ML20207T412
| ML20207T412 | |
| Person / Time | |
|---|---|
| Site: | Vogtle  |
| Issue date: | 02/06/1987 |
| From: | Conlon T, Fillion P, Merriweather N, Ruff A NRC OFFICE OF INSPECTION & ENFORCEMENT (IE REGION II) |
| To: | |
| Shared Package | |
| ML20207T399 | List: |
| References | |
| 50-424-87-06, 50-424-87-6, 50-425-87-06, 50-425-87-6, IEB-85-002, IEB-85-2, IEB-86-003, IEB-86-3, IEIN-85-074, IEIN-85-74, IEIN-86-037, IEIN-86-37, NUDOCS 8703230546 | |
| Download: ML20207T412 (19) | |
See also: IR 05000424/1987006
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NUCLEAR REGULATORY COMMISSION
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REGION 11
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101 MARIETTA STREET.N.W.
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ATLANTA, GEORGI A 30323 *
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Report Nos.: FO-424/87-06 and 50-425/87-06
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Licensee: Georgia-Power Company'
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P. u. Box 4545
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Atlanta, GA 30302,
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Docket Nos.: 50-424 and 50-425
License Nos.:
PPR-108'and CPPR-109
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Facility Name: Vogtle 1 and 2
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Inspection Conducted: January 12-16, 1987
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Inspectors:
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A. B. Ruff
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/Date' Signed
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N. MerrTw' eat er "
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Date Signed
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$-[-M
Date Signed
P. Fillion
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Approved by
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T. E~ Conlon, Section Chief
Date Signed
Engineering Branch
Division of Reactor Safety
SUMMARY
Scope:
This special, announced inspection was conducted in the areas of
electrical items that could impact fuel load which included licensee identified
items, inspector followup items, enforcement items identified on previous
inspections and I/E Bulletin.
Results:
One deviation was identified, paragraph 5.J.
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REPORT DETAILS
1.
Persons Contacted
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Licensee Employees
- R. H. Pinson, Vice President, Construction
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- I. Greene, Plant Manager
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- D. Smith, Construction Engineer
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Hayes, Quality Assur mce Manager
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- B. Harbin, Manager Quality Control
- E. Groover, Quality Assurance site Manager, Construction
- R. McManus, Readiness Review Program Manger
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- C. McCarley, Project Compliance Coordinator
A. Rogers, Ccmpliance Representative
R. Perry, Corpliance Representative
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S. Waldrup, Systems Engineer, Engineering Support
D. Edenfield, Electrical Engineer
J. Aufdenkampe, Engineering Supervisor
R. E. Hollands, Compliance Superintendent
H. Thomas, Plant Maintenance
S. Kersteins, Test Supervisor
Other licensee employees contacted included construction craftsmen,
engineers, technicians, operators, mechanics, security force members, and
office personnel.
Other Organizations
S. Pietrzyk, Bechtel Project Field Engineering Electrical Supervisor
R. Valdez, Quality Engineer, Bechtel
B. Woodley, Bechtel, Fire Protection Coordinator
D. Merriwether, Bechtei, Maintenance Engineer.ir )
J. Haratyk, Bechtel Engineer, Project Field E3e(rtrical Operation (PFEO)
5. Hayte, Bechtel Assistant Project Engineer"
D. Morrison, Westinghouse Engineer
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NRC Resident Inspector
- H.
Livermore
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- Attended exit interview
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2.
Exit :nterview
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The inspection scope and findings were summarized on January 16, 1987,
with those persons indicated in paragraph 1 above.
The inspectors described
the areas inspected and discussed in detail the inspection findings.
One
deviation was identified.
No dissenting comments were received from the
licensee.
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Oeviation 50-424/87-06-01, Discrepancy Between the FSAR Section
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8.3.2.1.1 and the Actual Values for the Capacity of Safety-Related
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Batteries, caragraph 5.J.
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The licensee'did not identify as proprietary any of the materials provided
to or reviewed by the inspectors during this inspection.
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3.
Licensee Action on Previous Enforcement Matters
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a!s (Closed) Violation 50-424/86-61-13, Failure to Maintain Control of QC
Accepted Conduit Support CS-7C4-102-068.
The licensee has responded to
this violation by their letter no. GN-1076 dated September 17, 1986.
(The response has been reviewed by Region II staff and was acceptable.
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A Deviation Report (DR) No. ED13377 was issued to track this deficient
condition.
The conduit support was reworked by craft personnel and
re-inspected by a QC representative.
The DR was closed.
A field
sighting by the NRC inspector confirmed that the support was assembled
properly and fasteners were observed to be tight.
To prevent similar
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problems a work directive (N0E-01260) was issued to the Chicago Bridge
and Iron (CBI) Site Superintendent.
The directive specially addressed
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the requirements that CBI personnel adhered to the work scope in the
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Maintenance Work Order (MW0).
In addition, a similar memo, addressed
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Manager.
This violation is closed.
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b.
(Closed) Violation 50'424/86-31-08, Failure to Follow Procedures for
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Protecting Installed Equipment / Components.
This violation was the
result of construction personnel standing and/or walking in a cable
tray section.
The licensee responded to this violation by their
letter, GN-979, dated July 2,1986.
The response was reviewed by
Region II staff and was considered acceptable.
The defective cable
tray section was replaced bnd cables were checked for damage.
It was
determined that no harm occurred to the cables in the damaged tray
section.
Additional inspections were performed on other cable tray
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installations.
As a result of this inspection, minor cable tray
section damage was identified but rework was not required in that the
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damage was minor and did not affect the function of the cable trays on
cables.
To prevent similar problems, site personnel were made aware of
this violation by memoranda and meetings.
Also, an article was included
in the plant newspaper (Blazer) on May 10,1986.
This article
! discussed the issue and provided the do s and don'ts for cable tray
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[ protection.
Monthly surveillance were conducted by the Vogtle
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electrical contractor to insure that damage and trash accumulations to
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and in c'able trays were identified and resolved.
The replaced tray
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section of the violation was verified to be reworked and several
.\\montnlysurveillanceswereexamined
This violation is closed.
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(Closed) Violation 50-424/86-95-01, and 50-42S/86-45-01, PFE Failed to
Follow Procedures for Processing FCRs and Inccraorating DCNs into
Design Drawings. The licensee responded to this item in a letter dated
December. 19, 1986.
The inspector reviewed this response for complete-
ness and found it to be acceptable.
Part 1 of this violation concerns
the failure to properly incorporate Design Change Notice (DCN) No. 5-4
(FCR No. E-FCRB-15409) into vendor instruction manual AX3AJ118-24-3.'
To correct this violation, the vendor's stanual was reviewed for unincor-
porated: design changes. The review identified three additional changes
which were not properly incorporated.
Revision 4 of the vendor manual
was issued on August 12, 1986, to correct all discrepancies identified
in the review.
The inspectors reviewed Revision 4 of the manual in the
site drawing control area and found it to be acceptable.
Additionally,
the licensee reviewed the special splice design FCR for impact on
installed hardware.'
This review concluded that splices installed
between issuance of the omitted design changes and their incorporation
were not impacted.
The licensee was in full compliance on August 12,
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1986.
Part 2 of this violation was attributed to inadequate implementation of
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the project procedure for processing FCRs.
A review was performed to
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determine the scope of the problem involving issuing generic NA/NA
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FCRs.
The review concluded that the total number of open NA/NA FCRs
that did not identify _ an unique component or installation is approxi-
mately 36 out of a total of 1662.
Thus, the cause was attributed to
isolated personnel errors.
The 36 NA/NA FCRs that did not identify a
unique component or installation were corrected by either issuing a
new FCR to supersede the existing FCR and identifying that a CSCN is
required; or for those cases where the construction specification had
already been revist:0 incorporate the generic concern, a new FCR
was issued to supersede le existing FCR.
To prevent recurrence,
responsible engineering personnel were reinstructed in the procedure
requirements for processing NA/NA FCRs.
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(Closed) Violation 50-424/86-95-02 and 50-425/86-45-02, Failure to
Provide Training for Electrical Engineering and QC Staff on the use of
Rai : hem "roducts.
The licensee responded to this item in a letter
dateo Dwember 19, 1986.
The inspector reviewed this response for
completeness and found it to be acceptable.
The major contributor to
this violation was that Project Field Engineers (PFE) approving FCRs
related to Raychem Splices had not received sufficient training to
become proficient in the use of Raychem.
As part of the corrective
action, the licensee had Raychem conduct training for engineers in
GPC-Construction and PFE in 3 and 4 way splice designs.
This training
was documented in letters from Raychem and is maintained at the site
in project file X7BP03.
All special 3 and 4 way splice designs were
reviewed to verify that they met Raychem's "use-range" criteria.
The
review resulted in identifying 8 FCRs which did not meet Raychem
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Field change request no. E-FCRB-18-072 was issued to void
those eight FCRs that were technically incorrect.. A Change Control
Package (No. F10140E, Revision 0) was issued on. September 16, 1986,
- to: correct the identified conditions.
Maintenance Work Orders (MWO)
were issued and rework was completed by October 9,1986.
To prevent
recurrence, Construction Specification X3AR01-E9 has been revised to
require that "special splices not covered by manual - AX3AJ118-24 be
specified by FCR, verified :and approved by engineers, who- have
successfully completed Raychem's special products training."
The
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licensee has also enhanced the instructions provided on FCRs to now
specify minimum sleeve lengths, shim lengths, and hardware restrictions
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where required to assure compliance with the seal . lengths and other
criteria by Raychem.
In addition, generic FCRs for 3 and 4 way splices
were incorporated in Construction Specification X3AR01-E9 by E-FCRB-18,
056.
This will. eliminate the need to generate several FCRs for
- splicing on Unit 2.-
Regarding the training of contract QC personnel, the licensee denied
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this part of the violation.
The response was reviewed and determined
to be acceptable.
However, the licensee did take_ steps to enhance
its training program by adding specific Raychem. training for cable
termination certification requirements.
All QC personnel in termina-
tion inspection have received this training.
All corrective actions have been completed and the licensee is now in
full compliance.
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(Closed). Violation 424/86-95-03 and 425/86-45-03, Inadequate Inspection
of NSCW Cable Splices. The licensee responded to this item in a letter
dated December 19, 1986.
The inspectors reviewed this response and
determined it to be acceptable.
The cause of the violation was
attributed to isolated cases of human error.
This was concluded after
GPC's. electrical engineering evaluated a sample of 149 QC accepted cable
- splices with only two errors identified that were attributable to QC .
inspection.
However, to prevent recurrence, additional training has
been provided for craft instructors, QC inspectors, and engineers.
The
NSCW cable deficiencies were documented on.0perations Deficicncy Report
Nos. T-1-86-3867 and T-1-86-3868.
Corrective actions were completed by
~ Maintenance Work Orders (MW0s) 18622269 and 18622270.'
The MW0s were
closed on January 14 and January 5, 1987, respectively.
The licensee
is now in full compliance. This item is closed.
f.
(Closed) Violation 50-424/86-109-01, Inaccurate Values for Electrical
Penetration Assemblies (EPA) Loading Calculations.
The licensee
promptly revised the EPA moment calculation sheets when this violation
was identified by the inspector.
The inspectors reviewed the corrective
actions taken during the latter portion of that inspection.
Corrective
actions have been taken and actions to preclude the recurrence of the
condition for Unit 2 have been taken.
This violation is closed.
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g.
(Closed) Unresolved Item (URI) 50-424/86-61-05, Review Commitment to
Regulatory Guide (RG) 1.89 Rev. O versus Regulatory Guide 1.89 Rev.1.
The above item was identified as part of NRC Readiness Review.
RG 1.89, 1974 was committed to by Vogtle in the FSAR and in Design
Criteria (DC) 1000-E prior to Revision 6.
In Revision 6 (August 29,
1985) to DC 1000-E RG 1.89, Revision 1 was inadvertently incorporated
during the revision process.
DC-1000-E has since been revised by
DMCN 1000-E-4 dated July 16, 1986, to reflect RG 1.89, 1974.
The
licensee stated that this change does not impact design / qualification
documents being used to satisfy safety related equipment since the
project is complying with the intent of RG 1.89, 1974 as committed in
h.
(Closed) Unresolved Item (URI) 50-424/86-61-10, Review FSAR Commitments
to IEEE 317/1976, Electrical Penetration Assemblies (EPA) for Chemical
Spray.
During an NRC Vogtle Readiness Review Team inspection, a
discrepancy was noted concerning environmental qualification of EPA
with regard to chemical spray testing.
The System Component Evaluation
Work Sheet (SCEW) for Medium Voltage Electrical Penetration Assemblies
was not tested and in the chemical spray section, Note 1 was refer-
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The justification given in Note 1 of the SCEW sheet was
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"The effects of chemical spray on seal and electrical integrity is
negligible.
The penetration is equipped with a termination enclosures
on the inboard side which precludes spray impingement."
In response to
NRC concerns, c'uring a separate EQ inspection / audit, the file was
changed to justify qualification of the penetration by a series of type
tests for another similar penetration.
The SCEW sheet now references
Conax Test Report IPS-585.5 and 473 and Note 1 was changed to "6200 ppm
Boron,'50 ppm Hydroxide, PH 9.94."
This item is closed.
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(Closed) Unresolved Item 50-424, 425/84-35-04, Discrepancy Punch Lists
for Cable Terminations.
The concern involved the original punch list
for cable terminations in that it failed to docuaent the person who
performed the electrical terminations and the tools used.
In response
to this item, the licensee committed to review their EL-16 Electrical
Termination punch lists versus termination cards for appropriate
documentation.
The licensee reviewed the punch list for twelve
attributes compared to the one attribute identified in Inspection
Report 84-35.
The scope of this review included a check of class 1E
Punch Lists records for their retrievability, completeness, acceptance
requirements, necessary information for tracking, and documentation of
work completed.
Discrepancies identified by the licensee were
documented and closed in Corrective Action Report (CAR) No. E-076 which
was closed on December 17, 1985.
Deviation Report (DR) No. ED-07803
was written to document and disposition those punch list items where it
was indeterminate as to who recrimped the items or what crimp tools
were used in reworking pre-dispositioned items on the punch list.
CAR E-076 identified the root cause was due to an inadequate procedure.
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Therefore, to prevent recurrence Inspection Procedure No. ED-T-08,
" Cable Termination" was revised to clarify required documentation. All
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corrective actions. were completed on DR-7803 on December 11, 1985.
Procedure ED-T-08-is currently at Revision 9.
Based on the above, this
liten-is considered closed.
5.
Licensee Identified Items .(Construction Deficiency Reports _ - CDR) 10 CFR 50.55(e)
a.
(Closed) CDR 85-78, Westinghouse -Safety Grade Core _ Exit Thermocouples
for Unit 1 and Unit 2.
A final report concerning the accuracy require-
ment on this _ item was submitted on November 20, 1986, by Georgia Power
Company to Region II.
The report was reviewed and determined to be
acceptable. .The inspectors held discussions with responsible licensee
representative and. reviewed supporting. documentation to verify that the
corrective actions. identified in the report have been completed.
Westinghouse Electric Corporation (WEC) by letters to the NRC dated
May 9,1985 reported a Part 21 item involving the Core Exit Thermo-
couples.
WEC reported that 'during'the performance of environmental
qualification testing of the safety grade core exit thermocouples (T/C)
a significant potential total system error was identified which exceeds
the acceptable values of_ certain functions.
The licensee has modified
the core exit thermocouple Emergency Operating Procedure setpoints
to reflect' the plant specific core exit T/C monitoring system post-
accident induced errors.
The Reactor Vessel Level Indicating System
(RVLIS) . temperature compensation was _ changed to loop Resistance
-Temperature Detectors (RTD). Additional information on.this subject.is
'in Appendix 4A-of the FSAR. MW0s 1-86-8307 and 1-85-14057 were issued
and completed as part of this corrective action.
Based on the above,
this' item is closed.
b.
(Closed) CDR 86-103, Separation of. Field Wires in Isolation Trans-
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formers (Unit #1).
A final report was submitted on June 12, 1986. The
report has been reviewed and determined to be' acceptable.
The inspec-
tors held discussion with responsible licensee representatives, and
reviewed supporting document- to' verify that the corrective action
identified in the report have been completed.
The CDR addressed the
minimum 6 inch separation distance of -field routed wiring within the
enclosure of - the isolation ~ transformers.
The wiring was initially
ral.ed for 90*C but was changed to wiring rated at 130*C.
This higher
rating cable type (Kapton) satisfies the temperature requirements
under normal and/or secondary short circuit operations.
This item is
discussed more fully in FSAR Table 8.3.1-4 and in Amendment 15 dated
March 7, -1985, in response to NRC Question PSB Q430.61C.
The 6 inch
separation is no longer required since there is no degradation of
the cable in this application.
A sample of MW0s 18615721, 18617744,
18613484 and 18613448, associated with this corrective action were
reviewed. This item is closed.
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(Closed) CDR '86-126, Conax Electrical Penetration Assemblies (EPA),.
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Units.:1 and 2. 'During_ Unit 1 containment building structural integrity
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testing ~ it was discovered that air was ' leaking from the. containment
building into- the control building. .GPC notified the NRC of a
potential -deficiency with Conax EPA.
A final report was submitted on
November 312,.1986.
The report- has been reviewed and determined to be
acceptable. . The inspector held discussions with responsibleLlicensee
representatives, and revieweit supporting - documents to ! verify the
corrective actions' specified in the report have been completed.
The
- Conax EPA assemblies for Unit I were repair welded in accordance with
Field- Change Request E-FCRB-686-N.
Work was accomplished on MWO
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1-86-15881.'
The licensee' stated that Unit 2 penetrations.were checked
and all;were. satisfactory.
The Unit 2 containment building structural
integrity test will be performed sometimes in the future.
This' item-is
closed.
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d.
.(Closed)_CDR.86-133, Balance-of-Plant / Engineered Safety Features
Actuation' System (BOP /ESFAS( Channel Voltage - Unit 1.
During a Vogtle
design review by GPC, a potential reportable condition was-identified
concerning the above item.
Maintenance / Isolation fuses were installed
in B0P/ESFAS circuit.
These circuits are identified in GPC report.
Since - a . failed fuse (s) in these circuits were not annunicated, an-
undected channel voltage loss could occur with the 30P/ESFAS circuits.
A final report was submitted on December 23, 1986.
The~ report has
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been reviewed and- determined to be acceptable.
The inspector held
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' discussions with- responsible licensee representatives, reviewed
supporting documentation, and observed representative samples of work
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to verify that corrective actions identified in the report have been
completed;
The maintenance / isolation fuses have been. replaced with
copper- bus- bars that fit into the fuse clip. his modification still
allows the design intent for maintenance / isolation. of the circuits.
The- modified design retains the 'over current protection as a function
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of the existing dedicated distribution panel breakers.
The existing
control room annunciation now provider voltage loss detection for the
subject' circuits.
This modification was accomplished by Change Control
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Package (CCP) #B10312E.
A field sighting verified the installation of
the' copper bus bars and MW0s 18623799, A8605069 and A9605070 for this
modification were reviewed.
This item is closed.
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e.
(Closed) CDR 86-120, Valcor Solenoid Valves (SV) - Unit 1.
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Engineering Corporation notified GPC that springs in their SV could
fail when exposed .to high temperature reactor coolant containing
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NRC issued Information Notice 86-72 of August 19, 1986, on
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the same subject.
As result of Valcor's notification, GPC notified
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Region'II on July 2,1986, of this potential reportable condition at
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Plant Vogtle.
After the preoperational test program and subsequent to
the report, another ccndition was encountered associated with the use
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of underrated seal-in contracts (Magnetic Reed Switch) on Valcor SV.
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A . final report was. submitted on September 17, 1986.
The report has
been reviewed and determined to be acceptable.
The inspectors held
discussions with responsible licensee representative and reviewed a
sample of supporting documentation to verify that the corrective action
identified in the report have been completed.
GPC determined that two
of the six SV identified had to have their springs replaced. The other
valves were acceptable, as supplied, for their service condition.
The underrated seal-in contact failures were corrected by a circuit
modification.
The modification allows the SV magnetic reed switch to
carry only the- holding (seal-in) current for the interposing Potter and
Brumfield (MDR137-8) auxiliary relay.
The holding (seal-in) current
for the auxiliary relay plus the holding current for SV is now routed
through an additional two MDR 137-8 relay contacts rather than the SV's
magnetic reed switch.
The spring replacement was implemented by Change
Control Package (CCP) B10284J and MW0s 18616225 and 18617902.
The
circuit modifications were specified by Field Change Requests, examples
as follows, EFCB 346N, 347N, 348N, 349N, 351N, 352N, 353N, 356N, 357N,
358N and 361N.
This item is closed.
f.
(0 pen) CDR 86-105, Support of Cable in Vertical Raceways - Units 1 and
2.
During an Independent Design Review (IDR) conducted for Vogtle by a
GPC consultant, an item was identified concerning the support of cable
in long vertical raceway runs.
The NRC raised some questions relative
to this concern and meeting were held on this subject.
GPC letter of
January 9,1987, discusses the engineering evaluation and corrective
actions.
The evaluation of cable supports in long vertical conduit
runs is considered satisfactory.
The evaluation was performed by
walkdown of all conduit as part the Electrical Raceway and Cable
Walkdown Finalization Program (FP-5) and Calculation No. X3CK20.
The
evaluation for cable supports (tie-wraps) in cable trays for long
vertical runs is considered adequate for one cycle of plant operation.
Further evaluation will assess the adequacy of the tie wrap supports,
in their various application, for the long term.
If additional
corrective actions are required, an implementation program will be
established. _GPC stated, in their letter of January 9,1987, that the
long term assessment of tie wrap supports would be provided to the NRC
during the Summer of 1987.
This item remain open pending receipt of
that response and NRC's future assessment.
g.
(0 pen) CDR 86-134, Solid State Protection System (SSPS) Relays -
Units 1 and 2.
On December 4,1986, GPC identified and notified the NRC
of a potential problem associated with SSPS relays.
These relays are
Potter and Brunfield MDR rotary type relays and the relay contacts
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control the operation or non-operation of other components.
Excessive
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current (higher than manufacturer's rating) was going through the relay
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contacts in certain circuit applications at Vogtle.
This excessive
current caused the nylon operating cam to melt sufficiently to prevent
the relays from performing its intended function.
This problem was
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' identified by a'.'GPC ESFAS - test that is performed. to -insure that
circuits / component operate .and function as intended.
GPC submitted
an interim report ! dated January 10, 1987,- to the_NRC.
This report
describes - a two .part evaluation program regarding the SSPS relays.
The . report has - been reviewed and determined to be acceptable.
The
inspector . held discussions with responsible licensee representative ~
concerning two part evaluation.
The first part-(short. term fix), which-
may, after further evaluation, be satisfactory for the -long term fix
-involved a modification of the affected. circuits.
The modification
put two MDR relays contacts (instead of one) in series and a surge
suppression rectifier across the solenoid valve coil.
This modifica-
tion was shop tested (200 cycles) to confirm that the relay contacts
would interrupt 'the inductive circuit and reset as required. .GPC
stated that NRC would. be notified of the long term assessment by
November 1,1987. - This ; item remains open pending receipt of that'
notification and NRC's inspection and evaluation of GPC assessment.
h.
(Closed) ' Item 424/CDR 86-100, Spliced Instrument Cables Inside the
-Containment and MSIV Areas.
This item was reported by the licensee-
,
under the reporting requirements of 10 CFR 50.55(e) and 10 CFR 21
in a letter dated June 30,- 1986. The irspectors reviewed the response
and determined it to be acceptable.
Tnis condition concerning the
protection of instrument cables inside areas subject to a harsh-
- environment was initially . identified in Deviation Report (DR)
,
No. ED-11309.
The DR indicated that no design criteria existed for
'
reconstituting the _ cable jacket for spliced instrument cables in harsh
environments. . A broadness review determined - that this condition
'
could exist inside containment and in the : Main Steam Isolation Valve
.(MSIV) areas of the plant.
This review identified approximately 120
.
instrument cables which are located in the potential accident environ-
ment that required either one end or both ends .of 'the cable to be.
sealed. This is documented on Construction Specification Change Notice
No. 476 to Specification X3AR01, Section E9.
The cables were reworked
and documented on DR-ED-12,274 (The licensee's response dated June 30,
1986, incorrectly identified the DR as #12247,
DR-12,274 was closed
"
out as complete on September 30, 1986, for Unit .1 only.
Action is
still pending for Unit 2.
This item is considered closed for Unit 1.
i.
(Closed) Item 424/CDR 86-124, Raychem Site Designed Electrical Splices.
This item was initially reported to NRC on August 12, 1986 and a final
L
report was submitted on October 9,1986.
The final report has been
reviewed-and determined to be acceptable.
The inspector held discus-
sions with licensee representatives and reviewed supporting documenta-
tion to verify that the corrective actions have been completed. The
condition was caused by the misapplication of the Raychem "use-range"
criteria on three and four way splice designs which were dispositioned
and approved by Project Field Engineers.
The problem was discovered
during a design review conducted by Raychem personnel and an NRC audit.
_
_ - _ _ _ _
- _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ - _ _ _ _ _ _
~
.
10
A broadness review of three and four way splice designs identified four
additional FCRs to be in error to make a total of nine FCRs involving 80
circuits.
To resolve this matter the licensee undertook the following.
. corrective actions:
(1) FCR #E-FCRB-18072 was issued for those FCRs that were not
technically correct.
Change Control Package No. F10140E was
issued to correct all, with one exception, of the improperly
applied heat shrinkable material on the splices listed in Table 2
of the October 9,1986 response.
The one exception on FCR
E-FCRB-11, 441 was evaluated by Raychem and determined to be
acceptable.
The work was completed by MW0s 18617984, 18617985,
18617986, 18617987, 18517988, 18617989 and 18618730.
(2) Special Raychem training was held at the site during January 1986
and August 1986, for GPC-Construction and PFE engineers clarifying
the implementation of the heat shrink requirements and providing
additional information on the "use-range" criteria.
Attendees who
successfully completed the training were provided certifications
'
from Raychem.
The training records are documented and on file in
the Bechtel Project training file no. X7BP03.
(3) Raychem special splice applications data has been logged into the
project's data files under a new log number AX3AJ118-39.
(4) To prevent recurrence of the condition on Unit 2, construction
specification X3AR01, Section E9 was revised by FCR #E-FCRB-18056
to require that special splice designs be verified by certified
engineers prior to the normal approval cycle defined in the
present project procedure, and to require that the site keep the
certified engineers training records on file.
Based on the
above, this item is closed.
j.
(Closed) CDR 86-118, Flaking of Positive Straps On 125 Volt DC
Batteries.
During a monthly inspection by the licensee of the Class 1E
batteries, metal flakes were observed falling off the straps of the
positive plates.
The flaking phenomenon continued for several months.
It was concluded that, if left uncorrected, the flaking would lead to
,
significant degradation of the battery's capacity.
Each of the four (4) safety-related batteries at Vogtle Unit 1 comprise
59 cells to produce a nominal
125 VDC.
The batteries are lead-acid
i
I
flat plate type with lead plates pasted onto calcium alloy grids.
l
Straps interconnect the plates and the bus bar within the cell jars.
Wclding was used to connect the straps.
The flaking phenomenon
occurred in 37 cells out of 236 total.
. _ _ _ _ .
.
_ _ _ _ - _ - - _ _ _ - _ _ _ _ - _ - _ .
,
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,:
a
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.
11
w
. Analysis by the vendor, C&D Power Systems', determined that the presence
Lof antimony:in the plate to strap weld area caused the flaking problem.
Obviously, antimony should.not have been present, but.it was determined
that'some _1_ead-antimony burning- sticks =were ; inadvertently, substituted -
for lead calcium burning sticks 'during.the manufacturing process.
C&D:
reached this conclusion after analyzing three of the defective. cells in
their laboratory.
C&D . recommended to ~ replace:the defective cells' and -
to maintain visual inspections for flaking. 'Both of these recommenda-
tions have been implemented by .the licensee.
The question of generic
implicationi of this problem has been addressed by the . 0ffice of
Inspection and Enforcement.
While evaluating ~CDR 86-118, the NRC inspectors found it useful to make
-
a chronology of events as follows:
,
Date
Etent
March-June, 1984
Class 1E batteries for the Vogtle plant,
_ '
Unit 1, were manufactured.
'
. December, 1984
Flaking first detected.'
Refer to' Georgia
Power-Compeny Deficiency: Report-
No. T-1-84-336.
July,-1985
Georgia Power Company decided to return
three (3) defective cells to C&D for analysis
of the flaking problem.
Refer to'DR T-1-85-
742.
September 16, 1985
Last time that-any additional flaking ~of the
Class 1E batteries was observed.
April 17, 1986
C&Ds analysis of the three (3) defective
cells was received by Georgia Power Company.
May-20,-1986
NRC first officially informed of the flaking
problem.
< .
June 26, 1986
The licensee's final report was submitted to
l'
the NRC pursuant to 10 CFR 50.55(e).
!
September, 1986
Cells with flaking in Unit 1 batteries were
replaced with cells manufactured for Unit 2
Class 1E batteries, which were being stored by
l
C&D.
Refer Work Order No. 18607664.
'
.
l'
November 1, 1986
Pre-Operational Test (Procedure 1-3PK-02) for
l-
the Class 1E 125 VDC System was begun.
l-
,
January 2, 1987
Procedure 1-3PK-02 was successfully completed.
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About .nine months after manufacture, the fhking problem was first;
-
,
noticed.
Then over a period of nine monN, additional. cells started
'to Lflake,:but after that time - the- number of defective cells remains
i
' fixed. _. The original E Unit 1 cells in which f1aking' has . not been
observed (199 : cells) are now about 31: months . old.
Since e the
l
time: frame for the observed flaking phenomenon was _9 -J18 months, the
.
original non-flaking cells must not have the lead antimony alloy which
causes flaking.
.
A test engineer employed by the licensee stated that over a period of
nine months, the float voltage decreased from 2.24-volts (normal) to as
low as 2.07 volts in cells having the worst flaking problems.
Specific
gravity values. also gradually decreased in the cells having flaking.
'
Whereas the battery maintenance procedure _at the Vogtle plant calls.for--
!
- monthly measuring and recording of all cell' float voltages, battery
,
. degradation would be revealed should the flaking problem recur.
The
4
- maintenance procedure also calls for monthly visual inspection for
4
,
flaking.
~ About seventy cells were inspected by the.NRC inspector for flaking,
~and none of these exhibited flaking.
In light of the above conclusions
- -
f and observations,' _CDR 86-118 " Flaking of Positive Straps on 125 Volt DC
Batteries" is closed.
During review of documentation related to CDR 86-118, the'NRC inspector
~ noticed -that the installed capacity . of- each of- the four Class 1E--
batteries is -less than stated in the FSAR.
The values are' tabulated-
below:
.
Installed Capacity
Capacity. Stated
'
(Amp-hours)
in FSAR (Amp-hours)
Channel
2.75 Hr. rate (2)
3.00 Hrs. rate (z)
3 Hrs. rate (3)
A
1584
1674
1947
'
B
1584
1674
1947
- -
C
880
911
983
-D
591
590
650
,
Notes:
h
.(1) When discharged from full voltage to 1.8 Volts per cell: in
2.75-hour period at 77*F.
Value determined by manufacturer and
engineer.
Verified by test.
(2) Determined by the NRC inspector for comparison with the three-hour
rate given in the FSAR.
(3) From VEGP-FSAR-8.3.2.1.1
~
=
.
.
.- - - .
. .
-. . - -. - -.
L
'
_.
.
-
.
.
13
Once it was noticed during the inspection that there was a discrepancy
between actual values and FSAR values with respect to battery capacity,
the NRC inspector reviewed the battery sizing calculations and the
pre-operational _ test results.
The pre-operational test did in fact
confirm the installed battery capacity (acceptance test) and demon-
strated the capability of the battery to carry the project load
(service test). The sizing calculations show that the batteries were
sized for the project load and have extra . capacity for load growth,
aging and operation at 55'F. The capacity was determined in accordance
However, it is considered of some
significance by the NRC that the values in the FSAR for the capacity of
the safety-related batteries are in error. Therefore, this matter is
identified as Deviation 50-424/87-06-01, Discrepancy between the FSAR
(8.3.2.1.1) and the Actual Values for the Capacity of the Safety-
Related Batteries.
The following documents were reviewed or referred to in evaluating CDR
86-118:
1.
FSAR page 1.9-100 Commitment to Regulatory Guides
2.
FSAR Section 8.3.2 DC Power Systems
3.
FSAR pages 14.2.8-81 and 82 Pre-Operational Test
4.
Vogtle Unit 1 Technical Specification 3/4.8.2 DC Sources
5.
Regulatory Guide 1.128 Installation Design and Installation of
Large Lead Storage Batteries for Nuclear Power Plants
6.
Regulatory Guide 1.129 Maintenance, Testing, and Replacement of
Large Lead Storage Batteries for Nuclear Power Plants
7.
IEEE Std 484-1975, Recommended Practice for Installation Design
and Installation of Large Lead Storage Batteries for Genersting
Stations and Substations
8.
IEEE Std 450-1975, Recommended Practice for Maintenance, Testing,
f
and Replacement of Large Lead Storage Bau.eries for Generating
l
Station and Substations
9.
IEEE Std 485-1978, Recommended Practice for Sizing Large Lead
Storage Batteries for Generating Stations and Substations
10.
10 CFR 50.55(e) Report, Evaluation of a Potentially Reportable
Condition 125V DC Station Batteries, Transmitted June 26, 1986
l
l
,
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_ _ _ -
.-
---
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-.
.
-
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14
11.
C&D Power Systems Drawings:
D-841 Discharge Characteristics for LC Cell Model
D-842 Discharge Characteristic for KC Cell Model
D-843 Discharge Characteristic for LCY Cell Model
12.
Calculation by Bechtel Power Corporation, Calc No. X3CF02 Rev. 5
for Class 1E Battery. Systems
13.
Letter by Bechtel Power Corporation, dated December 23, 1985, log
BG34106, transmitting battery amp-br ratings and battery load
profiles
14.
Pre-operational Test Procedure (and results) 1-3PK-02 for Class 1E
125 V DC System for VEGP Unit 1
15.
Letter by Southern Company Services from L. W. Williams, Jr. ,
Manager, Quality Assurance, to J. A. Bailey, Vogtle Project
Licensing Manager, dated June 12, 1986 on " Potential Significant
Deficiency Evaluation C&D Batteries - Flaking Positive Straps"
16.
Letter by C&D Power Systems (Plymouth Meeting, PA) to Bechtel
Power Co. (c/o Georgia Power Co.) dated April 17, 1986 on " Battery
Cells Returned to C&D for Laboratory Analysis of Flaking Positive
Straps"
17.
General Battery Maintenance Procedure 27915-C dated November 20,
1986
18.
Battery Installation and Operating Instruction Manual, Bechtel Log
No. AX3AD01-25-2
19.
C&D Specification Sheets (Catalogue Information) for the LC, KC
and LCY model ce is
20.
IE Information Notice IN 86-37:
Degradation of Station Batteries
21.
IE Information Notice IN 85-74:
Station Battery Problems
22.
M. W. Migliaro, " Sizing Batteries for Generating Stations," IEEE
Transactions (Energy Conversion), Volume EC-1, Number 4,1986,
pp 25-30
23.
J. F. Montalbono and R. V. Casalaina, " Installation and Mainte-
nance of Lead Acid Stationary Batteries for Generating Stations."
IBID pp, 57-61
24.
J. W. Anderson, " Testing of Large Lead Storage Batteries," IEEE
Transactions (Energy Conversion), Volume EC-1, No. 3, pp 76-79.
. - _ - _ _ _ - _ _
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15
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k.
(Closed) 'CDR 86-123', GE Re1ay . Type '12NG15AG3. in- DG Panels - Unit 1.
. CDR 86-123 was ~ closed. in consideration of the licensee's final report -
submitted pursuant to 10 CFR 50.55(e).
The report was transmitted
via - Georgia Power Company letter from Mr. P.D. . Rice, Vice President
Vogtle Plant, to Mr. J. Nelson Grace, Region II, Administrator, dated
November -20,1986, log GN-1187. - The = General ' Electric Company . relays
(Model NGA .15AG3) were . wired in reverse polarity by the diesel
- -
generator panel fabricator causing burnout of some of the relays. The
licensee's ! corrective action Lincluded re-wiring, replacement of
resistors, testing and revising of drawings.
1.
(Closed) CDR 86-131, Turb'. Driven Aux. _ Feed Pump Governor Malfunction -
. Units'1 and 2.
CDR 86-131 is clo' sed in consideration of the licensee's
final report submitted pursuant to 10 CFR 50.55(e)._ The report was
- transmitted via Georgia Power Company letter from Mr. P.D. Rice, Vice
President .Vogtle Plant, to Mr.
J.. Nelson Grace, Region II Adminis-
.
'trator, dated December 16, 1986,. log GN-1234.
Incorrect springs were
installed in the governor for the turbine driven auxiliary feed pump.
The vendor;' supplied a new governor for Unit 1 which was installed,
tested and operated properly.
Unit 2 will be the same.
m.
(Closed) CDR 86-137, Diesel Generator Exciter Circuitry - Unit 1.
86-137 is closed in ' consideration of. the licensee's final report
submitted' pursuant to 10 CFR 50.55(e).
The report was transmitted
via Georgia Power Company letter from Mr. P. D. Rice, Vice President,'
Vogtle Plant, Mr. J. Nelson Grace, Region II Administrator, dated
January 10, -1987, log GN-1314.
The Unit 1 diesel. generator exciter
circuitry has been modified to reset (enable) the exciter circuit upon
receipt of an emergency start signal independent of the engine speed
at the time.
Upon reset (enable) of the exciter circuit the field
flashing circuit is enable and if the generator voltage is insufficient
that field circuit is flashed again.
Design drawing changes will be
. issued for the Unit 2 required design changes.
This action will be
tracked by means of Program of Completion of Work (PCW) action item
This item is closed. for Unit 1.
Unit 2's corrective action
-
will be examined during a future NRC inspection.
n.
(Closed) CDR 86-99, No Calculations for Cable Internal Resistance
During Loca - Units 1 and 2.
CDR 86-99 is closed in consideration of
the licensee's final report submitted pursuant to 10 CFR 50.55(e) and
associated maintenance work reports.
The report was transmitted via
Georgia Power Company letter from Mr. R. E. Conway, Senior Vice
President, to Mr.- J. Nelson Grace, Region II Administrator, dated
November 6,
1986, log GN-1165.
Readiness Raview Finding 22-F16
indicated that cable insulation resistance cas not factored into
-
estimates of instrumentation loop losses.
When the calculations were
performed it was found that some cables had to be replaced and some
instruments adjusted.
The work of replacing the identified cables has
been completed.
A few instrument had to be replaced because it was not
possible to change the range as originally intended.
i
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16
6.
Inspector Followup Item (IFI)
a.
(Closed) IFI 50-424, 425/85-10-03, Review Inspection Records that may
.
be - Incomplete Due . to DR Closecut. .The inspectors had two concerns:
(1) that there are not cross references between inspection records and
DRs that permit immediate access to these types of records, and
. (2) when inspecting class 1E items, QC inspectors will sometimes not
proceed with an inspection if many non-conformances or a large
non-conformance is identified.
Thus, when later action is taken to
resolve the DR, the entire inspection procedure is recorded as closed
out, despite the fact that the original inspection may or may not have
been completed.
Results:
Concern No. 1
A similar concern was identified by the licensee's QA organization in
Audit Finding Report No. 790-II, Finding No. 3.
The root cause of the
problem was determined to be an " inadequate program for retrievability
of a single document from large number of like documents." To resolve
this audit finding, a massive backfit effort was undertaken to review
record storage program and to enter all construction DRs into NORMS to
cross reference the DRs to other documents.
This was demonstrated to
the inspector by Operations QA Record's staff. This work is complete
and is being kept curre:st.
Concern No. 2
To resolve this item rework and DR number are recorded on the
inspection document.
IF EE580 cards were previously accepted, dummy
cards with EE580 numbers and any rework or DRs will be generated by EQC
to be filed with the previous card in the vault.
By annotating the
rework and DR numbers on the inspection documents, it assures that all
inspection items have been completed,
b.
(Closed) IFI 50-424, 425/85-20-02, Review the Documentation Require-
ments for Cable C: amps and Entry Fittings.
The concern involved the
lack of QC acceptance criteria for the inspection of clamps holding
armour lock cable on unistruts or other hangers (Specifically, no
torque values are listed in the use of cable clamps mounted on unistrut
for support of armored cable).
To resolve this concern, the licensee
issued FCR No. E-FCRB-10,314 (CSCN 370) which revised Construction
Specification X3AR01, Section E9 adding the following acceptance
criteria:
" Cable clamps mounted on unistrut used for securing armored cable
shall be snug-tight; that is a solid connection obtained using
standard tools applied by a qualified craftsmen"
This item is considered closed.
I
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. . ..
- - ------------_-_____--_ --_-- -
_
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.
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,
- ^
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- -
.
17
c.
(Closed) . IFI 50-424/86-88-04,- Revise Control Fuses-In 4KV Switchgear.
This. item was closed by the NRC inspector because the-licensee .showed .
evidence that the fuses were replaced with ones having the proper
.- rati ng.
-d.
-(Closed) IFI 50-424/86-88-05, Justify Repair Required to Maintain Hot'
Shutdown.
SSER 4,. Section 9.5.1.4, gives justification for allowing .
the repair in question and, therefore, this item is closed.
.
e.
(Closed) IFI/50-424/86-88-06, Revise Repair Procedure 27579-C.
The NRC
inspector determined that the 'NRC's concerns expressed by this . item
have been resolved by reviewing a copy of the latest emergency repair
- procedure 27579-C and inspecting motor control center 1BBF.
This item-
is closed.
f.
(Closed) IFI 50-424/86-16-03, Incomplete Verification on Six Commit-
ments.
This item was identified during the early inspection of the
Readiness Review Module 19 (Elect _rical Supports). . During the review
of items by .the NRC, just prior to issuing the Module 19 Report 86-48,
_
the determination was made that -this finding did not constitute a-
weakness in the licensee's program and with the licensee's commitment
to followup on this condition, this item can now be closed.
g.
(Closed) IFI 50-424/86-46-01. - Review 'the NESC Requirements for
Off-Site Power Source Ice and Wind Loading.
During- the - review of
design commitment for Readiness Review Module #6 (Electrical Equipment)
it was noted that FSAR, when discussing the 230kv and 500kv system wind
and ice loading conditions, did not reference any particular edition-
of the National . Electrical Safety Code when addressing the design
requirement for buses.
Steps have been taken to change the FSAR to
resolve this IFI as follows:
. Revise the last paragraph of FSAR 8.2.1.1 to read:
The transmission line structures of both the- 230 - and 500-kV
systems are designed to withstand standard light loading
. conditions as specified in National Bureau of Standards handbook,
Number 8 (ANSI, C2.2-1960, National Electrical Safety Code).
This item is closed.
-7.
IE. Bulletins
a.
(Closed) IEB 85-02, Undervoltage Trip - Attachments (UVTA) of Westing-
house DB-50 Type Reactor Trip Breakers - Units 1 and 2.
This bulletin
was not applicable to plant Vogtle since it was not an operating plant
at the time the bulletin was issued.
However, Generic Letter 83-28,
" Required Actions Based on Generic Implications of Salem ATWs Events"
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.. . ..
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_
_ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ .
____-
T-
--
$
.
.
.
18
required the licensee to install -the. au'to shunt. modification on the-
reactor. trip switchgear (This is the same modification discussed in the
bulletin). -The shunt modification was accomplished on Vogtle Unit 1 by
Field Equipment Change Order (FECO) No. N-142-BF and was completed on
April 2,.1986.
Nuclear.' Operations has developed test procedures which
independently . test the UVTA' and shunt trip devices.
Additionally,
Plant Vogtle uses type DS-416 reactor trip breakers. . Routine mainte-
nance of the breakers is in accordance with the. commitments made to NRR-
"in a. letter dated: August 1, 1985.
Based on the above,' this item is ~
closed.
b.
(Closed) IEB 86-03, Potential Failure of ECCS Pumps
. Units 1 and 2.
This - outstanding item was closed by the NRC -in consideration of a
Georgia Power Company letter from Mr. P. D. Rice, Vice t resident Vootle
Project, . to Mr. J. Nelson Grace, Region II Administ..itor, dated
November .11, 1986, Log. GN-1173.
This letter states that the Vogtle
plant does not have .the particular piping configuration described in