ML20206N460
| ML20206N460 | |
| Person / Time | |
|---|---|
| Site: | Catawba |
| Issue date: | 06/13/1986 |
| From: | Brownlee V, Skinner P, Van Doorn P NRC OFFICE OF INSPECTION & ENFORCEMENT (IE REGION II) |
| To: | |
| Shared Package | |
| ML20206L550 | List: |
| References | |
| 50-413-86-17, 50-414-86-18, NUDOCS 8607010458 | |
| Download: ML20206N460 (8) | |
See also: IR 05000413/1986017
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UNITED STATES
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NUCLEAR REGULATORY COMMISSION
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101 MARIETTA STREET.N.W.
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ATLANTA GEORGI A 30323
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Report Nos.: 50-413/86-17 and 50-414/86-18
Licensee: Duke Power Company
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422 South Church Street
Charlotte, NC 28242
Docket Nos.:
50-413 and 50-414
License Nos.:
Facility Name:
Catawba 1 and 2
Inspection Conducted:
arch 26 - April 25,1986
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Inspector: _ P. K.'Vhn 0 rn[/ /'
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Approved by:
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V. L. BFownlee, Chief
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Reactor Projects Branch'3'
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Division of Reactor' Projects
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' SUMMARY
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Scope: This routine, unannounced inspection was conducted on' site inspecting in
the areas of review of plant operations (Units 1 & 2); surveillance observation
(Units 1 & 2); maintenance . observation (Units 1 & 2); review' of . licensee
nonroutine event reports -(Units 1 &.2); followup of IE Notices and IE Bulletins
-(Units 1 & 2); nonroutine reporting program (Units 1 & 2); and Review of Part 21
, reports (Units 1 & 2).
Results:
Of the seven areas inspected, one apparent violation was identified in
one area, (Failure to follow procedures for locking of valves, paragraph 5.b.).
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8607010458 860613
DR
ADOCK 05000413
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REPORT DETAILS
1.
Persons Contacted
Licensee Employees
- J. W. Hampton, Station Manager
E. M. Couch, Construction Maintenance Central Manager
H. B. Barron, Operations Superintendent
W. H. Bradley, QA Surveillance
A. S. Bhatnager, Performance Engineer
T. B. Bright, Construction Engineering Manager
S. Brown, Reactor Engineer
B. F. Caldwell, Station Services Superintendent
- J. W. Cox, Technical Services Superintendent
T. E. Crawford, Operations Engineer
B. East, I.& E. Engineer
C. L. Hartzell, Licensing and Projects Engineer
J. Knuti, Operating Engineer
- P. G. LeRoy, Licensing Engineer
W. W. McCollough, Mechanical Maintenance Supervisor
W. R. McCullum, Superintendent, Integrated Scheduling
- C. E. Muse, Operating Engineer
K. W. Reynolds, Construction Maintenance
- J.
Roach, Security Coordinator
F. P. Schiffley, II, Licensing Engineer
- G. T. Smith, Maintenance Superintendent
D. Tower, Operating Engineer
J. W. Willis, Senior QA Engineer, Operations
Other licensee employees contacted included technicians, operators,
mechanics, security force members, and office personnel.
- Attended exit interview
2.
Exit Interview
The inspection scope and findings were summarized on April 25,1986, with
those persons indicated in paragraph 1 above. The inspector described the
areas inspected and discussed in detail the inspection findings.
No
dissenting comments were received from the licensee. The licensee did not
identify as proprietary any of the materials provided to or reviewed by the
inspectors during this inspection.
3.
Licensee Action on Previous Enforcement Matters (Units 1 & 2) (92701)
(92702)
This section was not addressed in the inspection.
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4.
Unresolved Items *
New unresolved items are identified in paragraphs 5.c and 5.d.
5.
Plant Operations Review (Units 1 & 2) (71707 and 71710)
a.
The inspectors reviewed plant operations throughout the reporting
period to verify conformance with regulatory requirements. Technical
Specifications (TS), and administrative controls, control room logs,
danger tag logs, Technical Specification Action Item Log, and the
removal and restoration log were routinely reviewed.
Shift turnovers
were observed to verify that they were conducted in accordance with
approved procedures.
The inspectors verified by observation and interviews, the measures
taken to assure physical protection of the facility met current
requirements. Areas inspected included the security organization, the
establishment and maintenances of gates, doors, and isolation zones in
the proper condition, that access control and badging were proper and
procedures followed.
In addition to the areas discussed above, the areas toured were
observed for fire prevention and protection activities. These included
such things as combustible material control, fire protection systems
and materials, and fire protection associated with maintenance
activities.
b.
The inspectors observed 42 of 46 manual Unit 2 containment isolation
valves required to be closed per Technical Specification (TS) 3.6.3.
In addition, the inspectors observed selected additional valves
required to be locked in position by licensee procedures.
Although
valves were not observed improperly positioned, valves were observed
which were not properly locked as required by licensee procedures.
These included containment isolation Valve Nos. 2SM70, 2SM71, 2SM73,
2SM142, 2CF95, 2CF97, 2CA119, 2CA120, 2BW110 and 2WE22 as well as valve
nos. 2ND53, 2NV65 and 2NV76. Procedures applicable to these valves are
OP/2/A/6250/06,
OP/2/A/6250/01,
OP/2/A/6250/02,
OP/0/A/6500/06,
OP/2/A/6200/04, and OP/2/A/6200/01.
Valve lineup documentation for
each of these valves indicated that the valves were locked.
The
isolation valves had each been independently verified to be locked.
Although chains and locks were present, it appears that personnel are
not properly wrapping the chains to prevent valve repositioning. These
improperly locked valves represent a violation of TS 6.8.1 which
- An Unresolved Item is a matter about which more information is required to
determine whether it is acceptable or may involve a violation or deviation.
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requires the licensee to establish and implement written procedures.
It should be noted that previous concerns had been expressed by the NRC
(See Unresolved Item 413/85-43-03) and the licensee had assured the
inspectors that appropriate training and corrective action had been
taken.
This is Violation 414/86-18-01; Failure to follow procedures
for locking of valves.
c.
During . plant tours a number of minor discrepancies were noted and
brought to the licensee's attention. These included packing leaks; an
air leak at MSIV No. 2SM-1; valve tag missing on valve upstream of
2SM117; a fire extinguisher in the outside doghouse which had not been
inspected since January 8,1986; leak from instrumentation tubing for
instrument 2NVPG5240 (RC Pump D No.1 seal bypass flow meter); end cap
not on at valve No. 2VQ5; leak from under insulation downstream of
Valve No. 2BB81; cable armor or jacket pulled free from electrical
fittings in various areas; and temporary flush piping left in three
mechanical penetration rooms. The licensee had implemented corrective
action for these items, primarily by initiating work requests. The
licensee indicated that they would consider retraining relative to
preventing damage to cables due to various problems which have been
identified relative to cables and the susceptibility of cables to be
damaged or inadvertently altered relative to separation criteria. In
addition, the inspector requested the licensee to evaluate whether the
flush piping had an affect on operability of safety-related systems in
the area and to evaluate whether sufficient reviews are being conducted
relative to non-seismically mounted materials or equipment being left
in areas turned over from construction. The licensee was requested to
evaluate this area prior to Mode 2 operation for Unit 2.
This is
Unresolved Item 414/86-18-02: Verification of removal of or evaluation
of equipment remaining from Unit 2 construction.
d.
The inspectors performed a detailed inspection of ESF lineup for the
safety injection system to verify conformance to licensee drawings and
procedures and TS requirements.
The inspectors noted that the
procedure implemented to verify compliance to TS Surveillance 4.5.2 for
Unit 1, PT/1/A/4200/068, exempted venting of ECCS pump casings if the
pumps were being operated at the time of the surveillance. Although
this appears to be technically reasonable, the TS indicates that ECCS
piping is to be verified to be full of water by venting pump casings
and system high points every 31 days. The licensee was requested to
evaluate whether any system high points were inappropriately not vented
due to the procedure exemption and to evaluate why a procedure change
was made without obtaining appropriate TS clarification or changes. In
addition, the licensee was requested to submit a TS change request
clearly stating this exemption. This is Unresolved Item 413/86-17-01;
Review of compliance to TS 4.5.2, ECCS venting.
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6.
Surveillance Observation (Units 1 & 2) (61726)
a.
During the inspection period, the inspector verified plant operations
were in compliance with various TS requirements.
Typical of these
requirements were confirmation of compliance with the TS for reactor
coolant chemistry, refueling water tank, emergency power systems,
safety
injection,
emergency
safeguards
systems,
control
room
ventilation, and direct current electrical
power sources.
The
inspector verified that surveillance testing was performed in
accordance with the approved written procedures, test instrumentation
was calibrated, limiting conditions for operation were met, appropriate
removal and restoration of the affected equipment was accomplished,
test results met requirements and were reviewed by personnel other than
the individual directing the test, and that any deficiencies identified
during the testing were properly reviewed and resolved by appropriate
management personnel.
b.
The inspector reviewed in detail the mechanical and chemical initial
surveillances required by TSs. These surveillances were reviewed for
conformance to TS and licensee procedure requirements.
The ice
condenser initial surveillance testing was a part of the preoperational
test program which was exempted from completion by the NRC operating
license, NPF-48, but was required to be completed prior to Mode 4
Operation.
No violations or deviations were identified.
7.
Maintenance Observations (Units 1 & 2) (62703)
Station maintenance activities of selected systems and components were
observed / reviewed to ascertain that they were conducted in accordance with
requirements. The inspector verified licensee conformance to the require-
ments in the following areas of inspection:
the activities were
accomplished using approved procedures, and functional testing and/or
calibrations were performed prior to returning components or systems to
service; quality control records were maintained; activities performed were
accomplished by qualified personnel; and materials used were properly
certified. Work requests were reviewed to determine status of outstanding
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jobs and to assure that priority is assigned to safety-related equipment
maintenance which may effect system performance.
No violations or deviations were identified.
8.
Review of Licensee Nonroutine Event Reports (Units 1 & 2) (92700)
The below listed Licensee Event Reports (LER) were reviewed to determine if
the information provided met NRC requirements. The determination includea:
adequacy of description, verification of compliance with Technical
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Specifications and regulatory requirements, corrective action taken,
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existence of potential generic problems, reporting _ requirements satisfied,
and the relative safety significance of each event.
Additional inplant
reviews and discussion with plant personnel, as appropriate, were conducted
for those reports indicated by an (*).
The following LERs are closed:
- 413/85-54
Increased Containment Activity Causes Radiation Monitor
Trips
- 413/85-59
Unit Shutdown Required Due to Unidentified Reactor
Coolant Leakage
- 413/85-60
Automatic Start of Auxiliary Feedwater Pumps Due to Loss
of Main Feed-Water.
- 413/85-68
Both Trains of Nuclear Service Water Inoperable Due
Revision 1
to Low Torque Settings on Valves.
413/86-02
Required Firewatch not Established Due to Personnel
Error.
- 413/86-03
Both Trains Control Room Ventilation Inoperable Due to
Faulty Temperature Sensing Module.
413/86-04
Invalid Turbine Sump Rad Monitor Samples Due to
Malfunction of Valve.
- 413/86-05
Both Trains Control Room Ventilation Inoperable Due to
Loss of Chilled Water Makeup.
- 413/86-09
Auxiliary Feedwater Start Signal Actuation on Failure of
Main Feedwater Valve Operator.
The following LERS were also discussed with licensee personnel, but were not
closed due to additional information needed to assure adequate corrective
action or clarification of information:
413/85-53
Diesel Generator 1A Battery Charger Inoperable Due to
Blown Fuses.
413/86-08
Auxiliary Feedwater Start Due to Malfunction of Main
Feedwater Control Valve.
413/86-12
Both Trains of Containment Valve Injection Water System
Inoperable Due to Defective Procedure.
No violations or deviations were identified.
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9.
Followup of IE Notices and IE Bulletins Sent For Information (Units 1 & 2)
(92701)
The inspector reviewed the actions taken by the licensee upon receipt of an
IE Notice (IEN) or IE Bulletin (IEB) sent for information purposes only.
The Compliance Engineer, at present, controls receipt and distribution of
these documents to assure appropriate personnel review the contents and
determine actions that may be required as a result. The following notices
were reviewed to assure receipt, review by appropriate personnel, and any
resulting action identified, documented and followed to completion:
IE Notices 85-12
85-53
85-94
85-20, Supplement 1
85-56
85-96
85-22
85-66
85-98
85-25
85-67
85-100
85-32
85-72
85-35
85-79
85-37
85-83
85-45
85-85
In addition, IE Bulletin 85-2 was reviewed and determined to be not
applicable to this station.
Based on this determination IEB 85-2 is closed.
Although the licensee is adequately handling IEN's and IEB's at this time,
no administrative procedure exist to detail this process. This has been
discussed with the licensee and a commitment made to develop a procedure to
address this process.
This is identified as an Inspector Followup Item
413/86-17-02, 414/86-18-03: Develop procedure to describe process of
handling IE Notices and IE Bulletins.
No violations or deviations were identified.
10. Nonroutine Reporting Program (Units 1 & 2) (90714)
The inspector reviewed the nonroutine reporting program to verify that
administrative controls have been established for the prompt review and
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evaluation of off normal events, reporting of safety related events,
completion of corrective actions associated with these events, and
responsibility for the program has been established.
The following
administrative procedures were reviewed:
Station Directive (SD) 2.8.1, Revision 5, Reporting Requirements
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SD 2.8.2, Revision 0, LER Reportability Guidance
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SD 2.8.3, Revision 0, 10CFR21 Reportability Guidance
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SD 3.0.9, Revision 1, Catawba Action List File (CALF)
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SD 3.1.15, Revision 8, Activities Affecting Station Operations of
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Operating Indications
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SD 3.1.18, Revision 8, Investigation of Reactor Trips
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SD 3.1.19, Revision 5, Action to Take In Case of " Exceeding of
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Limits"
SD 3.1.22, Revision 0, Management Followup of Abnormal Plant Events
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SD 3.2.2, Revision 8, Development and Conduct of the Periodic Testing
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Program
RP/0/B/5000/13, NRC Notification Requirements
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Although administrative controls are implemented, through the procedures
identified above, for non-routine operating events, administrative controls
for review and evaluation of vendor information is not available at the
station.
Discussions with licensee personnel
indicate that vendor
information is reviewed by Mill Power Company, sent to the General Offices
in Charlotte, reviewed and then transmitted to the appropriate station for
action or information. Administrative Policy Manual Section 2.1.4, Vendor
Documents, address this area from a policy standpoint. This process will be
reviewed during a subsequent inspection in this area.
No violations or deviations were identified.
11.
Review of Part 21 Reports (Units 1 & 2) (92700)
The inspector reviewed the licensee documentation for review of P2185-07;
Faulty AK and AKR Low-Voltage Power Circuit Breakers. The licensee's review
showed that these breakers are not used at Catawba and therefore this item
is closed.
No violations or deviations were identified.
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