ML20206N460

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Insp Repts 50-413/86-17 & 50-414/86-18 on 860326-0425. Violation Noted:Failure to Follow Procedures for Locking of Valves
ML20206N460
Person / Time
Site: Catawba  Duke Energy icon.png
Issue date: 06/13/1986
From: Brownlee V, Skinner P, Van Doorn P
NRC OFFICE OF INSPECTION & ENFORCEMENT (IE REGION II)
To:
Shared Package
ML20206L550 List:
References
50-413-86-17, 50-414-86-18, NUDOCS 8607010458
Download: ML20206N460 (8)


See also: IR 05000413/1986017

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UNITED STATES

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NUCLEAR REGULATORY COMMISSION

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101 MARIETTA STREET.N.W.

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ATLANTA GEORGI A 30323

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Report Nos.: 50-413/86-17 and 50-414/86-18

Licensee: Duke Power Company

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422 South Church Street

Charlotte, NC 28242

Docket Nos.:

50-413 and 50-414

License Nos.:

NPF-35 and NPF-48

Facility Name:

Catawba 1 and 2

Inspection Conducted:

arch 26 - April 25,1986

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Approved by:

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V. L. BFownlee, Chief

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Reactor Projects Branch'3'

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Division of Reactor' Projects

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' SUMMARY

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Scope: This routine, unannounced inspection was conducted on' site inspecting in

the areas of review of plant operations (Units 1 & 2); surveillance observation

(Units 1 & 2); maintenance . observation (Units 1 & 2); review' of . licensee

nonroutine event reports -(Units 1 &.2); followup of IE Notices and IE Bulletins

-(Units 1 & 2); nonroutine reporting program (Units 1 & 2); and Review of Part 21

, reports (Units 1 & 2).

Results:

Of the seven areas inspected, one apparent violation was identified in

one area, (Failure to follow procedures for locking of valves, paragraph 5.b.).

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REPORT DETAILS

1.

Persons Contacted

Licensee Employees

  • J. W. Hampton, Station Manager

E. M. Couch, Construction Maintenance Central Manager

H. B. Barron, Operations Superintendent

W. H. Bradley, QA Surveillance

A. S. Bhatnager, Performance Engineer

T. B. Bright, Construction Engineering Manager

S. Brown, Reactor Engineer

B. F. Caldwell, Station Services Superintendent

  • J. W. Cox, Technical Services Superintendent

T. E. Crawford, Operations Engineer

B. East, I.& E. Engineer

C. L. Hartzell, Licensing and Projects Engineer

J. Knuti, Operating Engineer

  • P. G. LeRoy, Licensing Engineer

W. W. McCollough, Mechanical Maintenance Supervisor

W. R. McCullum, Superintendent, Integrated Scheduling

  • C. E. Muse, Operating Engineer

K. W. Reynolds, Construction Maintenance

  • J.

Roach, Security Coordinator

F. P. Schiffley, II, Licensing Engineer

  • G. T. Smith, Maintenance Superintendent

D. Tower, Operating Engineer

J. W. Willis, Senior QA Engineer, Operations

Other licensee employees contacted included technicians, operators,

mechanics, security force members, and office personnel.

  • Attended exit interview

2.

Exit Interview

The inspection scope and findings were summarized on April 25,1986, with

those persons indicated in paragraph 1 above. The inspector described the

areas inspected and discussed in detail the inspection findings.

No

dissenting comments were received from the licensee. The licensee did not

identify as proprietary any of the materials provided to or reviewed by the

inspectors during this inspection.

3.

Licensee Action on Previous Enforcement Matters (Units 1 & 2) (92701)

(92702)

This section was not addressed in the inspection.

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4.

Unresolved Items *

New unresolved items are identified in paragraphs 5.c and 5.d.

5.

Plant Operations Review (Units 1 & 2) (71707 and 71710)

a.

The inspectors reviewed plant operations throughout the reporting

period to verify conformance with regulatory requirements. Technical

Specifications (TS), and administrative controls, control room logs,

danger tag logs, Technical Specification Action Item Log, and the

removal and restoration log were routinely reviewed.

Shift turnovers

were observed to verify that they were conducted in accordance with

approved procedures.

The inspectors verified by observation and interviews, the measures

taken to assure physical protection of the facility met current

requirements. Areas inspected included the security organization, the

establishment and maintenances of gates, doors, and isolation zones in

the proper condition, that access control and badging were proper and

procedures followed.

In addition to the areas discussed above, the areas toured were

observed for fire prevention and protection activities. These included

such things as combustible material control, fire protection systems

and materials, and fire protection associated with maintenance

activities.

b.

The inspectors observed 42 of 46 manual Unit 2 containment isolation

valves required to be closed per Technical Specification (TS) 3.6.3.

In addition, the inspectors observed selected additional valves

required to be locked in position by licensee procedures.

Although

valves were not observed improperly positioned, valves were observed

which were not properly locked as required by licensee procedures.

These included containment isolation Valve Nos. 2SM70, 2SM71, 2SM73,

2SM142, 2CF95, 2CF97, 2CA119, 2CA120, 2BW110 and 2WE22 as well as valve

nos. 2ND53, 2NV65 and 2NV76. Procedures applicable to these valves are

OP/2/A/6250/06,

OP/2/A/6250/01,

OP/2/A/6250/02,

OP/0/A/6500/06,

OP/2/A/6200/04, and OP/2/A/6200/01.

Valve lineup documentation for

each of these valves indicated that the valves were locked.

The

isolation valves had each been independently verified to be locked.

Although chains and locks were present, it appears that personnel are

not properly wrapping the chains to prevent valve repositioning. These

improperly locked valves represent a violation of TS 6.8.1 which

  • An Unresolved Item is a matter about which more information is required to

determine whether it is acceptable or may involve a violation or deviation.

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requires the licensee to establish and implement written procedures.

It should be noted that previous concerns had been expressed by the NRC

(See Unresolved Item 413/85-43-03) and the licensee had assured the

inspectors that appropriate training and corrective action had been

taken.

This is Violation 414/86-18-01; Failure to follow procedures

for locking of valves.

c.

During . plant tours a number of minor discrepancies were noted and

brought to the licensee's attention. These included packing leaks; an

air leak at MSIV No. 2SM-1; valve tag missing on valve upstream of

2SM117; a fire extinguisher in the outside doghouse which had not been

inspected since January 8,1986; leak from instrumentation tubing for

instrument 2NVPG5240 (RC Pump D No.1 seal bypass flow meter); end cap

not on at valve No. 2VQ5; leak from under insulation downstream of

Valve No. 2BB81; cable armor or jacket pulled free from electrical

fittings in various areas; and temporary flush piping left in three

mechanical penetration rooms. The licensee had implemented corrective

action for these items, primarily by initiating work requests. The

licensee indicated that they would consider retraining relative to

preventing damage to cables due to various problems which have been

identified relative to cables and the susceptibility of cables to be

damaged or inadvertently altered relative to separation criteria. In

addition, the inspector requested the licensee to evaluate whether the

flush piping had an affect on operability of safety-related systems in

the area and to evaluate whether sufficient reviews are being conducted

relative to non-seismically mounted materials or equipment being left

in areas turned over from construction. The licensee was requested to

evaluate this area prior to Mode 2 operation for Unit 2.

This is

Unresolved Item 414/86-18-02: Verification of removal of or evaluation

of equipment remaining from Unit 2 construction.

d.

The inspectors performed a detailed inspection of ESF lineup for the

safety injection system to verify conformance to licensee drawings and

procedures and TS requirements.

The inspectors noted that the

procedure implemented to verify compliance to TS Surveillance 4.5.2 for

Unit 1, PT/1/A/4200/068, exempted venting of ECCS pump casings if the

pumps were being operated at the time of the surveillance. Although

this appears to be technically reasonable, the TS indicates that ECCS

piping is to be verified to be full of water by venting pump casings

and system high points every 31 days. The licensee was requested to

evaluate whether any system high points were inappropriately not vented

due to the procedure exemption and to evaluate why a procedure change

was made without obtaining appropriate TS clarification or changes. In

addition, the licensee was requested to submit a TS change request

clearly stating this exemption. This is Unresolved Item 413/86-17-01;

Review of compliance to TS 4.5.2, ECCS venting.

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6.

Surveillance Observation (Units 1 & 2) (61726)

a.

During the inspection period, the inspector verified plant operations

were in compliance with various TS requirements.

Typical of these

requirements were confirmation of compliance with the TS for reactor

coolant chemistry, refueling water tank, emergency power systems,

safety

injection,

emergency

safeguards

systems,

control

room

ventilation, and direct current electrical

power sources.

The

inspector verified that surveillance testing was performed in

accordance with the approved written procedures, test instrumentation

was calibrated, limiting conditions for operation were met, appropriate

removal and restoration of the affected equipment was accomplished,

test results met requirements and were reviewed by personnel other than

the individual directing the test, and that any deficiencies identified

during the testing were properly reviewed and resolved by appropriate

management personnel.

b.

The inspector reviewed in detail the mechanical and chemical initial

surveillances required by TSs. These surveillances were reviewed for

conformance to TS and licensee procedure requirements.

The ice

condenser initial surveillance testing was a part of the preoperational

test program which was exempted from completion by the NRC operating

license, NPF-48, but was required to be completed prior to Mode 4

Operation.

No violations or deviations were identified.

7.

Maintenance Observations (Units 1 & 2) (62703)

Station maintenance activities of selected systems and components were

observed / reviewed to ascertain that they were conducted in accordance with

requirements. The inspector verified licensee conformance to the require-

ments in the following areas of inspection:

the activities were

accomplished using approved procedures, and functional testing and/or

calibrations were performed prior to returning components or systems to

service; quality control records were maintained; activities performed were

accomplished by qualified personnel; and materials used were properly

certified. Work requests were reviewed to determine status of outstanding

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jobs and to assure that priority is assigned to safety-related equipment

maintenance which may effect system performance.

No violations or deviations were identified.

8.

Review of Licensee Nonroutine Event Reports (Units 1 & 2) (92700)

The below listed Licensee Event Reports (LER) were reviewed to determine if

the information provided met NRC requirements. The determination includea:

adequacy of description, verification of compliance with Technical

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Specifications and regulatory requirements, corrective action taken,

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existence of potential generic problems, reporting _ requirements satisfied,

and the relative safety significance of each event.

Additional inplant

reviews and discussion with plant personnel, as appropriate, were conducted

for those reports indicated by an (*).

The following LERs are closed:

  • 413/85-54

Increased Containment Activity Causes Radiation Monitor

Trips

  • 413/85-59

Unit Shutdown Required Due to Unidentified Reactor

Coolant Leakage

  • 413/85-60

Automatic Start of Auxiliary Feedwater Pumps Due to Loss

of Main Feed-Water.

  • 413/85-68

Both Trains of Nuclear Service Water Inoperable Due

Revision 1

to Low Torque Settings on Valves.

413/86-02

Required Firewatch not Established Due to Personnel

Error.

  • 413/86-03

Both Trains Control Room Ventilation Inoperable Due to

Faulty Temperature Sensing Module.

413/86-04

Invalid Turbine Sump Rad Monitor Samples Due to

Malfunction of Valve.

  • 413/86-05

Both Trains Control Room Ventilation Inoperable Due to

Loss of Chilled Water Makeup.

  • 413/86-09

Auxiliary Feedwater Start Signal Actuation on Failure of

Main Feedwater Valve Operator.

The following LERS were also discussed with licensee personnel, but were not

closed due to additional information needed to assure adequate corrective

action or clarification of information:

413/85-53

Diesel Generator 1A Battery Charger Inoperable Due to

Blown Fuses.

413/86-08

Auxiliary Feedwater Start Due to Malfunction of Main

Feedwater Control Valve.

413/86-12

Both Trains of Containment Valve Injection Water System

Inoperable Due to Defective Procedure.

No violations or deviations were identified.

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9.

Followup of IE Notices and IE Bulletins Sent For Information (Units 1 & 2)

(92701)

The inspector reviewed the actions taken by the licensee upon receipt of an

IE Notice (IEN) or IE Bulletin (IEB) sent for information purposes only.

The Compliance Engineer, at present, controls receipt and distribution of

these documents to assure appropriate personnel review the contents and

determine actions that may be required as a result. The following notices

were reviewed to assure receipt, review by appropriate personnel, and any

resulting action identified, documented and followed to completion:

IE Notices 85-12

85-53

85-94

85-20, Supplement 1

85-56

85-96

85-22

85-66

85-98

85-25

85-67

85-100

85-32

85-72

85-35

85-79

85-37

85-83

85-45

85-85

In addition, IE Bulletin 85-2 was reviewed and determined to be not

applicable to this station.

Based on this determination IEB 85-2 is closed.

Although the licensee is adequately handling IEN's and IEB's at this time,

no administrative procedure exist to detail this process. This has been

discussed with the licensee and a commitment made to develop a procedure to

address this process.

This is identified as an Inspector Followup Item

413/86-17-02, 414/86-18-03: Develop procedure to describe process of

handling IE Notices and IE Bulletins.

No violations or deviations were identified.

10. Nonroutine Reporting Program (Units 1 & 2) (90714)

The inspector reviewed the nonroutine reporting program to verify that

administrative controls have been established for the prompt review and

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evaluation of off normal events, reporting of safety related events,

completion of corrective actions associated with these events, and

responsibility for the program has been established.

The following

administrative procedures were reviewed:

Station Directive (SD) 2.8.1, Revision 5, Reporting Requirements

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SD 2.8.2, Revision 0, LER Reportability Guidance

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SD 2.8.3, Revision 0, 10CFR21 Reportability Guidance

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SD 3.0.9, Revision 1, Catawba Action List File (CALF)

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SD 3.1.15, Revision 8, Activities Affecting Station Operations of

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Operating Indications

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SD 3.1.18, Revision 8, Investigation of Reactor Trips

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SD 3.1.19, Revision 5, Action to Take In Case of " Exceeding of

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Limits"

SD 3.1.22, Revision 0, Management Followup of Abnormal Plant Events

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SD 3.2.2, Revision 8, Development and Conduct of the Periodic Testing

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Program

RP/0/B/5000/13, NRC Notification Requirements

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Although administrative controls are implemented, through the procedures

identified above, for non-routine operating events, administrative controls

for review and evaluation of vendor information is not available at the

station.

Discussions with licensee personnel

indicate that vendor

information is reviewed by Mill Power Company, sent to the General Offices

in Charlotte, reviewed and then transmitted to the appropriate station for

action or information. Administrative Policy Manual Section 2.1.4, Vendor

Documents, address this area from a policy standpoint. This process will be

reviewed during a subsequent inspection in this area.

No violations or deviations were identified.

11.

Review of Part 21 Reports (Units 1 & 2) (92700)

The inspector reviewed the licensee documentation for review of P2185-07;

Faulty AK and AKR Low-Voltage Power Circuit Breakers. The licensee's review

showed that these breakers are not used at Catawba and therefore this item

is closed.

No violations or deviations were identified.

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