ML20207N532

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Partially Deleted RO Insp Rept 70-1193/74-02 on 740311-13. Noncompliance Noted:Combination Lock on Matl Storage Vault Broken & Inoperable & Visitor Log Sheet Did Not Provide Purpose of Visit
ML20207N532
Person / Time
Site: 07001193
Issue date: 03/11/1974
From: Donahue J, Hind J
NRC OFFICE OF INSPECTION & ENFORCEMENT (IE REGION III)
To:
Shared Package
ML20207N448 List:
References
FOIA-86-281 70-1193-74-02, 70-1193-74-2, NUDOCS 8701140272
Download: ML20207N532 (12)
v • d • e


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1 U. S. ATOMIC ENERGY COMMISSION ~

DIRECTORATE OF REGUIATORY OPERATION f

. REGION III

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4 RD Inspection Report No. 070-1193/74-02 5.- -

Licensee: Kerr-McGee Corporation Kerr-McGee Building Oklahoma City, Oklahoma Cimarron Facility Plutonium Plant i

i Crescent, Oklahoma

. - Type of Licensee: Special Nuclear Material Type of Inspection:

. pecial, Unannou ed Physical Pro DatesofInspection.JMarci.il-15,_19 7 .

- Dates of Previous Inspection: \ February 11-15, 1974 0

. Principal Inspector: F.f .Donahue %Cng 8 Accompanying Inspector: None -

Other Accompanying Personnel: None .

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Reviewed By: sho YYc. -

J. A. Hind, Chief Materials and Plant j

Protection Branch

Attachment:

Findings (Exempt from Disclosure) 8701140272 FOIA 870109 PDR 8

PDRCANTRELB6-281

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SCOPE ,

A special unannounced physical protection inspection was conducted kkrch 11-13, 1974 Special Nuclear Materials at the Kerr-McGee Plutonium Plant pending full Criteria impicmentation of the new security. plan and the license conditions.

followed during this inspection consisted of 10 CFR 73 (April 30, 1973) and License Conditions applicable prior to March 6, 1974.

FACILITY PERSONNEL CONTACTED _

Primary contacts during this inspection were:

- Morgan Moore, Cimarron Plant Manager Raymond Janka, Manager, Administration and Accountability Fred H. Welch, Security Officer

SUMMARY

OF FINDINGS

[ A." Items of Noncompliance 10 CFR 73.3(j) (April 30, 1973) defines a security container as a 1.

\' " safe, vault,. vault-type room or security cabinet". " Locked" is {

defined in 73.3(e) as " protected by an operable _ lock".

Contrary to the abovedhe combination lock of the Material

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  • Storage Vault was found to be broken and inoperable and reportedly had been -in this condition for approximately three weeksp This violation is considered to be of Category II severity.

' 2. LicenseCondition9.3.7hequiresthatvisitors,vendorsandother non-employees entering the protected area be registered and a j record made of name, date, time, purpose of visit, and person visited 3 ,

'Also,LicenseCondition9.3.8statesthatIvisitors,vendorsand other non-employees shall be escorted by a guard, watchman or authorizedindividualwhilewithintheprotectedarea}

Contrarytotheabove,[hevisitorlogsheetusedtorecord k- individuals who visit the Plutonium Plant does not provide a section for " purpose of visit". Also, over the past year, several

\ log sheets fail to indicate the identity of an assigned escort by

' signed name or initials or fail to reflect the identity of the

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person visited within the protected area] This violation is considered to be of Category III severity.

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3. Prsgren Warknesa
3. The following was identified as a program weakness:

At the exit point within the Fu Plant leading to the dock area, the Pu monitoDas apparently given numerous spurious alarms over a period of several months. The " Security Log" maintained by the Pu Plant watchman indicated that, on occasion as many as 20 false alarms were transmitted during a given shift While it is standard practice to notify personnel within the Pu area that an alarm has been received,bere is no assurance or record to indicate that each such alarm is checked out by authorized personnel to

. determineitscause3 Possible causes for spurious alarms were identified as: ,

(1)Ileather conditions

. , (2) Material' movement or storage within the corriddr inside the

, Jtxit door N

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(3) Material received at the Receiving and Shipping Dock

, (4) Poor or faulty calibration or instrumentation

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Presently there is no capability for the watchman to visually determine the cause foi an alarm at his vantage point in the building's s gront lobby.

A possible solution would be installation of a television ;r I

  • # camera positioned to monitor the portal in question. Facility personnel were requested to resolve this matter to assure that prompt and -

geffective response this portal monitor

  • alarm is realized.

. C. Other Matters Discussed

4. The present system for recording required tests and maintenance of
  • security devices appears to need revision. While these items are kept in a chronological " Security Log", creation of, individual records on alarm tests and responses, tests of Pu monitors'and communication systems and required inspections of other physical security devices,

. . e.g. fences, doors, locks and barriers, would be preferable to the existing system.

5. The X-M agreement with the Guthrie Police De artment, where a radio receiver will be placed, provides ,fof(yeekly ests of communications equipment. It was pointed out the new regulations require such tests be conducted not less frequently than once at the beginning of each security personnel work shift. Facility personnel were requested to resolve this matter with the Police Department.

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6. With ths chtng:s in the protseted eran fenecd parimster, the

'- cxisting lighting should ba re-evslunted to coaura that illuminatica requirements are met. - .

. 3. Actions taken on previous items of noncompliance RO:III Report 070-1193/73-01 dated February 16, 1973, identified the-following items of noncompliance:

(1) "The physical barrier surrounding the protected area was not kept y' clear of objects that could aid in concealing individuals in that)(

'(eight(8)55-gallondrumswerelocatedwithin10feetinsidethe fence line] (License Condition 9.4.1)

Action taken: The drums were relocated to comply with the 50 foot distance requirement. Responsible personnel were reinstructed on this requirement. (During the current inspection a sufficient isolation zone was in evidence completely clear of any objects capable of concealing an intruder)

(2) FThe perimeter of the physical barrier surrounding the protected'

)[areawasnotbeinginspectedforevidenceofbreachingor g L, intrusion at two hour intervals (License Condition 9.4.3). j Action taken: The fence perimeter was laced on around-the-clock inspectionroundsconductedatdwohou ntervals by operat,ing personnel. Records are maintained to reflect th(bi-hourlyf-inspections. Procedures were reviewed and reemphasized with persons responsible for conducting such patrols. (Records checked during the current inspectjon .erified that surveillance rounds were being conducted each(two hours] 24 hours2.777778e-4 days <br />0.00667 hours <br />3.968254e-5 weeks <br />9.132e-6 months <br /> a day.)

(3) The material vault storage area, when lock'ed, was not protected bh' n intrusion alarm in active status (License Condtion 9.4.5). _,,,

Further, the entrance door of the vault was not protected by a

- Action taken: An intrusion alarm was installed on this portal

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andthedoorwasequippedwithaDuilt-inthreepositionchangeable Sargent and Greenleaf combination 3ock. (During the current inspection the alarm was inspectec. and tested for operability and performance. Inspection of the combination lock disclosed it was

- broken and inoperable thus resulting in citation number 1 mentioned

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earlier in this report).

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(4) , Each intrusion alarm used for protection of plutonium was not being tested for operability and funtional performance at least once s

- Lsvery seven days (License Conditien 9.4.8). . .

Action taken: Responsible personnel were reinstructed regarding

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the test frequency and tests of all intrusion alarms were to be (During conducted not less frequently than once each seven days.

the current inspection, records reflecting required tests of alarms within seven day intervals were reviewed and found adequate).

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- - DETAILS _

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A. Physical Security Plan ,

The licensee submitted a new security plan, as required by 10 CFR This 70.32(f), to the Directorate of Licensing on January 5,1974.

plan was reviewed by a representative of DL, Dr. 6-8,Frank 1974. Costanzi, The plan

'during his visit to the facility on February was discussed, item for item, and certain suggested changes and modifications were made to assure conformance with requirements.

Revisions were submitted to DL by.K-M on February 27 and March 6, 2.974. In order to strengthen the security program, DL revised

Materials and Plant Protection Amendment MPP-1 to License No. SNM-1174

- to delete old License Condition 9.0 and to add a new License Condition 9.0 to become dffective, with limited exceptions, on March 6, 1974.

B. Security Organization The overall responsibility for effective administration of the security He is assisted program rests with the Facility Manager, _ Morgan Moorg They by Raymond Jank$ Manager of Administration and Accountability.

perform periodic review of security activities to determine the effectiveness of the security organization.

- 'Ihe Security Officer) 5' red Welqh) who reports to Eankb supervises the day-to-day activities of the guard force and prepares p'rocedures for implementation. He directly supervises the basic security organization

  • including the guards and shift supervisors, initiates written security Shift procedures and is responsible for training add retraining.

Security Supervisors report to[ Welch and assume responsibility for over-all security activities in his~ absence.

t the time of this inspection, the plant protective force consisted of

' five company watchmen}who are assigned to control access to the Pu Plant protected area. On each shif t, pending completion of the new security fence and installation of the perimeter intrusion alarm system, there nkerton Guard who is assigned to patrol the isatleast$nearme fencelineatd5 minute ntervals.

.Mr.: Welch yas in the processing of interviewing guard applicants

'Ihe Pinkerton contract who will guards form the protective force as K-M employees.

and K-M watchmen will be phased out as new guard employees are hi trained.

guards, including or @ll be assigned toGuards eachwillshift.It is anticip$

be sc.cioned and a supervisor wi at the main gate house (Uranium Plant) and in the lobby of the ?u Building.

The supervisor will provide post relidf and backup to these guards.

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- c:crch of partons antering van being cenducted by a portable electronic metal-explosives detector in the corridor adjacznt to thm watchman (guard) post. '

A new badge system for employees and visitors was pending implementation.

In the interim, the old badge system is employed (See RO:III Report 070-1193/73-01).

Examination of records relating to visitors to the protected area revealed some deficiencies in that the visitor log sheet does not cor.tcin a section for the purpose of the , visit. Also the log did not show, in all inst,ances, the name of the person visited or the name or initials of the authorized employee who provided escort. This is in noncompliance with License Conditions 9.3.7 and 9.3.8. This violation was discussed with management at the close-out.

E. Detection

  • Aids ,

Tests of the existing intrusion alam system and Pu nonitors were conducted with no malfunctions experienced. Attempts to defeat the intrusion alarm on certain emergency exits met with negative results.

The upgrading of the alam system is pending implementation.

With respect to the PG monitor positioned at thgi[yortal leading from a corridor to the dock of the Shipping and Receiving areja'it was' detemined that numerous spurious alarms are frequently transmitted due to several possible causes. The Security Log, maintained by the Watchman who is stationed at the alarm console in the building's front lobby, indicated that on occasion as many as 20 false monitor alarms were received during a given shift. Standaid practiice requires the watchman, monitoring the alam console, to report the alarm activation via the public addres's system for check out by authorized employees who work with-

- in the Pu area. There is, however, no assurance or record to indicate that each such alarm is checked out to' determine its.cause. This was identified and reported to management as a program weakness which requires resolution. Since there is no present capability for the vacchman to visually determine the cause for the Pu monitor alarm from his vantage point in the front building lobby, a possible solution would be the installation of a television camera to view this portal.

F. Communications .

K-M has established liaison with Local Law Enforcement Agencies who will Letters provide assistance in emergencies, including security threats.

of agreement have been received froc the following:

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Organization Cre, scent Police Cuthrie Police 1

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Oklahoma State Highway M, l

. Patrol 4 -

Oklahoma Bureau of 2 Identification

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Sheriff Logan County (/)

FBI At the time of this inspection the means of off-site communication consisted of conventional telephones and a radio-telephone link with

. Kingfisher, Oklahoma (Pioneer Telephone Company). It is currently planned to install an emergency radio in the Guthric Police Station to '

. establish a redundant means of off-site communication. In the pre-

. 11minary negotiations with the Chief of the Guthric Police, it was agreed that tests of cl.e emergency radio would be conducted once each

. veek. Licensee representatives were advised that new Part 73 requires tests not less frequently than ones at Qe beginning of each security

. personnel work shift and that provisions should be made with the Guthrie Police Department to meet the spirit and intent of the requirement.

For on-site radio communications, K-M currently utilizes two vsy portable radios, one in the Pu Building Lobby, the other carried by the r.tnkerton

,' Cuard who makes periodic patrols of the protected area fence. When the  !

gate house at the uranium plant is completed and manned, radio communi-

. . . cation will be established between that post and the Pu building post.

C. Testing and Maintenance of Controls .

Review of the chronological " Security Log" and the Utility Operator's

. surveillance check sheet revealed that required exterior patrols were conducted as required and that radio-telephone communications checks as l well as alarm tests were conducted in timely fashion. Tests of the Pu monitors were conducted weekly. One deficiency, reported earlier, .

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  • involv d failure to record cnd correct tha inopgrcble ccmbinatien Jock on th2 Kateriel Storsgs Vault roon. }

B. Records System As reported earlier in Section D, deficiencies were disclosed with respect to the visitor register..

The present mechanism for recording required tests in a chronologicalIn

" Security Log" makes verification of the tests a cumbersome chore.

the management discussion it was pointed out that time frames for ~

required tests and inspections vary.and-it might be worthy co consider generation of individual records to substantiate the conducting of

. required tests within the required frequency. .

I. Recovery and Response Procedures Details concerning response actions to a ' variety of threats are outlined

. in the security plan. There were no incidents since the last inspection involving unaccounted for shipments, suspected theft, unlawful diversion or industrial sabotage. Appropriate notification channels have been established to assure that responsible persons are made aware of such incidents and of the actions being taken to cope with them.

J. Emergency Procedurg,s

  • Detailed procedures for responding to normal and threat conditions are
  • contained within Security Manual KM-NC-22-7 dated April 27, 1973. With the recent changes in the regulations, such procedures will be revised and updated. Assurances were provided that the emergency procedures would he cocpatible with the security plan and that organizational

' responsibilities will be clearly defined.

K. Comments -

l Discussion of the inspection findings was held with Messrs., Moore, Janka

' and Welch on March 13,.1974. They were advised that another inspection would be' conducted in the near future to ascertain implementation of the

  • new security plan, new license. conditions and 10 CFR 73.

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U. S. ATOMIC ENERGY C010 FISSION DIRECTORATE OF REGULATORY OPERATION h REGION III 30 Inspection Report No. 070-1193/74-02 ,

Licensee: Kerr-McGee Corporation , .

License No. SNM-1174

  • Kerr-McGee Building Category: A (1)

Oklahoma City, Oklahoma Priority: I

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Cimarron Facility Plutonium Plant .

Type of Licensee: Special Nuclear Material Type of Inspection: Special, Unannounced Physical Protection Inspection Dates of Inspection: March 11-13, 1974 Dates of Previous Inspection: February 11-15, 1974 (Materials)

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Principal Inspector: J. F. Donahue [

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Accompanying Inspector: None .

Other Accompanying Personnel: None Reviewed By:

oh YYL J. A. Hind, Chief Y!//!7

- Materials and Plant (Date)

Protection Branch f

Attachment:

Findings *

(Exempt from Disclosure) k.

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SCOPE A special unannounced physical protection inspection was conducted on

  • Harch 11-13, 1974 to ascertain the existing'degreee of protection afforded Special Nuclear Materials at the Kerr-McGee Plutonium Plant pending full Criteria isoplementation of the new security plan and the license conditions.

followed during this inspection consisted of 10 CFR 73 (April 30, 1973) and License Conditions applicable prior to March 6, 1974.

FACILITY PERSONNEL CONTACTED l l

Primary contacts during this inspection were:

Morgan Moore, Cimarron Plant Manager J Raymond Janka, Manager, Administration and Accountability

- Fred H. Welch, Security Officer

SUMMARY

OF FINDINGS A." Items of Noncompliance

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1. 10 CFR 73.3(j) (April 30, 1973) defines a security container " Locked" as is a

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" safe, vault, vault-type room or security cabinet".

defined in 73.3(e) as " protected by an operable _ lock".

l Contrary to the abovekhe combination lock of the Material

' Storage Vault was found to be broken and inoperable and reportedly

' hadbeeninthisconditionforapproximatelythreeweekspThis violation is considered to be of Category II severity.

2. License Condition 9.3.7 requires that visitors, vendors and other non-employees entering the protected area be registered and a record made of name, date, time, purpose of visit, and person visited.

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  • Also,LicenseCondition9.3.htatesthatvisitors,vendorsand other non-employees shall be escorted by a guard, watchman or authorized individual while within the protected area l

,the visitor log sheet used to record Contrary to the aboveg'the Plutonium Plant does not provide a individuals who visit section for " purpose of visit". Alsofver the past year, several log sheets fail to indicate the identity of an assigned eccort by signed name or initials or fail to reflect the identity of the person visited within the protected area] This violation is considered to be of Category Ill severity.

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B. Program Waakness '

3. The following was identified as a program weakness:

At the exit point within thh Plant leading to the dock area, the Pu monitor has apparently given numerous spurious slarms over a period of several months. The " Security Log" maintained by the Pu Plant watch =an indicated that, on occasion, as many as 20 false alarms were transmitted during a given shift. While it is standard practice to notify personnel within the Pu area that an

~

alarm has been received, there is no assurance or record to indicate that each such alarm is checked out by authorized personnel to determineitscause] ,

Possible causes.for spurious alarms were identified as:

1 (1) Weather conditions )

(2) Material movement or storage within the corriddr insids the

, exit door X W (3) Material received at the Receiving and Shipping Dock (4". Poor or faulty calibration or instrumentation J

5esentlythereisno'capabilityforthewatchmantovisually l .

determine the cause for an alarm at his vantage point in the building's front lobby. A possible solution would be installation of a television k Facilitypersonnel:f <

b,fcamera positioned to monitor thisthe portal in question.

Y were requested to resolve matter to assure that prompt and effective response this portal monitor alarm is realited. W C. Other Matters Discussed ,

4. The present system for recording required tests and maintenance of i security devices appears to need revision. While these items are kept

- in a chronological " Security Log", creation of individual records on alarm tests and responses, tests of Pu monitors and communication systems and required inspections of other physical security devices,

. . e.g. fences, doors, locks and barriers, would be preferable to the existing system.

5. The K-M agreement with the Guthrfe Police Department, wher'e a radio receiver will be placed, provides for weekly tests of communications equipment. It was pointed out the new regulations require such tests be conducted not less frequently than once at the beginning of each security personnel work shift. Facility personnel were requested to resolve this matter with the Police Departzaent. .

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