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Proposed Changes to Tech Spec Table 3.3-1 Re Reactor Trip Breakers
	ML20207D088
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Site:	Beaver Valley
Issue date:	08/01/1988
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TABLE 303-1 (' Continued)

REACTOR TRIP SYSTEM INSTRUMENTATION g

MINIMUM TOTAL NO.

CHANNELS CHANNELS APPLICABLE FUNCTIONAL UNIT OF CHANNELS TO TRIP

' OPERABLE MODES ACTION w

18. Turbine Trip (Above P-9) y A.

Auto Stop Oil Pressure 3

2 2

1 7

k B.

Turbine Stop Valve Closure 4

4 4

1 8

I

19. Safety Injection Input ca from ESF 2

1 2

1,2 1

5

20. Reactor Coolant Pump Breaker

~

Position Trip (Above P-7) 1/ breaker 2

1/ breaker 1

11 per oper-ating loop my

21. Reactor Trip Breakers 2

1 2

1,2 40 m

2 1

2 3*,4*,5*

39' Os

22. Automatic Trip Logic 2

1 2-1,2 1

2 1

2 3*,4*,5*

_39

_8i

23. Reactor Trip System g

Interlocks O

A.

Intermediate Range 2-1 1

2 3

Neutron Flux, P-6 B.

Power Range 4

2 3

1 12 Neutron Flux, P-8 C.

Power Range 4

2 3

1 12 Neutron Flux, P-9 D.

Power Range 4

2 3

1 12 Neutron Flux, P-10 E.

Turbine Impulse 2

1 1

1 12~

Chamber Pressure, P-13 gj8150238880726 ADOCK 05000334 p

PNU A.

TABLE 3.3-1 (CONTINUED)

ACTION 9 With a

channel associated with an operating loop inoperable, restore the inoperable channel to OPERABLE status within 2

hours or be in HOT STANDBY with the next 6

hours; however, one channel associated with an operating loop may be bypassed for up to 2 hours2.314815e-5 days 5.555556e-4 hours 3.306878e-6 weeks 7.61e-7 months for surveillance testing per Specification 4.3.1.1.

ACTION 10 Not applicable.

ACTION 11 With less than the Minimum Number of Channels OPERABLE, operation may continue provided the inoperable channel is placedin the tripped condition within 1 hour1.157407e-5 days 2.777778e-4 hours 1.653439e-6 weeks 3.805e-7 months .

ACTION 12 With the number of channels OPERABLE one less than required by the Minimum Channels OPERABLE requirement, restore the inoperable channel to OPERABLE status within 48 hours5.555556e-4 days 0.0133 hours 7.936508e-5 weeks 1.8264e-5 months or be in HOT STANDBY within the next 6 hours6.944444e-5 days 0.00167 hours 9.920635e-6 weeks 2.283e-6 months and/or open the reactor trip breakers.

ACTION 39 With the number of OPERABLE channels one less than the Minimum Channels OPERABLE requirement, restore the inoperable channel to OPERABLE status wjthin 48 hours5.555556e-4 days 0.0133 hours 7.936508e-5 weeks 1.8264e-5 months or open the reactor trip breakers within the next hour.

ACTION 40 a.

With one reactor trip breaker inoperable as a result of one inoperable diverse trip feature (undervoltage or shunt trip attachment); restore both diverse trip features to OPERABLE status within 48 hours5.555556e-4 days 0.0133 hours 7.936508e-5 weeks 1.8264e-5 months or be in HOT STANDBY within the next 6

hours.

Neither breaker shall be bypassed while cne of the diverse trip features is inoperable except for the time required for performing maintenance to restore the breaker to OPERABLE status.

b.

With one reactor trip breaker inoperable as a result of something other than an inoperable diverse trip feature; be in at least HOT STANDBY within 6

hours, however, one channel may be bypassed for up to 2

hours for surveillance testing per specification 4.3.1.1, provided the other channel is OPERABLE.

l BEAVER VALLEY - UNIT 1 3/4 3-7 (next page is 3/4 3-9) l l

Proposed Wording l

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ATTACHMENT A-2 i

s Revise the Beaver Valley. Unit No.

2 Technical Specifications as j

follows 1

Remove Pages Insert Pages-3/4.3-4 3/4 3-4 3/4 3-7 3/4 3-7

TABLE 3.3-1 (Continued)

~ ' -

REACTOR TRIP SYSTEM INSTRUMENTATION 9_

MINIMUM F

TOTAL NO.

CHANNELS CHANNELS APPLICABLE O

FUNCTIONAL UNIT OF CHANNELS TO TRIP OPERABLE M00ES ACTION c 19. Safety Injection Input

{

from ESF 2

1 2

1, 2 1

" 20. Reactor Coolant Pump Breaker Positica Trip (Above P-7) 1/ breaker 2

1/ breaker 1

11 per operating loop

21. Reactor Tiip Breakers 2

1 2

1, 2 40 T

2 1

2 3*, 4*, and 5*

39, 6 u

@s* 22. Automatic Trip Logic 2

1 2

1 2 1

I Y

2 1

2 3. 4*, and 5*

39 E

S kJ. Peactor Trip System tr Interlocks d

a.

Intermediate Range 2

1 2

2 44 Neutron Flux, P-6 b.

Power Range 4

2 3

1 44 Neutron Flux, P-8 c.

Power Range 4

2 3

1 44 Neutron Flux, P-9 d.

PowerRande 4

2 3

1, 2 44 Neutron Flux, P-10 e.

Turbine Impulse 2

1 2

1 44 Chamoer Pressure, P-13 1

TABLE 3.3-1 (Continued)

ACTION 10 -

This Action is not used.

ACTION 11 -

With less than tne Minimum Number of Channels OPERABLE, operation may continue provided the inoperable channel is placed in the tripped condition within 1 hour1.157407e-5 days 2.777778e-4 hours 1.653439e-6 weeks 3.805e-7 months .

ACTION 12 -

With the number of channels OPERABLE one less than required by the Minimum Channels OPERABLE requirement, restore the inoperable channel to OPERABLE status within 48 hours5.555556e-4 days 0.0133 hours 7.936508e-5 weeks 1.8264e-5 months or be in HOT STANOBY within the next 6 hours6.944444e-5 days 0.00167 hours 9.920635e-6 weeks 2.283e-6 months and/or open the reactor trip treakers.

A'; TION 39 -

With the number of OPERABLE channels one less than the Minimum Channels OPERABLE requirement, restore the inoperable channel to OPERABLE status within 48 hours5.555556e-4 days 0.0133 hours 7.936508e-5 weeks 1.8264e-5 months or open the reactor trip breakers within the next hour.

MTION 40 - N e of the diverse trip features (Undervoltage or het' trip atta inoperable, restore it to OP status within 48 hours5.555556e-4 days 0.0133 hours 7.936508e-5 weeks 1.8264e-5 months or R%c the t,rea perable and apply Neither breaker shall be ACTION 1 or ACTION 39 as a a

bypassed while on e diverse trip e is inoperable exce me required for performing maintena re the breaker to OPERABLE status.

ACTION 44 -

With less than the Minimum Humber of channels OPERABLE, within 1 hour1.157407e-5 days 2.777778e-4 hours 1.653439e-6 weeks 3.805e-7 months determine by observation of the associated permissive annunciator window (s) that the interlock is in its required state for the existing plant condition, or apply Specification 3.0.3.

ACTION 40 a.

With one reactor trip breaker inoperable as a result of one inoperable diverse trip feature (undervoltage or shunt trip attachment); restore both diverse trip features to OPERABLE status within 48 hours5.555556e-4 days 0.0133 hours 7.936508e-5 weeks 1.8264e-5 months or be in HOT STANDBY within the next 6 hours6.944444e-5 days 0.00167 hours 9.920635e-6 weeks 2.283e-6 months . Neither breaker sh;11 be bypassed while one of the diverse trip features is inoperable except for the time required for performing maintenanca to restore the breaker to OPERABLE status.

b.

With one reactor trip breaker inoperable as a result of something other than an inoperable diverse trip feature; be in at least HOT STAND 3Y within 6 hours6.944444e-5 days 0.00167 hours 9.920635e-6 weeks 2.283e-6 months , however, one channel may be bypassed for up to 2 hours2.314815e-5 days 5.555556e-4 hours 3.306878e-6 weeks 7.61e-7 months for surveillance teoting per specification 4.3.1.1, provided the other channel is OPERABLE.

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l BEAVER VALLFY - UNIT 2 3/4 3-7 hACAdS Q h)@(bIAlV

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ATTACHMENT B

r Safety Analysis Beaver Valley Power Station Proposed Technical Specification Change, Revision 1 Unit 1 Change No. 147 Unit 2 Change No. 2 Description of amendment request:

The proposed revision would modify our previous submittal by changing the Action statement specified for Table 3.3-1 item 21 Reactor Trip Breakers.

Action 40 has been revised to address reactor trip breaker inoperability:

a) the breaker is inoperable because a

diverse trip feature is inoperable (undervoltage or shunt trip attachment),

and b) the breaker is inoperable because of something other than an inoperable diverse trip feature.

This combines the requirements of both Action 1

and Action 40, therefore, Action 1 is no longer needed to apply to the reactor trip breakers in Modes 1 & 2 and only Action 40 will be applied.

Both Action 39 and Action 40 allow up to 48 hours5.555556e-4 days 0.0133 hours 7.936508e-5 weeks 1.8264e-5 months to restore an inoperable channel to operable status, however, Action 39 is more applicable to Modes 3*,

4*,

5*

(* indicates the reactor trip breakers are closed).

Action 39 requires opening the reactor trip breakers within 1

hour if the inoperable channel has not been restored to operable status within the required 48 hours5.555556e-4 days 0.0133 hours 7.936508e-5 weeks 1.8264e-5 months .

Therefore, only Action 39 need be applied to the reactor trip breakers in Modes 3*,

4*,

5*.

The proposed changes clarify the actions an operator is to take when a reactor trip breaker is inoperable.

If a diverse trip feature is inoperable in Modes 1,

2, then up to 48 hours5.555556e-4 days 0.0133 hours 7.936508e-5 weeks 1.8264e-5 months are provided to restore the breaker to operable status.

If the breaker is inoperable due to other than a

diverse trip feature, then the plant must be placed in hot standby within the next 6 hours6.944444e-5 days 0.00167 hours 9.920635e-6 weeks 2.283e-6 months .

These changes are consistent with the intent of Generic Letter 85-09 which describes the use of Action 40 as follows:

With the addition of the automatic actuation of the shunt trip attachment, diverse features exist to effect a reactor trip for each breaker.

If one of these diverse trip features is inoperable, a decision would have to be made with regard to the operability status of the reactor trip breaker.

The definition of OPERABLE-OPERABILITY in Section 1.0 of the STS states that a

component shall be operable or have operability when it is capable of performing its safety function.

Since either trip feature being operable would initiate a reactor trip on demand, it would be overly conservative to treat a breaker as inoperable if one of these diverse trip features were inoperable.

However, on the other hand, the reliability of the reactor trip system would be reduced if each diverse trip feature is not maintained in an operable status.

The reactor trip breaker surveillance test should independently verify the operability of the shunt and undervoltage trip features of the reactor trip breakers as part of a

single sequential test procedure.

Therefore, the surveillance test which identifies a failure of one diverse trip feature also confirms the operability of the other trip feature.

As a consequence, there is a high degree of confidence that the operable trip feature would be capable of initiating a reactor trip in the next 48 hours5.555556e-4 days 0.0133 hours 7.936508e-5 weeks 1.8264e-5 months .

The proposed changes

, Attachment B (Cont'd)

Pago 2 will not change the operability requirements as described above and are therefore in accordance with Generic Letter 85-09 with clarification to eliminate potential confusion when interpreting the action requirements.

Only Action 40 applies in Modes 1, 2 and only Action 39 applies in Modes 3*,

4*,

5*.

This clarifies the action requirements and does not affect the system descriptions or accident analysis provided in the FSAR and is administrative in nature and does not reduce the safety of the plant.

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ATTACHME_NT C

No Significant Hazards Evaluation proposed Technical Specification Change, Revision 1 Unit 1 Change No. 147 Unit 2 Change No. 2 Basis for proposed no significant hazards consideration determination:

The commission has provided standards for determining whether a-significant hazards consideration exists 10 CFR 50.92(c).

A proposed amendment to an operating license for a facility involves no significant hazards consideration if operation of the facility in accordance with the proposed amendment would not (1) involve a significant increase in the probability or consequences of an accident previously evaluated; (2) create the possibility of a new or different kind of accident from any accident previously evaluated; or (3) involve a significant redur. tion in a margin of safety.

The proposed changes do not involve a

significant hazard consideration because:

1.

These changes are administrative in nature since they only provide clarification of the actions required when the reactor trip breakers are inoperable.

The changes are consistent with the intent of Generic Letter 85-09 and only serve to reduce confusion when determining which action is to apply when a reactor trip breaker is inoperable.

These changes do not require any changes to the plant cesign or the FSAR accident analysis, therefore, there is no increase in the probability of occurrence or the consequences of any accident previously analyzed.

2.

The intent of the proposed changes is to ensure that when a reactor trip breaker is inoperable, the actions taken satisfy the requirements of Generic Letter 85-09.

The proposed changer are administrative in nature since only clarification is being provided.

These changes will not alter the intent of the required actions and, therefore, will not create the possibility of a

new or different kind of accident from those described in the FSAR.

l 3.

The proposed action requirements will not affect any of the plant setpoints or margins to the accident analysis or technical i

Epecification limits.

Therefere, the plant safety margins will not be affected or reduced as result of the administrative clarification provided.

Therefore, based on the above, it is proposed to determine that the revised action requirements do not involve a significant hazards consideration.

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ML20207D088

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