ML20209A723

Insp Rept 50-482/86-34 on 861201-31.Violations Noted: Failure to Have Adequate Procedure for Draining RCS & Failure of STS to Address Verification of Damper Actuation

ML20209A723
Person / Time
Site:	Wolf Creek
Issue date:	01/23/1987
From:	Bruce Bartlett, Cummins J, Hunter D, Mullikin R NRC OFFICE OF INSPECTION & ENFORCEMENT (IE REGION IV)
To:
Shared Package
ML20209A650	List: ML20209A644 ML20209A659 ML20209A723
References
50-482-86-34, IEIN-86-001, IEIN-86-014, IEIN-86-037, IEIN-86-057, IEIN-86-061, IEIN-86-077, IEIN-86-092, IEIN-86-093, IEIN-86-094, IEIN-86-096, IEIN-86-1, IEIN-86-14, IEIN-86-37, IEIN-86-57, IEIN-86-61, IEIN-86-77, IEIN-86-92, IEIN-86-93, IEIN-86-94, IEIN-86-96, NUDOCS 8702030423
Download: ML20209A723 (20)

See also: IR 05000482/1986034

Text

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APPENDIX B

U. S. NUCLEAR REGULATORY COMMISSION

REGION IV

NP.C Inspection Report: 50-482/86-34 LP: hPF-42

Docket: 50-482

Licensee: Kansas Gas and Electric Company (KG&E)

Post Office Box 208

Wichita, Kansas 67201 (-

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Facility Name: Wolf Creek Generating Station (WCCS)

Inspection At: Wolf Creek Site, Coffey County, Burlington, Kansas

Inspection Conducted: December 1 to 31, 1986

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Inspectors: \

@.ME. Cummins,1Mor Resident Inspector,

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/Date

Operations

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B. L. Bartlett',' Resident Reactor Inspector,

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Operations

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R.' i'. 'Mullikih,' Project Engineer Date

Approved: .

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Date

1 Reac'tbr Iroject Branch

8702030423 870129

PDR ADOCK 05000482

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Inspection Summary

Inspection Conducted December 1-31, 1986 (Report 50-482/86-34)

Areas Inspected: Routine, unannounced inspection including plant status;

followup of previously identified NRC items; operational safety verification;

ESF system walkdown; monthly surveillance observation; monthly maintenance

observation; cold weather preparation; review of LERs; IE Information Notice

followup; 10 CFR Part 21 Report followup; onsite event followup; plant startup

from refueling; thermal-hydraulic anomaly; and inservice inspection of safety

valves.

Results: Within the fourteen areas inspected, two violations were identified

(failure to have an adequate procedure for draining the reactor coolant system,

paragraph 12 and a violation of TS-fire suppression system surveillance,

paragraph 4). Two open items are identified in paragraphs 14 and 15.

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DETAILS

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1. Persons Contacted

Principal Licensee Personnel

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B. D. Withers, President, Wolf Creek Nuclear Operating Corporation

J. A. Bailey, Interim Site Director

• F. T. Rhodes, Plant Manager  :

• G. D. Boyer, Deputy Plant Manager l

• R. M. Grant, Director-Quality j

• C, M. Estes, Superintendent of Operations  :

• M. D. Rich, Superintendent of Maintenance l

+*M. G. Williams, Superintendent of Regulatory, Quality, and 1

Administrative Services I

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O. L. Maynard, Manager Licensing l

• K. Peterson, Licensing l

+*G. Pendergrass, Licensing I

+*W. M. Lindsay, Supervisor Quality Systems  ;

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+ C. J. Hoch, QA Technologist I

+ W. J. Rudolph, QA Manager-WCGS

• A. A. Freitag, Nuclear Plant Engineering Manager-WCGS

• M. Nichols, Plant Support Superintendent

+ S. Wideman, Technical Staff Specialist

+ A. S. Mah, Superintendent of General Training

+ W. L. Mutz, itanager of Nuclear Operations Support

NRC Personnel

+*J. E. Cummins, Senior Resident Inspector

• B. L. Bartlett, Resident Inspector

-+ R. P. Mullikin, Project Inspector

The NRC inspectors also contacted other members of the licensee's staff

during the inspection period to discuss identified issues.

+ Denotes those personnel in attendance at the exit meeting held on

November 18, 1986.

• Denotes those personnel in attendance at the exit meeting held on

January 6,1987.

2. Plant Status

During this report period, the first refueling cutage (October 16 to

December 20) was completed and the plant was returned to operating status

in Mode 1.

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3. Followup On Previously Identified NRC Items

(Closed) Open Item (482/8508-10): Reactor Engineering Surveillance

Procedures. This open item tracked the establishment of surveillance

procedures for performing surveillances in Section 3.10 of the TS. At the

time the open item was written, the licensee's matrix referenced

Procedures RXE 04-100 and 200 for performing the required surveillances.

However, this numbering system was not used and since TS limiting condition

for operation (LCO) for Surveillances 4.10.1.1, 4.10.1.2, 4.10.2.1,

4.10.2.2.a, 4.10.2.2.b, 4.10.4.1, and 4.10.4.3 apply only during the

infrequent suspension of the LCOs to support testing, the licensee has

elected to write these surveillance procedures on an as-needed basis, when

and if they are ever needed. The table below shows the applicable procedure

for the remaining TS surveillances in Section 3/4 10, "Special Test Exceptions,"

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of the TS:

TS Requirement Procedure

4.10.3.1 RXE 01-002

4.10.3.2 RXE 01-002

4 STS IC-235

STS IC-236

STS IC-241

STS IC-242

STS IC-243

STS IC-244

4.10.3.3 RXE 01-002

STS IC-201

STS IC-202

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STS IC 235

STS IC-236

STS IC-241

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STS IC-242

STS IC-243

STS IC-244

I 4.10.5 STS RE-007

This item is closed.

(Closed) License Condition 2.C(1): This item was also tracked as a 10 CFR

Part 21 Report-Colt Industries Inc. dated March 28, 1984, " Emergency

Diesel Generator Lube Oil Keep Warm Pumps."

The NRC inspector verified by review of documents and discussions with

licensee personnel that the emergency diesel generator lube oil keep warm

pumps had been replaced with pumps which satisfy ASME Section III, Class 3

requirements. The pumps were replaced on Wolf Creek (WC) Work

Requests (WR) 03157-86 and 03158-86. This item is closed.

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(Closed)OpenItem(482/8511-06): Microbiologically Induced Corrosion

(MIC) Inspections. This open item tracked a licensee commitment to

perform MIC inspection of selected systems during refueling outage. The

licensee has established and implemented Administrative Procedure ADM

01-100, Revision 0, "MIC Control Program," which provides instructions for

performing activities related to monitoring, evaluating, and controlling

MIC. The NRC inspector verified by review of the WC WRs listed below that

the licensee has inspected the selected systems:

o WR 00688-86, Inspected closed cooling water heat exchangers

o WR 60142-86, Circulating water system piping

o WR 60143-86, Component cooling water (CCW) heat exchangers and

essential service water piping at CCW heat exchanger water box

o WR 60145-86, One each of the diesel generator heat exchangers end'

spool piece between the two diesel generator "B" heat exchangers

o WR 60144-86, Fire protection system piping section in circulating

water screen house

This item is closed.

(Closed) Open Item (482/8515-01): Testing of Ruskin Fire Dampers During

Normal Air Flow Conditions. This item concerned a 10 CFR Part 21 Report

filed by Ruskin Manufacturing Company regarding the potential for certain

fire dampers to not completely close against normal ventilation system

flow. Even though the licensee had administrative controls to shut off

HVAC flow during a fire, they agreed to test TS fire dampers during normal

flow conditions. The licensee has tested the fire dampers and either

modified or replaced those that have failed. The NRC inspector reviewed

the applicable completed work requests. This item is closed.

(Closed) Open Item (482/8511-16): Reports Describing the Vendor Interface

Program and Reactor Trip Breaker Testing Frogram. This item required the

licensee to submit reports describing the vendor interface program and the

reactor trip breaker testing program, the results of the testing, and the

impact of the results on the breakers demonstrated life cycle and periodic

replacement interval. This is in regard to NRC Generic Letter 83-28. The

licensee has submitted the reports to the Office of Nuclear Reactor

Regulation (NRR) on May 21 and December 10, 1986. This item is closed.

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4. Operational Safety Verification

The NRC inspectors verified that the facility is being operated-safely and

in conformance with regulatory requirements by direct observation of

licensee facilities, tours of the facility, interviews and discussions

with licensee personnel, independent verification of safety system status

and limiting conditions for operations, and reviewing facility records.

The NRC inspectors, by observation of randomly selected activities and

interviews of personnel, verified that physical security, radiation

protection, and fire protection activities were controlled.

By observing accessible components for correct valve position and

electrical breaker position, and by observing control room indication, the

NRC inspectors confirmed the operability of selected portions of safety-

related systems. The NRC inspectors also visually inspected safety

components for leakage, physical damage, and other impaiments that could

prevent them from performing their designed functions.

Selected NRC inspector observations are discussed below:

On November 25, 1986, during a routine review of Defect / Deficiency

Report (DDR) No.86-104, the NRC inspectors observed that KG&E Quality

i Assurance (QA) Audit TE: 50140-K142, " Fire Protection (Annual)," had

written Quality Program Violation (QPV) 11/86-180 stating that maintenance

surveillance procedures did not cover TS surveillance requirement 4.7.10.3.b.

j TS 4.7.10.3.b requires halon systems to be demonstrated operable "at least

once per 18 months by verifying the system, including associated ventilation

l system fire dampers . . . actuates manually and automatically . . . ."

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Procedures STS MT-032, Revision 4, " Single-Zone Halon System Checkout,"

i STS MT-036, Revision 3. "Two-Zone Halon System Checkout," and STS MT-037,

l Revision 3 "Six-Zone Halon System Checkout," did not address the verification

of damper actuation, either automatically or manually, during halon system

surveillance testing. This failure to meet TS requirements is a

violation (482/8634-02). 10 CFR Part 2, Appendix C, Section V.a states,

in part, NRC will not generally issue a Notice of Violation (NOV) for a

violation that is self-identified, that is a Level IV or V, that was

reported if required, that was or will be corrected, and that was not a

violation that could reasonably be' expected to have been prevented by the

licensee's corrective action for a previcus violation. NRC

Violation 482/8541-01, " Violation of Technical Specification-Fire

Suppression System Surveillance," issued Hovember 29, 1985, states, in

part, "STS FP-005, Revision 0, monthly sprays / sprinkler valve position

l verification, does not require an inspection of these two ESF transformer

water spray systems. Thus, the required TS monthly surveillances have not

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been performed." KG8E's response to this violation, KMLNRC 85-277, dated

t December 20, 1985, states, in part, " Internal Operations Program

Deficiency (IOPD) Number 85-11 was generated to review the fire protection

program comitments to ensure they are all met by our administrative

program." Violation 482/8634-02 is a violation that could reasonably be

expected to have been prevented by the licensee's corrective action for a

previous violation.

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5. Engineered Safety Features System Walkdown

The NRC inspector verified the operability of the ESF system by walking

down selected accessible portions of the system. The NRC inspector

verified valves and electrical circuit breakers were in the required

position, power was available, and valves were locked where required. The

NRC inspector also inspected system components for damage or other

conditions that could degrade system performance.

The ESF system walked down during this inspection period and the documents

utilized by the NRC inspector during the walkdown are listed below:

System Documents

High Pressure Coolant Drawing M-12BG03(Q), Revision 2,

InjectionSystem(EM) Piping and Instrumentation Diagram

Chemical and Volume Control System

Drawing M-12EM02(Q), Revision 1,

Piping and Instrumentation Diagram

High Pressure Coolant Injection

System

No violations or deviations were identified.

6. Monthly Surveillance Observation

The NRC inspectors observed selected portions of the perfonnance of

surveillance testing and/or reviewed completed surveillance test

procedures to verify that surveillance activities were performed in

accordance with TS requirements and administrative procedures. The NRC

inspectors considered the following elements while inspecting surveillance

activities:

l o Testing was being accomplished by qualified personnel in accordance

'with an approved procedure. .

o The surveillance procedure conformed to TS requirements.

l o Required test instrumentation was calibrated.

Technical Specification limit.ing conditions for operation (LCO) were-

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satisfied.

I o Test data was accurate and complete. Where appropriate, the NRC

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inspectors performed independent calculations of selected test data

to verify their accuracy.

o The performance of the surveillance procedure conformed to applicable

administrative procedures.

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o The surveillance was performed within the required frequency and the

test results met the required limits.

Surveillances witnessed and/or reviewed by the NRC inspectors are listed

below:

o STS KJ-100A, Revision 3, " Integrated D/G and Safeguards Actuation >

Test-Train A," conducted on December 5-10, 1986

o STS RE-004, Revision 5 " Shutdown Margin Determination," conducted on

December 10, 1986

o STS PE-013, Revision 5, " Personnel Air Lock Seal Test," conducted on-

December 10, 1986

o STS BG-002, Revision 5, "ECCS Valve Check and System Vent,"

conducted on December 9 and 10, 1986

o STS AL-005, Revision 6, " Auxiliary Feedwater Automatic Pump Start and

Valve Actuation," conducted on December 11, 1986

o STS KJ-0018 Revision 3 " Integrated D/G and Safeguards Actuation

Test-Train B," conducted on December 11 through 13, 1986

o STS AL-103, Revision 4, " Turbine Driven Aux FW Pump Inservice Pump

Test," conducted on December 16, 1986

o STS AL-210, Revision 5, " Auxiliary Feedwater System Flow Path

Verification and Inservice Check Valve Test," conducted on

December 16, 1986

o STS PE-19E, Revision 0, "RCS Isolation Check Valve Leak Test,"

conducted on December 10, 1986

No violations or deviations were identified.

7. Monthly Maintenance Observation

The NRC inspector observed maintenance activities perfonned on

safety-related systems and components to verify that these activities were

conducted in accordance with approved procedures, Technical Specifications,

and applicable industry codes and standards. The following eleraents were

considered by the NRC inspector during the observation and/or review of

the maintenance activities:

o LCOs were met and, where applicable, redundant components were

operable.

o Activities complied with adequate administrative controls,

o Where required, adequate, approved, and up-to-date procedures were i

used.

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o Craftsmen were qualified to accomplish the designated task and

technical expertise (i.e., engineering, health physics, operations)

was made available when appropriate.

o Replacement parts a'nd materials being used were properly certified.

o Required radiological controls were implemented.

o Fire prevention controls were implemented where appropriate.-

o Required alignments and surveillances to verify post maintenance

operability were performed.

o Quality control hold points and/or checklists were used when

appropriate and quality control personnel observed designated work

activities.

Selected portions of the maintenance activities accomplished on the work

requests (WR) listed below were observed and related documentation

reviewed by the NRC inspector:

No. Activity

WR 01253-86, ALV054 Investigate Valve Internal Components for Degradation

and Valve Backleakage

WR 05132-86, KC System, Fire Damper Operated By ETLs Receiving Signals

from Halon System Must Be Physically Checked

No violations or deviations were identified.

8. Cold Weather Preparation

The NRC inspector verified by reviewing licensee procedure (performed on

September 19 and 20,1986) STN GP-001, Revision 1 " Plant Winterization,"

that the licensee had taken action to protect vital areas and equipment

that could be subjected to freezing conditions. The procedure verified

that heat and heat tracing was available and energized where appropriate

to the areas and equipment. The NRC inspector walked down the areas

adjacent to the refueling water storage tank and the condensate storage

tank and verified that lines (heating and instrument) were insulated where

they could be subjected to freezing conditions, and where appropriate heat

was being supplied to the area.

No violations or deviations were identified.

9. Review of Licensee Event Reports (LER)

During this inspection period, the NRC inspectors performed followup on a

Wolf' Creek LER. The LER was reviewed to ensure:

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o Corrective action stated in the report has been properly completed or

work is in progress,

o Responses to the events were adequate,

o Responses to the events met license conditions, commitments, or other

applicable regulatory requirements,

o The information contained in the report satisfied applicable

reporting requirements.

o Generic issues were identified.

The LER discussed below was reviewed:

o 482/85-017-00, " Technical Specification Violation-Ruskin Fire

Dampers"

This LER addressed the concerns listed in the Part 21 Report for

Ruskin Fire Dampers which have been reviewed in paragraph 11 of this

inspection report. This LER is closed.

Previous NRC inspection reports contained typographical errors in the LER

review paragraph. These errors and the correct designation are listed

below:

o In paragraph 8 of NRC Inspection Report 50-482/86-28, LER 86-028

should be 86-029.

o In paragraph 9 of NRC Inspection Report 50-482/86-24, LER 85-007

should be 66-007, LER 85-018 should be 86-018, LER 86-073 should be

85-073, and LER 85-001 should be 86-001.

! o In paragraph 9 of NRC Inspection Report 50-482/86-24, the DDR for LER

'85-064 should be DDR 85-116 rather than DDR 85-117, and the DDR for

LER 85-065 should be DDR 85-117 rather than DDR 85-121.

No violations or deviations were identified.

10. IE Information Notice (IN) Followup

The NRC inspector, by review of documents and discussions with licensee

personnel, verified that the ins listed below had been reviewed and

appropriately acted upon by the licensee

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o IN 86-01, " Failure of Main Feedwater Check Valve Caused Loss of

Feedwater System Integrity and Water-Hammer Damage"

o IN 86-14. "PWR Auxiliary Feedwater Pump Turbine Control Problems"

o IN 86-37, " Degradation of Station Batteries"

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o In 86-57, " Operating Problems With Solenoid Operated Valves At

Nuclear Power Plants"

o IN 86-61, " Failure of Auxiliary Feedwater Manual Isolation Valve"

o IN 86-77, " Computer Program Error Reporting Handling"

o IN 86-92, " Pressurizer Safety Valve Reliability"

o IN 86-93, "IEB 85-03 Evaluation of Motor-Operators Identified

Improper Torque Switch Settings"

o IN 86-94, "Hilti Concrete Expansion Anchor Bolts"

o IN 86-96, " Heat Exchanger Fouling Can Cause Inadequate Operability of

Service Water Systems"

The licensee has developed a program called the Industry Technical

Information Program to ensure that lessons learned from industry technical

experience are translated into corrective actions, if required, to improve

safety and reliability. This program reviews industry reports as well as

NRC Information Notices for applicability to Wolf Creek. The NRC

inspector's review of this program showed it to be a well organized and

implemented program. The licensee has shown initiative by reviewing

information received even before an IN was issued.

No violations or deviations were identified.

11. 10 CFR Part 21 Report Followup

The NRC inspector, by review of documents and discussions with licensee

personnel, verified that the 10 CFR Part 21 Reports discussed below had

been reviewed and appropriately acted upon by the licensee.

a. (Closed) Potential Malfunction of Reactor Protection System

-Permissive P-10, dated February 26, 1986. This 10 CFR Part 21 Report

identified a potential problem concerning the function of the P-10

permissive during operation with one or more of the power range

neutron flux measurement channels inoperative or removed from service.

The P-10 permissive, which is comprised of the four power range

neutron flux channels has two functions. The first function of the

permissive is to enable a manual block of certain functions during

power escalations when at least two of the four power range neutron

flux channels reach a value corresponding to the P-10 setpoint

(typically 10 percent nuclear power). The second function of the

permissive is to provide an automatic reinstatement of these

functions when three of the four power range neutron flux channels

indicate power level is below the setpoint.

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The licensee issued WCGS Standing Order 17 which addressed the

recommendations issued by Westinghouse in their letter notifying the

licensee of the potential malfunction. The NRC inspector reviewed

Standing Order 17, Revision 2, issued December 18, 1986, and verified

the licensee had implemented the Westinghouse recomendations as

appropriate, taking into account Final Safety Analysis Report (FSAR)

commitments and TS requirements.

b. (Closed)RuskinFireDampers

There were three 10 CFR Part 21 Reports associated with Ruskin Fire

Dampers. These reports were:

o Certain fire dampers may not completely close against normal

system ventilation flow.

o Welds used to join damper sections to damper section and damper

section to mullion plate were 1 inch long on 9 inch centers

rather than 1 inch long on 6 inch centers as specified by design

drawings.

o Some fire dampers were found to have less than the design

clearance between the damper frame and the penetration sleeve.

The subject of closure against system flow is addressed in the

closcout of Open Item 482/8515-01 in paragraph 3.

The NRC inspector reviewed documentation from Underwriters

Laboratories Inc. (April 19,1985) that stated that a weld spacing of

9 inches would not adversely affect the perfonnance of the fire

dampers. This resolves this 10 CFR Part 21.

The licensee inspected all TS fire dampers for clearance problems.

The NRC inspector reviewed all of the WR associated with the dampers

which required either replacement or modification. All work has been

completed. This resolves this 10 CFR Part 21.

c. (Closed) Emergency Diesel Generator Lube Oil Keep Wann Pumps, dated

March 28, 1986

This item was also tracked as a licensing condition and is discussed

and closed in paragraph 3 of this inspection report.

12. Onsite Event Followup

The NRC inspector performed onsite followup of nonemergency events that

occurred during this report period. The NRC inspector (when available)

observed control room personnel response, observed instrumentation

indicators of reactor plant parameters, reviewed logs and computer

printouts, and discussed the event with cognizant personnel. The NRC

inspector verified the licensee had responded to the event in accordance

with procedures and had notified the NRC and other agencies as required in

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a timely fashion. Engineered safety feature actuations that occurred

during the report period are listed in the table below. Where applicable,

the NRC inspector will review the LER for each of these events and will

report any findings in subsequent NRC inspection reports.

Date Event Plant Status Cause

12/02/86 RHR Pump Mode 6- Reduced water level in reactor

Cavitation vessel

12/05/86 CRVIS* Mode 6 Spot on detector paper

12/10/86 P-14 Actuation Mode 5 Low level in level instrument

reference legs on steam

generator (S/G)

12/20/86 Reactor Trip Mode 1 S/G 10-10 level during

(6%) power increase

12/22/86 Reactor Trip Mode 1 Failed S/G feedwater flow

(30%) instrument

12/22/86 Feedwater Mode 1 Hi-Hi S/G water level

Isolation

12/29/86 CRVIS* - Mode 1 Chlorine monitor component

failed

• CRVIS - Control Room Ventilation Isolation Signal

Selected NRC inspector observations are discussed below:

o The NRC inspector performed onsite followup of the RHR pump air

binding event that occurred on November 29, 1986. At the time of the

event, the plant was in Mode 6 with the refueling cavity being pumped

down in order to put the reactor vessel head on the vessel. RCS

recirculation flow was through RHR Pump "A" at approximately 3,000 gpm

and RHR Pump "B" was taking a suction from the RCS and rejecting

flew to the refueling water storage tank (RWST) at approximately

1,500 to 2,000 gpm. An operator had been stationed on the upper edge

of the refueling pool to monitor level. A 1/2 loop level meter was

valved out-of-service and a tygon hose used for level indication

which connected the drain line on RCS loop 1 crossover leg to a

pressurizer relief loop seal drain was not valved in. At

approximately 1:48 p.m. CST, both RHR pumps lost suction and were

secured. The "B" RHR pump was restarted on RCS recirculation.

However, flow could not be increased above 1,000 gpm until its

suction was vented, approximately 3:15 p.m. CST. It took until

3:55 p.m. CST to get "A" RHR pump filled, vented, and on RCS

recirculation. Refueling pool level was raised a few feet and then

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the pumpdown was restarted, after the tygon level tube and the 1/2

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loop level meter were placed in service. At approximately 4:34 p.m.

CST, "A" RHR pump again cavitated and was secured. The pump was

vented and returned to service at 10:11 p.m. CST. The refueling pool

was again flooded and subsequent letdown was performed using

chemical and volume control system (CVCS) letdown at approximately

100 gpm. Ho further problems occurred. There was no observed

increase in RCS temperature as a result of this event. The licensee

wrote Wolf Creek Event Report (WCER) No. 86-82, dated November 29,

1986, to initiate corrective action.

Events involving loss or degradation of RHR capability have been

reported in five NRC IE Information Notices.(80-20, 81-09, 81-10,

82-17, and 82-45), one NRC IE Bulletin (80-12), four INPO significant

operating experience reports (SOERs) and 14 INP0 significant event

reports (SERs). In addition, IN 86-101 " Loss of Decay Heat Removal

Due To Loss of Fluid Levels In Reactor Coolant System," was issued on

December 12, 1986. NRC Inspection Report 50-482/86-24, paragraph 8,

described a previous RHR pump cavitation or. air binding event at this

facility. Plant Procedure SYS EC-200, Revision 6 " Changing Level in

the Spent Fuel Pool or Refueling Pool," was used to lower level in

the refueling pool on November 29, 1986. This failure to have an

adequate procedure in accordance with TS 6.8.1, Regulatory Guide 1.33,

and ANSI N18.7-1976/ANS-3.2 is an apparent violation (482/8634-01).

o Wolf Creek Event Report 86-91

On December 20, 1986, with irradiated fuel assemblies in the spent

fuel storage pool, the storage pool water level was accidentally

lowered approximately 15 inches below TS 3.9.10.2 limit of 23 feet of

water over the top of the irradiated fuel assemblies. The event was

caused when a hose used for adding water to the storage pool was left

with its open end' suspended approximately 2 feet into the storage

pool. After the addition of water to the storage pool, the valve

lineup for the filling operotion was not isolated and water siphoned

from the storage pool to a recycle hold up tank until the end of the

hose was uncovered.

The licensee took immediate action and refilled the pool within the

TS action stateirent time limit. To prevent a reoccurrence, the

licensee is revising Procedure SYS HB202, Revision 3, " Waste

Evaporation Cooldown and Pumpdown," so that, af ter using this method

for filling, the hose is removed from the storage pool and the valve

lineup is returned to a configuration that would prevent siphoning of

the storage pool.

13. Plant Startup From Refuel _ing

The NRC ins]ectors observed selected portions of the plant startup,

following t1e first refueling outage. Portions of the activities

discussed below were observed:

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o Mode changes performed in accordance with TS requirements and the

procedures listed below:

. GEN 00-001, Revision 6, " Mode 5-F111 and Vent of the RCS"

. GEN 00-002, Revision 9, " Cold Shutdown to Hot Standby"

. GEN 00-003, Revision 12. " Hot Standby to Minimum Load"

. GEN 00-004, Revision 8 " Power Operation"

o Control rod testing performed in accordance with Surveillance

Procedure STS RE-007, Revision 2. " Red Drop Time Measurements"

o Low power physics testin

RXE 01-002, Revision 9 Reload

g performed in accordance

Low Power with Procedure

Physics Testing"

The NRC inspector performed post maintenance walkdowns of the coolant

charging system and the emergency diesel generators.

The NRC inspector's review of core power physics test data will be

documented in a future inspection report.

No violations or deviations were identified.

14. Thermal-Hydraulic Anomaly

On December 30, 1986, while operating at 100 percent reactor power,

licensee personnel confirmed the existence of a thermal-hydraulic anomaly.

This anomaly was first discovered at the Callaway Plant on November 17,

1986, and is discussed in Callaway, NRC Inspection Report 50-483/86-20.

The anomaly is characterized by random increases / decreases of up to

0.5 percent on individual power range detectors, up to 5.8 percent on

reactor vessel level indication (RVLIS), random increases of up to

1.2 percent on individual loop flows, and random decreases up to 1.2

percent on incore thermocouples.

In response to the ancmaly, the licensee contacted Westinghouse who

provided an evaluation. Westinghouse stated that the observed deviations

were within the limits of the WCGS TS and within the bounds of the WCGS

FSAR. There is no evidence of any loose part flow blockage, or internal

abnormality. The NRC inspectors observed the strip chart recordings of

the selected plant parameters, discussed the data with the Callaway NRC

inspectors, and followed the licensee's actions.

The cause of the thermal-hydraulic anomaly has not been determined. NRC

and the licensee are continuing their investigation of this anomaiy. This

itera is open pending further NRC review (0 pen Item 482/8634-03).

No violations or deviations were identified.

_ _ _

'

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.

-16-

15. Inservice Inspection (ISI) of Safety Valves

Duringthefirstrefuelingoutage(October 16toDecember 20,1986),the

licensee performed inservice inspection of selected safety / relief valves

per subsection IWV-3500 of ASME Code Section XI, 1980 Edition. The

licensee implemented the ISI program September 3,1985, and uses this date

as the startup date for scheduling ISI inspections. Based on this startup

date and the valve testing schedule delineated in subsection IWV-3500 of

the ASME Code Section XI, the licensee elected to not test any of the

three pressurizer safety valves, BB 8010A, BB 80108, and BB 8010C, during

this refueling outage. The setpoints for the pressurizer safety valves

were last tested by the vendor on the dates shown below:

Valve Date Tested

BB 8010A April 25, 1978

BB 8010B April 26, 1978

BB 8010C April 20, 1978

Pending further NRC review of this situation where the pressurizer safety

setpoints have not been retested for an interval of time in excess of 8.5

years, this is an open item (482/8634-04).

'

No violations or deviation; were identified.

16. Open Items

Open items are matters which have been discussed with the licensee, which

will be reviewed further by the inspector, and which involve some action

on the part of the NRC or licensee or both. Open items disclosed during

the inspection are discussed in paragraphs 14 and 15,

17. Exit Meeting

The NRC inspectors met with licensee personnel to discuss the scope and

findings of this inspection on January 6,1987. The NRC inspectors also

attended entrance / exit meetings of the NRC region based inspectors

identified below:

Inspection Lead Area Inspection

Period Inspector Inspected Report No.

12/9-12/86 R. Stewart Surveillance 86-29

12/01-05/86 G. Pick Surveillance 86-32

12/01-05/86 J. Kelly Security 86-33

12/15-19/86 R. Mullikin Followup 86-34

.

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