ML20207P427
| ML20207P427 | |
| Person / Time | |
|---|---|
| Site: | Sequoyah  |
| Issue date: | 01/07/1987 |
| From: | Meers B, Murphy M, Stewart D TENNESSEE VALLEY AUTHORITY |
| To: | |
| Shared Package | |
| ML20207P399 | List: |
| References | |
| 301.02-SQN, 301.02-SQN-R04, 301.02-SQN-R4, NUDOCS 8701160124 | |
| Download: ML20207P427 (18) | |
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l TVA EMPLOYEE CONCERNS REPORT NUMBER: C011301-SQN SPECIAL PROGRAM REVISION NUMBER: 6 PAGE 16 0F 16
- Require minor loads to be included in the final calculation process. l l
- Identify the methodology used to determine the final loading for each l embed evaluated. lR6 I
The line management response to CATD number C011301-SQN-01 was: l DNE-CEB will establish a program to ensure that DNE-CEB personnel are 1 adequately trained in the applicatior. of design criteria and standards IR6 relevant to the work being performed. l These corrective actions are not SQN restart items. l The corrective actions for the listed CATDs are detailed below:
C011301-SQN Performance of disposition and subsequent closure l l
of SCR-SQNCEB-8607. l C011301-SQN Piirformance of disposition and subsequent closure l of SCR-SQNCEB-8622. l C011301-SQN Performance of disposition and subsequent closure lR6 of NCR-SQNCEB-8502. l C011301-SQN-C7 - Performance of disposition and subsequent closure I of NCR-SQNCEB-8404. I C011301-SQN Performance of disposition and subsequent closure i of PIR-SQNCEB-8658. l VII. Generic Applicability The issues raised by the concerns in this element potentially apply to all TVA nuclear plants. This determination was also made by the WBN-ECTG Element Report on the subject of these issues, Design of Plates.
I VIII. Attachments l Attachment A Listing of Concerns Indicating Safety Relationship and l Generic Applicability l
1160124 870109 m p ADOCK 05000327 PDR
C011301-SON-R6 ATTACHMENT - A 10400 WBN YYYY IN-85-031-001 SS IN REVIEWING PREVIOUSLY 1-85-031-001 CO N K-FORM APPROVED DESIGN CALCULATIONS FOR
, T50054 i STRUCTURAL STEEL ACCESS PLATFORMS-LOCATED IN THE REACTOR BUILDINGS UNITS 1 & 2. CI HAS AT TIMES FOUND
' ERRORS, OMISSIONS OR INCORRECT ASSUMPTIONS WHICH COULD HAVE AN AFFECT ON QUALITY / SAFETY. WHEN CI
' MADE REQUEST TO SUPERVISOR (NAME KNOWN) TO CORRECT ERRORS, CI WAS TOLD THAT THERE WAS NO TIME OR MAN-HOURS AVAILABLE TO MAKE CORRECTIONS. CI STATED THAT SOME CALCULATION WENT UNCORRECTED. THIS OCCURRED DURING ALL OF 1984. CI
' COULD NOT PROVIDE ANY SPECIFICS / DETAILS.
' EN DES PROCEDURE EP 4.03 APP. 4 IS l-85-033-001 CO 10400 N WBN NNYY IN-85-265-WBN NS T50064 REPORT INADEQUATE. EP 4.03 APP. 4 ALLOWS ACCEPTANCE OF MINOR LOADS TO EMBEDDED PLATES BY PERFORMING VISUAL INSPECTIONS OF ATTACHMENTS TO EMBEDDED PLATES. SINCE PROCEDURE EP 4.03 APP .4 DOES NOT DEFINE WHAT A MINOR LOAD IS, THERE IS NO-LIMIT TO-WHAT CAN BE ACCEPTED BY VISUAL INSPECTION. EXAMPLE: FCR EP-3784 ILLUSTRATES PROBLEM WITH PROGRAM OF VISUAL INSPECTION. NO FOLLOW-UP REQUIRED.
f 4-85-103-001 CO 10400 N WBN YYYY I-85-111-WBN SS TVA IS NOT IN COMPLIANCE WITH NRC T50004 K-FORM BULLETIN 79-02 (SUPPORT OF RIGID PLATE ASSUMPTIONS IN ANALYSIS) IN THAT BASE PLATE FLEX IS NOT A DESIGN CONSIDERATION. NO ADDITIONAL CONTACT REQUIRED.
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'YYYY NS CONCRETE ANCHOR o0LT (WEDGE B' O LTS)
N-85-109-X04 CO 10400 ^N WBN REPORT IN. UNIT 1 & 2. THE ALLOWABLE BOLT T50057 LOADS FOR UNIT 1 ARE GREATER THAN UNIT 2. THE DESIGN PHILOSOPHY TO DETERMINE THE ACTUAL ALLOWABLES ON AkCl!OR BOLTS HAS CHANGED. FOR UNIT 1, THE DESIGN GROUP DID NOT CONS DER FLEXIBLE PLATE THEORY, INSTEAD THEY CONSIDERED THE BASE PLATE AS RIGID.
CI QUESTIONS THESE TWO DIFFERENT ALLOWABLES.
YYYY SS TWO AREAS REGARDING DESIGN METHODS
?-QMS-8 CO 10400 S NPS REPORT FOR PIPE SUPPORTS ARE NOT RECEIVING EN 22200 PROPER CONSIDERATION. 1) EFFECT OF BASEPLATE FLEXIBILITY ON ANCHOR LOADS. 2) DETAILING METHODS FOR WELDS.
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)TE: These concerns evaluated in subcategory 11301-SQN for SQN only.
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-' ;. . TVA EMPIhYEE CONCERNS REPORT NUMBER: 301.02-SQN SPECIAL PROGRAM REPORT TYPE: Sequoyah Nuclear Plant Element Report REVISION NUMBER: 4 TITLE: Diesel Generator Reliability Problems REASON FOR REVISION:
To incorporate TAS and SRP comments. IR1 To incorporate SRP comments, CATD's, and SQN corrective action plan lR2 To incorporate SRP comments lR3 To incorporate SRP comments lR4 PREPARATION PREPARED BY:
B. Z. Meers, Jr. ///- / ~7
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SIGNATURE DATE REVIEWS
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// SIGNATURE DATE TAS-R VW7 SIGNATURE DATE CONCURRENCES nCEG-H: ] YY I7fEl SIGNATURE DATE SRP: b 4 $ m k R) }l~7/[f DATE SIGNATURE [. [
APPROVED BY:
( / f5 N/A ECSP MANKGER DATE MANAGER OF NUCLEAR POWER DATE CONCURRENCE (FINAL REPORT ONLY)
- SRP Secretary's signature denotes SRP concurrences are in files.
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TENNESSEE VALLEY AUTHORITY SEQUDYAH NUCLEAR PLANT EMPLOYEE CONCERNS TASK GROUP OPERATIONS CEG t'
Subcategory: Mechanical Equipment Reliability / Design Element: Diesel Generator Reliability Problems Report Number: 301.02-SQN R4 XX-85-122-008 XX-85-122-009 XX-85-122-010 IN-85-323-001 WI-85-100-003 MAS-85-001
'l Evaluator: , ,
3 B [)4. Meers, '. Date Reviewed by: / '
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OPS CEd Mefaber Date Approved by: ] W. R. Lagergren I/7/07 Date 1703T
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Revision 4 I. DIESEL GENERATOR (D/G) RELIABILITY PROBLEMS This element report evaluates the concern of reliability degradation of the emergency D/Gs which are part of the Onsite (Standby) Power System.
The concern is that too much testing, frequent starting and stopping, lack of preventive maintenance, and lack of upgrading combine to reduce the reliability and life of the emergency D/Gs.
The scope of this evaluation is limited to testing (qualification, preoperational, and surveillance), preventive maintenance, operation, and upgrading of the D/Gs.
The scope does'not include design, loading, or load margin.
II. SPECIFIC EVALUATION METHODOLOGY This element is made up of six concerns.
The following two concerns are generic: ;
"IN-85-323-001 - Continuous stacting/ stopping of Diesel Generators (due to testing) is detrimental to engine parts. Test program requires lacreased number of tests after a certain number of failures. CI feels that increased frequency is contrary to vendor recommendations. CI could not provide specific test numbers. No additional information available. NUC Power concern. units 1 & 2."
"WI-85-100-003 - Diesel Generators have reliability problems. CI stated that correction requires reliability program, a reduction in the number of starts, attention to testing, preventive maintenance upgrading, and more interaction with INPO, other utilities and vendors to establish resolution to problems. CI has no further information. Anonymous concern VIA letter."
The following two concerns apply to other plants:
XX-85-122-009, XX-85-122-010 are BFN and BLN concerns that are exactly the same as Concern XX-85-122-008 for SQN and the generic WI-85-100-003.
The remaining two concerns are specific to Sequoyah Nuclear Plant:
"XX-85-122-008 - Sequoyah: Diesel Generators have reliability problems. CI stated that correction requires reliability program, a reduction in the number of starts, attention to testing, preventative maintenance upgrading, and more interaction with INPO, other utilities and vendors to establish resolution to problems. CI has no further information. Anonymous concern VIA letter."
" MAS-85-001 - SQN - D/G AC lube oil pump tripped because of possible '
gasket material in pump."
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Revision 4 The K-Forms were reviewed to determine the areas of concern. The referenced documents were reviewed to determine the requirements. The Diesel Generator Valid Start Log was reviewed to determine the-historical reliability. Historical documents were reviewed to verify training of maintenance personnel and equipment upgrading. The Potential Reportable Occurrence Log and associated applicable Licensee Event Reports _(LERs) were reviewed to determine past problems and failures. . Interviews were held with three cognizant. individuals and 4
walkdowns of the emergency D/Gs were conducted to determine the present conditions.
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III. FINDINGS The following areas were reviewed:
A.' Qualification of the Sequoyah Nuclear Plant (SQN) Emergency D/Gs DuringthelicensingprocesstokSQN,theNRCreviewedtheD/Gdesign and factory qualification tests. The NRC found that both the design and the qualification tests met regulatory _ requirements at the time.
This is documented in the SQN SER (NUREG 0011, reference 9).
Therefore the focus of this report is on maintenance and reliability issues which have surfaced since completion of the plant.
B. Regulstory Requirements and Reliability The emergency D/G reliability requirements and frequency of " valid starts" is identified in the SQN Technical Specifications in accordance with NRC Regulatory Guide 1.108 (references 28 and 7).
The present concerns center on reliability, maintenance, and overtesting. NRC has been concerned with D/G reliability for some time: " reliability of onsite emergency AC power sources has been a concern of both the commission and industry for at least a decade.
The issue of ' Diesel Generator Reliability' was identified as Generic Safety Issue B-56 in 1977. Since that time, several studies have been completed on diesel performance and reliability as well as on overall methods to improve reliability" (reference 5).
Initial reliability survey under NUREG-0471 (reference 6) cites industry-wide diesel reliability experience as 0.94 and more recently NUREG/CR-2989 cites reliability experience as 0.98. The NRC reliability goal may be shifting from 0.99 as stated in NRC Regulatory Guide 1.108 to 0.95 proposed in Draft Regulatory Guide NUREG-1109,
" Station Blackout", dated January 1986 (references 7 and 2). A significant study conducted by the University of Dayton Research Institute involving LER reviews, literature searches, and interviews with licensees, inspectors, and vendors was published February 1979 as b NUREG/CR-0660, " Enhancement of Onsite Emergency Diesel Generator Reliability", (reference 4). The recommendations of this report applicable to SQN D/Gs (in the order of significance given in the report) are:
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Revision 4
- 1. Effective air dryers in the compressed air starting system are essential to reliable operation.
- 2. Air quality as regards accumulation of dust, dirt, and grit in the D/G room-is essential to-reliable operation.
- 3. A continuing program of high quality training for operations, maintenance, and supervisory personnel is required for reliable operation.
- 4. Thoroughly test the D/G following maintenance and modifications.
- 5. Improvement of reliability hinges on identification of " root' cause" for problems and providing adequate corrective action.
- 6. Paint concrete floors in the D/G room to minimize dust, dirt, and grit fouling problems with relays.
- 7. Review other reliability studies.
- 8. Establish a plan to implement NUREG/CR-0660 recommendations NRC requested information and comments from SQN personnel concerning NUREG/CR-0660. Among the recommendations of this NUREG is a warning concerning the operation of D/Gs at light or no load conditions (Reference 18). Additional information on light-load operation was discussed within TVA (reference 19). TVA's response to NRC was that light-load operation at SQN was minimized (reference 20). The only recommendation of the NRC letter left unanswered by TVA was the recommendation of dust control around D/G electrical equipment.
TVA's response to NRC questions describe training, maintenance, and other areas including dust control (Question 8.36) (reference 21).
NRC NUREG/CR-2989, " Reliability of Emergency AC Power Systems at Nuclear Plants," written by Oak Ridge National Laboratory and published July 1983, has the following recommendations to improve D/G reliability:
- a. Install air dryers on air start system compressors.
- b. Install dust seals on relays and relay cabinets, f
I c. Have the governor periodically overhauled by the factory.
- d. Remove connections between independent diesel air start systems,
- e. Install water and sediment drains on fuel storage tanks.
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Revision 4 o
.The conclusions of this report state that independent failure of D/Gs is-an important contributor to the probability of an onsite AC power system
- failure, but significantly reducing the industry average probability of independent-diesel failure will be difficult because there is no single subsystem that dominates the failure probability. The report-further states that common-cause failure probability may 'oe reduced inexpensively by improving operating and maintenance procedures. The report suggests an extensive failure probability reduction factor is to add another D/G to the emergency onsite AC power system (reference 3).
In NUREG-0011. Supplement No. 2 -(reference'9), NRC required that air dryers be installed in the air start systems, heavy duty turbocharger drive gear assemblies be installed on the engines, and formal training be given to maintenance end other related personnel. Operating air
' dryer assemblies for each D/G air. start system were observed during
, inspections of the D/Gs by the evaluator. New heavy duty turbochargers were installed on DCRs (references 15 and 16). Personnel training has been conducted on numerous occasions (reference 17). In NUREG-0011, Supplement 2, the NRC staff states:
"Upon implementation of the above additions, modifications, and training, noted in the findings; the.Sequoyah diesel generators, their auxiliary systems and their maintenance activities will also be in conformance with the recommendation of NUREG/CR-0660, ' Enhancement Of Diesel Generator Reliability' and the related NRC guidelines and criteria. We therefore conclude that this will provide reasonable assurance of diesel generator reliability through the design life of the plant."
TVA has reviewed and taken appropriate action in response to information l from NRC, Institute of Nuclear Power Operations (INPO), and other utilities, as well being willing to share information with these organizations (reference 27).
i SQN Diesel Generator valid start history D/G starts are documented by Operations initially by OSLA7 and recently l by SI-7.2 (references 10 and 11). Inspection of these records yields f the following reliability figures for SQN D/Gs for the dates March 5, 1980 through August 13, 1986:
Diesel Number of Number Number Generator Starts Successful Failed Reliability l' 1A-A 176 172 4 .9773 ,
L 2A-A 152 148 4 .9737 1B-B 156 151 5 .9679 2B-B 154 153 1 .9935 Page 4 of 16
Revision 4 As of August 13, 1986 the reliability data for the last 100 starts on each Sequoyah D/G is:
Diesel Number of Number Number Generator Starts Successful Failed Reliability 1A-A 100 98 2 .980 2A-A 100 98 2 .980 IB-B 100 97 3 .970 2B-B 100 99 1 .990 These two sets of reliability data represent the reliability history of each Sequoyah emergency D/G tested based on " valid starts" as defined in <
In response to NRC Generic Letter 84-15 (reference 1), TVA quoted D/G reliability as follows (reference 12):
Table 1 SEQUOYAH D/G RELIABILITY MARCH 5, 1980 TO MAY 15. 1984 Total Number of Total Number of Unit Valid Tests Valid Failures Reliability W
1 A-A 132 4 .969 2 A-A 128 2 .984 1 B-B 147 2 .986 2 B-B 132 0 1.000 Table 2 SEQUOYAH D/G RELIABILITY (last 100 starts)
Number of Number of Unit Valid Tests Valid Failure _s_
I Reliability 1 A-A 100 3 .970 2 A-A 100 0 1.000 1 B-B 100 0 1.000 2 B-B 100 0 1.000 4
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Revision 4 The SQN D/G Start Log found in the unit control room indicates the following reliability data (reference 10):
Table 1 SEQUOYAH D/G RELIABILITY MARCH 5, 1980 to MAY 15, 1984 Total Number of Total Number of Unit Valid Tests Valid Failures Reliability 1 A-A 132 3 .977 2 A-A 128 2 .984 1 B-B 147 2 .986 2 B-B 132 0 1.000 Table 2 SEQUOYAH D/G RELIABILITY (last 100 starts)
Number of Number of Unit Valid Tests Valid Failures Reliability 1 A-A 100 3 .970 2 A-A 100 1 .990 1 B-B 100 1 .990 2 B-B 100 0 1.000 These same discrepancies appear in two other documents that were reviewed (references 13 and 14).
Maintenance / Housekeeping During a walkdown of the D/Gs and Diesel Building completed by the evaluator, the following conditions contrary to NUREG/CR-0660 were observed:
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Revision 4
- 1. Several lube oil leaks were found; " oil dry" compound had been used-in most cases. Some puddles of oil were observed. No work request tags were found for. repair of these leaks.
- 2. Diesel fuel.was found standing on-top of every engine day tank.
Some tanks were observed to have more fuel oil on top,1but in no -
j case was the fuel.cil judged to be over 1/4-inch deep.
- 3. A general dusty and dirty condition was observed in each D/G rocm.
The dust was particularly heavy on top of'the diesels.
- 4. Numerous work request tags were observed on the'D/G and support equipment. Examples are equipment not identified, bent tubing,-and other damage.
- 5. Piles of scrap pipe insulation and discarded cleaning rags were ,
observed behind engine A of D/G 1 B-B.
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- 6. Dust was observed inside some electrical control cabinets.
- 7. The D/G room floors cre sealed but dusty and dirty.
! 8. Temporary rags are wrapped around some of the air dryer purge. drains.
- 9. Several of the electrical control relays were observed to be either-the open contact type or pneumatic time-delay _ type, both of which
, are susceptible to failures resulting from dust contamination.
No formal failure root cause analysis program separate from the LER evaluation procedure could be identified.
C. Testing of the Emergency D/Gs Testing is an important part of the D/G reliability program. NRC has identified the initial qualification testing program which was
[_ conducted at the manufacturing plant and included 305 start and load i- cycles to be satisfactory (reference 9). The subsequent
[ preoperational testing program which included 69 consecutive start l and. load cycles and a 24-hour full-load-carrying capability test was E found to be acceptable to both TVA design and NRC (references 24 cId
- 22). The continuing surveillance testing program is accomplished by
[ SQN operations personnel using Surveillance Instruction SI-7.2 (reference 11). The purpose of this SI is to document valid test l
starts of the emergency D/Gs as required by the SQN Technical
- Specifications and recommended by NRC Regulatory Guide 1.108
- (references 28 and 7).
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Revision 4 In September 1985. Electric Power Research Institute published EPRI NP-4264, " Failures Related to Surveillance Testing of Standby Equipment: Volume 2: Diesel Generators". This research was started to investigate the belief that surveillance testing for emergency D/Gswas reducing generator reliability. The results of this report stated that surveillance testing was a factor in many D/G failures; however, other factors such as operation, maintenance, and inadequacies of design contributed significantly and were not easy to distinguish from the effects of surveillance testing. "Although maintenance was not responsible for many of these problems, the report identifies expansion of maintenance programs as the most promising way of increasing overall reliability....".
In April 1986 Brookhaven National Laboratory published NUREG/CR-4557 " to analyze the data and recommendations made by the various groups associated with nuclear power diesel generators and to summarize the major recomsnendations of each group." (reference 29). NUREG/CR-4557 presents an overview of information and experience gathered on diesel senseators as well as comments on NRC Generic Letter 84-15 which proposed a new D/G technical specification. Testing is a major issue in the report and the various parties involved generally agreed that overtesting can reduce the reliability and lifespan of the D/G sets. Unfortunately, the results are subjective and neither the utilities, regulators or vendors are able to produce hard data to support their position.
The NUREG tabulated utility responses to Generic Letter on diesel generator reliability. The respondents generally were adverse to the requirements for increased surveillance following diesel failures.
Likewise, industry groups such as American Society of Mechanical Engineers (ASME). EPRI, INPO, etc., stressed maintenance and analysis over increased testing as a means to improve reliability.
A particular comment which appeared frequently was that fast, cold test starts should be limited or eliminated. Again, no hard data was presented to support degradation of reliability because of overtesting.
Finally D/G vendor responses were discussed. Although not all manufacturers participated, Morrison - Knudsen/GM, manufacturer of the SQN diesels, generally supported the others. Recommendations 2 included: reduce fast starts, use prelube and prewarm (used at SQN), eliminate running unloaded (administratively in effect at SQN), and improve maintenance.
Of all the recommendations however, the fact remains that SQN Technical Specifications (Tech Specs) mandate periodic testing.
SQN sis prescribe testing to meet the Tech Specs and the tests are being run on schedule. Until the Tech Specs are revised, no significant change can be made to the test frequency or test j methodology.
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' l Revision 4 1 D. A search of all work requests from January 1, 1982 through April.
1986 failed to reveal any D/G lube oil pump failure due to gasket material. The SQN PRIME computer was used for document search.
Conclusions:
Based on the-findings in the various NUREGs and the EPRI report the industry's D/G's in general have reliability problems. Based on a review of the valid start data and the walkdown inspections it was concluded that the SQN D/Gs have reliability and cleanliness problems.
Independent of the data source referenced the lowest reliability factor noted was .9679. More recent data indicate reliability improvements, although the reliability factors don't meet the current Reg Guide 1.108
- goal of .99. SQN appears to have the necessary level'of management attention to further improve overall D/G reliability. lR4 Dur'ing inspections, the D/Gs were found to be very dirty, dusty, and plagued with various leaks. The general cleanliness condition could be greatly i improved although it was recognized that this inspection was performed on a station that has been in a year long outage. Diesel Generator surveillance testing has continued during this outage on the frequency mandated in the technical specification (reference 11 and 28).
Overtesting, by industry consensus, may have a deleterious effect on D/G lR4 sets, but the views about this effect are controversial. Unless relief l is given by NCR, no change can be made to the test frequency. SQN lR4 management, by TS change 107, is incorporating items to resolve the I test frequency issue. See section VII of this report. l Based on the findings it is concluded that there are no outstanding safety related issues as explained in the following discussion: lR4 Concern IN-85-323-001 is found to be valid because of the number of starts required by Tech Specs and consequent sis, and because the number of starts involved are contrary to manufacturer's recommendations.
Concern WI-85-100-003 is found to'be valid because of a lack of a formal reliability program, because of the combination of number of starts required by the Tech Specs and valid failures to start, and because of lack of preventive maintenance on the fuel and lube oil systems to eliminate leaks. The portion of the concern regarding interaction lR4 with INPO and other outsiae organizations was found to be not valid. I Concern KK-85-122-008 is found to be valid because improvement needed in reduction of the number of valid failures to start, because lack of establishment of a formal reliability program, because of the combination of number of starts required by the Tech Specs and valid failures to start, and because of lack of preventive maintenance on the fuel and lube oil systems to eliminate leaks. The portion of the concern was found to be not valid regarding interaction with INPO and other outside organizations.
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Revision 4 Concern NAS-85-001 could not be found valid, because of lack of findings on lube oil pump failure due to gasket material.
IV. ROOT CAUSE Based on the findings, the root cause is determined to be two fold, lack lR4 of a formal DG trending analysis program and related follow-up and lack i of adequate continuing housekeeping on the D/Gs.
V. GENERIC APPLICABILITY Based on the findings, the reliability concerns are found to be generically applicable to all TVA nuclear plants. This issue will be investigated at all sites.
Concern NAS-85-001 related to a SQN specific issue and is not considered generic to other TVA sites.
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VI. REFERENCES l
- 1. US NRC Generic Letter 84-15. " Proposed Staff Actions to Improve and Naintain Diesel Generator Reliability," dated July 2, 1984, (A02 840716 019)
- 2. USNRC NUREG-1109 (Draft Report for Comment), " Regulatory Analysis for the Resolution of Unresolved Safety Issue A-44, Station Blackout," dated January 1986 USNRC NUREG/CR-2989 (ORNL/IM-8545), " Reliability of Emergency A.C.
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3.
Power Systems at Nuclear Power Plants," dated July 1983 (A02.830810 005)
- 4. USNRC NUREG/CR 0660 (UDR-TR-79-07), " Enhancement of On-site !
Emergency Diesel Generator Reliability," dated February 1979 (A02 790425 007)
- 5. NUS Corporation, " Unresolved Safety Issues Review (February 1986 Update), Diesel Reliability (B-56)," dated February 1986 (No RIMS number assigned)
- 6. USNRC NUREG-0471, " Generic Tast Problem Descriptions, Category B, C, and D Tasks," dated June 1978
- 7. USNRC Regulatory Guide 1.108, " Periodic Testing of Diesel Generator units Used as Onsite Electric Power Systems at Nuclear Power Plants"
- 8. Electric Power Research Institute. " Failures Related to Surveillance Testing of Standby Equipment, Volume 2, Diesel Generators," EPRI NP-4264 dated September 1985
- 9. USNRC NUREG-0011. " Safety Evaluation Report by the Office of Nuclear Reactor Regulation, U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission, in the Matter of Tennessee Valley Authority, Sequoyah Nuclear Plant
, units 1 and 2. Docket Number 50-327 and 50-328," dated March 1979, sections 8.3 and 9.6
- 10. SQN Operations Instruction OSLA7, "Sequoyah Nuclear Plant Operation Secton - Diesel Generator Log," dated August 10, 1982 -
l Diesel Generator Logs for the Period March 5, 1980 to July 30, 1986 i
l 11. SQN Surveillance Instruction SI-7.2, " Diesel Generator i Surveillance Frequency," revision 0, dated April 18, 1986 - Diesel Generator Start Logs for the period June 25, 1986 to August 13, 1986 i
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- 12. Letter from L. M. Mills, Manager Nuclear Licensing. to Harold R.
Denton, Director, Office of Nuclear Reactor Regulation, U. S.
Nuclear Regulatory Commission, "Ir. the Matter of the Tennessee i
Valley Authority Docket Nos. 50-259, 50-260, 50-296, 50-327, and 50-328," dated October 1, 1984 (L44 841001 807)
- 13. Memorandum from T. G. Campbell, Site Director, NUC PR, Sequoyah Nuclear Plant, to L. M. Mills, "Sequoyah Nuclear Plant units 1 and 2 - NRC Generic Letter 84 Proposed Staff Action to Improve and Maintain Diesel Generator Reliability," dated October 4, 1984 (S01'841001 817)
I 14. Letter from T. G. Campbell to L.M. Mills, "Sequoyah Nuclear Plant -
Proposed Technical Specification Change No. 107," dated August 15, 1984 (L53 840809 983--with attachment) 15 .' SQ-DCR-945, (L24 310804 946)
- 16. SQ-DCR-1203, (L53 820728 083)
- 17. Various correspondence related to training for maintenance of '
D/Gs.
RIMS Numbers:
L24 810604 895 L28 810623 816 L24 810817 956 L47 810916 800 LO7 810923 802 LO1 811218 801 L20 820107 801 L47 820128 801 L47 820303 804 L47 820311 806 L47 820319 802 L24 820325 896 L24 820426 931 L47 820907 802 L24 820325 897 L23 840417 922
- 16. Letter from L. S. Rubenstein, Acting Chief, Light Water Reactor Branch No. 4 Division of Project Management, NRC, to H. G. Parris, Manager of Power, " Implementation of the Recommendation of 1 NUREG-0660, ' Enhancement of Onsite Emergency Diesel Generator Reliability' - Sequoyah Nuclear Plant, units 1 and 2," dated January 17, 1980 (A02 800121 014)
- 19. Memorandum from L. M. Mills to J. R. Calhoun, Director of Nuclear Power, "Sequoyah Nuclear Plant units 1 and 2 - Diesel Engine Driven Emergency Generator Operation at Light /No Load," dated February 20, 1980 (A27 800220 010)
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.. l Revision 4
- 20. Memorandum from J. R. Calhoun to L. M. Mills, "Sequoyah Nuclear i Plant units 1 and 2 - Enhancement of Diesel Generator Reliability,"
dated March 12, 1980 (L24 800306 845)
- 21. Letter from L. M. Mills to NRC, "In the Matter of the Application of Tennessee Valley Authority - Docket Nos. 50-327 and 50-328,"
dated May 19, 1980 (A27 800519 007)
- 22. USNRC NUREG-0011, Supplement No.l.
- 23. USNRC NUREG-0011, Supplement No.2.
- 24. TVA SQM Freoperational Testing Program for the Emergency Diesel Generators Unit 1:
DNE FINAL PREOP APPROVAL TEST DESCRIPTION DATE TVA-13A Onsite AC Distribution System 10/21/77 TVA-1381 Onsite AC Distribution System 03/02/79
- Load Shedding Logic TVA-13B2 Onsite AC Distribution System 03/21-79 TVA-13C Onsite AC bistribution System 12/15/79
- Diesel Generator Qualification TVA 13-D Onsite AC Distribution System 04/20/79
-Blackout TVA-14A Diesel Generator Fuel Oil 09/13/79 System TVA-14A R1 Diesel Generator Fuel Oil 05/04/79 System TVA-14B Diesel Generator Starting Air 03/08/78 System TVA-14C Diesel Generator Building 01/18/79 Heating and Ventilation System TVA-14D 125-V Diesel Generators 07/28/78 Battery System TVA-14D R1 Diesel Generators 125-V 04/16/79 Control and Field Flashing Batteries TVA-14E Diesel Generator Functional 09/26/79
, Tests Page 13 of 16
Revision 4 Unit-2:
DNE FINAL PREOP APPROVAL ~
TEST DESCRIPTION DATE TVA-13B1 Onsite AC Distribution System 12/22/80
- Load Shedding Logic TVA-1382 Onsite AC Distribution System 02/13/81
- 25. SQN Surveillance Instruction SI-7, " Electrical Power System:
Diesel Generators," revision 35, dated July 7, 1986
- 26. SQN Surveillance Instruction SI-7.1, " Diesel Generator AC Electrical Power Source Operability Verification (Diesel.
Generator /Offsite Source) " revision 7 dated July 14, 1986
- 27. Various correspondence on D/G reliability.
RINs Numbers:
NEB 790509 355 EEB 821021 933 C69 790802 947 L23 821022 968 NEB 791004 105 L23 830105 880 L53 791011 948 L23 830127 914 A27 791029 010 A27 830325 007 L23 800311 849 L33 830329 808 l L54 800417 800 A27 830607 010 NEB 800725 017 PWP 830616 518 L53 810324 972 L23 830829 918 L54 820614 620 L33 830916 809 L22 820823 801 L33 831109 805 SWP 820923 077 L33 831109 803 L22 831107 803 LOO 831116 305 LOO 831117 415 L33 840106 810 L23 840124 922 L23 840307 806 LO3 840315 406 L33 840703 802 L33 840917 802
- t. L33 841004 801 S01 841001 817 f L23 841026 909 L23 850108 973 S01 850712 840 SS3 850722 989 I L33 850729 801 L33 850624 804 L12 850828 801 L23 851004 849 L62 851023 681 Page 14 of 16 j-i
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Revision 4
- 28. SQN' Technical Specification, Section 3/4.8, " Electrical Power Systems, units 1 and 2"
- 29. USNRC NUREG/CR-4557 (BNL-NUREG-51969), "A Review of Issues Related to Improving Nuclear Power Plant. Diesel Generator-Reliability,"
dated April 1986 (A02 860509 015).
VII. INNEDIATE OR LONG-TERN CORRECTIVE ACTION Corrective Actica Tracking Document (CATD) 30102-SQN-02 documents Sequoyah's Corrective Action Plan (CAP) which states: "TS change 107 is incorporating items into the diesel generator start and test
-requirements that will resolve any diesel problems associated with testing. The Electrical Maintenance'Section will evaluate the additional maintenance related items referenced in NUREG/CR0660 and NUREG/CR2989 to determine the need for inclusion into the present program. The CAP specified is considered an enhancement to the present system and will be completed.by June 6, 1987." These actions are.
considered adequate and tracked by CATD 30102-SQN-02.
CATD 30102-SQN-01 was issued to SQN concerning the need for a strengthened housekeeping program for the DGs. Sequoyah's CAP in response to this matter states:
"Cleaniness of D/G control panels was considered as a potential contributor to D/G reliability. Consequently, the control panels for 1A-A, 2A-A 1B-B and 2B-B were thoroughly cleaned to remove accumulations of dust / grime. To maintain equipment in a clean condition, PNs have been prepared to perform annual and 18-month cleaning (see list below). The D/G building has also been included in a routine program for cleaning by maintenance laborers. Building
[ cleanliness has been significantly improved, and the routine cleaning will maintain it."
c The Sequoyah CAP (CATD 30102-SQN-01) indicated the following PNs have j- been prepared:
18-Nonth MI-10.1E/1.5Y cleans the 480V Diesel Auxiliary Boards by using PNs 4- 1485-82, 1484-82, 1483-82, and 1478-82.
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.. Revision 4
-Annual MI-10.1E/A cleans 1) the Voltage Regulator Panel, 2) the Woodward Governor Panel, 3) the Excitation Panel, 4) the Engine Control Panel.
- 5) the Engine Auxiliary-Control Panel, 6) the Neutral Transformer Cubicle, and 7) the Generator Protective Relay Panel by using PMs 1482-82, 1480-82, 1479-82, and 1481-82.
NOTE: All PMs except 1484-82 for-2A-A D/G and 1478-82 for 2B-B D/G -
have been completed. These will be completed by January 31, 1987.
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