ML20206L691

Responds to Request for Addl Info Re Util Request for Extended Outage Time for Vc/Yc Sys Mod

ML20206L691
Person / Time
Site:	McGuire, Mcguire
Issue date:	11/23/1988
From:	Tucker H DUKE POWER CO.
To:	NRC OFFICE OF ADMINISTRATION & RESOURCES MANAGEMENT (ARM)
References
TAC-65649, TAC-65650, NUDOCS 8811300152
Download: ML20206L691 (29)

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(N m,'14UI DUW %WER NoverMr 23, 1988 U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission Document Control Desk Washington. 0.C.

20555

Subject:

McGuire leuclear Station Docket 16os. 50-369 and 50-370 Response To Request For Additional Information Regarding Duke's Request For Extended Outage Ties For The VC/YC System Modification (TACs 65549 and 65650)

Gentlemen:

Pursuant to your letter of Septemb6r 1

1988, find attached the subject information eequested.

Should there be any questions, please contact S.E. LeRoy at (704) 373-6233.

Very truly yours, b.

Hal B. Tucker xc: Mr. M.L. Ernst Deputy Administrator, Region II U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission 101 Marietta St., NW, Suite 2900 Atlanta, GA 30323 Mr. Darl Hood U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Comission l

Office of Nuclear Reacto,' Regulation l

Washington. 0.C.

20555 l

Mi. c.4. Van Doorn Og NRC Resident Inspector McGuire Nuclear Station

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• 'U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission November 23, 1988 I

ATTACHMENT i

Duke Power company McGuire Nuclear Station Response To Request For Additional Information The NRC requested the following information:

1 Question No. 1 i

Discuss the controls for the VC system dampers.

Justify the proposed change in j

terms of the potential for, and the consequences (i.e., personnel exposure) of, failure of the damper in the recirculation line which influences flow to the

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system filters.

Include all failure modes (open, closed, partially closed). To what extent can damper failure affect operator doses due to lowered differential I

gressures (i.e., recirculation damper fails open) or increased flows (i.e., damper j

fails closed)?

Duke's Response r

Background:

n There are two Nuclear Station Modifications (NSM) presently in the design phase, both of which are intended to increase the reliability of the VC system.

Each

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involves hardware changes and do not involve system function changes.

NSM MG-11905 involves replacing eight damper / actuator assemblies which are used to l

l isolate the two 100% redundant Outside Air Pressure Filter Trains (OAPFT). Each r

OAPFT contains four (4) isolation dampers each positioned with electro-hydraulic j

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act;tators. These eight assemblies (Tag No 's CR-0AD-1 thru CR-0AD-8) are rach to l

l be replaced with a Nuclear Grade Stainless Steel Damper complete with j

spring-return pneumatic pisten actuators, and limit switches.

As a result of this review, the scope of NSM MG-11905 will be amended as follows, f

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Recirculation line dampers CR-0AD-2 and CR-0AD-6 will be removed from service and j

1 replaced with duct sections. The rectreulation line t'ow will be verified by I

l periodic testing under different failure corditions to assure flow in this line is

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toward an active filter train and away from an unfiltered path to the control room F

at the same time maintaining Control Room pressurization.

2 NSM MG-52009 involves replacing two (2) 50% capacity fans that presently serve each of two (2) Outside Air Pressure Filter Trains with one (1) 100% capacity

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nuclear grade fan. As a result of thece fan replacements, two isolation dampers r

(Tag No,'s CR-0AD-4 and CR-0AD-8) presently located at each deleted fans' j

discharge will also be removed.

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Duke plans to inplement NSM MS-liSO5 prior to implementation of NSM MG-52009.

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The croposed Technical Specificatic' change has been submitted requesting i

i additional allowed outage time to implement NSM MG-52009 and MG-11905. All

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discussion that follows is based on the system alignment after modifications

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MG-52009, and MG-11905 (as amended) are implemented.

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.'U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission i

November 23, 1988 l

Page 2 i

Attachment Duke Power Company McGuire Nuclear Station j

Response To Request For Additional Inforestion P

Reference Documents:

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Manufacturers Drawings:

4 MCM-1211.00-221 Controls Schematic MCM-1211.00-1927

. Damper Assembly Drawing l

MCM-1211.00-1935 Fan Assembly Drawing j

Duke Drawings:

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MCEE-131-00 Series Control Elementary l

r MCEE-231-00 Control Elementary j

f Duke Calculations:

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j MCC-1227.00-00-0002 Rev.1 Control Room t.0CA Dose l

l FSAR Paragraphs:

FSAR Section 6.4 FSAR Section 3.2.3-1 i

FSAR Section 7.1.2 FSAR Section 7.6.10 Standards, Regalatory Guides, etc.,:

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13th AEC Air Cleaning Conference, Nuclear Power Plant Control i

l Room Ventilation System Design For Meeting General Design I

i Criteria 19, K.G. Murphy, Dr. K. M. Ca.rpe i

Standard Review Plan-Section 9.4.1, " Control Room Area i

j Ventilation System," Rev. 2, 1981

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Code of Federal Regulations. Title 10, Part 50, Appendix A, "General Design Criteria for Nucle e Power Plants," 1982 l

Regulatory Guide 1.52 ANSI N509-1980 i

ANSI N510-1980 l

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'U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission November 23, 1988 Page 3 ATTACHMENT Duke Power Compar.y McGuire Nuclear Station Response To Request For Additional Information Control Reviot:

Overview:

Modification MG d1905 will not change the VC system isolation damper control logic. Only the method of control will change, and the actuator reliability will be increased.

The controls for the Chilled Water (YC) and Control Area Ventilation (VC) Systems a*e on the HVAC control board in the Main Control Room.

These systems are combined to form one system, the VC/YC system which is designed to provide HVAC to the Control Room and Control Room Area using redundant trains of equipment.

The equipment alignment is achieved by using two primary selector switches: the TRAI'l KEY SELECTOR and the CHW ALIGN pushbJtton.

The TRAIN KEY SELECTOR selsets which train will be operational, "A" or "B".

See Table 1.

During a Blackout or LOCA the Emergency Safety Features Actuation System (ESFAS) will automatically start both OApFT fans, independent of the TRAIN KEY SELECTOR SWITCH, and open their associated isolation dampers.

She above control logic has not been changed by either NSM described in the background section.

Specifics:

Ouring normal plant operation, the isolation dampers associated with both filter trains are in the closed position. The dampers which are being replaced, are presently positioned by ITT hydramotor actuators, Model NH96. These actuator j

motors run continuously to maintain the closed position causing early failure of the gasketr. at;d seals within the actuator assemblies.

The replacoment dampers will be positioned by an air driven cylinder type actuator that gives positive remote quarter-turn (90 Deg.) control.

The actuate was bought as a Nuclear Safety Related component capable of prodacing a mint a of 1.25 times the torque required to fully seat the damper. The operators are fall-safe spring-return type designed to open the damper upon loss of operating air pNssure.

An ASCO Model NPK832061V electric solenoid valve controls the control air signal. Upon Filter Train Fan actuation, one solenoid valve is de-energized causing air to be relieved from two (2) associated isolation damper actuitors allowing the dampers to spring open.

Each damper /acturter assembly is complete with two limit switches as manufactured by Namco, Model EA180. One limit switch is used to indicate the closed damper position, while the second indicates the open position.

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'U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission November 23, 1988 Page 4 ATTACHMENT Duke Power Company

("Guire Nuclear Station Response To Request For Additional Information After the fan modification is complete there will be two (2) isolatien dampers per filter train. Both open indicating limit switches are wired in series, such that both dampers must be open for the control room indicating light to actuato.

Similarly two dampers must be closed for the closed light to ac.uate.

Potential:

Each of M dampers which serve one (1) of two (2) 100% capacity 0APFTs are controlleo from a common air line. This air line signal is controlled from a single electric solenoid valve such that when the associated 0APF1 fan is off, the solenoid velve is energized allowing air to both damper actuators. The dampert ere piston driven by air filling tt.e actuators, forcing the damper to the closed petitlen.

The failure analysis that follows will review all credible damper, damper actuator, and VC system component failures and co.isecuences thereof. The discussion will include control air failure, power failure, and individual component failure.

1 Specifically for the isolation dampers in question (CR-0AC-1, CR-0AD-3, CR-0AD-5, i

l and CR-GAD-7) a control air failura would result in all four (4) isolation dampers to spring return to the open damper position.

As indicated from the above l

description, a solenoid failure, a control air, or power failure will cause both isolation dampers, which serve the affected CAPFT, to open. Because of this control logic, only a mechanical failure in one damper / actuator would allow it to l

hang-up in the partially open or closed position when the remaining damper is open. This is a highly unlikely evert considering the spring-rcturn type actuator design.

Consequences:

The Control Room ventilation system (See attached partial VC flow diagram fig. 1) is one of several subsystems which make up the VC system.

The ventilation system provides make-up air through four air vents at two locations on the Auxiliary building roof. Filtering capability is provided by two redundant pressure filter trains (0APFT-1, and 0APFT-2).

The ventilati n system is designed to meet all applicable criteria as specified in Appendix A to 10CFR Part 50. Gene *al Design Critaria 21 and Standard Review plan Section 9.4.1 requires that redundancy and indeoandence be designed into the protection system.

Listed below are different postulated fan, damper, and system failures and the consequences thereof as requested. Partially open positions were not evaluated sinct no partially open position constitutes a worst dose case. The consequences of a partially open failure are envsloped by the damper fall closed and oper cases which are discussed in detail.

c, b.b. Nuclear Regulatory Commission Noven.ber 23, 1988 Pag; 5 ATTACHMENT Duke Power Company McGuire Nuclear Station Response To Request For Additionfil Information Failure Analysis:

Case 1 - Single Train "A" Power Failure:

A single failure of the plant power system, specifically motor control center 1EMJH results in the system alignment shown as Case 1 in Table 1, and Figure 2.

Motor control center 1EMXH powers CRA-0APFT-1 heaters and fan, as well ss control room air handling unit train "A" fan.

Power panel board EKA is fed freu MCC 1EMXH and powers the controls associated with CRA-0APFT-1. Loss of 1EMXH causes the loss of EKA, resulting in the OAPFT fan and its associated isolation damper solenoid valve to lose power. The de-energized solenoid valve causes the isolation dampers to spring return to the open position.

As r result of the train "A" power failure, filter train "A" is inoperable.

Filter train "B" is operable and will provide 2000 cfm +10% of filter *4 air to the control room. As shown in Figure 2, some recirculation air flow from the inoperable train will occur.

Results:

l Based on 1000 cfm of outside air and 1000 cfm of recirculation air processed through the operable filter train, Duke Calculation MCC-1227.00-00-0002 Rev.1 predicts a control room LOCA dose of 0.34 Rem whole body and 18.0 Rem thyroid.

The dose under Cese 1 cor.ditions will very slightly from the calculated values, but will always be under the desigr basis allowables of 5 Rem whole body and 30 Rem thyroid with the following flows:

1) Operable filter train flow rate of 2000 cfm +10% is maintained; and, t

2) Control room pressurization of 1/9 inch w.g. relative to the outside air is maintained.

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Case 2 - Single Train """ Power f ailure:

A single failure of the plant power system, specifically motor control center 2EMXH results in the system alignment shown as Case 2 in Table 1, and Figure 3.

A> a result of a train "B" power failure, filter train "B" is inoperable.

Filter i

train "A" is operable and will provide 2000 cfm +10% of filtered air to the control room.

Results:

Same as Case 1 above.

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. 'U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Comission l

November 23, 1988 i

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ATTACHMENT l

Duke Power Company McGuiie Nuclear Station i

j Response To Request For Additional Information l

Case 3 - Single Mechanical Fan Failure Train "A" 0APFT:

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A single mechanical failure of the Train "A" 0APFT fan results in the system i

s',ignment shown as Case 3 in Table 1 and Figure 4.

This fan failure results in the loss of filter train "A" operability.

Filter train "B" is operable and will provide 2000 cfm +10% of filtered air to the control room. The filter train will receive rer.irculation air from the train "B" l

return air duct as well as the train "A" return duct. Upon receipt of an ESFAS, j

outside air is provided from two physically separated intakes. High radiation i

Jetection, or high chlorine detection will automatically close the affected

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intake.

If both intakes close, the operator will chose the least contaminated as a source of air for pressurizing the control room.

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Results.

i As in Case 1, presvirization to 1/8 inch w.g. is maintained, f bw rate through the I

operable filter train is maintained at 2000 cfm +10%, and the dose will be under the design basi., allneble. Cortrol room habitability will be maintained.

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f Case 3A - Control Air Failure:

A control air failure.ould result in dampers CR-0AO-1,3,5, and 7 opening to the t

"fati safe" positicn independent of the associated fan status. This damper alignment will not effect the control reem dose. However, a control air failure f

coupled with a single fan failure will result in the same system alignment as

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either Case 3 or 4 depending en the fan involved.

Results:

f Same results as Case 3.

Case 4 - Single Mechanical Fan Failure Train "B" CAPFT:

A single mechanical failure of the train "B" 0APFT fan results in the system f

I alignment shown as Case 4 in Table 1 and Figure 5.

As the result of a train "B" power failure filter train "B" inoperable. Filter train "A" is operable and will provide 2000 cfm +10% of filtered air to the control room.

i Results:

Same results as Case 3.

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U.C. Nuclear Regulatory Commission Novamber 23, 1988 1

Page 7 1

ATTACHMENT l

Duke Power Company McGuire Nuclear Station Response To Request For Additional Information i

Case 5 - CR-0AD-1 Mechanically Falls Closed:

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i Mechanical failure of damper CR-0AO-1 to the closed position results in the system I

alignment shown as Case 5 in Table 1, and Figure 6.

l This failure removes CR-0APFT-1 frort. use as a source for filtered air.

Redundant filter train CR-0APFT-2 would provide 2000 cfm +10% of filtered air to the control room.

j Results:

i Control room habitability is maintained and control room dose remains below the i

design basis allowables, since the control room is pressurized to +1/8 inch w.g.

and the operable filter train flow rate of 2000 cfm +10% is maintained, i

f Case 5A - CR-0AD-3 Mechanically Fails Closed:

Results:

l Same results as Case 5.

j Case 6 - CR-CAD-5, or CR-0AD-7 Mechanically Fails Closed:

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l Mechanical failure of one of the above dampers results in the system alignw nt

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shown as Case 6 in Table 1, and Figure 7.

This failure removes CR-0APFT-2 from use as a source of filtered air. Redundant i

filter train CR-0ADFT-1 would provide 2000 cfm +10% of filtered air to the control l

room.

I Results:

Same results es Case 5.

I Additional Information:

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Vhe following dampers were not specifically addressed in the NRC request, but will be discussed for completeness.

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Redundant smoke purge isolation dampers align to the "fail safe" closed position

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during an ESFAS. These dampers isolate the smoke purge exhaust fan on both the t

i suction ind discharge. A single damper failure will have no impact on the filter l

l trains ability to pressurize the control room.

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.- U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission Novembse 23, 1988

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Page 8 1

1 ATTACHMENT Duke Power Company McGuire Nuclear Station Response To Request For Additional Information 4

f Damper CR-D-5 is located in a "T" shaped duct section.

It's position is dependent

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on which control room air handling unit is operating. The damper does not have a closed position, only an "A" and "B" train position.

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Question No. 2

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Oiscuss the surveillance frequency and design provisions for the detection of a l

failure or change in position of a VC system damper. What procedures would be i

followed if such failure / position change were to occur?

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Duke's Response j

Filter Train System Surveillance:

F Surveillance Requirements:

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The control area ventilation system is subject to periodic testing as described in i

the statior Technical Specification Section 3/4.7.6. These surveillance requirements are attached. The systam design does not use centrol room alarms to l

alert the operator to damper or fan malfunctions, but relies on the periodic testing of the system to assure operabiliti in the event the system is needed.

l Fan and isolatior, damper status lights are provided in the control room, j

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j Although the periodic tests which are performed to meet the surveillance

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requirements do not specifically address damper position verification, t

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surveillance requirement 4.7.6 e. (see attached) addresses verification of flow J

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through the outside air pressure HEPA filter and charcoal absorber, as well as verification of control room pressurization.

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l The control area ventilation performance test PT/0/A/4450/08C will be upgraded to include verificacion of pressurization and flow under a worst case failure scenario 4

(cases 3 and 4). Verification of the flow direction in the idle recirculation line will also be performed under Case 3 and 4 conditions.

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.. U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Comission l

November 23, 1988 Page 9 f

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ATTACHMENT l

Duke Power Company

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McGuire Nuclear Station Response To Reouest For Additional Information Conclusions From the cases reviewed in the failure analysis it has been determined that with I

one operable filter train, filtered air is always available to provide the design

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requirement of 2000 cfm +10% and maintain the control room at, Jositive pressure j

of greater than or equal to 1/8 inch w.g relative to the outst' atmosphere; l

therefore, control room habitability is maintained.

1)

Any single damper, fan or power failure will not increase operator dose above the design basis allowables; 2)

Verification of damper positions, verification of system flow, and verification of control room pressurization are critical. System operability is verified through periodic testing. (See attachments and page 8 surveillance requirements for test descriptions.); and, 3)

Existico pr.riodic tests >:hich verify filter train operability and

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control rorm pressurization will be updated to include testing under the i

4 worst care failure scenario, Cases 3 and 4.

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• ' U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission

- November 23, 1988 Page 10 b

ATTACHMENT Duke Power Company l

McGuire Nuclear Station

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Response To Request For Additional Information

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i TAbtE 1 i

I SINGLE FA! LURE ANALYSIS i

DAMPER AND FAN ALIGNMENT COMPONENTS FAILURE CASES

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4 CASE 1 CASE 2 CASE 3 CASE 4 CASE 5 CASE 6

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• • TRAIN A COMPONENTS **

l CRA-0AD-1 0

0 0

0 0

0

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CR-0AD-1 0

0 0

0 C

0 i

OAPFT TAN A 0FF ON OFF ON ON ON CR-0AD-3 0

0 0

0 0

C I

CR-0-1 C

0 0

0 0

0 AHU FAN A 0FF ON ON ON ON ON

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CR-0-6 0

0 0

0 0

0 l

1 CR-0-4 C

0 0

0 0

0 t

• • TRAIN B COMPONENTS **

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CRA-0AO-2 0

0 0

0 0

0 CR-0AO-5 0

0 0

0 0

C l

OAPFT FAN B ON OFF ON OFF ON ON CR-CAO-7 0

0 0

0 0

0 CR-D-2 0

C 0

0 0

0 AHU FAN 8 ON OFF ON ON ON ON CR-0-7 0

0 0

0 0

0

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CR-0-3 0

C 0

0 0

0 f

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LEGEND: 0-OPEN l

1 C-CLOSED i

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ATTACllMENT Duke Power Company i

J McGuire Nuclear Station l

TABLE I i

November 23, 1988

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0'RYOJR NORMAL CONTROLS dC h

00RVA..OK tot SERIES oi PARALLEL UN 2 JN1 TRAIN A TRAIN 8 TRAIN A TRAI N 8 KEY ON KE)

Ta'A' TR' C RA-P- 1 X

X X

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CRA-C-f X

X X

X Note I

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I CR-ANU-l*

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g

)

X X

I CRA-ANU-1*

X 1

X X

t SGR-ANU-IA*

X X

X i

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5

$CR-AHU-2A*

X X

X i

scR-ANU-1C*

X X

X a

$GR-AHU-20*

X I

X X

i BR-XF-1 X

X X

i t

C RA-P- 2 X

X 1

4 CRA-C-2 X

X f

X I i j

Note i i

CR-ANU-2*

X X

) I C RA-ANU-2*

X X

) I

{

S C_ R_- AHU-1 B*

X X

i 7

_ SCR-ANU-28*

X y,

) (

)

SCM-ANU-10*

X i

X

) r SCR-AHU-2D*

X X

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l BR-XF-2 X

X Noto 1 C RA.0A PFT-1 X

X i

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Noto I C RA-OA PFT-2 X

X i

X-Canotes operatlocal ec;uipment j

• -Includes associated dampers

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NOTE:

1.

These components operate independent of the TRAIN KEY SELECTOR switches.

i Upon receipt of a LOCA or Blackout all of these components are allowed i

to operate.

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Duke Power Company

/ A. OB I

ccuir "uci st ti a PLANT 5(STEMS November 23, 1988 b(

3/4.7.6 CONTRUL AREA VENT!LATION SYSTEM LIMIT;NG CONOTTION FOR OPERATION 3.7,5 Tw) independent Control Area Ventilation Systems shall be OPERABLE.

APPLILABILITY:

ALL MODES ACTION:

(Units 1 and 2)

MODES 1, 2, 3 and 4:

With one Control Area Ventilation System inoperable, restore the inoperable system to OPERABLE status within 7 days or be in at least HOT STANDBY within the next 6 hours6.944444e-5 days <br />0.00167 hours <br />9.920635e-6 weeks <br />2.283e-6 months <br /> and in COLD 5HUTDOWN within the following 30 hours3.472222e-4 days <br />0.00833 hours <br />4.960317e-5 weeks <br />1.1415e-5 months <br />.

MODES $ and 6:

a.

With one Control Araa Ventilation System inoperable, restore the inoperable system to OPERABLE status within 7 days or initiate and maintain operation of the remaining OPERABLE Control Area Ventilation System in tha recirculation mode; and b.

With both Control Area Ventilation Systems inoperable, or with the OPSRABLE Control Area Ventilation System, required to be in the I

recirculation mode by ACTION a,, not capable of being powered by an OPERABLE emergency power source, suspend all operations involving CORE ALTERATIONS or positive reactivity changes.

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.e provisions of Specification 3.0.4 are not applicable.

SURVEILLANCE REOUIREMENTS l

l 4.7.6 Each Control Area Ventilation System shall be demonstrated OPERAELE:

a, At least once per 12 hours1.388889e-4 days <br />0.00333 hours <br />1.984127e-5 weeks <br />4.566e-6 months <br />, by verifying that the control room air temperature is less than or equal to 120*F; t

b.

At least once per 31 days on a STAGGERED TESY BASIS, by initiating, from the coitrol room, ' low through the HEPA filters and charcoal adsorbers and verifying that the system operates for at least 10 hours1.157407e-4 days <br />0.00278 hours <br />1.653439e-5 weeks <br />3.805e-6 months <br /> with the heaters operating; x

Am.er pent No.ll(Unit 2)

PcGUIRE - UNITS 1 and 2 3/4 7-13 A endment No. M(Unit 1) i

g AMACitMENT i f' ! r,*p q,f{ # 1 I l L e 1%

Duke Power Company

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6 McGuire Nuclear Statior.

P L AN T* SYSTEMS ~ "'-~ ~ ~~j November 23, 1988 SURVEILLANCE REQUIREMENTS (Continued) c.

At least once per 18 meriths, or (1) af ter any structural maintenance on the riEPA filter or charcoal adsorber housings, or (2) following painting, fire or cher.ical release in any venti'ation zone communicating with the system, by:

1)

Verifying that the system satisfies the in place penetration and bypass leakage testing acceptance criteria of less than 1%

and uses the test procedure guidance of Regulatory * -itions C.5.a. C.5.c. and C.5.1 of Regulatory Guide 1.52,

.sion 2 March 1978, and the system flow rate is 2000 cfm ; IO%;

2)

Verifying, within 31 days after removal, that a laboratory analysis of a representative carbon sample ebtained in accordance with Regulatory Position C.6.b of Regulatory Guide 1.52, Revision 2, March 1978, meets the laboratory testing criteria of Regulatory Position C.6.a of Regulatory Guide 1.52, Revision 2, March 1978, for a methyl iodide penetration of less than 1%; and 3)

Verifying a system flow rate of 2000 cfm 10% during system operation when tested in accordance with ANSI N510-1975.

d.

Af ter every 720 hours0.00833 days <br />0.2 hours <br />0.00119 weeks <br />2.7396e-4 months <br /> of charcoal adsorber o9eration, by verifying within 31 days after removal, that a laboratory analysis of a representative carbon sample obtained in acordance with Regulatory Position C.6.b of Regulatory Guide 1.52, Rev sion 2, March 1978, meets the laboratory testing criteria of Rep,.'atory Position C.6.a of Regulatory Guide 1.52 Revision 2. March I' 78, for a atthyl iodide penetration of less than 1%;

e.

At latast once per 18 months, by.

1)

Verifying that the pressure d*op across the cumbined pre-fil.ers, HEPA filters and charcoal adsorber banks is less than b inches Water Gauge while operating the system at a flow rate of 2000 cfm 10%;

2)

Verifying that upon actuation of a diesel generator sequemer the system automatically switches into a mode of operction with flow through the HEPA filters and charcoal adsoreer banks; 3)

Verifying tnat the system meintains the control rcom at a positive pressure of greater than or equal to 1/8 inch W.G.

relative to the outside atmosphere during system operation; and I

4)

Verifying that the heaters dissloate 10 : 1.0 kW when tested in accordance with ANSI N510-1975.

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SURVEILLANCE REQUIREMENTS (Continued) rioverter 23, 1988 y

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After each complete or partial replacement of a HEPA filter bank, by verifying that the HEPA filter bank satisfies the in place penetration and bypass leakage testing acetstance criteria of less than 1% in accordance with ANSI N510-1975 for a 00P test aerosol while operating the system at a flow rate of 2000 cfm : 10%; and g.

Af ter each comosete or partial replacement of a charcoal adsorber J'ank, by verifying that the charcoal adsorber satisfies the in place penetration ad byoass leakage testing acceptance criteria of less then 1% in accordance with ANSI N510-1975 for a halogenated hydro-carbon refrigerant test gas while operating the system at a flow rate of 2000 cfm : 10%.

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