ML20209G944
| ML20209G944 | |
| Person / Time | |
|---|---|
| Site: | Hatch  |
| Issue date: | 01/30/1987 |
| From: | Office of Nuclear Reactor Regulation |
| To: | |
| Shared Package | |
| ML20209G942 | List: |
| References | |
| TAC-64460, TAC-64562, NUDOCS 8702050495 | |
| Download: ML20209G944 (4) | |
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UNITED STATES NUCLEAR REGULATORY COMMISSION n
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WASHINGTON, D. C. 20665
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SAFETY EVALUATION BY THE OFFICE OF NUCLEAR REACTOR REGULATION SUPPORTING AMENDMENT NO. 73 TO FACILITY OPERATING LICENSE N0.
NPF-5 GEORGIA POWER COMPANY OGLETHORPE POWER CORPORATION MUNICIPAL ELECTRIC AUTHORITY OF GEORGIA CITY OF DALTON, GEORGIA EDWIN I. HATCH NUCLEAR PLANT, UNIT NO. 2 DOCKET N0. 50-366
1.0 INTRODUCTION
On January 26, 1987, while operating under Action Statement a.4 of Technical Specification (TS) 3.7.1.2, Unit 2 experienced a forced shutdown. The unit was operating unoer Action Statement a.4, because the Standby Service Water System (SSWS) was inoperable.
Once shutdown, the unit was prevented by TS 3.0.4 from restarting with the SSWS inoperable. TS 3.0.4 states that entry into an Operational Condition shall not be made unless the Limiting Conditions for Operation are met without reliance on provisions contained in Action Statements unless otherwise excepted.
By telephone co'nversations with the staff on January 26, 1987 Georgia Power Company (the licensee) requested a one-time exception to the provision of TS 3.0.4 as it relates to Action Statement a.4, on an emergency basis, to allow it to restart Unit 2.
It stated that it was preparing a formal submitta basis of these ' conversation.1 requesting this emergency TS > :ange.On the s and haVing determined that the unit could be safely restarted the staff orally granted a waiver from TS 3.0.4 as it applies to Action Statement a.4. while the request was being documented by the licensee and processed by the staff.
By letter dated January 27, 1987 the licensee documented its request.
2.0 EVALUATION TS 3.7.1.2 Action Statement a.4. requires the following upon the loss of the SSWS:
1.
Align the Unit 1 Service Water System to cool the Standby Diesel Generator within 8 hours9.259259e-5 days <br />0.00222 hours <br />1.322751e-5 weeks <br />3.044e-6 months <br />; 8702050495 870130 PDR ADOCK 05000366 P
. 2.
Restore the SSWS to operable status within 60 days.
The alignment has been completed, however, TS 3.0.4 prevents the restart of Unit 2 while under the provisions to TS 3.7.1.2 Action Statement a.4.
The one-time exception involves adding a statement that the provisinns of TS 3.0.4 are not applicable to TS 3.7.1.2 Action Statement a.4 for the startup from the January 26, 1986 outage.
With the SSWS inoperable and the Standby Diesel Generator aligned to the Unit 1 Service Water System, no single active failure will result in the loss of cooling water to the Standby Diesel Generator. Since aligning the Unit 1 Service Water System to cool the Standby Diesel Generator maintains the availability of cooling, we find that allowing entry into a higher Operational Condition when the SSWS is inoperable has no impact on any of the assumptions or analyses of the Hatch Final Safety Analysis Report.
Based on the maintenance of cooling to the Standby Diesel Generator as discussed'above, we conclude that removing, on a one-time basis, the applicability of TS 3.0.4 to the TS 3.7.1.2 Action Statement a.4 does not degrade the existing design bases and is acceptable.
3.0 EMERGENCY BASIS The emergency results from the situation where Unit 2 could be safely started and operated with the SSWS inoperable, but was prevented by TS 3.0.4 from restarting following an earlier reactor trip unless relief from TS 3.0.4 was granted.
Unlike the other plant emergency diesel generators, Standby Diesel Generator IB (which is shared between Hatch Unit 1 and 2) is normally supplied cooling water from an independent SSWS. When the SSWS is inoperable, the capability exists to provide an alternate safety-grade cooling water supply from the Unit I plant service water system. The subject SSWS was declared inoperable on January 7,1987 due to inability to meet rated flow requirements and the cooling water supply was switched to the plant service water system.
Inoperability of this system resulted in entry into a 60 day Limiting Condition for Operation (LCO) pursuant to TS 3.7.1.2 Action Statement a.4.
While under this LCO, on January 26, 1987, Hatch Unit 2 experienced a forced outage unrelated to this condition.
TS 3.0.4 prevents entry into different Operational Conditions (e.g. reactor restart)whileundertheprovisionsofTSActionStatements.This Specification thus prevents restart of Hatch Unit 2 from the shutdown of Janua ry 26, 1987, while under the provisions of TS 3.7.1.2 Action Statement a.4.
3-In telephone calls in the afternoon and evening of January 26, 1987 Georgia Power Company representatives informed the staff of the above information and stated that it was preparing an emergency request that TS 3.7.1.2 Action Statement a.4 be modified to include a statement that provisions of TS 3.0.4 are not applicable. Based on these telephone conversations it was determined by the Director, Division of Boiling Water Reactor Licensing that the plant could be safely restarted on a one-time basis and operated for the remainder of the 60 day LC0 with the SSWS inoperable. The Director orally granted a waiver to the provision of TS 3.0.4 as it applies to the SSWS while the licensee prepared and submitted its written request for the emergency TS change and while the staff processed this request.
4.0 FINAL N0 SIGNIFICANT HAZARDS CONSIDERATION DETERMINATION The Commission's regulations in 10 CFR 50.92 state that the Commission.
may make a final determination that a license amendment involves no significant hazards consideration if operation of the facility in accordance with the amendment would not:
(1)
Involve a significant increase in the probability or consequences of an accident previously evaluated; or (2) Create the possibility of a new or different kind of accident from any accident previously evaluated; or (3)
Involve a significant reduction in a margin of safety.
The requested change adds a note to TS 3.7.1.2 Action Statement a.4 that states that the provisions of TS 3.0.4 are not applicable during the restart from the January 26, 1986 outage. As noted above in this Safety Evaluation we have concluded that this change is acceptable.
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..c Also as noted in this Safety Evaluation, the Standby Diesel Generator is aligned to the Unit 1 Service Water System for its cooling. This alignment maintains the availability of cooling over that provided by the SSWS.
Further, allowing restart of Unit 2 with this cooling water alignment has no impact on any of the assumptions or analyses in the Unit 2 Final Safety Analysis Report.
On the basis, we have concluded that this TS change does not:
(1)
Involve a significant increase in the probability or consequences of an accident previously evaluated; or (2) Create the possibility of a new or different kind of accident from any accident previously evaluated; or (3)
Involve a significant reduction in a margin of safety.
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Acccedingly, the staff has concluded that the amendment to Facility Operating License NPF-5 excepting TS TS 3.7.1.2 Action Statement a.4 from the provisions of TS 3.0.4 for startup from the January 26, 1987 outage involves no significant hazards consideration.
The State of Georgia was consulted on this matter and had no comments on the determination.
5.0 ENVIRONMENTAL CONSIDERATION
S This amendment changes a requirement with respect to installation or use of a facility component located within the restricted area as defined in 10 CFR Part 20. The staff has determined that the amendment involves ro significant increase in the amounts, and no significant change in the types, of any effluents that may be released offsite, and that there is no significant increase in individual or cumulative occupational radiation exposure.
The Commission has made a final no significant hazards consideration finding with respect to the amendment.
Accordingly, the amendment meets the eligibility criteria for categorical exclusion set forth in 10 CFR 951.22(c)(9).
Pursuant to 10 CFR 551.22(b), no environmental impact statement or environmental assessment need be prepared in connection with the issuance of the amendment.
6.0 CONCLUSION
We have concluded, based on the considerations discussed above, that:
(1) there is reasonable assurance that the health and safety of the public.will not be endangered by operation in the proposed manner, and (2) such activities will be conducted in compliance with the Commission's regulations, and the issuance of the amendment will not be inimical to the common defense and security or to the health and safety of the public.
Princ,i g Con,tgibytp,r g P.,[ earnte era t i ment der 9 u e wnter rs&r.
ine Dated: January 30, 1987