ML20210V258
| ML20210V258 | |
| Person / Time | |
|---|---|
| Site: | San Onofre  |
| Issue date: | 10/03/1986 |
| From: | Medford M SOUTHERN CALIFORNIA EDISON CO. |
| To: | Harold Denton Office of Nuclear Reactor Regulation |
| References | |
| 2.206, TAC-64564, NUDOCS 8610100625 | |
| Download: ML20210V258 (54) | |
Text
n/" 5 Southem Califomia Edison Company P. O. BOX 800 2244 WAL NUT GROVE AVENUE ROSEMEAD. CALIFORNIA 91770 M.O.MEDFORD TELEPHONE MANQGER OF NUCLEAR ENGINEERING (Sf 8) 3021749
^" * '"**
October 3, 1986 Office of Nuclear Reactor Regulation Attention: Mr. Harold R. Denton, Director U. S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission Washington, D. C. 20555 Gentlemen:
Subject:
Docket Nos. 50-206, 50-361 and 50-362 Request for Comments on 2.206 Petition by Laguna Beach San Onofre Nuclear Generating Station Units 1, 2 and 3 By NRC letter dated August 25, 1986, SCE was provided with a copy of the subject petition and requested to provide comments regarding the concerns raised by the petitioner. Accordingly, find enclosed a document that details SCE's response to the concerns raised in the subject petition.
If you have any questions, please let me know.
Very truly yours ,
hf. hi l
. n(f-~
cc: J. B. Martin, Regional Administrator, NRC Region V
! F. R. Huey, USNRC Senior Resident Inspector, SONGS 1, 2 and 3 G. W. Knighton, Director PWR Project Directorate No. 7 G. E. Lear, Director, PWR Project Directorate No. 1 l
5 8610100625 861003 ~ \0 PDR ADOCK 05000206 p PDR
%, .)4 -
1 x' 2
3 4
5 6
7 8
9 10 i
" 11 RESPONSE OF' SOUTHERN 12 CALIFORNIA EDISON COMPANY TO 2.206 13 PETITION FILED BY CITY OF 14 LAGUNA BEACH 15 4 16 i
17 18 19 1 20 21 22 23 24 25 26 i
1
_.W-t E 1 TABLE OF CONTENTS 2
Page 3
4 1. INTRODUCTION .............................. 1 5 2. THE PROPER BOUNDARIES OF THE EPZ HAVE BEEN LITIGATED PREVIOUSLY ........ 2 6
- 3. THERE IS NO ABSENCE OF EMERGENCY 7 PLANNING FOR LAGUNA BEACH OR SOUTH LAGUNA .............................. 6 8
- 4. CHERNOBYL DID NOT RAISE ANY g UNRESOLVED SAFETY ISSUES . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 8 10 CONCLUSION .......................................... 9 11 12 13 14 15 16 17 18 19 20 21 22 23 24 25 26 1
e 1 1 1. INTRODUCTION 2 Pursuant to the request of the Nuclear Regulatory 3 Commission dated August 25, 1986, Southern California Edison 4 Company (" Edison") hereby submits its response to the 10 5 C.F.R. 2.206 petition of the City of Laguna Beach 6 (" Petitioner" or the " City") to expand the ten mile radius of 7 the Emergency Planning Zone ("EPZ") for the San Onofre Nuclear 8 Generating Station to include South Laguna and Laguna Beach.
9 In its petition, the City asserts four bases to 10 support its request to expand the EPZ: the topography of the 11 South Orange County coastline as it relates to the 12 transportation network; the effect of emergency evacuation on 13 the citizens of Laguna Beach; the lack of emergency planning 14 for Laguna Beach; and the "recent events in the Soviet 15 Union." Notice of Petition of City of Laguna Beach, 51 Fed.
16 Reg. 26484 (July 23, 1986). As is shown below, none of the 17 bases asserted presents a significant unresolved safety issue 18 that would warrant granting the petition. Moreover, the 19 adequacy of emergency planning at San Onofre was fully 20 litigated in the course of operating license proceedings in 21 the fall of 1981 (the " hearings"). The existing 10 mile EPZ 22 was approved by the NRC Staff and the Atomic Safety and 23 Licensing Board as well as the California Office of Emergency 24 Preparedness (OES), the state agency responsible for emergency 25 planning in the vicinity of nuclear power plants. There has 26 been no material change in circumstances which would warrant
F e i 1 re-examination of these previously litigated issues.
2 Petitioner's request should be denied.
3 2. THE PROPER BOUNDARIES OF THE EPZ HAVE BEEN LITIGATED PREVIOUSLY.
4 5 A petition pursuant to section 2.206 should be 6 granted only when the petitioner identifies a "significant 7 unresolved safdty issue or a major change in facts material to 8 the resolution of major environmental issues". See In the g Matter of Public Service Company of Indiana, Inc. (Marble Hill 10 Nuclear Generating Station Units 1 and 2), DD-79-17, 10 NRC 11 613, 615 n.3 (1979). Section 2.206 procedures should not be 12 used as "a vehicle for reconsideration of issues previously 13 decided . . ." In the Matter of Consolidated Edison Company 14 of New York, Inc. (Indian Point Units 1-3), CLI-75-8, 2 NRC 15 173, 177 (1975). It is well-established that this prohibition 16 extends to the relitigation of contentions previously rejected 17 by a Licensing Board, when there has been no change in 18 circumstances since the date of the Loard's action. In the 19 Matter of Philadelphia Electric Company (Limerick Generating 20 Station, Units 1 & 2), DD-84-13, 19 NRC 1137, 1141 (1984).
21 The emergency planning portion of the San Onofre 22 licensing proceedings took place from August 25 -
23 September 29, 1981. Contention 3, which was litigated by the 24 Parties in this portion of the hearings, addressed whether 25 specified local conditions, including evacuatic1 routes and 26 topography, had been properly considered in adopting a 10 mile 2
r-~
Q 8 1 EPZ.1/ In support of its position that the EPZ had been 2 properly determined, Edison introduced a report by Wilbur 3 Smith and Associates entitled " Analysis of Time Required to 4 Evacuate Transient & Permanent Population from Various Areas 5 within the Plume Exposure Pathway Emergency Planning Zone."
6 (" Smith Report")2/ That report specifically considered the 7 effect of local topography in determining the traffic capacity 8 of roadways designated as evacuation routes, one of the same 9 issues that Petitioner now asserts in support of its request 10 to expand the EPZ. See Smith Report, pp. 3-5, 39-50.
11 12 1/ Contention 3 provided:
13 The emergency response plans fail to meet the requirements of 10 C.F.R. 550.47(c)(2) because local 14 emergency planning officials have arbitrarily established the boundaries of the Plume Exposure EPZ 15 in that they have mechanically applied a 10 mile boundary and that the Interagency Agreement (IAEP) 16 among all local jurisdictions defines the EPZ by drawing compass lines on a map of the area. In 17 determining the exact size of the EPZ, emergency planning officials have failed to consider the 18 following local conditions:
19 1. topography
- 2. meteorology 20 3. evacuation routes
- 4. demography 21 5. jurisdictional boundaries
- 6. SAI report 22 7. land characteristics 23 In the Matter of Southern California Edison Company (San Onofre Nuclear Generating Station, Units 2 & 3) 24 LBP-82-39, 15 NRC 1163, 1176-77 (1982).
25 2/ The cited pages of the Smith Report are attached hereto 26 as Exhibit 1.
3
- - _ ~ _ , _ _ .-_
1 Moreover, by raising the issue of whether a 10 mile boundary 2 was proper for the San Onofre EPZ, Contention 3 also required 3 the parties to litigate whether emergency planning was needed 4 for locations beyond that distance, including Petitioner 5 Laguna Beach and South Laguna.
6 In its initial decision issued in May 1982, the 7 Licensing Board found that the 10 mile boundaries of the EPZ 8 for San Onofre "were drawn in accordance with relevant local 9 conditions an1 comply with 10 CFR 50.47(c)(2)." 15 NRC 1163, 10 1228. Thus, the Licensing Board found that local emergency 11 planning officialo had properly considered the need for 12 emergency planning within and without the 10 mile area and the 13 effect of local topography and evacuation routes in 14 determining the boundaries for San Onofre's EPZ.
15 Not only was the 10 mile EPZ accepted by the NRC 16 Licensing Board, it was also approved by the California Office 17 of Emergency Services ("OES"), the state agency responsible 18 for overseeing emergency planning in the vicinity of nuclear 19 power plants in California. See Transcript of Operating 20 License Haarings for San Onofre Nuclear Generating Station, 21 Units 2 and 3, p. 10129-30. 3/ (Hereinafter cited as "Tr.")
22 During the hearings, witnesses from OES stated that 23 the agency did not believe it was necessary to extend the EPZ 24 beyond the 10 mile boundary. John Kearns, Deputy Director of 25 26 3/ A copy of all Transcript pages cited are attached hereto as Exhibit 2.
4
~
1 OES, testified that the agency had concluded that 2 "approximately 10 miles was certainly adequate for planning 3 around the San Onofre plant." (Tr. 10129-30, 10163.)
4 Dr. Mary Frances Reed, Chief of the Nuclear Power Plant 5 Planning Section at OES, testified that no specific 6 arrangements were necessary for the general public outside the 7 10 mile EPZ. (Tr. 10198-99, 10276.)
8 The City of Laguna Beach is aware of the state's 9 approval of the 10 mile EPZ. In June 1982, Sally R. Bellerue, 10 then Mayor of the City, wrote to then California Governor 11 Brown apparently requesting information regarding 12 emergency planning for Laguna Beach. In response to that 13 letter, John Kearns of OES informed Ms. Bellerue that OES had 14 studied the effects of a serious nuclear power plant accident 15 at San Onofre, and that, based on the results of that study, 16 had determined that detailed emergency planning was not 17 necessary in the area beyond the 10 mile boundary. Lett'er of 18 John Kearns, Deputy Director, OES to Sally R. Bellerue, Mayor 19 of Laguna Beach, California dated July 20, 1982 (hereinafter 20 cited as "Kearns Letter").4/
21 Both the federal and state agencies charged with 22 responsibility for assuring proper emergency planning have 23 therefore thoroughly examined the local conditions and have 24 determined that a 10 mile EPZ adequately considers local 25 26 4/ A copy of the Kearns Letter is attached hereto as Exhibit 3.
5
1 emergency response needs and capabilities in the event of a 2 release at San Onofre. Petitioner has not and cannot suggest 3 that these local conditions have changed since the NRC staff, 4 the Licensing Board and the OES approval. Petitioner should 5 therefore not be permitted to use a 2.206 petition to 6 relitigate these previously decided issues. See Consolidated 7 Edison Company, supra.
8 3. THERE IS NO ABSENCE OF EMERGENCY PLANNING FOR LAGUNA BEACH OR SOUTH 9 LAGUNA.
10 Petitioner also asserts an absence of emergency 11 planning for Laguna Beach and South Laguna as a basis for 12 expanding the EPZ. As demonstrated supra, this issue was 13 fully examined in the licensing proceedings. Moreover, as is 14 shown below, there is not an absence of emergency planning for 15 Laguna Beach or South Laguna; rather the necessary level of 16 emergency planning is already available.
17 Although Laguna Beach and South Laguna are outside 18 the EPZ, both are within the extended Public Education Zone 19 created by the California State Nuclear Power Plant Emergency 20 Response Plan (the " Plan"). That Plan requires Edison to 21 create a public education program for an area extending to 20 22 miles from the plant. See Kearns Letter, supra. As part of 23 this education program, Edison distributes annually an 24 " Emergency Information Handbook"5/ (the " Handbook"), which 25
'26 5/ A copy of the Handbook is attached hereto as Exhibit 4.
6
1 provides the public with information regarding the levels of 2 emergency that could arise, emergency planning at San Onofre 3 and the steps the public can take to avoid or greatly reduce 4 the potential effects of a radioactive release. See Handbook 5 at 2. The Handbook informs residents in the Public Education 6 Zone that in the event of a general emergency at San Onofre, 7 notification would be made by news broadcasts and, if 8 necessary, by public address systems operated on a street by 9 street basis. The Handbook also lists the radio and 10 television stations that would provide the necessary 11 information and instructions. If it were necessary to expand 12 the response base for San Onofre, the existing channels of 13 information could be adapted to support response activities 14 beyond the current boundaries.
15 In addition to the emergency planning provided for 16 Laguna Beach and South Laguna by the Public Education Zone, 17 additional preparedness is also provided by the overall 18 response plan of Orange County. The County has a 19 twenty-volume emergency plan which provides general response 20 guidance. That guidance would be available to the citizens of 21 Laguna Beach and South Laguna in the event of a radioactive 22 release.
23 The public education program for the citizens of 24 Laguna Beach and South Laguna and the general emergency plan 25 for Orange County demonstrate that Petitioner's concern over 26 the lack of emergency planning is misplaced. Both the NRC and l
__ __j
1 the State have already determined the level of emergency 2 planning each believes necessary for Laguna Beach and South 3 Laguna and the more stringent requirements of the State Plan 4 have been fully complied with. Petitioner has presented no 5 new information that suggests any reason why the public 6 education program is inadequate. There is no significant 7 unresolved safety issue and Petitioner's mere assertion to the 8 contrary should not serve as a basis for granting the 9 requested action.
10 4. CHERNOBYL DID NOT RAISE ANY UNRESOLVED SAFETY ISSUES.
11 12 Petitioner's final basis for its request that the 13 Commission reconsider emergency planning at San Onofre is 14 "recent events in the Soviet Union," a reference to the April, 15 1986 accident at the Chernobyl nuclear power plant. The city 16 cites no basis for concluding that events at Chernobyl require 17 additional emergency planning in Laguna Beach.
18 The accident potential for San Onofre was fully 19 investigated as part of the plant's licensing proceedings.
20 All credible accidents were examined for their potential 21 effect on the offsite population. The results of that 22 investigation were the basis for determining the boundaries of 23 the existing EPZ.
24 The accident at Chernobyl does not change the 25 accident potential at San Onofre. There is no basis to 26 contend that because of the accident which occurred at 8
1 Chernobyl, the effects of a postulated release at San Onofre 2 require a modification of San Onofre's emergency plans. There 3 is therefore no "significant unresolved safety issue" that 4 would warrant the action requested by Petitioner. See Public 5 Service Company of Indiana, Inc., supra.
6 7 CONCLUSION 8 For the foregoing reasons, the petition of Laguna 9 Beach should be denied.
10 Dated: October _f?,1986 11 Respectfully submitted, 12 DAVID R. PIGOTT CATHERINE K. O'CONNELL 13 ORRICK, HERRINGTON & SUTCLIFFE 14 CHARLES R. KOCHER -
JAMES A. BEOLETTO 15 SOUTHERN CALIFORNIA EDISON COMPANY 16 17 / 7 David 6R. Pigott 18 Attorneys for Southern California Edison Company 19 20 21 22 23 24 i
25 26 9
.. . o I
(c '
1 Analysis of Time Required to Evacuate
- Transient and Permanent Population from Various Areas Within the Plume Exposure Pathway Emergency Planning Zone l
San Onofre Nuclear Generating Station l.
Revision 2 C l l
l l
0 N
l by e i
. I l
ML LA J Aas 1
1
- t. ..g . l l
~
\'
l ,
7 . .
Y
!(' the northern section of the United States Marine Corps Base (Camp Pendleton). Although the 10-mile radius actually bisects San Juan Capistrano, Dana Point and Ortega, the entire area
[ and population of these communities have been included within the EPZ and incorporated within the emergency response plans I for the local agencies. This expanded planning area is here- l l inafter referred to as the " extended EPZ."
EPZ Population - Within the extended EPZ boundary there are five urbanized areas representing an estimated resident population of approximately 79,600. In Orange County, the area within the extended EPZ boundary contains an esti-mated resident population of 62,400, or 78 per cent of the EPZ population. The remaining EPZ resident population (17,200)
~
is located in San Diego County within the Camp Pendleton United States Marine Corps Base.
k
.I It is estimated that approximately 32,150 non-residents visit the area on a peak weekend day during the summer. This transient population is generally concentrated in or near the state and local beach recreation areas. Also included in the k transient population segment are local workers who reside outside the study area. Estimated 1980 resident and transiant populations f are summarized in Table, 1 for identifiable areas within the EPZ.
L Daytime summer weekend population distribution by 22.5 Sector is f
summarized in Appendix A for the San Onofre EPZ.
l- Major Transportation Facilities - One interstate route (I-5)
- and two state routes (S.R.1 and S.R. 74) serve the area within the extended EPZ limits. Interstate Route 5, (San Diego Freeway)
L is the primary north-south route serving traffic between Orange and San Diego Counties.
~
State Route 1 (Pacific Coast Highway) provides secondary b north-south access within the EPZ north sector. State Route 74 I
3
t Table 1 1980 POPUIATION ESTIMATES RESIDENT TRANSIENT y
8,BTd. POPUIATION POPU1ATION San Clemente 27,200I '} 14,900 *
~
San Juan Capistrano 18,500 I} 1,000 }
Capistrano Beach 6,200 1,400 }
l Dana Point. 10,500 (d) 1,600 Doheny State Beach O (*) 5,750 San Clemente State Beach * (* 2,500 }
San Onofre State Beach O*I 4,500('} l Camp Pendleton Enlisted Men's Beach Club *( 500(h)
Camp Pendleton 17,200(9} N.A . j TOTAL 79,600 32,150
._ l (a) Source: San Clemente Public Works and Planning Department. l I (b) Based on Chamber of Commerce visitation figures. '
(c) San Juan Capistrano Public Works and Planning Department.
(d) Source: Orange County Environmental Management Agency. l (e) Source: California Department of Parks and Recreation. !
(f) Sources (e); Assumes maximum utilization.
(g) Source: Base Operations and Training Office, Camp Pendleton.
Marine Corps Base.
(h) Source: (g), Estimated maximum utilization based on average sununer and weekend visitation of 300 persons.
(i) Camp population within a ten-mile radius from SONGS excluding 1 recreation beach.
(*) Negligible N.A. Not Available g I i
e.
(
a
_4 l
_.. _ _ - ._ :* L - - -. - -. - -- - - _ _ - -- - _ _ _ ... - . -. - _-_ j
_ , . , . ,. ., _~.. ... . -.=.-....
r -, ,
L
(. (Ortega Highway) is the only regional east-west roadway within the study area. Ortega Highway is a winding, mountain-area
- f. roadway which connects the area toI-15 approximately 32 miles i
j 1
to the east.
F.
I Figures 2a and 2b illustrate the network of arterial and freeway facilities which presently provide the major travel-ways j in the study area. These major roadways are restricted somewhat i l
by geographic features and tend to either parallel the coastline or follow the inland valleys and canyons.
I i Emergency Response Plans This study has been completed in consultation and cooperation with primary local response agencies responsible for evacuation
,I planning and implementation within the area. The evacuation time estimates presented in this study were developed to reflect f(, the plans and procedures set forth in the relevant emergency response plans which have been developed and adopted by the various local agencies. These plans set forth the agency responsibilities, assigned functions, and procedures to be utilized in the event of a radiological incident at SONGS. The principal emergency response plans include:
o California Nuclear Power Plant Emergency Response l}
Plan, July, 1978.
j '- o Orange County Emergency Response Plan, San Onofre l
Nuclear Generating Station, December, 1980.
o San Diego County Nuclear Power Plant Emergency Response Plan, December 1980.
1 L o Camp Pendleton Marine Corps Base Emergency Response Plan, April, 1979 (with revisions).
{
l..
l , --
-_... _._.__ __ __ _..._,,.____,,_..._,.,,_m _ , . . . _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ . _ _ _ _ _ _ _ . _ _ _ _ _ . _ _ . _ _ _ _ . . _ . _
i . .
i
'1,1 CHAPTER 7
(
- EVACUATION ROADWAY NETWORK c
I V'
i Evacuation plans are set forth as part of the emergency
- response plans (Chapter 1) for the local organization responsible for the planning and implementation of an evacuation of the EPZ.
j These plans identify the area roadways to be used as evacuation routes by each community. The major roadway system and the
[ principal evacuation routes within the Orange and San Diego Counties EPZ sectors are depicted in Figures 7a and 7b, respectively.
'{
- Major Evacuation Routes Major roadways in the area which were examined for use as
[; evacuation routes are described in the following paragraphs.
These facilities, with the exceptioh of Ortega Highway, were i included as evacuation routes.
o Interstate Route 5'(San Diego Freeway), the principal area roadway follows a general north-south direction
- along the coast and passes just east of SONGS. I-5
.- is primarily an eight-lane facility built to full freeway standards. However, it narrows to six lanes
)
through the City of San Clemente, widening again to
! .. eight lanes near Capistrano Beach.
I o Basilone Road, a two-lane road which intersects I-5 d approximately two miles north of the site, runs in a southeasterly direction into the interior of Camp i l
Pendleton. ,
I L . . .
..w.. . .- .
' 5]
. ~
ji o Access Road, formerly Route 101, was originally a four-lane facility, but has been narrowed to two lanes in order to provide shoulder-area parking for j This highway paral-visitors to the State beach areas. -
1els I-5 from the Basilone Road interchange past the I SONGS facility, with a southern connection to I-5 via the Las Pulgas Interchange approximately seven miles ]
i I south.of the SONGS site. __
_J o El Camino Real (State Route 1) , is a four-lane un-r divided roadway, which generally parallels I-5 from
[ the Orange County line northward to Avenida Estacion. _
i l o Pacific Coast Highway (State Route 1) , State Route 1 ~
continues north of Avenida Estacion, as the Pacific '
Coast Highway. Between Avenida Estacion and Doheny Park -
Road, Pacific Coast Highway has been constructed as a four-lane facility, however, at the present time only two lanes are open to vehicular traffic. North of Doheny Park road, Pacific Coast Highway is a four-lane facility aligned generally parallel to the coastline. ,
o Avenid: P3co is a four-lane arterial within the City "
of San Clemente with its western terminus at El Camino
- It narrows to two lanes Real near the Pacific Ocean.
l east of I-5 and continues eastward to the TRW Systems f
Group property, where it terminates.
o Ortega Highway (State Route 74) , is a four-lane, east-west, roadway between Camino Capistrano and Ganado Road.
East of Ganado Road, Ortega Highway narrows to two lanes and continues along San Juan Creek Road to the Lake
- not Elsinore area in Riverside County. .This route i.
planned as a major evacuation route due to the mountainous
~
terrain it crosses and the resultant ease of blockage by landslides or accidents.
N d'>'
i I Q
'i1
~ s ?
n
- I - ..a d '} s
's g \
~
/
f ..- f
~
U )
C ST O r
! g g a f -
~
q sj '
p \
\ m q ,
~
?,%
wg v
/ r A \
e-
. .~e :
-. 5
/
d s;:mm ,
g/. .
s A 4
- t. / Qg '. ./ ,
DANA CAPISTRANO 's '
,s' ,
s
/
. POINT BEACH ..5 I
\,
7, ,
\
L .
.A.. mg~ ',,
2%',,'l=
' ~" "
y, ,, i 4
SAN CLEMENTE N.," ,,' (
i- s
- ~' q' l L' x x. ,
, lI m
- ~'1I Il"1*,"O T
{ y [_ ?t. -
>@ bv;L North Sector /
4 Primary Evacuation Routes ' % 's
& Traffic Control Points -
- s. .
Figwe 7e
l c.
\
l e
f.
( l
,. N. .
.' s e
f -
s
?
g
\
\,
i -
s.est: s -
)
\i
, N. 1
\,
r:- e i
, I I
I I
^(' -s.
. - / l mme cows enne l L
- l i
[ *<,% ~. .
- l a
j c,'. '
/
.3 -
/
/
,I __ ,
/
r s
/
/
l( _
/
'~
{ 9 Primary Evacuation Routes -
r-Traffic Control Points J
eu.
( Figure 7b 1
=O w -- nm--- s - - - , - = - ,
p x-wp---w.wm---r---,e--gwq~--w--,-w-- +v~- --
.e-, .-m------ -w, -,w,m-w-
- - ' - - - ~
_ , 1 l
1
- p. .
t l
. r- , !
l
.( o Camino Capistrano is a two-lane arterial, originating l at Pacific Coast Highway in North San Clemente, and i
parallels the Coast Highway through residential areas of Capistrano Beach. At Camino Las Ramblas, it turns
' ,[ northward, paralleling I-5 through San Juan Capistrano.
At it's juncture with Doheny Park Road, Camino Capistrano widens to a four-lane cross section, which is continued through most of San Juan Capistrano.
I' 1
o Rancho Viejo Road is a four-lane, north-south roadway i- which is aligned parallel to and east of I-5 from I i Junipero Serra Road to the San Juan Capistrano City
- r. Limit, where it becomes Marguerite Parkway.
i Planned Improvementato the Highway Network i
There is one significant improvement planned to the Q highway network which will affect access and egress from the I'
ten-mile radius study area. The six-lane section of I-5, through the city of San Clemente, will be widened to eight
- ,, lanes. This improvement project is currently underway and is
_ expected to be completed in 1982.
L-Longer term, there are several regional arterials being lf considered in or near the study area. Those which could increase
!' available evacuation route capacity are summarized below.
- - o Avenida San Pablo Corridor (between I-5 in San Clemente and Ortega Highway) - The Orange County Environmental Management Agency is currently studying alternatives
, for this corridor. The results of the study will determine the general alignment and extent of the facility. .
f._
I
, u
.: a; . +..-.a - .. ..- : ;g _ - -
]
Golden Lantern Corridor (between Pacific Coast Highway )!
o and Crown Valley Parkway) - When the remaining segment ..
7
_j is implemented, additional' evacuation capacity will be available to the north. _
(
o Extension of Alipaz Street between Pacific Coast Highway and Junipero Serra Road in San Juan Capistrano - ~
This extension would serve as an alternative evacuation m route for the local populace.
..]
i .-
o Extension of Camino Del Avion between Del Obispo Street and Crown Valley Parkway - This extension would ._
provide an alternative evacuation route for the local - ~l populace. , _
~
. t i
I The Orange County Development Monitoring Program includes . J l
' these arterial highway projects in the 1988 arterial system.
J Recent assessments of these' projects, however, do not anticipate ,
l their completion before 1990. None of the above mentioned short-range or long-range regional arterial improvements were considered
.J in this evacuation time analysis.
l
,j Designated Evacuation Routes and Reception Centers Transportation routes leading out of the EPZ to pre-selected reception centers have been designated for each subsector with EPZ. This information is to be distributed to the populace ~~
within the EPZ as part of the public information program.
l
' III Orange County Emergency Response Plan / San Onofre Nuclear .!l Generating Station; San Diego County, Nuclear Power Plant Emergency Pesponse Plan: U.S. Marine Corps Base Camp Pendleton Emergency Response Plan. .
J
- 42- .
--,~,-------,,---,-.,.p,.,_.%,-_,,mwf,- ,,wwe_, ,.gwm_m._,.,--,-wm%,- . _ , , _ _ _ , - . , . _ m .,%, .e,----- . - -
i .
(
In the EPZ evacuation plans, all persons within each subsector have been assigned the same principal svacuation route and the same reception center. Reception centers are located
[ beyond a fifteen-mile radius from SONGS and would be available to those evacuees requiring emergency shelter and/or medical aid.
For the Orange County subsectors, assigned evacuation routes lead northward, away from the SONGS facility and generally repre-sent the most direct routes out of the EPZ. The principal evacu-
)
ation routes out of the area are I-5 and the Pacific Coast Highway, with Camino Capistrano as a secondary route.
r I
Population from within U.S. Marine Corps Base Camp Pendleton F and San Onofre State Park, Bluffs Area, have assigned evacuation
! routes leading to the South. The principal evacuation routes to the south are Basilone Road, primarily for the Camp Pendleton I facilities, and I-5.
Evacuation Route Link / Node Network These designated evacuation routes were translated into a link / node network for input to the computerized Evacuation I Time Assessment Program. First, area roadway network was
- " redefined as a system of roadway links (segments) and nodes r (roadway intersections) . Network nodes were then numbered and L coded for input to the computer program.
r The designated evacuation routes were then translated into L' Subsectors a series of link / nodes for each individual subsectors.
i were further divided into several population centroids, each representing an individual population concentration within the subsector who require a separate local access route to reach j'
the primary evacuation routes. Table 6 identifies the evacuation
(
route link / node description for each population centroid. Presented r
Tablo 6 EVACUATION ROUTE LINK / NODE DESCRIPTION BY CENTROID r
1 CENTROID EVACUATION ROUTE 011 0011 2002 1012 1008 02H 0210 0214 0218 0220 0224 0228 0230 0234 0236 0240 0244 0252 012 0012 2003 1017 1018 1019 0210 0214 0218 0220 0224 0228 0230
[' 0234 0236 02 % 0244 0252 8
013 0013 2 M 7 1023 1024 2008 0218.0220 0224 0228 0230 0234 0236 0240 0244 0252 r 021 0021 2003 1009 1003 0236 0210 0214 0218 0220 0224 0228 0230
' ! 0234 0234 02 % 0244 0252 022 M 22 2004 1018 1019 0210 0214 0218 0220 0224 0228 0230 0234 i- 0234 02 4 0244 0252
,ji 023 0023 2004 0214 0218 0220 0224 0223 0230 0234 0234 02 % 0244 0252 024 0024 2008 0218 0220 0224 0228 0230 0234 0236 02 4 0214 0252 025 0023 2009 0220 0224 0228 0230 0234 0234 02 % 0244 0252
{~
.- 024 M26 2012108510331032 0224 0228 0230 0234 0236 02% 0244 0252 031 0031 2010 1029 2013 1097 2022 1055 2023 2024 1063 02 M32 20131037 23221055 2023 20241063 023 0033 2011 1030 1029 2013 1087 2022 1033 2023 2024 143 0034 1026 1027 2 M9 0220 0224 0228 0230 0234 0234 0240 0244
[,' 031 0252 035 0035 1029 1030 2011 1032 0224 0220 0230 0234 0236 0240 0244 0252 Or.1 0041 2016 104 0230 0234 0236 0240 02 4 0252
[
- 012 0012 2015 1034 2016 1040 0230 0234 0234 0240 0244 0252 043 M 43 2017 1039 1040 0228 0230 0234 0236 024 0244 0252 Oi? M44 20141033 2018 20211062 0234 02% 0244 0252 045 0045 2019 2020 104; 1045 0234 0236 02 % 0244 0252
[
- 051 0051 2022 1953 2023 2024 1043 .
032 0052 2023 2024 1063 f* 061 M412018 202t 1042 0234 024 0244 0252
- i' 062 0042 2021 I N 2 0236 02 M 0244 0252 071 0071 2020 1014 1945 0234 0234 02 4 0244 0252 F 072 0072 2C28 1 H t 1 %6 1067 1 H 8 2032 1073 1975 1676 2033 1977 073 M73 20291063 02% 0244 0252 074 M 74 2030 1072 1071 0244 0252 031 M31 2027 1067 1948 2032 1073 1075 1074 2033 1077 022 M82 2026 2027 1 N 7 1068 2032 1073 1030 1078 0252 j 023 0033 2031 1072 1071 02t4 0252 M84 2032107310001078 0252
'r. i 0C1 095 0085 2033 1077
'- 091 0091 2025 2023 2024 1063 l 092 0092 2024 1 4 3 I* 111 0111 2006 1095 1101 1100 0257 0259 112 0112100210012H11007 0202 02M 0210 0214 0218 0220 0224 l[ 0220 0230 0234 0236 0240 0244 0252 I
- 113 0113 2 M) I M7 0202 0204 0210 0214 0218 0220 0224 0228 0230 i' 0234 0234 02 4 0244 0252
., I l_
-u-e.
r- , --__.---6__ -- _..-ne.-e,_ _ _ _--,--mm--,ewmwoo---,wo-,--,---,-w----ee,-~, _-e--, --vre-p,-me---wr--_ ,:+_ e, --nm,,--,-s,.
[' . *
- r in this table are the numbers of each node through which the
/
evacuation route passes. Illustrated in Figures 8a and 8b are i the coded line/ node network and the evacuation routes for each centroid.
[.
A description of roadway characteristics represented by each
' link in the evacuation route network is presented in Table 7.
' Evacuation network links are identified by the numbered A and B
,r nodes which represent either and of the link. The order of the nodes (from A to B) indicates the direction of travel Also .
identified is the link travel time (under normal conditions),
i length, traffic capacity,and roadway identification. A brief
-~
description of each is given below:
)
i o Travel Time on a particular link is determined by dividing the normal traffic speed on each segment by the link length. Travel time is expressed in minutes.
l(' o Distance represents the length of the roadway link and is expressed in miles.
o capacity identifies the number of vehicles which can
'I L be accommodated on a particular roadway link during 4
a fixed increment of time. In this case, capacity has
[ been expressed in vehicles per 15 minute increment.
i t.
J o Roadway Identification is the name of the roadway l!! '- facility of which the link is a segment.
,I The follouing assumptions were utilized in developing the link travel times and capacities.
k Directional Flow - All roadways will cperate as they do
, j under present conditions. As an example,,for a two-lane, two-
~. way facility, only the two outbound lanes would be utilized for l( evacuation under normal conditions, with the inbound lane used L. for circulating traffic and/or emergency vehicles. i i' -
. . - . , - -..,,,e, -- -._. --y7 . , , . , - , . , . .,ww_, _.._...._v,_.----.-=,--.,_w.,,,,-mm,,,y-
__ , , , . - , . . . - - - _e--w+-
- _ _ , . ._-m
1 T . .
. Table 7 F
LINK-NODE NETWORK
('
IDENTIFICATION AND CHARACTERISTICS
'! IE Ett AM 8PSOE TDE 81ST CAP CAP ROADWAY IDENTIFICATION 11 2002 1.2 0.3 250 85 Centroid Connector 12 2005 1 3 0.3 250 94 Centroid Connector
- ' 13 2007 1 6 0.4 500 234 Centroid Connector
! 21 2003 2.0 0.5 500 299 Centroid Connector-22 2004 1.8 0.5 250 134 Centroid Connector 23 2006 3.7 0.9 500 539 Centroid Connector I 24 200t 3.0 0.8 250 222 Centroid Connector 25 2009 2.2 0.4 250 144 Centroid Connector 26 2012 0.4 0.1 250 43 centroid Connector
!' 31 2010 2 1 -0.5 1000 457 Centroid Connector I 32 2013 0.8 0.2 250 58 Centroid Connector 33 2011 2.1 0.5 250 152 Centroid Connector
- - 34 1026 4.0 1.0 500 585 Centroid Connector I
35 1029 3.2 0.8 500 469 Centroid Connector 41 2016 1.5 0.4 500 222 Centroid Connector 42 2015 2 7 0.7 250 !?? Centroid Connector 43 2017 2.2 0.4 500 328 Centroid Connector 44 2014 1.2 0.3 250 87 Centroid Connector 45 20!? 2.1 0.5 250 155 Centroid Connector 51 2022 0.4 0.1 200 2f Centroid Connector Q'
52 2023 0.8 0.2 250 58 Centroid Connector 41 2018 2 1 0.5 250 155 Centroid Connector
- 7 62 2021 1 4 0.4 250 120 Centroid Connector
') 71 2020 2.4 0.6 250 175 Centroid Connector 72 2028 2 0 0.5 250 143 Centroid Connector
- , 73 2029 1 4 0.3 250 99 Centroid Connector
'l^L 74 2030 1 2 0.3 250 87 81 2027 4 0 1.5 450 879 Centroid Centroid Connector Connector -
, 82 2026 1.0 0.3 250 74 Centroid Connector 83 2031 1.4 0.3 450 iff Centroid Connector i[ Centroid Connector
'_ - 84 2032 1.2 0.3 250 87 85 2033 2.0 0.5 250 143 Centroid Connector
. 91 2025 1 4 0.4 500 240 Centroid Connector I f2 202t 3.4 0.9 500 504 Centroid Connector 111 20 M 0.2 0.1 250 29 Centroid Connector 112 1002 0.4 0.1 200 29 Centroid Connector j 113 2001 0.4 0 1 250 29 Centroid Connector I
] ), TIME - Travel time from A Node to B Node (minutes) l DIST - Distance from A Node to B Node (miles)
)j INC CAP - Incremental link capacity (vehicles per 15 minutes)
HOLD CAP - Queuing capacity from A Node to B Node (vehicles)
I' _ --__-_:-----.-_. _
r , .
Table 7
[~- (Continued) d in nu AlWft BNOX TIE B1ST CAP CAP ROADWAY IDENTIFICATION I
202 2 % 1.2 1.0 1200 1194 I-5 Northbound r 206 210 1.2 1.0 1350 1196 I-5 Northbound i 210 214 0.7 0.6 1350 468 I-5 Northbound
, 214 218 0.7 0.6 1350 692 I-5 Northbound
. 218 220 0.4 0.3 1350 387 I-5 Northbound j 220 224 0.0 0.7 1350 833 I-5 Northbound 224 228 2.9 2.5 1350 2804 I-5 Northbound 228 230 0.0 0.0 1350 35 I-5 Northbound l' 230 234 1 2 1.0 1350 1208 I-5 Northbound 234 236 0.6 0.5 1800 586 I-5 Northbound 236 240 1.5 1.3 1800 1466 I-5 Northbound r 240 244 1.2 1.0 1800 1173 I-5 Northbound
)
l 244 252 4.0 3.4 1800 3963 I-5 Northbound 257 259 8.8 7.3 1800 8565 I-5 Southbound
- 1001 2001 3.4 1.0 3 M 522 Old Route 101 6 1002 1M1 10 0.4 300 123 San Onofre State Beach Service Rd.
I 1007 202 6.4 0.2 300 52 On-Ramp to I-5 Northbound 1008 206 0.4 0.2 375 59 On-Ramp to I-5 Northbound
[ 100? AC08 0.1 0.0 300 14 El Camino Real
, 1012 1000 0.3 0.1 300 29 Ave. Del Presidente/I-5 Overpass i
1017 1018 0.1 0.0 300 11 Ave. Mendocino r 1018 1019 0.2 0.1 500 58 El Camino Real j (- 1^19 210 0.2 0.1 300 23 I-5 On-Ramp Northbound 1023 1024 0.1 0.0 250 11 Ave. Presidio 1024 2 K 3 0.2 0.1 250 17 Ave. Presidio .
[- 1024 1027 0.1 0.0 250 11 Ave. Palizada 1027 200? 0.2 0.1 250 23 Ave. Palizada 1029 1030 0.4 0.3 250 73 Ave. Pico I 1029 2013 1.7 1.0 300 293 Pacific Coast Highway
. 1020 1029 0.4 0.3 500 144 Ave. Pico 1030 2011 0.3 0.2 500 117 Ave. Pico
- 1032 224 0.2 0 1 300 29 I-5 On-Ramp Northbound
[ 1033 1032 0 4 0.3 500 146 Ave. Pico
' Ave. Vaquero 1036 2016 0.0 0.3 250 73
, 1030 2018 3.0 1.0 250 293 Camino Capistrano
.; 1039 10t0 0.2 0.1 5 % . 58 Camino de Estrella 1040 228 0.5 0.3 300 73 I-5 On-Ramp Northbound 1040 230 0.3 0.2 300 49 I-5 On-Ramp Northbound j
1044 1945 0.2 0.1 375 29 I-5 On-Ramp Northbound l~ 1045 234 0.5 0 3 375 73 I-5 On-Ramp Northbound 1055 2023 0.5 0.3 500 146 Pacific Coast Highway 1N2 236 0.4 0 2 300 44 I-5 On-Ramp Northbound i 1064 1N6 0.1 0.1 300 29 Camino Capistrano 1065 240 0.4 0.2 300 50 I-5 On-Ramp Northbound 1066 1067 1.1 C.5 500 269 ,
Camino Capistrano ,
1067 1 N8 0.7 0.2 500' 134 i Camino Capistrano
- 1068 2032 1.0 0.7 500 428 Camino Capistrano
!!(
l Table 7
(- (Continued) e INC NOLS
, GE E0LE TIIE EIST CAP CAP ROADWAY IDENTIFCATION 1071 244 0.4 0.2 300 52 I-5 On-Ramp Northbound
'p
. 1072 1071 1 1 0.4 500 334 Ortega Highway 1073 1075 5.0 2.5 300 733 Junipero Serra Road 1073 1030 4.8 2.4 300 703 Camino Capistrano I 1075 1076 0.1' O.0 300 8 Junipero Serra Road 1074 2023 1.2 0.6 400 363 Rancho Viejo Road 1078 252 0.5 0.3 300 73 I-5 On-Ramp Northbound F 1C20 1073 0.2 0.1 300 29 Avery Parkway 1035 1033 0.4 0.2 500 129 Ave. Pico 1087 2022 1.6 0.9 500 539 Pacific Coast Highway
,, 1075 1101 3.4 1.5 300 439 Old U.S. Route 101 i 1100 257 0.4 0 2 300 58 I-5 On-Ramp Southbound 1101 1100 0.2 0.1 250 29 Old U.S. Route 101/I-5 Underpass 2000 1095 12.5 5.2 300 1525 Old U.S. Route 101
[ 2001 1007 0 2 0 1 300 29 Basilone Rd. Interchange Overpass 1 2002 1012 1.2 0.3 250 87 Ave. Del Presidente 2M3 1009 0.5 0.2 500 117 El Camino Real
[- 2004 1018 2.9 1 2 500 703 El Camino Real 2005 1017 0.5 0.2 250 58 Ave. Del Presidente 2M6 214 0.4 0.2 300 41 I-5 On-Ramp Northbound
, 2007 1023 1.2 0.5 450 293 Ave. Del Presidente 1( 2008 218 0 2 0.1 300 35 I-5 On-Ramp Northbound
' 2009 220 0.2 0.1 300 29 I-5 On-Ramp Northbound 2010 1029 1.4 0.7 500 410 El Camino Real
- [ 2011 1030 0.4 0.3 500 146 Ave. Pico 2011 1032 0.4 0.2 500 123 Ave. Pico 2012 1025 1.5 0.5 250 146 Ave. Presidio 2313 1'*7 2.8 '1.6 300 463 Pacific Coast Highway
!
- 14 1033 3.9 1.3 250 364 Camino Capistrano
!' 2015 1036 1.2 0.4 300 117 Ave. Vaquero 2016 1 MO 1.9 0.8 500 469 Camino de Los Mares ll ,
2017 1039 0.5 0.2 500 117 Camino de Estrella t 2013 2021 2.3 0.8 250 225 Camino Capistrano 2017 2020 0.4 0.1 250 33 Via California 2020 10:4 0.2 0.1 400 5': Camino las Ramblas
..' 2221 1052 0.5 0.2 300 47 Camino Capistrano
'~
2022 1055 0.2 0.1 500 70 Pacific Coast Highway 2223 2024 3 1 1 8 500 1661 Pacific Coast Highway
- 2024 1053 2.4 1.4 500 807 Pacific Coast Highway 2025 2023 1 5 0.7 300 214 Del Obispo Street 2025 2C27 1.2 0.5 300 144 Del Obispo Street i
2 t7 1067 0.4 0 1 500 87 Del Obispo Street
! 2023 1044 1.5 0.8 300 219 Camino Capistrano 2027 1065 0.5 9 2 300 47 Valle Road 2030 1072 1.3 0.4 250 123 La Novia Avenue 2031 1072 1.1 0 4 500 363 Ortega Highway 2032 1073 1.5 0 4 500 363 Camino Capistrano 2033 1077 2.4 1 1 400 833 Marguerite Parkway
(
R
-- =.-_ .
~
f*I Travel Speeds - Speeds were assigned to each link according I' to the character of the roadway. Freeway speeds were assigned at
- 50 miles per hour with rarap speeds at 30 miles per hour. Four'-
4' lane roadways were generally assigned speeds ranging from 25 i miles per hour (El Camino Real) to 35 miles per hour (Pacific r-Coast Highway) depending on posted speed limits and roadway quality. Speeds for two-lane roadways ranged from 20 to 30
!l miles per hour. Centroid connectors were considered as local or neighborhood streets and assigned a speed of 15 miles per hour.
\('
ll The assigned speeds reflect roadway conditions where t
- P traffic control signals have been switched from normal operation to a flashing mode. Under these conditions, the primary ev&uca-
!" tion route is given the right-of-way (flashing yellow signal) il and side streets are given lower priority (flashing red signal) .
Manual traffic control at key interesections, where primary
[- evaucation routes merge, is also assumed in and reflected by the
! estimated travel speeds.
u d ,
It should be noted that the above mentioned speed assignments l ', represent average speeds only when the roadway facilities are ,
operating below the assigned roadway capacity. .Once traffic flow reaches or exceeds the roadway capacity, the computer simulation
~~
model begins .to form traffic queues on the "over-capacity" links
' and any adjacent links affected by the over-capacity link. The j' computer model adjusts the travel . times to reflect the congested y conditions, i
Capacities - Capacities assigned to each roadway take into j consideration general roadway geometrics as well as side road interference.
For the purpose of this analysis, the following capacities were assigned: -
,(
I
,.------,,,_,,-,.----,,,n--.-- - --
,_,,,_.,,a , - - , . , , , , , , - - - - ,,-----~--,-,----e. - ,
=
. 1 l
c.-
(
6
- " .g k
l e e, . .
-e (_' .a
+
I i
-+ e e
i /'
. e .
~e e
6
~~*
.- ' --e r
? 2 M, TJ&
s.. \
,! te
\1
! e-e 1-k-
g w 4
Evacuation Roadway Link-Node Network
(
Figure 8a
~~
W *
}
. .., I
{
l o Freeway - An average 1,800 vehicles per lane per hour was estimated for I-5. This yields a three- ~
1ane section capacity equal to 5,400 vehicles per 7 hour8.101852e-5 days <br />0.00194 hours <br />1.157407e-5 weeks <br />2.6635e-6 months <br /> and a four-lane section capacity of 7,200 vehicles per hour. 7 I i
o Interchange Ramp - 1,200 vehicles per hour for -
a single-lane on-ramp. - _j i
m o High-Type Roadway - Two and four-lane roadways .J with limited access were assigned capacities of ,
1,200 vehicles per lane per hour,
~
o Unlimited Access Roadways - Two and four-lane facili-ties with substantial side-street interference were -
assigned capacities of 1,000 vehicles per lane per hour. , <
. ]
The average lane capacities summarized above are consistent F.
with those used in standard traffic engineering and planning -j studies and should be considered conservative estimates for emer- .
gency evacuation conditions. 4 J
l
[ Once an evacuation is well underway, most vehicles would be l headed in the same direction. Because of the directional flow d and controlled routings, lane capacities could be higher than those observed under normal circumstances. Another factor which could contribute to smoother flow and higher capacities is that the drivers involved in the evacuation would probably be the most seasoned, experienced driver of each household.
i w
1
% e a
~n 1
k i
a e
N l
'f
' ~
3 x'D \
N N
y N
[' [.
- f.2g-
- n I i g i i f
t.
Evacuation Roadway Link-Node Network j
l
\
.(
o Hf.s NCCLZAR REwdTORY COMCSSICN l'
i o ATOMIC SAFETY AND LICENSING BOARD
,(
I= da .%::a= cf:
)
SOUTHERN CALIFORNIA EDISON COMPANY ) DOCKET NOS. 50-361, OL ET AL., ) and 50-352 OL (SAN ONOFRE NUCLEAR GENFJATING )
STATION, UNITS 2 AND 3 )
)
( aq: SEPTEMBER 24, 1981 73agg 10,096-10,313 g: Anaheim, California o
ALDERSON REPORT 1XG q
s _r 400 7 h p 'a Ave.,.5.W. Washd p==,
C. C. ICC24 iA Talaph==a: (2:2) 554-2345 O
a
- 10,129 1 BY MR. MC CLUNG:
2 Q Can you tell us briefly what your duties and 8 responsibilities are in your position with the Office of 4 Emergency Services?
5 A As the Deputy Director I supervise the day to day 6 activities of the Office of Emergency Services with direct 7 involvement in the Nuclear Power Plant project and the 8 Governor's task force on earthquakes. I also act as director 9 in his absance.
10 Q Are you an official representative and spokes-11 person of the OES with respect to nuclear power issues?
32 A I suppose I am one of the spokespersons from the 13 office of Emergency Services regarding that issue, yes.
14 Q Have you testified before governmental bodies 15 such as the legislature and Federal Emergency Management 16 Agency with respect to the State Officer of Emergency Ser-17 vices' position regarding nuclear power plant planning?
18 A Regarding nuclear power plant planning, yes, I 19 have,
! 20 Q In your view as Deputy Director, then, can you 21 state for -- the position of the OES on matters regarding 12 emergency planning for nuclear power plans as it exists to-13 day?
24 A Yes, I believe I can.
l 15 Q Could you briefly set forth your qualifications i
- f. ._ _ _ _ _ _
10,130
, I and background with respect to the emergency planning, speci-I '
fically?
2 3 MR. PIGOTT: Excuse me. The Applicants would i
4 be willing to stipulate that Mr. Kearns is an expert in the 5 area of emergency planning preparedness. The only question 6 I would ask is a very simple one, whether Mr. Kearns speaks y for himself or his department.
g JUDGE KELLEY: I thought -- that is what the g prior question was --
10 MR. MC CLUNG: That is what --
yy JUDGE KELLEY: -- that he spoke for the depart-ment.
12 yy MR. PIGOTT: He said he could. I am not sure if he is, 14 t
15 JUDGE KELLEY: Okay.
16 WITNESS KEARNS: I indicated I was certainly 37 one of the spokespersons dealing with emergency planning gg around nuclear power plants in California, yes.
MR. PIGOTT:
j, And you are today speaking on be-20 half of your department or agency?
21 WITNESS KEARNS: Yes, sir, I am.
22 MR. PIGOTT: Okay, 23 MR. MC CLUNG: Thank you, Mr. Pigott.
24 BY MR. MC CLUNG:
, 25 Q Now turning for a second to the Intervenors'
, , . . - , _ _ _ , _,...__..,_--..,,__,,,,.m.. - - , , - , - , , , . _ , , , _ - - . _ . . , _ _ . . . . . _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ , - _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ . . _ _ , _ _ _ , _ _ . _, _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ .
10,163 1 certain of the plans. And if there is a confusion there, and 2 I think it is an important confusion in that one of our 3 positions in this case is that that line for the emergency 4 planning zone should be identical, and in fact that area in 5 San Juan Capistrano and Dana Point should be incorporated l 6 within the emergency planning zone, like they did in the 7 State of California, and not in a new term which doesn't 8 appear in the regulations called the extended planning zone, 9 where there might be confusion. We have already seen that to there was confusion in this case with respect to the mailing 11 of the informational pamphlets to that zone. We have seen 12 that there is confusion in this case with respect to whether 13 or not people should evacuate from that zone, The testimony 14 of the people from San Juan --
15 JUDGE KELLEY: All right. Excuse me. Excuse me.
l 16 May I ask the Witness whether you participated in the drawing 17 of the lines being used by the Applicants in this case?
18 WITNESS KEARNS: I presume when you say the I 19 Applicant you are including Orange County, because our dis-1 20 cussion was with local government. Based on the study we 21 came to the conclusion that approximately 10 miles was cer-12 tainly adequate for planning around the San Onofre plant.
23 Members of our staff worked with the Orange County officials 24 in defining the zones. We don't arbitrarily impose our 25 thoughts on them. They have the understanding, as I have to
--~ .... =--- ----.-- .
-(
10,198 k2 y 0654, and ultimately the federal emergency management agency
[
( 2 would also recognize that, so we begin to work with them to correct the shortcoming that may be apparent in the plan a
4 so that it meets 0654.
(- JUDGE KELLEY: Have you had any situations where 5
6 y u thought 0654 required one thing and FEMA thought it 7
required something else in some significant point?
- [ g WITNESS KEARNS
- I really can't address that.
g Perhaps the next witness could address it in more detail.
JUDGE KELLEY: Okay. Redirect, Mr. McClung?
10 MR. MC CLUNGt No, sir.
- ( gy JUDGE KELLEY: Okay. Mr. Kearns, thank you 12 y, very much. Appreciate your appearance.
WITNESS KEARNS: Thank you.
i I( 14 15 (Whereupon, the witness was excused.)
16 JUDGE KELLEY: Next?
MR. MC CLUNG: Yes, Intervenors would call
!( 17 gg Dr. Mary Frances Reed. .
19 Whereupon, MARY FRANCES REED g 20 i 21 having been first duly sworn by the Chairman, was called as 22 a witness herein and was examined and testified as follows.
DIRECT EXAMINATION
! 23 BY MR. MC CLUNG:
4 24 25 Q Would you state your name and address please it
(
k
-(
10,199 i i for the record?
'I A Mary Frances Reed. 411 South Flower Place, 2
3 West Sacramento, California.
4 Q Could you tell us the organization you work for I 5 and your title?
A I am with the California Officer of Emergency 6
Services. I am Chief of the Nuclear Power Plant Planning 7
( g Section.
9 Q Could you describe for us briefly your educa-10 tional background?
.( g; A I have a Bachelor of Science and a Ph.D. from the University of California in Berkeleys My Ph.D. was in 12 13 nuclear chemistry. I have spent a year in a post-doctoral
-( ( 34 appointment with the University of Kentucky Medical Center, 15 and I can go into professional now if you would like.
16 Q Well, that would be helpful if you would describ e
( 17 your professional experience as it relates to emergency 33 planning.
MR. PIGOTT: Applicants are willing to stipulate 19 20 that Dr. Reed is an expert in the area of emergency planning
(
21 and that her testimony can be considered as expert testimony .
MR. MC CLUNG: That is helpful.
22 MR. PIGOTT: At least in the area of emergency 23 planning. That is what we are talking about.
24 25 JUDGE KELLEY: Why don't we just go ahead to
(
- .w -._ . . _ . . _ _ _ - _
10,276 k8 1 WITNESS RZED: Not in detail. I know there are a 2 number of hospitals there.
a3 JUDGE KELLEY: All right. Have you ever given 4 any thought generally to the question of whether specific 5 medical arrangements ought to be made in the extended plan-6 ning zone in the event of a radiological emergency?
7 WITNESS REED: I do not think specific plans are 8 necessary to, say, evacuate a hospital in that extended zone, 9 for instance. However I do think some consideration to 10 sheltering and KI should be given. Any more than that -- I 11 am not quite sure what you are getting at. If you are 12 talking about for the hospital populition --
13 JUDGE KELLbY: I am talking about the general 14 public.
15 WITNESS REED: Okay.
16 JUDGE KELLEY: Right. Any special medical arrange--
17 ments?
18 WITNESS REED: Probably not. I would not antici-19 pate any need for specific medical arrangements for the 20 general public in that zone.
21 JUDGE KELLEY: The extended 20 zone?
12 WITNESS REED: True.
13 JUDGE KELLEY: How about the zero to 10 zone?
14 WITNESS REED: It is unlikely there even in terms 15 of any acute care need. Now I --
i*
NUCLEAR REGULATORY CO.WISSION This is to certify that the attached proceedings before the NUCLEAR REGULATORY COF2iISSION in the =att er o f: Southern NH 7-ia M m ci==ny, et al (San h6 Nuclear Generatirs Staticms, thits 2 and 3)
- Date of Proceeding: September 24, 1981 Docket Nu=ber: 50-361 OL, 50-362-OL Place of Proceeding: Anaheim, c=Hf = 4=
l were held as herein appears, and that this is the criginal transcrips
( therect for :he file of the Coc=ission., ,
i t
Ruth Portune Official aeporter (Typed) iff(cia 1ae..-ce.-at,=.=,e3
~
l 1
l
-n ~ . - - . . . . .
ste et cr tsasoceues i ^
L O*AUt10 G. B ROWN JR .. Co.-
OFFICE OF EMERGENCY SERVICES Post of f sCf 90: 9377 g--
1ACtAastNfC. Calif oewta 93033 (sis x>:xxna 427-4360 July 20, 1982 l [W e
U Sally R. Bellerue Mayor, City of Laguna Beach 505 Forest Ave.
Laguna Beach, CA 92651-2394
Dear Mayor Bellerue:
Your letter of June 4, 1982 to Governor Brown was forwarded to this office for reply.
In 1979, the office of Emergency Services, in response to Senate Bill 1183, undertook a study of the effects of a sericus nuclear power plant accident in California. The study was site-specific 7 It resulted in the creation of a Basic Emergency Planning Zone, extending approximately 10 miles from San Onofre, and an Extended Emergency Planning zone, going out 10 to 15 miles beyond the basic zone. ,
\
- t Within the basic zone, California has adopted federal planning standards which include detailed planning for both evacuation 3
and sheltering, as well as the development of a coordinated public warning and education program. Comprehensive plans have been developed by local jurisdictions within the basic zone, and the plans have been forwarded to this office for review.
l Southern California Edison has distributed brochures to l residents and businesses within this zone, providing informa-l tica on how the public would be notified in an emergency.
[ There is also a specific set of instructions on protective actions which may be necessary (e.g., evacuation routes to reception centers) .
In the extended zone, due to the reduced risk indicated by our study (as compared to the basic zone) such detailed planning is not required. We do, however, require distribution i
.4
, SCKDVE F aL JUL 2 31982 l
l DiTICE y ct1Y 'u nsua
- - . - - - a n. - - ,.- ,,, - -..--._,.,n - , .,,-.,,.,...-,,y
r Sally R. Bellerue
. July 20, 1982 Page 2 h
of educational materials and planning for warning the public L
using the Emergency Broadcast System.
As they have done in the basic zone, Southern California Edison is preparing public information materials for distri-bution within the extended zone. We are now reviewing a draf t of an " Emergency Information Handbook," which includes information on emergency levels, the planning that has been done to protect public health and well being and the steps to take to avoid or greatly reduce potential effects of a radioactive material release.
I hope this information is helpful to you. If we can be of further help, please contact this office.
S'ncerely, 3 l
J din .F r..'S . 7
- Dc,"'f D1 or 4
e e
k
l 1
\)l llI j
ka.
. < . . e 5$o.
? -
.u .
fh.
f.
p 6 . -
YN
. xb .;"
1[h-A$.
,;f d +
CO I 0% i}M rw
{
w':? .
[
N NT 0
.k-O g ,
EA3 I
- T :
.. y(g s
. ?. #4 M..
g/. ,-s,'; c.
I .;; -
y-D E y'3
. 3 j~ g! .-
.1 d; #.
E g -
G M )8
.pi ,
u;c., . ; .
,'v . ea d 'N, D w1;
D RR YN N 1 4 ..
G O,
- . I
,e iR N O s j' .g.
.* i c>..
- tsy, #. .
_ a : ,)
a' ; c, _ a .
C J_4 E AI A, I,
~
E .
c<
. f w . . .. 4 ;
h,
.wt,:'&p p.2 )
s..-
_FLAti S
MF A
_ L,O CRS, c
L,N'U E ENn O NN~
V '
I(
N-i E-
- _. A- dli-
- _ _S _.
-- - j Z
- _ _ I_
I.aIf i 5-
_ lj:Jl
_ l L_ i _
.,~!I
. ! ! i3 1 lLl lll
This handbook has been written to nelp residents who live ~
in areas outside, but adjacent to, the San Onofre Emergency Planning Zone to better understand the development of the Emergency Response Plans for the San Onofre Nuclcar Generating Station. .
The handbook describes the planning that has been done to protect public health and well-being; the levels of emergency which, although unlikely, could arise; and the steps the public can take to avoid or greatly reduce the potential effects of a radioactive material release. It answers many of the questions frequently asked about a potential emergency at the San Onofre Nuclear Generating Station.
- k. W.
$b 9 *$ i.
Mihd(;g,:% %,
449,4;;pg 3 5 Mf+d?N.'di :.
< c.1 - : 4 ! 4; . .
' *
- t t%
l
.#e.; ,. .p.
? V?k j sibDll i:llij NQ W@%
i F
$$ f yp1 s !F;pil1
. c es jd[W,C&q#N y pg $g#jyg{
g ,3 g; g p d p g g$ i M $ $g$4fd gggy$$p$[$EMP DA$ ! Y
,_ . .mg~.. n ~ . .-
l i w'_. _I /
I /
EMERGENCY PLANNING ZONE -
The federal government has established the area within about - - ^
a 10-mile radius of any nuclear generating station as the \ !
O O"Y Emergency Planning Zone for that station. At San Onofre, this emergency planning zone encompasses portions of -}
5.
i Yy /
/
Orange and San Diego Counties; the cities and communities of San Clemente, San Juan Capistrano, Capistrano Beach i^
\ r
/
and Dana Point; portions of the blarine Corps Base Camp -
- \ /
Pendleton and several beaches and parks operated by the I7 .
5 3' /
State Department of Parks and Recreation (San Onofre State Beach, San Clemente State Beach, Doheny State Beach).
\3 .
Nh '.
~
X#
M n
[
The federal government established this emergency planning ElrTORC zone to insure that advance emergency planning is provided m - . '# /
\ /
for an area of sufficient size surrounding each nuclear plant to assure that prompt and effective actions could be taken to IUm gl uito;
[lt~t_L su
_ .= "
h.h A,MC
,qf NP
\
/
/
protect the public in the event of an emergency. Emergency -
r"UBLIC P
g gR,S W -/
protective actions which the public in this area may be asked e m m -EDOGATlo g j to take include sheltering and, under very extreme emergencies, evacuation. __.a b L A. $
u g EL ]gnggf '
y
-4'h[ \
Y
\ Q
,v 4 pqww g ._
Mcusa usuum t.n :\ )
u m ni s +~ ;.
PUBLIC EDUCATION ZONE --spurn -
4 B _ = -
p d
L
-1
[ AG[3 R M-The State of California has defined an area outside and adjacent to the federal Emergency Planning Zone as the gN i
{ .11(,%
p T .
y z ', "
. t p(
rg Fy MCAle;k 3# l"M as >
.e :
M'pN I Public Education Zone. At San Onofre, the Public Education l -- '
Zone encompasses the communities of Laguna Beach, Laguna l SAN. .
SpW])hpW s "..
- . . N :d , , ,
Ilills, Laguna Niguel, South Laguna, El Toro and blission I 7" ' '
W MPI M hmiBIC M # 1 e 4-M Af9 B Mi"09"3 W* r/
Viejo in Orange County; portions of the Cleveland National Forest in Riverside and San Diego Counties; and portions of : SANT424NEN Eggyy;d S g; We/
blarine Corps Base Camp Pendleton and the communities of --
ONOFRB 1 gy wgg g m e6- q Oceanside, Fallbrook, Bonsall, Carlsbad and Vista in San Diego County. ] f ygg. -
y y ,yg, 4 P, MN* -N The State Office of Emergency Services established this Publie --
l I M l sLNbidca Fducation Zone to ensure that the public would be informed j $ g *s\ COUNTY in advance of how it would be notified of an emergency and OCEANSIDEI k'
I." ~
Eh
>/
~
what protective action, if any, should be taken in the event of an emergency.
,f H -J' rx
[
The only protective action which the public in this area may ! .CARISBAD .
f Q h
be asked to take is sheltering. Virtually all experts, including ----
l J the Nuclear Regulatory Commission, the Federal Emergency blanagement Agency, State Office of Emergency Services and T
P/ CIFIC DCEAN l the Counties of Orange and San Diego agree that no evacuation planning beyond the 10-mile Emergency Planning Zone will l Qq -
be necessary. The reason evacuation planning is not considered ._j_ __ _ _
l I D a real requirement is that the distance factor (the distance _ _ _
from San Onofre) reduces any hazard beyond the 10-mile The duration of a hazard within the Public Education Zone zone so significantly that this precaution becomes might be only several hours depending upon the nature of the unnecessary damage to the plant. ,
The area affected could vary from the plant site itself to an WhatIsA area several square miles surrounding the plant. The hazard NuclearPowerPlantEmergency? posed would be due to the radiation given off by the radio-A nuclear power plant emergency could occur if there were active gases or materials carried from the plant by the wind.
a problem with the equipment associated with public , Radiation levels from any radioactive gases reaching the protection. Public action would be necessary only if there were '
public beyond 10 miles from the plant would be much lower an anticipated or actual uncontrolled release of radioactive due to dilution of the gases and their distribution well above material into the environment. ground level.
4 How LikelyIs An Emergency? NuclearEmergencies:
The chances of a serious nuclear power plant emergency Who Decides When 7b Take Action occurring are remote compared to the chances of other i disasters such as floods, earthquakes and hazardous chemical spills. Nevertheless, the operators of the San Onofre Nuc! ear a Generating Station and local government agencies believe that '
.s citizens should know what to do if a serious nuclear power WI plant emergency should occur.
What Are TheHazards? ?
Industrial plants in general pose some hazard to the public.
Usually these hazards affect only the people who work in the y plants, but occasionally the public living near industrial plants i ; --
is threatened by fires, explosions, or the escape of harmful ,
~ 7 liquids or gases. '
, 9 A nuclear power plant, like conventional power plants and many industrial plants, releases water vapors (steam) every day. -
dC 5,f
.?
[S@,f c m .
This water vapor is not radioactive and is no cause for - - ; : s concern. Nuclear power plants may also release small quanti-ties of radioactive gases into the air and water under highly ps p<y -
4 .
controlled and regulated conditions. Such releases occur . $ M%c . . . ',
frequently, and are continuously monitored by the plant ' ' ' '
4 E n , ? y .
personnel in accordance with strict government standards.
The releases are controlled to make sure the radiation dose
- c .
~ 6,G U .,O@* U'
~ J" ' ' '
- h. ._
'l rate to the environment is considerably less than the natural While it is unlikely that the public would be endangered background radiation. ' by most malfunctions which could occur at the San Onofre Most nuclear power plant emergencies would not result in Nuclear Generating Station, some conditions require releases oflarge quantities of radioactive material into the air. immediate notification oflocal, state and federal authorities in the unlikely event such a release should occur, the while the conditions are at minor levels. Even under low level protective action to be taken would depend upon the amount emergency conditions, the staff at San Onofre would notify the and type of the material released, the wind direction, and counties of Orange and San Diego, the cities of San Clemente where you are located. and San Juan Capistrano, the Marine Corps Base at Camp 4 5
~
l Pendleton, California State Parks and Recreation Department, Levels o/Ennerpency Action Califorma Office of Emergency Services and the U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission. Depending upon the level of emer- Emergency conditions are classified into four categories ~
gency declared, agencies in turn would activate their covering the severity of possible accidents. They range from respective emergency response personnel and other emer- "those events which indicate a potential deterioration of the gency organizations including the police, fire and health level of plant safety or result in a radiological emergency departments, Coast Guard and Red Cross. Direct telephone involving a single person onsite," to "those even's of a radio-communications link the primary agencies to the San Onofre logical nature involving large numbers of people o// site." The plant management, insuring prompt reporting of changing emergency condition classifications have been standardized plant conditions to the authorities. ? across the nation. Local and state officials have carefully studied the actions they might need to take to protect the Emergency coordinators in each of the local governments, health and safety of the population should a radiological in consultation with one another, will then evaluate the >,
emergeEy occu seriousness of the event as it progresses in terms of a possible health hazard to the public. If the condition worsens to Under the vast maiority of circumstances, the most serious require protective action by the public, the authorities will emergency would progress over a period of time ~through each alert residents and visitors within the 10-mile Emergency of these stages, allowing more time for plant operators and -
Planning Zone to take any necessary protective actions. local governments to take action. It should be noted, however, that the emergency plans for San Onofre Nuclear Generating Jurisdictions and agencies located within the Public Education Station are based upon the assumption that emergency j Zone would be notified by Orange and San Diego County and c nditions started at the most severe level and required Marine Corps Base Camp Pendleton authorities. They would immediate action by local, state and federal agenc,esi and be kept informed of the emergency conditions and advised of 6er emergexy orgamzations.
any protective actions they might be requested to take.
- 1. Unusual Event i
Unusual Events generally characterize abnormal plant
/ conditions which, by themselves, do not constitute significant g ;
emergency conditions nor any hazard to the public. Some i
6 g
s
\ ! events indicate a potential lessening in the number of plant
.h i
backup safety systems which could escalate to a more severe 9 M condition if appropriate action by the plant operator or id fyII'J automatic actions engineered into the plants' systems were ineffective. With the possible exception of assistance by local
..6M%'s .
( support groups such as a fire department or medical facilities, I yf. p no response by other offsite agencies or the public is necessary
- l, y 2Sh ndy !
w y'n 2$ s 7 . 2. Alert
. A ~,
h% k 3 ;. M
- An Alert is characterized by events that involve actual or potentialdeterioration of plant safety. The Alert classification jE;hs % Mi .
Tf3'%' h Mt constitutes the lowest level in which emergency response by 1 :;.
gW '
.M c rp .
local officials and agencies for the 10-mile Emergency Plan-3W
~
i$ -
ning Zone would be necessary. The local agencies would alert key emergency personnel and bring emergency operations centers to an operational status. The local agencies would stand by for further information until the condition was corrected, or escalated to a more serious level. Some agencies 6 7
might take action in special situations; for example, at San Tune in to one of the following radio or television stations:
Onofre State Beach adjacent to the plant, the State Parks and Recreation Department would carry out a precautionary evacu. RadioStation Frequency Location ~
ation assisted by the operating staff at San Onofre. Ilowever, KEZY AM 1190/FM 95.9 Anaheim at this level of emergency, there would be no action necessary KWlZ AM 1480/FM 96.7 Santa Ana on the part of the general public. K\WE FM 107.9 San Clemente KlKF FM 94.3 Garden Grove
- 3. Site Emergency KSBR FM 88.5 Mission Viejo A Site Emergency would be characterized by events involving KUDE AM 1320 Oceanside actual or probable major failures of plant functions needed , KEZL FM 102.1 Oceanside to protect the public. Most events within this classification KOGO AM 600 San Diego would have a potential for significant releases of radioactive M N M .5 San Diego material to the environment, but not in amounts large enough KCBQ AM ll70/FM 105.3 Santee to require protective measures beyond the plant boundaries. Television Station The local agencies would establish their respective emergency CBS Channel 2 Los Angeles operations centers for the 10-mile Emergency Planning Zone, NBC Channel 4 los Angeles brief the news media and prepare for a possibly more serious ABC Channel 7 . Los Angeles emergency until the condition was corrected or escalated to KOCE Channel 50 -
Huntington Beach the next and most serious level. The San Onofre State Beach, KFMB Channel 8 San Diego which is located next to the plant, would be evacuated as KG'lV Channel 10 San Diego a precaution and the Marine Corps Base at Camp Pendleton KCST Channel 39 San Diego would move its Marines and dependents out of the immediate area in order to maintain its national defense capability and be prepared to assist the civilian community if necessary.
W/lat 'lb 00 In the event of an emergency, the public would be asked to
- 4. General Emergency take certain actions which could include waiting for further A General Emergency is characterized by events which would instructions or taking sheltering precautions.
involve an actual or imminent release oflarge amounts of .
radioactive material to the environment outside the plant N8N8IE8 boundaries. Total activation of the onsite and offsite emer- If the public was asked to take sheltering precaptions, gency organizations for the 10-mile Emergency Planning Zone instructions would be given which would include staying is required. Actions involving the public within the 10-mile indoors, closing all ventilators, windows and doors, turning Emergency Planning Zone would be likely. Actions involving off the air conditioner, cooking ventilation and clothing the public within the Public Education Zone would be very ' dryers. These precautions should remain in force until the unlikely; however, information and instructions would be given public was instructed otherwise.
over the Emergency Broadcast system radio stations.
PublicNotificats.on OfAn Emergency Some Facts AboutRadiation Enects '
,,g g ,gg,,cgggggy gggg ,,,,
Public notification of a serious emergency would be by news broadcasts and, if necessary, by public address systems operated Radiation continues to be one of the public's chief concerns by public service personnel on a street-by-street basis. This . regarding nuclear power plants. Th,si section provides m, forma-warning is to alert the public to turn on the radio or TV for tion about radiation, including its sources, measurement, emergency instructions, and to refer back to this folder. Notify ;icalth and safety effects, and how protective action would j neighbors to ensure they are aware of the emergency. The minimize radiat,on i impact dunng an emergency. j initial instructions may simply recommend that the public The primary difference between nuclear power plants and continue listening for further news or that they should close other steam-driven power plants is that the fissioning of their windows and stay indoors. :
uranium is used to provide the heat required to boil the water l
'n' 8 9 I
which generates the steam for driving the turbinelgenerator. average radiation dose, followed by exposure from medical During the process of releasing heat from uraniura, fission by- sources. The nuclear power industry, however, contributes products are formed which are the remains of the uranium.
less than 1% of the radiation to which we are regularly - l i Most of these fission by-products are radioactive and emit the exposed.
MCH PRESSURE IGN S OfRadiation CONTROL ROD DRIVES TURBINE
((
Radiation is a natural form of energy and there are two types:
mn STEAM GENERATOR LOW PRESSURE ionizing radiation and non-ionizing radiation. Visible light,
- EA PRESSURIZER \ / MBINE radio and TV waves, and microwaves are examples of non-
'ESS / GENERATOR , ,
1 I I j / 7 T' g'-
~
0 CONDENSER s... .
m.- -v y ".,,,. s Y- ~ ., g i
' "' ' -Q
% T9 qi .
s Qy .
m.. e..y.,,, .?
q ..
. .r . ; ,n. .
E . ., , , ,_
i i l .
CONDENSER l l' l h, PARTITION .
f?'". f; - ~
j CTOR IC Al, R ADIATION CONTROL ROD \.s 1.5 CLUSTERS g '. T .-
p;l. j)'.,
_a 1h y i - .- y extra energy they contain in the form of radiation. The radio- 67.6% M ATURAL BACKGROUND
~
active by-products are containes' within the plant and are not -
4 permitted into the environmer. < cept for the small .,
I-quantities of radioactive gase 'tiscussed on page 4. ..
Radiation can affect body cells and, in excessive amounts, can be injurious. However, as long as the radioactive materials (fission by-products) remain inside the nuclear reactor, there
['
are no harmful effects. Therefore, extraordinary effort is taken
. M 84k during the design, construction and operation of a nuclear THIS DIAGRAM plant to reduce the possibility of radioactive material finding SHOWS THAT: -
its way from the reactor, through the numerous protective barriers and the containment structure, into the surrounding
- the major contribution to the average dose Is from natural environment.
} background radiation
)
- the largest man-made contribution is from the medical uses NaturalBackgroundRadiation of radiation Every living thing on this planet is exposed to ionizing
- the nuclear power industry is a small contributor to the radiation and has been since time began. This naturally average radiation dose.
occurring radioactive material is in the air we breathe, in the Figure 1. From " Radiation-A Fact of Life" food we eat, and in the homes we live in. This natural by the International Atomic Energy Agency,1979 background" radiation is the largest contributor to a person's 4.upi.a iro s.no i n.aoio.c.i rro ci so a poux.i saritart 10 11
ionizing radiation. X-rays, alpha, beta and gamma are examples of ionizing radiation, and can come from virtually all
( Estiinate Your AnnualExposure
- natural materials. Both kinds of radiation can have beneficial as well as harmful effects. The term radiation, as used
(
To Radiation
- Your Ananal in this handbook, means the ionizing type, since it is the type Common Sources of Radiation Dese (arem) nuclear reactors produce. WilERE YOU LIVE
' 26 Location: Cosmic radiation at sea level . . . . . . . . . . . . .
There are many kinds of ionizing radiation. Perhaps the best For your elevation (in fee 0-add this number o(mrem . . .
known are X. rays, alpha, beta and gamma. Alpha radiation El n-mre particles have the potential to penetrate the surface of the skin, but can be stopped by a sheet of paper. Beta radiation 2000-5 5000-21 8000-53 ,
I 3000-9 6000-29 9000-70 particles can penetrate half an inch of water or human flesh, Elevation of some U.S. cities (in fee 0: Atlanta 1050,-
but can be stopped by wood or housing materials an inch Chicago 595, Dallas 435. Denver 5280, Las Vegas n' ,
thick. Camma rays and X. rays can penetrate the human body, 2000. Minneapolis 815. Pittsburgh 1200, St. touis 455, - ,
but can be very drastically reduced, or almost completely Salt Lake City 4400, Spokane 1890. .
l (Coastal cities are assumed to be zero, or at sea levet) '
I absorbed, by several feet of concrete for stronger gamma rays, '
or several inches of concrete for the weaker X-rays. These cround: US. average . . . . . . .. . ... .... . ... 26 characteristics of radiation are important in the public House Construction-For stone, concrete,'er masonry .
building, add 7 . .. . . .. . .
protective action called sheltering, and are discussed in more detail in the section on " Shielding Against Radiation." WIIAT YOU EAT, DRINK & BREATHE Food. Water, Air. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . U.S. average 24 WhatIsMeant By Radiation Dose? weapas test fall ~t . . .. . . .... . .
"~
4~ ',
"0"' YOU UVE -
HowIs Radiation Measured? X-ray and radio phar =="'bl diagnosis:
When a person is exposed to radiation, he or she absorbs Number of chest x-rays x 10 . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
some of the radiation energy. We call this receiving a radiation No. of lower gastrointestinal tract x-rays x 500. . . . . l dose. Ilowever, as in the case of coffee or medicine, the No. of radiopharmaceutical exams x 300 . . . . . . . . . l possible health effects can best be determined when we know (Average dose to total U.S. population - 92 mrem) - 'I the amount of radiation, the rate at which it was received and Jet plane travel: For each 2500 miles add 1 mrem . . . . . . l TV v; ewing: For each hour per day x 0.15 l the manner in which it was received. . . .
llOW CLOSE YOU LIVE TO A NUCLEAR PLANT Radiation doses to individuals are usually expressed in units At site boundary: Avg. no. of hours per day x 0.2 . . I of millirem (b1 reb 1). "htillirem" is a unit used to measure an One mile awar Ag no. d houn pu day x R02 - _. ,
amount of ionizing radiation. The millirem unit accounts for - Eve nides away: A4 no. d hNn pu day x E002-the different kinds of biological effect produced by equal doses ne -
Ova s away . .
of different radiations; therefore, it is used by physicians and ,, .;,,
health scientists m measurements refernng to radiation achevable"(AI. ARA) cnteru estabhshed by the U.S. Nuclear Regulatory C "*"*" E'P'"*" 5h "' that your actual do.e is substannany sens protection. than these hmets.
The rate at which a person receives radiation is expressed as My total annual dose in mrem =
millirems per hour, per year, etc. If you stand in a radiation cornpare w annuddose m us annalews- .
area of 10 millirems per hour for one hour, you receive a OM mrem per year is equal to: increasing your diet by 4%; or taking a 10-millirem radiation dose. If you remain in this 10 millirem ,
shacadon in the Siara Nevada mountains.
per hour radiation area for 10 hours1.157407e-4 days <br />0.00278 hours <br />1.653439e-5 weeks <br />3.805e-6 months <br />, you receive a 100-millirem radiation dose. (This measurement is similar in concept to the '"gc"4",'"'1*,,"/'
a ,",d**/."d*%%;;"%,7, ;'g*,,,,7,d w 8""'",O *a "i rate at which you drive a car-expressed in miles per hour. If *==> d *= w*aec . 2= '
Figure 2. From American Nuclear Society
- Nuclear Power and the -1 you drive at 10 b1Pil for 1 hour1.157407e-5 days <br />2.777778e-4 hours <br />1.653439e-6 weeks <br />3.805e-7 months <br />, you travel 10 miles).
Environment: Questions and Answers *-Radiation (Book 1) 1980 l The annual dose rate to the average U.S. citizen from cosmic ,
M l 12 i 13 ii
_ __u
radiations and radioactive material in the earth is about 100 sources. According to NRC radiation safety requirements, i millirem (ranging from 60 mrem in Florida to about 100 mrem persons living in the vicinity of a nuclear plant may rcceive '
in California to 145 mrem in Colorado), in addition the doses of no more than five millirem a year from the facility. .
average person also receives about 100 millirem from man-made sources. For example the average person receives about 75 millirem annually from medical X-ray diagnosis. Specifically, Radiation DOSCSIn flerSpect/De an X-ray of the chest when properly administered gives a person a dose of approximately 10 millirem per film. A barium Protective action for an affected area will be recommended by plant personnel to local officials if offsite radiation doses enema X-ray examination involves doses up to about 1,500 alirem to the skin of the midsection of the body. Your are estimated to exceed 500 millirem. A 500 millirem dose
' is much less than the smallest dose at which health effects annual radiation exposure can be estimated by using the start to become apparent. I/the public were instmeted to take information on page 13.
shelter in response to an emergency at San Ono/re, there Radiation At San Onofre. The radioactivity in the vicinity of would be no need to panic and risk an injury or accident in San Onofre Nuclear Generating Station has been monitored the belic/that there is imminent danger. The following dose continually in accordance with a program approved by the levels will give you an idea of the mcreasmg severity of Nuclear Regulatory Commission and the California Department radiation impacts:
of Public Health and Safety, beginning years before the plant 100 millirem in any one year-Average U.S. background began operating. Tiiis elaborate monitoring system measures radiation with no significant health effects.
- radiation in the air, ground, plants, animal life and water. More than 15 years of monitoring prove that San Onofre has not 500 millirem in any one year-No measurable effect.
added significantly to the natural background radiation levels. Annual increase above natural background radiation allowed
~
to an individual by the EP1 Protective measures would be If you lived next door to San Onofre Nuclear Generating Station, you would receive less than one millirem of ordered before this dose is reached.
additional radiation per year under normal operation. To put 5,000 millirem in any one year-A dose which is permis-that one millirem in perspective, natural background s ble to a radiation worker, year in and year out.
radiation alone exposes the average U.S. citizen to about 100 25,000 millirem in one day-A dose below which there millirems of radiation per year,22 to 27 of them from is usually no observable effect on the health of a person; a'i one':, own body.
allowable dose to an emergency worker.
Is That Radiation Within Safe Limits? The Nuclear Regulatory Commission (NRC) is responsible for implementing 75,000 millirem in one day-Mild flu-like symptoms may appear, and enforcing the radiation protection standards established by the Environmental Protection Agency (EPA). Radiation 500,000 millirem in one day-Fatal to about half of people standards have evolved from years of study and recommenda. exposed if no medical treatment is given.
tion by international and national radiation-protection The overwhelming majority of clinical evidence demonstrates l organizations beginning in the early 1920s. The present limits that low-level radiation doses up to several thousand millirem i in force in the United States were established on the basis of I do not result in long-term health effects. Any effects oflow the recommendations of the Federal Radiation Council (FRC) level doses of radiation are so small that they are totally I in 1960, as approved by the President. These limits are in masked by effects from other causes. However, to be conser-agreement with the long-standing recommendations of the vative, protective actions for the public would be ordered at National Council on Radiation Protection and Measurement low levels of anticipated or actual releases.
(NCRP) and the InternMional Commission on Radiological Protection (ICRP) and remain consistent with occupational radiation protection standards m effect worldwide. The U.S. Airborne Spread O/ Radioactive Materials Environmental Protection Agency allows individuals in the Nuclear power plants have many protective systems to hold general population to absorb 500 millirem per year from all radioactive material within the fuel assemblies containment sources other than natural background radiation and medical barriers and buildings. These systems include air filtration 14 15
1 1
/ o ap,c .;a n,+ ,r ~ > - m ;g ; .s 4 %- systems required to protect plant workers as well as the ffy~ / j,j%QNh'
- - t .
,.- ",Ng [ hy M Q d i' % f3
$4h general public. The most probable cause of radiation exposure to the public would be an airborne release of radioactive gas ,
k -
i from the normally air-tight containment. As this gas was 4.[M / 9,. E M hyNM h' g : p yh Q;. t ~
carried by the wind and mixed with air, it would form a
.C ',*. 1. iw Q - j;a,w g l* .. .yg s radioactive cloud called a plume. The shape and direction of i i t .='. ( . # .a. ,
LF the plume would depend upon the wmd speed, land contours,
- ..ey /
% .- %m , w. -
g,,t W.g 4- and atmospheric conditions at the time of the release.
i>6 V i X.? ' .- The concentration of radioactivity in the plume would
, , Q 'g ' yy f.w fll'Jj decrease as the distance from the plant increased, because the
.lj g;. A.'E h v. :
plume would spread out and dilute. A hypothetical " typical"
- 3; + .
1 s.. 339,4 g.t . k( ,49 plume is shown in Figure 3.
, .[ : % '- ' i F. ,. 3 , *.if
.4 N . m ;,; s ..; A. ~' %. Y R & W6 ShieldingAgainstRadiation dh a*1J.N. %
- f. -
L- Thick layers of concrete, water and steel have long been
- f. $_ %A ,
F,,.
, N '. *..P ?YC 4 used as effective shields against the very highly concentrated sources of radiation used in industry. Thicknesses of several
-.f ' ; 44tfd'
, , . 7. /
Y 1.h feet of concrete eliminate the soft, non-penetrating ,
.iC J 4 radiations and reduce the more penetrating radiation i f' " -
~ .[ g x O. ,/ ,. g p[ y:
( to less than 0.1% of the original dose rate.
( -
L -' ' 2 dfp .( '
Radiation levels from any radioactive gases reaching the public would be much smaller due to dilution of the gases and l
l#pi y&, a if 3 i
. e - .' their distribution well above ground level. The relatively thin 7.A -m fw M' materials of a house or building would be effective in three n'9pf -
l ". j j ways as protection against diluted airborne radioactive j /
. .? , ' " --
.%y^pM t,'e f: . ' materials. They would:
t% .1 ; -;
^
.i .
, e.-;.:: .
' - ip :y 'a. '[ :] hffh, 4
! 1) Minimize external gases from entering the building to get
, 3 ,. .
, near the occupants; I
,..i : e
- s. ,
- . gy
.y d} ' "... A. &s.w C m' F
- 2) Virtually stop the soft, non-penetrating radiation;
[.. .d; Aq -
yyf}y;]!?.> g #y 'h..g 3) Substantially reduce the more penetrating radiation.
.e t 4 j p- . m 1 J-a e-p g . A dc [d Environmental Protection Agency studies of the effectiveness I
ef .a o .' ' ' 7 o ;: 3. .m - ?7.1 yS-;-
n 7.: 4 . M. m C d of sheltering as protection against nuclear accidents show that closing a building's windows and doors and turning off y 'y ; l r
ventilation systems significantly delay entry of the gases-l
. n.,k.k..h perhaps until a gas cloud would pass.
. . . ,, . . ? _ . W $ W . . .
j
, [ According to these studies, even for penetrating radiation, a Figure 3. Plume Spreading Out and Diluting from a Nuclear Power Plant.
wood frame house would reduce radiation doses by as much Note: The radioactive material is not visible, and would be as 40%, a masonry house would reduce radiation by as much detected with monitoring instruments.
16 17 J
as 60%, and a large office building or multi-story building Sheltering would reduce radiation by as much as 99%.
! Radiation dose is reduced by placing an absorbing material, $
Under circumstances possible for a serious nuclear power i between a persen and the radiation source-the heavier the
~
plant accident, sheltering would reduce radiation doses by as better. Therefore, the dose would be less if you were inside a much as 92% when sheltering is begun before the radioactive home or office rather than outside in the open. In an gas arrives. And remember, in the Public Education Zone, emergency situation, the public would be instruc%d to go radiation levels would already have been substantially diluted indoors until the hazard was over. In addition, to prevent because of distance. 'i airborne radioactive material from entering your home, you would be instructed to close all ventilators, windows and E#ective PublicProtection Actions doors, and turn off the air conditioner, cooking ventitation The various types of protective measures you would be and clothing dryers-that is, turn off anything that exchanges instructed to take after an ememency has been declared inside air with outside air. !
include:
- 1. ALERT: Do nothing yet: keep tuned to local emergency W w W PC"?"p'R "76"x' 7;7' * ^ ' - "
l radio /TV stations for information. 4 o',%a .W,,9 :e.W. . .Mi M., t . - e_
p ,
.)
W M M k? N's.,_
- 2. SHELTER: Remain indoors until further notice. Close all l A N ;'
outside windows, ventilators and doors and turn off air -
Lj: Qf, j pg V - "'
4 conditioners, cooking ventilation and clothes dryers.
! g.Jgpf &' -
yg6gfR&gk j
n
.;w -
y 7 pfb,p e a QTi l Wl g i Fi U
1 4
- W ~
p n Tb%
C
- f.G, h l
-._. ~ _ _
ft j , W .a l } l jff6 l 3 , :.W ,
( l HM.
( >
n.Q q%
s 3
3
'a
+ ]
M"]! .-
Q pfF gyg d
a
[ e
~'
lj'yf.
v i< [. ,
, 4;;;; j
< 3
\
t .
? -
3 k,mh
, ? t-Any radiation dose can be reduced by three means: ?:Q@,
j e
^b . ,
4 ]
L Reducing the time of exposure to radiation. "y
- fL )j
- 2. Placing an absorbing material between the radiation source and the body.
yf ~ ~ ~
>-h 9
- 3. Increasing distance from the source of radiation. * * ' *
- d 6%- - " > d i 18 19 E ---- ~ ~ . __ - ~ ~ _ _
1 4
l W $NNWN9000n
' The emergency plans, although primarily responsive to an I emergency at a nuclear generating station, might also be imple- J mented under the direction of the local govemment(s) affected in the event of other disasters, such as: fire, flood, chemical i spill, earthquake, or toxic gas release. Should you desire additional information please contact your local authorities.
l i
= State Of6ce of = Of6ce of Disaster '
} Emergency Services Preparedness P.O. Box 9577 County of San Diego Sacramento, CA 95823 5201 Ruf6n Road San Diego, CA 92123
- Asst. Chief of Staff Operations & 'I1 raining
- American Red Cross Marine Corps Base South County Service Center +
l Camp Pendleton 27324 Camino Capistrano l .
Building 1160, Rm. 211 Ste. 205-207 Camp Pendleton, CA 92055 Laguna Niguel, CA 92677
- OfHce of Disaster . Southern California Preparedness Edison Company County of Riverside P.O. Box 800 l 4080 Lemon St. Ste. 8 Rosemead, CA 91770 l Riverside, CA 92501 Attn: Nuclear Affairs
= Orange County Fire / a San Diego Gas and Emergency Management Electric Company Division District Of6ce 625 N. Ross, B-169 101 W. El Portal -
Santa Ana, CA 92701 San Clemente, CA 92672 I l
l i.
_ .- . - . ._ . - - = . - . . . - - - . .
'