ML20211B435
| ML20211B435 | |
| Person / Time | |
|---|---|
| Site: | Point Beach  |
| Issue date: | 02/06/1987 |
| From: | Defayette R NRC OFFICE OF INSPECTION & ENFORCEMENT (IE REGION III) |
| To: | |
| Shared Package | |
| ML20211B289 | List: |
| References | |
| 50-266-87-02, 50-266-87-2, 50-301-87-02, 50-301-87-2, IEB-79-24, NUDOCS 8702190413 | |
| Download: ML20211B435 (8) | |
See also: IR 05000266/1987002
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U.S. NUCLEAR REGULATORY COMMISSION
REGION III
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Reports No. 50-266/87002(DRP);50-301/87002(DRP)
Docket Nos. 50-266; 50-301
Licensee: Wisconsin Electric Company
231 West Michigan
Milwaukee, WI 53203
Facility Name:
Point Beach, Units 1 and 2
Inspection At:
Two Creeks, Wisconsin
Inspection Conducted:
December 1, 1986 through January 31, 1987
Inspectors:
R. L. Hague
R. J. Leemon
Approved By:
R. De ye e
h.
J
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ReactorProjects ection 28
Date /
Inspection Summary
Inspection on December 11986, throuch January 31, 1987, Reports
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No. 50-266/8/002(DRP); No. 50-301/87C02(DRP))
Areas Inspected:
Routine, unannounced inspection by resident inspectors
of licensee action on previous inspection findings; operational safety;
maintenance; surveillance; cold weather preparation; licensee event report
follow-up and training and qualification effectiveness.
Results:
One deviation was identified in Paragraph 8 (Failure to comply
with commitment made in response to I.E. Bulletin No. 79-24).
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G702190413 870210
ADOCK 05000266
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DETAILS
1.
Persons Contacted
- J. J. Zach, Manager, PBNP
T. J. Koehler, General Superintendent
G. J. Maxfield, Superintendent, Operation
- J. C. Reisenbuechler, Superintendent, EQR
W. J. Herrman, Superintendent, Maintenance and Construction
R. S. Bredvad, Health Physicist
R. Krukowski, Security Supervisor
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- F.' A. Flentje, Staff Services Supervisor
- J. E. Knorr, Regulatory Engineer
The inspector also talked with and interviewed members of the Operation,
Maintenance, Health Physics, and Instrument and Control Sections.
- Denotes personnel attending exit interviews.
2.
Licensee Action on Previous Inspection Findings (92701)(92702)
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(Closed) Unresolved Items (266/84-20-01; 301/84-18-01):
During
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discussions with the licensee it was determined that it possesses
documentation which verifies that installation was accomplished per
required standards.
(Closed) Unresolved Items (266/84-20-02; 301/84-18-02):
During
discussions with the licensee it was determined that due to the
procedures and methods used in pulling cables, maximum pull tensions
were not exceeded.
(Closed) 0)en Items (266/850XX-01; 301/850XX-01):
This item was
evaluated )y EPS in Inspection Reports No. 266/86013; No. 301/86012.
(Closed) Open Items (266/85001-01; 301/85001-01):
The licensee made
minimum operability criteria available in the control room for on
shift determinations.
(Closed) Open Items (266/85001-05; 301/85001-05):
The licensee corrected
the affected procedures to include local valve position indication
verification.
(Closed) Unresolved Item (301/86014-01):
The licensee determined cause
and implemented a special testing program.
3.
Operational Safety Verification and Engineered Safety Features System
Walkdown (/1707 and /1/10)
The inspectors observed control room operations, reviewed applicable logs
and conducted discussions with control room operators during the months
of December and January.
During these discussions and observations, the
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inspectors ascertained that the operators were alert, cognizant of plant
conditions, attentive to changes in those conditions, and took prompt
action when appropriate.
The inspectors verified the operability of
selected emergency systems, reviewed tagout records and verified proper
return to service of affected components.
Tours of the Auxiliary and
Turbine Buildings were conducted to observe plant equipment conditions,
including potential fire hazards, fluid leaks, and excessive vibrations
and to verify that maintenance requests had been initiated for equipment
in need of maintenance.
The inspectors, by observation and direct interview, verified that the
physical security plan was being implemented in accordance with the
station security plan.
The inspectors observed plant housekeeping / cleanliness conditions and
verified implementation of radiation protection controls.
During the
months of December and January, the inspectors walked down the accessible
portions of the Auxiliary Feedwater, Vital Electrical, Diesel Generating,
Component Cooling, Safety Injection, Residual Heat Removal, and Contain-
ment Spray systems to verify operability.
These reviews and observations were conducted to verify that facility
operations were in conformance with the reguirements established under
Technical Specifications, 10 CFR and administrative procedures.
On December 1, 1986, with Unit 2 at 50% power, chemistry reported that the
boric acid concentration in the "C" boric acid storage tank (BAST) was
10.8 weight percent.
Technical Specification No. 15.3.2.c.3 forbids
the startup of one reactor with one already critical unless there are at
least two BASTS containing 2000 gallons of not 'ess than 11.5% by weight
of boric acid solution.
However, Technical ! .ification No. 15.3.2.d.
whichappliesduringpoweroperation,allowsIS15.3.2.ctobemodified
such that the flow path from the BAST to a reactor coolant system may be
out of service provided the flow path is restored to operable status
within 24 hours2.777778e-4 days <br />0.00667 hours <br />3.968254e-5 weeks <br />9.132e-6 months <br />. Within less than 30 minutes of discovering the low
boric acid concentration the licensee lined up' and put into service for
Unit 2 the backup "B" BAST and removed the "C
BAST from service.
Investigationbythelicenseedeterminedthatthecauseofthedilution
of the
C" BAST was one of two parallel safety injection suction valves
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from the BAST being not fully shut.
This allowed dilution from the
refueling water storage tank through a normally open minimum suction
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line.
A modification had been performed on the motor operators of these
two suction valves to prevent the hammer effect which can be caused by
relaxing of the spring pack after the motor has torqued out in the
closing direction.
The modification stopped the motor in the closing
direction by the use of a limit switch.
It was found that the switch
setting did not allow the valve to shut tightly on its seat allowing
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minor leakage from the RWST to the f5AST.
This modification will be
removed during the next Unit 2 outage and was cancelled for the upcoming
Unit 1 outage.
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During a routine inspection of the Unit 2 containment, a small amount of
water was noted on the ten foot elevation.
The inspection team could not
identify the exact source of the leak because it was coming from the high
radiation area between the steam generator and the reactor coolant pump.
A sample of the water was taken and analyzed.
The analysis indicated that
the leak was reactor coolant.
The licensee planned a weekend outage to
positively identify the leak and isolate it.
At 5:10 a.m. on January 17,
1987, Unit 2 was taken off line.
Further investigation disclosed that
the leak was due to a broken packing follower on a loop flow transmitter
isolation valve.
The licensee repaired the leak.
During the outage the licensee performed testing on the main steam
isolation valves (MSIVs) due to the closing problems encountered at the
beginning of the last outage.
Testing of the "A" MSIV was satisfactory.
When testing the "B" MSIV, the valve would not go to the fully shut
]osition.
This test was repeated seven times and each time the valve
lung open ten to 15 percent. On the eighth attempt to cycle the valve,
the valve stuck in the full open position.
The licensee took the unit
to cold shutdown to investigate and repair the MSIV.
On removal of the
valve bonnet it was discovered that the o)en stop, which 'is a 5 x 5 x 1/2
inch block welded to the valve body, had aroken off and the valve disc
had wedged itself against the broken weld.
The stop was retrieved from
the bottom of the valve, prepped, and rewelded into place.
After repair
the valve was satisfactorily tested both at cold shutdown and hot
shutdown conditions.
The licensee balieves that the cause for the failure of the valve to fully
close at hot shutdown in the initial seven tests was a small pressure
differential between steam generators.
This pressure differential would
allow a small amount of steam flow from the "A" steam generator to the "B"
The flow would have to be such that it was insufficient
to close the non-return check valve but sufficient enough to hold open the
reverse seating MSIV.
This belief was appparently substantiated by
reducing the pressure in the "A" steam generator using the atmospheric
relief and noting that the "B" MSIV went fully shut from its ten to
15 percent open position.
No violations or deviations were identified.
4.
Monthly Surveillance Observation (61726)
The inspector observed technical specifications required surveillance
testing on the Reactor Protection and Safeguards Analog Channels and
Nuclear Instrumentation and verified that testing was performed in
accordance with adequate procedures, the test instrumentation was
calibrated, that limiting conditions for operation were met, that removal
and restoration of the affected components were accomplished, that test
results conformed with technical specifications and procedure requirements
and were reviewed by personnel other than the individual directing the
test, and that any deficiencies identified during the testing were
properly reviewed and resolved by appropriate management personnel.
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The inspector also witnessed or reviewed portions of the following test
activities:
TS-1
" Emergency Diesel Generator 30 Biweekly"
TS-10A
" Hatch Door Seals"
TS-34
" Technical Specification Surveillance Testing Containment
Accident Fan-Cooler Units"
(Unit 2)
IT-04
"InserviceTestingofLowHeadSafetyInjectionPumps& Valves"
(monthly)
IT-10
" Inservice Testing of Electrically-driven Auxiliary Feed Pumps"
(monthly)
IT-285
" Inservice Testing of Main Steam Stop Valves" (Unit 2)
IT-295A
" Inservice Testing of Auxiliary Feedwater System Flow
Indicators" (Unit 2)
IT-555
" Leakage Reduction & Preventive Maintenance Program Test of
Liquid Chemical & Volume Control System" (Unit 2)
ICP 8.68 " Test Instrument Calibration Procedure"
IT-72-1
" Inservice Testing For CV-2839 on 3D Diesel Generator"
No violations or deviations were identified.
5.
Monthly Maintenance Observation (62703)
Station maintenance activities on safety related systems and components
listed below were observed / reviewed to ascertain that they were conducted
in accordance with approved procedures, regulatory guides and industr
codes or standards and in conformance with technical specifications. y
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The following items were considered during this review:
the limiting
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conditions for operation were met while components or systems were removed
from service; approvals were obtained prior to initiating the work;
activities were accomplished using ap/ proved procedures and were inspected
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as applicable; functional testing and or calibrations were performed prior
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to returning components or systems to service; quality control records
were maintained; activities were accomplished by qualified personnel;
parts and materials used were properly certified; radiological controls
were implemented; and fire prevention controls were implemented.
Workrequestswerereviewedtodeterminestatusofoutstanding,jobsandto
assure that priority is assigned to safety related equipment maintenance
which may affect system performance.
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The following safety-related maintenance activities were reviewed:
Replacement of spent fuel pit bridge transformer
Repair service water throttle valve to 3D diesel generator lube
oil cooler
Repair to containment equipment hatch mechanical interlocking
Torque switch adjustment on auxiliary feedwater M0V-4023
Adjustments to position indicator on auxiliary feedwater valve
2 M0V-4001
Repair boric acid heat tracing circuit P-35
Repair of "B" main steam isolation valve
Also during the inspection period a seal was replaced on Unit 1 "B"
condensate pump and a bearing was re) laced on Unit 2 "B" main feed pump.
Both of these repairs were accomplis 1ed at approximately 50% power.
No violations or deviations were identified.
6.
Event Followup (92700)
Through direct observations, discussions with licensee personnel, and
review of records, the following event reports were reviewed to determine
that reportability requirements were fulfilled, immediate corrective
action was accomplished, and corrective action to prevent recurrence
had been accomplished in accordance with technical specifications.
301/86007 " Degraded Steam Generator Tubes"
301/86008 " Reactor Trip During BOL Physics Testing" was reviewed by the
residentinspectorsandbyaspecialon-siteinspectionfromareactor
inspector from Region III s Test Programs Section. The following
summarizes the findings and conclusions with regard to the review,
inspection and evaluation of LER 301/86008.
Information about the trip was obtained through interviews with licensee
personnel and the review and evaluation of computer alarm logs, post trip
review data, and chart recorder traces.
a.
The reporting requirements were satisfied by the licensee, but the
report was not clear in some areas.
b.
The reactor trip occurred on a 10-10 steam generator "A" level due
to ineffective control of the reactor coolant system heat-up wi,thout
the availability of the "B" steam generator atmospheric :deani uuinp
valve.
This valve had stuck in the shut position.
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c.
The safety systems operated as designed.
d.
The limits on the startup rate were not exceeded.
e.
The licensee plans to include an information/ discussion session
as part of the normal training for licensed operators and duty
technical advisors during the next training cycle.
This training
module will emphasize the importance of operator awareness and will
discuss the interrelationships of systems.
f.
The licensee has committed to update / supplement the original LER in
response to NRC concerns and quastions,
g.
This LER will remain open until e. and f. above are completed.
No violations or deviations were identified.
7.
Training and Qualification Effectiveness (41400and41701)
The training and qualification program make a positive contribution,
commensurate with procedures and staffing, to understanding of work and
adherence to procedures with few personnel errors.
The training program
is well-defined and im)lemented with dedicated resources and a means to
feedback experience; t1e program is applied to the necessary staff.
Inadequate training could rarely be traced as a root cause of major or
minor events or problems occurring during the rating period.
On December 9, 1986, INP0 awarded the plant a plaque for the successful
accreditation of five training programs:
radiation control operators;
duty technical advisors; senior reactor operators; control operators; and
auxiliary operators.
The remaining five programs are ready for INP0
accreditation.
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No violations or deviations were identified.
8.
Cold Weather Preparations (71714)
The inspector ascertained that the licensee has inspected systems
susceptible to freezing to ensure the presence of heat tracing, space
heaters, and/or insulation; the proper setting of thermostats; and that
theheattracingandspaceheatingcircuitshavebeenenergized.
The
inspector reviewed the following Cold Weather Systems and Equipment
Checklists:"
PC-49, Part 1
Unit 1 Turbine Hall Ventilation
PC-49, Part 2
Unit 2 Turbine Hall Ventilation
PC-49, Part 3
Auxiliary Building
PC-49, Part 4
Auxiliary Building Miscellaneous and Facades
PC-49, Part 5
Outside Areas and Miscellaneous
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During the course of this inspection, the inspectors noted that a
multichannel recorder for monitoring the heat tracing circuits in the
facades was not in the trend mode.
The mode switch was selected to the
" Record on Alarm" position.
Further inspection disclosed that three
points on the recorder were out of service, one of which had been out of
service since December 14, 1985.
A review of the licensee's response to
IE Bulletin No. 79-24; Frozen Lines, indicates that the licensee committed
to monitoring all heat traced lines in the facades and that all points
would be trended for early indication of a malfunction.
The present
status of the facade freeze detection system is a deviation from a
commitment made to the NRC (266/87002-01(DRP)).
One deviation identified.
9.
Exit Interview (30703)
The inspectors met with licensee representatives (denoted in Paragraph 1)
throughout the inspection period and at the conclusion of the inspection
periodtosummarizethesco)eandfindingsoftheins')ectionactivities.
The licensee acknowledged tie inspectors comments. T1e inspectors also
discussed the likely informational content of the inspection repert with
regard to documents or processes reviewed by the inspectors during the
inspection.
The licensee did not identify any such documents / processes as
proprietary.
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