nitrogen Quarterly is operable for the receiving cylinder valve closer.
SR 2.3.4.1-5 Verify that the check valve on the air supply line to the Quarterly transfer cylinder valve closer air motorjust upstream cf the nitrogen supply interface is operable.
BASIS:
The reaction of UF and water (free atmospheric humidity) in the case of a UF release produces 6
uranyl fluoride (UO F ) as particulates and hydrogen fluoride (HF) as a gas which will hydrate. The 22 UO F and HF*x(H O) are highly visible as " smoke." The UF, release detection safety system is 22 2
provided on systems which contain gaseous or liquid UF above atmospheric pressure. This system j
6 includes (1) automatic detection and isolation, and (2) manual isolation capability. Only the automatic isolation capability is required by the accident analysis to mitigate an event and satisfy l
the LCO. The system is designed to automatically close the liquid block, emergency liquid block, l
and cylinder valves if smoke is detected at the withdrawal position. The detection of a UF release 6
is based on detection of the smoke resulting from the reaction UF with moisture in the air. Failure of the cylinder pigtail during the filling of a cylinder would result in a UF, release. Operation of this l
system to detect a UF, release and close the isolation valves (including the cylinder valve) within j
30 seconds after detection minimizes the quantity of UF. released. This system can be automatically l
O actuated by a low voltage detector over each withdrawal position or it can be initiated manually via
(.J containment switches /pushbuttons located in the l
2.3-9 l
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TSR-PGDP July 23,1999 RAC 99C029 (RO)
SECTION 2.3 SPECIFIC TSRs FOR PRODUCT AND TAILS WITHDRAWAL FACILITIES 2.3.4 GENERAL LIMITING CONDITIONS FOR OPERATION 2.3.4.1 UF, RELEASE DETECTION AND ISOLATION SYSTEM - LOW VOLTAGE
("NEW") SYSTEM AT THE UF, WITHDRAWAL STATIONS (continued)
BASIS (continued):
' ACR. In the event the UF detectors are inoperable, a smoke watch is established in the affected area to assure the process is monitored during the period permitted by the LCO. Upon sight or odor cietection of a release, the " smoke watch" will contact the ACR operator who will initiate manual activation of the system via switches /pushbuttons located in the ACR. [SAR Sections 3.15.4.1, 4.3.2.2.4 and 4.3.2.2.11]
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2.3-9a
TSR-PGDP July 23,1999 RAC 99C029 (RO)
SECTION 2.3 SPECIFIC TSRs FOR PRODUCT AND TAILS WITHDRAWAL FACILITIES 2.3.4 GENERAL LIMITING CONDITIONS FOR OPERATION 2.3.4.2 UF, RELEASE DETECTION SYSTEM - LOW VOLTAGE SYSTEM AT THE UF, WITHDRAWAL ROOM CEILING (continued)
BASIS:
The reaction of UF, and water (free atmospheric humidity) in the case of a UF release produces uranyl fluoride (UO F ) as paniculates and hydrogen fluoride (HF) as a gas which will hydrate. The 22 UO F and HF*x(H O) are highly visible as " smoke." The UF, release detection system is prosided 22 2
on systems which contain gaseous or liquid UF above atmospheric pressure. The UF, detection l
system contains detectors which use an ionization chamber in which air is made conductive by the use of an alpha emitter [SAR Section 3.15.7.3].
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2.3-11
TSR-PGDP July 23,1999 RAC 99C029 (RO) 3 SECTION 2.3 SPECIFIC TSRs FOR PRODUCT AND TAILS WITHDRAWAL (U
FACILITIES 2.3.4 GENERAL LIMITING CONDITIONS FOR OPERATION 2.3.4.3 UF, RELEASE DETECTION SYSTEM - NORMETEX PUMP (continued)
SURVEILLANCE REOUIREMENTS:
Surveillance Frequency SR. 2.3.4.3-1 Functional test by actuating each combination of Annually two adjacent detector heads with " smoke." The Normetex pump discharge valve must close and pump must trip.
BASIS:
The reaction of UF, and water (free atmospheric humidity) in the case of a UF release produces uranyl fluoride (UO F ) as paniculates and hydrogen fluoride (HF) as a gas which will hydrate. The 22 UO F and HF*x(H O) are highly visible as " smoke." The UF, release detection safety system is 2 2 2
provided on systems which contain gaseous or liquid UF above atmospheric pressure. The UF l
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detection system contains detectors which use an ionization chamber in which air is made Q
conductive by the use of an alpha emitter. The safety function of this system is to trip the pump, l
V limiting the quantity of UF released. The UF, detection system contains four detectors. Firing of l
6 two adjacent detectors causes the pump to trip. [SAR Sections 3.15.4.8,4.3.2.2.4,4.3.2.2.12, and l
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4.3.2.2.17]
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TSR-PGDP July 23,1999 RAC 99C029 (RO) r-SECTION 2.3 SPECIFIC TSRs FOR PRODUCT AND TAILS WITHDRAWAL
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FACILITIES 2.3.4 GENERAL LIMITING CONDITIONS FOR OPERATION 2.3.4.4 UF, RELEASE DETECTION SYSTEM - HIGH VOLTAGE ("OLD")
i SYSTEM FOR UF, CONDENSERS, ACCUMULATORS, AND PIPING HEATED HOUSINGS (continued) i BASIS:
UF, detection is provided above the UF, condensers, accumulators, and heated housings. These detectors are on a high-voltage system and when activated sound alarms in the local control room.
(The building alarm will sound for C-315.)
In the event of a failure of the UF, release detection system, the stationing of an operator at the affected equipment would assure monitoring of the system to determine if any outleakage of UF, should occur and would provide surveillance capability until the system can be repaired. The real l
safety hazard is when UF is released into the area inhabited by plant personnel. UF, released inside 6
the heated housing is not of significant safety concern unless it leaks from the (non-air tight) housing. Thus, a smoke watch posted outside the housing, watching for " smoke" escaping the heated housing into the occupied spaces, is capable ofproviding an adequate level of safety. [SAR Section 3.15.7.3]
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p TSR-PGDP July 23,1999 RAC 99C029 (RO) eq SECTION 2.3 SPECIFIC TSRs FOR PRODUCT AND TAILS WITHDRAWAL Q
FACILITIES 1
l 2.3.4 GENERAL LIMITING CONDITIONS FOR OPERATION 2.3.4.5 UF, RELEASE DETECTION SYSTEM - HIGH SPEED CENTRIFUGAL PUMPS (C-315 ONLY)(continued)
BASIS:
The reaction of UF, and water (free atmospheric humidity) in the case of a UF release produces uranyl fluoride (UO F ) as particulates and hydrogen fluoride (HF) as a gas. The UO F pnd 22 2
HF*x(H O) are highly visible as " smoke." The UF, release detection sy:; tem is provided on systems 2
which contain gaseous or liquid UF, above atmospheric pressure. The UF, detection system contains detectors which use an ionization chamber in which air is made conductive by the use of an alpha emitter [SAR Sections 3.15.7.3 and 4.3.2.2.1].
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i TSR-PGDP July 23,1999 RAC 99C029 (RO)
SECTION 2.3 SPECIFIC TSRs FOR PRODUCT AND TAILS WITHDRAWAL p/
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FACILITIES 2.3.4 GENERAL LIMITING CONDITIONS FOR OPERATION 2.3.4.6 FACILITY ASSAY LIMITS LCO 2.3.4.6: Product Withdrawal facility and equipment contained therein (with the exception of the North NaF traps) shall not be operated at assays greater than 2.75 wt % usU.
The Nonh NaF traps located in the Product Withdrawal facility shall not be operated at assays greater than 2.0 wt % "'U.
Tails Withdrawal facility and equipment contained therein shall not be operated at assays greater than or equal to 1.0 wt % "5U.
APPLICABILITY: Modes: At alltimes ACTIONS:
Condition Required Action Completion Time A.
Assay exceeds analyzed safe A.1 Initiate actions to Immediately limit.
reduce assay.
SURVEILLANCE REQUIREMENTS: None.
G BASIS:
Product Withdrawal Facility has been analyzed for criticality concerns. The C-310/310-A facility, including the UF, accumulators, condensers, traps, scale pits, and product cylinders, is approved for operation up to 2.75 wt % usU. The north bank 16-inch diameter NaF traps of the product l
withdrawal facility are approved for operation up to 2.0 wt. % "'U. Tails Withdrawal Facility has not been analyzed for criticality concerns. Therefore, the maximum assay in the facility must be limited to less than 1.0 wt % "'U below which nuclear criticality concerns are negligible. [SAR Sections 4.3.2.6 and 5.2, Appendix A]
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p TSR-PGDP July 23,1999 RAC 99C029 (RO) p.
SECTION 2.3 SPECIFIC TSRs FOR PRODUCT AND TAILS WITHDRAWAL V
FACILITIES 2.3.4 GENERAL LIMITING CONDITIONS FOR OPERATION 2.3.4.7 CRITICALITY ACCIDENT ALARM SYSTEM (continued)
SURVEILLANCE REQUIREMENTS:
Surveillance Frequency SR 2.3.4.7a-1 Calibrate CAAS system equipment.
Annually BASIS:
The CAAS is used to warn plant personnel of a criticality or radiation accident. This system is designed to detect radiation and provide a distinctive, audible signal which will alert personnel to move from those work areas which are potentially affected. The design of the system, three detector modules per cluster, provides protection for criticality events even with partial losses of required equipment. The CAAS also provides detection coverage in most areas by using an overlapping pattern ofindividual cluster units. Criticality concerns with the product withdrawal facility are associated with the movement of fissionable materials. The action items maintain the facility in f
steady state operations to limit the potential for these concerns to the extent possible. Providing
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another means of coverage (i.e., portable detector / alarm, personal alarm device), restricting operations, or restricting access to the area in the event of the loss of detection will establish protection. [SAR Sections 3.15.7.1 and 4.3.2.6]
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2.3-20
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TSR-PGDP July 23,1999 RAC 99C029 (RO)
SECTION 2.3 SPECIFIC TSRs FOR PRODUCT AND TAILS WITHDRAWAL (m)
FACILITIES 2.3.4 GENERAL LIMITING CONDITIONS FOR OPERATION 2.3.4.7 CRITICALITY ACCIDENT ALARM SYSTEM (continued)
SURVEILLANCE REQUIREMENTS:
Surveillance Frequency SR 2.3.4.7b-1 Test the CAAS and building horns.
Quarterly SR 2.3.4.7b-2 Verify that the CAAS air accumulator supply Quarterly pressure to the building horns is at least 129 psig.
j BASIS:
The CAAS is used to warn plant personnel of a criticality or radiation accident. This cystem is designed to detect radiation and provide a distinctive, audible signal which will alert persomel to move from those work areas which are potentially affected. Audibility is not provided for areas in permit-required confined spaces. A " buddy system" is used to ensure personnel working in these areas are notified of alarms in order to evacuate. One person remains outside the area and maintains contact with personnel in the area. Evacuation of the area ofinaudibility and restricting access to O
those areas will eliminate the potential for increased consequences due to personnel not hearing an O
alarm. The design of the system, three detector modules per cluster, provides protection for criticality events even with partial losses of required equipment. The CAAS also provides detection coverage in most areas by using an overlapping pattern of individual cluster units. Criticality concerns with the product withdrawal facility are associated with the movement of fissionable materials. The action items maintain the facility in steady state operations to limit the potential for these concerns to the extent possible. The alarm signal is provided by sounding building horns which sound upon a signal from any cluster. Providing another means of coverage (i.e., portable detector / alarm, personal alarm device, etc.), restricting operations, or restricting access to the area in the event of the loss of alarms will establish protection. [SAR Sections 3.15.7.1, and 4.3.2.6]
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The CAAS air accumulators provide for 120 seconds of horn actuation when at their minimum acceptable pressure of 129 psig. Electronic horns are installed in some areas. These horns have battery backup power supplies which will provide for at least 120 seconds of horn actuation even if off-site power is lost.
The quarterly surveillance of the CAAS building horns consists of placing the cluster in the test mode with a keyswitch, and manually causing two detector modules to generate radiation readings above the alann setpoint. The cluster electronics determines that this meets the high radiation alarm criteria and propagates a high radiation alarm signal to the rest of the system. This signal activates the high radiation alarm light and bell in C-300 and activates the building CAAS horns and lights.
l Each horn and light is qualitatively verified to be operating. This test is a horn and light functional I
test and each module combination is tested to generate the high radiation signal.
n 2.3-22
TSR-PGDP July 23,1999 RAC 99C029 (RO) p SECTION 2.3 SPECIFIC TSRs FOR PRODUCT AND TAILS WITHDRAWAL FACILITIES 2.3.4 GENERAL LIMITING CONDITIONS FOR OPERATION 2.3.4.7 CRITICALITY ACCIDENT ALARM SYSTEM (continued)
SURVEILLANCE REOUIREMENTS:
Surveillance Frequency SR 2.3.4.7c-1 Test the CAAS, local cluster horns and building Quarterly horns.
SR 2.3.4.7c-2 Verify that the nitrogen supply pressure to the Quarterly j
cluster horns is at least 900 psig.
BASIS:
The CAAS is used to warn plant personnel of a criticality or radiation accident. This system is designed to detect radiation and provide a distinctive, audible signal which will alert personnel to move from those work areas which are potentially affected. Evacuation of the area ofinaudibility and restricting access to those areas will eliminate the potential for increased consequences due to personnel not hearing an alarm. The design of the system, three detector modules per cluster, N(b provides protection for criticality events even with partial losses of required equipment. The CAAS also provides detection coverage in most areas by using an overlapping pattern ofindividual cluster units. Criticality concerns with the product withdrawal facility are associated with the movement of fissionable materials. The action items maintain the facility in steady state operations to limit the potential for these concems to the extent possible. The alarm signal is provided by sounding a local hom associated with each individual cluster and building horns which sound upon a signal from any cluster. Providing another means of coverage (i.e., portable detector / alarm, personal alarm desice, etc.), restricting operations, or restricting access to the area in the event of the loss of alarms will establish protection. [SAR Sections 3.15.7.1 and 4.3.2.6]
l The nitrogen bottles which backup plant air for the local cluster horns are standard cylinder size l A (1.55 fP, 9 x 51 inches) and provide for 120 seconds of horn actuation when at their minimum acceptable pressure of 900 psig.
The quarterly surveillance of the CAAS, local cluster horns and building horns consists of placing the cluster in the test mode with a keyswitch, and manually causing two detector modules to generate radiation readings above the alarm setpoint. The cluster electronics determines that this meets the high radiation alarm criteria and propagates a high radiation alarm signal to the rest of the system. This signal activates the high radiation alarm light and bell in C-300, causes the local cluster to sound and activates the building CAAS horns and lights. Each horn and light is qualitatively verified to be operating. This test is a horn and light functional test and each module combination is tested to generate the high radiation signal.
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2.3-22b
i TSR-PGDP July 23,1999 RAC 99C029 (RO) i SECTION 2.3 SPECIFIC TSRs FOR PRODUCT AND TAILS WITHDRAWAL c()
l FACILITIES 2.3.4 GENERAL LIMITING CONDITIONS FOR OPERATION 2.3.4.8 FIRE PROTECTION SYSTEM - BUILDING SPRINKLER SYSTEM (continued) i BASIS:
As discussed in the SAR accident analysis, an unmitigated lube oil fire could cause failure of the j
stmetural steel followed by localized collapse of the structure. This collapse could damage process piping allowing a release of UF.. A large fire could also cause a primary system failure due to overtemperature. The sprinkler system will minimize the potential for and mitigate the effects of a large fire.
The portions of the high pressure fire protection system (HPFWS) required to mitigate a lube oil fire in the product and tails withdrawal facilities include the automatic wet-pipe sprinkler systems in buildings C-310 and C-315; the HPFWS distribution mains, water storage tank and pumps; and the C-631-2 cooling tower basin. The dry pipe sprinkler system in C-310 (canopy area for product withdrawal) and the deluge system located adjacent to C-315 (exterior transformer) are part of the sanitary and fire water system and are not subject to the LCO. They are excluded since a fire within the areas protected by these systems would have no impact upon process piping.
l The sprinkler systems provide primary fire suppression capability for the areas in which they are (v) installed. If a system is not functional or has a closed valve, backup fire suppression will be provided by hose streams supplied from fire hydrants located adjacent to the affected building. The sprinkler system also provides primary fire detection for the affected areas by supplying flow annunciation upon system actuation. Hourly fire patrols will provide backup fire detection capability.
Surveillance Requirement 2.3.4.8-2 functional tests include the opening of an ITV and a main drain flow test. The ITV test simulates the actuation of a single sprinkler head and then verifies that an alarm in C-300 is actuated by the sprinkler system alarm valve. This valve will only alarm on sustained water flow due to a buih-in 32-second time delay. The time delay feature " filters" out flow pulses which might be caused by short-lived pressure transients in the system, and thus only alarms on true sustained water flow. If the C-300 alarm fails to annunciate within the required time, it could be an indication of either an electrical or mechanical problem. The 90-second response criteria is consistent with NFPA 25 and 72. The ITV and main drain flow tests will also verify that upstream control valves are open and there are no line blockages in the system's water supply piping.
Positions ofindicating control valves and seals on non-indicating control valves will be sisually verified monthly. Non-indicating valves with missing or broken seals will be cycled and new seals installed. All control valves will be cycled annually. [SAR Sections 3.15.7.2, 4.3.2.1.9 and 4.3.2.2.16]
Ov 2.3-25
TSR-PGDP July 23,1999 RAC 99C029 (RO)
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SECTION 2.3 SPECIFIC TSRs FOR PRODUCT AND TAILS WITHDRAWAL FACILITIES 2.3.4 GENERAL LIMITING CONDITIONS FOR OPERATION 2.3.4.9 FIRE PROTECTION SYSTEM - HIGH PRESSURE FIRE WATER DISTRIBUTION MAINS (continued)
SURVEILLANCE REOUIREMENTS:
Surveillance Frequency i
SR 2.3.4.9-1 Verify sectional valves in the flow paths are Monthly open.
SR 2.3.4.9-2 Cycle all sectional valves in direct flow p uh.
Annually SR 2.3.4.9-3 Flow test at least 1 HPFWS fire hydrant Annually adjacent to each process building (distribution system test).
BASIS:
All required sprinkler systems have at least two supply paths from the HPFWS pumps through the p
distribution mains Hence, the closure ofone of the sectional valves in Condition A of this TSR will V
not cause a loss of function of any required sprinkler system. If two or more sectional valves are closed, the ability to supply water to the required sprinkler systems can be lost. This would be identified by Action B. A temporary water supply will be provided consisting ofhoses connected between one or more fire hydrants and the fire deparunent connection (s) on the affected sprinkler system (s). The hoses are to be in place and connected to satisfy Condition C. The hoses will only be pressurized with HPFWS water in the event of a fire.
Positions ofindicating sectional valves and seals on non-indicating sectional valves will be visually verified monthly. Non-indicating valves with missing or broken seals will be cycled and new seals installed. All sectional valves will be cycled annually. [SAR Sections 3.15.7.2, 4.3.2.1.9 and 4.3.2.2.16]
pG 2.3-27
TSR-PGDP July 23,1999 RAC 99C029 (RO)
A SECTION 2.3 SPECIFIC TSRs FOR PRODUCT AND TAILS WITHDRAWAL U
FACILITIES 2.3.4 GENERAL LIMITING CONDITIONS FOR OPERATION 2.3.4.10 FIRE PROTECTION SYSTEM - WATER SUPPLY BASIN (continued)
SURVEILLANCE REOUIREMENTS:
Surveillance Frequency SR 2.3.4.10-1 Verify water levelin the C-631-2 RCW Monthly cooling tower basin is within 5 feet of the top of the basin.
l BASIS:
The C-631-2 RCW cooling tower basin and the wetwell under the C-631 building are connected by a flume. Tneir combined volume provides the source ofwater to all the HPRVS pumps. They will hold over 4 million gallons of water when the level is within 5 feet of the top of the basin. At this level, the usable volume ofwater available to HPRVS pumps 2 and 3, which take a suction through (n
the side of the basin, will exceed the 825,000 gallons needed to satisfy maximum system demands of 6,875 gpm for a two hour duration. [ Note: This requirement is conservative with respect to the system evaluation presented in SAR Section 3.15.7.2.] HPFWS pumps 5 and 6 take a suction from the C-631-1 wetwell. Their suction intakes are at a lower elevation than those of the other two pumps and can draw on more than 3.5 million gallons of water. If the basin level drops to 15 feet from the top of the basin, the suctions of HPRVS pumps 2 and 3 will be uncovered. However, HPRVS pumps 5 and 6 will stii! have an adequate water volume to meet the maximum system demands for two hours.
Normal makeup flow to the basin is from the plant water system. If the water drops below the required level and can not be restored by normal makeup, emergency makeup will be initiated to I
dedicate all plant water system output to the basin. If needed, crossover valves can also be opened to supply up to 9,000 gpm from the C-633 basin.
Basin water level is verified by visual observation of a graduated measuring device. [SAR Sections 3.15.7.2,4.3.2.1.9 and 4.3.2.2.16]
AU 2.3-29
1 TSR-PGDP July 23,1999 RAC 99C029 (RO)
(~S SECTION 2.3 SPECIFIC TSRs FOR PRODUCT AND TAILS WITHDRAWAL
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FACILITIES 2.3.4 GENERAL LIMITING CONDITIONS FOR OPERATION 2.3.4.11 FIRE PROTECTION SYSTEM - IIIGH PRESSURE FIRE WATER PUMPS (continued)
SURVEILLANCE REQUIREMENTS:
Surveillance Frequency SR 2.3.4.11-1 Manually start fire water pumps.
Monthly j
SR 2.3.4.11-2 Automatic start of fire water pumps on simulated Annually loss of fire system pressure.
SR 2.3.4.11-3 Calibrate the switches that provide the automatic Annually l
start signals to the HPFWS pumps.
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SR 2.3.4.11-4 Verify HPFWS pumps 2,3, 5, and 6 will flow at Annually l
least 90% of their rated capacity at their rated pressure.
BASIS:
The HPFWS pumps must be capable of satisfying the maximum sprinkler system and hose stream demands of 4,875 gpm and 2,000 gpm respectively. This results in a combined pumping capacity requirement of 6,875 gpm. [ Note: This requirement is conservative with respect to the system l
evaluation presented in SAR Section 3.15.7.2.]
l Pumps 2,3,5, and 6 are rated at 125 psi TDH and have rated capacities of 4,625 gpm,4,625 gpm, 4,500 gpm, and 4,500 gpm respectively. To allow for degradation of the pumps over time, only 90%
of the rated pump flow is relied upon to satisfy system flow demands. The two pumps with the smallest flow capacities can supply a combined flow of 8,100 gpm under degraded conditions.
When the HPFWS storage tank is 90% full, it is capable of supplying 2,250 gpm for two hours. This flow combined with the flow from one degraded HPFWS pump would fall shon of satisfying maximum system demand by no more than 575 gpm. The shon fall can be addressed by the use of a fire pumper tmck taking a suction from a cooling tower basin and discharging through a fire hydrant te the system distribution mains. If such a temporary water supply is needed to satisfy 2.3-31
I TSR-PGDP July 23,1999 RAC 99C029 (RO)
SECTION 2.3 SPECIFIC TSRs FOR PRODUCT AND TAILS WITHDRAWAL n
(,)
FACILITIES 2.3.4 GENERAL LIMITING CONDITIONS FOR OPERATION 2.3.4.11 FIRE PROTECTION SYSTEM - HIGH PRESSURE FIRE WATER PUMPS (continued)
BASIS (continued):
Condition A, the pumper and required hoses / pipes will be pre-positioned. The hoses / pipes will not be filled with water except in the event of a fire.
l When only one HPFWS pump is operable, the C-300 operators will manually start the pump upon notification of a fire. This is necessary since the automatic start of the pump would not i
occur until after the HPFWS storage tank level drops below 40% full.
1 If no HPFWS pumps are operable or Condition A cannot be satisfied, the off site fire departments will be alerted so they will be ready to provide assistance if needed. Also, temporary sources of pumping capacity will be sought to restore design capacity within 72 hours8.333333e-4 days <br />0.02 hours <br />1.190476e-4 weeks <br />2.7396e-5 months <br />.
HPFWS pump 1 is a jockey pump and has a rated capacity of only 200 gpm. It cannot be used O
to satisfy the TSR Condition Requirements since it will be dead headed when the larger HPFWS
(
pumps are operating. HPFWS pump 4 is not operable and has been abandoned in place.
level in the HPFWS storage tank is normally maintained by HPFWS pump 1. If water demand on the system exceeds the capacity of this pump, tank level and system pressure will drop.
Switches in each of the fire pump controllers will automatically start the fire pumps sequentially until the system demand is satisfied. [SAR Sections 3.15.7.2, 4.3.2.1.9 and 4.3.2.2.16]
l l
llO l
2.3-32
TSR-PGDP July 23,1999 RAC 99C029 (RO) p SECTION 2.3 SPECIFIC TSRs FOR PRODUCT AND TAILS WITHDRAWAL Q-FACILITIES 2.3.4 GENERAL LIMITING CONDITIONS FOR OPERATION 2.3.4.12 FIRE PROTECTION SYSTEM - HIGH PRESSURE FIRE WATER STORAGE TANK (continued)
SURVEILLANCE REQUIREMENTS:
Surveillance Frequency SR 2.3.4.12-1 Verify that the HPFWS storage tank contains at Monthly least 270,000 gallons of water (filled to at least 90% capacity).
SR 2.3.4.12-2 Visual inspection of exterior of HPFWS storage Annually tank.
BASIS:
The pressure in the HPFWS system is maintained by the 300,000 gallon elevated storage tank.
O When the tank is 90% full, it is capable of supplying maximum sprinkler system and hose
-O stream demands of 6,875 gpm [ Note: This requirement is conservative with respect to the system l
evaluation presented in SAR Section 3.15.7.2.] for approximately 39 minutes. It is also capable l
of supplying 2,250 gpm for a duration of two hours which is slightly greater than 32% of the I
water required for maximum fire protection demands.
l.evel in the tank is normally maintained by the 200 gpm capacity HPFWS pump 1. If water demand on the system exceeds the capacity of this pump, tank level and system pressure will drop. Switches in each of the fire pump controllers will automatically start the fire pumps sequentially until system demand is satisfied. [SAR Sections 3.15.7.2, 4.3.2.1.9 and 4.3.2.2.16]
l l
l i
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2.3-34 i
y TSR-PGDP July 23,1999 RAC 99C029 (RO)
J p
SECTION 2.3 SPECIFIC TSRs FOR PRODUCT AND TAILS WITHDRAWAL V
FACILITIES 2.3.4 GENERAL LIMITING CONDITIONS FOR OPERATION i
2.3.4.14 CYLINDER SCALE CART MOVEMENT PREVENTION SYSTEM (continued)
SURVEILLANCE REQUIREMENTS:
Surveillance Frequency SR 2.3.4.14-1 Test the system quarterly to verify that the Quarterly scale cart will not move unless the pigtail is at atmospheric pressure (* 3 psi using installed instrumentation) and the key interlock energized.
SR 2.3.4.14-2 Calibrate the system's detection and Annually initiation pressure instrumentation.
BASIS:
This system helps prevent receiving cylinder pigtail failure and subsequent UF release by 6
q prohibiting scale cart movement if the transfer manifold pressure indicates the potential presence tv ofliquid UF,(pressure significantly above atmosphere). The 3 psi tolerance around atmosphere is based purely upon engineeringjudgement. [SAR Section 3.15.6.5]
l pV l
2.3-37 l
L
TSR-PGDP July 23,1999 RAC 99CO29 (RO) q SECTION 2.3 SPECIFIC TSRs FOR PRODUCT AND TAILS WITHDRAWAL i
)
FACILITIES 2.3.4 GENERAL LIMITING CONDITIONS FOR OPERATION 2.3.4.15 CYLINDER FILLING - PRE-FILL WEIGHT LCO 2.3.4.15: UF, cylinders shall not be filled with 2 1% 2"U material if they contain greater than 40 pounds of moderating or unknown material until a verification of the cylinder's contents has been performed.
APPLICABILITY: Modes: I and 2 ACTIONS:
Condition Required Action Completion Time A.
Cylinder being prepared for A.1 Reject the cylinder Prior to entering mode 2 withdrawal operation for filling until with a 1% "U material.
2 involving material a 1%
either its contents 2"U discovered to have are verified or the greater than 40 pounds of moderating /unknow moderating or unknown n material has been matedal.
removed.
p%.]
SURVEILLANCE REQUIREMENTS:
Surveillance Frequency SR 2.3.4.15-1 Weigh each UF, cylinder to be filled.
Prior to entering mode 2.
I BASIS:
Controls for nuclear criticality safety of cylinders containing material enriched to 2: 1.0 wt %
"U is in the form of moderation control by limiting the amount of potentially moderating material allowed to be present in the cylinder. Cylinders having an excess of 40 pounds of known moderating or unknown material are suspected of having a source of moderation. At 5.5 wt % 2"U, over 50 pounds of water are required to initiate and sustain a nuclear criticality.
[NCSE 3974-05 (August 1993)]. Verification (by weighing) of the cylinder's contents prior to filling assures that moderating materials have not been inadvertently introduced. [SAR Section l
4.3.2.2.11]
l 2.3-38
TSR-PGDP July 23,1999 RAC 99C029 (RO) p SECTION 2.3 SPECIFIC TSRs FOR PRODUCT AND TAILS WITIIDRAWAL
'd FACILITIES 2.3.4 GENERAL LIMITING CONDITIONS FOR OPERATION 2.3.4.16 CYLINDER FILLING - CYLINDER PRE-FILL INSPECTION LCO 2.3.4.16: Damaged UF cylinders shall not be filled with UF.
6 APPLICABILITY: Modes: I and 2 ACTIONS:
Condition Required Action Completion Time A.
Unacceptable cylinder Repair and test (if Prior to entering mode 2 damage identified by necessary) the cylinder in with the subject cylinder.
cylinder pre-fill visual accordance with SAR inspection.
Section 3.7.1 and SAR Figure 3.7-1.
SURVEILLANCE REQUIREMENTS:
Surveillance
(
Frequency
\\
SR 2.3.4.16-1 Cylinder visual inspection for damage.
Prior to initial entry into mode 2 of each cylinder filling cycle.
BASIS:
Depending upon the degree of damage (detected during the pre-use inspection), a cylinder may 4
or may not be capable of withstanding its hydropressure. A UF. cylinder is removed from service for repair or replacement when it has leaks, excessive corrosion, cracks, bulges, dents, gouges, defective valves, damaged stiffening rings or skirts, or other conditions that, in the judgement of the inspector, renders it unsafe or unserviceable. Some types of cylinder damage l
and/or deformities are acceptable as-is or after repair. [SAR Sections 3.15.6.1, 4.3.2.2.11 and l
4.3.2.2.15]
l
)
v 2.3-39
r TSR-PGDP July 23,1999 RAC 99C029 (RO)
SECTION 2.3 SPECIFIC TSRs FOR PRODUCT AND TAILS WITHDRAWAL
^h FACILITIES 2.3.4 GENERAL LIMITING CONDITIONS FOR OPERATION l
2.3.4.17 CYLINDER FILLING - CYLINDER FILL LIMIT LCO 2.3.4.17:
The accountability weight of UF, drained into the receiving cylinder shall not exceed the standard fill limit (Maximum Fill Limit for Shipment for cylinders other than tails cylinders, or the Maximum Fill Limit for In-Plant Tails Storage for tails cylinders per TSR Section 2.3, Appendix A) for that cylinder.
APPLICABILITY: Modes: 2 ACTIONS:
Condition Required Action Completion Time j
A.
Cylinder filled beyond A.1 Connect cylinder to Prior to placing the standard fill limit and UF manifold (if cylinder in the local discovered prior to disconnected) cylinder yard for cool removal from the M
down.
O withdrawal room.
A.2 Evacuate contents to V
a low pressure source until cylinder net weight is less than the standard fill limit.
B.
Cylinder filled beyond B.I.
Identify the cylinder Immediately standard fill limit and as an overfilled discovered after removal cylinder from the withdrawal M
room.
B.2 Allow the cylinder Prior to removing from to complete its cool the local cylinder yard down period.
SURVEILLANCE REQUIREMENTS: None.
BASIS:
In the event a cylinder is overfilled during a transfer operation, the excess material can be removed from the cylinder safely by evacuating the cylinder to a low pressure. The hot liquid in the cylinder provides the thermal energy to vaporize UF. out of the cylinder to the 73 evacuation low pressure source.
l C'
2.3-40
TSR-PGDP July 23,1999 RAC 99C029 (RO) t'N SECTION 2.3 SPECIFIC TSRs FOR PRODUCT AND TAILS WITHDRAWAL FACILITIES 2.3.4 GENERAL LIMITING CONDITIONS FOR OPERATION 2.3.4.18 CYLINDER HANDLING - CYLINDER DISCONNECTION LCO 2.3.4.18:
The cylinder valve shall be closed prior to disconnecting the cylinder from the pigtail.
APPLICABILITY: Modes: 1 ACTIONS:
Condition Required Action Completion Time A.
Cylinder valve cannot be A.1 Establish cylinder Prior to disconnecting closed.
pressure below either end of the pigtail.
i atmospheric pressure ANQ After disconnecting either A.2 Cap the open end of the pigtail.
connections.
j i
SURVEILLANCE REQ ~UIREMENTS:
Surveillance Frequency SR 2.3.4.18-1 Calibrate the PI used to monitor cylinder Annually pressure.
BASIS:
4 Closing the cylinder valve prior to disconnecting the cylinder from the manifold prevents UF. release from an open source. On rare occasions, it is discovered that the cylinder valve, for one reason or another, cannot be closed and seated as evidenced by the pigtail pressure rising after evacuation. In those instances, the safest course of action is to allow the cylinder to cool below atmosphere, disconnect the cylinder from the manifold, and cap the open connections to minimize UF. outleakage.
l 2.3-41 1
TSR-PGDP July 23,1999 RAC 99C029 (RO)
)
1 g
SECTION 2.3 SPECIFIC TSRs FOR PRODUCT AND TAILS WITHDRAWAL
(
FACILITIES 2.3.4 GENERAL LIMITING CONDITIONS FOR OPERATION 2.3.4.19 CYLINDER HANDLING - CYLINDER VALVE COVERS LCO 2.3.4.19:
Liquid-filled cylinders shall not be removed from the withdrawal room without a cylinder valve protector installed.
APPLICABILITY: Modes: l' (*Only if cylinder contains liquid in quantities greater than heel quantities.)
ACTIONS:
Condition Required Action Completion Time A.
Liquid-filled cylinder A.1 Place the cylinder Immediately removed from the in a set of cylinder withdrawal room without storage saddles cylinder valve protector (scale cart or fixed) installed - discovered AND Prior to re-entering mode while the cylinder is A.2 Install a cylinder 1 with the subject O
suspended.
valve protector.
cylinder.
B.
Liquid-filled cylinder B.1 Install a cylinder Prior to re-entering mode removed from the valve protector.
I with the subject withdrawal room without cylinder.
cylinder valve protector installed - discovered after the cylinder has been placed in a set of storage saddles.
SURVEILLANCE REQUIREMENTS: None.
j BASIS:
The extended cylinder valve, although partially protected by the cylinder, is one of the most likely failure points on a cylinder while it is being moved. Installing the cylinder valve protector provides additional protection of the valve against damage that could result in a UF. release to the environment. [SAR Section 3.15.6.1]
l 2.3-42
TSR-PGDP July 23,1999 RAC 99C029 (RO) q SECTION 2.3 SPECIFIC TSRs FOR PRODUCT AND TAILS WITHDRAWAL V
FACILITIES 2.3.4 GENERAL LIMITING CONDITIONS FOR OPERATION 2.3.4.20 CYLINDER HANDLING - APPROVED CRANES FOR LIQUID CYLINDERS LCO 2.3.4.20:
Liquid-filled cylinders shall be lifted (suspended) only with overhead cranes meeting the conditions set forth in TSR section 2.3.5.2.
APPLICABILITY: Modes: 1* (*Only if cylinder contains liquid in quantities greater than heel quantities.)
ACTIONS:
Condition Required Action Completion Time A.
Liquid-filled cylinder lifted A.1 Place the cylinder Immediately (suspended) by equipment in a set of cylinder other than that specified in storage saddles at section 2.3.5.2 prior to ground level.
completion of the cylinder cool-down period (3 days for 2%-ton cylinders and 5 days for 10- and 14-ton cylinders) p
- discovered while the d
cylinder is suspended.
B.
Liquid-filled cylinder lifted B.1 Restrict cylinder Immediately and until (suspended) by equipment movement to completion of the other than that specified in lifting with an cylinder cool-down section 2.3.5.2 prior to overhead crane period completion of the cylinder approved for liquid cool-down period (3 days cylinder handling for 2%-ton cylinders and 5 (as in 2.3.5.2) for days for 10- and 14-ton placement in a set cylinders)'- discovered after of cylinder storage cylinder has been placed in a saddles at ground set of storage saddles.
level.
SURVEILLANCE REQUIREMENTS: None.
BASIS:
Lifting liquid-filled cylinders only with cranes approved for that use reduces the potential for a cylinder handling mishap that could result in the release of UF. to the environment. [SAR Sections 3.15.6.2, 4.3.2.2.4 and 4.3.2.2.15]
l i O V
2.3-43
TSR-PGDP July 23,1999 RAC 99C029 (RO) p SECTION 2.3 SPECIFIC TSRs FOR PRODUCT AND TAILS WITHDRAWAL Q
FACILITIES 2.3.4 GENERAL LIMITING CONDITIONS FOR OPERATION 2.3.4.21 CYLINDER LIFTING RESTRICTION LCO 2.3.4.21:
No UF. cylinder shall be moved over another cylinder when either cylinder contains liquid UF..
APPLICABILITY: Modes: I when the cylinder being lifted has not been acceptably heeled.
ACTIONS:
Condition Required Action Completion Time A.
UF. cylinders suspended A.1 Move the Immediately one over the other when suspended cylinder at least one of the such that the LCO 4
cylinders contains liquid statement is U F..
satisfied.
SURVEILLANCE REQUIREMENTS: None.
{
BASIS:
The cylinder drop and puncture scenario in the accident analysis involving liquid UF. cylinders
[
(SAR Section 4.3.2.2.15) assumes a release source term of 28.000 pounds of UF..
The l
prohibition of lifting one cylinder over another if one of the cylinders contains liquid UF.
preserves the accident analysis assumption of only one cylinder contributing to the release source term (even though the contribution from a solid UF. cylinder would be negligible).
A, linder that has been acceptably heeled will contain no liquid UF.. A cylinder will be considered acceptably heeled when its vapor pressure falls below 20 psia for more than 5 minutes during the heeling process. [SAR Sections 3.15.6.2 and 4.3.2.2.15]
l O
2.3-44
TSR-PGDP July 23,1999 RAC 99C029 (RO)
SECTION 2.3 SPECIFIC TSRs FOR PRODUCT AND TAILS WITHDRAWAL p)
(
FACILITIES 2.3.4 GENERAL LIMITING CONDITIONS FOR OPERATION 2.3.4.23 SCALES LCO 2.3.4.23: The withdrawal facility scale (s) used for verification of cylinder weight per LCOs 2.3.4.15, 2.3.4.17, 2.1.4.6, and 2.2.4.4 shall be operable.
APPLICABILITY: Whenever the withdrawal facility scale (s) is/are used for verification of cylinder weight.
ACTIONS:
Condition Required Action Completion Time A. Scale discovered to be A.1 Administratively control scale to Immediately inoperable prevent use.
SURVEILLANCE REQUIREMENTS:
Surveillance Frequency SR 2.3.4.23-1 Calibrate NMC&A scale ID 11 and 12 Annually (C-310 positions 3 and 4) and 13,14,15, and 16 (C-315 positions 1, 2, 3, and 4), to
{
an adequate range and tolerance for the item being weighed, in accordance with NMC&A program requirements.
SR 2.3.4.23-2 Perform functionai test of NMC&A scale ID Prior to placing the 11 and 12 (C-310 positions 3 and 4) and 13, cylinder in the withdrawal 14,15, and 16 (C-315 positions 1,2,3, and 4)
Position.
(i.e., check operation using test weights in accordance with NMC&A program requirements).
BASIS:
All cylinder weights are assumed to be within the tolerances assumed in the accident analysis.
The calibration and testing of the scale carts to within the tolerances specified in the NMC&A program (which are much more stringent than the tolerances required by the accident analysis) assured that cylinder weights do not invalidate the accident analysis. [SAR Sections 3.15.6.4]
l m.
2.3-46
' TSR-PGDP
~
July 23,1999 RAC 99C029 (RO)
(,
SECTION 2.3 SPECIFIC TSRs FOR PRODUCT AND TAILS WITHDRAWAL l
\\
FACILITIES l
I 2.3.4 GENERAL LIMITING CONDITIONS FOR OPERATION l
2.3.4.24 HIGH SPEED COMPRESSOR MOTOR LOAD INDICATORS l
l LCO 2.3.4.24: C-315 High Speed UF compressor motor load indicators in the C-331 and C-315 l
6 ACRs shall be operable.
l I
APPLICABILITY: Mode 2 when C-315 High Speed UF, compressor motors are operating.
l l
ACTIONS:
l Condition Required Action Completion Time l
A.
C-331 ACR A.1 Verify that the applicable motor load 8 hours9.259259e-5 days <br />0.00222 hours <br />1.322751e-5 weeks <br />3.044e-6 months <br />
[
compressor motorload indicator in the C-315 ACR is operable.
l indicatoris inoperable. M l
M A.2 Continuously station an operator at the l
C-331 ACRis C-315 ACR.
8 hours9.259259e-5 days <br />0.00222 hours <br />1.322751e-5 weeks <br />3.044e-6 months <br /> l
evacuated.
M l
A.3 Restore the motor load indicator to l
C'd operable status.
7 days l
I See TSR 2.3.4.25 for additional actions if l
the C-331 ACR is evacuated.
l l
TSR 1.6.2.2.d does not apply.
l B.
C-315 ACR B.1 Verify that the applicable motor load 4 hours4.62963e-5 days <br />0.00111 hours <br />6.613757e-6 weeks <br />1.522e-6 months <br /> l
compressor motor load indicator in the C-331 ACR is operable.
l indicator is inoperable. M l
B.2 Restore the motor load indicator to l
operable status.
7 days l
l TSR 1.6.2.2.d does not apply.
l C.
Required action A.1 or C.1 Shut down the affected compressor 1 hour1.157407e-5 days <br />2.777778e-4 hours <br />1.653439e-6 weeks <br />3.805e-7 months <br /> l
A.2 or A.3 not motor.
l accomplished.
QE 1 hour1.157407e-5 days <br />2.777778e-4 hours <br />1.653439e-6 weeks <br />3.805e-7 months <br /> l
QR C.2 Place the affected equipment in Mode l
Required action B.1 or 3.
l B.2 not accomplished.
l QE l
Both Condition A and l
e B exist.
l 2.3-46a
f TSR-PGDP
~
July 23,1999
{
RAC 99C029 (RO) p SECTION 2.3 SPECIFIC TSRs FOR PRODUCT AND TAIIS WITHDRAWAL l
Q FACILITIES l
l 2.3.4 GENERAL LIMITING CONDITIONS FOR OPERATION j
l 2.3.4.24 HIGH SPEED COMPRESSOR MOTOR LOAD INDICATORS (continued) l l
SURVEILLANCE REQUIREMENTS:
l Surveillance Frequency l
SR 2.3.4.24-1 Perform a channel check of the C-331 ACR compressor Following l
motor load indicator.
compressor motor l
start.
l SR 2.3.4.24-2 Perform a channel check of the C-315 ACR compressor Following l
motor load indicator.
compressor motor l
start.
l l
l BASIS:
l l
The motor load indicators provide an indication of various types of failures of the compressors.
l Using ammeter indications in the C-331 ACR for the individual C-315 high speed compressor l
n motors, operators can quickly identify most abnormalities caused by various malfunctions of the l
process equipment. Operator training is relied upon to distinguish between load changes associated l
with normal fluctuations, such as inventory changes, and equipment malfunctions. Compressor load l
changes can be caused by such events as compressor failures or failures of the primary system l
pressure boundary that cause inleakage or a release of UF. If an ammeter should malfunction, the l
load changes can be seen on the ammeters for the compressor motor in the C-315 ACR. In the event l
of evacuation of the C-331 ACR, the C-315 ammeter indications can be used to monitor for load l
changes that could be representative of an equipment malfunction. This detection of an event and i
mitigative action by the operator will control the primary pressure and temperature increases to l
minimize UF releases for on-site personnel. This system is not essential for the off-site public l
protection.
l l
The surveillance requirement is provided to ensure that, after motor start, the ammeter provides l
nominal indication of motor load. [SAR Sections 3.15.4.4,4.3.2.2.1,4.3.2.2.4, and 4.3.2.2.12]
l l
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2.3-46b
r r
TSR-PGDP July 23,1999 RAC 99C029 (RO) p SECTION 2.3 SPECIFIC TSRs FOR PRODUCT AND TAII3 WITHDRAWAL l
()
FACILITIES l
I 2.3.4 GENERAL LIMITING CONDITIONS FOR OPERATION l
2.3.4.25 HIGH SPEED UF, COMPRESSOR MOTOR MANUAL TRIP LCO 2.3.4.25: The high speed UF compressor motor manual trip shall be operable.
APPLICABILITY: Mode 2 when high speed UF compressors are operating.
6 ACTIONS:
1 Condition Required Action Completion Time l
A. C-331 ACR A.1 Verify the applicable C-315 ACR Immediately compressor motor compressor motor stop button is operable.
stop button M
j inoperable (not A.2 Station an operator at the C-315 ACR.
8 hours9.259259e-5 days <br />0.00222 hours <br />1.322751e-5 weeks <br />3.044e-6 months <br /> i
due to loss of DC 2
i voltage).
A.3 Shutdown arrected UF compressor 8 hours9.259259e-5 days <br />0.00222 hours <br />1.322751e-5 weeks <br />3.044e-6 months <br /> 6
M motor.
C-331 ACRis 2
8 hours9.259259e-5 days <br />0.00222 hours <br />1.322751e-5 weeks <br />3.044e-6 months <br /> evacuated.
A.4 Place affected equipment in Mode 3.
O See TSR 2.3.4.24 for additional actions if the U
C-331 ACRis evacuated.
j TSR 1.6.2.2.d does not apply.
B.
C-315 ACR B.1 Verify the applicable C-331 ACR Immediately compressor motor compressor motor stop button is operable.
stop button M
inoperable (not B.2 Restore C-315 ACR compressor motor 7 days i
due to loss of DC stop button to operable status.
voltage).
TSR 1.6.2.2.d does not apply.
C. Both Condition A C.1 Notify Cascade Coordinator of potential Immediately and B apply.
need to utilize alternate means for applicable compressor shutdown.
M C.2 Station an operator at an established 8 hours9.259259e-5 days <br />0.00222 hours <br />1.322751e-5 weeks <br />3.044e-6 months <br /> alternate motor shutdown location with communications to the C-331 ACR.
M C.3 Shutdown affected UF compressor 8 hours9.259259e-5 days <br />0.00222 hours <br />1.322751e-5 weeks <br />3.044e-6 months <br /> motors.
M C.4 Place affected equipment in Mode 3.
8 hours9.259259e-5 days <br />0.00222 hours <br />1.322751e-5 weeks <br />3.044e-6 months <br /> q
k_)
2.3-46c
1 TSR-PGDP July 23,1999 RAC 99C029 (RO) q SECTION 2.3 SPECIFIC TSRs FOR PRODUCT AND TAILS WITHDRAWAL l
V FACILITIES l
l 2.3.4 GENERAL LIMITING CONDITIONS FOR OPERATION l
2.3.4.25 HIGH SPEED UF COMPRESSOR MOTOR MANUAL TRIP (continued) l 6
ACTIONS (continued):
l Condition Required Action Completion Time l
D. Battery / connected D.1 If the AC battery charger is inoperable, 8 hours9.259259e-5 days <br />0.00222 hours <br />1.322751e-5 weeks <br />3.044e-6 months <br /> cell / charge-verify that the applicable battery is conditions (other operable.
than voltage)
M found outside D.2 If battery / cell conditions are found 90 days surveillance outside surveillance parameters, restore parameters.
battery / cell parameters to within limits.
TSR 1.6.2.2.d does not apply E. C-315 DC voltage E.1 Notify Cascade Coordinator of potential Immediately potential <105 need to utilize alternate means for volts at applicable compressor motor shutdown.
battery room.
M
,N 2
E.2 Station an operator at an established 8 hours9.259259e-5 days <br />0.00222 hours <br />1.322751e-5 weeks <br />3.044e-6 months <br /> No DC power at alternate motor shutdown location with the compressor communications to the C-331 ACR.
motor breaker.
M E.3 Shutdown affected UF compressor 8 hours9.259259e-5 days <br />0.00222 hours <br />1.322751e-5 weeks <br />3.044e-6 months <br /> 6
motors.
M E.4 Place affected equipment in Mode 3.
8 hours9.259259e-5 days <br />0.00222 hours <br />1.322751e-5 weeks <br />3.044e-6 months <br /> F.
Required action F.1 Station an operator at an established 8 hours9.259259e-5 days <br />0.00222 hours <br />1.322751e-5 weeks <br />3.044e-6 months <br /> B.2 or D.2 not altemate motor shutdown location with accomplished.
communications to the C-331 ACR.
M F.2 Shutdown affected UF compressor 8 hours9.259259e-5 days <br />0.00222 hours <br />1.322751e-5 weeks <br />3.044e-6 months <br /> 6
motors.
M F.3 Place the affected equipment in Mode 3.
8 hours9.259259e-5 days <br />0.00222 hours <br />1.322751e-5 weeks <br />3.044e-6 months <br /> 2.3-46d
TSR-PGDP July 23,1999 RAC 99C029 (RO) p SECTION 2.3 SPECIFIC TSRs FOR PRODUCT AND TAILS WITBDRAWAL l
\\.
FACILITIES l
l 2.3.4 GENERAL LIMITING CONDITIONS FOR OPERATION l
2.3.4.25 HIGH SPEED UF, COMPRESSOR MOTOR MANUAL TRIP (continued) l SURVEILLANCE REOUIREMENTS:
l Surveillance Frequency l
SR 2.3.4.25-1 Verify C-315 DC bus voltage 2105 volts DC.
Daily l
SR 2.3.4.25-2 Verify DC power is available at UF compressor motor Daily 6
breakers.
SR 2.3.4.25-3 Verify that the battery charger output is > 0 DC amps.
Daily l
SR 2.3.4.25-4 Inspect battery terminals and racks for evidence of Quarterly corrosion and for cell leakage of electrolyte.
SR 2.3.4.25-5 Check that the specific gravity of the pilot cell is 2 1.180 Quarterly corrected to 77'F.
i l
SR 2.3.4.25-6 Visually check the cell electrolyte levels to verify that the Quarterly level is above the low level indication line and no more m
)
than 0.25 inches above the high level indication line.
SR 2.3.4.25-7 Check that the specific gravity of the cells is 21.180 Annually corrected to 77'F.
SR 2.3.4.25-8 Perform a channel functional test of the C-331 and C-315 Prior to restart ACR withdrawal high-speed UF, compressor motor after each planned manual trip systems.
compressor motor shutdown.
BASIS:
The compressor motor manual trip system aids in the prevention and mitigation of UF releases during compressor operations by reducing the operating pressure and temperature to minimize the potential for process system integrity failure and to minimize the release of UF, after a failure of the system integrity. The C-315 High speed compressor motors can be tripped from the ACRs in both C-315 and C-331. There are several ways available to trip compressors with various breakers that provide power to the motors. In order to demonstrate reliability of both the ACR compressor motor trip functions, motor trips that are not required to mitigate a transient condition will be performed at either of the two locations, the C-331 or C-315 ACR, utilizing the motor stop button, or the alternate test, (i.e., tripping the motor breakers prior to compressor motor startup). Either method is satisfactory to demonstrate the operability of the motor trip function. Other available shutdown locations, such as the switchyard, are considered alternate shutdown locations. Because of the number of available trip locations, these alternate locations are not tested periodically.
2.3-46e
F TSR-PGDP July 23,1999 RAC 99C029 (RO) r SECTION 2.3 SPECIFIC TSRs FOR PRODUCT AND TAILS WITHDRAWAL l
V]
FACILITIES l
l 2.3.4 GENERAL LIMITING CONDITIONS FOR OPERATION l
l 2.3.4.25 HIGH SPEED UF, COMPRESSOR MOTOR MANUAL TRIP (continued) l BASIS (continued):
The channel functional test of the C-331 and C-315 ACR withdrawal high-spee:1 UF, compressor motor manual trip system may be accomplished by 1) crediting a successful function of the C-331 or C-315 ACR trip system at the time of the compressor shutdown, and 2) testing the function of the trip location that was not utilized during the planned compressor shutdown. It is permissible to verify functionality via tripping the breaker on a deenergized bus, performing combinations of I
wiring and relay checks and/or tripping the breaker from the " test" position. In determining the appropriate test method, credit may be taken for portions of the circuitry tested during the preceding compressor motor shutdown / breaker trip (e.g., the breaker mechanism does not necessarily need to be cycled twice to test both the C-315 and the C-331 ACR trip buttons).
Internal resistance of the equipment slows repressurization of the shutdown equipment, allowing inleakage rather than outleakage which will mitigate the release until the necessary valve evolutions can take place to isolate the system from any additional supply of UF, and to prepare the system for compensatory actions and repair. In order to initiate a compressor motor shutdown, the DC control and trip power circuit must be operable. However, the failure of the local trip circuit to function on
(
demand does not constitute a significant impact on any of the scenarios where shutdown is assumed to occur at sometime during the scenario. This is due to the numerous alternate and independent means available for disrupting power, i.e., breaker manual trip or C-300/swhchyard de-energization of electrical feeders, buses, transformer bays, main switchyard lines. The battery surveillances
)
provide additional assurances that the battery system will be able to deliver the power necessary to trip the compressor motor breakers as long as the system voltage is maintained above 105 volts.
[SAR Sections 3.15.4.2, 3.15.4.3, 4.3.2.2.1, 4.3.2.2.4, and 4.3.2.2.12]
i 2.3-46f
TSR-PGDP July 23,1999 RAC 99C029 (R0)
,o SECTION 2.3 SPECIFIC TSRs FOR PRODUCT AND TAILS WITIIDRAWAL
()
FACILITIES 2.3.5 GENERAL DESIGN FEATURES 2.3.5.1 UF CYLINDER LIFTING FIXTURES DF 2.3.5.1: UF, cylinder slings and lining fixtures are designed with a structural factor of safety of 5 to 1 based upon the material's ultimate tensile strength.
SURVEILLANCE REOUIREMENTS:
Surveillance Frequency SR 2.3.5.1-1 Visualinspection for damage Prior to first use of shift i
SR 2.3.5.1-2 Hands-on Inspection (no disassembly required)
Monthly SR 2.3.5.1-3 Load test at a minimum of100% ofrated Biennially capacity.
BASIS:
Slings, H-frames, etc used to handle liquid filled UF, cylinders are credited for prevention of the liquid cylinder drop and rupture accident scenario. Visualinspection will detect obvious defects which could cause the cylinder drop accident scenario. Surveillance requirements 1,2, and 3 are V
performed to meet the requirements of OSHA 1910.184 [SAR Sections 3.15.6.2 and 4.3.2.2.15]
l 2.3.5.2 CRANE DESIGN DF 2.3.5.2:
The liquid cranes (and associated lining fixtures) are designed and maintained not to fail in a manner to cause a primary system integrity failure.
t0 v
2.3-47
r TSR-PGDP July 23,1999 RAC 99C029 (RO)
SECTION 2.3 SPECIFIC TSRs FOR PRODUCT AND TAILS WITHDRAWAL O
FACILITIES 2.3.5 GENERAL DESIGN FEATURES 2.3.5.2 CRANE DESIGN (continued)
I SURVEILLANCE REOUIREMENTS:
Surveillance Frequency SR 2.3.5.2-1 Visualinspection for damage Prior to first use of shift SR 2.3.5.2-2 Hands-on Inspection (no disassembly required)
Monthly SR 2.3.5.2-3 Hands-on Inspection (some disassembly Annually required)
SR 2.3.5.2-4 Load test at a minimum of100% ofrated Biennially capacity.
BASIS:
Cranes used to handle liquid filled UF cylinders are credited for prevention of the liquid cylinder 6
drop and rupture accident scenario. Visualinspection will detect obvious defects which could cause
(~
the cylinder drop accident scenario. Surveillance requirements 1,2, and 3 are performed to meet the requirements of OSHA 1910.179. [SAR Sections 3.15.6.2 and 4.3.2.2.15]
l 2.3-48
r.
TSR-PGDP July 23,1999 RAC 99C029 (RO) 1 g~g SECTION 2.3 SPECIFIC TSRs FOR PRODUCT AND TAILS WITHDRAWAL g
FACILITIES 2.3.5 GENERAL DESIGN FEATURES 2.3.5.3 UF CYLINDERS 6
DF 2.3.5.3:
UF cylinders (2%-ton and larger) are as a minimum designed to a MAWP of 6
100 psig.
SURVEILLANCE REOUIREMENTS:
j i
Surveillance Frequency SR 2.3.5.3-1 UF cylinders (2%-ton and larger) shall be 5 years 6
hydrostatically tested at 200% of MAWP.
Note: Cylinders that are full of UF but have an expired j
6 hydrostatic test may be heated for removal of the UF, but shall i
6 be hydrostatically tested prior to refilling.
BASIS:
UF cylinder MAWP equal to or greater than 100 psig is an assumption used in several accident 6
analysis scenarios. [SAR Sections 3.15.6.1,4.3.2.2.4 and 4.3.2.2.11]
l O
2.3.5.4 UF CYLINDER PIGTAILS 6
DF 2.3.5.4: Pigtails are designed to withstand at least 400 psig.
i SURVEILLANCE REOUIREMENTS:
Surveillance Frequency SR 2.3.5.4-1 Pigtails shall receive a post fabrication Prior to initial use.
inspection and hydrostatic test to at least 400 psig.
BASIS:
This design feature helps minimize the possibility of the initiator of the " pigtail failure" accident scenario. [SAR Sections 3.15.4.5,4.3.2.2.4 and 4.3.2.2.11]
l r
2.3-49 u
I TSR-PGDP July 23,1999 RAC 99C029 (RO) i O~
SECTION 2.3 SPECIFIC TSRs FOR PRODUCT AND TAILS WITIIDRAWAL FACILITIES 2.3.5 GENERAL DESIGN FEATURES i
2.3.5.5 SCALE CART DESIGN DF 2.3.5.5: The scale carts are designed with a minimum capacity of 20 tons and have a " low boy" design. The scale carts that carry liquid UF are designed and maintained not f
to fail in a manner to cause primary system integrity.
i f
SURVEILLANCE REQUIREMENTS:
Surveillance Frequency SR 2.3.5.5-1 Visualinspection of the scale cart for structural Biennially drinage, degradation, cracks, distorted members and loose fasteners.
BASIS:
This design feature minimizes the possibility of the " liquid cylinder rupture" accident scenario.
[SAR Sections 3.15.4.9.4,4.3.2.2.4 and 4.3.2.2.15]
l O
V 2.3.5.6 UF. CONDENSER AND ACCUMULATOR MINIMUM WALL THICKNESS DF 2.3.5.6:
The withdrawal area UF condensers and accumulator vessels have the minimum 6
required metal thicknesses in accordance with ASME requirements.
SURVEILLANCE REOUIREMENTS:
Surveillance Frequency SR 2.3.5.6-1 Visual inspection, including thickness measurements, Five Years shall be taken on the withdrawal area UF condensers 6
and UF accumulators at least every five years in order 6
to verify the vessel wall has not been reduced below minimum required metal thicknesses.
BASIS-1 Ensuring vesselintegrity of the UF, condensers and accumulators helps prevent a UF release. The minimum thicknesses for the condensers and accumulators were established in accordance with the 1986 edition of the ASME Boiler and Pressure Vessel Code,Section VIII, Division 1. Surveillance frequency and monitoring points are established and inspections conducted in accordance with the current revision of the National Board Inspection Code (NIBC). {SAR Section 3.15.4.5]
l 2.3-50
i TSR-PGDP July 23,1999 RAC 99C029 (RO) 1 i
q SECTION 2.3 SPECIFIC TSRs FOR PRODUCT AND TAILS WITHDRAWAL l
/
FACILITIES s
l TSR 2.3 Appendix A Maximum weight limits for UF, cylinders.
Max. Fill Limit for Max. Fill Limit for In-Plant Model No.
Cylinder Nos. or Type Shipment (Ibs UF )
Tails Storage (lbs UF )
l 2
2 6
6 12B All 460 30A Concave Hd.
4950 5150 30B Customer Nos.
5020 48A 1-1,000 21030 21870 i
48A 3,001-3,365 21030 21870 48B(T) 5,001-9,230 20700 21530 48F 9,501-9,530 27030 28000 l
'48F 9,601-9,660 27030 28000 l
48G 121,926 - 149,999 26840 28000 I
48G 160,000 and up 26840 28000
\\b 48H 151,001-154,144 27030 28000 48HX 150,001-151,000 27030 28000 l
48Y All 27560 28000 l
)
480 10,000-16,601 26070 27110 l
480M 16,602-18,801 26070 27110 l
480M 100,001 - 111,820 26070 27110 l
480M 111,821-121,925 26840 28000 48X All 21030 21870 l
l 480M Allied -
AC AC-400 27030 1.
All fill limits for shipments are based on 5% free volume, 99.5% purity, and a maximum vaporization temperature of 250*F per USEC-651.
2.
Fill limits for in-plant tails storage cylinders are based on 3% free volume and a maximum vaporization temperature of 235*F except for 48F,48H,48HX, and 48Y cylinders whose in-plant storage limits have been further reduced to ensure the maximum amount of UF6 assumed in the accident analysis (28000 lbs) is not exceeded.
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2.3-51 l
a
F l
I TSR-PGDP PROPOSED July 23,1999 RAC 99C029 (RO) 1
- A SECTION 3.0 ADMINISTRATIVE CONTROLS l
lG Table 3.2.2.1 Minhnum Staffing Requirements' l
Facility Function Mode / Operation Staffing Requirements Work Area Definition C-300 All 4
PSS on the plant site with designee in C-300. APSS on plant site. Cascade Coordinator on plant site. Power l
Operator in C-300.
C-360 lb,3,4,5 1*
In the facility or immediately surrounding grounds to include the guard station and the local cylmder yard.
la,2 2
In the facility or immediately surrounding grounds to include the guard station and the local cylinder yard.
6, 7 2
At least one person in the Laboratory. One person in the facility or immediately surroundmg grounds to include the guard station and the local cylinder yard.
C-333.A
- 1. 2, 5 2
Two persons in the operating facility or immediately surrounding grounds including the local cylinder yard.
1 C-337-A 3, 4 i
One person in the facility or immediately surrounding grounds includmg the local cylinder yard.
)
I C-310 Product withdrawal 2s At least one person in the ACR. One person in the
)
I, 2, 3d facility or immediately surrounding grounds including I
Cascade the local cylinder yard.
1, 3 C-315
- 1. 2, 3d 2s Two persons in the facihty or immediately surrounding I
q O
grounds including the local cylinder yard.
C-331 Cascade At least one person in the ACR.
1, 2, 3 2
C-335 1, 2, 4, 5 C-333 Cascade At least one person in the ACR.
l
- 1. 2. 3 3
i F/S C-337 1,2,3,4.5 Health Physics At all times 2
Onsite.
-)
Power Operations At a!! times 4
Onsite.
Utilities Operations At all times 4
Onsite.
Fire Services At all times 4
Onsite.
Security Services At all tunes 4
Ons te.
- a. Sinffing may be less than the mmirraun seguirement lised for a pemd of a time not to exceed four hours in order to accommodate unexpected absence of on-duty shift members provided immediate action is taken to restore the shift manrung requirements to within the mmimum sequaements The C-331 C 333 C-335, and C-337 ACRs shall always be manned. The ACRs for C-310, C-315, C-333-A, and C-337-A shall be manned when required by operaung mode. Manning not required during emergency conditions requiring buildmg/ area evacuation.
- b. Manrung sequuement is zero if all autoclaves are in MODE 6 (Not in Use for C-333-A and C-337-A) or MODE 8 (Not in Use for C-360) and the Transfer Station is in MODE 8 (Not in Use).
- c. When withdrawal process equipment is brought below atmospheric pressure or to a UF. negative in the NOT LN USE (Mode 4) operaung mode then the staffing requirements for the appropriate withdrawal facility do not apply.
3.0-4
.