ML20209G354
| ML20209G354 | |
| Person / Time | |
|---|---|
| Site: | Sequoyah  |
| Issue date: | 04/24/1987 |
| From: | Brown R, Russell Gibbs, Selewski M TENNESSEE VALLEY AUTHORITY |
| To: | |
| Shared Package | |
| ML20209G315 | List: |
| References | |
| C010900-SQN, C010900-SQN-R06, C10900-SQN, C10900-SQN-R6, NUDOCS 8704300528 | |
| Download: ML20209G354 (42) | |
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- 'M TVA EMPLOYEE CONCERNS REPORT NUMBER: C010900-SQN 4
SPECIAL PROGRAM ok REPORT TYPE: Sequoyah Nuclear Plant Element REVISION NUMBER:
6 (FINAL REPORT)
TITLE: Cable PAGE 1 0F 37 REASON FOR REVISION:
Revised to incorporate TAS and SRP comments.
Revision 1 Revised to incorporate a new evaluation at SQN and NRC comments.
Revision 2
[
Revised to incorporate TAS, DNQA, and SRP conenents.
Revision 3 Revised to incorporate SRP comments, further evaluations at Revision 4 SQN, line management responses, and to finalize report.
n Revised to incorporate revised CAP.
Revision 5
,i Revised to incorporate revised CAP.
Revision 6 i
PREPARATION PREPARED BY:
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DATE 6 MANAGER OF NUCLEAR POWER DATE i
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o TVA ENPLOYEE CONCERNS REPORT NUMBER: C010900-SQN SPECIAL PROGRAN REVISION NUMBER:
6 PAGE 2 0F 37 I.
INTRODUCTION The following concerns have been evaluated in relation to Sequoyah Nuclear Plant (SQN) specific and Watts Bar Nuclear Plant (W8N) generic issues relative to all areas of the cable program:
WBN GENERIC SQN SPECIFIC CABLE PULLING Spilcing (1 concern)
MAS-85-003 Minimum Bend Radius (1 concern)_
Maximum Pull Tension and JLH-86-002 Sidewal). Pressure (21 concerns)
EX-it'i-076-003 Insulation Damage (1 concern)
EX-S$-086-001 00-85-005-014 IN-85-213-001 IN-85-255-001 IN-85-295-003 IN-85-325-005 IN-85-433-002 IN-85-436-004 IN-85-581-001 IN-85-733-001 IN-85-856-005 IN-85-935-001 IN-85-978-001 IN-86-028-001 IN-86-199-001 IN-86-201-001 IN-86-259-001 IN-86-259-004 IN-86-262-003 XX-85-008-001 XX-85-094-004 Minimum Bend Radius (3 concerns)_
EX-85-157-002 IN-86-266-006 WI-85-100-013
TTA ENPLOYEE CONCERNS REP 0tf NUNBER: C010900-SQN J
e' SPECIAL PROGRAM REVISION NUMBER:
6 PAGE 3 0F 37 f
I.
INTkODUCTION (Continued) i WBN GENERIC Cable coatina (3 concerns) i IN-86-259-005 i
IN-86-268-002 j
OW-85-007-004 t
480-volt Receptacle (1 concern)
J, IN-85-009-001
{
Nuclear Instrumentation System (NIS) Cable (1 concern)
IN-85-120-001 Firebarrier (2 concerns) i IN-85-018-004 XX-85-094-005 i
Cable Routina (2 concerns)
IN-85-300-002 IN-86-268-003 I
l Spilcina (1 concern) i IN-86-314-005 Terminations (2 concorrs) l I-85-101-WBN PH-85-003-N32 4
II.
SUMMARY
OF PERCEIVED PROBLEM The perceived problems evaluated in this elen.ent r> port are I
i Cable pulling - Allowable limits for banimum pull tension (MPT),
cable sidewall pressure (SWP), and minimum band radius (MBR) have l
been exceeded.
f
\\
Cable coating - Flamemastic 77 has been applied thicker than l
j specified by site procedures allowing too much heat bu11 dup in cable l
trays.
It has also been removed from cables with sharp instruments I
which resulted in possible cable damage.
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((rebarriers - Inadequate cohtrols and improper tools have been used to breach firebarriers (Room Temperature Vulcanizing (RTV) silicone i
foam) in wall and floor penetrations.
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TTA EMPLOYRE CONCERNS REPORT NUMBER: C010900-SQN SPECIAL PROGRAN REVISION NUMBER:
6 PAGE 4 0F 37 II.
SUMMARY
OF PERCEIVED PROBLEM (Continued)
Insulation damage - Insulation was mistakenly cut off of a 440-volt cable which feeds the back flow or discharge gate hoist motor (part of Condenser Circulating Water (CCW) System), and was incorrectly repaired using electrical tape.
480-volt receptacles - Receptacles have not been properly sized for j
Division of Nuclear Engineering (DNE) specified wire size for receptacles found throughout the plant.
Cable routing - Cables were improperly routed outside of cable trays.
SD11elna (MAS-85-003) - This covered a specific instance of an l
improper splice.
I Uplicint (IN-86-314-005)_ - There was improper splicing at the plant site.
T Nuclear Instrumentation System (NIS) Cables - Cables were not i
supported for long distances after they exited the raceway to the NIS detectors.
Terminations - AMP Diamond Grip Insulated Terminal Lugs (PIDG) which were designed for use with stranded wire were used on solid wire leads.
List of Evaluators Lead Evaluator Rob Brown Evaluator Guy Huff Mike _Shirey Both_Selewski 4
Chris Heerr j
i III. EVALUATION METHODOLOGY l
It was determined whether or not other investigations had been i
performed on these issues, j
The expurgated Employee Concerns Task Group (ECTO) files were i
reviewed to determine if additional information was available to assist in evaluation.
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TVA EMPLOYEE CONCERNS REPORT NUMBER: C010900-SQN
.a SPECIAL PROGRAM REVISION NUMBER:
6 PAGE 5 0F 37 t
III.
EVALUATION METHODOLOGY (Continued)
Cable Pullint, Sidewall Pressure (SWP) and Maximum Pull Tension (MPT) i R. W. Cantrell's memorandum to C. C. Mason, dated December 2, 1985 (B43 851203 915) was reviewed to determine the significance of Division of Nuclear Engineering's (DNE) program for addressing Class 1E installed cables.
Modifications and Additions Instruction M&AI-04 " Control, Power, and Signal Cables," Revision 8, was reviewed to determine the site requirements for monitoring maximum pull tension.
NSRS Report I-85-06-WBN was reviewed to determine the inadequacies cited in TVA's cable pulling program, and to determine if findings, l
conclusions, and recommendations were adequate.
I j
R. M. Pierce's memorandum to K. W. Whitt dated July 8, 1985 (F01 850708 604), " Nuclear Safety Review Staff Investigations of an Employee Concern Regarding Cable Routing, Installation, and Inspection Practices - NSRS Report Number I-85-06-WBN" was reviewed to determine the NSRS recomendations regarding the adequacy of the program for cable pulling.
" Cable Sidewall Bearing Pressure Test" conducted by the Division of Operations Support Central Laboratorios Service Branch was reviewed to determine test results.
SQN Generic Concerns Task Force (GCTF) Report titled, " Overfill of Cable Trays and Conduits " was reviewed to evaluate the findings and 4
conclusions of that report concerning conduit overfill.
SQN GCTF Report titled, "Overtensioning and Minimum Bend Radius j
]
Violations of Cables Due to Improper Cable Installation Methods "
j was reviewed to evaluate the findings and conclusions of that report
]
concerning sidewall pressure and maximum pull tension concern issues.
Discussions were conducted with cognizant Modifications engineers involved with cable pulling.
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W. S. Raughley's memorandum to J. A. Raulston dated September 2, j
1 1986 (B43 860903 905) was reviewed to determine DNE's response to the NRC's request for information in their letter dated August 4, 1986, to Steven A. White with regard to sidewall bearing pressure 1
l concerns.
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TVA EMPLOYEE CONCERNS REPORT NUMBER: C010900-SQN SPECIAL PROGRAM REVISIOh NUMBER:
6 PAGE 6 0F 37 W=
III.
EVALUATION METHODOLOGY (Continued)
Discussions were conducted with cognizant DNE design engineers involved in walkdowns and calculations addressing conduits with multiple bonds between cablo pull points which could cause excessive SWP.
DNE calculation SQN-E12-015 (B25 860724 801) titled " Identifying Sidewall Pressure Violations" was reviewed to dotormine how SWP was analyzed at SQN and to determine calculation results.
Minimum Bond Radius (MBR)
Site proceduro M&AI-4, all revisions, General Construction Specification G-38 Revision 8 and Design Specification DS-E12.1.5,
" Minimum Rad 11 for Field Installed Insulated Cable Rated 15,000 Volts and Loss," woro reviewed to determino appilcable requirements for MBR at SQN.
Two personnel knowledgeable of the design, construction, and operation of SQN were interviewed to determine if any work had boon dono concerning MBR violations at SQN.
SQN GCTF Report titled, "Overtonstoning and Minimum Bend Radius Violation of Cables Due to Improper Cable Installation Methods " was reviewed to determine the findings and conclusions relative to L51s evaluation.
Nuclear Safety Review Staff (NSRS) Report I-85-06-WBN was reviewed to determine the findings and recommendations appilcable to this evaluation.
W. S. Roughley's memorandum dated September 2, 1986 (B43 860903 904) titled " Class 1E Cablo Bond Radius" was reviewed to datormine what additional work nooded to be completed before Sequoyah Nuclear plant's restart concerning the bond radius of C1riss 1E cables.
With respect to concern JLH-86-002, the NQA supervisor at SQN was interviewed on what correctivo actions have been generated as a result of the concern.
SQ-CAR-86-02-005 was reviewed for the actions taken to answer JLH-86-002.
Cablo Coating Site personnel in Modifications (1) and Electrical Maintenance (3) woro interviewed about the existence of proceduros for the removal of Flamemastic cable coating and if they had removed Flamemantic in the past.
TVA EMPLOYEE CONCERNS REPORT NUMBER: C010900-SQN SPECIAL PROGRAM REVISION NUMBER:
6 PAGE 7 0F 37 III.
EVALUATION METHODOLOGY (Continued)
M&AI-13. Revision 6 and SQN Inspection Instruction (II) A4, Revision i and Revision 6, were reviewed for any precautions against the use or sharp instruments to remove Flamemantic and for acceptance criteria for the depth of coating to be applied.
The SQN Generic Concerns Task Force Report on OW-85-007-004 and IN-86-262-002 was reviewed for adequacy of findings and conclusions.
Reviewed the Joslyn Research Centor Report on the use of Flamemastic for information relative to this ovaluation.
Members of the WBN ECTG walked down trays in the Cable Spread Room for evidence of excessive depth of cable coating.
The responsible DNE engineer was interviewed on the stops that had been taken to initiate a sampling program to verify the adequacy of ampacity of the installed cables.
Firebarriors (Site Procedure Control)
Surveillance Instruction.51-233.1, Revision 0, " Visual Inspection of Penetration Fire Barriers - Mechanical" was reviewed.
Curveillance Instruction, SI-233.2, Revision 0, " Visual Inspection of Penetration Firo Barriors - Electrical" was reviewed.
Physical Security Instruction, PHYSI-13. Revision 48, " Fire" was reviewed.
The Safety Supervisor was interviewed on the subjects of penetrations, SI-233.1, SI-233.2, and control of breaching.
His section prepared SI-233.1, SI-233.2, and PHYSI-13.
Ejiret arriers (fircachint Tools) b Modifications and Addition Instruction, Mt.AI-13. Revision 6
" Electrical Pressure Seal Firestop Barrier, and Flame Retardant Cable Coating" was reviewed.
A responsible Modifications supervisor was interviewed on the subject of breachinf electrical penetrations.
A responsible general foreman was interviewed on the subject of breaching electrical penotrations.
TVA EMPLOYEE CONCERNS REPORT NUMBER: C010900-SQN e
SPECIAL PROGRAM REVISION NUMBER: 6 PAGE 8 0F 37 III.
EVALUATION METHODOLOGY (Continued)
Insulation Damage Personnel knowledgeable of the equipment at SQN were interviewed to determine the location and function of the discharge gates hoist motors specific to this evaluation.
Observation of the supply cables on the above motors was performed to determine their status and condition.
Workplan 11043 and Engineering Change Notico (ECN) L5720 were reviewed to determine what work had been done on the cables and what were the changes and reason for changes of the ECN.
The SQN system.'7 Systems engineer was interviewed on the method used to do-onergizo the gate hoist motors, aB0-volt Receptacles A walkdown was conducted with two electricians to determine the maaufacturer and model number of 480-volt receptacles in the fifth diesel generator area.
Discussions were conducted with the cognizant DNE procurement supervisor to determine the acceptable cable diameter range for the receptacles four.d in the walkdown.
Discussions were conducted with a cognizant Electrical Maintenance engineer to determine the cable diameter for number 2 wire.
CableJRouting II-28, " Cable Pulling Inspection," Revision 4. M&AI-04, " Control, Power and Signal Cables " Revision 0 through Revision 8. 0-38,
" Installing Insulated Cables Rated Up to 15,000 Volts." Revision 8 SOP-104. " Electrical Cable Installation," Revision 1, and E-6,
" Cable Storage and Installation," Revision 0 through Revision 7, wore reviewed for information on the acceptability of running cables outside of cable trays.
Two Modifications electrical engincors and two DNE onsite engineers were interviewed on the acceptability of running cables outside of cable trays and on the removal of temporary cables.
The DNE enr.inoer responsible for revisions to 0-38 was intervlowed on the interpretation given to step 3.2.1.8.2(b) regardinr, the acceptability of routing cablo outside cable trays.
A walkdown of cable trays in the Cable Spread Room was conducted to locato examples of improperly routed cables.
i TVA ENPLOYEE CONCERNS REPORT NUMBERg C010900-SQN SPECIAL PROGRAN REVISION NUMBER:
6 l
PAGE 9 0F 37 III.
EVALUATION METHODOLOGY (Continued) i I
Solicint (MAS-85-003) l Discussions were conducted with a cognizant Electrical Maintenance engineer in regards to split insulation on cable to the CS Component Cooling System (CCS) pump that had been taped during construction.
l Maintenance Request (MR) A561116 was reviewed to determine if the spilce had been reworked using a Raychem sleeve.
Solicing (IN-86-314-005) i A discussion was conducted with the cognizant SQN DNE engineer on the disposition of Nonconformance Reports (NCR) 6208, 6224, 6536 6623. and 6774.
t A discussion was conducted with the cognizant individual responsible for the SQN Esperience Review Program on the disposition of NCR i
6208/6224.
I A discussion was conducted with cognizant DNE nuclear licensing and Electrical Engineering Branch (EEB) personnel on the generic applicability of NCR 6623/6774.
Applicable DNE and site documentation of the generic applicability of NCR 6623/6774 was reviewed for actions taken at SQN on the
- subject, i
A discussion was conducted with SQN DNE and EE8 engineers with respect to the disposition of NCR 6623/6774.
Nuclear Instrumentation System (NIS) Cable The SQN GCTF Report on concern IN-85-120-001 was reviewed to evaluate the findings and conclusions of that report concerning the supports for NIS cable.
Terminations NSRS Report I-85-101-WBN " Improper Termination Techniques " was I
reviewed to evaluate the finding, conclusion, and recommendation pertaining to SQN concerning the use of PIDO lugs for termination of discreto electrical components with solid wire leads.
A memorandum from H. O. Parris to K. W. Whitt dated September 13, 1985 (A02 850904 010), was reviewed to discover what corrective action was specified to resolve the NSRS recommendations in I-85-101-WBN.
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TVA EMPLOYEE CONCERNS REPORT NUMBER: C010900-SQN SPECIAL PROGRAM REVISION NUMBER:
6 PAGE 10 0F 37 1
III.
EVALUATION METHODOLOGY (Continued) i Potential Generic Condition Evaluation memorandums (B43 850923 916 and B25 851008 015) for SCR WBNEEB8537 and a memorandum from i
H. G. Parris to Those listed, dated September 13, 1985 (A02 850905 009), were reviewed to discover the generic applicability of the subject SCR and what section was responsible for corrective l
action.
A discussion was conducted with the responsible Electrical Maintenance
}
engineer concerning the corrective action taken in relation to l
SCR WBNEEB8537.
A discussion was conducted with the responsible Compliance engineer i
concerning the status of the question raised pertaining to PIDG lugs on surge suppression networks.
A discussion was conducted with the responsible DNE engineer on the status of the decision to be made on whether or not to replace the PIDG lugs on solenoid valve surge suppression networks.
A preliminary memorandum from D. W. Wilson to P. R. Wallace dated j
October 24, 1986 was reviewed for more detail on the DNE response to replacing PIDG lugs on surge suppression networks.
IV.
SUMMARY
OF FINDINGS Cable pullint (MPT and SWP)-
1 Review of R. W. Cantroll's memorandum to C. C. Mason dated December 2,
]
1985, revealed the purpose of the etaluation was to collect and review operational, maintenance, and surveillance test data on cable from TVA's operating plants and any readily available equivalent data from other outside sources to determine if cable failures could be attributed to l
past cable pulling practices. As a result of the evaluation, DNE i
determined that no cable failures could be attributed to past cable pulling practices, i.e., violations of the minimum bending radius or maximum allowable sidewall pressure. The following statement was given l
in an executive summary attached to the memorandumt "From the evaluation, DNE concludes that past Class 1E cable installations could not adversely affect startup, operation, or safe shutdown capabilities. DNE has used historical data, ongoing surveillance requirements and a random failure concept to arrive at
~
this conclusion."
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TVA EMPLOYEE CONCERNS REPORT NUMBER: C010900-SQN SPECIAL PROGRAM REVISION NUMBER: 6 PAGE 11 0F 37 IV.
SUMMARY
OF FINDINGS (Continued)
For specifics on representative cable test data, see Section II titled,
" Collection and Evaluation of Cable Test Data" of the above mentioned memorandum.
1 Review of M&AI-4 revealed the following statement concerning mechanical assistance on cable pulls:
"On pulls requiring mechanical assistance, the craft foreman shall notify the cognizant engineer that mechanical assistance will be required on that particular cable pull. The cognizant engineer will in turn perform the sizing of the pull rope and necessary calculations (refer to sections 6.3.1 and 6.4.1) prior to the cable pull."
Methods for determining the maximum pulling force were given in C
section 6.0.
Table 6.2.1.3.c provided manila break rope sizes for various conductor sizes.
Non-Class 1E cables were not monitored for maximum pull tension nor 1
sidewall pressure.
j NSRS Report I-85-06-WBN was reviewed and three problem areas of the cable i
program were found that were applicable to this evaluation:
(1) the fact that TVA did not include sidewall pressure (SWP) calculations in their cable pull procedure, (2) the way TVA defined their method of calculating l
maximum pull tension (MPT) on multi-cable pulls, and (3) the way DNE 1
resolved the question of exceeding minimum bend radius.
The NSRS recommendations consisted of establishing values for pulling and training radil that were fully supported by manufacturer's test data.
These values were to be used to disposition NCRs on the subject. The report suggested a sample at WBN, (the plant to which the report was written) Unit 1 for Class 1E cables for inspection of pulling and training radli.
If the evaluation f ailed to justify the as-installed 3
conditions, then it was suggested that a formal in-service surveillance / inspection program be considered.
A review of "NSRS Investigation of an Employee Concern Regarding Cable Routing. Installation, and Inspection Practices" revealed the following conclusion and recommendation concerning the adequacy for cable pulling:
"The DNE and Nuclear Construction established and documented program was determined to be inadequate to accomplish the cable pull activities. The past and present programs have boon inadequate, inconsistent, and in violation of the accepted industry standards and practices."
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TVA EMPLOYEE CONCERNS REPORT NUMBER: C010900-SQN l
SPECIAL PROGRAM REVISION NUMBER:
6 PAGE 12 0F 37 IV.
SUMMARY
OF FINDINGS (Continued)
"DNE management should revise G-38 and G-40 to incorporate resolutions to the identified problems discussed in this report; and, subsequently, WBN DNE NU CON, and ONP management should revise the relevant DNE documents, as well as NU CON and ONP procedures. The final adequacy of the present cable installation should then be evaluated per revised acceptance criteria."
A similar program to that given for pulling and training radius was also suggested.
" Cable Sidewall Bearing Pressure Test" was reviewed, and the objective and results are summarized below:
The objective of the test was to determine the maximum Sidewall Bearing Pressure (SWBP) possible on cable pulls without cable degradation.
Representative samples of power, control, signal and instrument, and coaxial cables free TVA's nuclear power plants were pulled through a conduit test setup containing four horizontal 90-degree bends. The applied tension was controlled and measured during each cable sample pull to achieve maximum SWBP. With the exception of the larger power cables, size No. 2 and larger, each cable was tensioned to near its ultimate breaking strength. The maximum SWBP values achieved are summarized in the following table:
Cable Types Maximum SWBP (1bs/ft)
Power Cables The cable with the lowest tensile strength 1398 The cable with the highest tensile strength 3104 Control Cables The cable with the lowest tensile strength 602 The cable with the highest tensile strength 1831 Sir.nti and Instrument Cables:
The cable with the lowest tensile strength 447 The cable with the highest tensile strength 1496
TVA EMPLOYEE CONCERNS REPORT NUMBER: C010900-SQN SPECIAL PROGRAM REVISION NUMBER:
6 PAGE 13 0F 37 IV.
SUMMARY
OF FINDINGS (Continued)
Cable Types Maximum SWBP (1bs/ft)
Coaxial Cables The cable with the lowest tensile strength 373 The cable with the highest tensile strength 1242 After pulling, the cables were inspected, dimensioned, and outer jackets were removed from multi-conductors. They were then subjected to dielectric breakdown tests (see section 6.0 of the above mentioned test for the acceptance criteria).
"All cables met the established acceptance criteria."
Review of GCTF report titled, " Overfill of Cable Trays and Conduits,"
revealed the following:
There was no computer program check or QA records kept on the total cross sectional area fill of cables in conduits.
SCR SQNEEB8529 was generated to document conduit overfill of 55 conduits at Sequoyah. The recommendation for the disposition was use-as-is. Tests and inspections were performed on the esbles in question, and no damage was revealed. The SCR was closed out on January 28, 1986. However, in the time since then, it was
- discovered that the cable diameters used in the cable fill program were not auditable.
For this reason, cable diameters were measured at TVA Singleton Labs for various cable samples and sizes. The cable diameter data was distributed to each Engineering Project in TVA Design Standard DS-E12.1.13.
SQN Engineering Project was in the process of incorporating the new values into their conduit fill program. NCRs will be written on any conduits where SWP has been exceeded.
Review of GCTF report titled "Overtensioning and Minimum Bend Radius Violations of Cables Due to Improper Cable Installation Methods,"
revealed the following conclusion stated in the report:
"The NSRS Recommendation No. I-85-06-WBN-02 and the DNE walkdown procedure are appropriate actions to determine if "Overtensioning of Cables" is a problem at SQN."
The evaluation agreed with the findings of the report.
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TVA EMPLOYEE CONCERNS REPORT NUMBER: C010900-SQN SPECIAL PROGRAM REVISION NUMBER:
6 PAGE 14 0F 37 IV.
SUMMARY
OF FINDINGS (Continued)
Discussions were conducted with a cognizant Modifications engineer concerning monitoring of MPT during cable pulls. The following information was obtained. MPT had been monitored in the past using break ropes and other devices. General Construction Specification G-38 was recently revised which changed the way MPT and SWP were determined. The majority of the cable were pulled before these changes and were pulled by the old requireme.its.
Concerning cable pulls with trucks, cherry pickers, or other devices, the use of a mechanical device was acceptable when pull tensions were monitored by break ropes or dynamometers. The use of a choker was also acceptable for safety purposes only. The choker was used to prevent the cable from whipping out and hitting personnel if the break rope broke.
Review of W. S. Raughley's memorandum to J. A. Raulston dated September 2, 1986, revealed the following response to the NRC's request for information concerning the methods used by TVA in determining the acceptability of sidewall pressure exerted on Class 1E cable:
"The purpose of the calculations was to determine acceptability of sidewall bearing pressures exerted on Class 1E cables in existing conduits. All Class 1E (approximately 10,400) conduits were evaluated through preliminary screening and field inspection."
Note: Data was taken from WBN assumed worst-case conduit configurations to determine the SWBP test set-up.
" PRELIMINARY SCREENING The screening analysis was performed as follows:
(1)
Developed a list of assumed worst-case configurations based on vertical conduit with four 90 degree bends in pulling end of conduit. The cable pull was assumed to be upward. See figure:
3" Conduit
'n 3 Cables We =1.4 y
K = 0.42 L
t R = 0.955 Ft a = 90* (1.57 rad)
-b Sidewall bearing pressure (SWP) = 300 lbs/ft y
(Conservatively assumed)
W = Cable weight per foot
TVA EMPLOYEE CONCERNS REPORT NUMBER: C010900-SQN SPECIAL PROGRAM REVISION NUMBER: 6 PAGE 15 0F 37 IV.
SUMMARY
OF FINDINGS (Continued)
(2)
Calculated maximum pulling tension allowable to avoid exceeding sidewall bearing pressure limits (300 lbs/ft for power and control; 100 lbs/ft for instrumentation)
EXAMPLE:
T=
3(SWP)R (3We -2)
T = 391 lbs. for above figure (3)
Calculated length of conduit in terms of W that would correspond with allowable sidewall bearing pressure limits.
This was done for all the conduit sizes and number of cables in each conduit.
EXAMPLE:
Ti = WL1 8
T1 ( 1.93)
T =T1e
=
2 T =T2 eKa = Ti
( 3.72) 3 T =T3 aEa - Ti
( 7.18) 4 T =T4 eEa = T1 (13.86) = WL1 (13.86) 5 28.21 391 TS Li-
=
=
(13.86)(W)
(13.86)W W
(4)
Screened the conduit schedule for lengths exceeding the calculated lengths by using nominal weights of cables. A large number of extremely short cables were eliminated from further analysis because they were shorter than the length of four 90 degree bends.
The original number of 10,400 conduits was reduced during the preliminary screening process to a list of 1914 conduits requiring further evaluation.
Conservatism was used in the screening method because:
(a) Sidewall bearing pressure criteria was 300 lb./ft. Test results of 600 - 1500 lb./ft. were later reported.
(b) Four conduit bends were assumed back to back. Using a more typical conduit with bends distributed throughout the conduit could result in pulling tensions 1/2 to 1/4 of those in screening.
(c) Initial conduit section assumed to be vertical. This assumption doubled the resultant tension as compared to pulling through a horizontal section (which is far more typical)."
TVA EMPLOYEE CONCERNS REPORT NUMBER:
C010900-SQN o
SPECIAL PROGRAM REVISION NUMBER:
6 PAGE 16 0F 37 IV.
SUMMARY
OF FINDINGS (Continued)
FIELD INSPECTION Obtained a sample size of 81 worst-case conduits at WBN for detailed calculations (approximately 20 conduits per voltage level). The worst case conduits were selected by visual inspection of 778 conduits using the criteria of multiple bends
(>360*), long lengths, elevation changes and conduit fill (>301)
(EEB Engineering Procedure 22.29).
Discussions with two DNE cognizant engineers revealed TVA selected and conducted a walkdown of 16 conduits at SQN which should meet the worst case configurations to determine whether the allowable sidewall pressure (SWP) or MPT for cable in conduit had been exceeded. The conduit configurations were tabulated, isometric sketches were drawn, and cable pull cards were obtained for SWP calculations.
Review of SQN-E2-015 titled " Identifying Sidewall Pressure Violations" revealed calculations were performed by DNE for SQN to determine if sidewall pressure inside conduits had exceeded allowable limits. Sixteen conduits were selected as indicated in the above mentioned walkdown. The conduits were assumed to be worst-case. The calculation concluded that all of the calculated sidewall pressure and pulling tension values were within the prescribed guidelines.
At the writing of this report, DNE's evaluation of sidewall pressure and MPT was not yet complete. DNE was involved in contract negotiations with a third party engineering company to evaluate the sampling program mentioned above. Final resolution of the SWP and MPT issues addressed for all TVA Nuclear Plants depend on DNE's final response.
Because of the ongoing DNE evaluation process, no further information was available concerning the resolution of this issue.
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TVA EMPLOYEE CONCERNS REPORT NUMBER: C010900-SQN i
SPECIAL PROGRAM REVISION NUMBER:
6 PAGE 17 0F 37 IV.
SUMMARY
OF FINDINGS (Continued)
==
Conclusion:==
MPT and SWP issues were verified. The program inadequacies were identified in NSRS report I-85-06-WBN and later addressed in SQN GCTF report titled "Overtensioning and Minimum Bend Radius Violations of Cables because of Improper Cable Installation Methods." To provide a resolution, DNE was actively evaluating sidewall bearing pressure to determine the acceptability of installed Class 1E cables.
TVA's Central Laboratory conducted a test to determine acceptable SWP limits using representative cable samples from SQN, BFN, and BLN and surveys from sections of assumed worst-case conduits at WBN.
The test results were favorable since SWP limits were reported between 600 to 1500 pounds / foot while TVA's prescribed guidelines were from 100 to 300 pounds / foot. To verify the installed cable at SQN, DNE selected 16 worst-case conduits, performed walkdowns to develop isometric sketches, and then performed calculations.
The initial calculation results were favorable since SWP and MPT values were within TVA's prescribed guidelines. While actions appeared to be complete, the sampling program used to determine worst-case conduits was in question. For this reason, TVA was involved in contract negotiations with a third-party engineering company to evaluate the methods used to select the worst case conduits. Until further evaluation is complete and NSRS report I-85-06-WBN is addressed, SWP and MPT issues will remain open.
(CATDs 10900-NPS-01, 10900-NPS-05, and 10900-SQN-03) lR6 Minimum Bend Radius Design standards, site procedures, and construction specifications were reviewed and those found applicable for cable MBR installation guidelines are listed below:
Design Standard DS-E12.1.5 M&AI-4 Construction Specification G-38
TVA EMPLOYEE CONCERNS REPORT NUMBER: C010900-SQN
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6 PAGE 18 0F 37 IV.
SUMMARY
OF FINDINGS (Continued)
Four concerns were evaluated concerning minimum bend radius (MBR).
Interviews with two personnel involved in both the design and construction of SQN and knowledgeable of the problems concerning MBR, revealed that some attention had been given to this issue at SQN.
Review of NSRS Report I-85-06-WBN revealed the NSRS conducted a comprehensive review of cable bend radius issues for installations between 1979 through 1985. The report questioned the way DNE resolved the issue of exceeding manufacturers' requirements for cable bend radius. The NSRS recommendation consisted of establishing values for training radii that were fully supported by manufacturer test data.
(See discussion given below for W. S. Raughley's memorandum dated September 2, 1986 for action taken concerning this issue.)
The SQN GCTF report on MPT and MBR was reviewed and no pertinent information was discovered.
Interviews with personnel involved in the installation of cable at SQN as well as some limited field evaluation indicated that violations of MBR requirements existed.
Review of W. S. Raughley's memorandum dated September 2, 1986, titled " Class 1E Cable Bend Radius" revealed the purpose of the memorandum was to provide direction to each project concerning specific work actions which were necessary to resolve concerns on bend radii of Class 1E cables before each plant could operate. The following direction was given pertaining to SQN:
"The Electrical Engineering Branch has evaluated the adequacy of the bend radius to which Class 1E cables were installed. The basis for the evaluation was the comprehensive investigation conducted by the Nuclear Safety Review Staff on the same subject during February to April 1985. The measures specified herein are expected to comprise the majority of any project specific corrective actions resulting from this investigation. EEB's final report documenting the evaluation and providing conclusions and recommendations based upon an independent review of our evaluation will be issued in September 1986.
(Discussion on November 14, 1986 with the DNE Engineer responsible for preparing this report revealed the report was not complete because DNE was concentrating on ampacity calculations.)
Each project should proceed immediately to perform the following inspections, as applicable, and to forward the results to the respective engineering projects.
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6 PAGE 19 0F 37 IV.
SUMMARY
OF FINDINGS (Continued)
(1)
(Instructions pertained to WBN and BLN only).
(2) All projects shall perform a field inspection of all conduits containing Class 1E medium voltage power cables for the existence of any straight-through pull box or conduit type (C. ELL TEE, etc.) raceway fitting or any conduit raceway fitting other than a standard conduit bend around which a cable is bent. The existence of any such fittings, including the raceway number and size, the fitting description, manufacturer (if available) and size, and the location shall be documented as a nonconformance and forwarded to the respective engineering project for disposition.
(3) All projects shall determine the minimum size conduit that the following coaxial, triaxial, and twinaxial cables, if utilized in Class 1E applications and routed in conduit, are installed in.
If any of these cables are installed in Class 1E applications and in a conduit smaller than indicated below, the project shall perform a field inspection for the existence of conduits of any type (ELL, TEE, etc.) in which the cable is bent. The existence of any such fittings, including the raceway number and size, the fitting description, manufacturer (if available) and size and the location shall be documented as a nonconformance and forwarded to the respective engineering project for disposition.
In addition, each project shall verify that the following list includes all coaxial, triaxial, and twinaxial cables installed in Class 1E applications. A positive statement to this effect or a list of additional cable mark numbers shall be addressed to my attention.
Minimum Conduit Cable Mark No.
Description Size (Inches)
WTJ Coax RG6A/U 2
WTJ-5 1/c #21 Coax Solid Cu Clad Steel 2
WTK
- 22 Coax RG59B/U 1-1/2 WTK-1 Coax RG59B/U XLP 1-1/2 WTL Coax RG216/U Except 3 Shields 3
WIL-4 Coax 55 ohm #22 AWG 1-1/2 WTM Coax RG114A/U Except 3 Shields & ST 3
WIM-6 1/c Coax #26, 7 Strands, LOCA 3
WTY-1
- 21 AWG, Coax, RG58C/U 1-1/2 WTU
- 20 Triax RG 11/U 3
WTN Triax RG-59U #22, 2 Shields LOCA 2
WTN-1 Triax Similar to RG11/U LOCA 3
WTN-2 Twinax RG22B/U 3
WWK TP //22 W/SH TP #20 2/c #22 2-Coax 3
TVA EMPLOYEE CONCERNS REPORT NUMBER: C010900-SQN SPECIAL PROGRAM REVISION NUMBER:
6 PAGE 20 0F 37 IV.
SUMMARY
OF FINDINGS (Continued)
(4) The Watts Bar project shall perform a field inspection of all Class 1E coaxial, twinarial, and triaxial cables which were installed or modified during the period of May 25, 1979 to l
May 18, 1981, under the guidance of Design Information Request (DIR) No. E-9.
In addition, all projects shall inspect all Class 1E coaxial and twinaxial cables which were installed or modified during the period of September 20, 1983 to April 23, 1986, under the direction of DS-E12.1.5 Revision 0.
The cable shall be verified to be installed to a bend radius equal to 8 times its outside diameter. This inspection need not address the bend radius in standard conduit bends as this has been addressed generically in PIRGENEEB8605. The inspection of the bend radius in conduits is covered in item 3 above. Therefore, provided the project establishes that all cable tray fittings were procured with a radius equal to or greater than 8 times the outside diameter of the largest cable in question or that the cable was restricted to use in conduit and that all conduit bends meet the minimum requirements of DS-E13.1.7, this inspection may be limited to cables in free air (transitions from raceway to raceway or raceway to equipment) and to the points of termination.
All installations which do not conform to the specified 8 times factor shall be documented as a nonconformance and forwarded to the respective engineering project for disposition. The documentation shall include the cable and, if applicable, the raceway number, the location of the violation, the actual installed bend radius and the results of a visual inspection noting any discernible stress on the cable jacket in the area of the bend or any ripples in the cable jacket which could indicate shield deformation.
Each Lead Engineer should prepare a fragnet reflecting the individual project's approach and schedule for resolving these issues.
Resolution of these concerns has been tied to plant restart and should be scheduled for implementation accordingly."
Due to the ongoing DNE evaluation process, no further information was available concerning the resolution of this issue.
An interview was conducted with the NQA supervisor at SQN to determine what actions had been initiated as a result of JLH-86-002.
This concern specified violations of MBR for Conar connectors. The supervisor stated that a survey had been conducted as a result of the concern. SQ-CAR-86-02-005 had been generated on February 10, 1986 because of the discrepancies found.
TVA EMPLOYEE CONCERNS REPORT NUMBER: C010900-SQN SPECIAL PROGRAM REVISION NUMBER: 6 PAGE 21 0F 37 IV.
SUMMARY
OF FINDINGS (Continued)
SQ-CAR-86-02-005 was revie-il t o di: cover what correct.ive actions had occurred. The CAR stated that:
" Contrary to the requirements of M&AI-19 and the Conax Vendor Manual IPS-725, not all Conax connectors were installed with wire bend radii within allowable limits. In addition, M&AI-19 is not consistent with the vendor manual revision referenced in the EQ binder. Adherence to these requirements is necessary to maintain equipment environmental qualification."
The survey conducted due to JLH-86-002 had revealed three problem areas:
(1) Two valves were found to have excessive MBR during maintenance activities. These valves had been installed on WP 11077 R1.
A review of the workplans used to install the Conax connectors revealed that three of them had been field complete before M&AI-19 (the ONP procedure used to install Conax connectors) was written. Another workplan was found to have been written and approved before M&AI-19 was issued but was not field complete until after M&AI-19 was issued. No change to this workplan had been initiated to incorporate requirements for wire bend radii.
(2) Two work releases had been initiated to sample valves for wire bend radii problems.
Five of nine in unit 1 and nine of nine in unit 2 were unacceptable.
(3) M&AI-19 had a different torquing sequence with a different final torque value than the Conax Vendor Manual (IPS-725 Revision G) referenced in the EQ binder.
In response to item 3, a memorandum from B. M. Patterson to R. A. Sessoms dated February 7, 1986 (S01 860207 956) was initiated asking if the torquing sequence found in M&AI-19 was equivalent to the Revision G of IPS-725 found in the EQ binder. The response (B70 860304 005) dated March 4, 1986 stated that the two sequences were equivalent based on information from Conax Buffalo Corporation (B70 860226 100). The vendor stated that the method in M&AI-19 was a longer process for torquing than Revision G.
A memorandum from R. W. Olson to D. C. Craven dated March 26, 1986 (S02 860326 862) gave the corrective action for items 1 and 2 as inspection of all field terminations of Conax connectors. Those found out of compliance were to be reworked.
TVA EMPLOYEE CONCERNS REPORT NUMBER: C010900-SQN SPECIAL PROGRAM REVISION NUMBER:
6 PAGE 22 0F 37 IV.
SUMMARY
OF FINDINGS (Continued)
SMIs 1-363-1 and 2-363-1 had been written to provide walkdown procedures for reinspection of the connectors (these SMIs were initiated by work releases B122261 and B106248). The reinspection was complete. SMIs 1-363-2 and 2-363-2 were initiated for all rework of Conax connectors.
The ECTG group for other sites which was evaluating the classical NSRS items interviewed SQN Modifications personnel and discovered all rework was complete. The data packages had been sent to QA for review. They had been rojected because there was no Nuclear Performance Reliability Data System reporting. The packages were still in Modifications.
==
Conclusion:==
The MBR issue was verified. The issue was actively being evaluated by DNE. The program discrepancies were identified in NSRS report I-85-06-WBN mentioned above. SQN GCTF report titled "Overtensioning and Minimum Bend Radius Violations of Cables Because of Improper Cable Installation Methods," also identified the problem at SQN. Based upon the above findings, we concur with the SQN GCTF report.
EEB's final report documenting the evaluation and providing conclusions and recommendations will be required to provide a resolution to the minimum bend radius concerns.
(CATD 10900-NPS-01) lR6 Concern JLH-86-002 was verified. Conax connectors had been installed with excessive MBR4 However, corrective action had been initiated. All reworkwascompletij.
Cable Coating The use of sharp instruments to remove Flamemastic was never verified. ONP had no written method for removing Flamemastic, but through conversation with a cognizant general foreman, it was determined that it was not an approved practice to use sharp instruments to remove the coating. He also stated they had never removed Flamemastic except at penetrations where the cables were terminated.
Here the procedure was to flex the cable until the coating cracked and then peel it off.
There was some question that the Flamemastic coating had exceeded the limits set by DNE for depth of coating. However, the examples noted in the spread room which appeared to have excessive coating were Non-QA trays (trays VCA, VCB, and WB). The safety-related trays were much neater in that the surface was smoother and was more evenly applied.
In a review of the Joslyn Research Center report on the effects of Flamemastic on grouped cables, it was noted that this report was almost identical to the Factory Mutual Report on Vimasco and the same conclusions were reached. At WBN the above mentioned test did not appear to be adequate for the
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6 PAGE 23 0F 37 IV.
SUMMARY
OF FINDINGS (Continued) configurations in the plant, therefore the same recommendation is made for SQN as for WBN in NSRS report I-85-569-WBN.
The recommendation consisted of testing using trays which were filled, as found at the plant sites.
New ampacity tables had been generated in DS-E12.6.3 which included the derating effects of cable coatings. As a result of the changes made in these tables, the adequacy of ampacity of installed cables was questioned. An interview with the responsible DNE engineer revealed that a sampling program was to be conducted to verify the adequacy of V3, V4, and V5 level cables installed prior to the issuance of DS-E12.6.3, Revision O.
However, there was no procedure drafted for this program.
==
Conclusion:==
Based upon the above findings, the concern (IN-86-268-002) for the use of sharp instruments to remove Flamemastic was never verified.
Although the use of sharp instruments to remove Flamemastic was not verified, the potential existed that this could occur because there was nothing in any site procedure preventing their use and no provision for assuring that there was no cable damage after the coating was removed. The concerns (IN-86-259-005, OW-85-007-004) for Flamemastic coatings exceeding the limits set by DNE for depth of coating were verified.
(CATDs 10900-NPS-04, 10900-SQN 62, lR6 and 10900-SQN-04) l Firebarriers (Site Procedure Control)
Review of Surveillance Instructions (SI-233.1, Revision 0, " Visual Inspection of Penetration Fire Barriers - Mechanical," and SI-233.2, Revision 0, " Visual Inspection of Penetration Fire Barriers - Electrical"), and Physical Security Instruction, PHYSI-13. Revision 48, " Fire", along with an interview with the safety supervisor revealed the following:
i SQN had only one procedure for control of breaching fire barriers.
This has been PHYSI-13 " Fire," Attachment F. " Procedure for the Control of Breaching Fire Barriers." The condition of attempted control through multiple organizations of ONP and DNC at WBN has not existed at SQN.
SQN has not had a problem with fire barrier breaching control. Surveillance instructions are in place at SQN to verify the integrity of the penetration fire barriers.
L
TVA EMPLOYEE CONCERNS REPORT NUMBER: C010900-SQN SPECIAL PROGRAM REVISION NUMBER:
6 PAGE 24 0F 37 IV.
SUMMARY
OF FINDINGS (Continued)
==
Conclusion:==
Based on the above findings, SQN had adequate procedures and control to verify the integrity of the penetration fire barriers.
Firebarriers (Breaching Tools)
M&AI-13, revision 6, stated that a metallic breaching tool may be used.
The foreman must note and sign the data sheet that the metallic tool is free of burrs and sharp edges before use.
Both interviews had the following findings. There was no known fish-hook tool for foam removal. As with the WBN ECTG Report, it was assumed that the concerned individual had meant to use the term fish tape.
Fish tape had been used at SQN to breach the fire barriers. This was acceptable by MLAI-13. No problems were identified because of the use of fish tape.
==
Conclusion:==
Based upon the above findings, the concern was not verified. However, WBN MAI-14 had been revised on revision 6 to exclude the use of fish tape.
Fiberglass or wooden rods were to be used to breach penetrations. This same change should be evaluated at SQN for inclusion in SQN M&AI-13.
(CATD 10900-NPS-02) lR6 Insulation Damage This concern stated that insulation was mistakenly cut off of a 440-volt cable which fed the back flow or discharge gate hoist motor of the Condenser Circulating Water (CCW) system.
Electrical tape was supposedly used to re-attach this insulation. The concerned individual gave four motor numbers (IAA, 1BB, 2AA, and 2BB) as well as four conduits (1-PL-6370-B, 1-PL-6360-A, 2-PL-6370-B, and 2-PL-6360-A).
Discussions with various personnel from the Electrical Engineering Branch-site, Electrical Maintenance, and Operations units revealed that these motors were used to control the gates which prevented the backflow of hot condenser circulating water to the intake when the Essential Raw Cooling Water (ERCW) Pumps were located at the initial intake pumping station. This was a necessary precaution needed to maintain the ERCW supply temperature requirements. However, the ERCW
TVA EMPLOYEE CONCERNS REPORT NUMBER:
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6 PAGE 25 0F 37 IV.
SUMMARY
OF FINDINGS (Continued) pumps had been moved to a separate pumping station (ERCW pumping station) and the need for these backflow gates no longer existed.
Currently, these gates have been blocked in the open position and the subject cables have been de-energized.
A field evaluation of these motors verifi9d that they were numbered as the concerned individual stated, and they had been taken out of service as described above. This field evaluation did reveal a disconnected cable inside a control panel with a tag referencing Workplan 11043. A review of this workplan revealed that this work was done to remove several instruments from service. This was required according to Engineering Change Notice (ECN) L5720. A review of this ECN revealed that it gave the same information concernlig,these gates as that stated above.
The SQN system 27 Systems engineer was interviewed on the specifics of how the gate hoist motors had been removed from service. The engineer discovered that the breakers were open with a Caution Order sign attached.
==
Conclusion:==
Based upon the fact that the subject cables were not energized, and no longer needed, and had been taken out of service, the need for further action concerning this item was not required.
480-volt Receptacles A walkdown was conducted and assisted by two electricians. During the walkdown, the electricians removed covers from two of the 480-volt receptacles in question. These were box 4097 (480-volt Receptacle-DSL Auxiliary Board C2-S) and box 4100 (480-volt Receptacle - DSL Auxiliary Board C2-S).
Both of the receptacles were Crouse-Hinds model number AEQ 01648. Both of the receptacles were wired with 3 conductor number 2 wire. This was the only model j
number found in the fifth diesel generator area, i
Discussions with the Procurement Section Supervisor (DNE) revealed that catalog information for Crouse-Hinds catalog number 4700 (catalog page IP-27), model number AEQ 1648 stated the cable diameter range for the receptacle was from 0.64 inches to 1.37 inches.
Discussions with an Electrical Maintenance engineer revealed the l
diameter of one number 2 wire is 0.476 inches. By using TVA Cable Splice and Termination drawing number SD-E12.5.8, Revision 2, the evaluator determined that 3 conductor WMT wire now being used had a minimum diameter of 1.02 inches and a maximum of 1.30 inches.
l l
i i
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6 PAGE 26 0F 37 IV.
SUMMARY
OF FINDINGS (Continued)
==
Conclusion:==
This investigation demonstrated the receptacles being used were rated for 3 conductor number 2 wire and therefore were not a problem.
Cable Routing From a review of site DNC and Modifications instructions, no specific references to maintaining cables in cable trays was discovered until MLAI-04 Revision 8, dated December 31, 1985. This was due to a misinterpretation of G-38.
G-38 step 3.2.1.8.2(b) was worded such that there was a difference of interpretation between site DNE and Modifications personnel and DNE personnel in Knoxville. This difference was extremely significant because site personnel believed before December 31, 1985, it was acceptable to run cable outside of cable trays while DNE in Knoxville said something entirely different. The wording murt be made clear. It will mean a walkdown at SQN to verify all permanent cables are in the cable trays and to correct those that are not (An example of an " improperly" routed non-QA cable was discovered at SQN in the 480-volt Shutdown Board Room 2A2 in cable tray JAN.)
It should be noted all examples found were non-QA.
The removal and/or identification of temporary cables had been the source of improperly routed cables outside of cable trays at WBN determined during the WBN site evaluation. The cables had not been identified or they had not been removed at the end of use by DNC.
The major source of these cables was temporary security cables.
SQN site personnel stated they had seen one or two cables running outside of cable trays in various locations around the plant (no specific locations given) but there were no massive amounts of unsupported cable. There were large amounts of cable running outside cable trays at WBN. As stated previously, these cables were l
determined to be temporary DNC cables and temporary security cables in a walkdown of the cable trays.
DNE and Modifications personnel were confident that all temporary security cables had been removed in 1981 or 1982. The temporary security cables were removed by workplan because they appeared on design drawings which were then voided. The DNE response to NCR W-283-P (the NCR written at WBN which dealt with unidentified cables in cable trays) reads that " Abandoned cables are spares not given numbers yet.
Spare cables have no function, thus cannot affect safe operation and/or shutdown of the plant." This would indicate i
1
[
TVA EMPLOYEE CONCERNS REPORT NUMBER:
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6 PAGE 27 0F 37 IV.
SUMMARY
OF FINDINGS (Continued) that if there are unidentified temporary cables they are not a problem as far as the safe operation of the plant is concerned.
A walkdown of all cable trays should identify all cables routed outside of cable trays.
==
Conclusion:==
This evaluation concentrated on the removal of temporary cables because this was the problem identified at WBN. However, interviews conducted indicated that temporary DNC and security cables had been removed.
Attention was turned to permanent cables. The concern for cable routing outside cable trays was valid because site personnel believed it was acceptable before the December 31, 1985 revision to M&AI-04.
(CATD
[R6 10900-SQN-01)
I Splicing (MAS-85-003)
Discussion with a cognizant engineer in Electrical Maintenance revealed they were aware of a specific case of split insulation on cable to the CS CCS pump that had been taped during construction.
The concern had been that this cable might still be taped according to earlier procedures rather than meeting II-10, Revision 11, which required the use of Raychem for splices. A review of MR A561116 revealed that cables 1PL47355 and 1PL47365 were inspected and repaired. Cable 1PL47355 had Raychem sleeves placed on it.
Cable 1PL47365 was found to have no damage.
==
Conclusion:==
The taped insulation on cable IPL47355 had been replaced with Raychem sleeves and was no longer a problem.
No further action was required.
Splicing (IN-86-314-005)
A discussion was conducted with the cognizant SQN DNE engineer on the disposition of NCRs 6208, 6224, 6536, 6623, and 6774. The NCRs had been identified as the problem areas in the WBN Employee Concerns Task Group (ECTG) report on cable.
It was determined that NCRs 6208, 6224, and 6623, 6774 were to be grouped together because they were NCRs on the same subject with different affected units
TVA EMPLOYEE CONCERNS REPORT NUMBER: C010900-SQN SPECIAL PROGRAM REVISION NUMBER:
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SUMMARY
OF FINDINGS (Continued)
(one for unit 1 and one for unit 2).
The sites dealt with only one NCR and evaluated it for both units. The engineer had information on NCR 6208/6224 and 6536. The problem defined in NCR 6536 was determined not to exist at SQN because the site used a different series of products to make a splice than at WBN. The engineer referred to ONP for further details on NCR 6208/6224. He had information that the NCR was to be handled by the Experience Review Program.
A discussion was conducted with the cognizant individual in charge of the SQN Experience Review Program on the disposition of NCR 6208/6224. This program was a method of handling questions generated by NRC bulletins, INPO reports, SCRs, etc. The licensing unit would assign the questions to the appropriate plant sections which would respond es to whether a problem existed onsite. In the case of this NCR, all splices in question were inspected and corrections were made as necessary. The documentation was then sent to the Environmental Qualification (EQ) project to become a part of the EQ binder. The NCR in question was considered closed on the SQN site.
A discussion was conducted with the cognizant DNE Nuclear Licensing Section and Electrical Engineering Branch (EEB) personnel on the generic applicability of NCR 6623/6774. These NCRs questioned all splices in harsh environments in that it questioned the environmental qualification of the Raychem products used before December 1985. They had documentation that a potential generic applicability memorandum had been sent to SQN and that a response had been received.
Applicable DNE and site documentation was reviewed to determine what had been decided on the generic applicability of NCR 6623/6774.
This included reviewing the potential generic applicability memorandum from DNE to SQN and their response.
It was determined that the activities in question were applicable to SQN and Significant Condition Report (SCR) SQNEEB8631 was generated.
A discussion was conducted with the cognizant SQN DNE and EEB engineers on the disposition of SCR SQNEEB8631. The SQN DNE engineer said that there were three parts to the SCR. The part that dealt with the use of HVS Raychem kits was not applicable to SQN because this particular kit was not used onsite in the timeframe noted. The part that dealt with the application ranges of WCSF-N tubing was dispositioned by the fact that the ranges for use
TVA EMPLOYEE CONCERNS REPORT NUMBER: C010900-SQN SPECIAL PROGRAM REVISION NUMBER:
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SUMMARY
OF FINDINGS (Continued) were broadened, and therefore any applications before this change were well within the specified range. The site DNE engineer referred to the cognizant EEB engineer on the disposition of the last part of the SCR which dealt with the use of breakouts and end caps with no oversleeve in harsh environments. The EEB engineer said that this part of the SCR was being dispositioned use-as-is according to an EEB calculation which was in the process of being finalized. This calculation was to prove that there was no problem for cables whose ends were not sealed to keep the shield (or drain) wire separated from the ground. The SCR has since been dispositioned and no rework was required.
==
Conclusion:==
No problem was found at SQN with NCR 6536. NCR 6208/6224 had been found generic, but all work associated with this NCR had been completed. NCR 6623/6774 was dispositioned use-as-is.
Nuclear Instrumentation System (NIS) Cables The SQN Employee Concerns Task Force Report on WBN Concern IN-85-120-001 was reviewed for adequacy. The evaluation agreed with the report. The design of the system was different between SQN and WBN. The SQN orientation did not have the large distances found between the raceway and the detectors.
==
Conclusion:==
This evaluation agreed with the SQN Employee Concerns Task Force report.
The layout of the NIS cables at SQN was different from WBN because the orientation of cables at SQN did not have large distances between raceways and detectors and the concern was not verified at SQN.
4 Terminations NSRS report I-85-101-WBN had been written describing the misapplication of AMP PIDG lugs. As part of this evaluation at WBN, SQN was tied into the report. The evaluator discovered that SQN had experienced test point resistor failures in the Foxboro racks due to crimp failures and that all PIDG lugs in the security system which were crimped on solid wire were replaced with the appropriate type terminal lugs. The evaluation did discover that even though there had been problems with past installations, the present SQN procedure M&AI-12. " Interconnecting Cable Termination and Insulation i
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SUMMARY
OF FINDINGS (Continued)
Inspection," Revision 7 did note that only AMP Solistrand lugs were to be used on solid conductors. Through interviews with SQN personnel, it was determined that the PIDG lugs used on solid conductors were being replaced and/or soldered over on an as-needed basis. The recommendation was made by the NSRS that a formal replacement and/or solder program be implemented for all AMP PIDG lugs used for terminations of discrete electrical components with solid wire leads.
A memorandum from H. G. Parris to K. W. Whitt dated September 13, 1985 (A02 850904 010) described the proposed corrective action for SQN due to the recommendation of NSRS report I-85-101-WBN.
Some PIDG lugs on smoke actuated dampers were found to be installed incorrectly. They were to be replaced by August 27, 1985. A memorandum was to be issued from the plant manager to Instrument and Electrical naintenance and the Modifications group to remind then to use the proper type of lug on safety-related equipment.
Inspections were in progress to verify the extent of the misapplication of PIDG lugs and to identify all sources of misapplication.
SQN ongingers were then to evaluate the impact to plant safety of each application.
Corrective action and a schedule for rework would follow this. These evaluations were to be completed by October 15, 1985.
A review of the potential generic condition evaluetion memorandum and a memorandum from H. G. Parris to Those listed dated September 13, 1985, revealed that the issue had been referred to ONP.
The H. G. Parris memorandum in particular stated that the problem would be handled by the Experience Review Program at SQN.
An interview with the individual responsible for the Experience Review Program revealed that the problem was being evaluated by Electrical Maintenance. An interview with the responsible Electrical Maintenance engineer verified that all work specified in the preceding paragraph which dealt with smoke actuated dampers was complete. It was also verified that all evaluations and rework associated with the misapplication of PIDG lugs was complete except for the rework of lugs on solenoid valve surge suppression networks. The work had been specified on SMI-2-317-25.
The Compliance Section had been asked to justify not replacing these lugs. The existence of a memorandum to ensure that Instrument Maintenance, Electrical Maintenance, and Modifications used the proper type lug was not verified.
- However, M&AI-7, " Cable Terminations, Splicing, and Repairing of Damaged Cables", Revision 7 and M&AI-12. " Interconnecting Cable Termination
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6 PAGE 31 0F 37 IV.
SUMMARY
OF FINDINGS (Continued) and Insulation Inspection," up until it was cancelled with Revision 8 both specified that AMP solistrand lugs were to be used on solid conductors. There was also a requirement for the QC inspector to verify the proper type lug was used. Therefore, there was no need for any further action since the site procedures contained the proper information.
The individual responsible for resolving the surge suppression issue in Compliance stated that the issue had been referred to DNE and that no response had been received.
4 An interview with the EEB engineer resolving the problem stated he was writing a memorandum requiring that all valves where the solenoid energized to perform its safety function were to have the lugs replaced or soldered over immediately. All others would have to be checked to determine if the lugs were in an acceptable condition.
It was going to be recommended that these lugs be reworked.
A preliminary copy of the memorandum referenced in the preceding paragraph (from D. W. Wilson to P. R. Wallace dated October 24, 1986) gave a general description of the use of are suppressors. They were "to protect the circuit contacts against pitting and burning caused by arcing associated with breaking the inductive load current of the solenoid valve." The memorandum indicated that PIDG lugs on Class 1E surge suppressors should be replaced or soldered.
As mentioned in the previous paragraph, all PIDG lugs on solenoid valves which energize to perform their safety function were to be replaced or soldered prior to restart. For those which de-energerized a 10-percent sample was to be verified operable by field measurement i
of are suppressor circuit resistance. If any were found open, all Class 1E are suppressors should be checked. It was suggested this procedure be repeated periodically until all are suppressor circuits were permanently fixed.
==
Conclusion:==
1 The evaluation agreed with the NSRS report that a problem with the misapplication of AMP PIDG lugs existed at SQN. A replacement program had been initiated but not completed due to the question over the replacement of lugs on surge suppression networks.
(CATD 10900-NPS-03) lR6 l
l l
r l
- _ - _ = _ - - - - _ _ _ _ _ - - _ _ _ - _.. _ - - _
TVA EMPL0 FEE CONCERNS REPORT NUMBER: C010900-SQN SPECIAL PROGRAM REVISION NUMBER:
6 PAGE 32 0F 37 V.
ROOT CAUSE Cable Pulling MPT, SWP, MBR - The upper-tier document (G-38) for pulling cable was inadequate which, in turr, resulted in inadequate site procedures. The reason was failure to retognize a need to monitor maximum pull tension, sidewall bearing pressura and adhere to the manufacturers' minimum bend radius limits.
Conduit Overfill - The Design Project used non-auditable records for conduit fill. There was no Quality Assurance record kept on the total cross sectional area fill and TVA Design Standard DS-E12.1.13, Revision 1 (recently revised) did not incorporate average cable diameters also resulting in some error.
Cable Coating The root cause of cable coating concerns was a failure to follow the manufacturer's recommended maximum thickness. Inadequate administrative control over the application of Flamemastic was the major cause of the excessive coatings.
Cable Routing The root cause of the routing problem was inadequate site procedures due to a misinterpretation of Construction Specification G-38 in regards to routing cables outside of cable trays. These procedures have since been updated.
Terminations Failure by TVA and Foxboro to follow vendor recommendations in the application of terminal lugs, and failure of TVA to follow General Construction Specification G-38.
VI.
CORRECTIVE ACTIONS The line management response to CATD 10900-SQN-01 was:
An evaluation will be performed on cables routed outside of trays to determine the potential areas of concern.
In particular this evaluation will consider the potential impact on electrical separation, cable ampacity, physical support and protection of the cable, and adequacy of tray supports. A field inspection will then
TVA EMPLOYEE CONCERNS REPORT NUMBER: C010900-SQN SPECIAL PROGRAM REVISION NUMBER:
6 PAGE 33 0F 37 VI.
CORRECTIVE ACTIONS (continued) be performed to locate and determine the extent of cables routed outside of trays which are subject to the concerns evaluated above.
The process will continue until it is determined that all such cables with a potential concern are identified and the configuration justified or modified.
This is not a SQN restart item.
lR6 The line management response to CATD 10900-SQN-02 was:
An investigation was initiated in response to PIRGENEEB8605. A sampling program (that led to the evaluation of all 480 V and 6900 V Class 1E cables in trays and non-Class 1E cables routed with Class 1E cables in trays) was conducted to determine if the cables installed in Class 1E cable trays at Sequoyah were adequately sized. The cables were evaluated according to the requirements of Electrical Design Standard DS-E12.6.3.
This standard applied a derating factor for Flamemastic 77 cable coating.
Other derating factors applied were cable tray covers, cable tray bottoms, cable tray fill and qualified cable insulation temperature.
The derating factors for the effects of Flamemastic 77 on cable ampacity were derived from test data. The test applied varying cable coating thicknesses to cables grouped in bundles by voltage level as required by Construction Specification G-38.
This program identified some undersized cables for which SCR SQNEEB86178 was initiated describing a condition adverse to quality. Those cables identified on SCR SQNEEB86178 were further evaluated, and certain physical modifications and engineering controls were applied such that the majority of the cables were made acceptable for use. The remainder were being replaced with adequately sized cable.
The test will be reviewed to determine if the test report encompasses the worst case as-constructed condition at Sequoyah for Class lE cable trays.
This is a SQN restart item.
TVA RMPLOYEE CONCERNS REPORT NUMBER: C010900-SQN SPECIAL PROGRAN REVISION NUMBER:
6 PAGE 34 0F 37 The line management response to CATD 10900-SQN-03 was:
To prevent further recurrences the site procedure has been revised to comply with G-38 regarding cable pulling. N&AI-4 now requires monitoring and documenting the pulling forces used in the installation of non-Class IE cables (with certain listed exceptions as contained in G-38).
The few associated cables (i.e., non-Class IE cables routed in raceways designated for Class 1E circuits) that exist at SQN were pulled to the same requirements as Class 1E cables.
All systems (including non-Class IE cables) have undergone Pre-Op or functional testing. Additionally, all medium-voltage cables (i.e.,
480 volt equipment rated at more than 100 horsepower and 6900 volt equipment) are periodically tested under the plant's maintenance schedule (NI-10.20).
i The inclusion of non-Class 1E cables in G-38's requirement for monitoring pull tension is an economic consideration only (to preclude damage and thus wasting material) and is not a safety-related concern.
Failure of these cables would be a random occurrence and will be remedied on a case-by-case basis.
4 Hence, this employee concern item requires no further corrective l
action.
i l.
The line management response to CATD 10900-SQN-04 was:
\\
f 1.
Determine if a CAQ exists.
2.
Identify the appropriate place to provide written instruction i
for craft and inspector use in the removal of Flamemastic. The written instruction is to include the identification of proper l
tooling and prohibit the use of sharp tools.
3.
Revise as appropriate the identified document or generate a new document to provide written instruction for the removal of Flamemastic.
This corrective action is not a SQN restart item.
i i
1 I
TVA EMPLOYEE CONCERNS REPORT NUMBER: C010900-SQN SPECIAL PROGRAM REVISION NUMBER:
6 PAGE 35 0F 37 The line management response to CATD 10900-NPS-01 was:
To determine the magnitude of the SWP applied to SQN cables during installation. TVA reviewed all conduits containing safety-related cables against screening critaria. This was used to determine 16 of the worst conduit sections. The maximum SWP of cables within these conduits were determined. These values were compared to maximum SWP values determined from testing at TVA's Central Laboratories. The SQN values were less than those determined in testing. The overall conclusions of TVA's testing were confirmed by the report of a third party reviewer. TVA has, through the above testing and analysis, conclusively demonstrated that the practices employed during the installation of electrical cable at SQN maintained the adequacy and integrity of Class 1E cable with respect to SWP.
TVA practice of monitoring total tension rather than individual tension, does assure individual conductor strength limits are not exceeded, and is consistent with IEEE 690-1984.
In fact. TVA practice is more conservative. Since August of 1978 DNC takes 80 percent rather than 100 percent of individual conductor strength on multi-cable pulls.
TVA's EEB has used NSRS report I-85-06-WBN in addition to the manufacturer's requirements, to form the basis for its evaluation.
Each of the areas of potential concern is being resolved into elements for further analysis.
In each case the actual bend radius to which a cable has or could have been subjected is determined. In particular. EEB has identified the elongation stress, to which a cable is subjected as the result of a bend, as the critical parameter in determining acceptability. Preliminary conclusions of the study indicate that this worst case bend at SQN does not reduce the cable's available elongation properties below that required for it to perform its safety-related function. The final report is expected to be issued in March 1987 for SQN.
The effects of a reduced bend on shielded medium voltage power cable and coaxial, triaxial and twinaxial cables will be evaluated separately.
EEB has issued project specific actions for the evaluation of these cables. These actions will include field inspections for the existence of pull boxes or conduits of any type in which the cable is bent as well as individual inspections of a cable's bend radius. The actual bend radius will be determined and the resulting effects on the integrity of the cable will be established. The work is expected to be complete by March 1987.
The work is being tracked by SCR SQNEEB8703.
This is a SQN restart item.
l
TVA EMPLOYEE CONCERNS REPORT NURSER: C010900-SQN
/
SPECIAL PROGRAN REVISION NUMBER:
6 PAGE 36 0F 37 The line management response to CATD 10900-NPS-02 was:
No problems were identified during the investigation / evaluation because of the use of fish tape to breach fire barriers.
Note that section 6.G.1.2 on page 29 of M&AI-13 satisfactorily addresses the use of metallic breaching. tools.
The line management response to CATD 10900-NPS-03 was:
Corrective action which include soldering or replacing AMP (PIDG) terminal lugs on solid wire, has been completed for unit 2 per SNI-2-317-25 except the solenoid valve surge suppression networks.
Those CAQ's will be addressed by the resolution of the more specific employee concerns 241.02-SQN-01 and 241.02-SQN-02.
The estimated completion date of employee concern 10900-NPS-03 will be determined by the dates shown on employee concerns 241.02 SQN-01 and 241.02-SQN-02.
The line management response to 241.02-SQN-01 and 241.02-SQN-02 was:
For solenoid valve are suppressors, those identified as required for safety require replacement. Rework should be completed prior to restart on each unit. Arc suppressors required for safety on both units will be identified on the schematics prior to unit I restart.
This corrective action is a SQN restart item.
The line management respoa.. to CATD 10900-NPS-04 was:
This potential problem was identified by Problem Identification Report PIRGENEEB8605 (B43 860808 908). This PIR will assure corrective action will be identified and implemented.
This corrective action is a SQN restart item.
The line managenent response.o CATD 10900-NPS-05 was:
The new cable diameters are being incorporated into the SQN cable routing system per memorandum to Roberts from Raughley dated September 23, 1986 (B45 860923 908). Corrective action to NCR SQN EEB8601 will assure verification of cable input diameter information and that the cable raceway fill program is reevaluated using the new verified values.
This corrective action is a SQN restart item.
TVA EMPLOYEE CONCERNS REPORT NUMBER:
C010900-SQN
~
s SPECIAL PROGRAM REVISION NUMBER:
6 PAGE 37 0F 37 VII. GENERIC APPLICABILITY The concerns which dealt with MPT, MBR, and SWP have been determined in the WBN ECTG report on cable to be appilcable to Sequoyah Nuclear Plant (SQN), Bellefonte Nuclear Plant (BLN), and Brown's Ferry Nuclear Plant (BFN).
The cable coating concerns were found to be potentially generic to BFN in the WBN ECTG report on cable.
One of the fire barrier concerns (IN-85-018-004) was found to be potentially generic to BFN and BLN in the WBN ECIG report on cable.
The other concern (XX-85-094-005) was determined to be potentially generic to BFN in the WBN ECTG report on cable.
Splicing concern IN-86-314-005 was considered potentially generic to BFN and BLN in the WBN ECTG report on cable.
Due to SCR WBNEEB8537, I-85-101-WBN and PH-85-003-N32 were generic to BLN and BFN.
No new generically applicable concerns were found in the SQN evaluation.
VIII. ATTACHMENTS Attachment A - List of SQN Concerns
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- g. FORM PRE-1984 CABLE PULL 1HG.
PD551stF CS BL E DAf1 AGE f1AY HAVE RESULTED 2.
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CONSTRUCTION DEPT. COHOERN.
CI HAS ND ADDITIDHAL INFDRMATION.
-GENERIC CON:ERH-
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- T3Dc51 REPORT IN THE ADDITIDHAL DIESEL CENERATOR DUILD3HD FEED CADLES HERE SIZED LARG ER THAN THE PLUG 5 CDULD HANDLE
- THr
- THE TRANSFER (SCHEDULE) HAD TO BE MET. C/1 ELECT. ENGR. AIDE IN CHARGE 0* THIS WITNESSED THE DISCUSSION BETWEEN ENGINEER AND HDRR (NAME Clygy) p;3gggggy 7gyg pg kNp"h"ghRS$M"g} HIE @gj yDy i
ENG. AIDE AND IS CONCERNED THAT SCHEDULE TOOK gg RIS5 THIS PROBLEM. HMEN ELECT. ENGR PRECEDE.NCE OVER QUALITY.
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. ENGINEER ]H CHARgg gp ggg gy37g{g gggg NE GIVEN). !HCINEgR IN CHARGE OF SYS
- EM STAi!D THAT "I DDri'T HAVE TIME Y 0 HDRRY ABOUT THIS PRD3LEM 2E AUSE*
1H 018-004 CD ~UUDN'H3N YYYY I-23-(Pf-M3N HS SU ERVI51DN (KHDHH) HDUL D NDT t'DLL DH TSC164 REPDKT CABL! 'UL LING PROCEOURE. THE 140RK PRO:EEDE: H;THOUT P!RMIT5 A5 R!OUIRE D EY PRC:! DURE. SUntt!K 1984
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- T AINLI55 ST!!L I4ALL FRDM A RA*EHAY.
TD THE TERMINATIDris DN THE DETE*TiRS 0/I OCUiD HDT PRDVI:! ANY ADDIilD HAL INTDRMAT3DH. HD FURTH!R int 0RMA i!ON AVAILABLE. HD FD.'!DH-UP RE UIR r
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LCD UHDER CABLES HHICH WHERE'PUL.
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HD FUR 1HER DETAIL 5 AVAILABLE.
110 TOLLDH UP REQUIRED.
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C0 1D9D0 H HDH YYYY 10DC 1 H5 REPORT CABLES IN CABLE TRAYS, PARTICULARLY IN THE CABLE SPREA0lHG ROOM (BOT 115),
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HUMEROUS HON-3PECIFIC IH51 AN REL ATED REGARDING DVERSTRE i
LES DUR2HG PULLlHG OPERAT3DNS CTRICAL CABLES, (ELE STRESS HAS OF D0lH UNIT 5 18 ) DVER SUFFICIENT SEVERITY 10
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RED HOT 10 luIT FOR CO 2n5P ZH -t5-634-004 CD 10P00 N HDN YYYY I
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K-FORM H5 TOO MANY HIRES IN DHE CONDUIT PULLED DVER INERGIZED HIRES.
1 TC 1 YR. AGO THIS DATE (4-8-!!)PRI OR MAX.
THE PULL TENS 2ON HA5 NOT MONITO IN *t!-333-001
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TION. CONSTRUCTION DEPT. CONCERN.
CA3tEs TNA; 3
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BEND RADU5 HAS Y]DLATED AllD PULLIllG PRDCEDUNE IIA 5 HDI (DLLDHED, AFTER C ADLE HAS IN PLACE. IT llAS tlDT PRDTEC TED AND HA5 DallADED FUR 1HER BY CDH5T RUCTIDH ( UllI T 2)' FDLL DH UP RE,0UIRED.
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IN C28-001 CD ID9hD N H3N YYYY 33
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CE5LE PULL LIMITS HERE EX*EEDED O T3D11g REPDRT HE CABLE GDING TO THE INTAKE PUMPIN G STRU:TURE (IPS) ELE *TROAL MAN HDLE 55,4,5,6,7,8.
I HA3 HD ADDIT IDNAL INFDRMATIDil.
IN 199-001 CD 20900 N H3N YYYY I-E5-466-H3H 33 CABLE PULLS ARE flDT ALHAYS PERFORMED T501:3 REPORT TD THE REDUIREMENTS DF THE COI.
FD R EXAM *LE, BREAK LIliK5 HERE flDT USED DURIHC CABLE PULLS, AND DHDUITS AR E TDD FULL. CDNSTRU TION CDN !RN.
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x:EEDED DURIND CABLE PULL 5 !! FORE 19 E2. C1 STAT 13 THAT PULLING LIMIT $ HE R! NDT ADHERED TD DR MDri TORID !!FOR E THAT DATE. 00n37. DEPT.
DN !RN. O I HA3 ilD ADOITIDUAL INFORMATION. HD FDLLCW UP REDVIRED,,
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- D 1DPDC H H3H YYYY I-25-368-HEN 35 YVA FA! LED TD U3r U3E LINKS DR CTHE
- TSC149 REPDET R TEN 32DN INDIAT DR5 HHIL E PULL 1tiG ABLE.
'U3! LINK $ HAVE Dt!LY JEEN USE D IN THE PA5T I I/2 YEARS. :DRST RU TIDN' DEPT. :Dit !Ril.
- I HA3 110 ADDIT IDNAL INFDRMATIDN. HD FDLLDH-UP REC 5
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Ill 266-006 CD ihiDD HBN YYYY M$llY CABLES HERE PULL 75E200 REPORT H5 R PLACEt1EHiGREE BENDS HI1HO IN 1HE CAllLE 1 RAYS.
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HDT KHDH ANY SPECIFICS.
IIOR HA5 AH Y ADDITIONAL IHFDRHAT10H. C0ft31R
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, 'i REPORT CABLES HERE Ill51ALLED INPRDPERLY
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RATIDN WA5 IMPROPER DEFORE PA HITH IN3UL ATI0tt P.
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CON 51RUCTION DEPT. CONCERN.
CI HA5 180 ADDIT 10HAL INFDRMATID HD FOLLOH-UP REQUIRED.
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MA5-25-DC3 CD 10900 N SON NNYH 55.'S C*3 PUMP MOTORADEDUA REPORT DD -E5-DD5-014 CD 1DSDD H 50H HNYH T502T2 SEOUDYAH - INSULATIDN HA3 MISTA REPDRT OUT OFF DF A 440 VOLT CA$tE.
HMEN THE MI5TAKE WAS D15:0VERED, THE INSU LATION HAS REATTA0HED llITH ELECTR L TAPE.
THE BAOK FLDHCADLE 15 THE PDNER (OR DISCHARGE) GATE HD IST MDTDR (MDTOR N05. I AA, IEE, 2AA AND 2BB IN DHE DF THE-FDLLDHING CD UIT5 1-PL-(570-5, 1-PL-L560-A, 2-P L-(370-B OR 2-PL-E360-A).
IHOIDENT C*0URRED IN 1977.
CTO, H:THMELD DUE TO 00H: DETAILS KNOWN T HD FURTHER Ill:CRMATION1DENTIALITY MAY !! RE' EASED. *0NSTRUCT10H DEPARTMENT C J
CI RAS NO FURTHER INFORMATION.ONCE 3W 007-004
- 0 10900 N H3N YYYY T5C24 R-FDP.M N5 VAMA 5*0 FIRE FRCDFING 1:A3 APP ELE;TRICAL PDHER CA3(g3 50 Tgi gly THAT AT TD DIISIPATE.IT HILL li0t ALLOW RESIS THIS HILL OAU3E TH N AND FAIL.E ELECTRICAL IHSUL 01 MA5 HD FURTHER INFDR RH HD FOLLDH UP REDUIR
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.CD 10900 !!BLH YYYY I-E5-579-BLH HS BELLETONTE: THE t1AJORITY OF CAB T50I50 K-FDRM S FEEN PULLED der 0RE THE USE OF FI 1ArE FUSE L]HK OR f1DH110R1HG DEV S HERE REDVIRED:
THEREFORE 1HE MAX.
PULL TEtlSION HAS sinT tiONITORED.
Call S T RUCT] UN DEPT. C0110ERll. CI HAS HD
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XX 094-D05 CD 20900 N DLN YYYY I-25-580-DLH llS DELLEr0HTE: AH " ILLEGAL" FISH HO'JK T T5D15D REPORT YPE 100L HAS FREQUENTLY USED 10 REMO s' #
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VE THE FDAN ON TERiilnATIDils 30 NORE CABLE CDULD DE FULLEO.
THIS ILLEGAL TOOL CAUSED AH JilDETERillflATE ANDUNT DF DAMAGE.
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' ATE TD VERIFY ALL DAMAGED CABLE HAS BEEN IDENTIFIED AHD CORRECTED. CDtIS TRUCTION DEPT. COHOERN. OI HAS tl0 F URTHER INFDRMATIDN. HD FDLLDH UP RE QUIRED.
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(E.G. A CDHDU" TOR HAD A HOLE I H THE DUTER INSUL ATION, A SUPERVISDR HAS CALLED TD LDDK AT IT AND HE SAI
. D. " TAPE IT DVER AllD PUL L IT IN", 19 E3.)
ADDITIDHAL IllFDRMATIDH KHDWN T D CTO, HITHMELD TD flAINTAIN CONFIDEN TIALITY. ND ADDITIDHAL INFORMATION MAY BE RELEASED. CONSTRUCTION DEPT.
CDHOERN; HD FDLLDH-UP REQUIRED.
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IN 239-004 CD 1090D N H3N YYYY I-t3-5Ia-H3N IS CAELES HAVE IEEN PULLED AT WATTS BAR T3D149 REPORT EY USING A COME-AL ONG HINCH.
DDORS WERE HELD SHUT TD PREVENT C0 D! SERV 4
ATION.
COMSTRUCTION DEFT 00NCERN.
CDITAILS TO THIS SPECIFIO CASE ARE K 1
HDHN 10 070 AND HITHMELD TD MAINTAIN 00N*IDENTI ALITY). OI HAS HD FURTHE r
R INFDRMATION. HD FDLLDh-UP REDUIRE 4-D.
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109 M3N YYYY NS 1.!M: ROPER E' ECTRICAL TER."INAT!DN TE REPORT CHNIOUE. 2 ORIM -DF-TYPE LUCS WERE U SED :DR TERM *NATIDN OF IISORETE E' E0 TRICAL 00MPDNENTS R TH.SOLIL MU.E LE
'REFORT FROM THEIR REVIEW Dr THE :TO FILES CRIM* DN LUCI 3:E I'IED FDR STRAND EO HIRE ARE USED DN SO'ID WIRE AGAIN, ST VEN00R S:EO.
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