ML20209E308

Audit of Environ Qualification of Safety-Related Electrical Equipment for Vogtle Electric Generating Plant Unit 1, Informal Rept

ML20209E308
Person / Time
Site:	Vogtle
Issue date:	10/31/1986
From:	Beahm D, Magleby H EG&G IDAHO, INC., IDAHO NATIONAL ENGINEERING & ENVIRONMENTAL LABORATORY
To:	NRC
Shared Package
ML20209E286	List: ML20209E280 ML20209E308
References
CON-FIN-A-6415 EGG-NTA-7403, NUDOCS 8704300020
Download: ML20209E308 (62)

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October 1986 i

INFORMAL REPORT

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idaho Nationa/ AUDIT OF THE ENVIRONitENTAL QUALIFICATION OF Engineering SAFETY-RELATED ELECTRICAL EQUIPf1ENT FOR THE V0GTLE ELECTRIC GENERATING PLANT UNIT 1 Laboratory Managed by the U.S. D.11. Beahm Department H. L. 14agleby o/ Energy ti. Trojovsky 9

04 "*"*" Prepared for the ,

w,, -o,mu o ,, U. S. NUCLEAR REGULATORY COMMISSION DOE Contract No. DE-AC017610015?O 4

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EGG-NTA-7403 ,

October 1986 4'

INFORMAL REPORT

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f idaho National AUDIT OF THE ENVIRONf1 ENTAL QUALIFICATION OF SAFETY-RELATED ELECTRICAL EQUIPf1ENT FOR THE Engineenny V0GTLE ELECTRIC GENERATING PLANT UNIT 1 Laboratory , l l'

Managed by the U.S. D. ft. Beahm Department H. L. 11agleby o/Ene py M. Trojovsky ,

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1 DISCLAIMER This book was prepared as an account of work sponsored by an agency of the United Staites Government. Nether the United Sta:es Government nor any agency thereof, nor any of ther employees, makes any warranty, express or emplied, or assumes any legal liability or responsbility for the accuracy, completeness, or usefulness of any information, apparatus, product or process uim:losed, or represents that its use would not intnnge pnvately owned nghts. References herein to any specific commercal product, process, or service by trade name, trademark, manuf acturer, or otherwise, does not necessanly constitute or imply its endorsement, recommendation, or favonng ,

by tne United States Gownment or any agency thereof. The views and opinions of authors expressed herein do not necessanly state or reflect those of the United States l Government or any agency thereof, l

EGG-NTA-7403 AUDIT OF THE ENVIRONMENTAL QUALIFICATION OF SAFETY-RELATED ELECTRICAL EQUIPMENT FOR THE V0GTLE ELECTRIC GENERATING PLANT UNIT I Docket No. 50-424 D. M. Beahm H. L. Magleby M. Trojovsky Published October 1986 Idaho National Engineering Laboratory EG&G Idaho, Inc.

Idaho Falls, Idaho 83415 Prepared for the U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission Washington, D.C. 20555 Under DOE Contract No. DE-AC07-761001570 FIN No. A6415

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l ABSTRACT The Vogtle Electric Generating Plant Unit I was audited to determine the environmental qualification of safety-related electrical equipment.

Results of the audit are summarized in this report.

l NRC FIN No. A6415--Equipment Qualification Case Reviews 11

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SUMMARY

An audit of the environmental qualification of safety-related electrical equipment for the Vogtle Electric Generating Plant Unit I was conducted by a team comprised of representatives of the NRR and I&E Support Branch of EG&G Idaho, Inc., and the Nuclear Regulatury Conunission (NRC) staff Qualification deficiencies for individual equipment items found during the pre-audit review are provided in Appendix A. Summaries of the central file review are provided in Appendix B. As a result of the audit it was concluded that when the Vogtle Electric Generating Plant Unit I resolves the concerns noted in this report, their electrical qualification ,

program will be complete and in accordance with 10 CFR 50.49.

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4 This report is supplied as part of the " Equipment Qualification Case

Reviews" being conducted for the U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission, Office of Nuclear Reactor Regulation, Division of Pressurized Water Reactors l Licensing-A, Electrical Instrumentation and Control System Branch, by EG46 f Idaho, Inc., NRR and I&E Support Branch.

The U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission funded the work under the i authorization, B&R 20-19-40-41-2.

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CONTENTS ABSTRACT .............................................................. 11

SUMMARY

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FOREWORD .............................................................. iv

1. INTRODUCTION ..................................................... 1 i

2. 8ACKGROUND ....................................................... 2 1

3. PURPOSE .......................................................... 3

4. SCOPE ............................................................ 4

, 5. EVALUATION ....................................................... 5 i

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6. CONCLUSION ....................................................... 12 i

7. REFERENCES ....................................................... 13

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1 1 APPENDIX A--PRE-AUDIT REVIEW 0F THE V0GTLE ELECTRIC GENERATING PLANT UNIT I ENVIRONMENTAL QUALIFICATION PROGRAM (INCL, TA8LE I & TABLE II) ....................................... 15 4

j APPENDIX 8--SUMMARIES OF THE CENTRAL FILE REVIEW ...................... 35 I

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AUDIT OF THE ENVIRONMENTAL QUALIFICATION OF' SAFETY-RELATED ELECTRICAL E0UlpMENT FOR THE V0GTLE ELECTRIC GENERATING PLANT UNIT I

1. INTRODUCTION Equipment which is used to perform a necessary safety function must be

- demonstrated to be capable of maintaining functional operability under all service conditions postulated to occur during its installed life for the time it is required to operate. This requirement, which is embodied in General Desiga Criteria 1 and 4 of Appendix A and Sections III, XI, and XVII of Appendix 8 to 10 CFR 50, is applicable to equipment located inside as well as outside containment. More detailed requirements and guidance relating to the methods and procedures for demonstrating this capability have been set forth in 10 CfR 50.49, " Environmental Qualification of Electric Equipment Important to Safety for Nuclear Power Plants," and NUREG-0588, " Interim Staff Position on Environmental Qualification of Safety-Related Electrical Equipment" (References 1 ,

and 2). This NUREG supplements IEEE Standard 323-1974 (Reference 3), and various NRC Regulating Guides and industry standards.

On September 9-12, 1986, a team comprised of representatives of the NRR and I&E Support Branch of EG&G Idaho, Inc., and the NRC staff conducted an audit of the environmental qualification of safety-related electrical equipment for the Vogtle Electric Generating Plant Unit I. The work effort consisted of: (a) a pre-audit review of the licensee's submittal (References 4 and 5), (b) an audit of the licensee's central files for selected equipment items, and (c) an on-site visual inspection of the equipment items for which the central files were audited. Qualification deficiencies, as found while performing the pre-audit review, for individual equipment items are provided in Appendix A. SummJries of the central file review are provided in Appendix B.

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2. BACKGROUND NUREG-0588 was issued in December 1979 to promote a more orderly and systematic implementation of equipment qualification programs by the

industry and to provide guidance to the NRC

taff for its use in ongoing j licensing reviews. The positions contained in NUREG-0588 provide guidance *

! on (1) how to establish environmental service conditions, (2) how to select

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methods which are considered appropriate for qualifying equipment in j different' areas of the plant, and (3) other specific topics such as margin, aging, and documentation.

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j In February 1980 the NRC requested certain near term Operating License j (OL) applicants to review and evaluate the environmental qualification documentation for each item of safety-related electrical equipment and to

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i identify the degree to which their qualification programs comply with the l staff positions discussed in NUREG-0588. IE Bulletin 79-01B " Environmental l Qualification of Class 1E Equipment," issued January 14, 1980, and its  ;

l supplements dated February 29 September 30, and October 24, 1980, i established environmental qualification requirements for operating  :

1 j reactors. This bulletin and its supplements were provided to OL applicants i for consideration in their review. A final rule on environmental ,

I qualification of electrical equipment important to safety for nuclear power  !

l plants became effective on February 22, 1983. This rule, Section 50.49 of f i 10 CFR part 50, specifies the requirements to be met for demonstrating the  !

l environmental qualification of electrical equipment important to safety i l located in a harsh environment. In accordance with 10 CFR 50.49, the

) electrical equipment at the Vogtle Electric Generating Plant may be

} qualified to the acceptance criteria specified in Category 1 of NUREG-0588. ,

The qualification requirements for mechanical equipment are principally contained in Appendix A and 8 of 10 CFR 50. The qualification

! methods defined in NUREG-0588 can also be applied to mechanical equipment. (

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3. PURPOSE The purpose of this report is to evaluate the adequacy of the Vogtle Electric Generating Plant Unit I environmental qualification program for 4 electrical equipment important to safety as defined in 10 CFR 50.49. A

, discussion of open items, as well as any unresolved issues, is provided in this report.

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4. SCOPE The scope of this report includes an evaluation of the completeness of the list of equipment to be qualified, the criteria which they must meet, the environments in which they must function, and an assessment of the qualification documentation for the equipment. The principle area of -

review was the qualification of safety'-related equipment which must function in order to prevent or mitigate the consequences of a loss-of-coolant accident (LOCA) or high energy line break (HELB) inside or outside of containment, while subjected to the harsh environments associated with these accidents. It is limited to electrical equipment important to safety within the scope of 10 CFR 50.49. .

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5. EVALUATION The evaluation of the applicant's environmental qualification program included an on-site examination of electrical equipment, a review of the qualification documentation for these components, and a review of the

. applicant's Final Safety Analysis Report (FSAR) and Environmental Qualification of Electrical Egetpment Important to Safety Report (EQ submittal) for completeness and acceptability of systems and components, qualification methods, and accident environments. The criteria described in NUREG-0800, Revision 2, Section 3.11 (Reference 6), NUREG-0588, Category I, and Regulatory Guide 1.89, Revision 1 (Reference 7), form the basis for the evaluation of the adequacy of the applicant's qualification program.

An audit of the applicant's qualification documentation on selected equipment and a visual inspection of this equipment was performed by the staff on September 9-12, 1986. The audit consisted of a review of fourteen files (three by the NRC staff and eleven by EG&G Idaho) containing equipment qualification documentation. The staff's findings during the audit are discussed in detail in Section 5.4 and in Appendix B of this Technical Evaluation Report (TER).

5.1 Completeness of Eautoment Imoortant to Safety The applicant was directed to (a) establish a list of systems and components that are required to prevent or mitigate a LOCA or HEL8 and (b) identify components needed to perform the function of safety-related display instrumentation, post-accident sampling and monitoring, and

.adiation monitoring.

Based upon information in the applicant's EQ submittal, systems and conoonents included in the applicant's EQ program are those required to achieve and support: (a) emergency reactor shutdown, (b) containment isoletion, (c) reactor core cooling, (d) containment heat removal, (e) core resicual heat removal, and (f) prevention of significant release of radiocctive material to the environment.

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i With regard to 10 CFR 50.49(b)(2)' equipment, the applicant stated in the Environmental Qualification submittal that despite several analysis and scenarios they were unable to identify any nonsafety-related equipment

requiring qualification that meets the 50.49(b)(2) equipment definition of "nonsafety-related electric equipment whose failure under postulated

environmental conditions could prevent satisfactory accomplishment of

• safety functions."

I 5.2 Oualification Methods 5.2.1 Electrical fauipment in a Harsh Environment i

! Detailed procedures for qualifying safety-related electrical equipment j in a harsh environment are defined in NUREG-0588. The criteria in I

NUREG-0588 are also applicable to other equipment important to safety as defined in 10 CFR 50.49 paragraphs B(2) and B(3). Type testing of j equipment in a sequence consisting of pre-aging, seismic and dynamic l

loading, and exposure to LOCA/HELB conditions is the preferred method of i qualification. However, in a few cases the applicant has extrapolated

partial test data to estabitsh equipment qualification. Some of the files

reviewed during the on-site audit did contain analysis that was found to be j unacceptable. These are discussed in Section 5.4.

l 5.3 Service Conditions NUREG-0588 defines the methods to be utilized for determining the environmental conditions associated with loss-of-coolant accidents or high j energy line breaks inside or outside of containment. The analytical

methods used by the applicant to postulate environmental conditions were still under review by the NRC staff at the time of the on-site audit. The

] qualification documentation has been reviewed to ensure that the 4

qualification conditions envelop the specified conditions established by I the applicant as presented in their EQ submittal and/or as presented in the

! EQ files. See Section 5.4 for a further discussion on the problems i

i encountered in regard to the applicant's specified profiles, i 1 I

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5.3.1 Temoerature. Pressure. and Humidity Conditions Inside the Primary Containment The applicant provided the LOCA/HELB profiles used for equipment qualification. There are 3 harsh environmental zones located inside

, containment. The peak values resulting from these profiles are as follows: temperature, 400*F, pressure, 50 psig; and relative humidity,

.. 100% steam.

5.3.2 Temoerature. Pressure. and Humidity Conditions Outside the Primary Containment

.The applicant has provided the temperature, pressure and humidity conditions associated with normal / abnormal operation, and, high and moderate energy line breaks outside the containment. See Table A-1 for a summary of the peak environments resulting from these postulated events.

5.3.3 Submeraence ,

The flood level inside the containment that would result from a LOCA/HELB has been established by the applicant to be 181 ft. 2 in. The applicant has stated in the EQ submitted that the location of safety-related components was compared to the calculated flood level in the surrounding area. Those items identified as being below the flood level were reviewed for acceptability. In the majority of cases, it was confirmed that the submerged component was not required to be functional for the event that could cause the flooding and that failure of the component would be acceptable. In the remaining cases, it was shown that the component would perform its required function (e.g., input to an alarm) prior to the time it would become submerged. In such cases, it was also

. confirmed that subsequent submergence would not result in unacceptable consequences. In those cases in which failure of the component would be unacceptable, corrective actions were made (e.g., curbs) to preclude submergence.

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-The circuitry for submerged components.was reviewed for electrical interfaces with other components. It was judged by the applicant that the I

circuit breakers have been properly coordinated, so that submergence of the j component would not result in the failure of other connected devices.

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!- The aging requirements for Vogtle Electric Generating Plant Unit I' l electrical equipment are defined in Section 4, Category I of NUREG-0588.  ;

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The degrading influences of temperature, radiation, vibration, and mechanical stresses should be considered and included in the aging program. This requires the establishment of a qualified life and maintenance and replacement schedules based on the findings.

5.3.5 Radiation (Inside and Outside Containment)

The applicant has provided values for the radiation levels postulated

, to exist following a LOCA. The application and methodology employed by the applicant to determine these values are those methods found in NUREG-0588.

I The maximum value based on 40 years normal operation and one year

post-DBA Total Integrated Dose (TID), specified for use inside the 8

I containment is 2.0x10 Rads TIO gamma and beta.

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l Outside containment, values ranging from 1x10 Rads gamma to 1x109

) Rads gamma, depending upon specific component location, have been specified

! for use in qualifying components. See Table I for a summary of the TID's established by the applicant for those zones outside containment.

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Chemical spray is used for containment heat removal following a design ,

! basis accident. The composition of this spray has been specified by the j applicant to be 2000 ppm boron with NaOH (30 to 35 wt%) to maintain a pH between 8.5 to 10.5.

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t 5.4 Environmental Qualification Audit i

! An audit was conducted of the applicant's qualification documentation and installed equipment on September 9-12, 1986. Fourteen files were reviewed (11 by EG&G personnel and 3 by NRC personnel) to determine if the j o test data and analysis in the files supported the qualification status determined by the applicant. The following general comments were made during the audit.

1. For the number of files audited an unusual amount of justification was required to demonstrate qualification. The 4

utility is to review their entire program to identify files with-unusual numbers of justifications to meet the qualification

{ requirements and establish a plan to meet the requirements with fewer deviations from NUREG-0588 and ancillary standards.

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2. As a result of the audit it was discovered that the containment profiles used to qualify some of the equipment is not the same as i those provided in the submittal. As a result the utility is to f provide the new curves to NRC for review and approval and in the interim, all equipment inside containment not qualified to the l FSAR Chapter 6 LOCA/MSLB profiles are considered open items, i

Comments on specific files are as follows:

4 i 1. Conax Electrical 15 KV medium Voltage Penetration, EQOP-X3A803,

] Component Id. 11818H3P13. ,

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! o The test report establishing qualification was found to have l unacceptable deviations from NUREG-0588 and IEEE

{. Standard-317.

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2. Eaton 600 V Instrument Cable, EQDP-X3AJ04 o The methodology used to establish the qualified temperature was found to be unacceptable.

3. Limitorque Actuator, EQDP-X6AA15, (EQDP-hE-4), Component Id. lHV8116 o The file establishing qualification did not meet the requirements of NUREG-0588 Section 2.3, Test sequence, in regard to using separate effects as a basis for qualification.

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4. Limitorque Actuator, EQDP-X5AC01, Component Id. 1HV3500.

o Information needed to establish a 40 year qualifiej life for the specified conditions was not included in the file.

5. Pyco RTD, EQDP-X5AE06, Component Id. ITE 15215A o The required and demonstrated accuracies are considered open items.

o The post accident operability calculation was not in the file nor referenced on the SCEW sheet.

6. Chem Pump, EQDP-X6AA15 (EQDP-AE-3), Component Id. 11208P6006M01 o During the walkdown it was noted that the locations were incorrect on the SCEW sheets.

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7. Fisher /Asco Solenoid Valve, EQDP-X5ACO3, Component Id. 1HY2626.

o No Specific Comments.

8. Fisher /Namco Position Switch, EQDP-X5AC03, Component

, Id. 1250(C)26268.

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9. Westinghouse Hydrogen Recombiner, EQDP-X6AA15 (EQDP-SP-1),

Component Id. 11513H7001000.

o No Specific Comments.

10. Raychem Heat Shrink Termination Kits, EQDP-X3AJ11.

o No Specific Comments.

11. Barton Pressure Sensor, Model 351, EQDP-X6AA15 (EQDP-ESE-21),

Component Id. 1PX934.

o No Specific Comments.

12. Barton Pressure Transmitter, Model 764 EQDP-X6AA15 (EQDP-ESE-3A), Component Id. 1PT934.

o No Specific Comments.

13. Conax/Litton Electrical Seal Assembly, EQDP-X6AA15 (EQDP-HE-8).

. o No Specific Comments.

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14. Limitorque Actuator, EQDP-X6AA15 (EQDP-HE-1), Component Id.

IHV8701A.

o No Specific Comments. l Appendix B contains summaries of the central file review performed by -

EG&G personnel. These summaries present an indepth discussion on the above open items, including the resolution (if any) of the above open items.

5.5 Outstandina Eauipment The applicant has committed to having all safety-related equipment 1 qualified by the time their permit for fuel load is issued. In addition to correcting the concerns identified in Section 5.4 of this report, the applicant is to review and correct the SCEW sheet discrepancies and "open items" identified in Table A-2 of the appendix as discussed with the applicant during the on-site audit.

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6. CONCLUSION The electrical equipment environmental qualification program for the Vogtle Electric Generating Plant Unit I has been reviewed. The review has included the systems and components selected for qualification, the environmental conditions resulting from design basis accidents, the methods used for qualification and the documentation for specific items of

. equipment.

The following items are outstanding and should be resolved prior to issuance of an operating license.

1. The outstand.ing iteras identified during the on-site audit by the staff should be resolved.

2. Any outstanding items identified by the staff in the applicant's submittal should be resolved.

Based on these considerations, it is concluded that satisfactory completion of the corrective actions identified herein will ensure compliance to the requirements of 10 CFR 50.49 and relevant parts of General Design Criteria 1 and 4 of Appendix A;Section III, XI, and XVII of

'ppendix 8, 10 CFR 50.49; and the criteria specified in NUREG-0588.

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7. REFERENCES

1. Code of Federal Regulations, Environmental Qualification of Electric Equipment Important to Safety for Nuclear Power Plants, 10 CFR 50.49, February 22, 1983.

2. Interim Staff Position on Environmental Qualification of Safety Related Electrical Equipment, NUREG-0588, Revision 1.

3. IEEE Standard for Qualifying Class lE Equipment for Nuclear Power l Generating Stations, IEEE Std. 323-1974. ,

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4. Vogtle Electric Generating Plant Final Safety Analysis Report, Section 3.11, Amendment 23.

5. Vogtle Electric Generating Plant Environmental Qualification of Electrical Equipment Report, Revision 2, dated August 22, 1986.

6. NUREG-0800, Standard Review Plan, Section 3.11, Environmental Qualification of Mechanical and Electrical Equipment, Revision 2, July 1981.

7. U.S. NRC Regulatory Guide 1.89, Environmental Qualification of Certain Electrical Equipment Important to Safety for Nuclear Power Plants, Revision 1, June 1984.

8. U.S. NRC Regulatory Guide 1.97, Revision 2, December 1980, Instrumentation for Light-Water-Cooled Nuclear Power Plants to Assess Plant and Environs Conditions During and following an Accident.

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J APPENDIX A

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PRE-AUDIT REVIEW 0F THE V0GTLE ELECTRIC GENERATING PLANT l EQUIPMENTGUALIFICATIONPROGR5 e

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CONTENTS' TABLES

.- A-1

SUMMARY

OF V0GTLE I ENVIRONMENTAL CONDITIONS ..................... 19.

A-2

SUMMARY

OF V0GTLE I COMPONENT EVALUATIONS ........................ 21 4

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PRE-AUDIT REVIEW OF THE V0GTLE ELECTRIC GENERATING PLANT E0UIPMENT 00ALIFICATION PROGRAM The Vogtle Electric Generating Plant (VEGP) Environmental Qualification (EQ) Program, as found in Vogtle's FSAR, Section 3-11, Amendment 23, and Vogtle's EQ submittal, Rev 2, submitted by the Georgia

. Power Company was reviewed to determine compliance with 10 CFR 50.49 and Auxiliary standards. It was found that the applicant's methodology in achieving compliance to 10 CFR 50.49 was sound with the exceptions as pointed out in this pre-audit report. The VEGP has used 1EEE Standard 323-1974 and NUREG-0588 Category I, to establish requirements for qualification tests.and analysis performed on the electrical equipment.

A review of the VEGP EQ report and FSAR Ch 3.11 indicated the following areas of concern.

1. FSAR Table 3.11.8 1-2, the 80P EQDP summary is incomplete. ~"-

Qualification results and Qualified life of equipment are listed

'j as "later" with commeats of " Program in Progress".

2. FSAR Paragraph C. Pages 3.11.B l-3 needs to be updated to include the latest MSIV area superheat environmental conditions impacts on equipment qualifications.

3. FSAR Paragraph 3.11.N.2.3 indicates the Westinghouse Program outlined in WCAP-8587 and the EQDP is under review by NRC. EG&G believes this has been accepted per NRC letter from C. O. Thomas to E. P. Rahe, Jr., Westinghouse Corp,., dated November 10, 1983.

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. 4. F5'AR Table 3.1.B.3-1, sheet 9 of 11 and EQ submittal section 3.4. VEGP conformance statement relating to submergence, 2.2(5), is incorrect as evidenced by SCEW sheets for leak detection switches, GEMS /TRANS DELAVAL, ILSH9826 etc., and e Raychem termination kits.

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5. Table 3.11.N.3-1, sheet 2 of 16. NSSS Program response to NUREG-0588 Cat. I. position 1.22 ' indicates the Westinghouse C0C0 model described in WCAP-8327 of WCAP-8936 may not be approved by NRC for Generic use.

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6. A section in the EQ submittal or FSAR should address IE .

Notices / Bulletins as to plant specific actions taken to resolve them. -

7. Table A-1 and Table A-2 are attached. Table A-1 presents the

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VEGP environmental conditions as presented in the FSAR Ch. 3-11

, and in the EQ submittal dated July 31, 1986. Table A-2 lists the discrepancies identified during a review of the SCEW sheets of the August 22, 1986 submittal. The table indicates the discrepancies as identified by VEGP and those found during our review prior to the audit. The predominate discrepancies are the i "open items to be supplied" and the MSIV area environmental conditions and verification.of qualification of equipment located there. Other discrepancies where information on the SCEW sheets was incorrect, missing, or typographical errors identified during ,

the review are listed. These deficiencies do not necessarily mean the equipment is unqualified. However, the deficiencies are cause for concern and require further case by case evaluation.

The applicant should resolve these deficiencies and document the resolutions in an auditable form.

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< TABLE A-1. (continued)

Temperature Pressure Radiation Humidity Chemical 1 Spray Sutmergence Butiding Deorees F PSIG 40 Years + Accident _

Outside Areas (Ill)

Mild NA NA

1. Main Steam Tunnels Mild Mild IE3 NA NSCS Piping Tunnels Mild Mild IE3 Mild NA

2. Mild NA NA

3. Diesel Cen Cooling Tunnel Mild Mild IE3 NA Mild Mild IE3 Mild NA

4. Diesel Gen. Elac. Tunnel Mild NA NA

5. Aux. FW Tunnels Mild Mild IE3 NA Mild Mild IE3 Mild NA

6. RWST & RMWST Tunnels Mild NA - NA

7. Elec. Sim. Boller Tunnel Mild Mild IE3 NA S. Reactor MU Water 5tg. Tank Mild Mild IE3 Mild NA

9. RWST Mild Mild IE3 Mild NA NA i

i

! Note: If any one of the following conditions exist, the location is considered " HARSH."

1. Temperature increases due to a pipe break

2. T.I.D. > 1 x 104 rad.

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__.__ ___________ _ __ _ _________ _ _ _ . _ . _ _ _ _ _ _ -_. . _ _ _ _ _ . _ _ _ _ _ _ _ . _ . . _ . _ . - . . _ . ,. _ m, _ _ . _ . __ . _m.. _ _

TABLE A-2. (Continued)

Manuf acturer/ Type of Number of Qualification Deficiencies identified Deficiencies identified .

by the Applicant by the Reviewer Component /Model C_osconents Report locations 2

BOP COMPONENTS COMSIP Inc.

Auxiliary building, None. None.

Hydrogen monitoring 2 COMSIP #1035-1 fuel handling panel, model K-llt building CONAX Corb IPS-473 Containment None. None.

Penetration, 48 type 2, 3, IPS-585.3 LVPLC, LVPSC control 6 IPS-473 Containment None. None.  ;

Penetration, i ,

type 1 MV IPS-585.3 power IPS-473 Containment Mone. None.

Penetration, 18 N type 4, 5 IPS-585.2

• N instrument IPS-585.4 Cutler Hammer Motor control center, 2 Eaton Auxiliary building None. None.

} model NA PEITR-83-22-1, niest. RQR-104A, Rockbestos DA23-0210 i

CV1/ Reliance

! Cooling unit-motor, 8 X604 Containment building None. None.

model 600287-79 frame 5008 EATON Corp. ,

600V Instrument and 1 No. BE8 & Inside and outside None. None.

specialty cable, Sandia NUREG/ containment 25 mils XLP0 CR0275R2 insulation with HYPALON jacket sch SE-8

, a -- - - - -- - -- . - _ _ - - _ - . _ _ . _ _ .

. ~- - .. .. -. , . - - - . . . _-- __-.- _ - . . _ _ . - _ ~ . . . . - - _ . . . . . - , - - - . . - - . . . . .

• * , ,e TABLE A-2. (Cor.tinued)

Deficiencies identified Deficiencies Identified Manufacturer / Type of Number of Qualification by the Appilcant by the Reviewer ,

_ Component /Model Components Report Locations ,

ROP COMPONENTS Eaton Corp. (continued)

Inside and outside None. None.

600V Instrument and 1 No. 8E-2 &

specialty cable, Sandia NUREG/ containment 1.

' model 30 alls XLP0 CR0275R2 l.

insulation with HYPALoel Jacket sch. 8E-2 F isher/ASCO Containment building, None. Missing references, wrong Solenoid Valve, 6 ASCO-AQS21678/

equipment building, component, wrong model NPK 8316A14E,. TR-Rev A manufacturer, incorrect NI u 32lA2V West. auxillary building

' EQ&T-EQT-2364, report, and typographical ,

BPC log mistakes.

X6AA15-7-1 MSIV area, Mone. MSIV area superheat not ,

to Solenoid valve, 23 ASCO-AQR-67368  !

" Containment building, shown. '

mudel NPK 8320A186 fuel handling, building, auxillary i

building I

F isher/NAMCO Containment building, None. MSIV area superheat not Position switch, 30 NAMCO-QTR-105 MSIV area, fuel shown. ,

model EA180 handling building, 4, equipment building i Gems /Trans Delaval ,

Wyle Lab. Auxiliary building None. None. l Level switch, 20  !

47037-01, &

1 model LS-41740 i 45700-1 ITT Rarton Instruments _

Containment building, None. None.

Pressure transmitter, 3 #R3-763-6 l fueI hand 1Ing

onde1 763-351 building, auxiliary i

building 4

[

t

[

1

- - , - . . . - . . ,~ . . . .

j -

TAP.LE A-2. (Continued)

Deficiencies identified Deficiencies identified Manufacturer / Type of Number of Qualification by the Applicant by the Reviewer Component /Model y nts C Report incations _

BOP COMPONENTS III Barton Instruments (continued)

Containment Qualification incomplete. Not Reviewed.

Level transmitter, 5 #R3-764-20 model 764-352 ,

Containment None. None.

F low transmitter, 8 #R3-764-9 model 764 til General Auxiliary building, None. None, E-H actuator, 2 ITT Gen.

model NH95G Requal.

Program 730.i.140 i Johnson Controls /FCI ,

4 to None.

• F low Sensor / transmitter, 14 FC1-708349 Containment building, None.

model LT81 ,

Johnson Controls /NAMCO Containment building, None. None, Position switch, 30 NAMCO-QfR 105 model EA180 fuel handling building, auxiliary building Johnson Controls /TAVl5 Control building, None. None, Dif ferential pressure 3 NTS 557-13478 transmitter, model P8C, & 1347E fuel handling building.

P8C(S)

Johnson Controls /UE 8 Action testing Auxillary building, None.

Temperature indicating . Nr.ne.

switch, model 802-6AS Corp. fuel handling

1. 17255 & building.

17255-1 None. None, Temperature element, 4 FEl-708382 Auxiliary building no.lel FR12-IS (sensor only) 1

! . e

- _ . . - ~ -- .

- -.. - - - - --. _ -- ..- - . . . - - . - _ . - . - . . _ - - - - - - .-~. . .....- ,. - . ~,

t i

? TABLE A-2. (Continued)

=*

Deficiencies Identified Deficiencies identified 5 Manuf acturer/ Type of Number of Qualification by the Appilcant by the Reviewer Component /Model Report locations C_o w nts BOP COMPONENTS Johnson Controls /ASCO None, t Solenoid valve, 20 ASCO Fuel handling Mone.

" model MPL831674E, fAQS-21678/TR building, Rev A & Rev 8 auxiliary building.

& NPL8321A2E J Johnson Controls /ITT General Fuel handling None. None.

[-H actuator, C IIT #730.1.140 building, auxillary model int 95G. NH91 building. i l

h/Re11ance s

None. '(

Motor, mudel 2 Joy-X604 & Containment building None.  ;

600287-90 addendum i N None.

• Motor, model 2 AAF fMESE-329 Auxiliary building None.

500H26-2783 appendix 52 ,

j; frame 365T Kerite 4 AC-4160V Containment building None. None.

1 Cable. SKV j power cable, liiK-SPS

' shielded, FR jacketed i Limitorque Limitorque Containment building None. None. ,

Limitorque Valve 2 a Actuator, Models 58, Report 30212 ,

1 SMB, and SMC 15 Limitori:ve M51V area and Qualification incomplete. Not Reviewed ,

Report 800456 containment building  ;

Motor-WCAP containment hullding Qualification incomplete. Not Reviewed 13 8587 Supplement i EPDP-tE-1 i Rev. 3 1

Actuator-

' Limitorque i Report 900456 i

i 4

nn------.. ._ - _ . . _ - - - -- ., , v v,, . ,.,..+n.

TABLE A-2. (Continued)

Deficiencies identified Deficiencies identified Manuf acturer/ Type of Number of Qualification by the Applicant by the Reviewer Component /Model Components Report locations _

BOP CflMPONENTS Limitorque (continued) timitorque MSIV area, fuel Qualification incomplete. Not Reviewed.

Limitorque Valve 16 Actuator, Models 58, Report B0003 handling, equipment, and auxillary SMB, and SMC buildings L Limitorque MSIV Area Qualification incomplete. Not Reviewed 4

Report B0009 (DCactuator)

NAMCO MSIV area, None. MSIV area superheat not Limit switch, 17 NAMCO-fQTR-105 containment building, shown.

model EA-100 auxiliary building, '

equipment building to l 05 NUTHERM Fuel handling Mone. None.

Humidity controllers 9 fN-101-R

& sensors, no model building, auxiliary tellding numbers OKONITE Mone. None, Cable, 600 Volt 1(generic) AWV-02-80 & Inside and outside power and control, ER No. 355 containment model EPR insulation Containment building None. None, Cable. SKV power 1(generic) AWV-06-00 armored, model- & ER No. 355 okoguard insulation Paul Monroe MSIV area. None. MSIV area superleat not Electro-hydraulic 4 FPA89946 shown.

actuator, model - VOL 62 l _ . . . . . _

-=. .- . _ ~ - . - - . - . - - . . _ _ _ . - . . _ . - - . - - _ - . . - _ . - . - _ . - -. . ..-

TABLE A-2. (Continued)

Manuf acturer/ Type of Number of Qualification Deficiencies Identified Deficiencies identified by the Applicant by the Reviewer Component /Model Components Report _ Locations _

BOP C11MPONENTS PYC0 PYf0-fl6436-82N Auxiliary building None. Specified and Jemo Rip, model 122-7026 24 strated accuracy.

Raythem Auxillary building None. None.

lermination kit 8 KV 1 QPI-V12 high voltage heat shrinkable, NMCK8 None. None, Termination kit, low 4 QPI-Vl2 Containment voltage heat shrinkable NE5K, NMCK.

WC5F-N, and NCBK Reliance AAF-NESE-738 Auxillary building, None. None.

Motor, f rame 14 1321, 184T, NUC-9, fuel handling NUC-18 building CCL Rtp. No. Fuel hand 11pg None. None.

Local control station, 1 model IH510628 A-485-82 building Rock bestos Outside containment None. None, Cable, instrument & 2 QR-3806 speciality coaxial, ,

R55-6-104/LE, R55-6-100/tE Cable, instrument & 1 Uncertain Inside and outside None. Qualification document speciality triaxial, containment referenced is for R55-6-104/LE.

R 55-6-109/LE Switchboard wire, 1 QR 1806 Outside containment None.  ;

Firewall 515 1

Rockwell 8 Rockwell MSIV area Mone. MSIV area superheat not Actuator, RAL 7090 shown.

model A290

iABLE A-2. (Continued)

Deficiencies identified Deficiencies identified Manuf acturer/ Type of Misnber of Qualification by the Applicant by the Reviewer Conponent/Model Components Report locations BOP COMPONEN15 WOSEMOUNI None. None, Pressure transmitter, 6 Rosemuunt Auxillary building, model 1153 GB 108025 containment Containment Qualification incomplete. Not Reviewed F low transmitter, 2 Rosemount ammtel 1153 GB 108025 None. None, l'Iow transmitter, 9 Rosemount Containment.

model 1153 DB, B 108025 auxillary building, control building Fuel handling Nor.e. None.

Pressure transmitter, 3 Rosemount model 1153 8 108025 & 26 building, auxillary building VALCOR to None.

CD Process solenoid valve, 36 VALCOR Contelnment building, None.

models $295, 5683, 6042, QR526-5683-6 fuel handling 6030, and 6040 building, auxillary building

l'

. . , e l

l TABLE A-2. (Continued)

Deficiencies identified Deficiencies identified Manufacturer / Type of Number of Qualification by the Applicant by the Reviewer Component /Model Cnsponents Report 1.nc at ions M555 COMPONEN15 ASCO MalV area, Qualification incomplete for Temperature margin for Solenoid valve, 28 WCAP-8587 those located inside l model hP831654E, & Rev 6A & containment, these located in the MSIV area.

l auxillary building containment.

model NP832iA5 EQOP-lie 2/5 j Rev 5 fuel handling building.

Solenoid valve, 8 WCAP-8587 Aust11ary building None.

model 206-381-6F Rev 6A &

EQDP-HE 2/S Rev 5 BARION Containment building, None. None, Dif ferential pressure 10 WCAP 8587 transeltter, model Rev 6A & auxillary building.

764 EQOP-ESE-3A fuel handling building y Rev 4 WCAP 8587 Containment building Mone. None.

Pressure sensor, 4 model 351 Rev 6A &

EQDP-ESE-21 Rev 4 Aust11ary building, None. None.

Dif f erential pressure 10 WCAP 8587 I transmitter, model Rev 6A & fuel handling 752, 153 EQOP-ESE-4 building Rev 6 Containment building None. None, Pressure transaltter, I WCAP 8587 model 763 Rev 6A &

E00P-ESE-1A Auxillary building. None. None.

Dif ferential pressure 6 WCAP-8587 indicating switch, Rev 6A & fuel handling EQOP-ESE-49A building model 581-4 Rev 1 6 WCAP 8587 Containment building None. None.

High volume sensor, model 353 Rev 6A &

EQOP-ESE-48A Rev 1 None, Dif ferential pressure 2 WCAP 8587 Auxiliary building Mone.

indicating switch, Rev 6A &

model 581 EQDP-ESE-40A l

' Rev i

IAntE A-2. (Continued)

Deficiencies identified Deficiencies identified Manuf acturer/ Type of Number of Qualification by the Applicant by the Reviewer Component /n> del Coroonents _. Report _

incations NS$$ CINPONENTS Cit [tftMP Auxiliary building None. None.

Pump motor, 2 WCAP 8587 model Gvil-10K Rev 6A &

EQDP-AE-3 Rev 5 CEB Industries Inside Reactor None. Speciffed and demonstrated Incore thermocouple, I WCAP 8587 accuracy.

Type K Rev 6A & Vessel EQOP-E5E-43A Rev I WCAP 8587 Containment bul'iding None. None.

o 10 extension cable & 1

• connector, model - Rev 6A &

211146 Rev A EQDP-ESE-438 o

CONAX/t!ITON Inside and outside None. None.

[lec. Seal Assy. Generic EQDP-ItE-8 Extel Hl1007/CIR containment CROSBY Containment building None. None.

Position indication 3 WCAP 8587 device, andel Rev 6A &

D5-C-65678 EQDP-HE-7 Rev I GARREIT Solenoid operated 2 WCAP 8587 Containment building None. None, pilot valve, model Rev 6A &

37'20014 EQDP-ilE-9 Rev 1 t_IMITORyur Limitorque Valve 46 WCAP-8587 Auxiliary and None. ,

Specified parameters or Supplement I fuel handling component location for h iels $8 and SMB lHVB811A, 1HV9002A, EQDP-HE-1 buildings, and Rev 3 containment building IHV88118 and Iffv90028.

32 WCAP-8587 Auxillary and None. Radiation, POSI-DBA Supplement I fuel handling operability time and EQOP-HE-4 buildings Note I for IHV8116.

Rev 4

TABLE A-2. (Continued)

Manuf acturer/Iype of Number of Quellfication Deficiencies identified Deficiencies identified Locations by the Applicant by the Reviewer Cneponent/Model Components Report NSSS C11MPONtNIS MinC0 RID 14 WCAP 8587 Contalrunent building Qualification incomplete for m .e.

model 58809, 58810 Rev 6A & 4 components located below flood EQDP-ESE-47A level.

Rev 1 NAMCO 64 WCAP 8587 MSIV area, None. None.

Limit switch, ex1el EA180 Rev 6A Containment building, EQOP-HE-3/6 auxiliary building, Rev 4 MSIV area, fuel handling building E

WCAP 8587 Contalment pullding Mone. None.

w RID 24

• model 21204, 21205 Rev 6A &

EQOR-ESE-6 Pew 5 EQCR-ESE-5, Rev 4 1ARGEI ROCK WCAP 8587 Auxillary building, Qualification incomplete. Not reviewed.

E lectronic control 5 mwfule, model 801 Rev 6A, control building EQOP-ILE-3/6 Rev 4 &

HE-10B Rev 1 Containment building, None. None, Solenoid operated 7 WCAP 8587 modulattnq valve, Rev 6A & auxiliary building model 79A8-003, 005, EQDP-HE-10A 006, 008. Rev 2 HE-10C Rev 1 Containment building None. None.

Solenoid operated 12 WCAP 8587 Isolation valve, Rev 6A &

model 79A8-001, 004 E00P-HE-10A

' Rev 2 l

l I

_ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ ._--_ _ . _ _ . _ _ _ _ . _ _ _ . _ _ _ . _ . _ . _ _ _ . _ . _ _ _ _ _ _ _ . _ _ _ _ . - _ . - . _ _ _ . . _ . . . - . . . _ . _ . _,__m IABLE A-2. (Continued) i Manuf acturer/ Type of Number of Qualification Deficiencies identified Deficiencies identified .

by the Appilcant by the Reviewer Caponent/Model Components Report Locations __

N555 CONPONENTS TOBAR Auxillary building None. None.

Differential pressure 14 WCAP 8587 transmitter, model Rev 6 containment building 32 Del. EQDP-ESE-38 &

3C Rev 1 Auxiliary building, None. None. r Pressure transmitter, 7 WCAP 8587 model 32 pal Rev 6 containment building EQDP-ESE-18 &

IC Rev I WCAP 8587 Fuel handling None. None.

Pressure transmitter 2 (Gp B), model 32PG2 Rev 6 building EQDP-ESE-2 Rev 5. ESE-2C RevI l u

!" VERIIRAK 23 WCAP 8587 Containment building None. None.

Dif ferential pressure transmitter model 760P2 Rev 6 & '

EQOP-ESE-38 6 WCAP 8587 Auxiliary building. None. None.

Pressure transmitter, l

model 76PGI, 16PH2 Rev 5, & containment building l

EQDP-ESE-18 12 WCAP 8587 Containment building None. None.

Olfferential pressure

• transmitter, model 760P1 Rev 6A, I EQDP-ESE-4  ;

I Rev 6 Westinehouse None.  !

Hydrogen recombiner, 2 WCAP 8587, Containment building None.

l i model B WCAP 7709L. .

l EM 9M6 '.

t 2 WCAP 8587 Ausillary building None. None. l I L arge pump motor, '

model TEWC Rev 6A. '

EQOP-AE-2 Rev 5 .

l Containment building None. None, Incore TC reference 2 WCAP 8587, ,

junction bon, model ESE-44A WK-34794 '

.-4 ,. . _ --, _ . . - . , - . , - - . , . - - -- , ._ , _

- - _ . _ . . - _ _ _ . - _ _ _ _ _ - - - _ _ . _ _ . _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ , . _ . _ _ . . . _ ~_.

TABLE A-2. (Continued)

Deficiencies identified Deficiencies Identified i Manuf acturer/ Type of Number of Qualification by the Applicant _ by the Reviewer Component /Model Components Report Locations _

N555 COMPONENTS Westinghouse (continued)

Containment building Qualification incnarlete Not Reviewed.

IC splice, model 1 WCAP 0587 15&G/ISA(84)-192 Rev 6A ESE-43C Westinghouse / PED Containment building Mone. None, Integrated head I WCAP 8587, package connector ESE-43C mwiel 211147, 211I45 l

M tinghouse l

Wide range flux detector, 2 Later Containment building Qualification incomplete. Not Reviewed.

model WL-24205 Cable spilcer assy../ WCAP 8587, Containment building Qualification incomplete. Not Reviewed.

d hardline potting adapter, 1

ESE-43C model 15&S/15A (84)-192 Radiation detectors, 8 WCAP 8587 Containment building, Qualification for model 6091042G01 None.

incomplete.

models ESE-708, 70A auxillary building, l MSIV area 6091042G01, 101

~

6094089GPl 6092D96GP1 4 WCAP 8587, Containment building None. None.

PR neutron detector, model WL-24154 ESE-8A WCAP 8587 Containment building Mone. None.

SR & IR neutron 2 detectors, model ESE-9A WL-23821 SR & IR preampilfters, 2 WCAP 8587 Control building Qualification incompleted. Not Reviewed model 1469F29G01 ESE-11 Neutron flux preamp, 2 Later Control building Qualification incompleted. Not Reviewed model WL-24207 WCAP 8587, Containment building, Qualification incomplete. Not Reviewed Radiation monitor 5 audio /vlsual alarm, ESE-70F fuel handling model 2390A74G02 building WCAP 8587 Containment building, Qualification incomplete. Not Reviewed l Radiation monitor 5 l remote indicator, ESE-70E fuel handling model 6087064G01 building l

l

l I

(

1ABLE A-2. (Continued)

Number of Qualification Deficiencies identified Deficiencies identified Manuf acturer/ Type of by the Reviewer locations by the Applicant Component /Model C_omponents _ Report NS$$ COMPONENIS Westinghouse (continued)

Containment building None. None.

Signal cable. 2 WCAP 8587 model 3385CO3GPl 2 ESE-70E 3, 4 & 6093044GPI Radiation detector, 1 WCAP 8587 Fuel bandling Qualification incomplete. Not Reviewed model 6087D88602 ESE-70C building 6 WCAP 8587 Auxiliary building None. None.

Large pump motor, .

model - Ilfe line D Rev 6A &

EQDP-AE-2 Rev 5 WCAP 8587 Auxiliary building, None. None.

w Medium ptmp motor, 2 A f rame 4041 Rev 6A & fuel bandling EQDP-ESE-AE-1 building Rev 4 i

i l

l l

l l

l 1

l l

l

e e

APPENDIX B SUMMARIES Of CENTRAL FILE REVIEWS l

i

. l 35

CONTENTS Barton Pressure Sensor Model 351 EQDP-X6AA15 (EQDP-ESE-21) ............ 37 Barton Differential Pressure Transmitter Model 764 EQDP-X6AA15 (EQDP-ESE-314) ............................................ 38 Chempump Pump Motor Model GVH-10k EQDP-X6AA15 (EQDP-AE-3) ............. 40 Conax 15KV Electrical Penetration EQDP-X3AB03 ......................... 41 Eaton Corporation Electrical Cable Model 600v Instrument and Speciality Cable EQDP-X3AJ04 .......................................... 44 Fisher /Namco Position Switch Mode EA 180 EQDP-X5AC03 .................. 46 Limitorque Valve Actuator Model's SB and SMB EQDP-X6AA15 (EQDP-HE-4) ........................................................... 48 Limitorque Valve Actuator Model SMB-1 Component 10, 1HV8701B EQDP-X6AA15 (EQDP-HE-1) ...................................... 50 Limitorque Valve Actuator Model SB-000 Component ID 1HV3500 EQDP-X5AC01 ................................................... 51 1

PYC0 RTD, Model 122-7026 Component ID ITE152157 EQDP-X5AE06 ........... 52 Westinghouse Electric Hydrogen Recombiner Model B EQDP-X6AA15 (EQDP-SP-1) ............................................... 53 i

e i

l 36 l l

. BARTON PRESSURE SENSOR MODEL 351 E00P-X6AA15 (EODP-ESE-21)

Four of these sensors are used at Vogtle Unit 1. They are located in the containment building and are used to sense containment pressure.

. The maximum environmental parameters for which these sensors are required to be qualified based on the Vogtle specification are temperature, 400*F; pressure, 50 psig; humidity, 100%; radiation, 3 x 10 rads y and 8

1.5 x 10 rads S; and chemical spray, 2000 ppm boron plus sufficient sodium hydroxide solution to achieve the desired pH. The sensors are above the flood level. The maximum post-DBA operability time is four months.

Qualification of sensors is based on tests of the same model documented in WCAP-8587 Supp. 1 EQDP-ESE-21 Rev. 4 and WCAP-8687 Supp. 2 E21A Rev. 2. The test sensors were aged at 300*F for 30.8 days and were irradiated to an exposure of 6.8 x 10 rads. Calculations were referenced that demonstrate the radiation exposure is equivalent to 8

5.0 x 10 rads y plus 9 x 10 rads S. The transmitters were then exposed to the simulated design basis accident (08A) with peak environmental conditions of: temperature, 420*F; pressure, 72 psig; humidity, 100%; and chemical spray, 24 hrs. of 2750 ppm boron and sufficient sodium hydroxide to achieve a pH of 10.7.

A qualified life in excess of 10 years with four months post-D8A operability time was established by the Arrehenius Methodology.

The accuracy demonstrated during the test of 11% met the plant specified accuracy of 11% required during and after a DBA.

In conclusion, these sensors are considered qualified for the

. conditions specified at the Vogtle Unit 1 plant and documentation is contained in the applicant's file to support the qualification.

37

-BARTON DIFFERENTIAL PRESSURE TRANSMITTER

! MODEL 764 E00P-X6AA15 (E00P-ESE-314)

These transmitters are located in the containment building, the l auxiliary building and the fuel handling building. They are used to ,

measure containment pressure, reactor vessel vent flow, excessive letdown to the pressure reduction tank, reactor heat removal minimum flow and -

charging pump safety injection flow.

The maximum environmental parameters for which these transmitters are required to be qualified based on the Vogtle specifications are: temperature, 400*F; pressure, 50 psig; humidity, 100%;, radiation, 3 x 10 rads y and 1.5 x 10 rads S; and chemical spray, 2000 ppm boron plus sufficient sodium hydroxide solution to achieve the desired pH.

! The transmitters are either above the flood level or are not required to operate for the event that causes the transmitter to be submerged. The

maximum post-DBA operability time is four months.

Qualification of the transmitters is based on tests of a Model 764 transmitter. These tests are documented in WCAP 8587 Supplement 1 EQDP-ESE-3A Rev. 4 and EQTR-E0-3A. The test transmitters were thermally

, aged at 125'C for 1673 hrs at 125'C. Failed 0-rings were replaced and the transmitters with replaced 0-rings were aged for an additional 350 hrs, at i

125'C. The transmitters were irradiated to an exposure of 6.8 x 10 rads. Calculations were referenced that demonstrate this 8

exposure is equivalent to 5.0 x 10 rads y and 9 x 10 rads S. The transmitters were then exposed to the simulated design basis accident (DBA)

]

with peak environmental conditions: temperature, 420*F; pressure, 72 psig; humidity, 100%; and chemical spray of 2500 ppm boron and sufficient sodium hydroxide to achieve a pH of 10.7. The post-DBA was simulated by 15 days .

at 250*F.

1 A qualified life of 6 years in the containment building and 10 years in the auxiliary and fuel handling buildings was established by the I

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Arrehenius Methodology. A four month post-DBA operability time was also established in all buildings by the Arrehenius Methodology. The qualified life of tne 0-ring was established as 2 years. Erratic behavior was observed on some of the test transmitters. Some of the erratic response was demonstrated to be corrected by soldering the connector between the ,

strain gauge and the circuit board. Vogtle verified lihat the installed transmitters were all purchased by P.O. 487247 Lot 7 which they reported s

, had the modification included in the original fabrication. In response to the Audit Team's request to see maintenance procedures that would call far the replacement of the 0-rings at 2 years and transmitters at 10 years, Vogtle reported that the procedures for these components afe not in place.

A description of the procedures for developing the maintenance program that assures these requirements are included was provided.

A justification was given for eliminating consideration of this erratic behavior in establishing the qualified accuracy of the transmitters. With this justification, the demonstrated accuracy enveloped the required accuracy. ,

l In conclusion, these transmitters are considered qualified for 6 years in the containment building and 10 years in the auxiliary building and the fuel handling building provided the 0-rings ara replaced every two years.

Documentation is contained in the applicant's file to support the l qualification.

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8 39

4 CHEMPUMP PUMP MOTOR MODEL GVH-10K.

, E0DP-X6AA15 (E00P-AE-3)

These pump motors are used on the boric acid transfer pumps and are located in the auxiliary building and will not be exposed to the adverse .

environmental conditions from a design base HELB. Environmental testing is only required to demonstrate equipment capability under nornal and abnorpal .

temperature extremes. The specified environmental parameters are: temperature, 100*F; pressure, atmos; humidity, 60%; no chemical spray or submergence; and radiation, 7 x 10* rads gamma TIO. (per calc.

X6CJH.32.0). Operability time required is for continuous operation.

a Tests were performed on selected components of the Chempump motor that could be subject to thermal aging or radiation degradation. Individual component type tests were performed on the stator (simulated by use of motorettes), leads, lead connector, bearings, gaskets, and seals. The I components were thermally aged for the equivalent of a minimum of 5 years (22 years for stator). The motorettes, bearings, and lead connectors were I 8 irradiated to 2 x 10 rads which is greater than that expected from 40 years of normal and one year post-accident operation.

The environmental parameters to which the components were tested are: temperature, 122*F; pressure, atmospheric; humidity, 95%; and 5

radiation, 1 x 10 rads gamma TID.

4 I In conclusion the Chempump motors are qualified for the environment specified for five years and supporting documentation is contained in the applicant's files.

During the walkdown inspection it was noted that the locations of the .

Chempump motors were not in agreement with the SCEW sheets. The utility is to correct the SCEW sheets. -

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CONAX 15KV ELECTRICAL PENETRATION E0DP-X3AB03 l i

l Six medium voltage penetrations of this design are used in the plant.

Four are used for the power leads to the main coolant and two are installed spares. The equipment identification numbers are 1818H3P08, 13, 17, 18 52 I and 55.

l The maximum environmental parameters for which these penetrations are required to operate based on the Vogtle specifications are: temperature, 8

400*F; pressure 50 psig; humidity, 100%; radiation, 2 x 10 rads Total

Integrated Dose (TID) and chemical spray, 2000 ppm Boron, 30-35 Weight %

i Na0H with pH - 8.5 to 10.5. The required post design basis accident (DBA)

operability time is one year.

1 l Qualification of the penetration was based on the tests of a similar

] 5 KV penetration supplemented with tests on a similar 8 KV penetration.

The tests of the 5 KV penetration were reported in CONAX report IPS-473, j and the tests on the 8 KV penetration were reported in CONAX report 1PS-585.

The 5 KV penetration was thermally aged at 250*F for 168 hrs, and received 1.19 x 10 Rads TID. It was then exposed to the DBA simulation 4 with 396*F peak temperatures without chemical spray and a post-accident simulation equivalent to 158.7 days. The justification for similarity was j not given for all tests conducted. In addition, not all the tests required

) by IEEE-317 were performed on the SKV penetrations nor were these conducted in the specified sequence nor did they always envelope the specific Vogtle requirements. Justifications for some parameters were given by referencing

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tests conducted on the 8 K'l penetrations. This method leads to qualification by " separate effects" since the 5 KV penetration did not i experience all of the tests. This method is not usually accepted. A j summary of the tests that did not meet the specified requirements and

. justification, if provided in the file, are given below with reference to the paragraphs of IEEE-317. ,

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6.4.4 The dielectric strength test was conducted at 15 KV on the 5 KV penetration without justification of how this satisfies the requirement of 36 KV for the 15 KV penetration.

6.4.7 The rated continuous current test was conducted out of sequence.

A justification was provided that the sequence used was more .

severe.

6.4.10 The short circuit current test did not envelope the measurements for the penetration based on Paragraph 4.2.4 of IEEE-317. The justification given stated that other tests on similar cables had demonstrated that the cable would be capable of carrying the higher short circuit current loads. This method is a " separate effects" test and is not acceptable.

6.4.11 The seismic testing was conducted out of sequence. The justification given was that the normal service thermal aging and irradiation did not introduce any damage. The measurement taken would not identify change in physical properties.such as strength and therefore the justification is not valid.

0 6.4.13 The total irradiation was'l.19 x 10 rads while the specified requirement was 2 x 10 rads. The justification given was other test for a similar penetration demonstrated that the higher irradiation levels did not damage the penetrations. This method is a " separate effects" evaluation and is not acceptable.

6.4.14 The test of rated maximum duration of rated short circuit current was not conducted using the values of current specified in IEEE-317. A justification was given that demonstrated that the test conducted produced a more severe heating than the required .

test.

The Design Basis Event (DBE) tests had a peak temperature of only 396"F. The required temperature specified was 400"f plus margin.

42

Justification was given in the test report by showing that the temperature of the penetration would not exceed 308'F. Vogtle apparently did not choose to use the test report justification to verify qualification.

Justification given on the System Component Evaluation Work (SCEW) Sheets l 1s calculation X6CJF.02 and X6CHG.18. Resolution of the containment i

temperatures for the DBE has been raised as a general issue during the  ;

, audit. Resolution of the general is. sue will serve as resolution for this item.

l The DBE tests did not include a chemical spray. Justification in the test report was based on the~ design having an enclosed box and seals. The integrity of these components has not been demonstrated by test. Also, the possible degradation to be added to other effects is omitted.

The post-DBE simulation tests had a post-accident thermal aging equivalent to 158.7 days which is less than the specified service requirement of 1 year. No justification for the shorter time was given.

I The file in general had too many variations from the standard such I that the standard could not be used with confidnce to establish qualification. In addition, the justifications for low short circuit current, out of sequence seismic testing, low irradiation exposure, and l

i omitting chemical spray are not considered adequate.

j In response to these concerns, Vogtle suggested that the file be I changed to justify qualification of the penetration by the series of type j tests for another similar penetration, an 8 KV penetration. The suggestion

is considered acceptable if the test conditions are verified to envelope

.; the Vogtle specific requirements and an acceptable similarity analysis is provided.

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EATON CORPORATION ELECTRICAL CABLE MODEL 600V INSTRUMENT AND SPECIALITY CABLE E00P-X3AJ04 l The cable is two conductor with 25 mils XLP0 insulation and a Hypalon jacket. The cable is used throughout the plant to provide electrical .

continuity in instrument loops.

The maximum environmental parameters for which the cable are required to be qualified based on the Vogtle specification, including consideration of superheat in the MSIV area, are: temperature, 422*F; pressure, 50 psig; humidity, 100%; radiation, 2 x 10 rads; and chemical spray, 2000 ppm with sufficient sodium hydroxide to achieve a pH of-8.5 to 10.5. The cable

! is located below the flood level in some applications. The maximum post-0BA operability time is one year.

Qualification was based tests of samples of the same type cable. The tests are documented in Qualification Report No. 8E-8 which includes test report NTS 558-1088.

The test samples were aged without the jacket for 220.3 hours3.472222e-5 days <br />8.333333e-4 hours <br />4.960317e-6 weeks <br />1.1415e-6 months <br />. The jackets were installed on the samples and they were irradiated to 3.5 x 10 rads. The jacketed samples were then aged at 121*C for 168 hours0.00194 days <br />0.0467 hours <br />2.777778e-4 weeks <br />6.3924e-5 months <br /> and then irradiated to 1.65 x 108 rads. The samples were subjected to a simulated design basis event with a peak environmental conditions of: temperature, 375'F; pressure, 75 psig; humidity, 100%; and chemical spray, 110 days with 3000 ppm boron and sufficient sodium hydroxide to achieve a pH of 9 to 11. The cable was immersed in water for 1 minute and electrical continuity measurements made.

A qualified life of 40 years with one year post-0BA operability time .

was established by the Arrehenius Methodology.

The file included a calculation using Arrehenius Methodology to i demonstrate the time of temperature for the test to 375*F was equivalent to the specified transient which required temperatures to 422*F plus margin.

44

The use of the Arrehenius Methodology to extend qualification to temperatures higher than tested is not considered acceptable. Vogtle reported they would make thermal lag calculations for the main steam line break in the MSIV area and inside containment to demonstrate the temperature of the cable would not exceed temperatures'that would be qualified by the 375*F test.

In conclusion, the cable is considered qualified for the conditions specified at the Vogtle Unit 1 Plant provided that the thermal lag calculations successfully demonstrate the jacket and insulation will not exceed 360*F during the DBA for both inside containment and in the MSIV area. Documentation is considered to be contained in the applicant's file to support the qualification provided the thermal lag calculations are added to the file.

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i FISHER /NAMCO POSITION SWITCH .

j MODEL EA 180

, E00p-X5AC03 l

These position switches are used throughout the plant. Their purpose

. is for indication of the position of various valves. .

l The environmental parameters for which this switch is required to .

! operate are: temperature, 400*F; pressure, 50 psig; humidity 100%;

I radiation <2 x 10 TID (calc. X6CHH.03); and chemical spray solution l 2000 ppm Boron, pH 10 to 11. The switches are located above submergence, j The required post-D8A operability time is one year.

l Testing of similar limit switches is documented in Namco Qualification

{ Report QTR-105. The switches were thermally aged at 120*C for 400 hours0.00463 days <br />0.111 hours <br />6.613757e-4 weeks <br />1.522e-4 months <br />, 2

8 j cycled 100,200 times under load, received 2.04 x 10 Rads TID, then exposed to the following peak environmental conditions: temperature,

]

j 391*F; pressure, 70 psig; humidity, 100%; and chemical spray, pH 10 to 11.

! Switches were continuously energized during the test and inspected after I testing with no failures.

l 1 A qualified life of 5 years with a one year post-DBA operability time I

was established by the Arrehenius Methodology. The qualified life can be I

extended to 40 years by periodic maintenance and replacement of the I

elastomeric components as recomended by the manufacturers maintenance procedure.

l Justification for qualification for temperature given on the SCEW

! sheets is a reference to the calculations X6CJF.02 and X6CHG.18. Vogtle l reported during the audit that these calculations demonstrate that the l

maximum temperature for this component is 316*F which was enveloped by the ,

391*F test. Resolution of the containment temperatures for the DBE has been raised as a general issue during the audit. Resolution of the audit -

general issue will serve as resolution of this item.

l 46

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In conclusion, upon resolution of the containment temperatures for the DBE, this component is considered qualified for the conditions specified and documentation is contained in the applicant's file to support this..

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l LIMITOROUE VALVE ACTUATOR I 1

MODEl's S8 AND SMB E00P-X6AA15 (E0DP-HE-4)

This file documented the qualification of various NSSS supplied Limitorque valve actuators located throughout the auxiliary and fuel -

handling buildings where radiation is the only harsh environment under which these valves are required to function.

Documentation used by the applicant to support qualification of these valves was as follows: WCAP 8587 Methodology, Revision 6A; WCAP 8587 Supplement 1, EQDP-HE4, Revision 4; WCAP 8687 Supplement 2, EQTR-H04A, Revision 3 (Westinghouse's proprietary version of EQDP-HE-4); and Westinghouse Letter GP-10293.

Similar valve actuators, as documented in EQTR-H04A. were thermally aged (both actuator and motor) to establish a qualified life of 40 years at 40*C (104*F), mechanically aged by undergoing 2000 cycles, exposed to 4.08 x 10 rads TID, then seismically stimulated.

Because many of the valves in this file had a higher specified TID than what was demonstrated by EQTR-H04A, Westinghouse Letter GP-10293 was used to extend the demonstrated TIO. This letter described a methodology in which qualification was obtained by using the results of tests performed on different valve actuators (EQTR-H04A and Limitorque Report 80003).

EQTR-H04A was being used to establish the qualified life where as B0003 was being used to establish the demonstrated TIO. Because NUREG 0588, Section 2.3, Test Sequence, calls for the same piece of equipment to be used throughout the test sequence and that for the most part separate effects is not an acceptable qualification method, it was determined that the methodology incorporated in Westinghouse Letter GP-10293 was -

unacceptable Discussions with Vogtle personnel disclosed that for the valves that were affected by this finding, component specific calculations could be used to drop the specified TID under the TID demonstrated by EQTR-H04A.

48

Provided that the file is updated to reflect the reduced specified TID's so that EQTR-H04A alone can be used to demonstrate qualification for these valves, it can be concluded that these valves are considered qualified for the conditions specified at the Vogtle Electric Generating Plant and that documentation does exist in the applicant's files to support this.

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LIMITOROUE VALVE ACTUATOR MODEL SMB-1 COMPONENT ID. 1HV8701B E00P-X6AA15 (E0DP-HE-1)

This valve actuator is located inside containment, above flood level, ,

and is used to operate the RCS hot leg to RHR isolation valve.

The maximum environmental parameters under which this actuator is required to operate are: temperature, 400*F; pressure, 50 psig; radiation, 2 x 108rads TID (general area); humidity, 100% R.H.; chemical spray, 2000 ppm Boron with pH-10.5; submergence, N/A; with a post-DBA operability time requirement of 1 year.

Similar valve actuators, as reported in WCAP 8687 Supplement 2, EQTR-HE01A, were thermally and mechanically aged to establish a qualified life of 5 years at 120*F, exposed to 1.85 x 10 rads TID, seismically i

tested, then exposed to a DBA test to the following maximum set of conditions: temperature, 420*F; pressure, 78 psig; humidity, 100% R.H.;

and chemical spray, 2500 pppm Boron with pH-10.5. The post-DBA operability time requirement was met by extending the test duration of 12.5 days to 1 year by use of the Arrehenius Methodology. A component specific radiation dose rate calculation was performed to ensure that the actual TID 8

received by the actuator was less than 1.85 x 10 rads.

In conclusion, the Limitorque actuator for 1HV87018, and other similar actuators who's basis for qualification is EQTR-HE01A, is considered qualified for the conditions specified at the Vogtle Electric Generating Station and documentation is present in the applicant's file to support this.

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LIMITOROUE VALVE ACTUATOR MODEL SB-000 COMP 0NENT 10. 1HV3500 4 E00P-X5AC01 l

This valve actuator is located inside containment, above flood level, and is for containment isolation of the RCS sampling system.

!* The maximum environmental parameters under which this actuator is l

required to operate are: temperature, 400*F; pressure, 50 psig; radiation, 8

2 x 10 rads TID; humidity, 100% R.H.; chemical spray, 2000 ppm Boron with pH-10.5; submergence, N/A; with a post-0BA operability time requirement of 1 year, i Similar valve actuators, as reported in Limitorque Report 80212, were thermally and mechanically aged and exposed to 1.7 x 10 rads TIO to I establish a qualified life of 40 years, seismically tested, exposed to 2.1 x 10 rads TID, then exposed to a DBA test to the following maximum ,

set of conditions: temperature, 440*f; pressure, 72 psig; humidity, 100% R.H.; and chemical spray, 2500 ppm Boron with pH 10.5. The post-DBA ,

operability time requirement was met by extending the test duration of J 12.5 days to 1 year by use of the Arrehenius Methodology.

Although the tested valve actuators were thermally aged to estabitsh a qualified life of 40 years, it was not apparent in the file what service temperature this qualified life was based on. Calculations were presented to the reviewer that derived what service temperatures the aged components were good for based on the available data in the test report. These derived temperatures were well above the normal service temperatures that

{

this actuator will see over its 40 year qualified life.

l o i In conclusion, provided that the information presented to the reviewer

. regarding the qualified life is incorporated into the file, the Limitorque Actuator for 1HV3500, and other similar actuators who's basis for  ;

qualification is B0212, is considered qualified for the conditions l

! specified at the Vogtle Electric Generating Station and documentation is present in the applicant's file to support this, i l'

51

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PYC0 RTD. MODEL 122-7026 ,

COMPONENT 10. 1TE15215A i E00P-X5AE06 4

This RTO is located in the auxiliary building, above flood level, and is used to detect a pipe break in the CVCS letdown piping. -

l Documentation used to establish qualification of this RTO is contained in test report 16436-82N, by Action Environmental Testing Corporation, for Pyco, Inc. A cursory review of this file revealed that the test sequence did conform to the guidelines of IEEE Std. 323-1974 and that the tested conditions enveloped the specified conditions at Vogtle. However, the demonstrated accuracy of the tested RTO did not meet the required accuracy specified by Vogtle personnel. This was acknowledged by Vogtle personnel and is considered to be an open item.

l l Other observations made during this review were that this test report contained many anomalies. Some of these anomalies occurred during DBA stimulation testing and other anomalies were observed during the post-DBA l

stimulation inspection. Due to time considerations the reviewer could not determine how these anomalies were resolved by the applicant.

Typographical errors and omissions were also found on the SCEW sheet for this component. The applicant acknowledged and committed to correct these errors.

1 l

4 52 l

I WESTING!'0VSE ELECTRIC HYDROGEN RECOMBINER I MODEL B E00P-X6AA15 (E0DP-Sp-l)

The hydrogen recombiners are used inside containment. Their purpose is to provide control of the concentration of hydrogen and oxygen inside the primary containment following a LOCA. The power supply and control

. panel are located in the control building where the environment is unchanged following a LOCA and the components are not required to be qualified for a harsh environment.

The specified LOCA environmental parameters are: temperature, 400*F; pressure, 50 psig; humidity, 100%; spray, 2000 ppm Boron, pH 10 to 11; radiation 1.6 x 10 rads (calc. X6CHH.03); submergence is N/A; and operability time is for 1 year post-08A.

Environmental testing of the recombiner is recorded in EQSP-SP-1. The test parameters are: temperature, 309'F; pressure, 62 psig; humidity, 8

100%; radiation 2 x 10 rads gamma TIO; chemical spray, pH 10.0; and operability time is for 1 year post-0BA.

The recombiner was subjected to 100 thermal cycles corresponding to 40 years aging. The recombiner has no temperature sensitive electrical components required to operate during post-LOCA pressure transient when high temperature exists.

Justification for qualification for temperature given on the SCEW sheets is a reference to the calculations X6CHG.18. Vogtle reported during the audit that the calculation demonstrated that the maximum temperature for this component is 290'F which was enveloped by the 309'F test.

, Resolution of the containment temperature for the DBE has been raised as a general issue during the audit. Resolution of the audit general issue will

. serve as resolution of this item.

53

It is concluded that, upon resolution of the containment temperatures for the DBE, the hydrogen recombiners are qualified for operation at Vogtle Electric Generating Plant and there is adequate documentation in the applicant's file to support this conclusion.

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$48,48,muCf.om8omrue.tvenst 3 Lt.wset.ma

3. virts .40 sweritte Audit of the Environmental Qualification of Safety-Related Electrical Equipment for tha Vogtle Electric Generating Plant Unit 1 . oare aucar co urio

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U. S. fluelear Requlatory Connission tiashington, DC 20555 3 Sunkt 49r.av90,ti

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The Vogtle Electric Generating Plant Unit I was audited to determine the environnental qualification of safety-related electrical equipment.

Results of the audit are sunnarized in this report.

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