ML20210L490
| ML20210L490 | |
| Person / Time | |
|---|---|
| Issue date: | 08/06/1997 |
| From: | Callan L NRC OFFICE OF THE EXECUTIVE DIRECTOR FOR OPERATIONS (EDO) |
| To: | |
| References | |
| SECY-97-181, SECY-97-181-01, SECY-97-181-1, SECY-97-181-R, NUDOCS 9708210186 | |
| Download: ML20210L490 (84) | |
Text
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Auaust 6.1997 SECY-97-181 EQB:
The Commissioners FROM:
L. Joseph Callan Executive Director for Operations
SUBJECT:
IMPLEMENTATION OF NEW IAEA SAFEGUARDS MEASURES IN THE UNITED STATES 1
PURPOSE:
To provide the Commission with information on: (1) commitments relating to the implementation, in the United States (U.S.), of new International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA) safeguards measures directed to detection of clandestine nuclear activities; (2) the i
current plans for U.S. interagency coordinated activities to satisfy the commitments; and l
- 13) future Commission decisions that are likely to be needed concerning associated Nuclear Regulatory Commission responsibilities and staff efforts.
DISCUSSION:
- 1. Backaround l
l Discovery of the clandestine Iraqi nuclear program in 1991 led to the rea!ization that IAEA i
l safeguards needed to be strengthened. The primary focus of IAEA safeguards had been on ensuring that all material declared by a country to exist in that country was, in fact, l
present and remained in peaceful nuclear activities. The primary lAEA activities were the I
review and evaluation of reports of transfers and inventories of material under IAEA safeguards, and the conduct of inspections to observe and verify inventories and flows of the declared material.
CONTACT: Theodore S. Sherr, NMSS/FCSS NOTE:
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O The Commissioners 2-However, Nuclear Non Proliferation Treaty (NPT) obligations go beyond lAEA safeguards on all material declared by a country. In particular, there is an obligation to declare all material that is in the country, as well as to notify the IAEA, in advance of the construction, of facilities that would process nuclear material. Although Iraq as a party to the NPT had these obligations, it had not notified the IAEA of allits nuclear material and nuclear f acilities (existing or under constructioni, and, of course, its intention was to conduct a clandestine program to produce nuclear weapons.
As a result of the Iraq revelations,it was recognized that the IAEA needed to broaden its program to improve its capability to detect clandestine activities. This recognition was ref',vted in a number of IAEA Board of Governors' decisions, beginning in December 1991.
l A chronology of the decisions is provided in Attachment 1. The latest decision was made at a special meeting of the IAEA Board of Governors on May 15,1997, when the Board approved the Model Protocol contained in IAEA document GOV /2914 (Attachment 2). The Model Protocol includes provisions for increases in the information provided to the IAEA by States and other parties and for expansion of lAEA physical access to sites and other locations in a State. The White House Press Release, on May 16,1997, included the following statement:
The strengthened safeguards system adopted by the IAEA will give international nuclear inspectors greater information and access to nuclear and related facilities worldwide, By accepting a new legally-binding protocol, states will assume new safeguards obligations that will rnake all their nuclear activities more transparent --
including by allowing inspections at all suspicious sites, not just at declared sites.
The next step is for the IAEA to negotiate, with individual States and other parties, an additional protocol to their current safeguards agreement, consistent with the Model Protocol.
- 2. U.S. Commitment The Model Protocol was developed as a standard for additional protocols that are to be concluded with the IAEA by States and other parties to comprehensive safeguards agreements (i.e., non-nuclear weapons States with agreements committing to place all appropriate nuclear activities under IAEA safeguards). These States and other parties are expected to accept the Model Protocol measures in their entirety.' With regard to nuclear weapons States, the foreword includes a Board request to the Director General "... to negotiate additional protocols or other legally binding agreements with nuclear weapons States incorporating those measures provided for in the Model Protocol that each nuclear-weapon State has identified as capable of contributing to the non-proliferation and efficiency aims of the Protocol...." A United States commitment to implement all possible Model Protocol measures, and not only those that are "... capable of contributing to the
' The IAEA Board of Governors has not taken a position on whether States party to the NPT have an obligation to conclude a protocol. Some States beheve thete is an obligation, others do not. Ilowever, approval of the Model Protocol, by consensus, by both a Committee of the Board, and by the Board itselt, creates a strong presumption of an obligation.
The Commissioners 3-non-proliferation and efficiency aims of the Protocol," was considered necessary for gaining key non nuclear weapons States' acceptance of the inclusion of appropriate provisions in the Model Protocol. In particular, at the May 1997 special meeting of the IAEA Board of Governors, the U.S. representative read a message from President Clinton stating:
The U.S. stands ready to accept the new safeguards measures as fully as possible in our country consistent with our obligations under the NPT. The United States intends to do so by accepting the protocol in its entirety and applying all of its i
provisions except where they involve information or locations of direct national security significance to the United States. It is our intention to make the Protocol legally binding.
By letter dated June 6,1997, from lAEA Director General Hans Blix to Secretary of State Albright, the IAEA requested "... the U.S. to reconfirm those spe1ific provisions of the protocol which your government is prepared to accept." A response is in preparation which will reiterate the commitments of the President's statement, and it probably will provide a target date for initiating negotiations with the IAEA Secretariat in early 1998.
- 3. Plan of Actions for interanency Coordinated Activities The staff at the Arms Control and Disarmament Agency (ACDA), in coordination with staff from the Department of State, the Department of Energy, the Department of Defense, and NRC,is developing a plan of actions for interagency coordinated activities to bring into force, in the U.S., a new additional protocol based on the Model Protocol. The current version of this plan is provided in Attachment 3. The overall target is to begin negotiations with the IAEA in early 1998. All the involved agency participants recognize that this target is ambitious, and many of the scheduled milestones may be overly optimistic. The plan contemplates that, in general, approvals will be conducted through the interagency coordination process, i.e., through the Subcommittee on International Safeguards and Monitoring (SISM) and the IAEA Steering Committee NRC representatives on thes6 groups are, respectively, Theodore S. Sherr, Office of Nuclear Material Safety and Safeguards, and Carlton Stoiber, international Programs. The current draft plan adJresses the following activities:
A.
Prenarations for Neaotiation of U.S. Additional Protocol: The trope. ations Vml require the resolution of a number of issues, including, for examgl1, when tw y.*i.
should target the entry into-force; the best means for assuring that the national security exclusion applies to the U.S, Protocol; identification of any needed changes to the text of the Model Protocol; and the preparations, for approval by the Secretary of State, of a mandste (Circular 175) to negotiate an additional protocol to the US/lAEA Safeguards Agreement.
B.
Imclementation Responsibilities: The activities to support implementation responsibilities include: legal interpretation of Model Protocol language; identification, for each article of the Model Protocol, of the U.S. agency or agencies to be responsible for its implementation; and identification of requirements for new or modified legislation or regulations.
The Commissioners 4-C.
Coordination with U.S. Iniuatry: These activities include the identification of U.S.
industry points of contact and briefings to the industry at various stages of the process.
D.
Neaotiation, with IAEA Secretariat, of U.S. Additional Protocch The current target is for the negotiations to start in early 1998. The current assumption is that members of the U.S. negotiating team will be the various agency representatives on SISM.
E.
Sybmission to the U.S. Conaress: The first step will be a decision on whether the Additional Protocolis to be an Executive Agreement, submitted to both Houses of Congress, or submitted to the Senate for its advice and consent. Other steps will be the determination of a submission date; coordination with Congress; and complete preparation of the legislative package.
F.
Plannina for Implementation of National Security Exceptiom There is a need to ensure that the national security exception of the President's commitment is appropriately reflected in the U.S./lAEA negotiated Additional Protocol text, l
Although, the desire is to implement the national security exception in the narrowest possible way, it must be implemented in a manner broad enough to fulfill its intended role. To support these needs, an interagency agreernent will be developed on the principles and process for application of the national security exception.
- 4. NRC Imolementation Activities to Support the U.S. Government Commitments Staff will be involved in the overall coordination process to bring into force the Additional Protocol in the U.S. Further, NRC will have operatior'al responsibilities, once it is brought into force in the U.S. to..nplement certain provisions, at least to the extent that they involve NRC licensed activities.* As noted above, one of the decisions that will have to be made, under the " Plan of Activities," is the determination of which agency or agencies will be responsible for the implementation of the Additional Protocol provisions. The first step in this process was a presentation and discussion of ACDA proposals at the SISM meeting on July 30, 1997. This will be followed by lAEA Steering Comm!ttee approvalin August 1997, and confirmation by the responsible agencies in September 1997. Assuming this schedule holds, the Commission can anticipate preposals for specific NRC responsibilities in late August or early September 1997, following lAEA Steering Committee approval. (if a meeting of the IAEA Steering Committee proves to be necessary, the scheduling of such a meeting may be a problem; at this time, the Steering Committee has no designated Chairman because of the vacancy in the position of U.S. Ambassador to the IAEA.)
2 It is anticip ted that responsibility for various Additional Protocol provisions will be assigned not only to the NRC.
but to the Departments of Energy and State, and possibly otrer agencies. Presently. NRC implements existing U.S.
international safeguards commitments associated with the U!,ilAEA Safeguards Agreement as it pertains to NRC licensed activities, through the regulations in 10 CFR Part 75. Further information relating to the US/tAEA Safeguards Agreement is provided in Attachment 4.
The Commissioners The most significant operational responsibilities willlikely be related to Article 2 of the Model Protocol, " Provision of Information." Staff has conducted a preliminary review of the current availability of the information called for in Article 2, and provided the results of this review to the other SISM representatives. Some of the information appears to be currently available to DOE, NRC, and other agencies. Some of the needs could be satisfied by modifications to Part 75 (" Safeguards on Nuclear Material Implementation of US/lAEA Agreement") and would not require additional legislative authority. The collection of other required information would appear to be possible only with expanded legislative authority and associated regulatory changes.
It is too early to assess the resource and information technology impacts of any new NRC responsibilities. Some additional staff effort may be needed for regulatory development activities, as well as for the routine collection, review, and transmittal of information in l
addition, resources may be needed for travel, for lAEA negotiations and accompaniment of IAEA inspectors to licensee f acilities, and for information system support. Staff will develop preliminary estimates of the resource impacts at the time proposals for NRC responsibilities are provided for Commission consideration.
COORDINATION:
l The Office of the General Counsel has no legal objection. The Office of Internatk,nal Programs concurs in this paper. The Office of the Chief Financial Officer has reviewed this Commission Paper and has no objections. The Office of the Chief Information Officer has reviewed the Commission Paper for information technology and information management implications and concurs in it.
DISTRIBUTION:
Commissioners OGC SECY
.J aph Callan OCAA Exe tive Director clo for Operations OPA OIP Attachments:
OCA CIO 1.
" Chronology of Decisions for Strengthening IAEA Safeguards."
" Report of the Committee on Strengthening the Effectiveness and improving the Efficiency of the Safeguards System (Committee 24), to the Board of Governors" (GOV /2914, dated 10 April 1997).
3.
" Plan of Actions for Additional Protocol to the US Voluntary Offer Safeguards Agreement (INFCIRC/288)," dated July 15,1997.
4.
" Background Information on the US/lAEA Safeguards Agreement"
4 CHRONOLOGY OF DECISIONS FOR STRENGTHENING IAEA SAFEGUARDS Discovery of the clandestine Iraqi nuclear program in 1991 led to the realization that International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA) safeguards needed to be strengthened. Up to this point, the primary focus of lAEA safeguards had been on assuring that all material declareft by a country to exist in that country, was, in fact, present and remained in peace ul nuclear activities. The primary lAEA activities were the review and evaluation of reports of transfers and inventories of matedal under IAEA safeguards, and the conduct of inspections to verify inventories and flows of the declared material.
4 However, Nuclear Non Proliferation Treaty (NPT) obligations go beyond lAEA safeguards on all material declared by a country. In particular, there is an obligation to declare all material that is in the country, as well as to notify the IAEA, in advance, of the construction of facilities that would process nuclear material. Iraq was a party to the NPT, l
but notwithstanding, it had not notified the IAEA of allits nuclear material and nuclear i
f acilities (existing or under construction), and of course, its intention was to conduct a clandestine nuclear program to produce nuclear weapons.
As a result of the Iraq revelations, it was a recognized that the IAEA needed to broaden its program to improve its capability to detect clandestine activities. A chronology of lAEA decisions to this end are as follows:
I December 1991 lAEA Board confirmation of IAEA authority, under comprehensive safeguards agreements, to conduct special inspections when the IAEA considers that information made available by the State, including explanations from the State and information obtained from routine inspections, is not adequate for the Agency to fulfillits responsibilities under the Agreement.
February 1992 Establishment of policy that information on plans for construction of nuclear f acilities be provided to the IAEA as early as possible.
February 1993 Establishment of a voluntary reporting scheme as a means for enhancing transparency through the provision of information on imports, exports, production, and locations of nuclear materials, and imports and exports of specified non nuclear material and equipment over and above the reporting requirements of safeguards agreements.
April 1993 The Standing Advisory Group on Safeguards implementation provided recommendations for improving the cost-ef fectiveness of IAEA safeguards in response to the IAEA Director General's request.
Shortly thereafter, the IAEA Secretariat initiated an in-depth review of matters relating to improving the efficiency and effectiveness of IAEA Safeguards. This review was referred to as " Programme 93 + 2."
ATTACHMENT 1
2 February 1995 On the basis of the Programme 93 + 2 review, an lAEA Secretariat proposal was provided to the IAEA Board of Governors for the addition of new measures to enhance the effectiveness and efficiency of IAEA safeguards. The technical measures included: (1) States providing additional information to the IAEA: (2) allowing lAEA increased physical access to locations within a country; and (3) lAEA using environmental sampling, which can indicate undeclared material processing in some circumstances.
March 1995 IAEA Board of Governors confirmed a set of general principles related to the need for safeguards to provide credible assurance of the absence of undeclared nuclear activities.
- May 1995 The IAEA Secretariat provided the Board with specific proposed measures divided into two parts: Part 1 measures those activities for which the Secretariat believed it had sufficient authority for implementation; and Part 2 measures - those activities for which it believes complementary authority was required for implementation.
The Secretariat recommended that the Board take note of the Director l
General's plan to implement at an early date the measures described l
in Part 1 and that it urge States,, arty to comprehensive safeguards agreements to cooperate with the Secretariat to f acilitate such implementation.
June 1995 lAEA Board of Governors approved the recommendation for the implementation of Part 1 measures. " Discussion drafts" relating to Secretariat proposals for Part 2 measures were discussed at lAEA Board of Governors' meetings in December 1995 and March 1996.
May 1996 lAEA Secretariat submitted its formal proposals for the Part 2 measures.
June 1996 In response to the Secretariat proposals, IAEA Board of Governors decided to establish an open ended committee of the Board
(" Committee 24") with the task of drafting a "Model Protocol." The purpose of the Model Protocol was to reflect the Part 2 measures in appropriate agreement language, and to serve as a standard for additional protocols that are to be concluded with States and other parties to safeguards agreements with the IAEA. The understanding was that, when additional protocols are concluded with States and other parties with comprehensive safeguards agreements, they will contain all the measures in the Model Protocol, and accordingly, the State would be obligated ' o provide all the information called for and t
provide for increased IAEA physical access to locations within the State.
3 July 1996-February 1997 Four sessions of Committee 24 were held where the details of the Model Protocol were negotiated.
May 1997 At a special meeting of the IAEA Board of Governors, the Board i
approved the Model Protocol contained in IAEA document GOV /2914.
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4 GOV /2914 10 April 1997 International Atomic Energy Agency RESTRICTED Distr.
BOARD OF GOVERNORS riginah ENGUSH For official use only item 4 of the provisional agenda (GOV /2912)
REPORT OF TIIE COhfMITTEE ON STRENGTIIENING TIIF EFFECTWENESS AND IhfPROVING THE EFFICIENCY OF TIIE SAFEGUARDS SYSTEh! (COhihilTTEE 24)
TO TIIE BOARD OF GOVERNORS 1.
At its June 1996 session, the Board of Governors decided to establish a committee with the task of drafting a model protocol. The Committee's mandate was outlined in more detail in the Chairman's summing-up of the Board's discussion under agenda item 4(b) at its j
meeting on 14 June 1996 (GOV /OR.898, paras84-100). All Member States of the Agency, I
all other States which had concluded or had a legal obligation to conclude a comprehensive safeguards agreement with the Agency and any intergovernmental organizations which were parties to such an agreement were invited to participate in the Committee's work - the intergovernmental organizations as observers.
2.
The Committee on Strengthening the Effectiveness and improving the Efficiency of the Safeguards System [ hereinafter referred to as the " Committee"] held four series of meetings: July 2 4,1996; October 1-11, 1996; January 20 31,1997; and April 2-4, 1997.
3.
On 3 April 1997, the Committee agreed on a draft Model Protocol for submission to i
the Board of Governors and has thus completed the mandate given to it by the Board in June 1996.
1 4.
During the sessions, the Committee had before it, as its main working documents, the following:
(a)
Document GOV /2863 and GOV /2863/ Corr.1 and Corr.2 thereto. A draft Protocol was included in Annex III to the document; (b)
Written proposals of Member States circulated as working papers (GOV /COM.24/W.P.1-20);
97-01449 ATTACHMEf1T 2
~
GOV /2914 page 2 (c)
A Compendium of changes proposed to the draft Protocol in Annex 111 to document GOV /2863 and Cort.1 (GOV /COM.24/3);
(d)
Rolling Text of the draft Model Protocol dated 18 October 1996 (GOV /COM.24/ Chairman's W.P.2);
(e)
Secretariat's paper of 6 December 1996 entitled " Analysis of the application of the provisions of INFCNC/153-type safeguards agreements in relation to the 18 October 1996 Rolling Text of the draft Protocol" (GOV /COM.24/W P.31);
(f)
Note by the Secretariat dated 17 January 1997 to which was attached a Secretariat draft of the " Agency's Regime for the Protection of Safeguards Confidential Information"; and (g)
Chairman's Consolidated Revised Text o' the draft Model Protocol dated 5 February 1997.
5.
In agreeing to submit the draft Model Protocol for the Board's consideration, panicipating States took into consideration the declaration made by the Chairman of the Committee at the opening meeting of its session of January 20-31,1997. In that statement, the Chairman - inter alla - indicated his understanding that the Nuclear Weapon States "had been looking at two issues:
(a) the substance, that is to say, what measures that will be accepted by States with comprehensive safeguards agreements that they, the Nuclecr Weapon States, will be prepared to ad 3;and, (b) the procedures for ensuring tht.t commitments on the pan of both the NWS and NNWS proceed with a certain degree of parallelism. "
6.
The Chairman went on to note that "this means that the meeting of the Board that would be called upon to approve the report of the Comminee (including the Protocol) would take a decision on the Protocol in light of an understanding of the positions of the NWS.
This would be achieved by the NWS setting cut their positions before the Board so that the BLrd could take account of this information in approving the Protocol.
l I
l.
GOV /2914 page 3 The Board meeting may also be an appropriate moma !=
tny other country that might wish to indicate its position to do su 7.
The Committee recommends to the Board that in its consideration of the draft Model Protocol it take account of the foregoing statement by the Chainnan and such developments as relate to it.
8.
With regard to the last sentence of the Chairman's text quoted in paragraph 1 all the participating States with exclusively INFCIRC/66-type agreements indicated that, in their view, the pronsions of the draft Mo&! Protocol are not applicable to them.
9.
A number of other delegations ca' led upon all States with exclusively INFCIRC/66-type agreements to negotiate with the Director General additional protocols containing measures provided for in the draft Model Protocol.
1 10.
The Committee was concerned about the need to ensure that the Agency shall have a stringent regime for the protection of confidential information and therefore wishes to bring to the attention of the Board the provisions of Article 15 of the draft Model Protocol.
11.
Following discussion in the Committee on the issue, the Secretariat subsequently submitted for the consideration of the Board at its March session, a pape on "The Agency's Regime for the Protection of Safeguards Confidential Information" contained in document GOV /2897 of 13 February 1997.
12.
In March, the Board, while generally endorsing the Agency's regime for the protection of safeguards confidential information described in document GOV /2897, requested the Secretariat to consider all the suggestions made and, as appropriate, incorporate them in a further document which would supplement document GOV /2897 and which would be submitted for the Board's consideration later this year.
13.
The Committee also wishes to draw the attention of the Board to the statement by Mr.
FJBaradei, Assistant Director General, Division of External Relations, on 31 January 1997 setting out the Secretariat's interpretation of tba relationship between the Additional Protocol and the relevant safeguards agreement. The Committee took note of the Secretariat's interpretation and also wished to place on reccrd its understanding concerning its interpretation of Article 1 as far as the manner of concluding additional Protocols and the responsibility for t'leir implementation are concerned. The Committee reverted to this matter in its final meeting and confirmed the earlier interpretation. Attached to this report are the J
u
GOV /2914 page 4 Secretariat's Interpretation of 31 January 1997 (Attachment 2) and the Committee's Understanding of 3 April 1997 (Attachment 3).
14.
The Committee was also concerned about the amendment procedures for the list of activities specified in Annex I and the list of equipment and material specified in Annex II.
The Committee draws to the attention of the Board that, as provided for in Article 16 b. of the draft Model Protocol, the list of activities specified in Annex I and the list of equipment and material specified in Annex 11 may be amended by the Board upon the advice of an open-ended working group of experts established by the Board for that pu pose. It is understood that in arriving at its decisions, t'le open-ended working group will follow the established practice of the Board. The Committee also agreed on a simplified procedure for amending Annexes I and II. A number of delegations stressed the need for greater transparency concerning a number of non-nuclear materials and items not on the list in Annex !
RECOhihfENDED ACTION BY THE BOARD 15.
In the light of the foregoing, the Committee recommends that the Board:
(a) take note of this report; (b) take note of the statements by non<omprehensive safeguards States setting out their positions in the Board with respect to measures previded for in the Model Protocol; (c) endorse the understanuings reached in the Commit! e on the relationship between additional protocols and the respective safeguards agreements; (d) approve the draft Model Protocol in Attachment I to this Report; (e) request the Director General to proceed as set forth in the Foreword to the Model Protocol and to keep the Board regularly informed of the conclusion and entry into force of individual protocols; (f) agree to set up open<nded ad-hoc working groups to advise it whenever amendments are proposed to the lists contained in Annexes I and II and confirm that these working groups will follow the established practice of the Board in arriving at their decisions; and (g) request the Director General to periodically review and update the regime for the protection of confidential information and to keep the Board periodically informed on the implementation of the regime.
I i
GOV /2914 3 April 1997 ATTACHMENT 1 Committee on Strengthening the Effectiveness and Improving the Efficiency of the Safeguards System Draft Model Protocol PROTOCOL ADDITIONAL TO THE AGREEMENT (S)'BETWEEN
.......... AND THE INTERNATIONAL ATOMIC ENERGY AGENCY FOR THE APPLICATION OF SAFEGUARDS
. -.. ~
GOV /2914 page1 t
Foreword This document is a inodel Additional Protocol designed for States having a Safeguards Agreement with the Agency, in order to strengthen the effectiveness and improve the efficiency of-the safeguards system as a contribution to global nuclear non-proliferation objectives, The Board of Governors has requested the Director General to use this Model Protocol as the standard for additional protocols that are to be concluded by States arxl other parties to comprehensive safeguards agreements with the Agency. Such protocols shall contain all of the measures in this Model Protocol, The Board of Governors has also requested the Director General to negotiate -
1 1
additional protocols or other legally binding agreements with nuclear-weapon States incorporating those measures provided for in the Model Protocol that each nuclear-weapon State has identified as capable of contributing to the non-proliferation and efficiency aims of -
the Protocol, when implemented with regard to that State, and as consistent with that State's 5
obligations under Article I of the NPT.
The Board of Governors has further requested the Director General to negotiate additional protocols with other States that are prepared to accept measures provided for in the i
model Protocol in pursuance of safeguards effectiveness and efficiency objectives.
In conformity with the requirements of the Statute, each individual Protocol or other legally binding agreement will require the approval of the Board and its authorization to the
. Director General to conclude ard subsequently implement the Protocol so approved.
I i
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GOV /2914'
- Attachment 1 page 2 Preamble
- WHEREAS -.......... - (hereinafter referred to as "..........") is a party to (an)
Agreement (s) between.......... and the International Atomic Energy' Agency (hereinafter referred to as the " Agency") for the application of safeguards [ full title of the Agreement (s) to be inserted) (hereinafter referred to as the " Safeguards Agreement (s)"), which entered into '
force on........... ;
-j AWARE OF the desire of the international community to further enhance nuclear ron-proliferation by strengthening the effectiveness and improving the efficiency of the Agency's safeguards system;-
. RECALLING that the Agency must take into account in the implementation of safeguards the need to: avoid hampering the economic and technological development of
.......... or international co-operation-in the field of peaceful nuclear activities; respect health, safety, physical protection and other security provisions in force and the rights of individuals; and take every precaution to protect commercial, technological and industrial-secrets as well as other confidential information coming to its knowledge; -
- WHEREAS the frequency and intensity of activities described in this Protocol shall be kept to the mmimum consistent with the objective of strengthening the effectiveness and improving the efficiency of Agency safeguards; i
NOW THEREFORE.......... and the Agency have agreed as follows:
GOV /2914 page 3 RELATIONSHIP BETWEEN THE PROTOCOL AND THE SAFEGUARDS AGREEMENT Article 1 The provisions of the Safeguards Agreement shall apply to this Protocol to the extent that they are relevant to and compatible with the provisions of this Protocol. In case of conflict between the provisions of the Safeguards Agreement and those of this Protocol, the provisions of this Protocol shall apply.
PROVISION OF INFORMATION Article 2
.......... shall provide the Agency with a declaration containing:
a.
(i)
A general description of and information specifying the location of nuclearfuel cycle-related research and development activities 1' not involving nuclear material carried out anywhere that are funded, specifically authorized or controlled by, or carried out on behalf of,..........
(ii)
Information identified by the Agency on the basis of expected gains in
- effectiveness or efficiency, and agreed to by........, on operational activities of safeguards relevance at facilities and locations outside facilities where nuclear materialis customarily used.
l' Terms in italics have specialized meanings, which are defined in Article 18 below.
GOV /2914 page 4 (iii)
A general description of each building on each site, including its use and, if not apparent from that description, its contents. The description shall include a map of the site.
(iv)
A description of the scale of operations for each location engaged in the activities specified in Annex I to this Protocol.
(v)
Information specifying the location, operational status and the estimated annual production capacity of uranium mines and concentrat'..i plants and thorium concentration plants, and the current annual production of such mines and concentration plants for......... as a whole........... shall provide, upon request by the Agency, the current annual production of an individual mine or l
concentration plant. The provision of this information does not require detailed nuclear material accountancy.
(vi)
Information regarding source material which has not reached the composition and purity suitable for fuel fabrication or for being isotopically enriched, as follows:
(a) the quantities, the chemical composition, the use or intended use of such material, whether in nuclear or non-nuclear use, for each location in......... at which the material is present in quantities exceeding ten metric tons of uranium and/or twenty metric tons of thorium, and for other locations with quantities of more than one metric ton, the aggregate for........ as a whole if the aggregate excecds ten metric tons of uranium or twenty metric tons of thorium. The provision of this information does not require detailed nuclear material accountancy; (b) the quantities, the chemical composition and the destination of each export out of.........., of such material for specifically non-nuclear purposes in quantities exceeding:
l
GOV /2914 page 5 (1) ten metric tons of uranium, or for successive exports of uranium from........... to the same State, each ofless than ten metric tons, but exceeding a total of ten metric tons for the year; (2) twenty metric tons of thorium, or for successive exports of thorium from.......... to the same State, each of less than twenty metric tons, but exceeding a total of twenty metric tons for the year; (c) the quantities, chemical composition, current location and use or intended use of each import into..........
of such material for specifically non-nuclear purposes in quantities exceeding:
(1) ten metric tons of uranium, or for successive imports of uranium into.......... each of less than ten metric tons, but exceeding a total of ten metric tons for the year; (2) twenty metric tons of thorium, or for successive imports of thorium into.......... each of less than twenty metric tons, but exceeding a total of twenty metric tons for the year; it being understood that there is no requirement to provide information on such material intended for a non-nuclear use once it is in its non-nuclear end-use form.
1
)
GOV /2914 page 6 (vii)
(a) information regarding the quantities, uses and locations of nuclear material exempted from safeguards pursuant to [ paragraph 37 of INFCIRC/153]F; (b) information regarding the quantities (which may be in the form of estimates) and uses at each location, of nuclear maten'al exempted from safeguards pursuant to [ paragraph 36(b) ofINFCIRC/153}F but not yet in a non-nuclear end-use form, in quantities exceeding those set out in
[ paragraph 37 ofINFCIRC/153]F. The provision of this information does not require detailed nuclear material accountancy.
(viii) Information regarding the location or further processing of intermediate or high-level waste containing plutonium, high enriched uranium or uranium-233 on which safeguards have been terminated pursuant to [ paragraph 11 of INFCIRC/153]F. For the purpose of this paragraph, "funher processing" does not include repackaging of the waste or its further conditioning not involvbg the separation of elements, for storage or disposal.
(ix)
The following information regarding specified equipment and non-nuclear material listed in Annex II:
f (a) for each export out of.......... of such equipment and material: the identity, quantity, location of intended use in the receiving State and date or, as appropriate, expected date, of export; (b) upon specific request by the Agency, confirmation by........., as imponing State, of information provided to the Agency in accordance with paragraph (a) above.
T The reference to the corresponding provision of the relevant Safeguards Agreement should be inserted where bracketed references to INFCIRC/153 are made.
i GOV /2914 Attachment I page 7 (x)
General plans for the succeeding ten-year period relevant to the development of the nuclear fuel cycle (including planned nuclearfuel cycle-related research and development activities) when approved by the appropriate authorities in i
b.
.......... shall make every reasonable effort to provide the Agency with the following information:
(i).
a general description of and information specifying the location of nuclearfuel cycle-related research and development activities not involving nuclear material which ate specifically related to enrichment, reprocessing of nuclear fuel or the processing of intermediate or high-level waste containing plutonium, high enriched uranium or uranium-233 that are carried out anywhere in.......... but which are not funded, specifically authorized or controlled by, or carried out on behalf of,........... For the purpose of this paragraph, " processing" of intermediate or high-level waste does not include repackaging of the waste or its conditioning not involving the separation of l
elements, for storage or disposal.
1 (ii)
A general description of activities and the identity of the person or entity carrying out such activities, at locations identified by the Agency outside a site
-- which the Agency considers might be functionally related to the activities of that site. The provision of this information is subject to a specific request by l
the Agency. It shall be provided in consultation with the Agency and in a timely fashion.
j c.
Upon request by the Agency,.......... shall provide amplifications or clarifications of any information it has provided under this Article, in so far as relevant for the purpose of safeguards.
I
GOV /2914 page 8 Article 3
.......... shall provide to the Agency the information identified in Article 2.a.(i), (iii),
a.
(iv), (v), (vi)(a), (vii) and (x) and Article 2.b.(i) within 180 days of the entry into force of this Protocol.
b.
......... shall provide to the Agency, by 15 May of each year, updates of the information referred to in paragraph a. above for the period covering the previous calendar year. If there has been no change to the information previously provided,
.......... shall so indicate.
J
.......... shall provide to the Agency, by 15 May of each year, the information c.
identified in Article 2.a.(vi)(b) and (c) for the period covering the previous calendar year.
d.
......... shall provide to the Agency on a quarterly basis the information identified in Article 2.a.(ix)(a). This information shall be provided within sixty days of the end of each quarter.
.......... shall provide to the Agency the information identified in Article 2.a.(viii) 180 c.
days before further processing is carried out and, by 15 May of each year, information on changes in location for the period covering the previous calendar year.
f.
...... and the Agency shall agree on the timing and frequency of the provision of the information identified in Article 2.a.(ii).
g.
.......... shall provide to the Agency the information in Article 2.a.(ix)(b) within sixty days of the Agency's request.
i
GOV /2914 page 9 COMPLEMENTARY ACCESS Article 4 The following shall apply in connection with the implementation of complementary access under Anicle 5 of this Protocol:
The Agency shall not mechanistically or systematically seek to verify the information a.
referred to in Article 2; however, the Agency.shall have access to:
(i)
Any location referred to in Article 5.a.(i) or (ii) on a selective basis in order to assure the absence of undeclared nuclear material and activities; (ii)
Any location referred to in Article 5.b. or c. to resolve a question relating to the correctness and completeness of the information provided pursuant to Article 2 or to resolve an inconsistency relating to that information; (iii)
Any location referred to in Article 5.a.(iii) to the extent necessary for the Agency to confirm, for safeguards purposes,........ 's declaration of the decommissioned status of afacility or location outsidefacilities where nuclear material was customarily used.
b.
(i)
Except as provided in paragraph (ii) below, the Agency shall give........
advance notice of access of at least 24 hours2.777778e-4 days <br />0.00667 hours <br />3.968254e-5 weeks <br />9.132e-6 months <br />; (ii)
For access to any place on a site that is sought in conjunction with design information verification visits or ad hoc or routine inspections on that site, the period of advance notice shall, if the Agency so requests, be at least two hours but, in exceptional circumstances, it may be less than two hours.
GOV /2914 page 10 Advance notice shall be in writing and shall specify the reasons for access and the c.
activities to be carried out during such access.
d.
In the case of a question or inconsistency, the Agency shall provide.......... with an opponunity to clarify and facilitate the resolution of the question or inconsistency.
Suh an opportunity will be provided before a request for access, unless the Agency considers that delay in access would prejudice the purpose for which the access is sought. In any event, the Agency shall not draw any conclusions about the question or inconsistency until........ has been provided with such an opportunity.
Unless otherwise agreed to by.........., access shall only take place during regular e.
working hours.
f.
.......... shall have the right to have Agency inspectors accompanied during their access by representatives of.........., provided that the inspectors shall not thereby be delayed or otherwise impeded in the exercise of their functions.
Article 5
....... shall provide the Agency with access to:
a.
(i)
Any place on a site; (ii)
Any location identified by......... under Article 2.a.(v)-(viii);
(iii)
Any decommissionedfacility or decommissioned location outside facilities where nuclear material was customarily used.
b.
Any location identified by
....... under Article 2.a.(i), Article 2.a.(iv), Article 2.a.(ix)(b) or Article 2.b, other than those referred to in paragraph a.(i) above, N.
4 1
GOV /2914 page 11 provided that if.......... is unable to provide such access,.......... shall make every reasonable effort to satisfy Agency requirements, without delay, through other means.
Any location specified by the Agency, other than locations referred to in paragraphs c.
- a. and b. above, to carry out location-specific emironmental sampling, provided that if.......... is unable to provide such access,.......... shall make every reasonable effort to satisfy Agency requirements, without delay, at adjacent locations or through other means.
Article 6 4
When implementing Article 5, the Agency may carry out the following activities:
a.
For access in accordance with Article 5.a.(i) or (iii): visual observation; collection of environmental samples; utilization of radiation detection and measurement devices; application of seals and other identifying and tamper indicating devices specified in Subsidiary Arrangements; and other objective measures which have been demonstrated to be technically feasible and the use of which has been agreed by the Board of Governors (hereinafter referred to as the " Board") and following consultations between the Agency and...........
b.
For access in accordance with Article 5.a.(ii): visual observation; item counting of nuclear material; non-destructive measurements and sampling; utilization of radiation detection and measurement devices; exammation of records relevant to the quantities, origin and disposition of the material; collection of environmental samples; and other objective measures which have been demonstrated to be technically feasible and the use of which has been agreed by the Board and following consultations between the Agency and...........
GOV /2914 page 12 c.
For access in accordance with Article 5 b.: visual observation; collection of environmental samples; utilization of radiation detection and rneasurement devices; examination of safeguards relevant production and shipping records; and other objective measures which have been demonstrated to be technically feasible and the use of which has been agreed by the Board and following consultations between the A gency and...........
d.
For access in accordance with Article 5.c., collection of environmental samples and, in the event the results do not resolve the question or inconsistency at the location specified by the Agency pursuant to Article 5.c., utilization at that location of visual observation, radiation detection and measurement devices, and, as agreed by.........
and the Agency, other objective measures.
Article 7 Upon request by.........., the Agency and.......... shall make arrangements for a.
managed access under this Protocol in order to prevent the dissemmation of proliferation sensitive information, to meet safety or physical protection requirements, or to protect proprietary or commercially sensitive information. Such arrangements shall not preclude the Agency from conducting activities necessary to provide credible assurance of the absence of undeclared nuclear materials and activities at the location in question, including the resolution of a question relating to the correctness and completeness of the information referred to in Article 2 or of an inconsistency relating to that information.
b.
......... may, when providing the information referred to in Article 2, inform the Agency of the places at a site or location at which managed access may be applicable.
GOV /2914 page 13 Pending the entry into force of any necessary Subsidiary Arrangernents,......... may c.
have recourse to managed access consistent with the provisions of paragraph a. above.
Article 8 Nothing in this Protocol shall preclude.......... from offering the Agency access to locations in addition to those referred to in Articles 5 and 9 or from requesting the Agency l-to conduct verification activities at a particular locadon. The Agency shall, without delay, make every reasonable effort to act upon such a request.
Article 9
.......... shall provide the Agency with access to locations specified by the Agency to carry out widesrea environmental sampling, provided that if.......... is unable to provide such access it shall make every reasonable effort to satisfy Agency requirements at alternative locations. The Agency shall not seek such access until the use of wide-area emiromnental 1
sampling and the proc (:iural arrangements therefor have been approved by the Board and following consultations between the Agency and...........
I Article 10
- The Agency shall inform.......... of:
' The activities carried out under this Protocol, including those in respect of any -
- a.
questions or inconsistencies the Agency had brought to the attention of........... -
within sixty days of the activities being carried out by the Agency.
s
GOV /2914 page'14
- b.
The results of activities in respect of any questions or inconsistencies the Agency had -
brought to the attention of.........., as soon as possible but in any case within thirty days of the results being established by the Agency.
The conclusions it has drawn from its activities under this Protocol. The conclusions c.
shall be provided annually.
DESIGNATION OF AGENCY INSPECTORS Article 11 a.
(i)
The Director General shall notify.......... of the Board's approval of any Agency official as a safeguards inspector. Unless.......... advises the Director General of its rejection of such an official as an inspector for.......... within three months of receipt of notification of the Board's approval, the inspector so notified to.......... shall be considered designated to........... ;
(ii)
The Director General, acting in response to a request by.......... or on his own initiative, shall immediately inform.......... of the withdrawal of the designation of any official as an inspector for...........
b.
A notification referred to in paragraph a, above shall be deemed to be received by
......... seven days after the date of the transmission by registered mail of the notification by the Agency to...........
GOV /2914 page 15 -
VISAS -
Article 12
.......... shall, within one month of the receipt of a request therefor, provide the designated inspector specified in the request with appropriate multiple entry / exit and/or transit '
visas, where required, to enable the inspector to enter and remain on the territory of.........
for the purpose of carrying out his/her functions. Any visas required shall be valid for at least one year and shall be renewed, as required, to cover the duration of the inspector's designation to...........
SUBSIDIARY ARRANGEMENTS Article 13 i
Where.......... or the Agency indicates that it is necessary to specify in Subsidiary a.
Arrangements how measures laid down in this Protocol are to be applied.......... and the Agency shall agree on such Subsidiary Arrangements within ninety days of the entry into force of this Protocol or, where the indication of the need for such Subsidiary Arrangements is made after the entry into force of this Protocol, within ninety days of the date of such indication.
b.
Pending the entry into force of any necessary Subsidiary Arrangements, the Agency shall be entitled to apply the measures laid down in this Protocol.
GOV /3914 page 16 COMMUNICATIONS SYSTEMS Article 14
......... shall permit and protect free communications by the Agency for official a.
purposes between Agency inspectors in......... and Agency Headquarters and/or Regional Offices, including attended and unattended transmission of irdormation generated by Agency containment and/or surveillance or measurement devices. The Agency shall have, in consultation with.........., the right to make use of internationally established systems of direct communications, including satellite systems and other forms of telecommunication, not in use in..........
At the request of.......... or the Agency, details of the implementation of this paragraph with respect to the attended or unattended transmission of information generated by Agency containment and/or surveillance or measurement devices shall be specified in the Subsidiary Arrangements, b.
Communication and transmission of information as provided for in paragraph a. above shall take dn account of the need to protect proprietary or commercially sensitive informatit
. gn information which......... regards as being of particular sensitivity PROTECTION OF CONFIDENTIAL INTORMATION Article 15 The Agency shall maintain a stringent regime to ensure effective protection against a.
disclosure of commercial, technological and industrial secrets and other confidential information coming to its knowledge, including such information coming to the Agency's knowledge in the implementation of this Protocol.
l l
.... _ _. _.. _ _... _ _.___ _ _ _ _._ _ _ _..__ ___._.__.>.. _.,_.____.. _._ _ ~. _
f W
^
GOV /2914 L4
. Attachment 1 page 17, i
I 7
b.
The regime referred to in paragraph a. above shall include, among others, provisions relating to:
1-
.(i)
General principles and associated measures for the handling of confidential J
l information; e_l-J j
(ii)
Conditions of staff employment relating to the protection of confidential 3
~ information; i
(iii) - Procedures in cases of breaches or alleged breaches of confidentiality.
[
j..
The regime referred to in paragraph a. above shall be approved and periodically.
c.
it reviewed by the Board, i.
V 1.
4 i
ANNEXES i
'Anicle 16-j The Annexes to this Protocol shall be an integral part thereof. Except for the purposes a.
j' of amendment of the Annexes, the term " Protocol" as used in this instrument means I
the Protocol and the Annexes together.
i b.
The list of activities specified in Annex 1, and the list of equipment and material -
specified in Annex II, may be amended by the Board upon the advice of an open-ended working group of experts established by the Board. Any such amendment shall take effect four months after its adoption by the Board.
GOV /2914
. page 18 ENTRY INTO FORCE Article 17:
This Protocol shall enter into force on the date on which the Agency receives from.......... written notification that
..........'s statutory and/or constitutional requirements for entry into force have been met.
O R2/
upon signature by the representatives of.......... and the Agency.
.......... may, at any date before this Protocol enters into force, declare that it will apply this
- Protocol provisionally.
The Director.' General shall promptly inform all Member States of the Agency of any declaration of provisional application of, and of the entry into force of, this Protocol, l'
The choice of alternative depends on the preference of the State concerned according to its internal legal requirements.
.. _. - -. -.. -. - - ~.- _ _ -.. - -..~ - _.
~_
e e
i GOV /2914
- 4-
- page 19 -
- i DEFINITIONS 4
Article 18 i
For the purpose of this Protocol:
L a.
~ Nuclearfuel cycle-related research and development activities means those activities which are specifically related to any process or system development aspect of any of-n
.the following:
{:
conyctsion of nuclear material, l
1 enrichment of nuclear material, 7
- nuclear fuel fabrication, i.
- reactors, i
i
- critical facilities,-
i 2
reprocessing of nuclear fuel,--
1 l
processing (not including repackaging or conditioning not involving the 4-;'
separation of elements, for storage or disposal) of intermediate or high-level waste containing plutonium, high enriched uranium or uranium-233, 4
i
. but do not include. activities related to theoretical or basic scientific.research or to research and development on industrial radioisotope applications, medical,-
j -
hydrological and agricultural applications, health and environmental effects and
};
improved _ maintenance.
1-
GOV /2914 page 20 b.
Sitt means that area delimited by.......... in the relevant design information for a facility, including a closed-downfacility, and in the relevant information on a location outsidefacilities where nuclear material is customarily used, including a closed-down location outsidefacilities where nuclear material was customarily used (this is limited to locations with hot cells or where activities related to conversion, enrichment, fuel fabrication or reprocessing were carried out).
It shall also include all installations, co-located with thefacility or location, for the provision or use of essential services, including: hot cells for processing irradiated materials not containing nuclear material; instaHAtions for the treatment, storage and disposal of waste; and buildings associated with specified items identified by.......... under Article 2.a.(iv) above.
c.
Decommissioned facility or decommissioned location outside facilities means an installation or location at which residual structures and equipment essential for its use have been removed or rendered inoperable so that it is not used to store and can no longer be used to handle, process or utilize nuclear material, d.
Closed-downfacility or closed-down location outsidefacilities means an installation or location where operations have been stopped and the nuclear material removed but which has not been decommissioned.
. High enriched uranium means uranium containing 20 percent or more of the isotope c.
uranium-235.
f.
Location-specept environmental sampling means the collection of environmental samples (e.g., air, water, vegetation, soil, smears) at, and in the immediate vicinity of, a location specified by the Agency for the purpose of assisting the Agency to draw conclusions about the absence of undeclared nuclear material or nuclear activities at the specified location.
GOV /2914 Page 21 j
g.
Wide-area environmental sampling means the collection of environmental samples (e.g., air, water, vegetation, soil, smer.rs) at a set oflocations specifed by the Agency for the purpose of assisting the Agency to draw conclusions about the absence of undeclared nuclear material or nuclear activities over a wide area.
l h.
Nuclear material means any source or any special fissimble material as defined in Article XX of the Statute. -The term source material shall not be interpreted as applying to ore or ore residue. Any determmation by the Board under Article XX of the Statute of the Agency after the entry into force of this Protocol which adds to the materials considered to be source material or special fissionable material shall have -
effect under this Protocol only upon acceptance by...........
i.
Facility means:
(i)
A reactor, a critical facility, a conversion plant, a fabrication plant, a reprocessing plant, an isotope separation plant or a separate storage installation; or (ii)
Any location where nuclear material in amounts greater than one effective kilogram is customarily used, j;
Location outsidefacilities means any installation or location, which is not afacili:y,-
where nuclear material is customarily used in amounts of one effective kilogram or less.
n..
GOV /2914 4
Attachment'l I
Annex I page1 f
ANNEX I LIST OF ACTIVITIES REFERRED TO IN ARTICII 2.a.(iv) OF THE PROTOCOL
}
1-(i)
The manufacture of centrifuge rotor tubes or the assembly of gas centnyuges.
f'~
F Centnfuge rotor tubes means thin-walled cylinders as described in entry 5.1.1(b) of Annex II.
Gas centnfuges means centrifuges as descrit.ed in the Introductory Note to entry 5.1 of Annex II.
k (ii)
The manufacture of difusion barriers.
Digusion barriers treans thin, porous filters as described in entry 5.3.1(a) of Annex II.
F (iii)-
The manufacture or assembly of laser-based systems.
Laser-basedsystems means systems incorporating those items as described in entry 5.7 -
of Annex II.
(iv); The manufacture or assembly of electromagnetic isotope separators.
Electromagnetic isotope separators means those items referred to in entry 5.9.1 of '
Annex Il containing ion sources as described in 5.9.1(a) of Annex II.
(v)
The manufacture or assembly of columns or extraction equipment.
Columns or extraction equipment means those items as de.w:ribed in entries 5.6.1, 5.6.2, 5.6.3, 5.6.5, 5.6.6, 5.6.7 and 5.6.8 of Annex II.
(vi)
The manufacture of aerodynamic separation noules or voner tubes.
Aerodynamic separation noules or vonex tubes means separation nozzles and vortex tubes as described respectively in entries 5.5.1 and 5.5.2 of Annex II.
' (vii) ' The manufacture or assembly of uranium plasma generation systems.
- Uranium plasma generation systems means systems for the generation of uranium plasma as described in entry 5.8.3 of Annex II.
,-.3
GOV /2914 Annex I page 2 (viii) _ The manufacture of zirconium tubes.
Zirconium tubes means tubes as described in entry 1.6 of Annex H.
(ix). The manufacture or upgrading of hea>y water or deuterium.
Heaty water or deuterium means deuterium, heavy water (deuterium oxide) and any other deuterium compound in which the ratio of deuterium to hydrogen atoms exceeds 1:5000.
(x)
The manufacture of nuclear grade graphite, 4
Nuclear grade graphite means graphite having a purity level better than 5 pans per million boron equivalent and with a density greater than 1.50 g/cuf.
(xi)
The manufacture offlasksfor irradiatedfuel.
A flaskfor irradiatedfuel means a vessel for the transportation and/or storage of irradiated fuel which provides chemical, thermal and radiological protection, and dissipates decay heat during handling, transportation and storage.
(xii)
Tbe manufacture of reactor control rods.
Reactor control rods means rods as described in entry 1.4 of Annex H.
(xiii) The manufacture of criticality safe tanks and vessels.
Criticality safe tanks and vessels means those items as described in entries 3.2 and 3.4 of Annex H.
(xiv) The manufacture of irradiatedfuel element chopping machines.
Irradiatedfuel element chopping machines means equipment as described in entry 3.1 of Annex H.
(xv)
The construction of hot cells.
Hot cells means a cell or interconnected cells totalling at least 6 rrf in volume with shielding equal to or greater than the equivalent of 0.5 m of concrete, with a density 3
of 3.2 g/cm or greater, outfimed with equipment for remote operations.
GOV /2914 Annex B page 1 ANNEX II LIST OF SPECIFIED EQUIPMENT AND NON-NUCLEAR MATERIAL FOR THE REPORTING OF EXPORTS AND IMPORTS ACCORDING TO ARTICLE 2.a.(ixF 1.
Reactors and equipment therefor 1.1.
Complete nuclear reactors Nuclear reactors capable of operation so as to maintain a controlled self-sustaining fission chain reaction, excluding zero energy reactors, the latter being defined as reactors with a designed maximum rate of production of plutonium not exceeding 100 grams per year.
EXPLANATORY NOTE A " nuclear reactor" basically includes the items within or attached directly to the reactor vessel, the equipment which controls the level of power in the core, and the components which normally contain or come in direct contact with or control the primary coolant of the reactor core.
It is not intended to exclude reactors which could reasonably be capable of modification to produce significantly more than 100 grams of plutonium per year.
Reactors designed for sustained operation at significant power levels, regardless of their capacity for plutonium production, are not considered as "zero energy reactors".
1.2.
Reactor pressure vessels Metal vessels, as complete units or as major shop-fabricated parts therefor, which are especially designed or prepared to contain the core of a nuclear reactor as defined in paragraph 1.1, above and are capable of withstanding the operating pressure of the primary coolant.
EXPLANATORY NOTE A top plate for a reactor pressure vessel is covered by item 1.2. as a major shop-fabricated part of a pressure vessel.
T This is the list which the Board agreed at its meeting on 24 February 1993 would be used for the purpose of the voluntary reporting scheme, as subsequently amended by the Board.
G W,<2914 Attaclunent 1 Annex 11 page 2 Reactor internals (e.g. ;upport columns and plates for the core and other vessel internals, control rod guide tubes, thermal shields baffles, core grid plates, diffuser plates, etc.) are normally supplied by the reactor supplier. In some cases, certain internal support components are included in the fabrication of the pressure vessel.
These items are sufficiently critical to the safety and reliability of the operation of the reactor (and, therefore, to the guarantees and liability of the reactor supplier),
so that their supply, outside the basic supply arrangement for the reactor itself, would not be common practice. '!herefore, although the separate supply of these l
unique, especially designed trx! prepared, critical, i' rge and expensive items would l
not necessarily be considered as falling outside the area of concern, such a mode of supply is considered unlikely.
1.3.
Reactor fuel charging and discharging machines Manipulative equipment especially designed or prepared for inserting or removing fuel in a nuclear reactor as defired in paragraph 1.1. above capable of on load operation or employing technically sophisticated positioning or alignment features to allow complex off load fuel;ing operations such as those in which direct viewing of or access to the fuel is not normally available.
1 Reactor control rods Rods especially designed or prepared for the control of the reaction rate in a nucitar reactor as defined in paragraph 1.1. above.
EXPLANATORY NOTE This item includes, in addition to the neutron absorbing part, the support or suspension structures therefor if supplied separately, 1.5.
Reactor pressure tubes Tubes which are especially designed or prepared to contain fuel elements and the t>rimary coolant in a reactor as dermed in paragraph 1.1. above at an operating pressure in excess of 5.1 MPa (740 psi).
1.6.
Zirconimn tubes Zirconium metal and alloys in the forrn of tubes or assemblies of tubes, and in quantities exceeding 500 kg in any }qhd of 12 months, especially designed or prepared for use in a reactor as defined in paragraph 1.1. above, and in which the relation of hafnium to zirconium is less than 1:500 parts by weight.
1' l
GOV /2914
- 1..
Annex 11 page 3 1.7.
Primary coolant pumps IMmps especially designed or prepared for circu!ating the primary coolant for nuclear reactors as defined in paragraph 1.1. above.
EXPLANATORY NOTE Especially designed or prepared pumps may include elaborate sealed or multi scaled systems to prevent leakage of primary coolant, canned-driven pt?mps, and pumps with inenial mass systems. This definition encompasses pumps certified to NC-1 or equivalem standards.
j 2.
Non nuclear materld; for reactors 2.1.
Deuterium a*.d heavy water Deuterium, heavy water (deuterium oxide) and any other deuterium compound in 4
which the ratio of deuterium to hydrogen atoms exceeds 1:5000 for use in a nuclear reactor as <lefined in paragraph 1.1. above in quantities exceeding 200 kg of deuterium atoms for any one recipient country in any period of 12 months.
2.2.
Nuclear grade graphite Graphite having a parity level better than 5 pans per million boron equivalent and with a density greater than 1.50 g/cm' for use in a nuclear reactor as defined in paragraph 1.1, above in quantities exceeding 3 x 10' kg (~,0 metric tons) for any one recipient country in any period of 12 months.
NOTE For the purpose of reponing, the Govenunent will determine whether or not the expons of graphite meeting the above specifications are for nuclear reactor use.
3.
Plants for the reprocessing of irradiated fuel elements, and equipment especially designed or prepared therefor INTRODUCTORY NOTE Reprocessing irradiated nuclear fuel separates plutonium and uranium from intensely radioactive fission products and other transuranic elements. Different technical procesres can accomplish this separation. However, over the 3 ears Purex has become the most commonly used and accepted process. Purex involves tlw dissolution of irradiated nuclear fuel in nitric acid, followed by separation of the
GOV /2914 Amiex 11 page 4 uranium, plutonium, and fission products by solvent extraction using a mixture of tributyl phosphate in an organic diluent.
Purex facilities have process functions similar to each other, including: irradiated fuel element chopping, fuel dissolution, solvent extraction, and process liquor storage. There may also be equipment for thermal denitration of uranium nitrate, conversion of plutoalum nitrate to oxide or metal, and treatment of fission product waste liquor to a form suitable for long term storage or disposal liowever, the specific type and configuration of'h: quipment performing these functions may differ between Purex facilities for several reasons, including the type and quantity of irradiated nuclear fuel to be reprocessed and the intended disposition of the recovered materials, and the safety and maintenance philosophy incorporated into l
the design of the facility.
A " plant for the reprocessing of irradiated fuel elements
- includes the equipment and components which normally come in direct contact with and directly control the irradiated fuel and the major nuclear material and fission product processing streams.
These processes, including the complete systems for plutonium conversion and plutonium metal production, may be identified by the measures taken to avoid criticality (e.g. by geometry), radiation exposure (e.g. by shielding), and toxicity hazards (e.g. by contaitunent).
Items of equipment that are considered to fall within the meaning of the phrase *and equipment especially designed or prepared" for the reprocessing of irradiated fuel elements include:
3.1, Irradiated ful element chopping machines INTRODUCTORY NOTE This equipment breaches the cladding of the fuel to expose the irradiated nuclear material to dissolution. Especially designed metal cutting shears are the most commonly employed, although advanced equipment, such as lasers, may be used.
Remotely operated equipment especially designed or prepared for use in a reprocessing plant as identified above and intended to cut, chop or shear irradiated nuclear fuel assemblies, bundles or rods.
J
GOV /2914 Attactunent 1 Annex U page 5 3.2, Dissolvers INTRODUCTORY NOTE Dissolvers normally receive the chopped-up spent fuel. In these critically safe vessels, the irradiated nuclear material is dissolved in nitric acid and the remaining hulls removed from the process stream.
Critically safe tanks (e.g. small diameter, annular or slab tanks) especially designed or prepared for use in a reprocessing plant as identified above, intended for dissolution of irradiated nuclear fuel and which are capable of withstanding bot, highly corrosive liquid, and which can be remotely loaded and maintained, t
3.3.
Solvent extractors and solvent extraction equipment INTRODUCTORY NOTE Solvent extractors both receive the solution ofirradiated fuel from the dissolvers and the organic solution which separates the uranium, plutonium, and fission products.
Solvent extraction equipment is normally designed to rnect strict operating parameters, such as long operating lifetimes with no maintenance requirements or adaptability to easy replacement, simplicity of operation and control, and flexibility for variations in process conditions.
Especially designed or prepared solvent extractors such as packed or pulse columns, n.txer settlers or centrifugal contactors for use in a plant for the reprocessing of irradiated fuel. Solvent extractors must be resistant to the corrosive effect of nitric acid. Solvent extractors are normally fabricated to exuemely high standards (including special welding and inspection and quality assurance and quality control techniques) out of low carbon stainless steels, titanium, zirconium, or other high quality materials.
3.4.
Chemical holding or storage vessels INTRODUCTORY NOTE Three main process liquor streams result from the solvent extraction step. Holding or storage vessels are used in the furtbar processing of all three streams, as follows:
(a) The pure uranium nitrate solution is concentrated by evaporation and passed to a denitration process where it is converted to uranium oxide. This oxide is re-used in the nuclear fuel cycle.
GOV /2914 Attaciunent 1 Annex 11 psge 6 (b) The intensely radioactive fission products solution is normally concentrated by evaporation and stored as a liquor concentrate. This concentrate may be l
subsequently evaporated and converted to a form suitable for storage or l
disposal.
l 1
(c) The pure plutonium nitrate solution is concentrated and stored pending its transfer to further process steps, in particular, holding or storage vessels for plutonium solutions are designed to avoid criticality problems resulting from changes in concentration and form of this stream.
Especially designed or prepared holding or storage vessels for use in a plant for the reprocessing of irradiated fuel. The holding or storage vessels must be resistant to the corrosive effect of nitric acid. The holding or storage vessels are normally fabricated of materials such as low carbon stainless steels, titanium or zirconium, or other high quality materials, llolding or storage vessels may be designed for remote operation and maintenance and may have the following features for control of nuclear criticality:
(1) walls or internal structures with a boron equivalent of at least two per cent, or (2) a maximum diameter of 175 mm (7 in) for cylindrical vessels, or (3) a maximum width of 75 mm (3 in) for either a slab or annular vessel.
3.5.
Plutonium nitrate to oxide conversion system INTRODUCTORY NOTE in most reprocessing facilities, this final process involves the conversion of the plutonium nitrate solution to plutonium dioxide. The main functions involved in this process are: process feed storage and adjustment, precipitation and solid / liquor separation, calcination, product handling, ventilation, waste management, and process control.
Complete systems especially designed or prepared for the conversion of plutonium nitrate to plutonium oxide, in particular adapted so as to avoid criticality and radiation effects and to minimize toxicity hazards.
3.6.
Plutonium oxide to metal production system INTRODUCTORY NOTE This process, which could be related to a reprocessing facility, involves the fluorination of plutonium dioxide, normally with highly corrosive hydrogen fluoride, to produce plutonium fluoride which is subsequently reduced using high purity calcium metal to produce metallic plutonium and a calcium fluoride slag. The main
4 GOV /2914 Annex 11 page 7 functions involved in this process are: fluorination (e.g. involving equipment l
fabricated or lined with a precious metal), metal reduction (e.g. employing ceramic i
crucibles), slag recovery, product handling, ventilation, waste management and i
process control.
Complete systems especially designed or prepared for the production of plutonium metal, in particular adapted so as to avoid criticality and radiation effects and to minimize toxicity hazards.
l 4.
Plants for the fabrication of fuel elements A *phnt for the fabrication of fuel elements" includes the equipment:
(a) Which nonnally comes in direct contact with, or directly processes, or controls, the production flow of nuclear material, or (b) Which seals the nuclear material within the cladding.
5.
Plants for the separation of isotopes of uranium and equipment, other than analytical instruments, especially designed or prepared therefor items of equipment that are considered to fall within the meaning of the phrase
" equipment, other than analytical instruments, especially designed or prepared" for the separation of isotopes of uranium include:
5.1.
Gas centrifuges and assesnblies and components especially designed or prepared for use in gas centrifuges INTRODUCTORY NOTE The gas centrifuge normally consists of a thin-walled cylinder (s) of between 75 mm (3 in) and 400 mm (16 in) diameter conta'aed in a vacuum environment and spun at high peripheral speed of the order of 300 m/s or more with its central axis vertical. In order to achieve high speed the materials of construction for the rotating components have to be of a high strength to density ratio and the rotor assembly, and hence its individual components, have to be manufactured to very close tolerances in order to minimize the unbalance in contrast to other centrifuges, the gas centrifuge for uranium enrichment is characterized by having within the rotor chamber a rotating disc shaped baffle (s) and a stationary tube arrangement for feeding and extracting the UF, gas and featuring at least 3 separate channels, of which 2 are connected to scoops extending from the rotor axis towards the periphery of the rotor chamber. Also contained within the vacuum environment are a number of critical items which do not rotate and which although they are especially designed are not difficult to fabricate nor are they fabricated out of unique materials. A
l GOV /2914 l
Annex 11 page 8 l
centrifuge facility however requires a large number of these compotwnts, so that I
quantities can provide an imponant indication of end use.
5.1.1.
Rotating components (a)
Complete rotor assemblies:
Thin walled cylinders, or a number of intercormected thht-walled cylinders, manufactured from one or more of the high strength to density ratio materials described in the EXPLANATORY NOTE to this Section if interconnected, the cylinders are joined together by flexible bellows or rings as described in section 5.1.1.(c) following. The rotor is fitted with an intemal baffle (s) and end caps, as described in section 5.1.1.(d) atxt (e) following, if in final form. However the complete assembly may be delivered only partly assembled.
(b)
Rotor tubes:
Especially designed or prepared thin-walled cylinders with thickness of 12 mm (0.5 in) or less, a diameter of between 75 mm (3 in) and 400 mm (16 in), and manufactured from one or more of the high strength to density ratio materials described in the EXPLANATORY NOTE to this Section.
(c)
Rings or Bellows:
Components especially designed or prepared to give localized support to the rotor tube or to join together a number of rotor tubes. The bellows is a short cylinder of wall thickness 3 mm (0.12 in) or less, a diameter of between 75 mm (3 in) and 400 mm (16 in), having a convolute, and manufactured from one of the high strength to density ratio materials described in the EXPLANATORY NOTE to this Section.
(d) Baffles:
Disc-shaped components of between 75 mm (3 in) and 400 mm (16 in) diameter especially designed or prepared to be mounted inside the centrifuge rotor tube, in order to isolate the take-off chamber from the main separation chamber and, in some cases, to assist the UF. gas circulation within the main separation chamber of the rotor tube, and manufactured from one of the high strength to density ratio materials described in the EXPLANATORY NOTE to this Section.
(e)
Top caps / Bottom caps:
Disc-shaped components of between 75 mm (3 in) and 400 mm (16 in) diameter especially designed or prepared to fit to the ends of the rotor tube, and so contain the.UF, within the rotor tube, and in some cases to support, retain or contain as an integrated part an element of the upper bearing (top cap) or to carry the rotating elements of the motor and lower bearing (bottom cap), and manufactured from one
)
GOV /2914 Annex 11 page 9 of the high strength to density ratio materials described in the liXPLANATORY NOTE to this Section.
EXPLANATORY NOTE The materials used for centrifuge rotating components are:
(a) hiaraging steel capable of an ultimate tensile strength of 2.05 x 16 N/m2 l
(300,000 psi) or more; (b) Aluminium alloys capable of an ultimate tensile strength of 0.46 x 11 N/m2 (67,000 psi) or more; (c) Filamentary materials suitable for use in composite structures and having a I
specific modulus of 12.3 x ICf m or greater and a specific ultimate tensile strength of 0.3 x 10 m or greater (' Specific hiodulus' is the Young's hiodulus 2
in N/m divided by the specific weight in N/m'; ' Specific Ultimate Tensile l
Strength' is the ultimate tensile strength in N/nf divided by the specific weight in N/m').
5.1.2.
Static components (a) hiagnetic suspension bearings:
Especially designed or prepared bearing assemblies consisting of an annular magnet suspended within a housing containing a damping meditun. The housing will be manufactured from a UF -resistant material (see EXPLANATORY NOTE to Section 6
5.2.). The magnet couples with a pole piece or a second inagnet fitted to the top cap described in Section 5.1.1.(e). The magnet may be ring-shaped with a relation between outer and inner diameter smaller or equal to 1.6:1. The magnet may be in a form having an initial permeability of 0.15 II/m (120,000 in CGS units) or more, or a remanence of 98.5% or more, or an energy product of greater than 80 kJ/nf (10' gauss-oersteds). In addition to the usual material properties, it is a prerequisite that the deviation of the magnetic axes from the geometrical axes is limited to very small tolerances (lower than 0.1 mm or 0.0CM in) or that homogeneity of the material of the magnet is specially called for.
(b) Bearings / Dampers:
Especially designed or prepared bearings comprising a pivot / cup assembly mounted on a damper. The pivot is normally a hardened steel shaft with a hemisphere at one end with a means of attachment to the bottom cap described in section 5.1.1.(e) at the other. The shaft may however have a hydrodynamic bearing, attached. The cup is pellet shaped with a hemispherical indentation in one surface. These components are often supplied separately to the damper,
GOV /2914 Annex Il page 10 (c) Molecular pumps:
l Especially designed or prepared cylinders having internally machined or extruded helical grooves and internally machined bores. Typical dimensions are as follows:
75 mm (3 in) to 400 mm (16 in) internal diameter,10 mm (0.4 in) or more wall thickness, with the length equal to or greater than the diameter. The grooves are l
typically rectangular in cross section and 2 mm (0.08 in) or more in depth.
(d) Motor stators:
l Especially designed or prepared ring shaped stators for high speed multiphase AC hysteresis (or reluctance) motors for synchronous operation within a vacuum in the frequency range of 600 2000 Hz and a power range of 50 - 1000 VA. The stators
{
consist of multi-phase windings on a laminated low loss iron core comprised of thin layers typically 2.0 mm (0.08 in) thick or less.
(e) Centrifuge housing / recipients:
Components especially designed or prepared to contain the rotor tube assembly of a gas centrifuge. The housing consists of a rigid cylinder of wall thickness up to 30 j
mm (1.2 in) with precision machined ends to locate the bearings and with one or more flanges for mounting. The machined ends are parallel to each other and perpendicular to the cylinder's longitudinal axis to within 0.05 degrees or less. The housing may also be a honeycomb type structure to accommodate several rotor tubes. The housings are made of or protected by materials resistant to corrosion by UF..
(f)
Scoops:
Especially designed or prepared tubes of up to 12 mm (0.5 in) internal diameter for the extraction of UF. gas from within the rotor tube by a Pitot tabe action (that is, with an aperture facing into the circumferential gas flow within the rotor tube, for example by bending the end of a radially disposed tube) and ca}>4ble of being fixed to the central gas extraction system. The tubes are made of or protected by materials resistant to corrosion by UF.,
5.2.
Especially designed or prepared auxiliary systems, equipment and components for gas centrifuge enrichment plants INTRODUCTORY NOTE The auxiliary systems, equipment and components for a gas centrifuge enrichment plant are the systems of plant needed to feed UF. to the centrifuges, to link the individual centrifuges to each other to form cascades (or stages) to allow for progressively higher enrichments and to extract the ' product' and ' tails' UF from
0 GOV /2914 Annex 11 page 11 the centrifuges, together with the equipment required to drive the centrifuges or to control the plant.
Normally UF. is evaporated from the solid using heated autoclaves and is distributed in gaseous form to the centrifuges by way of cascade header pipework. The
' product' and ' tails' UF. gaseous streams flowing from the centrifuges are also passed by way of cascade header pipework to cold traps (operating at about 203 K
( 70*C)) where they are condensed prior to onward transfer into suitable containers for transportation or storage. Because an enrichment plant consists of many thousands of centrifuges arranged in cascades there are many kilometers of cascade header pipework, incorporating thousands of welds with a substantial amount of l
repetition of layout. The equipment, components and piping systems are fabricated l
to very high vacuum and cleanliness standards.
5.2.1.
Feed systems / product and tails withdrawal systems Especially designed or prepared process systems including:
Feed autoclaves (or stations), used for passing UF. to the centrifuge cascades at up to 100 kPa (15 psi) and at a rate of 1 kg/h or more; Desublimers (or cold traps) used to remove UF from the cascades at up to 3 6
kPa (0.5 psi) p::ssure. The desublimers are capable of being chilled to 203 K
(-70 'C) and heated to 343 K (70 C);
I
' Product' and ' Tails' stations used for trapping UP. into containers.
This plant, equipment and pipework is wholly made of or lined with UFeresistant materials (see EXPLANATORY NOTE to this section) and is fabricated to very high vacuum and cleanliness standards.
5.2.2.
Machine header piping systems Especially designed or prepared piping systems and header systems for handling UF.
within the centrifuge cascades. The piping network is normally of the ' triple' header system with each centrifuge connected to each of the headers. There is thus a substantial atnount of repetition in its form. It is wholly made of UF-resistant 6
materials (see EXPLANATORY NOTE to this section) and is fabricated to very high vacuum and cleanliness standards.
5.2.3.
UF. mass spectrometers /lon sources Cspecially designed or prepared magnetic or quadrupole nass spectrometers capable of taking 'on-line' samples of feed, product or tails, from UF. gas streams and having all of the following characteristics:
GOV /2914 Annex 11 page 12 1.
Unit resolution for atomic mass unit greater than 320; 2.
lon sources constructed of or lined with nichrome or monel or nickel plated; 3.
Electron bombardment ionization sources; 4.
llaving a collector system suitable for isotopic analysis.
5.2.4.
Frequency changers Frequency changers (also known as converters or invertors) especially designed or prepared to supply motor stators as defined under 5.1.2.(d), or parts, components and sub assernblies of such frequency changers having all of the following characteristics:
1.
A multiphase output of 600 to 2000 IIz; 2.
liigh stability (with frequency control better than 0.1 %);
3.
I.ow harmonic distortion (less than 2%); and 4.
An efficiency of greater than 80%.
EXFLANATORY NOTE The items listed above either come into direct contact with the UF. process gas or directly control the centrifuges and the passage of the gas from centrifuge to centrifuge and cascade to cascade.
Materials resistant to corrosion by UF. include stainless steel, aluminium, aluminium alloys, nickel or alloys containing 60% or more nickel.
5.3.
Especially designed or prepared assemblies and components for use in gaseous diffusion enrichment INTRODUCTORY NOTE In the gaseous diffusion method of uranium isotope separation, the main technological assembly is a special porous gaseous diffusion barrier, heat exchanger for cooling the gas (which is heated by the process of compression), seal valves and control valves, and pipelines. Inasmuch as gaseous diffusion technology uses uranium hexafluoride (UFJ, all equipment, pipeline and instrumentation surfaces (that come in contact with the gas) must be made of materials that remain stable in contact with UF..
A gaseous diffusion facility requires a number of these assemblies, so that quantities can provide an important indication of end use.
{
GOV /2914 Annex II l
i page 13 5.3.1.
Gaseous diffusion barriers (a) Especially designed or prepared thin, porous filters, with a pore size of 100 -
l 1,000 A (angstroms), a thickness of 5 mm (0.2 in) or less, and for tubular forms, a diameter of 25 mm (1 in) or less, made of metallic, polymer or ceramic materials resistant to corrosion by UP., and (b) especially prepared compounds or powders for the manufacture of such filters.
Such compounds and powders include nickel or alloys containing 60 per cent or more nickel, aluminium oxide, or UFeresistant fully fluorinated hydrocarbon polymers having a purity of 99.9 per cent or more, a particle size less than 10 microns, and a high degree of particle size uniformity, which are especially prepared for the manufacture of gaseous diffusion barriers.
5.3.2.
Diffuser housings i
Especially designed or prepared hermetically sealed cylindrical vessels greater than 300 mm (12 in) in diameter and greater than 900 mm (35 in) in length, or rectangular vessels of comparable dimensions, which have an inlet connection and two outlet connections all of which are greater than 50 nun (2 in) in diameter, for containing the gaseous diffusion barrier, made of or lined with UFcresistant materials and designed for horizontal or vertical installation.
5.3.3.
Compressors and gas blowers Especially designed or prepared axial, centrifugal, or positive displacement 4
compressors, or gas blowers with a suction volume capacity of I rd/ min or more of UF, and with a discharge pressure of up to several hundred kPa (100 psi),
designed for long-term operation in the UF. environment with or without an electrical motor of appropriate power, as well as separate assemblies of such compressors and gas blowers. These compressors and gas blowers have a pressure ratio between 2:1 and 6:1 and are made of, or lined with, materials resistant to UF..
5.3.4.
Rotary shaft seals Especially designed or prepared vacuum seals, with seal feed and seal exhaust connections, for sealing the shaft connecting the compressor or the gas blower rotor with the driver motor so as to ensure a reliable seal against in-leaking of air into the inner chamber of the compressor or gas blower which is filled with UF.. Such seals are normally designed for a buffer gas in-leakage rate of less than 1000 cid/ min (60 in'/ min).
n
,n
GOV /2914 Annex Il page 14 5.3.5.
Ileat exchangers for cooling UF.
Especially designed or prepared heat exchangers made of or lined with UF-resistant materials (except stainless steel) or with copper or any combination of those metals, and intended for a leakage pressure change rate of less than 10 Fa (0.0015 psi) per hour under a pressure difference of 100 kPa (15 psi).
5.4.
Especially designed or prepared auxiliary systems, equipment and components for use in gaseous diffusion enrichment INTRODUCTORY NOTE The auxiliary systems, equipment and components for gaseous diffusion enrichment plants are the systems of plant needed to feed UF to the gaseous diffusion assembly, to link the individual assemblics to each other to form cascades (or stages) to allow for progressively higher enrichments and to extract the ' product' and ' tails' UF.
from the diffusion cascades. Because of the high inertial properties of diffusion cascades, any interruption in their operation, and especially their shut-down, leads to serious consequences. Therefore, a strict and constant maintenance of vacuum in all technological systems, automatic protection from accidents, and precise automated regulation of the gas flow is of importance in a gaseous diffusion plant.
All this leads to a need to equip the plant with a large number of special measuring, regulating and controlling systems.
Normally UF is evaporated from cylinders placed within autoclaves and is distributed in gaseous form to the entry point by way of cascade header pipework.
The ' product' and ' tails' UF. gaseous streams flowing from exit points are passed by way of cascade header pipework to either cold traps or to compression stations where the UF gas is liquefied prior to onward transfer into suitable containers for transportation or storage. Because a gaseous diffusion enrichment plant co:sists of a large number of gaseous diffusion assemblies arranged in cascades, there are many kilometers of cascade header pipework, incorporating thousands of welds with substantial amounts of repetition of layout. The equipment, components and piping systems are fabricated to very high vacuum and cleanliness standards.
5.4.1.
Feed systems / product and tails withdrawal systems Especially designed or prepared process systems, capable of operating at pressures of 300 kPa (45 psi) or less, including:
Feed autoclaves (or systems), used for passing UF, to the gaseous diffusion cascades; Desublimers (or cold traps) used to remove UF from diffusion cascades;
GOVi2914 Attaciunent 1 Armex 11 page 15 l
Liquefaction stations where UF. gas from the cascade is compressed and cooled to form liquid UF.:
' Product' or ' tails' stations used for transferring UP into contahrts.
5.4.2, Ileader piping systems Especially designed or prepared piping systems and header systems for handling UF 3
within the gaseous diffusion cascades. This piping network is normally of the
' double" header system with each cell connected to each of the headers.
5.4.3.
Vacutun systems (a) Especially designed or prepared large vacuum manifolds, vacuum headers and vacuum pumps having a suction capacity of 5 m'/ min (175 ft'/ min) or more.
(b) Vacuum pumps especially designed for service in UFebearing atn.ospheres made of, or lined with, aluminium, nickel, or alloys bearing more than 60% nickel.
These pumps may be either rotary or positive, may have displacement and fluorocarbon seals, and may have special working fluids present.
5.4.4.
Special shut off and control valves Especially designed or prepared manual or automated shut-off and control bellows valves made of UF -resistant materials with a diameter of 40 to 1500 mm (1.5 to 59 6
in) for installation in main and auxiliary systems of gaseous diffusion enrichment plants.
5.4.5.
UF. mass spectrometers /lon sources Especially designed or prepared magnetic or quadrupole mass spectrometers capable of taking 'on-line" samples of feed, product or tails, from UF gas streams and having all of the following characteristics:
1.
Unit resolution for atomic mass unit greater than 320; 2.
Ion sources constructed of or lined with nichrome or monel or nickel plated; 3.
Electron bombardment ionization sources:
I 4.
Collector system suitable for isotopic analysis.
GOV /3914 Annex 11 page 16 EXPLANATORY NOTE The items listed above either come into direct contact with the US process gas or directly control the flow within the cascade. All surfaces which come into contact with the process gas are wholly made of, or lined with, UP.-resistant materials. For the purposes of the sections relating to gaseous diffusion items the materials resistant to corrosion by UP. include stainless steel, aluminium, aluminium alloys, aluminium oxide, nickel or alloys containing 60% or more nickel and UFcresistant fully fluorinated hydrocarbon polymers.
1 5.5.
Especially designed or prepared s3 stems, equipment and components for use in aerodynamic enrichment plants l
INTRODUCTORY NOTE l
In aerodynamic enrichment processes, a mixture of gaseous US and light gas (hydrogen or helium) is compressed and then passed through separating elements wherein isotopic separation is accomplished by the generation of high centrifugal forces over a curved wall geometry. Two processes of this type have been successfully developed: the separation nonle process and the vortex tube process.
For both processes the main components of a separation stage include cylindrical vessels housing the special separation elements (nonles or vortex tubes), gas compressors and heat exchangers to remove the heat of compression. An aerodynamic plant requires a number of these stages, so that quantities can provide an important indication of end use. Since aerodynamic processes use US, all equipment, pipeline and instrumentation surfaces (that come in contact with the gas) must be made of materials that remain stable in contact with US.
EXPLANATORY NOTE The items listed in this section either come into direct contact with the US process gas or directly control the flow within the cascade. All surfaces which come into contact with the process gas are wholly made of or protected by US-resistant materials. For the purposes of the section relating to aerodynamic enrichment items, the materials resistant to corrosion by US include copper, stainless steel, aluminium, aluminium alloys, nickel or alloys containing 60% or more nickel and UFc esistant fully fluorinated hydrocarbon polymers.
r 5.5.1.
Separation nonles Especially designed or prepared separation nonles and assemblies thereof. The separation nonles consist of slit-shaped, curved channels having a radius of curvature less than 1 mm (typically 0.1 to 0.05 mm), resistant to corrosion by UF6 and having a knife-edgc within the nonle that separates the gas flowing through the nonle into two fractions.
GOV /2914 Attaclunent 1 Annex 11 page 17 5.5.2.
Vortex tubes Especially designed or prepared vortex tubes and assemblies thereof. The vortex tubes are cylindrical or tapered, made of or protected by materials resistant to corrosion by UF., having a diameter of betwt.en 0.5 cm and 4 cm, a length to diameter ratio of 20:1 or less and with one or more tangential inlets. The tubes may be equipped with nou,le-type appendages at either or both ends.
EXPLANATORY NOTE The feed gas enters the vortex tube tangentially at one end or through swirl vanes or at numerous tangential positions along the periphery of the tube.
5.5.3.
Compressors and gas blowers Especially designed or prepared axial, centrifugal or positive displacement compressors or gas blowers made of or protected by materials resistant to corrosion by UF, and with a suction volume capacity of 2 nr/ min or more of UF,/ carrier gas (hydrogen or helium) mixture.
EXPLANATORY NOTE These compressors and gas blowers typically have a pressure ratio between 1.2:1 and 6:1.
5.5.4.
Rotary shaft seals Especially designed or prepared rotary shaft seals, with seal feed and seal exhaust connections, for sealing the shaft connecting the compressor rotor or the gas blower rotor with the driver motor so as to ensure a reliable seal against out-leakage of process gas or in-leakage of air or seal gas into the inner chamber of the compressor or gas blower which is filled with a UF,/ carrier gas mixture.
5.5.5.
licat exchangers for gas cooling Especially designed or prepared heat exchangers made of or protected by materials resistant to corrosion by UF..
5.5.6.
Separation element housings Especially designed or prepared separation element housings, made of or protected by materials resistant to corrosion by UF., for containing vortex tubes or separation noules.
i l
GOV /3914 Annex 11 page 18 EXFLANATORY NOTE These housings may be cylindrical vessels greater than 300 mm in diameter and greater than 900 mm in length, or may be rectangular vessels of comparable e
dimensions, and may be designed for horizontal or vertical installation.
5.5.1.
Feed systems / product and tails withdrawal systems Especially designed or prepared process systems or equipment for enrichment plants made of or protected by materials resistant to corrosion by UF., including:
(a)
Feed autoclaves, ovens, or systems used for passing UF, to the enrichment process; (b)
Desublimers (or cold traps) used to remove UF, from the enrichment process for subsequent transfer upon heating; (c)
Solidification or liquefaction stations used to remove UF. from the enrichment process by compressing and converting UP to a liquid or solid form; (d)
'Froduct' or ' tails' stations used for transferring UP Into containers.
5.5.8.
Header piping systems Especially designed or prepared header piping systems, made of or protected by materials resistant to corrosion by UF., for handling UF. within the aerodynamic cascades. This piping network is normally of the ' double' header design with each stage or group of stages connected to each of the headers.
5.5.9.
Vacuum systems and pumps (a)
Especially designed or prepared vacuum systems having a suction capacity of 5 m'/ min or more, consisting of vacuum manifolds, vacuum headers and vacuum
- pumps, and designed for service in UF-bearing atmospheres, (b) Vacuum pumps especially designed or prepared for service in UF-bearing atmospheres and made of or protected by materials resistant to corrosion by UF..
These pumps may use fluorocarbon seals and special working fluids.
5.5.10. Special shut off and control valves Especially designed or prepared manual or automated shut-off and control bellows valves made of or protected by materials resistant to corrosion by UF with a diameter of 40 to 1500 mm for installation in main and auxiliary systems of aerodynamic enriclunent plants,
GOV /2914 Annex 11 page 19 5.5.11. UF. mass spectrometers /lon sources Especially designed or prepared magnetic or quadrupole mass spectrometers capable l
of taking 'on line' samples of feed, ' product' or ' tails', from UF gas streams and having all of the following characteristics:
1.
Unit resolution for mass greater than 320; 2.
Ion sources constructed of or lined with nichrome or monel or nickel plated; 3.
Electron bombardment ionization sources; 4.
Collector system suitable for isotopic analysis.
5.5.12. UF / carrier gas separation systems Especially designed or ptepared procers systems for separating UF from carrier gas (hydrogen or helium).
EXFLANATORY NOTE These systems are designed to reduce the UF. content in the carrier gas to 1 ppm or less and may incorporate equipment such as:
(a) Cryogenic heat exchangers and cryoseparators capable of temperatures of
-120 C or less, or (b) Cryogenic refrigeration units capable of temperatures of 120 C or less, or (c)
Separation nozzle or vortex tube units for the separation of UF. from carrier gas, or (d) UF. cold traps capable of temperatures of -20 *C or less, 5.6.
Especially designed or prepared systems, equipment and components for use in chesnical exchange or non exchange enrichment plants
-INTRODUCTORY NOTE The slight difference in mass between the isotopes of uranium causes small changes in chemical reaction equilibria that can be used as a basis for separation of the isotopes Two processes have been successful.ly developed: liquid-liquid chemical exchange and solid liquid ion exchange,
GOV /2914 Annex 11 page 20 in the liquid liquid chemical exchange process, hnmiscible liquid phases (aqueous and organic) are countercurrently contacted to give the cascading effect of thousands of separation stages. The aqueous phase consists of uranium chloride in hydrochloric acid solution; the organic phase consists of an extractant containing uranium chloride in an organic solvent. The contactors employed in the separation cascade can be liquid liquid exchange columns (such as pulsed colunms with sieve plates) or liquid centrifugal contactors. Chemical conversions (oxidation and reduction) are required at both ends of the separation cascade in order to provide for the reflux requirements at each end. A major design concern is to avoid contamination of the process streams with certain metal ions Plastic, plastic lined (including use of fluorocarbon polymers) and/or glass-lined columns and piping are therefore used.
In the solid-liquid ion-exchange process, enrichment is accomplished by uranium adsorption / desorption on a special, very fast acting, lon-exchange resin or adsorbent.
A solution of uranium in hydrochloric acid and other chemical agents is passed through cylindrical enrichment columns containing packed beds of the adsorbent.
For a continuous process, a reflux system is necessary to release the uranium from the adsorbent back into the liquid flow so that ' product' and ' tails' can be collected.
This is accomplished with the use of suitable reduction / oxidation chemical rgents that are fully regenerated in separate external circuits and that may be panially regenerated within the isotopic separation columns themselves. The presence of hot concentrated hydrochloric acid solutions in the process requires that the equipment be made of or protected by special corrosion-resistant materials.
5.6.1.
Liquid-liquid exchange columns (Chemical exchange)
Countercurrent liquid liquid exchange columns having mechanical power input (i.e.,
pulsed columns with sieve plates, reciprocating plate columns, and columns with internal turbine mixers), especially designed or prepared for uranium enrichment using the chemical exchange process. For corrosion resistance to concentrated hydrochloric acid solutions, these columns and their internals are made of or protected by suitable plastic materials (such as fluorocarbon polymers) or glass. The stage reridence time of the columns is designed to be shon (30 seconds or less).
5.6.2.
Liquid-liquid centrifugal contactors (Chemical exchange)
Liquid-liquid centrifugal contactors especially designed or prepared for uranium enrichment using the chemical exchange process. Such contactors use rotation to achieve dispersion of the organic and aqueous streams and then centrifugal force to separate the phases. For corrosion resistance to concentrated hydrochloric acid solutions. the contactors are made of or are lined with suitable plastic materials (such as fluorocarbon polymers) or are lined with glass. The stage residence time of the centrifugal contactors is designed to be'short (30 seconds or less),
i
GOV /2914 Annex 11 page 21 5.6.3, Uranituu reduction systems and equipment (Chemical exchange)
(a)
Especially designed or prepared electrochemical reduction cells to reduce uranium from one valence state to another for uranium enrichment using the chemical exchange process. The cell materials in contact with process solutions must be corrosion resistant to concentrated hydrochloric acid solutions.
EXPLANATORY NOTE The cell cathodic compartment must be designed to prevent re-oxidation of uranium to its higher valence state. To keep the uranium in the cathodic compartment, the cell may have an impervious diaphragm membrane constructed of special cation exchange material. The cathode consists of a suitable solid conductor such as graphite.
(b) Especially designed or prepared systems at the product end of the cascade for taking the U" out of the organic stream, adjusting the acid concentration arxl feeding to the electrochemical reduction cells.
EXPLANATORY NOTE These systems consist of solvent extraction equipment for stripping the U" from the organic stream into an aqueous solution, evaporation and/or other equipment to accomplish solution pil adjustment and control, and pumps or other transfer devices for feeding to the electrochemical reduction cells. A major design concern is to avoid contamination of the aqueous stream with certain metal ions. Consequently, for those parts in contact with the process stream, the system is constructed of equipment made of or protected by suitable materials (such as glass, fluorocarbon polymers, polyphenyl sulfate, polyether sulfone, and resin impregnated graphite).
5.6.4.
Feed preparation systems (Chemical exchange)
Especially designed or prepared systems for producing high-purity uranium chloride feed solutions for chemical exchange uranium isotope separation plants.
EXPLANATORY NOTE These systems consist of dissolution, solvent extraction and/or ion exchange equipment for purification and electrolytic cells for reducing the uranium LP+ or U" to U)+. These systems produce uranium chloride solutions having only a fcw parts per million of metallic impurities such as chromium, iron, vanadium, molyixlenum and other bivalent or higher multi-valent cations. Materials of construction for portions of the system processing high-purity LP+ include glass, fluorocarbon polymers, polyphenyl sulfate or polyether sulfone plastic-lined and resin-impregnated graphite.
l
GOV /2914 l
Annex 11 page 22 5.6.5.
Uranium oxidation systems (Chemical exchange)
Especially designed or prepared systems for oxidation of U'* to U" for retum to the uranium isotope separation cascade in the chemical exchange enrichment process.
EXPLANATORY NOTE These rystems may incorporate equipment such as:
(a) Equipment for contacting chlorine and oxygen with the aqueous effluent from the isotope separation equipment and extracting the resultant U" into the stripped organic stream returning from the product end of the cascade, (b) Equipment that separates water from hydrochloric acid so that the water and the concentrated hydrochloric acid may be reintroduced to the process at the proper locations.
5.6.6.
Fast reacting lon exchange resins / adsorbents (lon exchange)
Fast-reacting lon<xchange resins or adsorbents especially designed or prepared for uranium enrichment using the ion exchange process, including porous macroreticular resins, and/or pellicular structures in which the active chemical exchange groups are lhnited to a coating on the surface of an inactive porous support structure, and other composite structures in any suitable form including particles or fibers. These ion exchange resins / adsorbents have diameters of 0.2 mm or less and must be chemically resistant to concentrated hydrochloric acid solutions as well as physically strong enough so as not to degrade in the exchange columns. The resins / adsorbents are especially designed to achieve very fast uranium isotope exchange kinetics (exchange rate half-time of less than 10 seconds) and are capable of operating at a temperature in the range of 100 C to 200 C.
5.6.7.
Ion exchange columns (Ion exchange)
Cylindrical columns greater than 1000 mm in diameter for containing and supporting packed beds of ion exchange resin / adsorbent, especially designed or prepared for uranium enrichment using the ion exchange process. These cohunns are made of or protected by materials (such as titanium or fluorocarbon plastics) resistant to corrosion by concentrated hydrochloric acid solutions and are capable of operating at a temperature in the range of 100 C to 200 'C and pressures above 0.7 MPa (102 psia).
5.6.8.
Ion exchange reflux systems (lon exchange)
(a) Especially designed or prepared chemical or electrochemical reduction systems for regeneration of the chemical reducing agent (s) used in ion exchange uranium enrichment cascades.
OOV/2914 Annex 11 page 23 (b) Especially designed or prepared chemical or electrochemical oxidation systems for regeneration of the chemical oxidizing agent (s) used in ion exchange uranium enrichment cascades.
I EXPLANATORY NOTE The ion exchange enrichment process may use, for example, trivalent titanium (TP*)
as a reducing cation in which case the reduction system would regenerate Tf* by reducing Ti".
The process may use, for example, trivalent iron (Fe") as an oxidant in which case i
the oxidation system would regenerate Fe'* by oxidizing Fe.,
2 5.7.
Especially designed or prepared systems, equipment and components for use in laser-based enrichment plants INTRODUCTORY NOTE Present systems for enriclunent processes using lasers fall into two categories: those in which the process medium is atomic uranium vapor and those in which the process medium is the vapor of a uranium compound. Common nomenclature for such processes include: first category - atomic vapor laser isotope separation (AVLIS i
or SILVA); second category - molecular laser isotope separation (MLIS or MOLIS) and chemical reaction by isotope selective laser activation (CRISLA). The systems, equipment and components for laser enrichment plants embrace: (a) devices to feed uranium metal vapor (for selective photo-ionization) or devices to feed the vapor of a uranium compound (for photo-dissociation or chemical activation);-(b) devices to collect enriched and depleted uranium metal as ' product' and ' tails' in the first category, and devices to collect dissociated or reacted compounds as ' product' and unaffected material as ' tails' in the second category; (c) process laser systems to selectively excite the urrnium 235 species; and (d) feed preparation and product conversion equipment. The complexity of the spectroscopy of uranium atoms and compounds may require incorporation of any of a number of available laser technologies.
EXPLANATORY NOTE Many of the items listed in this section come into direct contact with uranium metal vapor or liquid or with process gas consisting of UF. or a mixture of UF. and other gases. All surfaces that come into contact with the uranium or UF are wholly made of or protected by corrosion-resistant materials. For the purposes of the section relating to laser based enrichment items, the materials resistant to corrosion by the vapor or liquid of uranium metal or uranium alloys include yttria-coated graphite and tantalum; and the materials resistant to corrosion by UF, include copper, stainless steel, aluminium, aluminium alloys, nickel or alloys containing 60 % or more nickel and UFr sistant fully 11uorinated hydrocarbon polymers.
re
)
GOV /2914 Annex Il page 24 5.7.1.
Uranium vaporization systems (AVLIS)
Especially designed or prepared uranium vaporization systems which contain high-power strip or scanning electron beam guns with a delivered power on the target of more than 2.5 kW/cm.
5.7.2.
Liquid uranium metal handling systems (AVLIS)
Especially designed or prepared liquid metal handling systems for molten uranium or uranium alloys, consisting of crucibles and cooling equipment for the cmcibles.
EXPLANATORY NOTE The crucibles and other parts of this system that come into contact with molten uranium or uranium alloys are made of or protected by materials of suitable corrosion and heat resistance. Suitable materials include tantalum, 31tria coated graphite, graphite coated with other rare canh oxides or mixtures thereof.
5.7.3.
Uranium metal ' product' and ' tails' collector assemblies (AVLIS)
Especially designed or prepared ' product' and ' tails' collector assemblies for uranium metal in liquid or solid form.
EXPLANATORY NOTE Components for these assemblies are made of or protected by materials resistant to the heat and corrosion of uranium metal vapor or liquid (such as 31tria coated graphite or tantalum) and may include pipes, valves, fittings, ' gutters', feed-throughs, heat exchangers and collector plates for magnetic, electrostatic or other separation methods.
5.7.4.
Separator module housings (AVLIS)
Especially designed or prepared cylindrical or rectangular vessels for containing the uranium metal vapor source, the electron beam gun, and the ' product' and ' tails' collectors.
EXPLANATORY NOTE These housings have multiplicity of ports for electrical and water feed-throughs, laser beam windows, vacuum pump connections and instrumentation diagnostics and monitoring. They have provisions for opening and closure to allow refurbishment of internal components.
GOV /2914 Annex 11 page 25 5.7.5.
Supersonic expansion nozzles (MLIS)
Especially designed or prepared supersonic expansion nozzles for cooling mixtures of UF. and carrier gas to 150 K or less and which are corrosion resistant to UF..
5.7.6.
Uranium pentalluoride product collectors (MLIS)
Especially designed or prepared uraniuni pentafluoride (UF ) solid product collectors 3
consisting of filter, impact, or cyclone-type collectors, or combinations thereof, and which are corrosion resistant to the UF /UF, environment.
3 5.7.7.
UFJcarrier gas compressors (MLIS)
Especially designed or prepared compressors for UF / carrier gas mixtures, designed for long term operation in a UF. environment. The components of these compressors that come into contact with process gas are made of or protected by materials resistant to corrosion by UF..
5.7.8.
Rotary shaft seals (MLIS)
Especially designed or prepared rotary shaft seals, with seal feed and seal exhaust connections, for sealing the shaft connecting the compressor rotor with the driver motor so as io casure a icHable seal against out leakage of process gas or in-leakage of air or seal gas into the int.f. cham'oer of the compressor which is filled with a UFdcarrier gas mixture.
5.7.".
Fluorination systems (MLIS)
Especially designed or prepared systems for fluorinating UF (solid) to UF (gas).
3 EXFLANATORY NOTE These systems are designed to fluorinate the collected UF powder to UF for 3
subsequent coll ction in product ntainers or for transfer as feed to MLIS units for additional enriclunent. In one,pproach, the fluorination reaction may be accomplished within the isotope separation system to react and recover directly off the ' product' collectors. In another approach. the UF, powder may be removed / transferred from the ' product' collectors into a suitable reaction vessel (e.g., fluidized-bed reactor, screw reactor or flame tower) for fluorination. In both approaches, equipment for storage and transfer of fluorine (or other suitable fluorinating agents) and for collection and transfer of UF. are used.
GOV /2914 Annex !!
page 26 5.7.10. UF. mass spectrometers /lon sources (MLIS)
Especially designed or prepared magnetic or quadrupole mass spectrometers capable of taking 'on-line' samples of feed, ' product' or ' tall;', from UF, gas streams and having all of the following characteristics:
1.
Unit resolution for mass greater than 320; 2.
lon sources constructed of or lined with nichrome or monel or nickel plated; 3.
Electron bombardment ionization sources; 4.
Collector system suitable for isotopic analysis.
I 5.7.11. - Feed systems / product and tails withdrawal systems (MLIS) l Especially designed or prepared process systems or equipment for enrichment plants made of or protected by materials resistant to corrosion by UF., including:
(a) Feed autoclaves, ovens, or systems used for passing UF. to the enrichment process
-(b) Desublimers (or cold traps) used to remove UF from the enrichment process for subsequent transfer upon heating; (c) Solidification or liquefaction stations used to remove UF. from the enrichment process by compressing and converting UF. to a liquid or solid form; (d)- ' Product' or ' tails' stations used for transferring UF. into containers.
5.7.12. UF./ carrier gas separation systems (MLIS)
Especially designed or prepared process systems for separating UF. from carrier gas. The carrier gas may be nitrogen, ergon. or other gas.
EXPLANATORY NOTE These systems may incorporate equipment such as:
(a) Cryogenic heat exchangers or cryoseparators capable of temperatures of
-120 *C or less, or -
(b) Cryogenic refrigeration units capable of temperatures of -120 C or less, or (c)
UF cold traps capable of temperatures of-20 C or less.
6 I
I GOV /2914 Annex il page 27 5.7.13. Laser systems (AVLIS, MLIS and CRISLA)
Lasers or laser systems especially designed or prepared for the separation of uranium isotopes.
EXPLANATORY NOTE The laser system for the AVLIS process usually consists of two lasers: a copper vapor laser and a dye laser. The laser system for MLIS usually consists of a CO 2
or excimer laser and a multi-pass optical cell with revolving mirrors at both ends.
Lasers or laser systems for both processes require a spectrum frequency stabilizer for operation over extended periods of time.
5.8.
Especially designed or prepared systems, equipment and components for use in plasma separation enrichment plants INTRODUCTORY NOTE i
In the plasma separation process, a plasma of uranium ions passes through an electric field tuned to the U-235 ion resonance frequency so that they preferentially absorb energy and increase the diameter of their corkscrew like orbits. Ions with a large-diameter path are trapped to produce a product enriched in U-235. The plasma, which is made by ionizing uranium vapor, is contained in a vacuum
+
chamber with a high-strength magnetic field produced by a superconducting magnet.
The main technological systems of the process include tne uranium plasma generation system, the separator module with superconducting magnet and metal removal systems for the collection of ' product' and ' tails'.
5.8.I.
Microwave power sources and antennae Especially designed or prepared microwave power sources and antennae for producing or accelerating ions and having the following characteristics: greater than 30 Gilz frequency and greater than 50 kW mean power output for ion production.
5.8.2.
Ion excitation coils Especially designed or prepared radio frequency ion excitation coils for frequencies of more than 100 kHz and capable of handling more than 40 kW mean power.
5.8.3.
Uranium plasma generation systems Especia'Jy designed or prepared systems for the generation of uranium plasma, which may contain high-power strip or scanning electron beam guns with a deliver ed power on the target of more than 2.5 kW/cm.
GOV /3914 Annex II I
page 28 5.8.4.
Liquid uranium metal handling systems Especially designed or prepared liquid metal handling systems for molten uranium or uranium alloys, consisting of crucibles and cooling equipment for the cmcibles.
EXPLANATORY NOTE The cmcibles and other parts of this system that come into contact with molten uranium or t:ranium alloys are made of or protected by materials of suitable corrosion and heat resistance. Suitable materials include tantalum, yttria-coated graphite, graphite coated with'other rare earth oxides or mixtures thereof.
5.8.5.
Uranium metal ' product' and ' tails' collector assemblies Especially designed or prepared ' product' and ' tails' collector assemblies for uranium metal in solid form. These collector assemblies are made of or protected by materials resistant to the heat and corrosion of uranium metal vapor, such as yttria-coated graphite or tantalum.
5.8.6.
Separator module housings Cylindrical vessels especially designed or prepared for use in plasma separation enrichment plants for containing the uranium plasma source, radio-frequency drive coil and the ' product' and ' tails' collectors.
EXPLANATORY NOTE.
These housings have a multiplicity of ports for electrical feed-throughs, diffusion pump connections and instrumentation diagnostics and monitoring. They have provisions for opening and closure to c.llow for refurbishment of intemal components and are constructed of a suitable non-magnetic material such as stainless steel.
5.9..
Especially designed or prepared systems, equipment and components for use in electromagnetic enrichment plants INTRODUCTORY NOTE in the electroma;netic process, uranium metal ions produced by ionization of a salt feed material (typically UCl) are accelerated and passed through a magnetic field that has the effect of causing the ions of different isotopes to follow different paths.
The major components of an electromagnetic isotope separator include: a magnetic field for ion-beam diversion / separation of the isotopes, an ion source with its acceleration system, and a collection system for the separated ions. Auxiliary systems for the process include the magnet power supply system, the ion source high-voltage power supply system, the vacuum system, and extensive chemical harxiling systems for recovery of product and cleaning / recycling of components.
GOV /2914 Annex 11 page 29 5.9.1.
Electromagnetic isotope separators Electromagnetic isotope separators especially designed or prepared for the separation of uranium isotopes, and equipment and components therefor, including:
(a) lon sources Especially designed or prepared single or multiple uranium ion sources consisting of a vapor source, lonizer, and beam accelerator, constructed of suitable materials such as graphite, stainless steel, or copper, and capable of l
providing a total ion beam current of 50 mA or greater.
l (b) lon collectors Collector plates consisting of two or more slits and pockets especially designed or prepared for collection of enriched and depleted uranium ion beams and constructed of suitable materials such as graphite or stainless steel.
(c) Vacuum housings Especially designed or prepared vacuum housings for uranium electromagnetic separators, constructed of suitable non-magnetic materials such as stainless steel and designed for operation at pressures of 0.1 Pa or lower.
EXPLANATORY NOTE The housings are specially designed to contain the ion sources, collector plates and water-cooled liners and have provision for diffusion pump connections and opening and closure for removal and reinstallation of these components.
(d) Magnet pole pieces Especially designed or prepared magnet pole pieces having a diameter greater than 2 m used to maintain a constant magnetic field within an electromagnetic isotope separator and to transfer the magnetic field between adjoining separators.
5.9.2, 'High voltage power supplies Especially designed or prepared high voltage power supplies for lon sources, having all of the following characteristics: capable of continuous operation, output voltage of 20,000 V or greater, output current of 1 A or greater, and voltaEe regulation of -
better than 0.01% over a time period of 8 hours9.259259e-5 days <br />0.00222 hours <br />1.322751e-5 weeks <br />3.044e-6 months <br />.
GOV /2914
' Attachment 1 Annex 11 page 30 5.9.3.
Magnet power supplies
- Especially designed or prepared high-power, direct current magnet power supplies having all of the following characteristics: capable of continuously producing a current output of 500 A or greater at a voltage of 100 V or greater and with a current or vol: age regulation better than 0.01 % over a period of 8 hours9.259259e-5 days <br />0.00222 hours <br />1.322751e-5 weeks <br />3.044e-6 months <br />.
6.
Plants for the production of heavy water, deuterium and deuteriten compounds and equipment especially designed or prepared therefor INTP.ODUCTORY NOTE Heavy water can be produced by a variety of processes. However, the two processes that have proven to be commercially viable are the water hydrogen sulphide exchange process (G3 process) and the ammonia hydrogen exchange process.
The GS process is based upon the exchange of hydrogen and deuterium between water and hydrogen sulphide within a series of towers which are operated with the top section cold and the bottom section hot. Water flows down the towers while the hydrogen sulphide gas circulates from the bottom to the top of the towers. A series -
of perforated trays are used to promote mixing between the gas and the water.
Deuterium migrates to the water at low temperatures and to the hydrogen sulphide at high temperatures. Gas or watc.r enriched in deuterium, is removed from the first stage towers at the junction of the hot and cold sections and the process is repeated in subsequent stage towers. The product of the last stage, water enriched up to 30%
in deuterium, is sent to a distillation unit to produce reactor grade heavy water, i.e.,
99.75% deuterium oxide.
The ammonia-hydrogen exchange process can extract deuterium from synthesis gas through contact with liquid ammonia in the presence of a catalyst. The synthesis gas is fed into exchange towers and to an ammonia converter. Inside the towers the gas flows from the bottom to the top while the liquid ammonia flows from the top to the bottom. The deuterium is stripped from the hydrogen in the synthesis gas and concentrated in the an:monia. The ammonia then flows into an ammonia cracker at the bottom of the tower while the gas flows into an ammonia converter at the top.
Further enrichment takes place in subsequent stages and reactor p.de heavy water is produced through final distillation. The synthesis gas feed can be provided by an ammonia plant that, in turn, can be constructed in association with a heavy water ammonia-hydrogen exchange plant. The ammonia-hydrogen exchange process can also use ordinary water as a feed source of deuterium.
Many of the key equipment items for heavy water production plants using GS or the ammonia-hydrogen exchange processes are common to several segments of the chemical and petroleum industries. This is particularly so for small plants using the GS process. However, few of the items are available "off-the-shelf". The GS and ammonia-hydrogen processes require the handling of large quantities of flammable,
GOV /2914 3 April 1997 A'ITACHMENT 3 Conunittee on Strengthening the Effectiveness and huproving the Efficiency of the Safeguards System Understanding Recorded by the Committee Concerning the Interpretation of Article 1 as far as the Manner of Concluding Additional Protocols and the Responsibility for their Implementation a
4 1,
in adopting Article 1, the Comminee took note of the Interpretation provided by the Secretariat at the. meeting of the Committee on 31 January 1997.
2.
For States that are members of international institutions that are party to safeguards agreements with the IAEA, this text does not prejudge the legal modalities which these States and international institutions adopt regarding the conclusion of additional protocols or the division of responsibilities in their implementation.
, q
_'h 4
4 s
GOV /2914 page 1 ATTACHMENT 2 Committee on Strengthening the Effectiveness and Improsing the Efficiency of the Safeguards System INTERPRETATION BY THE SECRETARIAT OF THE RELATIONSHIP BETWEEN THE PROTOCOL AND THE SAFEGUARDS AGREEMENT (Excerpt from the summary record of the Conunittee's 48th meeting, held on 31 January 1997)
Mr. ELBARADEI (Assistant Director General, Division of External Relations) said that in his view it was of fundamental importance that everyone understand the ideas behind Article 1.
For legal purposes, that was crucial to the interpretation and implementation of the Protocol and the Safeguards Agreement. He would like to go through his interpretation of the relationship between the Protocol and the Safeguards Agreement. It was important that everyone see eye to eye on that relationship and how it operated. The question of its formulation was a different matter, but he believed that the Committee would share his interpretation.
Article 1, which dealt with the relationship between the Protocol and the Safeguards Agreement, did not seek to determine the question of the existence or non-existence of a legal obligation to adhere to the Protocol. Nor did it prejudge the question of prospective parties or the modalities for their adherence; whether States would adhere individually, or as a group, or in conjunction with international organizations was outside the scope of Article 1.
Questions of legal obligations and political undertalmgs had to be considered in the light of States' non-proliferation obligations and policies outside the tramework of the Protocol.
Article 1 simply sought to determine the manner in which the Protocol was to be implemented in conjunction with the Safeguards Agreement.
GOV /2914 l
i page 2 Another point regarding the relationship was that, as had been agreed from the outset, the Protocol was not to be a stand-alone document - for two reasons. Firstly, no State could adhere to the Protocol unless it had previously concluded a Safeguards Agreement with the Agency. Secondly, the Protocol depended in many ways on the underlying Safeguards Agreement. The Committee had decided at the outset not to go through a process of amending the Safeguards Agreement or creating a new, stand-alone document; it had decided to create a document which had a " symbiotic" relationship with the Safegu:rds Agreement, so that they co-existed in a dynamic relationship working in each direction. The Protocol did not have many clauses which should exist if it were a stand-alone document; for example, it did not have any settlement of disputes, interpretation or amendment clauses. In those instances, reliance was placed in the existence of such clauses in the Safeguards Agreement.
In other respects, the Protocol superseded the provisions of the Safeguards Agreement - for example, on the questions of inspector designation and visas. The relationship between the two documents was best described as " dynamic" and " symbiotic". The Protocol depended on the Safeguards Agreement, and in cenain respects the Safeguards Agreement depended on the Protocol.
That interrelationship led to one inevitable conclusion:
for the purpose of interpretation, the two agreements - once concluded - had to be read and interpreted as one agreement. That was the only way in which the two documents could be implemented together.
That was his interpretation of the relationship. He hoped that all Committee members shared it as it was fundamental to the future implementation of the Protocol and the Safeguards Agreement. If that interpretation was acceptable, it would be possible to look into how Article 1 - and particularly the first sentence - should be formulated.
The fact that the Protocol was additional to the Safeguards Agreement was in his view already reflected in the Protocol's title, so that the issue covered by the fhst part of the first sentence had already been resolved. It was the second part of the first sentence which was giving rise to discussion in the Committee. No matter how it was formulated, however, he would like his interpretation - which would be in the summary record of the meeting - to be accepted by all Committee members and to serve as guidance in the future for implementing the Protocol and the Safeguards Agreement.
l GOV /2914 -
Annex II page 31 corrosive and toxic fluids at elevated pressures. Accordingly, in crablishing the
'l design and operating standards for plants and equipment using these processes, careful attention to the materials selection and specifications is required to ensure
-long service life with high safety and reliability factors. The choice of scale is primarily a function of economics and need. Thus, most of the equipment items would be prepared according to the requirements of the customer, i
Finally, it should be noted that, in both the GS and the ammonia-hydrogen exchange 1
processes, items of equipment which individually are not especially designed or prepared for heavy water production can be assembled into systems which are especially designed or prepared for producing heavy water. The catalyst production system used in the ammonia-hydrogen exchange process and water distillation systems used for the final concentration of heavy water to reactor-grade in either process are examples of such systems.
The items of equipment which are especially designed or prepared for the production of heavy water utilizing either the water-hydrogen sulphide exchange process or the ammonia-hydrogen exchange process include the following:
6.1.
Water - Hydrogen Sulphide Exchange Towers Exchange towers fabricated from fine carbon steel (such as ASTM A516) with l
diameters of 6 m (20 ft) to 9 m (30 ft), capable of operating at pressures greater than or equal to 2 MPa (300 psi) and with a corrosion allowance of 6 mm or greater, especially designed or prepared for heavy water production utilizing the water-hydrogen sulphide exchange process.
6.2.
Blowers and Compressors Single stage, low head (i.e., 0.2 MPa or 30 psi) centrifugal blowers or compressors for hydrogen-sulphide gas circulation (i.e., gas containing more than 70% H:S) especially designed or prepared for heavy water production utilizing the water-hydrogen sulphide exchange process. These blowers or compressors have a throughput capacity greater than or equal to 56 m'/second (120,000 SCFM) while operating at pressures greater than or equal to 1.8 MPs (260 psi) suction and have seals designed for wet H S service.
2 6.3.
Ammonia-Hydrogen Exchange Towers Ammonia-hydrogen exchange towers greater than or equal to 35 m (114.3 ft) in height with diameters of 1.5 m (4.9 ft) to 2.5 m (8.2 ft) capable of operating at pressures greater than 15 MPa (2225 psi) especially designed or prepared for heasy water production utilizing the ammonia hydrogen exchange process. These towers also have at least one flanged axial opening of the same diameter as the cylindrical part through which the tower internals can be mserted or withdrawn.
GOV /2914
- Attachment 1 Annex 11 page 32 6.4.
Tower Internals and Stage Pumps Tower internals and stage pumps especially designed or prepared for towers for heavy water production utilizing the ammonia-hydrogen exchange process. Tower internals include especially designed stage contactors which promote intimate gas / liquid contact. Stage pumps include especially designed submersible pumps for circulation of liquid ammonia within a contacting stage internal to the stage towers.
-6.5.
Ammonia Crackers Ammonia crackers with operating pressures greater than or equal to 3 MPa (450 psi) especially designed or prepared for heavy water production utilizing the ammonia-hydrogen exchange process.
6.6.
Infrared Absorption Analyzers Infrared absorption analyzers capable of "on-line" hydrogen / deuterium ratio analysis where deuterium concentrations are equal to or greater than 90%.
6.7.
Catalytic Burners Catalytic burners for the conversion of enriched deuterium gas into heasy water especially designed or prepared for heavy water production utilizing the ammonia-hydrogen exchange process.
-7.
Plants for the conversion of uranium and equipment especially designed or prepared therefor INTRODUCTORY NOTE
' Uranium conversion plants and systems may perform one or more transformations from one uranium chemical species to another, including: conversion of uranium ore concentrates to UO, conversion of UO to UO, conversion of uranium oxides to 3
3 2
UF or UF, coniersion of UF, to UF, conversion of UF to UF, conversion of 4
6 6
UF to uranium metal, and conversion of uranium fluorides to UO:. Many of the 4
key equipment items for uranium conversion plants are common to several segments of the chemical process industry. For example, the types of equipment employed in these processes may include: furnaces, rotary kilns, fluidized bed reactors, flame tower reactors, liquid centrifuges, distillation columns and liquid-liquid extraction colmuns. However, few of the items are available "off-the-shelf"; most would be prepared according to the requirements and specifications of the customer. In some instances, special design and construction considerations are required to address the corrosive properties of some of the chemicals handled (HF, F, CIF, and uranium 2
3 fluorides). Finally, it should be noted that, in all of the uranium conversion processes, items of equipment which individually are not especially designed or
GOV /2914 Annex U page 33
. prepared for uranium conversion can be assembled into systems which are especially designed or prepared for use in uranimn conversion.
7.1.
Especially designed or prepared systems for the conversion of uranium ore concentrates to UO3 EXPLANATORY NOTE Conversion of uranium ore concentrates to UQ can be performed by first dissolving the ore in nitric acid and extracting purified uranyl nitrate using a solvent such as tributyl phosphate. Next, the uranyl nitrate is converted to UQ either by concentration and denitration or by neutralization with gaseous ammonia to produce ammonium diuranate with subsequent filtering, drying, and calcining.
7.2.
Especially designed or prepared systems for Se conversion of UQ to UF, EXPLANATORY NOTE i
l Conversion of UO to UF, can be performed directly by fluorination. The process 3
requires a source of fluorine gas or chlorine trifluoride.
7.3.
Especially designed or prepared systems for the conversion of UQ to UO2 EXPLANATORY NOTE Conversion of UO to UO can be performed through reduction of UQ with cracked 3
2 ammonia gas or hydrogen.
7.4.
Especially designed or prepared systems for the conversion of UQ to UF, EXPLANATORY NOTE Conversion of UO to UF, can be performed by reacting UO with hydrogen 2
2 fluoride gas (HF) at 300-500 C.
7.5.
Especially designed or prepared systems for the conversion of UF to UF, 4
EXPLANATORY NOTE Conversion of UF to UF is performed by exothermic reaction with fluorine in a 6
tower reactor. UF, is condensed from the hot effluent gases by passing the effluent strean through a cold trap cooled to -10 C. The process requires a source of fluorine gas.
GOV /2914 Annex Il page 34 7.6.
Especially designed or prepared systems for the conversion of UF to U metal 4
EXPLANATORY NOTE Conversion of UF, to U metal is performed by reduction with magnesium (large batches) or calcium (small batches). The reaction is carried out at temperatures above the melting point of uranium (1130 C).
7.7.
Especially designed or prepared systems for the conversion of UF, to UO.
2 EXPLANATORY NOTE Conversion of UF to UO can be performed by one of three processes. In the first, 2
UF. is reduced and hydrolyzed to UO: using hydrogen and steam. In the second, UF. is hydrolyzed by solution in water, ammonia is added to precipitate ammonium diuranate, and the diaranate is reduced to UO.with hydrogen at 820 C. In the 2
third process, gaseous UF., CO, and NH are combir.ed in water, precipitating 2
3 ammonium uranyl carbonate. The ammonium uranyl carbonate is combined with steam and hydrogen at 500-600 'C to yield UO -
2 UF, to UO conversion is often performed as the first stage of a fuel fabrication 2
plant.
7.8.
Especially designed or prepared systems for the conversion of UF, to UF, EXPLANATORY NOTE Conversion of UF. to UF is performed by reduction with hydrogen.
4
07/15/97 Tl'E 16 : 4 9 I'A> 2% 6 4 7 4 467 ACD A/ NP /NST
@ool
~
UNITED STATES ARMS CONTROL AND DISARMAMENT AGENCY wasNaston, D C 20451 July 15,1997 MEMORANDUM TO:
ACDA/NP/NST
- M. Rosenthal ACDA/GC
- T. Hirah State /PM/NE
- A. Burkart State /PM/lAEA
- L. Gallini DOE /NN 44
- K Sanders /L. Owens OASD/ISP/CP/ Nil M. Friend JCS
- K Sandkuhler NRC/NMSS
- T. Sherr/B Moran FROM:
ACDA/NP/NST
- F. Houck
SUBJECT:
US Addhional Protocol: Plan ofActions l
Attached Wthe cleared Plan of Actions for the Additional Protocol to INFCIRC/288. It reflects all of the comments received through July 15. ' Ibis is our guide for our work during the next reveral months. Please review h carefully to avoid misunderstandings of due dates. Also, please let me know if any of the dates cannot be met or if any addhions or other changes are needed in the Plan.
Attachment Plan of Actions for Additional Protocol to INFCIRC/288, July 15,1997 (NNH: 7-097) cc:
N. Wulf NNH: 7-105 ATTACHMENT.3
07/15/97' TlF. 16:49 FM 202 647 4467
\\m'7m
~'
2 July 15,1997 (7-097)-
Plan of Actions for Additional Protocol to the US Voluntary Offer Safeguards Agreement (INFCIRC/288) f l
This Plan addresses the main steps needed to enable the US to bring into force a new Additional Protocol based on the Model Protocol contained in l
IAEA GOV /2914 and approved by the IAEA Board of Governors at its 15 May 1997 meeting. At that time the US representative read a message from President Clinton stating that the " United States intends to do so [ accept the new safeguards as fully as possible in our country consistent with our obligations under the NPTl by accepting the protocol in its entirety and applying all of its provisions except where they involve information or locations of direct national security significance to the United States" (State 083848 of 6 May 1997). The U.S. committed to making its protocollegally binding.
y The exception is an extension to the scope of the Model Protocol of the exclusion that already applies under INFCIRC/288 (Article 1(a)) to U.S..
facilities associated with activities of direct national security significance to the U.S. The interagency agreed understandings governing the application of this exclusion under INFCIRC/288 are contained in the Assistant Secretary of Defense for International Security Policy " Understandings on the Implementation of IAEA Safeguards in the United States" of 16 May s
1996. The extension will apply this exclusion to information, sites and 7
locations under the U.S. Protocol.
t The schedule for the actions in the plan is predicated on moving forward expeditiously with preparations for the U.S. protocol in erder to be in a position for entry-into-force at the earliest practicable date. The schedule provides the date (month) for completion of each step through approval of the Circular 175, the target date for which is the end of calendar 1997. Dates are not included for steps that might be taken entirely within an individual agency in order to be in a position. to take the steps identified in this plan.
Dates also are not included for the steps invoking negotiation with the IAEA or submission to the Congress. Decisions on the schedule for these steps are deferred untillater when the situation, including the progress of other States with their protocols, can be better assessed.
1
@ oo.1 07/t3/07 TIE 18:30 F u 202 647 4467 ACDA/NP/NST
. Page 2 EBEPARATIONS FOR NEGOTIATION OF U.S. ADDITIONAL PROTOCOL Decimon on time to be ready for entry into-force of the U.S. protocol with later decision
-L on time for entry into force relative to those ofNNWSs (before, in parallel with or after EU ani Japan): IAEA Steering Conunittec: tentatively December 1997.
Decision on means, e.g., exchange of notes or inclusion in protocol, to ensure that the 2.
. national security exclusion now in Article 1 ofINFCIRC/288 will apply to the U.S.
Protocol.
Reconunendation: ACDA/GC in consuhation with State /L: July 1997.
a.
b.
Clear: SISM: August 1997.
Approve: IAEA Steering Conunittee: September 1997.
c.
Identification of any conflicts (as referred to in Model Protocol Article 1) between the 3.
provisions ofINFCIRC/288 and those of the ModelProtocol, how such conflicts would aher the provisions ofINFCIRC/288 and any needed action, Identification and any reconunended actions: ACDA/GC: August 1997.
s.
b.
Clear SISM: September 1997.
Approve: IAEA Steering Conunittee: October 1997.
c.
Identification of any needed changes to text ofModelProtocol(Attachmant I to 4.
- GOV /2914).
Draft: ACDA/GC: September 1997, a.
b.
Clear: SISM: October 1997.
Approve: IAEA Steering Conmuttee: October 1997.
c.
5.
Circular 175.
Draft: State /PM/NE and ACDA/GC: November 1997.
a.
b.
Clear. IAEA Steering Conunittee: November 1997.
Approve: Under Secretary of State: December 1997, c.
1
@ 004 07/15/97 TIT. 16 :50 FAN 202 647 4467 ACDArNP/NST Page 3 IMPLFMENTATION RESPONSIBILITIES IL Legal interpretation of Model Protocol language 1.
provide"infbrmation, and the U.S. is " unable to provide such access."
Proposal: ACDA/GC: September 1997.
a.
b.
Clear: SISM: October 1997.
Policy approval: IAEA Steering Comnuttee: October 1997.
c.
Identification for each article of the Model Protocol of the U.S. ageni 2.
responsible for its implementation, Identify degree to which authority exists and in what agency: SISM s.
Proposal for each atticle: ACDA: July 1997, b.
Clear: SISM: July 1997.
c.
Approve:lAEA Steering Comnuttee: August 1997, d.
Confirm: Responsible agencies, with designation of point-of con c.
officer: September 1997.
Adequacy of existing legislation and regulations, and require 3.
legislation and regulations.
Assess and draft proposal on whether any new USG entity is implementation: State /PM/NE (with consukation whh CT a.
-1997.
Assess and draft proposals identifying any needed new or m regulations for existing agencies: Responsible agency (ies):
b.
Coordinate: SISM: October 1997, c.
Appro ve: IAEA Steering Comanttee: October 1997.
d.
Draft any needed Executive Order, legislation and regulations agency (ies) and ACDA/GC (for any needed new entity): N e.
@ons 07/13/97 TtE 18:50 fat 202 647 4467 ACDA /NP /\\ST Page 4 f.
Interagency clearance of all draft legislation: December 1997.
Complete legislative package: See step E.4 below.
g.
C COORDIN ATION WITH US INDUSTRY 1.
Identify US industry points of contact.
Proposals: NRC and DOE: July 1997.
a.
b.
Approve: SISM: August 1997.
Briefmg on U.S. plans for U.S. Protocol, schedule and main contents: ACDA: August 2.
1997.
Progress report to industry and amplification of reponing and access provisions: ACDA:
3.
October 1997.
Progress repon to industry and plans for submitting to Congress: ACDA: December 19 4.
Briefmg ofindustry segments on specific reponing and access requirements affecting 5.
them ACDA and Responsible agency (ies): immediately after concluding protocol (following step D.2).
r NEGOTIATION WITH IAEA SECRETARIAT OF U.S. ADDITIONAL PROTOCO R
- Determination of stan date: ACDA recommendation to IAEA Steering Conumttee for 1.
approval: January 1998.-
Recommendation to take into account: (1) degree of progress of other States with their protocols; and (2) assessment of the likely 'mternationalimpact of extending the ex
^
of LOFs as in INFCIRC/288 to the U.S. Protocol.
Negotiation: SISM with ACDA leadi estimated completion time - 1 month.
2.
SUnMISSION TO THE U S. CONGRFRS. IF NECESSARY E
Decision on whether the protocolis to be an Executive Agreement, submitted to both 1.
Houses of Congress, or submitted to the Senate for its advice and consent:
1 l
l
,-07fisho7_ TtE519351 m 202 u7-M Page 5 Recoinmendation: ACDA/GC: October 1997.
a.
Decision: IAEA Steering Conanittee: November 1997, b.
Determination of submission date: ACDA recommendation to State /H t
Affairs), ACDA/CA (Congressional Affairs) and 1AEA Steering Committ 2.
January 1998, Reconmendation to take into account: (1) degree ofprogress of oth li protocols;(2) assenmant of the likely impact on the plans of other fthe of their protocols of early U.S. acdon on the U.S. Protocol; and (3) assessm situation in the Congress relevant to action on the protocol.
Coordination with Congress: IAEA Steering Committee with ACDA 3.
1997.
Complete preparation of the legislative package for submission to (for transmittal to the President for submission to the Congress 4.
with State /L: estimated preparation time 2 months.
PLANNING FOR IMPT EMENTATION E
(An essentialpart of preparing for implementatio i
i b submhted exception. This willbe necessary for preparation of the innial declarat on fh pursuant to Article 2 of the ModelProtocol and due 180 days af protocol P will also be necessary for respond i
d locations for which the U.S. has determined in the course of prepar declarations a need for remictions durmg complementary access in or national security infennation. These principles OL: Positions cleared ACDA paper " COMMITTEE 24 PROGRAMME 93+2 PROTOC on implementation by the US"(NP-24546) of 28 Febmary 1997.)
Principles for application of national security exception, 1.
Proposal of principles: State /PM/NE in consukation with DO a.
August 1997.
Clear. SISM: September 1997.
b.
Page 6 Approve: IAEA Steeting Coraraittee: October 1997.
c.
Procedures for applying principles for each type of site and location, with examples for a 2.
few represertative sites and locations.
Proposal ofprocedures: State /PM/NE in consultation with DOFJNN and DOD:
a.
August 1997.
b.
Clear: SISM: September 1997.
Approve: IAEA Stecting Conunittee: October 1997.
c.
PROTOCOL SUBSIDIARY ARRANGEMENTS (INCLUDNG ANY NFFDED E
FACILITY ATTACHMENTS) 1.
To be determmed.
I I
BACKGROUND INFORMATION ON THE U.S./lAEA SAFEGUARDS AGREEMENT
- 1. HISTORY AND NATURE OF THE US/lAEA SeEGUARDS AGREEMENT i
The International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA) was created as an agency of the United i
Nations on July 29,1957. It is recognized as the agency responsible for international activities concerned with the peaceful uses of atomic energy. The IAEA performs its function according to the Statute, which authorizes the IAEA to perform the following safeguards functions:
Establish and administer safeguards designed to ensure that special fissionable and
+
other materials, services, equipment, f acilities, and information made available by the lAEA, or at its request, or under its supervision or control, are not used in such a 4
way as to further any military purpose; Apply safeguards, at the request of the parties, to any bilateral or multilateral i
arrangement, or at the request of a State, to any of that State's activities in the field
[
of atomic energy, designated by the Agency after consultation with the State; and Send into the territory of the recipient State or States, inspectors who shall have access at all times to all places and data and to any person who by reason of his a
occupation deals with materials, equipment, or f acilities required to be safeguarded, 4
as necessary to determine compliance with the State's undertaking.
initiallv, safeguards were first ' agreed to on a bilateral basis. Early in the 1960s, the United States (U.S.) began trac.sferring the administration of these bilateral safeguards to the IAEA. In July 1968, the Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty (NPT) was signed, and it entered into force in March 1970. Safeguards carried out by the IAEA under NPT agreements apply to all nuclear materialin all peaceful nuclear activities within each non nuclear-weapon (NNW) State. Furthermore, each State party to the NPT agrees not to provide nuclear material or equipment to any NNW State unless the materialis subject to safeguards.
As a nuclear-weapons State party to the NPT, the U.S. was not obligated to accept lAEA safeguards on its peaceful nuclear activities. However, to demonstrate that acceptance of IAEA_ safeguards does not place a State at a commercial disadvantage,- the U.S. agreed with the IAEA to permit application of IAEA safeguards to its nuclear facilities, except those with a direct national security significance.
The Senate ratified the U.SJIAEA Agreement as a treaty on July 31,1980.- This
. agreement (IAEA document INFCIRC/288, dated December 1981) carries the force of law and, being a vital part of U.S. non-proliferation policy, is implemented at selected facilities-within the U.S., with strong emphasis on the legal and international consequences of non-compliance.
ATTACHMENT 4 1
4 The detailed provisions in the Agreement governing how safeguards will be implemented are similar to those in the safeguards agreements of NNW States described in the IAEA
. document INFCIRC/153 and provide that the IAEA and the U.S. shall cooperate to f acilitate the implementation of safeguards provisions described therein. Most of its articles are identical to those in the NPT safeguards agreements of NNW States. To stress the intent
.that IAEA safeguards in U.S. facilities be the same as in NNW States, Article 3(c) of the Agreement specifies that in applying safeguards in U.S. facilities, the IAEA will use ?.he same procedures used in applying safeguards on similar materialin similar f acilities in NPT NNW States.
The U.S./lAEA Safeguards Agreement defines, in general terms, the purpose of IAEA safeguards in the U.S.; the responsibilities of the U.S. and the IAEA; and the structure of the safeguards to be applied. It consists of two documents (i.e, the " Agreement" and a
" Protocol"). The U.S. is required to provide the IAEA with a list of all U.S. facilities that are not associated with direct national security activities. This list is referred to as "the eligible facilities list." The IAEA has the right to select any or all the facilities on the list.
Facilities selected under the " Agreement" are required to satisfy information reporting requirements, and meet other requirements associated with IAEA inspections at these facilities. Facilities selected under the " Protocol" are only required to satisfy the reporting requirements.
Since the U.S./lAEA Safeguards Agreement was brought into force, a number of NRC licensed activities havn been selected for application of IAEA safeguards. A summary of these selections is as follows:
Low-Enriched Uranium (LEU) Fuel Fabrication Plants Time Period of IAEA Selection
- Siemens 03/81-11/83*
- Combustion Engineering 06/83-08/85*-
- Westinghouse 01/86-05/88*
- General Electric 12/87-12/90*
- Framatome Cogema Fuels 02/89-12/92*
- All t.EU fuel fabrication facilities, including CE Hematite, are currently selected per the Protocol of the US/IAEA Agreement.. As such, they are required to do the same nuclear material reporting activity as when they were being inspected by the IAEA.
O 3
Hiah-Enriched Uranium fuel Fabrication Plants 1
- BWX Technologies 08/96-present (Downblending of Project Sapphire material)
Nuclear Power Plants - NRC-Licensed
- Trojan Nuclear Power Plant 02/81-04/84
- Rancho Seco Nuclear Power 'lant 02/81-04/84
- Arkansas i Unit 2 Nuclear Power Plant 07/83-12/85
- San Onofre Unit 2 Nuclear Power Plant 07/83-12/85
- Turkey Point Unit 4 Nuclear Power Plant 11/85-01/88
- Salem Nuclear Power Plant 11/85-01/88
- 2. INTERAGENCY COORDINATION AND NRC RESPONSIBILITIES l
l The U.S. Government has established three interagency groups to deal with
{
implementation of the U.S./lAEA Agreement: (1) IAEA Steering Committee (ISC);
(2) Subgroup on IAEA Safeguards in the U.S.; and (3) Negotiating Team.
The ISC is the interagency mechanism for coordinating policy and resolving disputes relating to the implementation of the Agreement and is concerned generally with IAEA policy matters. The ISC is composed of representatives from the Department of State (DOS); the Department of Energy (DOE); the Nuclear Regulatory Commission; the Arms Control and Disarmament Agency (ACDA); the Department of Defense; the Office of Management and Budget; and the staff of the National Security Council and the intelligence community. The ISC is chaired by the U.S. representative to the IAEA or such other official as may be designated by the Secretary of State.
The Subgroup on IAEA Safeguards in the U.S. (SISUS)is composed of representatives from DOS, ACDA, NRC, and DOE. The NRC representative is the Chair of SISUS. SISUS monitors implementation of the Agreement; carries out responsibilities specifically prescribed in the Agreement; and undertakes such other working-level activities as the ISC may designate.
The Negotiating Team is composed of the members of SISUS or their designates. The Negotiating Team negotiates the Subsidiary Arrangements with the IAEA and undertakes such other responsibilities as the ISC may designate. For negotiations with regard to NRC-licensed or NRC-certified facilities, the NRC member is the head of the Team. For negotiations with regard to DOE facilities not licensed and subject to DOE Orders, the DOE member will be the head of the Team.
4-NRC is the primary U.S. Government agency involved in the process of implementing the
- U.S./lAEA Agreement at U.S. nuclear f acilities subject to NRC regulatory authority. It has established and maintained processes for the implementation of IAEA safeguards.
Regulations to implement the requirements of the U.S./lAEA Agreement at U.S. NRC i
licensed or NRC-certified f acilities or activities subject to the Agreement have been promulgated. In addition, licensing procedures, a means of controlling compliance, and an l
l information processing capability have been established.
l IAEA safeguards requirements, applicable to nuclear facilities subject to NRC regulatory l
authority, are contained in the NRC regulation,10 CFR Part 75, " Safeguards on Nuclear Material-Implementation of U.S./lAEA Agreement." These requirements are aimed at establishing f acility nuclear material control and accounting requirements that satisfy the provisions of the U.S./lAEA Safeguards Agreement. Part 75 applies to: (1) all parties licensed by NRC or by an Agreement State to possess source or special nuclear material (SNM) at f acilities on the U.S. eligible list; (2) certain holders of construction permits; and (3) parties who intend to receive source or SNM.
_