ML20209E614
| ML20209E614 | |
| Person / Time | |
|---|---|
| Site: | San Onofre  |
| Issue date: | 08/20/1986 |
| From: | Office of Nuclear Reactor Regulation |
| To: | |
| Shared Package | |
| ML20209E612 | List: |
| References | |
| TAC-54862, TAC-54863, NUDOCS 8609110263 | |
| Download: ML20209E614 (4) | |
Text
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SAFETY EVALUATION BY THE OFFICE OF NUCLEAR REACTOR REGULATION SUPPORTING AMENDMENT NO. 52 TO NPF-10 AhD AMENDMENT NO. 41 TO NPF-15 SOUTHEFN CALIFORNIA EDIS0N COMPANY, ET AL SAN ON0FRE NUCLEAR GEhERATING STATION, UNITS 2 AND 3 DOCKET NOS. 50-361 AND 50-362 1.0 INTRCCUCTION Southern California Edison Company (SCE), on behalf of itself and the other licenses, San Diego Gas and Electric Company, The City of Riverside California, and The City of Anaheim, California, has submitted several applications for license amendments for San Onofre Nuclear Generating Station, Units 2 and 3.
One such request, Proposed Change PCN-111, is evaluated herein. ThischangewouldreviseTechnicalSpecification(1S) 3/4.11.2, " Gaseous Effluents," to allow incineration of radioactively contaminated cil.
2.0 DESCRIPTION
OF CHANGE The amendments revise Table 4.11-2, " Radioactive Gaseous Waste Sampling and Analysis Program" of Technical Specification 3/4.11.2, " Gaseous Effluents,"
ano Technical Specification 3.11.2.3, " Dose-Redioiodines, Padioactive Materials in Particulate Form and Tritium," to allow disposal of radioactively contaminated reactor coolant pump (RCP) motor oil, turbine building sump and other waste oil by incineration.
TS 3/4.11.2 provides the maximum dose rates at which radioactive gaseous effluents may be released into the environment. Table 4.11-2 lists the different types of radioactive gaseous releases and specifies sampling and analysis requirements to verify that dose rates are within the limit.
The amendments revise Table 4.11-2 to reflect incineration of oil as a release type and specify sampling and analysis requirements which must be met prior to incineration in order to verify that the dose limit will not be exceeded.
TS 3.11.2.3 specifies limits of dose which an individual may receive due to radioiodines, radioactive materials in particulate form and tritium release from the plant in any calendar quarter and calendar year. The amendments revise TS 3.11.2.3 to limit the dose contribution resulting from the incineration of oil to less than 0.1*. of the specified dose limits for radiciodines, particulates, and tritium.
8609110263 860920 PDR ADOCK 03000361 P
3.0 EVALUATION OF CHANGE The NRC staff has evaluated the change and has concluded that it is acceptable because the incineration of contaminated oil will be in compliance with 10 CFR 20 Appendix B Table II, Column I, and will meet the dose objectives of 10 CFR 50 Appendix I.
Specifically, concentrations of any radioactivity leaving the Station will be calculated and documented per methods in the Offsite Dose Calculation Manual. The potential dose that could occur as a result of the incineration of contaminated oil has been calculated. The highest radioactivity concentration would probably be less than 4.6 uCi per drum. This value is based on the determination of the highest concentration in reactor coolant pump oil from an 860 MwE net unit owned by another utility (0.2 uCi Co-E8, 0.3 uCi 70-60,1.0 uCi Cs-134, and 3.1 uti Cs-137 per drum). Assuming this worst case concen-tration were the average for all 1000 gallons incinerated per year at San Onofre, the dose to any organ of the maximum exposed individual (a child atthenearestresidencelocated1.3milesNNWoftgeplant)wascalculated to be 0.001 mrem /yr based on a X/Q of 1.2 E-6 sec/m and a D/Q of 4.5 E-9
-2 m
This dose is 0.012 of the limit in TS 3/4.11.2.3 and is considered to be an insignificant contribution to dose via this pathway. Revised Technical Specification 3/4.11.2 will require calculations of dose associated with the incineration of each barrel, and will limit the accumulated dose during a calendar quarter or calendar year to less than li of 10 CFR 50, Appendix I limiting dose objectives. This is an appropriate small fraction of such limits for this source and is considered to be As Low As Is Reasonably Achievable.
In addition to the above considerations, the equipment used to incinerate waste oil will not be interconnected with or in the immediate vicinity of safety-related systems, and thus will not have an impact on previously evaluated accidents.
In summary, because the results of the change meet all applicable regulatory requirements, and because the revised technical specifications are consistent with NUREG-0472, Revision 2, the Standard Radiological Effluent Technical Specifications for PWRs, the staff finds the amendments to be acceptable.
4.0 CONTACT WITH STATE OFFICIAL The NRC staff has advised the Chief of the Radiological Health Branch, State Department of Health Services, State of California, of the propcsed determination of no significant hazards consideration. No comments were received.
5.0 ENVIRONMENTAL CONSIDERATION
These amendments involve changes in the installation or use of facility components located within the restricted area. The staff has determined that the amendments involve no significant increase in the amounts of any
effluents that may be released offsite and that there is no significant increase in individual or cummulative occupation radiation exposure. The Commission has previously issued proposed findings that the amendments involve no significant hazards consideration, and there has been no public comment on such findings. Accordingly, the amendments meet the eligibility criteria for categorical exclusion set forth in 10 CFR Sec. 51.22(c)(9).
Pursuant to 10 CFR 51.22(b) no environmental impact staten.ent or environ-mental assessment need to be prepared in connection with the issuance of these amendments.
6.0 CONCLUSION
The Staff has concluded, based on the considerations discussed above, that:
(1) there is reasonable assurance that the health and safety of the public will not be endangered by operation in the proposed manner, and (2) such activities will be conducted in compliance with the Commission's regulations and the issuance of the amendments will not be inimical to the common defense and security or to the health and safety of the public. We, therefore, conclude that the proposed changes are acceptable, and are hereby incorporated into the San Onofre 2 and 3 Technical Specifications.
Dated: August 20, 1986 a
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CONTAINMENT SYSTEMS BASES 3/4.6.1.7 CONTAINMENT VENTILATION SYSTEM The 42-inch containment purge supply and exhaust isolation valves are required to be closed during plant operation since these valves have not been demonstrated capable of closing during a LOCA or steam line break accident.
Maintaining these valves closed during plant operations ensures that excessive quantities of radioactive materials will not be released via the containment purge system. To provide assurance that the 42-inch va,1ves cannot be inadvert-ently opened, they are sealed closed in accordance with Standard Review Plan 6.2.4 which includes mechanical devices to seal or lock the valve closed or prevent power from being supplied to the valve operator.
The use of the containment purge lines is restricted to the 8-inch purge supply and exhaust isolation valves since, unlike the 42-inch valves, the 8-inch valves will close during a LOCA or steam line break accident and there-fore the site boundary dose guidelines of 10 CFR Part 100 would not be exceeded in the event of an accident during purging operations.
The design of the 8-inch purge supply and exhaust isolation valves meets the requirements of Branch Technical Position CSB 6-4, " Containment Purging During Normal Plant Operations."
Leakage integrity tests with a maximum allowable leakage rate for purge supply and exhaust isolation valves will provide early indication of resilient material i
seal degradation and will allow the opportunity for repair before gross leakage failure develops.
The 0.60 L leakage limit shall not be exceeded when the leakage rates oetermined by tlle leakage integrity tests of these valves are added to the previously determined ' total for all valves and penetrations subject to Type B and C tests.
3/4.6.2 DEPRESSURIZATION AND COOLING SYSTEMS 3/4.6.2.1 CONTAINMENT SPRAY SYSTEM The OPERABILITY of the containment spray system ensures that containment depressurization and cooling capability will be available in the event of a LOCA.
The pressure reduction and resultant lower containment leakage rate are consistent with the assumptions used in the accident analyses.
The containment spray system and the containment cooling system are redundant to each other in providing post accident cooling of the containment i
atmosphere.
However, the containment spray system also provides a mechanism for removing iodine from the containment atmosphere and therefore the time requirements for restoring an inoperable spray system to OPERABLE status have been maintained consistent with that assigned other inoperable ESF equipment.
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t SAN ONOFRE-UNIT 3 8 3/4 6-3
Reissued 8/20/86 CONTAINMENT SYSTEMS BASES 3/4.6.2.2 RECIRCULATION FLOW PH CONTROL SYSTEM The OPERABILITY of the recirculation flow pH control system ensures that there is sufficient trisodium phosphate available in containment to guarantee a sump pH of > 7.0 during the recirculation phase of a postulated LOCA.
This pH level is required to minimize the potential for chloride stress corrosion of austentitic stainless steel. The specified amount of TSP will result in a recirculation phase pH of 7.2 assuming complete dissolution and maximum allowed l
boric acid concentrations from the borated water sources.
Similarly, surveil-lance 4.6.2.2 will produce a pH of 7.2.
The specified temperature of 120 i 10 t
degrees-F for the surveillance is based is consistent with expected long term recirculation phase sump temperature reported in the FSAR.
3/4.6.2.3 CONTAINMENT COOLING SYSTEM i
The OPERABILITY of the containment cooling system ensures that 1) the containment air temperature will be maintained within limits during normal operation, and 2) adequate heat removal capacity is available when operated in conjunction with the containment spray systems during post-LOCA conditions.
The containment cooling system and the containment spray system are j
j redundant to each other in providing post-accident cooling of the containment atmosphere. As a result of this redundancy in cooling capability, the allow-able out-of-service time requirements for the containment cooling system have i
been appropriately adjusted. However, the allowable out-of-service time i
requirements for the containment spray system have been maintained consistent with that assigned other inop m ble ESF equipment since the containment spray system also provides a mechanist for removing iodine from the containment atmosphere.
3/4.6.3 CONTAINMENT ISOLATION VALVES The OPERABILITY of the containment isolation valves ensures that the contain-ment atmosphere will be isolated from the outside environment in the event of a release of radioactive material to the containment atmosphere and is consis-tent with the requirements of GDC 54 through 57 of Appendix A to 10 CFR 50.
Containment. isolation within the time limits specified for those power operated isolation valves designed to close automatically upon a CIAS signal ensures that the release of radioactive material to the environment will be consistent with the assumptions used in the analyses for a LOCA.
Such valves are listed in Sections A and B of Table 3.6-1 and Surveillance requirements-to verify OPERABILITY of these valves are explicitly stated in 4.6.3.1 thru 4.6.3.3.
Check valves located inside containment are considered OPERABLE provided their leak rate is within limits when tested pursuant to 10 CFR 50 Appendix J.
Section C of Table 3.6-1 contains a listing of manual valves that are normally closed and assumed to be closed under design basis accident conditions, but which may be opened intermittently for service, maintenance or test during normal operation provided adequate administrative controls are implemented to ensure operator action is taken to close such valves in the event of an accident.
SAN ONOFRE - UNIT 3 B 3/4 6-4 AMEN 0 MENT NO. 40