ML20206J519
| ML20206J519 | |
| Person / Time | |
|---|---|
| Issue date: | 04/10/1987 |
| From: | Advisory Committee on Reactor Safeguards |
| To: | |
| References | |
| ACRS-T-1580, NUDOCS 8704160112 | |
| Download: ML20206J519 (200) | |
Text
OR 'G ' NAL UNnED $TATES g
NUCLEAR REGULATORY COMMISSION IN THE MATTER OF:
DOCKET NO:
ADVISORY COMMITTEE ON REACTOR SAFEGUARDS 324TH GENERAL MEETING O
LOCATION:
WASilINGTON, D.
C.
PAGES:
192 - 365 DATE:
FRIDAY, APRIL 10, 1987 v
,f h
.f l
~l
-6N 1
,: i,,,,'
' '.r.
'b.,. I'k $ 4f.tlM N/ i!
di'iWL* U V ' 8 iO 7
- l.,
i o.
IE / m' ' kh, ',,
ACE-FEDERAL REPORTERS, INC.
'Gl oygg(wg p,,,,,,
q
,_','l
/o 444 North Ca itol Street Washington, C. 20001 d
' '4 (202)347 3700 W
I NATIONWIDE COVERACE bl
l-
~
l l-l 0
, (}
PUBLIC NOTICE BY THE i
UNITED STATES NUCLEAR REGULATORY. COMMISSIONERS' I
l ADVISORY COMMITTEE ON REACTOR SAFEGUARDS FRIDAY, APRIL 10, 1987 i
The contents of this, stenographic transcript of the li proceedings of the. United States Nuclear Regulatory Commission's Advisory Committee en Reactor Safeguards (ACRS), as reported herein, is att uncorrected record of the discussions recorded at the meecing held on the above date.
No member of the ACRS Staff and no participant at
()
this meeting accepts any responsibility for errors or l
inaccuracies of statement or data contained in this i
transcript.
I i
l i
I i
l
()
i I
e
n CR30515.0 DAV/pjg 192 1
UNITED STATES OF AMERICA 2
NUCLEAR REGULATORY COMMISSION ADVISORY COMMITTEE ON REACTOR SAFEGUARDS 3
324TH GENERAL MEETING S
Nuclear Regulatory Commission Room 1046 6
1717 H Street, N.W.
l Washington, D. C.
7 Friday, April 10, 1987 8
l 9
The 324th General Meeting reconvened at 8:30 a.m.,
1 l
10 Dr. William Kerr, chairman, presiding.
11 ACRS' MEMBERS PRESENT:
12 O
DR. WILLIAM KERR 13 DR. FORREST J. REMICK DR. CHESTER P. SIESS i
14 DR. J. CARSON MARK DR. HAROLD W.
LEWIS DR. DAVID OKRENT 15 DR. DADE W. MOELLER DR. PAUL G. SHEWMON 16 MR. DAVID A. WARD MR. JESSE C.
EBERSOLE 17 MR. CARLYLE MICHELSON M.R CHARLES J. WYLIE 18 MR. GLENN A. REED 19 20 21 j
22 23 0
24 25 ACE. FEDERAL. Ruroninns, INC, 202-)4717(W1 Nati<mwkle Cmerase Rub)M eM6
5150 01 01 193 llhAVbur 1
DR. KERR Gentlemon, wo will begin our session 2
on Friday morning with the continuation of our consideration 3
of a draft letter on the safety goal implomontation.
You 4
havo Draft 2, or should have, the blue colored, in front of 5
you, and if Dr. Okront will be kind enough to continuo his 6
reforeoing, I will turn things over to him.
7 DR. OKRENT:
If I recall correctly, we woro at 8
the point talking about the lovels, is this correct?
9 DR. KERR:
Yes, sir, in the now version.
It is 10 on page 3, Structure of the Safoty Goals.
11 DR. OKRENT:
Shall I start at structure of the 12 safety goals?
I might as well.
(3 13 Are thoso a paragraph at a timo now?
14 DR. KERR Go right ahead.
15 And/or hierarchy of goals inhoront in tho safety 16 goal policy.
17 Wo boliovo it is unoful to emphasizo a moro 18 oxplicit hiorarchical structuro.
The highest lovel sorvos 19 NRC in regulating nuclear power and can be used in decisions 20 about broad policy matters and gonoral comparisons with 21 other industrial and technological activition.
22 Tho lowont levols can be used practically by the 23 NRC staff for making npocific regulatory docinions.
24 For each loval -- I am sorry -- each lovel of the 25 ACl! IIl!!)tillAl. Ill!!'OllllillS, INC.
- o: 147 3710 Natirnwkle rmerne No 311 (Mfi
h
! 5150 01 01 194 t
l llkbur-I hierarchy should be consistent with the level above but 2
should' represent quantification and should not be so l
3 conservative that it creates a de facto new policy.
If only 4
so that the simplification is accommodated, the following 5
description of the hierarchy will indicate the development 6
needed.
7 Any questions?
8 (No response.)
l 9
DR. OKRENT:
Level 1.
This i,s the pair of 10 qualitative goals expressed in the Commission policy 11 statement of August 4, 1986.
12 Level 2.
This is the pair of quantitative health 13 objectives expressed in the same policy statement.
14 Level 3.
This is the previously proposed.
15 quantitative objective that there should be likelihood of a i
16 major release no greater than 10 to the minus 6 per reactor 17 year.
18 The definition of a major release remains to be 19 established.
No definition is as low as some which have l
I 20 been su00ested, like a 25 rem whole body at the individual 21 plant boundary.
This seems to fail one of the~ criteria 1
22 discussed abover that is, such a definition is so much more 23 restrictive than the Level 1 or 2 goals that it in effect 24 estab'.ishes a more restrictive policy than that described by 25 the pore general goals.
ACE. FEDERAL REvonTEns, INC.
202 347 3700 Nationwide Coverase WA336 6646
5150 01 01 195 hur 1
We believe that that is clearty a distortion of 2
the intent of the policy and suggest that a more appropriate 3
definition of major release would be significantly larger, 4
probably to the level at which deaths would be postulated.
5 I indicated earlier I have a problem with this 6
paragraph and couldn't agree with it for a variety of f
7 reasons.
In the first place, the EPRI proposal is on the l
8 table at 25 r.
I think there would be some incentive in the 9
staff to use what is in Part 100.
There is nothing like 10 using --
11 DR. SHEWMON:
I guess I am not clear whether it 12 is you feel the arithmetic suggested by the paragraph is I
l 13 wrong or that you really think we ought to go for the 14 tighter goal instead of what comes at the higher level.
15 DR. OKRENT:
Oh, I would see arguments like if 16 you wanted to you could rewrite it to say EPRI has suggested 17 25 r, for example.
18 DR. SHEWMON:
My question was you said you 19 disagroo with the paragraph.
20 DR. OKRENT:
Let me go along.
EPRI has suggested 21 2'i r, for examplo, and others have suggested use of Part 22 100, which is roughly equivalent, the criteria in Part 100.
l l
23 I would then say those critoria appear to be somewhat more l
24 rostrictive than direct analysis based on the safety goal.
l 25 They could be interpreted as providing additional insurance, Acit Fl!DI!RAL Riti>onTrins, INC.
I 202 34M700 Nationwide Cmcrage Mn3%fM6 i
5150 01 01 196 llkbur 1
which may account for the uncertainties.
2 I prefer not talking about a level at which 3
deaths could be postulated.
I think that is not a very 4
catchy phrase.
5 DR. SIESS:
Wo went through this on our SPI, 6
remembor?
7 DR. OKRENT:
That is my opinion, and I may be a 8
minority of one.
9 DR. SIESS:
What became of the idea that the 10 largo reloano ought to be definod in terms of the roloase?
11 Bernoro went through the process of showing that 12 ST 1 wasn't a largo roloaso.
13 DR. REMICK:
Are we discussing paragraph by 14 ;
paragraph, or are we reading?
15 DR. OKRENT:
We have road it through, haven't wo?
16 DR. REMICK:
We are just reading this one 17 paragraph, then?
10 DR. OKRENT:
We are on 11 and 12.
19 DR. REMICK:
There is no question in my mind it 20 should be consistent with the higher lovels of the 21 hierarchy, and if one could como up with roloases that are 22 consistont I think it should be considorod.
It should bo 23 consistent with the highor levol goals in the samo way.
24 I don't understand why in 5 or 25 rom -- I think i
)
25 wo woro told by the staff it is throo orders of magnitudo ACi!.I:1!I)!!RAl. IlliPORiliRS, INC.
202 m m 00 NationwtJe Coserage mo W. Mui
5150 01 01 197 llkbur 1
lower -- how we can possibly think of 5 or 25 no mattor who 2
had recommended it,_EPRI or whoover would como up with it, 3
or staff.
It is inconsistent.
4 One of the things you have to do -- the wholo 5
purpose of the letter is to point out that the hierarchy 6
here should be entiroly self-consistent.
7 MR. EDERSOLE:
Is the release the sourco term, O
what gets outsido containment?
9 It scoms to mo that is the most definitive thing, 10 a rolonso.
11 DR. SIESS:
The thing is, for examplo, the 12 argument, the discussion last month, comobody said Chornobyl y
\\
13 would be the definition, the CCDF definition, of a fatality 14 offnito.
The staff said, yes, but I think we could show 15 that with the right motoorology, if it didn't have that high 16 plume, wo wouldn't moot it.
17 So you 000, CCDF in dopondent on what gets out, 18 how much, whero it gota out, how high it in, the demography, 19 whore the people aro, aro they evacuated, are they 20 nholtorod, in it raining, and chich way the wind is blowing.
21 MR. EllERSOLE:
Ily that timo it in no fuzzy you 22 havon't got your hando on anything.
23 DR. SIESS:
It apponrn from the discunnion, from 24 the additional remarkn that wont with the policy ntatomont, 25 that nomo of the Comminnionorn woro thinking of a largo Aci:.FuniinAi. Itiii>oit ti:its, INC.
- 02. W.U m Nadim Me Gncan mL W 4,W.
'l50 01 01 198 s
llkbur 1
roloaso, and that is the term they used, not major roloaso.
2 You might want to correct that.
They wore thinking of a 3
large release in terms of the porception of the public, not 4
the harm to the public.
5 As one of them said, use the unusual nuclear 6
occurrenco definition because that now is a political typo 7
definition.
8 DR. REMICK:
It is based on roms, though.
9 DR. SIESS:
That was based on roms.
Somebody 10 olso says put it at a lovel that would require evacuation.
11 That is EPG guidolinos.
That is a consequence typo 12 definition, not a rolonso typo definition.
But they called g
k-13 it a large roloaso.
14 It sooms that their intent wan in terms of the 15 consequences of the rolonso.
That would not cause 16 nignificant connequences.
It wouldn't make the newspapors.
17 Woll, that is ridiculous, but so what?
10 M?. EDERSOLE:
You are going to have so many 19 variables.
20 DR. SIESS:
Right, but that was their thinking 21 about it.
The object of making that ntatomont in naying 22 onco in a million reactor yearn, not more than once in a 23 million roactor yearn will wo have an accident whero wo havo 24 to ovacuato nomeono.
t i
\\
25 DR. KEltR :
It noomn to no that Davo'n nuggontion Acit.17iti>iinAt. Ri:i>oitIsins, INC.
- onimm N,iniinwue nunne xm no tM6
5150 01 01 199 llkbur 1
is worth considering, if I understood it, as it was put out, 2
that the 5 or 25 appeared to be more rostrictive than the 3
general ones, and this may be appropriato if ono wants to 4
introduce a considerablo amount of conservatism to take care 5
of uncertainties.
Othorwino, it perhaps should bo 6
rooxamined.
7 It does not scom to mo that it in a fact that it 8
acoms to mo considerably more rostrictivo.
9 DR. SIESS:
It in two or throo orders of 10 magnitudo.
Of courno, if the uncertainty in two or throo 11 orders of magnitudo, maybo wo havo to introduco 4
12 connorvatismo at the namo lovol.
kJ 13 DR. SilEWMON:
Ah, como on.
We ought to got back 14 to the bont estimato.
15 DR. SIESS:
The boat ostimato of what?
16 DR. SilEWMON:
The bont ontimato of the coro molt 17 in whero wo started in novoro accidentn.
18 DR. SIESS:
Wo aro in major rolonno.
Did it any 19 largo rolonno, Davo?
20 DR. OKRENT:
Thono aro no, my worda.
I think the 21 committoo } opod to chango it.
22 MR. WARD:
Yon, I don't know why a largo rolonso 23 couldn't bo unod in thoro, but it in my point it nucht to bo 24 connintont with tho uppor lovel goaln.
/
i J
25 Dit. KEltit Woll, we havo nald, and wo nald Ari: i'lii>iin AI l(i:i'on ti'ns, INC.
l 20 to no N enaidermrean s u t v.,o,
5150 01 01 200 llkbur 1
carlier, that th.is ought to be condistent.
2 Now, in this paragraph, if we brought out it 3
isn't consistent --
4 DR. REMICK:
That is not anything that is before 5
us.
6 DR. KERR:
It has boon proposed by at least ono 7
Commissioner of the fivo.
8 DR. SIESS:
What wo don't establish here and wo 9
did in the previous one, why do wo want another critorion 10 that presumably doon the same thing as the oarlier 11 critorion?
12 The roanon wo gave once was that thin could be an o
k.
13 oanily calculated nurrogato for an ill-dofined critorion.
14 If it is going to bo a surrogato, it shouldn't be throo 15 ordorn of magnitudo.
16 Even if it in not different, the CCDP
-- ntaff 17 alwayn pointed that out -- but it was about a factor of 10, 10 I think they said.
19 The surrogeto idon, if wo havo a critorion on 20 coro molt and on containment performanco, that la nupponod 21 to do nomothing that covern the two thingn.
It comon down 22 to the motocrology and domography.
23 DR. KERR:
It in nynonymoun with rolonno.
24 Dit. SIESS:
Dut rolonno inn't nynonymoun with 25 thin dofinition becauno that requiron dintanco, motoorology, Aci:.1'iti>itnai. Iliti'<>nilins, INC.
- CHWm Nminok ( mn.m km H6 u,64
l' 5150 01 01 201 l
llkbur 1
population, and so forth.
2 But if you have a core melt criterion.and, let's 3
say, a release criterion, then you need a third one to get 4
back to the health effects.
5 Is this the third one?
6 DR. KERR Let me raise a question which might i
7 help to move this discussion along.
8 Do we agree.that these criteria should be 1
9 consistent with the top levels?
Dave?
10 DR. OKRENT:
I don't think the Commission said 11 that this 10 to the minus 6 is consistent with good safety 12 goals.
(
13 DR. KERR:
That was not my question.
14 DR. OKRENT:
I am trying to answer your question.
15 In laying out the NUREG 0739, I was the principal one, I 16 guess, in choosing those numbers in there.
I consciously 17 chose numbers that were, in my opinion, not consistent 18 namely, 10 to the minus 4 core melt for new containment,.01 i
19 change of containment leakage given a large scale. core melt, 20 and still these similar risks to the public.
If you put in 21 meteorology or evacuation, people will say, well, it is 22 consistent.
23 I think one can make arguments for consistency.
f I
24 1 think one can make equally defensible -- I will put it 25 that way -- that when you multiply together, or whatever it l
t Acs FitntinAL Riti>onit ns, INC.
l l
2024347 37m Nallonwide Cmerage m)M Mi44
5150 01 01 202 llkbur 1
is, different things are not directly consistent.
But if 2
they are not consistent, one can put in words -- and I tried 3
to indicate a set of words -- that possibly indicate that in 4
fact if you use this you will have a big allowance for -- or 5
some allowance for uncertainty.
6 DR. KERR:
Am I to interpret that to mean that 7
you don't think that the lower level critoria should be 8
consistent with the highor levol?
9 DR. OKRENT:
I don't think you have to be able to 10 multiply through coro melt times containment performance.
11 DP. KERR That is not my question.
It scoms to 12 me if thoro is a 3 order of magnitudo difference -- and I 1,
don't know that thoro is -- that is a rather largo 14 conservatism, and I would call it not consistent with the 15 critoria.
Maybo you would call it consistent.
16 I am trying to got an idea of whether you think 17 one should deliberately introduce a conservatism as big no la throo ordorn of magnitudo.
19 l
DR. OKRENT:
I road thin -- if wo take the EPRI 20 definition, it is that it is 10 to tho minus 6 for 25 rom or 21 moro.
That is really what they are saying.
So the larger 22 onen are alno in thoro.
It in not that you can't excood 25 23 rom, but you can exceed it with a lowor probability than 10 24 to the ninun 6.
,e 25 DR. KERR I am trying to undoratand if you think ACli FimiinM. Rrroinitas, INC.
l 202.innn Nanonode narran m i tt, tu.
5150 01 01 203 llkbur 1
there should be a 3 order of magnitude conservatism, a 2 or 2
a 1 or none.
3 DR. OKRENT:
As I said, I don't myself have a 4
good case for knowing the difference.
I looked into the 5
calculations and assumptions, and so forth.
So I don't know 6
that there are these amounts that.large.
l 7
DR. KERR:
Mr. Moeller.
l 8
DR. MOELLER:
One question to help me.
In terms 9
of the safety goals, is it a major release that results in l
10 the health effects defined by the safety goals?
l 11 DR. REMICK:
Let me try to respond.
I think you l
12 have to put in perspective what happened.
You remember the 13 ongoing discussion of core melt in containment performance.
14 Remember when this took place.
The 10 to the minus 6 came 15 in when the Commission took out the core melt and did not 16 put in the containment.
17 So I would argue that 10 to the minus 6 -- in 18 fact I am fairly certain of this -- is a surrogate of that 19 question of the combination of core melt and containment 20 frequency.
21 I don't know if that answers your question, but 22 my view is that the 10 to the minus 6 major release -- and 23 that is consistent -- the staff had an effort of trying to 24 define the containment performance criteria, and one of O
i 25 their proposed ways of doing it was a figure of 10 to the i
I Ace Fnonnat Rneonicas, INC.
j 2em.37<>i s.ikm.ia,c m er,,,
n<n>33uu6
5150 01 01 204 llkbur 1
minus 6.
2 DR. SIESS:
Maybe it would help, maybe it won't, 3
but I am going to try.
I would like to read you the exact 4
words from the safety goal policy statement under the 5
heading V, or 5, guidelines for regulatory implementation.
6 The staff will require specific guidelines to use 7
as a basis for determining whether the level of safety 8
accribed to a plant is consistent in the safety goal policy 9
-- and it skips some stuff.
The guidance would be based on 10 the following general performance guideline which is 11 proposed by the Commission for further staff examination.
12 The guideline reads as follows:
~ J 13 Consistent with the traditional defense in depth 14 approach and the accident mitigation philosophy requiring 15 reliable performance of containment systems, the overall 16 mean frequency of a large release of radioactive material to 17 the environment, not to the person, of reactor accidents 18 shoul be loss than 1 in a million por year of reactor 19 operation.
20 That is as far as they wont.
In the additional 21 comments by Asselstine and Bornthal, they tried to defino a 22 largo roloase.
Asselstine had the 5 rom to an individual 23 consistent with the protectivo action guidelinos, and 24 13crnthal had a dif ferent probabilty.
lie had once in a 25 hundred years, a thousand years, or something, and ho tried ACII III!DIiRAl. Ill!!'ORTl!RS, INC.
2021 U Moo Nationwide Cmcrage m D6-fM6
i 5150 01.01 205 hur 1
to define the term " substantial offsite damages" a's the 2
extraordinary nuclear occurrence thing.
i 3
But the statement itself' talked about a release 4
4 to the environment.
i -
l 5
6 1
l 8
l 9
10 l
11 1
j 12 13 14 i
t 1
15 16 i
17 f
18 19 i
i 20 i
21 i.
l 22 i
23 24 i
}
25 i
ace FEDERAL REPORTERS, INC.
202 347 3700 Nationwide Coverage 800 336 6646 -
I
.1 5150 02 01 206 1(_N,AV/bc
-1 DR. REMICK:
And defense _indepth.
/'
2 DR. SIESS:
And defense indepth, and related to 3
containment systems.
4 He also mentioned level of safety for a plant, 5
which we are arguing about.
But it's confused, you see.
6 Once you define the large release, they began to define it.
7 in terms of consequences.
8 DR. REMICK:
Who defined it in terms of 9
consequences?
10 DR. SIESS:
Asselstine and Bernthal.
11 DR. REMICK:
But, that's different opinions or 12 additional comments.
13 DR. SIESS:
People try to read the Commission's 14 mind.
If five Commissioners try to define it and they all 15 try to define it in terms of consequences, right.now, we 16 don't know what the other three think, but two of them were 17 defining it in terms of consequences.
18 The system right now says consistent with the 19 safety goal policy.
20 DR. REMICK:
Thinking about defense indepth, the 21 question of a balance between core melt and containment.
22 DR. KERR Suppose that the paragraph said the 23 definition needs to be established?
It is our feeling that i
24 whatever definition is established be consistent with the O's 25 higher levels.
ace. FEDERAL REPORTERS, INC, 202 347 3700 Nationwide Cmerage 800 336-6M6
5150 02 02 207 I(q,AV/bc h
1 Would that be an acceptable statement?
2 DR. SIESS:
That would be a literal reading of 3
what they said.
4 DR. MOELLER:
Another way of interpreting, say, 5
Asselstine's comments would be that he defines a large.
6 release as any release in which the population has to think-7 about perhaps evacuating.
8 That's what he's saying.
9 DR. SIESS:
Bernthal's were in another form.
10 DR. MOELLER:
He says if you ever want~to have 11 the population think about evacuating with a frequency of 12 less than 10 to the minus 6.
i 13 DR. SIESS:
I think the Commission realizes the 14 confusion that exists in trying to define "large. release".
15 Should we discuss that in here?
The difference between a 16-release and its consequences.
17 DR. MOELLER:
-You remember the committee wrote a 18 letter six months or so ago suggesting that. tables be 19 prepared correlating the safety goal with the doses to the 20 population, as a result of those health effects.
21 If we had those tables.
22 DR. OKRENT:
It seems to me that this society,
~
23 there would have been a large release if all the people 24 within 10 kilometers instead of 30 kilometers at the' plant 4
s L
25 had to evacuato;and stay out for years.
I'think they.would ACE FEDERAL REPORTERS, INC.
202-347-3700 Nationwide Coverage 800-336-6646
4 5150 02 03 208 1(fAV/bc 1
consider that a large release, even if there were no acute 2
fatalities.
3 I'm not for one wed to the idea of this 4
consistency being one and the other.
There are different 5
attributes that go into a large release.
6 I would rather be silent than to have this 7
paragraph.
8 DR. KERR:
Would you acceptia paragraph --
9 DR. OKRENT:
If it's consistent, I would again 10 have a problem because I think, as I've said before, the 11 safety goals themselves have failed to allow for large-scale 12 contamination of land, for example.
13 DR. KERR:
It seems to me if that's the case, we 14 ought to say that te safety goals are flawed rather than say.
15 that this should make up for the fact that they have a flau, 16 don't you think?
17 DR. WARD:
I agree very strongly with what you 18 just said, Bill, if that's the problem.
19 DR. SIESS:
Would anybody be_ interested in 20 hearing what the ACRS said about a large release at 10 to.
21 the minus 67 22 We wrote a letter in April.'86 which said that we 23
.believe that the mission should put'out certain performance 24 guidelines as one satisfactory means to satisfy compliance O
25 with the safety goal objectives.
ACE FEDERAL REPORTERS, INC.
202-347-3700 Nationwide Coverage 800-336-6646
5150 02 04 209.
1()AV/bc 1
These guidelines should be structured so'that,the 2
principle.of defense-indepth is maintained.
We propose that 3
the. plant performance guidelines be regarded as fully 4
acceptable surrogates for the safety. goal objectives.
5 There should be two performance guidelines, and 6
consideration should be given to the third, which'was-7 operations.
8 The first guideline should be the 10 to the minus 9
4.
The second guideline should relate to containment 10 performance and should be such that the. chance of a very 11 large release of radioactive materials to the environment 12 should be less than 10 to the minus 6 per reactor year.
13 Now, I would say that what the Commission put in 14 on the general performance guideline is very closelyfrelated-15 to what we've said right there,.considering that:the little 16 history that they just obtained, if we want to know what d
17 they mean, maybe we could figure out what we meant when we 18 said "a very large release of materials to the 19 environment".
20 Were we thinking of consequences?
21 DR. SHEWMON:-
I sure would not equate it with 22 the level the Governor of Pennsylvania thought he should i
'23 evacuate people at, at TMI-II.
4 24 So the evacuation part I think is a poor i:
25 surrogate.
ACE-FEDERAL REPORTERS, INC.
202-347-3700' Nationwide Coverage 800-336-6M6
i-5150 02 05-210' 4
1()AV/bc
'l DR.:OKRENT:. I agree.- Ifdon't think it's the 1
2 level or the circumstance of which you would institute 3
evacuation.
But I think, if there are-large numbers of 4
people who can't go home for years --
5 DR. MOELLER:
Yes.
6 DR. OKRENT:
For example,. releasing all the noble 7-gases could mean it's not a very large, or large release, 8
although,.in' principle, it could cause an early fatality.if 9
it'were going the right way, and so forth, for the reason 10 that it doesn't have this long-lasting effect and there is a 11 limit to what it's going to do in any event..
12 And, in effect, even in NUREG 0739 we try to-s I
13 indicate that.
And you're going to have to'1' eave a 14 substantial part of the cesium.
15 DR. SIESS:
All the. nobles could meet the CCDF 16 criteria.
j 17' DR. OKRENT:
They might meet it, ye's.
18 DR. SIESS:
They told us that.'
19 MR. TAYLOR:
Could I make a point?
20 I think, if you look at the analysis done by 21 Mr. Merrill in containment venting, you would find,7 1 think, 22 around with an elevated release, 25 rem whole body at one-23 mile.
1 24 The ground level release would be considerably 25 above that.
i
/\\CE-FEDERAL REPORTERS, lNC.
202-347-3700 Nationwide Coverage 800-336-6646 4
5150 02 06 211 1(,,IAV/bc 1
DR. KERR:
If you release all the nobles at-2 ground level, yes.
3 DR. REMICK:
It's been stated that Dave would 4
have problems.
I have problems if we propose a hierarchy 5
which is not consistent, and to get us off dead center, I 6
would move that we proceed with a paragraph somewhat like 7
what we have here of this general type.
8 DR. SHEWMON:
If we went to Dave's comment and 9
did this in terms of what's likely to crap up the concrete 10 cycle --
11 DR. KERR:
Just a minute.
We've got a motion.
12 DR. WARD:
I'll second it.
13 DR. KERR:
Now you're discussing the motion?
14 DR. SHEWMON:
I don't know what the motion ie.
I 15 didn't hear it.
16 DR. REMICK:
The motion is that we proceed with a 17 paragraph of the type we have in paragraph 12, subject to 18 minor editing.
19 DR. SIESS:
And something that doesn't say what 20 it should be.
It says that what the staff has proposed is 21 inconsistent.
22 DR. SHEWMON:
Then I'm discussing the motion..
23 The staff has proposed meter 5 or 25.
24 DR. SIESS:
It proposes CCDP.
That's the last 25 I've heard.
ACE-FEDERAI, REPORTERS, INC.
202 347-3700 Nationwide Coverage 800-336-6M6
5150 02 07 212 1llhAV/bc 1
DR. OKRENT:
It's my impression that there's 2
another part of the staff that's been doing some' thinking 3
that's proposing something other than the CCDF.
4 DR. SIESS:
Staff is obviously trying very hard 5
to interpret what the Commission gave them.
6 DR. KERR:
Mr. Shewmon.
7 DR. SHEWMON:
Would it be possible to express 8
this CCDF?
I'm darned if I know what it is.
I think I've 9
been told twice, and it still isn't very clear.
It's some 10 statistical distribution integration thing that doesn't 11 stick with me.
12 But, if we got back into what would release
(
13 enough to the environment so that it became less 14 inhabitable, would you consider trying to express things in 15 that way here?
Or, is that outside the realm of what you 16 want to talk about in terms of a large release?
17 To me, that's more meaningful than saying, you 18 know, we will strike one dead, and we ought to put it at 19 that level.
And it's more appropriate, indeed, for what you 20 do wish to avoid.
21 DR. REMICK:
You're proposing that we put it in 22 the direction of going in the direction of the CCDP.
23 DR. SHEWMON:
I'm darned if I know what a CCDF 24 is, and I'm not sure I want to learn, though I may have to.
\\J 25 I really was asking about what happens in terms ACE. FEDERAL REPORTERS, INC.
202-347-3700 Nationwide Coverage 800-336-6M6
5150 02 08 213 1(,'AV/bc 1
of habitability of the countryside.
2 DR. REMICK:
I interpret that to be inconsistent 3
with my motion, which was the general sense of what's here 4
subjected to engineering.
5 DR. KERR:
Mr. Siess.
6 DR. SIESS:
I guess what I'm hearing is that the 7
proposals 5 and 25 with CCDF are much more conservative than 8
the level one and level two requirements.
9 And I don't see how we can call them level 10 three.
It seems to me that's really a replacement safety 11 goal.
It's a cleariry-expressed one.
As somebody said, 12 it's one any newspaper editor could understand.
g/
\\_
13 So is it really a substitute and not just a means 14 of implementation?
It's much more than the qualitative or 15 quantitative health effects.
It really includes both core 16 melt and containment.
17 And you're not going to meet either one alone.
18 It includes demography, siting, et cetera.
So it's really a 19 replacement.
I don't think it's that much more 20 restrictive.
21 And how can we fit it into a hierarchy when it's 22 really a parallel type thing?
23 DR. WARD:
Could I comment?
24 DR. SIESS:
You're saying that, but you're not OkJ 25 saying it.
ACE FEDERAL REPORTERS, INC.
202-347-3700 Na ionwide Coverage 800-336-6646
5150 02 09 214 A
llsjAV/bc 1
DR. WARD:
I think it fits into our hierarchy.
I 2
don't think it's really necessary, but it's there.
3 DR. SHEWMON:
Why do you feel it's hierarchical?
4 DR. SIESS:
I don't think it's hierarchical.
5 DR. WARD:
If it's evaluated at a proper level, 6
it is.
That's what paragrraph 12 is complaining about.
7 DR. SIESS:
It's not that clear.
You see, the 8
Commission said they should consider this as a part of 9
implementation.
But what they're doing is essentially not 10 using that general performance criterion as a surrogate to 11 implement, but as a replacement, as a much lower level.
12 DR. WARD:
I know, and I think that's wrong.
4 13 DR. SIESS:
But it doesn't say'it as clearly as I 14 would like to see it.
15 DR. KERR:
Do you have a suggestion?
16 DR. WARD:
It says:
We believe this is clearly a 17 distortion of the intent of the policy.
18 DR. KERR:
Let me suggest something that might 19 make sense in the motion.
We have not in this paragraph 20 referred to the letter that Chet just read.
1 21 It seems to me, since we've written that letter, 22 it might make some sense to refer to it and say, "The 23 definition of a major release remains to be established.
24 You will note that in our letter of -- we also suggest 25 something about a major release."
/\\CEJFEDERAL REPORTERS, INC.
202 347-3700 Nationwide Coverage 800-336 6M6
5150 02 10 215 1()AV/bc 1
DR. SIESS:
The surrogate that we proposed in our 2
letter, and it must be set at a level where it is a 3
surrogate.
4 DR. KERR:
And if it is to be a surrogate, it 5
needs to be consistent with the top lev 1 safety goals.
6 Is that something that could be the sense of your 7
motion?
8 DR. REMICK:
I would agree.
i 9
DR. WARD:
I think it could be.
I'd like to 10 comment on our letter of a year ago.
The paragraph that 11 Chet read in the letter of a year ago, of course, was really 12 talking about what in this letter we're calling level four.
13 DR. SIESS:
It was a replacement for 4-2 14 containment.
15 DR. WARD:
No, the whole paragraph was discussing 16 three performance objectives.
It introduced 10 to the minus 17 6th there as just a way of putting some sort of boundary 18 around what we thought a containment objective ought to be.
19 But, at that time, it wasn't proposing it as 20 another level.
And, after that, when the policy finally-21 came out in the Commission, this new level of large release, 22 10 to the minus 6, was introduced at that point.
I 23 That was after our letter.
24 DR. SIESS:
We were trying to avoid additional 25 probability of containment failure.
Every possiblo core ACE FEDERAL REPORTERS, INC.
202 347-3700 Nationwide Coserage 804336-6M6
4 5150 02 11 216
(.
1( jAV/bc 1
melt had to be a.1 or.01 on containment.
We said overall 2
10 to the minus 6 we had a very low probability of core melt 3
and we would certainly fail the containment.
4 That was permissible as long as the overall 5
probability was 10 to the minus 6.
That was the reason why 6
it was expressed that way rather than a core melt.
7 Now, the containment failure probability is a 8
conditional probability.
That would require that you 9
eliminate every core melt from the containment, no matter 10 how low the probability.
11 DR. KERR:
Is there further discussion of the 12 motion?
Do you want to try the sentence before we vote on
(~%
(_/
13 the motion?
14 DR. SIESS:
No.
15 DR. KERR:
Further discussion of the motion?
16 (No response.)
17 DR. KERR:
Those in favor of the motion, right 18 hands.
19 (Show of hands.)
20 DR. KERR:
Five.
Opposed?
21 (Show of hands.)
22 DR. KERR:
One.
The motion carries.
23 Dave, can you try to write something that might 24 be slightly different than this, which is in the spirit of 25 the motion and perhaps would refer to our earlier letter?
ACE-FEDERAL REPORTERS, INC.
202-347-3700 Nationwide Coverage 800-336-6M6
5150 02 12 217 1llhAV/bc 1
DR. WARD:
Yes, all right.
2 DR. KERR:
Mr. Okrent.
3 DR. OKRENT:
Shall we go on?
Level four.
This 4
level of the hierarchy consists of three parallel 5
performance objectives.
These objectives are at a low 6
enough level of abstraction that they can be used by the'NRC a
7 staff in making decisions about specific regulations.
8 I have a comment here which I've said before, but 9
I'll repeat it very briefly.
Earlier on in this letter one 10 says that a PRA is not sufficiently developed to be used 11 with appropriate confidence to make decisions on individual i
12 plants.
13 I think,'when you're making decisions ~about 14 specific regulations, you're making decisions about j
15 individual plants because that's what they're going to apply 16 to.
4 17 It's just a far ade to say that you're not.
I'll 18 just leave it at that.
The committee may feel differently 19 and proceed however it wants.
20 I think that's the weak point, as I said before, 21 the key weak point.
22 DR. KERR:
If, in your view, it is in the PRA to 23 make decisions regarding regulations is equivalent to making 24 decisions on individual plants, and what you want to do is i
25 make decisions on indiv! dual plants, just say that's the way ACE FEDERAL REPORTERS, INC.
202-347-3700 Nationwide Coverage 80 4 336-6646
5150 02 13 218 1()AV/bc 1
to do it.
2 DR. OKRENT:
If you hear me say I want to make 3
recisions, you use PRA.
4 DR. KERR:
I didn't hear you say that.
I 5
inferred that from what you were saying.
6 DR. OKRENT:
And, furthermore, as I said before, 7
when you make decisions in. regulations, when you make 8 I decisions, that's just part of the game.
I think the way 9.
the French and the Germans are using-the PRA, and in a way 10 the British, although they're further behind, makes more 11 sense to me.
12 To my knowledge, they don't have any regulations, 13 per se, on the books.
They used PRA to try to get a feeling 14 for what the situation is.
The French have a high level 15 safety goal, by the way, which is 10 to the minus 6th for an 16 unacceptably large release, which is one that can't filter 17 down.
So it's acceptable.
18 And they don't refine it, I think, beyond that.
19 Their evacuation provision would work okay, but you wouldn't 20 expect much field damage to people.
No variable on having i
21 to stay out of places if they're in the acceptable range.
22 i
23 24 25 i
ace FEDERAL REPORTERS, INC.
202 347-3700 Nationwide Coverage BN) 336 6M6
~
5150 03 01 219 2llhAVbw 1
And you're led to this inconsistency at the low 2
level right now.
3 Let me read on.
4 The first performance objective is an expression 5
of the effect of this other design prevention system.
We 6
believe that the previously proposed value of 10 to the 7
minus 4 per reactor year, with a maximum likelihood of core 8
melt, is appropriate.
We propose that core melt be defined 9
as maximum damages to the core, to the extent they are 10 damaged and a likely challenge to the containment occurs.
11 MR. EBERGOLE:
May I make a comment here?
12 When you said the first performance objective is 13 the expression of the effectiveness of the prevention 14 systems, could that be sharply qualified for core melt, 15 where core melt leaves core on the floor, because normally, 16 you know, mitigating systems are to mitigate 17 depressurization or whatever it is called.
Mitigation 18 systems, where you put them in a prevent mechanism.
19 MR. WARD:
I put " prevention" in quotes there.
20 MR. EBERSOLE:
I understand.
But I was really 21 lining it out so that you knew what prevention meant.
What 22 the limits of it were, and if you knew what core melt was.
23 MR. WARD:
In fact, I added that last sentence, 24 "We propose that core melt be defined as such-and-such,"
25 because, you know, the discussion yesterday indicated some ACE. FEDERAL REPORTERS, INC.
202 347 3700 Nationwide Coverage 800-336-6646 k
5150 03 02 220 4,r~}AVbw 1
members thought that there was a need for that, and that was LJ 2
my intention to find core on the floor.
3 MR. EBERSOLE:
What I am saying is, you are taking 4
what is normally a mitigation system.
5 DR. KERR:
What system is that, Jesse?
6 MR. EBERSOLE:
All the devices to protect the.coro 7
after you have a LOCA.
They are called mitigation systems, 8
normally.
9 DR. KERR:
I didn't realize that.
I thought they 10 were to prevent core melt.
11 MR. EBERSOLE:
They mitigate the consequences of a 12 LOCA.
Those things float back and forth, and you've got to
()
13 nail them down.
14 DR. KERR You are only talking about core molt, 15 and this is, therefore, prevention of core molt.
16 MR. EBERSOLE:
And so stated explicitly for core 17 molt, where core melt means core on the floor.
18 DR. KERR I dona't know that we have any systems 19 that distinguish betwoon loss of capability to deal with the 20 core and core on the floor.
21 MR. EBERSOLE:
I am just trying to arbitrarily put 22 a nail in the slot.
23 DR. OKRENT:
I have different comments on this 24 paragraph, which I wil repeat now, since we are getting Gk_j 25 ace FEDERAL REPORTERS, INC.
202 347 3700 Nationwide Coscrage 800-33MM6
5150 03 03 221 3 d AVbw 1
down to business.
'w) 2 First, let me ask the question.
The term maximum 3
likelihood is a mathematical term, although I don't know I
4 that you are using it in the mathematical sense.
5 MR. WARD:
Probably not.
6 DR. OKRENT:
Do~you mean mean or the largest mean 7
that the mean value should be no greater than?
I am just' 8
trying to see what you are trying to say.
9 MR. WARD:
Yes, mean value should be no greater 10 than.
I am not trying to invent something now, but we have 11 accepted it in the past.
{
12 DR. SHENMON:
Is this on page 9, i!ne 967
()
13 DR. OKRENT:
Yes.
.I think you avoid some possible i
14 difficulties, if you were to say it that way.
s 15 MR. WARD:
I agree.
16 Let's go back and say --
l 17 DR. OKRENT:
Let me ask about the following.
1 18 I am aware of Staff analyses.
You may have heard
]
19 the preliminary results, I don't know, where they look at 20 what would be needed, if you were to have what they i
21 interpret as a possible mathematical representation of the 22 hortatory statement on safety policy goals about no core 23
. melts.
It doesn't say in the lifetime of the current 24 plants, no core melts.
I think some of the' Staff are
()
25 saying, at least, well, if the mean frequency of core ACE FEDERAL REPORTERS, INC.
202 347 3700 Nationwide Coverage 800-336-(M6 s
m
~
5150 03 04 222 2llhAVbw 1
melt for all the plants -- in other words, some overall --
2 the life of these plants is less than 1.
That is perhaps 3
meeting the intent of this hortatory statement.
Maybe you 4
want to have some confidence that this is met.
You may or 5
may not.
But they come up with values like 2 x 10 to the 6
minus 5, not 10 to the minus 4.
They want confidence, in 7
fact, less than 10 to the minus 5, a factor of three.
So 8
there is in this statement, as it currently exists, sort of 9
a benign neglect of that paragraph -- I will put it that 10 way -- because the Commission, I think, was referring to 11 existing plants.
12 For future plants, EPRI has already said they are 13 going to shot for 10 to the minus 5.
14 I assume you are here talking about existing 15 plants, am I correct, this?
16 MR. WARD:
Well, I don't know.
The policy applies 17 to both.
18 DR. OKRENT:
Well, all right.
See, if the intent 19 is that this sentence applies to both, that gives me a 20 problem, because although I might, as I said tafore, go 21 along with 10 to the minus 4, for an existing point, 22 particularly if I thought that the containment gave me at 23 least
.l.
For future plants, I think they should shoot for 24 10 to the minus 5, and I make a distinction.
I think we xi 25 should.
They say they have done, you know.
So if we ACE FEDERAL REPORTERS, INC.
202-347-37n0 Nationwide Coverage mL3364M6 g
1
~
5150 03 05 223 Ir~"AVbw 1
really mean for both current and future, and I guess we V
2 probably mean for current, then, as I say, we have avoided 3
this future question.
There is this benign neglect in that 4
paragraph.
5 DR. KERR:
Independently of the number.
6 DR. SHEWMON:
It is the fault of the policy.
7 DR. OKRENT:
I agree with you, but the policy, I 8
think, has general words -- correct me if I am wrong.
9 Certainly, the severe accident policy does --'that future 10 plants should be safer, but it doesn't say how much.
11 DR. SHEWMON:
An interesting point.
It's like 12 airplanes.
As you get more and more of them, you probably 13 have to have each one of them'be a little safer to meet the
(}
14 safety goals.
15 DR. OKRENT:
That is true, because the public 16 counts the number of crashes per year and doesn't divide by 4
17 the number of flights.
18 DR. KERR:
Independent of that, the first 19 performance objective is to express the effectiveness of the-20 design of the plant prevention systems.
We believe that, as 21 we have previously proposed, the mean value of core melt 22 should be no more than 10 to the minus 4 per reactor year.
23 We have previously proposed that, I think.
24 DR. OKRENT:
We have said it for existing plants,
()
25 though.
ace FEDERAL REPORTERS, INC.
202-347-3700
' Nationwide Coverage 800-336-66:6
5150 03 06 224 1llhAVbw 1
DR. KERR:
Would you accept it for existing 2
plants, Mr. Ward?
3 DR. SHEWMON:
Nonexistent plants don't have 4
accidents.
5 DR. KERR:
At least I can say we have previously 6
proposed for existing plants and what else?
7 DR. LEWIS:
We have, in the past, recommended-10 8
to the minus 4 for existing plants.
I think that was wrong, 9
because we never defined it at the time.
We are defining it t
10 now.
11 DR. REMICK:
I guess, though, I have a little bit 12 of a problem with that, because we are talking about' safety 13 goal policy statements in general here, which, as Dave 14 points out -- I am not sure what our reference to 10 to the, 15 minus 4 for existing plants helps overall.
It is one piece t
16 of it.
I am not sure.
It may be more confusion than help.
17 DR. KERR:
I am getting to the point that-we might l
18 put in a sense that says for new plants we want it to be i
19 different.
Maybe we don't.
20 DR. OKRENT:
We have said it, but the committee 1
21 has declined to recommend 10 to the minus 5, but has said, 22 safer.
23 DR. LEWIS:
Except, what we have done in this 24 letter is to say that the safety goal should be used-as a r
25 mechanism for the interpretation of the effectiveness of
/\\CE-FEDERAL REPORTERS,1NC.
202-347-3700 Nationwide Coverage 800-336 6646
5150 03 07 225 1(3,,AVbw 1
-the existing body of regulations and that effectiveness can 1
2 be judged both for its effectiveness on existing plants and 3
the extent to which it constrains plants in the future.
4 DR. REMICK:
Are you saying that you don't.think 5
that that confuses them, by referring to what we say on 6
existing pla'nts?
I am not quite sure I understand your 7
point.
8 DR. LEWIS:
I never liked, as you know, these very 9
precise things we've said in the past.
Ratings without a 10 definition.
But given the fact that we've said them, I 11 would see no harm to say that in this context, you get more 12 and more specific in which you reach a point in which the
()
13 Staff actually starts using these at one level of 14 concretion.
I wouldn't actually_say as a paragraph 13, low 15 enough levels of abstraction.
I would say a sufficient 16 level of concretion.
17 But anyway, when you start talking about core 18 melt, you can say that core melt probability is a reasonably 19 specific concretion of the impact of the safety goals that 20 one can imagine being used, and that in the past this 21 committee has recommended an objective of 10 to the minus 4 22 for all except a few existing plants, and that we want to do 23 better for the future.
24 That is what we said.
I don't want to reopen that f'-)
i 25 argument, but that would be, at least, factual.
/\\CE. FEDERAL REPORTERS, lNC.
i 202-347-3700 Nationwide Coverage 800-336 6646
5150 03 08 226 1llkAVbw 1
Am I missing the point?
2 DR. KERR Would that be acceptable to the 3
committee, something like that?
4 DR. OKRENT:
Let me ask a question of the 5
principal author of the paper.
6 How is this 10 to the minus 4 number to be used, 7
in your opinion?
Suppose they have a plant for which, in 8
fact, not only the first estimate but al the estimates of 9
containment effectiveness are that it is not very good, and 10 say that.8 out of 1 core melts, lead to a significant or 11 large release.
Is 10 to the minus 4 stil okay?
12 DR. REMIC.?:
It is 10 to the minus 6, though.
13 DR. OKRENT:
You are not going to make it with 10 14 to the minus 6, so how do they use it with 10 to the minus 15 4?
16 DR. LEWIS:
They don't use it on the specific 17 plant.
18 DR. OKRENT:
But the use it in deciding on the 19 regulations that relate to core melt.
20 My point is, if you have a group of plants, let's 21 say, that have hardly a containment for severe accidents, 22 uaybe they needed their own set of regulations.
23 MR. WARD:
It could be, but what we are saying, and have said all along with the safety goal policies, is 24 25 that we are sort of insisting on defense in depth, and that ACE-FEDERAL REPORTERS, INC.
l 202-347-3700 Nationwide Coverage 800-336-6646
5150 03 09 227 1llkAVbw 1
that we are not really willing to trade off bad containment 2
for good core melt numbers, and I think that is sort of a 3
principle, and that is the idea of our continuing to insist 4
on the two parallel quantitative guides, or whatever you 5
call them -- the core melt and the not satisfactorily 6
developed centainment -- because we don't want to permit 7
just free willy-nilly trade-offs between these two things, 8
insisting on some sort of leck in at acceptable levels for 9
each.
10 DR. OKRENT:
I don't think that point has been 11 made quite directly in this letter and, in fact, I think it 12 would be made somewhat more directly, if one stated not m) 13 only that, but that there should be some minimum performance 14 of containment.
15 DR. KERR:
Dave, let me provide an alternate.
I 16 would say that what we need to do is to look at a population 17 of plants and try to determine what the core melt trend, 18 mean value, or whatever, among the plants, might be.
If it 19 turns out that it is less than 10 to the minus 4, you can 20 conclude that the existing regulations are appropriate.
If 21 it isn't, then it seems to me, that we ought to look at 22 why.
What's wrong with the prevention system that it isn't 23 meeting that criteria and change the regulations 24 appropriately.
25 Then one would know, using the systematic ACE. FEDERAL REPORTERS, INC, l
202 347 3700 Nationwide Cmcrage 800-336 M 46
5150 03 10 228 a
ll G AVbw 1
evaluation or whatever, to look~at each plant and see if it 2
makes regulations, and that would'be the test you would 3
use.
You wouldn't look at each plant and say, does it mean 4
10 to the minus 4.
5 DR. OKRENT:
My point is, that if you have a very
~
l 6
good containment, the 10 to the minus 4 -- see, earlier, I 7
heard people saying we should look for consistency and, in 8
fact, they wanted to define this large release consistent 1
9 with the health effects.
10 Well, if you are going to follow that path, I 11 maintain, just to be logically, your core melt and your 12 containment performance effectiveness had been be defined, O
V 13 so that they are also consistent with this very large 14 release.
And if you leave a hole here, then you are, in 15 fact, beating yourself into the system.
16 MR. WARD:
I don't disagree with that.
17 DR. OKRENT:
And being wishy-washy on what the 18 containment does.
19 DR. SIESS:
We have just moved very large release l
20 up to Level 1.
I I
21 DR. LEWIS:
I don't agree with you, Dave.
I l
22 think, within the context of the probability of large 23 release, you can trade off containment against core melt 24 probability, but we are saying is that we are not -- we'vbe 25 said many times in to past, we are not sufficiently l
I ACE. FEDERAL REPORTERS, INC, 202 347 3700 Nationwide Cmerage 800 336-6646 l
5150 03 11 229 1((~,y_ AVbw I
comfortable with that trade-off, that.we are willing to do 2
that.
So we are adding an additional factor which is that 3
even though you can conform to all the higher things in the~
4 hierarchy by trading them off together, we prefer to 5
maintain some level of defense in depth, in which we are 6
going to set performance standards on both core melt 7
probability, defined this time for an innovation and 8
containment performance criteria, which we are not ready to 9
define at this time.
But at least we've said many times, 10 somebody should get cracking and do it.
11 But that is a new element which has been said in 12 the past, and one can say it again, if one wants to, but it 13 isn't entirely rational, in the context of the earlier 14 goals, because within the context of the earlier goals, I 15 can imagine a situation in the year 2300,~in which one has a 16 containment that is the size of the State of Iowa, 17 surrounding a fully automated plant, in which you don't give 18 a damn what happens inside the containment.
19 DR. KERR:
Gentlemen, our schedule calls for us to 20 begin, at this point, a discussion of the topics for the i
21 meeting with the Commissioners.
22 Since we are scheduled to begin this at 10:00, we 23 probably should start.
24 (Whoreupon, at 9:30 a.m., the open session was 25 recessed and thereafter, at 10:00 a.m., the committee 1
26 entered into an unrecorded session.)
Acn FnonnAi. RuronTens, INC.
202 447-3700 Nationwide Coverage 300 336 4 46
- 5150 04 01 230
. _,m l 2C'AVbw 1
DR. REMICK:
(presiding)
The meeting will come to l
2 order.
3 Gentlemen, we are scheduled form 11:45 to 12:30 to i
4 continue our discussion of the safety goal letter.
5 Yes, Chet.
l 6
DR. SIESS:
One item, Bill promised me I could 7
take a minute with.
l 8
DR. REMICK:
Please.
i 9
DR. SIESS:
Gentlemen, may I assume, in view of 10 the letter we wrote yesterday regarding the Safety Research
(
11 Report, that we will not prepare such a report this year.
l 12 MR. MICHELSON:
We can safely assume that, maybe.
l 13 DR. SIESS:
We said we propose, for your 14 concurrence.
There is a little pressure on me.
Are we-15 going to have a meeting in May, because somebody weants to 16 have a meeting in May.
It may not be the best reading in 17 the world not to do the award.
I have got a whole list of 18 other reasons.
But was it your assumption when you wrote 19 that that it would apply?
l 20 DR. REMICK:
Are you talking about the letter to 21 Congress?
22 MR. MICHELSON:
In other words, how long will it 23 take them to decide and will we have any time left after 3
24 they decide, if they decide they want a letter?
25 DR. SIESS:
If it is our general intention that Ace FEDERAL, RneonTens, INC.
202 347 3700 Nationwide Cmerage 8(n.336 6M6
5150 04 02 231 1llhAVbw 1
we not go ahead.
If this was a request not to do it, then I 2
would say, don't schedule anything in May.
When the 3
Commission comes back, we can argue with them a little bit 4
and tell them all the reason why we've got other more 5
important things to do.
6 MR. MICHELSON:
If they still want it, tell them 7
it will be delayed a little bit.
8 DR. SIESS:
Okay.
That will do.
9 DR. MARK:
So the subcommittee on May 3 or 4 or 10 whatever.
That subcommittee.
11 DR. SIESS:
Is Sam here?
Charlie will schedule 12 three days.
13 DR. WYLIE:
We've got the blocked out~ schedule 14 there.
15 MR. WARD:
For May 6th then, Charlie.
16 DR. WYLIE:
In place of the research.
17 DR. MOELLER:
Forrest, another quick question.
i 18 Several of us thought during the meeting with the 19 Commissioners that the subject of waste might have come up, 20 but obviously, it did not.
Now they have this SECY, which 21 says we are in favor of the separate waste management 22 advisory committee.
I sort of think, since the vote on that i
i 23 is scheduled for April 20th, maybe Ray can give us better 24 guidance.
I sort of think tomorrow, I would like to propose f
25 a very simple one or one-and-a-half paragraph letter to them i
ACE FEDERAL REPORTERS, INC.
202 347 3700 Nationwide Cmcrage 80n.3 % 6646
5150 04 03 232 n
1(_,:AVbw 1
expressing some comments on that.
2 DR. REMICK:
I think you certainly have the right 3
to introduce a letter.
The Planning Committee has suggested 4
that they saw no need for action, but that certainly would 5
not preclude you.
6 DR. MOELLER:
Maybe you know things that I do 7
not.
We assume that they really won't vote on April 20.
8 They are coming down to meet with us next month, and that is 9
the logical time for us to write a letter.
10 MR. FRALEY:
They are going to be with us the 11 month after next.
12 DR. MOELLER:
On the waste management plan?
O)
(_
13 MR. FRALEY:
Are you talking about the 14 Commissioners?
15 DR. MOELLER:
The Staff.
16 MR. FRALEY:
The Staff..is going to como down and 17 brief you next month on this paper.
18 DR. SIESS:
When is the Commission going to act on 19 it?
20 MR. FRALEY:
The Commission has been asked to act 21 by April 20.
22 DR. SIESS:
And the question you are asking is, 23 should we attempt to influence the Commission?
24 DR. MARK:
I am in favor of the need for such a 25 letter, as long as it says what I want it to say.
ACE-FEDERAL REPORTERS, INC.
202-347-37(X)
Nationwide Cmerage 8(X)-3346646
s
=5150104f04.
233-
- 1 hAVbw 1
DR. SIESS - The committ'ee felt that we had 2
indicated.once that any way'they wanted _to go was all right 3
with us.
There is no_need for.further indications to the.
4 Commission.
5 DR. MOELLER:
Let me propose a letter, maybe.
I.
~
6 wil check with Carson, but Paul Shewmon and:I had. concerns, 7
not.about the mechanism.
They can have any one of~the_three-8 approaches, but the one they proposed'as-the favorite said 9
that the committee would only answer their1 questions, you 10 know, questions posed to it.
It wouldn't really_have_ free 1
11 rein.
And number two,.it wouldn't have'any consultants.
12 DR. SIESS:
It was going to have all.the people on i
13 it that they needed.
l 14 DR. MOELLER:
I don't know whether we should say:
15 that.
It might not be wise.
-I don't know.
I will talk to-16 Carson.
17 DR. MARK:.You'will get a biased view, coming-from 18 me.
This-is their one and only chance to have that can of' 19 worms viewed in perspective is to-have it here. HIf they get>
r 20 a committee of hydrologists, they are going to learn a~ lot-21 of hydrology, but that is not what they need to know.'
22 DR. REMICK:
Okay, gentlemen.
23 MR. WARD:
I endorse that sentiment.
24 DR. MOELLER:
Okay.
Then we can put that in the O
25 letter, in a short letter.
Let me try.
You know,'if you.
ACE-FEDERAL REPORTERS, INC.
202-347-3700 Nationwide Coverage 800-336-6646 -
J
}
5150 04LOS 234
~
)AVbw~
l will let it come up Saturday, th'at is-fine.
2 DR. SIESS:
That will be sure'that:we give them 13
. good advice, but it doesn't mean to be self-serving.
3 4
DR. OKRENT:
In principle,'they could set up a
'+
5 committee whose membership is.similar to the one the j
6 committee set up that included hydrologists, geologists:--
7 DR. MARK:
Look, I have nothing.against I
l 8
hydrologists.
i 9
DR. OKRENT:
-- and civil engineers.
So Ilam 10 reluctant to say this is their one and only chance.
11 DR. MARK:
A committee of specialists can give 12 additional comment, that is true.
But the kind of-thing
(\\
I v
13 that Dade wrote a month ago, where-does it fit.in-the L
14 spectrum of safety?- The hydrologists will.not say.
15 DR. SIESS:
That committee can do what Dade's i
16 subcommittee has been doing.. That is their view.of it.
And i
17 this overall perspective, we haven't been'givan,;'we have to i
)
18 change our ways, and they thought-_we couldn't-change our i
J 19 ways and do two jobs without adding a-lot of people to the 1
I I
20 committee.
i 21 DR. REMICK:
Gentlemen, let's discuss that
]
7 22 tomorrow, if we have the' letter before us, and let's go on l~
23
.to safety goals.
l i
l 24 DR. OKRENT:
It is my-recollection, and correct me i
25 if I am wrong, that we were on chapter -- well, it seems ACE-FEDERAL REPORTERS, INC.
202-347-3700 Nationwide Coverage 800-336-6646
- l
S
~
i
~ 5150 04 06 235
<1llhAVb'w
'l' like chapter -- paragraph 14.
"i 2
DR. REMICK:.That is correct.
s 3
DR. OKRENT:
And I am not sure that the-committee' s
4 had reached consensus.
's
+'
'5 /
DR.' REMICK:
In' fact,.I wish I had made a comment-6
-before I became Acting Chairman.
I didn't/know -
'I' thought 7
Bill'was going to be gone after lunch.
The one comment.that~
8 I would make, I am having a little bit of concern defining 9
core melt as core on the floor, as I have seen.it.
10 interpreted here and then associating-that with:10fto.the l
11 minus 4.
/
12 I fully realize that.from an analysis standpoint,'
13 you can't distinguish the onset of core melt and core on the 14 floor.
So they are handled as kind of one and.the same, but 15 as I understand the way it~is written here now,'it means 16 that the probability,of a TMI type accidentLcould'be greater l
17 than 10 to the minus 4.
That gives me some concern.
18 So I had a question, Dave.
Did you'really mean to.
19 associate core on the floor with the 10 to the minus 4 core 20 melt frequency or 10 to the minus 4'with the onset.of-21 severe core damage?
22 MR. WARD:
No.
I meant with core on-the floor.
t, l
i 23 YHOu know, I think we have been ambiguous.
I was trying to 24 be nonambigious, and I guess the committee's got to decide O'~
25 what it really wants.
This is what I would propose, n.
i whCE FEDERAL REPORTERS,"INC.
202-347-3MU 1 Nationwide Coverage
.800-336-6646 s.
4
~
~
i.5150 04 07 236 1lkAVbw
~
12 personally.
'2.
g5 DR. REMICK:
It could be 10 to.the.minus 4 on' core.
i I
3 -;
on the floor, and it could be 10 to'the minus 4 on 4
initiation of severe core damage.. We could still be-5
. specific.
6 DR. SIESS:- The analysts can't distinguish between I
7 those two 8
MR. WARD:
I am notLaure the analysts'can't 9
necessarily distinguish. 'They-frequently haven't.
I don't c
i y
l 10
.know that it is a technical impossibility.
In fact, I would i
11 say, you know, the-thing that's often calculated is not~the E l
12 onset of damage but rather theLloss of assured cooling,.
13 which is even another step.
I'think there's two or three
~
1 1
14 possible steps-that can be defined.. If it-is necessary to i
15 define them, I suspect it might be useful to be-more 16 definite about it.
l.
{
17 DR. REMICK:
The difference I-would see would be 18 on how it would.be implemented.
Let us sayathat,one.did-j I
19 say, well, what we mean by 10fto the-minus 4 is for core on 20 the floor, then I think that places a f ar greater 21 requirement on the containment than if we say.the frequency' i
i l
22 we are talking about is the onset of severe-core damage or 23' something like that, realizing that there is some factor 24
-which we don't know, which is the difference between the 25 onset of severe core damage and the core on the floor.
Some 1
ace-FEDERAL REPORTERS, INC.
202 347-3700 Nationwide Coverage 800 336-6646
5150,04 08 237
<s
- 1!,)AVbw; I
factor, we don't know what it is.
That places ~less of a 2
requirement on the containment. - I don't know how much 3
less.
4 MR. REED:
As an operator, not' knowing too much l
5 about things, I think you should talk about. onset of some
-6 type of severe core damage and 10 to the minus 4..
.That may 7
be more restrictive than core on the floor, but that is 8
where I would draw the line.
You'know, it is an interesting 9
thing, the cores that are melting.
'EBR-1, which melted.
10 What saved EBR-1 from being, say, core on the floor, was 11-reactivity control and the runaway positive coefficient.
i 12 action was snuffed out.
13 Three Mile Island 2, of course, decay heat removal J
14 was jeopardized, and I guess Chernobyl was a case of 15 reactivity and loss of decay' heat removal.
16 So that is not. relevant to much, but I really 4
17 think we should be drawing the lines at 10 to the minus 4, 18 onset of severe core melt, because the same consequences 19 exist financially, socially, industrial prestigewise and 4
20 everything.
21 DR. SHEWMON:
What does severe core damage mean?
22 Does that mean 2200 F on some piece of cladding someplace 23 calculated, or does this mean handling down to where you've 24 got a knob on the bottom of the core, and it is up against 25 the water like the TMI 2 was?
ACE FEDERAL REponTEns, INC, 202-347 3700 Nationwide Coserage 800 336-6M6
-ouse m
ewwm.
n 8
w r
SI-
- 4-
,t
, pr
--e7.
-.y<--1+d
- o-we ey
--,s-i
,g#-
=a-
,gw an ey~-
p werk--
-egmw
5150 04-09 238 1llhAVbw 1-DR. RSMICK:
Paul, I can't define it.
I 2
don't have an answer to it.
It's just I have the. feeling 3
that in my mind it's not core on the floor, it is something 4
less than that.
I don't know how you define it.
5 DR. SHEWMON:
It seems to me, it is very important 6
to have some better idea what it is we are talking about.
7 MR. WARD:
To kind of calibrate the discussion 8
here, are we having a quantitative argument, or are -- you 9
know, in other words, if there's a probability of X that we 10 would find acceptable for core on the floor, then what we 11 will find acceptable for the onset of severe core damage, 12 however, we define that, would be a number a little bit 13 larger than X, and for a loss of a third core cooling, the 14 number is still a little bit larger than that.
So are we 15 really talking about, we decided we would like 10 to the 16 minus 4, and we want to decide where to slip it in?
17 or what are we discussing?
18 DR. REMICK:
We have addressed 10 to the minus 4 19 in a number of our letters.
It is my personal assumption 20 that we were talking about something like onset of coro 21 damage.
Personally, that is what I thought we were talking 22 about.
23 MR. WARD:
Okay.
So are we talking about where 24 want to slip in 10 to the minus 4 on the curve, or are we 25 talking about what it is possible to define?
ACE-FEDERAL RnponTEns, INC.
202 347-3700 Nationwide Cmcrage 8(XF33MM6
~
~
5150 04 10
-239:
1((_,\\
i AVbw 1
DR. SIESS:
I can't understand your question..'If' 2
the PRA analyst gets to the point where,you've got no system i
l 3
for putting water in the core, and'he starts with that, do l
]
4 they also look at what the probability is that somebody can
]-
5 restore those systems?
I 6
DR. OKRENT:
Yes.
7 MR. WARD: :Sometimes, yes.
8 DR. SIESS:
So that'is all accounted for.
l l
9 Now you've got no core cooling.
l 10 Isn't the probability, one,.that you are going to i
f 11 have core on the floor from that point on?
At TMI, there l
12 was intervention.
They have taken intervention into 13 account, and that should affect their probability.
That i
i 14 scenario, then, shouldn't go to core melt.
15 DR. OKRENT:
You might:have been running for five 16 days instead of 50 days, i
17 DR. SIESS:
Let me put it this way.
A PRA, at a 18 certain stage, may have loss of core cooling, putting some 19 probabilities on intervention and~what might happen at some i
20 later stage, they can restore cooling.in time to prevent i
i 21 core on the floor.
Which probability do they report as'a i
22 probability of core melt?
If they are different, there must 4
23 be different probabilities; right?
And somebody's chosen i
l 24 one to report.
i 25 MR. TAYLOR:
Excuse me.
We do try to take into i
1 14CE FEDERAL ReponTens, INC.
202 347 3700 Nationwide Coverage 800 336-6646 l
A V
J 5150 04 11 240 A
1(,,AVbw I
account recovery actions in the frequency' prediction;-
2 however, once the core starts to dissemble, lose its 3
geometry, we don't know how to say we can arrest it by what 4
combination of circumstances.
We just don't know that.
j 5
DR. SIESS: -You know it can be arrested.
6 MR. TAYLOR:
It can be arrested.- Perhaps it can 7
be retarded to allow additional recovery actions, perhaps 8
keeping your pumps on, the main coolant pumps.
l j
l 9
DR. SIESS:
And you've'never had your experts l
10 offer any opinions on the probability, between the 11 probability of not having core on the floor, given loss of 12 cooling.
13 MR. TAYLOR:
There have been opinions put forth, iI 14 factors of 2 to 10, and those opinions again'are 15 scenario-dependent.
16 DR.'SIESS:
And somebody has to look at all the
- r 17 scenarios.
)
18 DR. OKRENT:
And all the opinions.
J 19 DR. REMICK:
Dave, to be specific on my question, 20 the sentence is in here.
"We believe the previously' 21 proposed value of 10 to the minus 4 per reactor year for a 22 mean value core melt is appropriate."
L l
23 I assume what we are talking about -- we've said i
l 24 10 to the minus 4.
And then we go on to say that should be l
25 confined as core on the floor.
Maybe 1 am wrong.
All along i
i
}f
/4CE. FEDERAL REPORTERS, lNC.
202 347-3700 Nationalde Coverage 800-336-6646
5150 04 12 241 1llhAVbw 1
I thought we were talking about something other than that.
2 That is my problem.
3 Maybe other people don't have that problem.
1 4
MR. WARD:
I don't know for sure what we are 5
talking about.
I put this in as a strawman.
6 DR. SIESS:
I got half of my question answered, 7
but now the numbers we're talking about, we are talking 8
about core molt, but consequences to the public.
There is 9
no challenge to the containment.
There might be a couple of 10 exceptions, but basically, there is no challenge to the 11 containment until you get the core out of the primary 12 system.
13 DR. OKRENT:
There's a hydrogen challenge.
14 MR. WARD:
Oh, there's a challenge to give the 15 containment at TMI.
16 DR. SIESS:
Not really.
17 MR. WARD:
The noble gases and iodine got out.
18 DR. SIESS:
What I am getting at is, what we need 19 for containment beyond final mitigation.
We have got to 20 have probability related to it somehow.
That is what you 21 were saying.
Core on the floor is a major challenge to 22 containment.
And if we are going to multiply two 23 probabilities together or look at them in that sense, which 24 probability are we talking about, core on the floor or loss 25 of core cooling?
It would be different.
J j
/\\CE-FEDERAL REPORTERS. INC.
202 347 3700 Nationwide Coverage 800436-6M6
5150 04 13 242 1llhAVbw 1
DR. REMICK:
They generally would be different.
2 DR. SIESS:
In some scenarios, they would be, in 3
some they wouldn't be.
4 As you pointed out, correcting me, there's some 5
scenarios that you don't challenge the containment.
Of 6
course, if the core is not out of the primary system, 7
there's not that much fission products.
8 DR. OKRENT:
Had TMI containment opened up, it 9
would have been very awkward.
10 DR. SIESS:
If that got out of the primary 11 system.
I didn't say vessel, I said primary system.
But 12 you know, the fact that you just jump to the bottom line, 10 13 to the minus 6 in a large release, that doesn't help us 14 either.
To got to that 10 to the minus 6, they have got to 15 go through the same steps, making the same kind of 16 assumptions.
So splitting it in two parts just emphasizes 17 different sets of uncertainties.
18 19 20 21 22 23 24 25 Acu-FEDERAL RiironTuns, INC.
202 347 3700 Nationwide Coverage M4.UMM6
l
- l. 5150 05 01
.243 1hV/bc 1
DR. REMICK:
I guess where I was coming from in 2
that last sentence in paragraph 14 --
3 DR. SHEWMON:
Treat it with benign neglect.
l 4
DR. REMICK:
Where's our drafter?
5 DR. SHEWMON:
He just had a telephone call..
6 Dave, what's your reaction?
7
.DR. OKRENT:
I mentioned that I think there are 8
some other questions that also went to this 10 to the minus 9
4 related to the safety policy statement on core melt, 10 which, in fact, would set you to a more stringent goal.
l 11 So I'm not sure what the committee is trying to 12 say at the moment in this paragraph.
I think I know what 13 the committee had in mind when it wrote the paragraph which 14 it reiterated about how the Commission should have-adopted 15 the policy, whatever, and work toward a core melt. frequency 16 of less or more than 10 to the minus 4 for all except a few 17 small reactors exercising prudence and a lesser of the cost 18 benefit.
l 19 That was in the middle of arguments about what 20 was the right equation for cost benefit.
Do you include on 21 site or off site?
22 There are some who had for one equation, some for 23 another, and others who didn't think you should go for cost 24 benefit.
O 25 But you really should just work toward the 10 to I
Ace FEDERAL ReconTnns, INC.
202 347 3700 Nationwide Cmcrage 80f)336 6646.
5150 05 02 244 1((~jAV/bc s
1 the minus 4.
2 That reflects a mixture of thinking around here 3
that led to that recommendation.
4 DR. SIESS:
Where are we?
5 DR. OKRENT:
It was in that context, I believe, 6
that that recommendation evolved and, in fact, it preceded 7
this.
And you may remember there were some members of the 8
staff who said, Look, we ought to work toward 10 to the 9
minus 4.
The numbers are too high.
10 DR. REMICK:
10 to the minus 5, you mean.
11 DR. OKRENT:
Then we said 10 to the minus 5, 12 meaning on the floor.
So we had this range of opinion.
s_
13 DR. SIESS:
What's the issue here, the number or 14 the definition?
Or both?
15 DR. REMICK:
The problem is the definition of 16 coro molt.
17 DR. SIESS:
The definition of core melt is pretty 18 good.
It says a core melt is anything that is a challenge 19 to the containment.
It has to be a challenge to the 20 containment and have the fission product in it.
21 That I t'iink is included in challongo.
22 DR. REMICK:
Let me correct my concern.
It's tho 23 combination of that definition with 10 to the minus 4 that's 24 my problem.
It's not the definition itself.
25 DR. SIESS:
I think when we wore talking numbers ACE. FEDERAL REvonTEns, INC.
202 347 3700 Nationwide Cmcrage 8(x)-33&MA6
5150 05 03 245
!"h 1,jAV/bc 1
before, that's what we were thinking.
s 2
DR. REMICK:
Core on the floor for 10 to the 3
minus 47 4
DR. SIESS:
Challenge to containment.
I always 5
thought of it as an interim step in getting the stuff out, 6
10 to the minus 4 to here and then whatever the containment 7
provided from there on out.
8 Except, in some sequences, obviously, it's 10 to 9
the minus 7.
10 DR. REMICK:
Where I have my problem, that means 11 that we would be saying something like TMI could have it 12 more frequently than that.
13 DR. SIESS:
The problem is I wish I knew.
14 MR. WARD:
We don't know.
15 DR. SIESS:
We don't know how much more 16 frequently and whether the PRA people know or not, I don't 17 know.
18 DR. REMICK:
Dave, what I propose is remove the 19 last sentonce.
What's your reaction to that?
20 MR. WARD:
That's the way I had it in the first 21 place.
But there was some sentiment on the committee.
22 DR. SIESS:
I don't soo any advantage in being 23 indefinito about it.
l 24 MR. WARD:
But, Forrest is onsontially making a O/
25 quantitativo argument.
Ilo's uncomfortable with the number ACE. FEDERAL REPORTERS, INC, 202 347 3700 Nationwide Coverage 8m33MM6
5150 05 04 246 i
'1llkAV/bc 1
for that' advanced an accident.
2 DR. SIESS:
What we're saying is we think core 3
melt should be defined as an accident that challenges the 4
containment.
Then we think that the.PRAs ought to give us 5
some answers on the probability of an accident that 6
challenges the containment rather than the probability on an 2
7 accident that removes the ability to cool the core.
8 MR. WARD:
And they do, or they attempt to.
9 DR. REMICK:
You see, we can only come so far.
l 10 Therefore, we're going to assume it comes.
And then you get 11 the opposite.
1 l
12 DR. SIESS:
How big that step was, we don't 13 know.
We don't know whether it was 2 or 10.
Are we going 14 to worry about bottom lines?
l l
15 DR. SHEWMON:
Forrest, would you be willing to i
16 say, put in there for a definition of a core melt, where i
l 17 there's a challenge in the containment?
J 18 DR. SIESS:
That's what it says now.
19 DR. SHEWMON:
Well, it may, but I don't mean that 20 piece.
21 DR. REMICK:
Where I have the problem is 22 dissociating that from 10 to the minus 4.
i 23 DR. SHEWMON:
Core on the floor is not the same 24 as challenging containments, which may be what Dave has in 25 mind.
)
i i
i ace FEDERAL REl'ORTERS, INC.
202 347 3700 Nationwide Coverage 8 % 336 6646
P l
5150 05 05.
247 1llhAV/bc 1
MR. WARD:
I thought they were getting pretty 2
close.
3 DR. SHEhMON:
We're getting back to TMI-II 4
again.
But it was a challenge to containment.
l l
5 MR. WARD:
That's true.
6 DR. SHEWMON:
In a sense.
Now, you needed the 7
coritainment.
There probably wasn't much chance of rupturing 8
it.
9 DR. SIESS:
That's why I like the definition 10 here.
Damages the core to the extent that damage to the l
11 reactor vessel and a likely challenge to containment 12 occurs.
l 13 DR. REMICK:
Couldn't we say that without putting l
14 a number associated with it?
15 DR. SIESS:
You can say it a lot better than 16 that.
You can say it's an accident that challenges the f
17 containment, or releases activity into the containment,and 18 challenges its integrity.
19 MR. FRALEY:
I believe that the committee has 20 said core melt is 10 to the minus 4, melting the core.
Then l
21 we would like another 10 to the minus 6 that the containment 22 fails when that occurs.
)
23 You can't make both of them 10 to the minus 4, or l
24 10 to the minus 2, then that the containment fails, so you O
25 have 10 to the minus 6.
l l
l Ace FEDERAL REPonTERs, INC.
202 347 37(n Nationwide Coscrage 800 3%66M
)
{
5150 05 06 248 1llbAV/bc 1
I don't think the committoo meant 10 to the minus 2
6 that the core molts, or 10 to the minus 4 that the core 3
melts and the containment fails.
4 I think.Forrest is right.
This is much too 5
probable for that serious an accident.
The committee has 6
said 10 to the minus 4 for coro molt, 10 to the minus 2 for 7
containment failure once the core is molted.
8 DR. SIESS:
And that cannot be done.
9 MR. FRALEY:
Are you giving up a factor of 100?
10 MR. WARD:
I don't understand that, Ray.
11 DR. SIESS:
An additional probability of core 12 molt is an impossible addition given to the state of the
,( >
13 art.
The words we put in that lettor, wo discussed up 14 there, were that containment should be designed to fold in 15 the accident to the extent necessary to koop the 10 to the 16 minus 6.
17 l've got a 10 to the minus 7 accido.,t that gives 18 me a probability of 1 that the containment is going to go, 19 whether it's a steam explosion or something else somebody 20 can think of.
I've got to accept that.
I cannot design a 21 containment that will hold in anything anybody can think of 22 at any probability.
23 But I can cortainly tako all the accidents that 24 prosent reasonable challengen to the containment, and most
(
)
25 of those fall in the higher rangos.
And design a Acit.171!DERAl.. Ill!!'ORTERS, INC.
202 34 Woo Nationwide Cmuage m3 %W6
\\
5150 05 07' 249 1llhAV/bc 1
containment that will prevent that.
2 But, you see, you don't have to have just a 3
challenge to containment to go out in public if you have's l
4 release into containment and a valve is open.
l 5
Well, I guess you've challenged it, have you?
6 MR. WARD:
Yes.
7 DR. SIESS:
This.says you've got to damage the 8
core and damage the vessel, and you don't have to damage the 9
vessel.
10 TMI did not damage the vessel.
11 MR. WARD:
I guess one approach would be to 12 leave it ambiguous like we have all along.
I mean, we've 13 always been ambiguous, I think.
l 14 DR. SIESS:
Not just us.
Everybody else.
15 MR. WARD:
Everybody has been.
And we were 16 trying here to change that.
But maybe we can't.
Maybe 17 we're not ready.
18 DR. SIESS:
The event that this is trying to hold 19 the 10 to the minus 4 is challenge to the containment, 20 Forrest thinks that may be too much of a challenge to 21 containment to meet the 10 to the minus 6.
22 You see, I don't know whether it will.
23 DR. REMICK:
I'm just uncomfortable with that.
24 DR. SIESS:
You have to look at all the sequences 25 and look at that conditional probability.
l l
Acu.Fl!DERAL RnronTuns, INC.
l
'02 347 3700 Nationwide Coverage un 33MM6 l
i f51500508 250 lhV/bc 1
MR. WARD:
I'll move that we delete the last 2
sentence in paragraph 14.
j 3
DR. REMICK:
Do we have a second?
4 DR. SIESSt Delete the last sentence?
5 DR. REMICK:
We remove the last sentence in 6
paragraph 14, which would basically restore to the type of 7
thing we've said in the past, when we were not definitive.
8 DR. SIESS:
I think it's in the wrong direction.
9 DR. SHEWMON:
Then vote against the motion.
l 10 DR. SIESS:
The thing is we're talking about in 11 one and two there, the two stages, challenge to containment 12 and the ability of the containment to meet that challenge.
13 And unless those are going to be separated completely from 14 the 10 to the minus 6, if the 10 to the minus 6 is covered 15 in level 3, these two don't have to be quantitative.
16 DR. REMICK:
Unless you want to set some kind of 17 a limit.
18 MR. WARD:
Unless you want to set some standard 19 for defense indepth, and that's what. this is doing.
20 DR. SIESS:
Then the 10 to the minus 4 sets the l
21 standard for defense indepth, but we don't try to pull that 22 into 10 to the minus 6th.
23 Forrest's problem comes from looking at 10 to the l
l 24 minus 4 and 10 to the minus 6 and dividing one into the
{
25 other and getting 10 to the minus 2.
I I
l ace FEDERAL RneonTuns, INC.
202 347 3700 Nationwide Coverage 8(n33MM6 l
5150 05 09 251 1llhAV/bc 1
The 10 to the minus 6 is considered a surrogate.
2 See, what I'm down to now is saying I've combined the 10 to 3
the minus 4 core damage with the 10 to the minus 6 general 4
performance and that tells me what the containment has to 5
do.
6 MR. WARD:
It doesn't really.
That's only in an 7
inadequate model.
8 DR. REMICK:
Gentlemen, we have a motion.
Do I 9
not hear a second?
10 DR. SIESS:
I just talked myself into it.
We've 11 said now that this should be containment performance 12 criteria.
If we don't really define that 10 to the minus m
13 4...
14 DR. SHEWMON:
I'd be pleased to second the motion 15 so I can vote against it.
16 DR. SIESS:
We don't define that as containment 17 challenge.
18 What kind of structure would we expect to see for 19 containment performance criteria?
A nonprobabalistic one?
20 MR. WARD:
Yes.
I don't know.
That's a big 21 question.
That's one that we and no one else have been 22 able--okay, it's been seconded.
23 DR. REMICK:
Is there further discussion?
24 MR. WARD:
I don't know that I'm in favor of the
'/
25 motion.
I just made it.
ACE-FEDERAL REPORTERS, INC.
l 202 347-37(X)
Nationwide Coverage 8(X)-336-646
r 5150 05 10 252 1llkAV/bc 1
DR. SHEWMON:
The one who seconded isn't in 2
favor of it either.
3 DR. REMICK:
There are eight of us here.
4 DR. MOELLER:
If it's lopsided, it will win.
5 MR. WYLIE:
Clarification.
If you vote against 6
the motion, that's not a vote for the sentence.
7 MR. WARD:
You can introduce another one.
8 DR. SIESS:
This hierarchical thing is more 9
philosophical.
Right?
10 MR. WARD:
Yes.
But part of the philosophy is, 11 at some level, to get some sort of a quantitative guideline 12 that people can work with.
)
13 DR. SIESS:
The only quantitative guideline that 14 comes out of this is 10 to the minus 4 on core melt and 10 15 to the minus 6 on large release.
16 MR. WARD:
But we say it's not complete and that 17 there should be these other two objectives, performance 18 objectives, developed.
19 We've said it before.
We're saying it again, 20 because you don't want 10 to the minus 7 on core melt and no 21 containment.
We're taking that as a principle.
22 DR. SIESS:
What you're saying is we'll put an 23 absolute limit on core melt and some sort of a limit on 24 containment to be sure we've got something there.
/m
(-
25 We don't know what.
Those don't have to be ACE-FEDERAL REPORTERS, INC.
202 347-3700 Nationwide Coverage 800-336-6M6
5150 05 11 253 m
1(_)AV/bc 1
thoroughly consistent with the 10 to the minus 6.
2 MR. WARD:
They should be' generally.
3 DR. SIESS:
But what you're going to trade off, 4
some of them might be 10 to the minus 8.
You'll be trading 5
off.
6 DR. REMICK:
I'm not sure I can stretch this as 7
far as 10 to the minus 8.
8 DR. SIESS:
We've got the equivalent of 10 to the 9
minus 2 on containment out in that 10 to the minus 8.
10 That's what we want.
I don't know if I can use the general 11 performance criteria basis to relax either one of those.
12 DR. REMICK:
Dave, now we're discussing the
(~~.
\\_/
13 motion.
Right?
14 DR. OKRENC:
Right.
The way the discussion has 15 drifted, I just want to call your attention to the fact that 16 in an earlier version of this letter there was a paragraph 17 which said the ACRS believes that 10 to the minus 5 per 18 reactor year is a suitable goal for core melt frequency for 19 future LWRs.
20 In examining whether the suggested guideline of 21 large release has been met, the ACRS believes that a core 22 melt frequency of 10 to the minus 5 should be the smallest 23 value used in examining containment performance and defense 24 indepth.
25 The ACRS recommends that a minimum containment ACE-FEDERAL REPORTERS, INC.
202 347 3700 Nationwide Coverage 800-336-6 4 6
5150 05 12 254 l-1()AV/bc 1
performance criterion of not more than one chance in 10 of a 2
large releaae leading to core melt be tentatively adopted 3
and evaluated.
)
4 For some plants, still greater containment l
5 efficacy may be relevant.
4 6
DR. SIESS:
That was a much better statement.
7 I'm not sure I agree with the' numbers.
i 8
MR. WARD:
Jessie, we have a motion and a second i
9 to scratch the last sentence in paragraph 14.
And we're 10 about ready to vote, unless there's further discussion.
11 Those in favor of the motion to eliminate the i
12 last sentence in paragraph 14, raise their hand.
t 13 (Show of hands. )
i 14 DR. REMICK:
One.
l 15 Those opposed?
l l
16 (Show of hands.)
i 17 DR. REMICK:
Four.
The motion fails.
i 18 Are we satisfied with 14 then?
19 DR. OKRENT:
I'm not satisfied.
20 MR. WYLIE:
No.
i l
21 DR. OKRENT:
But I'm not going to make any 3
22 specific proposal.
23 DR. SIESS:
I've still got real problems with 24 this.
I don't know how the general performance criteria are-C:)
l 25 involved.
If it's just a large release, then I've got to 4
i
/\\CE FEDERAL REPORTERS, INC.
f 20{.347 3700 Nationwide Coverage 800-336 4646
I I 5150 05 13 255 1
hAV/bc.
I have the challenge to the containment.
And then I have to 2
have the containment performance.
3 And if I make it 10 to the minus 6 total, I can 4
go in and say, okay, 10 to the minus 6 but don't attribute 5
more than 10 to the minus 4 to the core melt, or more than 6
10 to the minus 2 to containment, or something like that.
7 That's poorly stating what we had in that 8
letter.
But if we're going to go out with the dose level, 9
then we've got another step of having the people, the 10 meteorology, et cetera.
11 If we can do the core melt and containment 12 performance thing independently of the general performance 13 criteria, I don't know how you'd do it.
I just think we've 14 got a multi-tiered safety goal and I'm confused.
P 15 MR. WARD:
Maybe should we; recommend that what f
16 we've called level three in here be eliminated?
i 17 Maybe it doesn't really serve any purpose.
i l
18 DR. SIESS:
Well, my point was --
l 19 DR. OKRENT:
Level three?
f l
20 MR. WARD:
The 10 to the minus 6.
l l
21 DR. OKRENT:
Are you proposing that the 22 Commission drop it from its safety policy?
23 MR. WARD:
I'm raising that.
I 24 DR. OKRENT:
I oppose us even hinting that they i
t l
25 should drop it.
If we suggested it -- now they're i
i i
/\\CE. FEDERAL REPORTERS, INC.
202 347 3700 Nationwide Coverage sorb 3346646
I i
?
f51500514 256 l
1hV/bc 1
suggesting it in effect -- I don't propose to weaken it.
2 MR. WARD:
I'm trying to figure a way out of 3
this.
4 DR. SIESS:
I've got some new words for that 5
paragraph.
6 DR. REMICK:
Paragraph 147 7
DR. SIESS:
No, the one on level three.
8 DR. REMICK:
Another possible way out.is to 9
propose what we think core melt should be, and not associate
[
10 a number with it.
That's another possibility.
f 11
)
12 i
O 13 l
14 l
15 16 17 18 19 20 l
21 22 23 t
24 25 P
l Ace FitounAt Rueontens, INC.
202 347 37(u)
Nationwide Coverage im316.(M6 i
~..-
l l 5150 06 01 257 1hv/bc 1
DR. OKRENT:
I think one has to ask himself where l
2 is this letter heading?
I think it's heading, it's an i
3' original idea and that what we do somehow is enough studies 4
and be able to make enough judgments.
5 I deliberately didn't say comparisons -- that 6
you're able to decide whether the regulations are adequate 7
or should be changed.
8 Now, I assumed that what Dave Ward was trying to
[
9 do here was give the staff numbers against which they could 10 make a comparison, not so they'd go back and police an i
11 I individual plant.
But, after sampling enough plants and
[
12 making these comparisons, they decide whether they need to 13 change the regulations for families of plants, or whatever.
i 14 MR. WARD:
Yes.
l 15 DR. OKRENT:
If so, somehow, suitable numbers 16 have to be arrived at, but we're not ready to recommend 17 them.
But, at least you have to say -- the staff has to
'l 18 have something in mind.
l 19 Maybe one way of doing it could be the 20 following.
You could neglect the core melt part and say we 21 could jump to that thing that I just read, in effect, saying t:
22 that for future plants, 10 to the minus 5 would be good.
23 But, even for future plants, we would still want 24 at least 10 to the minus 1 for containment.
For existing j
i i
25 plants, some other mix of numbers may be evolved or l
Acil.Fl!!M!RAl. Rt Pon ti!ns, INC.
I 202.m.no Nationaide coman an.)w tu6
5150 06 02 258 1llkAV/bc 1
whatever.
It's not going to be a single not.
2 DR. SIESS:
I'm beginning to got a fooling for 3
what's wrong here.
What wo said and what the Commission 4
said, thero ought to be a containment obje:tivo.
Wo really 5
don't know what it should be.
6 We'll put thin 10 to the minun 6 for largo 7
roloasos on and that will provido a containment performanco a
critorion.
That's what they said, that's what wo said.
9 In thin lottor, we've ntill got levol throo an 10 opposed to objectiven.
But, when wo go to lovel four, wo 11 put the containmant objectivo back in that's minoing, rather 12 than explicitly, by satisfying coro molt and the 10 to the 7
\\
/
13 minus 6.
w 14 MR. WARD:
That'n right.
And the roanon for 15 that, I think, is that you want to givo the ntaff, lot's 16 nay, somothing to work with rogarding its regulationn that 17 govern the donian and operation of the containment syntemn.
10 You don't want them to havo to go back.
19 DR. SICSS:
I haar you.
An it'n writton now, 20 lovel throo and lovel four aro not lovoin.
Thoy are both 21 doing the namo thing.
22 MR. WARD:
I don't think no.
23 DR. SIESS:
They will control rolonnon from tho 24 containmont, the probability of rolonnon.
25 tiow, an far an giving the ntaff nomothing to tont ACli ll!I)l!RAl. Illil'OR ll!RS, lNC.
202 umm Noonwue rinnue a n,, u.ir,
5150 06 03 259 1llkAV/bc 1
for futuro plants, which is a little hard to think about, 2
the containments would design with mitigation in mind.
They 3
will tako that core molt probability because they have to 4
moot 10 to the minus 4, or whatever.
They would take that 5
containment and then 800 if they mot 10 to the minus 6.
6 And if they didn't, there's somothing wrong with 7
the design basis for the containmont.
We're tolling them, 8
you know, you can't do it all.
If wo say 10 to the minus 4, 9
you're not going to got any bonofit frcm 10 to the minus 5 10 overall.
Soquence by noquenco, you might.
10 to the minun 11 5 and 10 to the minus 1 for nomo noquentos, and 10 to the 12 minun 6 and 1 for othorn.
kj 13 That wan what the 10 to the minun 6 was nupposed 14 to do.
But you take the apoctor of low probability, lar00 15 containment challongon and modium probability, modium 16 containment challengen.
17 DR. SilEWMON:
llow do wo got containmont out of 18 what we havo in the lottor now?
Aro thoro any containment 19 critoria?
20 DR. SIESS:
Two.
21 DR. SilEWMON:
That junt nayn we continuo to 22 advocato tho development of critoria.
It nnyn nothing about 23 10 to the minun 6 or anything olno.
24 DR. SII;SS :
Why do they nood it if they'vo got 25 levol throo?
Thin in what I've never boon ablo to ACibll!!)liitAl. Ill!!'Oltil~l(S, INC.
- ot.10. nm N.wnm ue nnone w t u, u,v,
5150 06 04 260 1llkAV/bc 1
understand.
2 MR. WARD:
I agroo.
If you look at it as just a 3
problem in algebra that all you have to do to ensure defense 4
indeth is to have, let's say, the core melt probability in 5
the health offects.
That's enough to assure defonso 6
indopth.
7 Dut the levels do more than that.
They provido, 8
and this fourth levol is supposedly to provido some sort of 9
practical objectivo measure of the performance to be sought 10 for that syntom, or act of systems.
11 DR. SIESS:
It norvos another purpoao.
It 12 provento you from allocating all the events on one or tho
/~S
'O 13 othor.
14 MR. WARD:
It doon that, too, but when you koop 15 naying that wo don't nood item two under level four for the 16 allocation to provent the misallocation, wo do nood it as a 17 practical definition.
18 DR. SIESS:
I think wo nood it more as a 19 provention of minallocation.
What I'm trying to avoid --
20 DR. OKPENT:
You both agroo that wo nood it.
21 DR. SIUSS:
You know, you can't do the allocation 22 becauno thoro are noquencon.
And that'n what loada you back 23 to that overall thing.
Tako tho whole spoetrum of things, 24 and that you can comparo with the 10 to the minun 6, and you 25 can't oven toll them containment must always be at least a Acti.17:oiRai. Iliti>onitins, INC, i
202 1 47 3700 Nationwide Cmcrage so IM u,m
i r
i i
f'51500605 261 1llhAV/bc probability of one'in'1', because we're. going to let experts 1
O L
2 tell us what the accidents are.
i 3
DR. REMICK:
Gentlemen, we've run out of time-4 that we had allocated.
5 Dave, you have one more word?
6 DR. OKRENT:
Yes.
It's my intuition that the 7
committee will not finish this letter at this meeting.
I'm l
8 not saying one shouldn't work on it tomorrow, but this,i:s my 9
intuition.
10 Saturday is a time when ACRS members stay away, 11 as we know, and so forth.
And I think we should, in fact, 12 have a large number of members here.
And there should be-13 time.
14 MR. WARD:
Prime time like FridayLmorning?
Where 15 is everybody?
16 DR. OKRENT:
There should be time for members who l
17 have disagreements to see what it is the committee has-18 finally decided on, and have a chance to organize their-19 thoughts as to what they want.
And the committee should in 20 fact then review these.
21 I think we should work on it as time permits.
22 DR. REMICK:
We have time set aside tomorrow.
'l i
1 1
23 DR. OKRENT:
The assumption would be, you know, 24 we spent 40 minutes not really on one sentence but, O
25 seemingly, on one sentence, but on some hard questions.
r ACE. FEDERAL REPORTERS, INC.
202 347 3700 Nationwide Coverage 800 336-6646
a
. 5150'06106 262
-lhAV/bc-
- 1 ~.
-DR.
SIESS:
Let me suggest a possible way. ~It 2
seems to me that if two 'in here, the performance, would i
f 3
indicate that no matter what.the. probability,of' core melt i-4 can be achieved, we still'want. mitigation capability 5
overall. -And the kind.of language that was in the letter we 6
discussed this morning, which says it's designed to mitigate i
7 accidents where necessary.
i 8
I mean, it said should be capable of mitigating 1
9 those accidents where it's necessary in order.to meet-the-10 10 to the minus 6.
11 You don't want-to put absolutes on both of them.
12 But what we want to do is divide it up in some way.
3 13 DR. REMICK:
Gentlemen, since we have the staff-14 coming in at 1:30, I,think we should come back by 1:30.- So i
15 I'm going to cut off discussion now and'we'll take it up
.I 16 again tomorrow.
5 17 (Whereupon, at 12:35-p.m., the meeting recessed,
't l
18 to reconvene at 1:30 p.m.,
this'same day.)
l 19 j
20 4
l l
i 21
)
22 l-23 I
24 l
25 i
I l
/\\CE FEDERAL REPORTERS, INC.
j 202-347 3700 Nationwide Coverage 800-336-6646
.a-.
-. \\
i 0
\\'
1
. g t' 5150.07,01 f3 263 4
1hAV/bc
.1-
[AfF T S R-N 0 O N
[S E.S S ILO N-l c.
~
2' (1: 30 'p pm.-)
l 3-DR. REMICK:
The next item:on the agenda is-a-4 discussion ~of nuclear plant operating experiences.
It's my P
9 5
understanding that-sometime~during_this session,.we will:go f
6 into closed session, right'after Turkey Point.
i-7 Jessie, our subcommittee chairman,'you can take i
j 8
the lead.
s 9
MR. EBERSOLE:
As is our usual custom,Lwe'v'e'made-10 a list, and at a meeting on a'rather large series.of-2 11 operating events that occurred during the last~60.dpys,'we-t 12 went through those and established sort of'a hierarchy.
3 We picked a number ofLthem,Jwhich'~are,still'on i
13 5
14 the board today.
There are,six. 'Plus some general comments-(15 that Jack Rosenthal and Ed Jordan!are goin'g to make.'
t 16 This is what we're' supposed to,do1today.
In the i:
1-17 course of doing this, we did_ eliminate-several' events from
,l 18 the larger set we were working with~.
-I expect:you may be-
- ,' j hearingaboutwhywe[elim,inated_those.
I thought-I.would 19
=
20 comment on them.
j-21 One of the reasons:that we did.take these events
+
i 22 out of the discussion today-is.that'they appear to be;.-
23 localized in sets that.we can characterize as thoseHcoming d
f.
24 under the heading for prior consideration.-
25 One, for instance, wasithe finding ~of a set of 1
.f j
r i
ACE-FEDERAL REPORTERS, INC.
' 202-347-3700 Nationwide Coverage 800-336-6646 j /j.
- J.. q :
A
- a - x,-
. s.
5150 07 02 264 cx li )AV/bc 1
failure potentials in aux feedwater sets, steam headers, due 2
to the realistic potential for failure of the steam pressure 3
regulators, steam release centers sticking or going beyond 4
their band width.
5 That come under the broad heading that wherever 6
there is a control -- and I put-that in quotes because it's 7
not a safety device.
It has a band width and it's backed up 8
by safety systems -- the hypothetical failure of the 9
controlled band width goes to an extreme of performance 10 capability.
And will, in all probability, exert severe 11 destructive loads on whatever the receiver is, whether it's 12 pressure or temperature or whatever.
13 And, therefore, the mitigating device in this 14 case is a loak valve.
We should consider the whole range of 15 those mitigative devices, not just the controlled band 16 width.
17 A case in point is you must consider the open 18 plenum on the release systems. 'And this leads to over-19 voltage.
This happens to be a pressure system and that 20 comes under the heading I think we should package under'a 21 very large categorization process and take it up.
22 MR. REED:
Was decay heat removal potentially in 23 jeopardy with this?
24 MR. EBERSOLE:
Yes.
This was a steam header for 25 the aux feedwater pumps.
It did have motor-driven pumps.
ACE FEDERAL REPORTERS, INC.
202-347-3700 Nationwide Coverage 800-336-6646
5150 07 03 265 1()AV/bc 1
Had it been a plant, for instance, like Davis-Besse, which 2
didn't have'those, then it would have been, in truth, a 3
challenge to this unit.
4 MR. REED:
The redundant equipment was wiped 5
out.
6 MR. EBERSOLE:
The motor-driven pumps would have 7
picked it up.
Another was a case.where-the RHR pump minimum 8
flow, if it were prolonged enough, of causing extreme damage 9
to the impellars of the RHR pumps.
10 We took that out and I think'we must by separate
~
11 letter or separate procedures throw that into the larger 12 package where we consider both ends of the operating flow 13 spectrum of the RHR and other pumps.
14 With due regard to the other end of-the spectrum 15 where we have to deal with runup petitions, for which we've 16 been unable to meet the loads on attempting'to go to full 17 flow without valve coordination in an' attempt to establish' 18 very early large reflows, I'm not at all sure but what we 19 don't have some problems out there that we.are capable of 20 imposing hydraulic loads on the pumps which they'll be 21 unable to meet.
22 For instance, subsequent to the March LOCA.
In i
23 one of the discussions of the Salem event, a little spinoff-24 came out of that.
We found that happened to be, as you will
[
25 see, erosion head break on steam generator premotors.
We l
i ACE FEDERAL REPORTERS, INC.
202-347-3700 Nationwide Coverage 800-336-6646
5150 07 04 266
/~s 1(,jAV/bc 1
were releasing steam and vapor into areas not just for 2
mechanical failure, but causing system interactive effects.
3 And the discussion here w'ill' focus eventually on 4
what will the security system do.
5 If you turn over the security system design to 6
the security experts, and I'll put that in quotes, I think-7 almost invariably, he will demand that if you get into 8
trouble with.the security system, what happens is, 9-instantly, you lock all the doors.
Therefore, you impede.
10 the operator's ability to go in and respond, go in and do 11 anything.
12 I think we must take that up as a logic problem 13 and deal with it on a more generic field than just this 14 event.
I'm not at all sure but what we need to clear up the 15 matter of what does the security system do if it goes into 16 disarray for any cause.
17 This particular one being a sys'em-interactive t
18 effect leading to the vapor loading of a system or region 19 where the controls are located.
20 With these few remarks I'm going to turn this 21 meeting over to Jack Rosenthal and his crew.
Ed Jordan, 22 l everybody we know.
You have your own sequence here, and 23 sort of an allocated time for each one.
I'll be watching 24 that.
Okay?
25 DR. REMICK:
Before you start, is there anything ACE FEDERAL REPORTERS, INC.
202-347-3700 Nationwide Coverage 800-336-6646
'5150 07 05 267 1()AV/bc 1
we can do, John,.with thelP.A. system?
I think we have a 2
voice-deactivated system.
Whenever somebody starts to-3 talk, the system goes out.
4 MR. MCKINLEY:
We've had our experts in here 5
during the lunch break trying to work it.
If you talk at 6
the microphone, it works much better.
7 MR. ROSENTHAL:
The first speaker is Al Herdt, 8
from Region II, who led the AIT team inspection of.the 9
Turkey Point boric acid corrosion problem, which you're 10 about to hear about.
We also have a video tape prepared by 11 the licensee as part of.that presentation.
12 We intend to go about 40-45 minutes with Turkey O
(/
13 Point.
Somewhere along the line, Mark Gallo, from_ Region I, 14 will be in.
And he's prepared to speak to you about the 15 Peach Bottom shutdown.
That will need to be in closed 1
16 session.
17 And then we'll open it back up for the remaining 18 events, 10 to 15 minutes a piece.
19 MR. EBERSOLE:
Before you go into that, I-20 circulated the wonderful color slides around with a very 21 graphic portrayal of the problem.
22 Okay.
23 MR. HERDT:
As Jack has said, I'm Alan Herdt, 24 Chief of the Engineering Branch in Region II, and I led-the j
O 25 AIT that went down to look at Turkey Point 1IV, and the i
i
/LCE-FEDERAL REPORTERS, INC.
202-347-3700 Nationwide Coverage 800-336-6646
4 l5150107 06 268
-1()AV/bc l
boric acid corros' ion on the reactor vessel had.
2-(Slide.)
3 I'd.like to' divide this presentation'into_three
~
I I
4 parts.
One.will be the sequence of events on'the-
~
5 background so orientation can be established.
l 1
6 The second is we_have a video of'the actual-7 reactor vessel, the area of boric acid corrosion.. I think 8
that's a very_ graphic-and fine way to see it.
j 9
And the third part ofLthis presentation, I'id like a
10 to present what the licensee is-currently doing'and-as:close-3 4
1 11 to it as some of their findings are right now..
l 12 And I'd.like to say;before..I get any further 13 that the investigation and the analysis'and the corrective J
l 14 actions are all currently going on right now.
15 (Slide.)
i 16 Just from an aspect ofTunderstanding from an 17 engineering point of view where we are and what the problem.
18 was, the problem is obviously_that boric.Lacid corrosion of j
19 equipment on and around the' reactor vessel upper head.
i
)
20 The significance is the potential degradation.
21 The reactor coolant system pressure boundary and the' damage 22 to the equipment:on.the head,.and its associated components 23_
due to boric acid corrosion:and where-_the boric acid 24 corrosion came from was a small leak with instrument ports
(
25 sealed.
ACE-FEDERAL REPORTERS, INC.
202-347-3700 Nationwide Coverage
_ 800-336-6M6 1
5150 07 07 269
<s-li,IAV/bc 1
You'll hear the expression cono-seal.
That's s
2 what the term is, where this leak occurred, as a part of 3
this entire instrument port seal.
4 MR. EBERSOLE:
Would you agree that the 5
significance might be somewhat larger is a consideration of 1
6 what boric acid damage might do anywhere?
7 MR. HERDT:
_Anywhere, not just.within the reactor 8
head, but also with the associated components.
And I'm 9
talking in the shroud.- You could be_ talking even anywhere 10 inside the containment, as you'll see.
11 DR. SHEWMON:
Sir, it doesn't corrode stainless 12 steel as fast as it does ferritic, does it?
13 MR. HERDT:
That's correct.
14 DR. SHEWMON:
So it's not quite any place all the 15 same?
16 MR. HERDT:
That's correct.
17 (Slide.)
18 Just to give some background on this event, the 19 unit, unit four at Turkey Point, was coming out of a-20 refueling outage.
The outage had lasted from January to 21 August of '86.
22 There was a small leak noted from the lower 23 cono-seal, the northeast quadrant cono-seal, during the 24 latter part of August, August 30th, to be exact, during an 25 inspection that the licensee had done.
ACE-FEDERAL REPORTERS, INC.
202-347 3700 Nationwide Coverage 800-336-6646
_ ~.
x 4
5150'07 08 270 1
hAV/bc 1
The licensee at th'at. time did an evaluation, did
[
2 a safety evaluation to determine.that the leak was within 3
tech spec limits.
4 On October 24th, the unit was back down~for an 5
- unrelated condenser problem, and they went back in and L
}
6 looked at that area again.
7 The-reason they did is that-they had initheir 8
safety evaluation said that, in August, that they could go 9
six months without any inspection.
10 In October, they went back-in--to see howithings~
The people that went back and looked'..at that area,.it 11 were.
4 12 had been cleaned up.
Before they.had looked at it,'there
(
13 was some boric acid crystals on the vessel 1 flange _and around j
j 14 the cono-seal.
i 15 But, around that time, they felt that the leak i
i i
16 still was negligible.
And that the safety evaluation that~
17 was written in August was still valid.
18 At the end of. February, right before the'six 19 months ran out from the August 30th date, the licensee-did.
I 20 another evaluation to see if, in fact, they could run any.
t 21 longer without doing another inspection.
I 22 They took the six months from October and'said 1
23 they.could run until Aprirl.24th.
At the same time,.they I
24 were getting a hold of Westinghouse to verify their safety
(
1 25 evaluation.
4 ACE FEDERAL REPORTERS, INC.
202-347-3700 Nationwide Coverage
-800-336-6646 l
. -.. -. - ~ - -
~.
i 5150,07 09' 271-l 1lhAV/bc 1
On the 13th of March,-Westinghouse notifiedIFP&L, 2
that the expected corrosion rates they.had calculated were 3
in fact-not' conservative enough by at least a factor.of 2, i
4 if not more.
5 The. reason that'the plant was down on the lith to 6
the 13th of March, again, is' an unrelated problem, having to 7
-do with a containment a'irlock and personnel airlocksvalves.
~
+
8 When the licensee got this information from 9
Westinghouse on the 13th of March, they immediately shut-10 down and went in-to inspect and found that they had;a. lot'of 11 boric acid, estimated somewhere in the neighborhood of:500~
12 pounds on the reactor. vessel head in that. area.
4
{
13 Based on this event,.we sent an AIT, an augmented j
14 inspection team, to the site on the 19th of-March.
4 15 DR. SHEWMON:
Sir, there was then. order of 16 magnitude more boric acid there than the last-time?. Or had l
17 the maintenance people protected them from learning that?
18 MR. HERDT:
No.
I think there was moreithere.at t
4 19 the time in March than there was in October.
f 20 ER. SHEWMON:
That's certainly.true.
I asked if-21 it was an or' der of magnitude more.
Five-hundred pounds is;a l
l 22 fair amount..
23 M 1.
HERDT:
I feel it was because we talked to 24 the maintenance people.
They said it was just in a very.
- Q'/
-l 25 small area.
They could sweep it up with rags and put it in i
/\\CE-FEDERAL REPORTERS, lNC.
l 202.147-3700.
Nationwide Coverage 800-336-6646
'5150'07 10 272-r's 1(,)AV/bc 1
a little dustpan, was their comment.
.A lot different'than 2
what was subsequently found.
3 (Slide.)
4 I know this is a little bit on the busy side, but-5 just to give a little feel, the reactor vessel studs, this i
6 is the CRDM but it's also where the cono-seal comes 7
through.
The CRDM and cono-seal penetrations are the same.
8 They're the same design.
9 There are, as I say, four cono-seals and Iijust' 10 wanted to get the feel of this.
There is a lifting lug, and-11 there are also support shroud lugs.
12 Why I bring that up, eventually you'll see-that 13 one of the shroud support lugs right next to where the:
14 cono-seal failed was very much deteriorated and it'had to be 1
15 subsequently repaired.
16 DR. MARK:
You say'the cono-seal failed?-
17 MR. HERDT:
The cono-seal-leaked.
Sorry.
I'm t
)
18 saying this lug support was very much deteriorated right i
19 here.
20 DR. MARK:
I have seen the pictures, and I don't l
21 know enough about this business to distinguish between the-22 crystals which gather and agglomerate around the piece of 23 metal, and the state of the metal itself..
1 24 To what extent is the metal actually affected?
25 MR. HERDT:
I'll show a little bit in the video.
ace FEDERAL REPORTERS, INC.
202-347-3700 Nationwide Coverage 800-336-6M6
5150 07 11 273
-1 hAV/bc 1
You,will see some of the aspects of what the reactor vessel 2
studs and what their reaction was to the boric acid, and how 3
much wastage there was there..
4 There's also examination work being done on the 5
reactor vessel head and the penetrations.
And they've seen 6
some wastage there also.
7 DR. ItEMICK:
Please continue.
8 (Slide.)
9 MR. HERDT:
This is a graphic sketch, just to get 10 some orientation.
This is the cono-seal itself.
This is 11 the way the shroud is on the reactor.- This is the 12 insulation.
The cono-seal leaked.
The boric acid crystals 13 came down eventually to the reactor vessel floor in here.-
14 This part is the CRDM shroud and.the ductwork:
15 that goes to the CRDM coolers.
16 DR. SHEWMON:
Are they on the head bolts or where 17 on that?
i 18 MR. HERDT:
They're here.
And my next picture 19 will show this stripped away so you'll be able to see that.
3 20 (Slide.)
21 Taking away that insulation, now your reactor 22 vessel stud bolts are right here.
And'the reason we've 23 outlined 24, 25 and 26, those are the ones that you will see 24 in the video, are the ones that have wastage on them.
25 This is that affected cono-seal and how it came ACE-FEDERAL REPORTERS, INC.
202-347-3700 Nationwide Coverage 800-336-6M6 -
1 5150'07 12' 274 J
A
.l(_jAV/bc l'
down, around and under the shroud.
2 The' insulation was here, which was deteriorated, 3
and so were these particular studs.
~
4 (Slide.)
5 I've mentioned the shroud and the CRDM 6
ventilation.
And-I just wanted to show where this fits into 7
the entire reactor shielding and reactor head.
8 The cono-seal, as I said, is right here.
And t
9 there were boric acid crystals all the way up into this 10 whole area.
What people term as the north CRDM coolant and 11 ductwork.
)
12 Subsequently, the licensee has taken this portion-
~
13 off as well as this to clean off any boric: acid that's in 14 there and look for any deterioration.
15 MR. REED:
There must also be crystals throughout 16 the inside of containment.
17' MR. HERDT:
There were condensers that we noticed i
18 in some of the containment coolers, because it vents itself 19 right-inside the containment cooler.
20 (Slide.)
s 21 This is what the cono-seal
-- and this is just-22 an artist's sketch -- what this cono-seal is and where the 23 leak occurred is right in this area here.- There's a 24 spacer.
There's jacking pressures.
And there's a ring.
25 It's called a cono-seal.
It's got something like 42 j
ace-FEDERAL REPORTERS, INC.
202-347-3700 Nationwide Coverage 800 336 6646 -
9 5150 07 13 275 1llkAV/bc 1
thermocouples that come through it.
Then this is the 2
reactor vessel head and the penetration through here.
3 DR. SHEWMON:
Where did the leak develop?
4 MR. HERDT:
Right in there.
5 DR. SHEWMON:
Is there an O-ring there, or is 6
there a metal to metal seal?
7 MR. HERDT:
It's a metal to metal seal.
It's a 8
stainless gasket.
9 MR. REED:
Cono-seals are etch-type seals.
- And, i
10 frequently, when you install the new seals and put them back 11 toge'ther, you first start to pressurize and start up, you 12 might get a droplet or something.out after they're made up.
13 My experience is, if you've got a drop or-so 3
14 oozing out, why,,you 1m it go.
'And when you come up in 15 temperature, let the temperature finish the sealing out.
16 And you come out all-right.
17 But, it seems to me these people must have had 18 rather a pinhole leak or something wrong with the 19 cono-seal.
20 f
21 4
22 23 1
24 25 i
ACE-FEDERAL REPORTERS, INC.
202 347-3700 Nationwide Coverage 800-336-6 4 6
\\
i, I
l 5150 08 01 276 1()AVbw 1-
. MR. 'HERDT: LWhat we are evaluating right now is, 2
if, in' fact, this was assembled correctly.
We are looking i
3 into-that now. ;If the space was'in there correctly,-if the i
I 4
seal itself were measuring what the respective pressures are 5
here and the jacking pressures.
We are looking into thatl
~
6
~
MR._ REED:
Ouite frankly, if I'd had had any leak 7
of any significance, other than a drop once a day, I would i
8 never allow a cono-seal to go into operation.
I would say, 9
okay,-you've got to go back and remake.the.cono-seal,
]
f 10 because it is a very bad place tx) have a leak _on top of the 11 reactor vessel head, and I haven't. asked the question of l
j 12 what kind of insulation water tightness was put on the O
j v
13 insulation around the control rod drive penetrations and'the 14 cono-seal penetrations,. But there are some people-that i
l 15 insist, of course, on a completely watertight skin over the
[
16 insulation on top of the reactor vessel head.
i 17 So it seems to me, somebody gave poor advice -to 18 somebody that you should run the cono-seal like this, i
19 because I make a bet right now, somebody's ' going to have to 2
u 20 cut that cono-seal off and put a_whole new assembly on f
21 there.
22 MR. HERDT:
You are a little bit ahead of me, but 23 that is what has happened.
They have. lifted the reactor-l 24 vessel head.
To do that,. you have tx) disassemble all these R
f 25 cono-seals before, and they have found in the female I
ACE-FEDERAL REPORTERS, INC.
202 347-3700 Nationwide Coverage 800-336 6646
,,. - - ~.
_ _. - -.,,. _. _, _, _.. _ _ _ _.,. -.. ~..
~. ~. _. ~
u 5150 08'02 277 1
1llhAVbw 1
portion down in here, that they are, in fact, going to cut 2
that off and reweld it, because it has got some steam wear 3
or some corrosion.
So a seal is go'ing to.have to be put in 4
there.
That is right.
5 MR. REED:
Was there watertight insulation skin 6
over the insulation?
7 MR. HERDT:
No, because the boric acid got behind 8
the insulation and came.down.
9 MR. REED:
It was not designed that way?
10 MR. HERDT:
Not that I am aware of; that's 11 correct.
12 (Slide.)
13 If you're looking down on the reactor, the 14 cono-seal that let go, that leaked, is this one right here.
15 As I said, it is what people term the northeast cono-seal,
.i 16 just from an orientation point of view.
This is the 17 northwest, southwest and southeast.
Then.these are the 18 lifting lugo and these are the shrouds for the lugs, and 19 this is one, as I say, that was.very much deteriorated and 20 has to be rewelded.
21 These are the three visually damaged studs.
I 22 Subsequently, they were UT, as were the two on either side.
23 They were UT-tensioned and expanded sample done 180 degrees 24 from there.
The results indicated that there was some 25 cracking in five out of six of these or six of the seven, I t
ace. FEDERAL REPORTERS, INC.
202-347-3700 Nationwide Coverage 800-3346M6
5150 08 03 278
--lis_jAVbw-1 should say,-of those particular studs.
There was no 2
cracking indicated by UT in any of those three.
3 These had -- for them to take the vessel head off, 4
these had to be replaced, one at a time, and then installed 5
with new ones, and you will see in'the video all that 6
operation being done.
Therewerelike28 studs'thatwereaffectedbyIhe 7
8 boric acid.
They ranged all the way from around five, all 9
the way to 37, not every one of them, but from that general Subsequently, they are all going to be UT'd to mak'e j
10 area.
11 sure they are satisfactory, before any go back.
Obviously, 12 these three are not going back at all.
13 DR. SHEWMON:
Was that corrosion all above the 14 flange on the head, or did it get around and into the area 15 between the head and the flange on the vessel?
16 MR. HERDT:
There was some corrosion after-they-17 lifted the head, not corrosion, but some boric' acid.
They 18 did not any deterioration of the flange' surf ace nor of the 19 O-ring on the flange.
20 MR. REED:
Nor in the threads of the vessel 21 proper?
22 MR. HERDT:
In the threads of the vessel proper, 23 the same thing.
Again, the video will show one of those 24 where there was boric acid, but the threads looked okay.
25 I think right now, the best thing-for me is to
/\\CE FEDERAL REPORTERS, lNC.
202-347-3700 Nationwide Coverage 800-336-6M6
5150 08 04 279 1llkAVbw I
put the video on.
It runs about eight minutes, I guess, and 2
it will show graphically some of these aspects of the 3
pictures, as well as somebody taking the reactor vessel 4
stud out and some of that examination.
5 MR. EBERSOLE:
If I lose progressively the stud 6
loading on the receiving ring on the vessel. head due to loss 7
of the threads, how many of those adjacent studs do I need 8
to lose before something interesting happens?
9 MR. HERDT:
We have asked the utility to look into 10 that.
I don't know the numbers.
It's called an unzippering 11 phenomenon, and I don't know what that number is.
And they 12 were looking into it.
This vessel, just from a background, 13 oven though the nuclear steam supplier is Westinghouse, this 14 was a vessel that was designed and built by Babcock &
15 Wilcox, so both nuclear steam suppliers are in it, but we 16 have asked that question just to see if it is three or four l
17 or one or whatever the number is.
18 MR. REED:
In answer to what you-are probably 19 thinking, Jesse, you will get leakage long before.
This is 20 really a case of really leak before break.
21 (Film shown.)
22 (Slide.)
23 MR. HERDT:
The licensee, as we see is assessing 24 the damage that has occurred from this event and has already 25 removed the reactor head, has put it up on the reactor stand ACE FEDERAL REPORTERS, INC.
202-347-3700 Nationwide Coverage 800-336-6M6
_ ~
5150 08 05 280
<~x.
1(
'ATRnt 1
to look and to examine the remaining areas that need to be 2
examined around each cono-seal, the CRDMs, penetrations, 3
penetrations, that whole area.
4 The cono-seal design is going to be a little bit 5
changed in the way it is assembled.
It is a new design that 6
Westinghouse has developed, and it is in the process of 7
putting into Turkey Point 3 during their current refueling 8
outage and into other areas and other plants.
9 There is obviously a. clean up going on.
It also 10 means the fact of examining other components that could be 11 affected by the boric acid crystals and within the 12 containment or within the duct work or heat exchangers. -The 13 licensee is permitted to replace damaged parts, obviously, 14 like those studs which are damaged, and they are in the 15 process of replacing almost the entire CRDM shroud, at least 16 120 degrees of it, in the~affected cono-seal area, maybe all 17 of it.
The insulation is going to be all replaed, and as I 18 said, any other components that are necessary to bei 19 replaced.
20 I alluded already on the cono-seal that they are 21 going to have to replace that female portion of that 22 cono-seal, because of the damage that has occurred.
The 23 licensee feels, and we have been down there during each one 1
24 of the steps that are going on, and part of my AIT team is 25 still down there.
It is going to take at least another two ACE FEDERAL REPORTERS, INC.
202-347-3700 Nationwide Coverage 800-336-6646
5150 08 06 281 1
hAVbw I
weeks or more for this event to be cleaned up and to be 2
properly evaluated and documented.
3 MR. REED:
I realize, of course, the head is 4
pretty hot, because you've got a lot of radioactivity, and 5
so on, up in the core drives and I would certainly try to 6
get it down as much as I could by operating the drives 7
several times, but a thing like replacing the insulation on-8 the reactor vessel head is going to account for a lot of.
9 exposure.
Are they going to try to put a water seal coating 10 on that insulation this time around?
11 MR. HERDT:
I am not aware of that.
-I have not 12 gotten into the depth of, you know, the insulation and the 13 reassembly yet.
14 MR. REED:
You see, there is quite a lot of 15 potential for leakage in the control rod drive assembly and 16 the cono-seals, that they didn't have a. totally watertight 17 seal on-that insulation behind the shroud and holding the 18 reactor vessel in there.
19 MR. EBERSOLE:
Let me ask you this.
Apart from 20 the specific incident itself, I got out of this a call for 21 notification that there is going.to be very much extreme 22 corrosion due to extensive boron leakage in any plant
~
23 anywhere at any place.
Like, for instance, at the manhole l
24 bolts, and that a call should be put out warning the 25 operators to expedite, accelerate or intensify, whatever j
ACE FEDERAL REPORTERS, INC.
d 202-347-3700 Nationwide Coverage 800-336-6646
1 5150 08 07 282 1(')AVbw 1
effort they have to pick up what.was found here'almost by 2
accident.
3 MR. REED:
Jesse, I think that's all gone out.
4 This is the age-old issue of valves and the kind of the-5
. bolting of valves and the leaks, with flexitonic gaskets, 6
and so on.
4 I
7 MR. EBERSOLE:
Here it went faster than we 8
thought.
9 MR. REED:
I am not sure-it went faster than we.
10 thought.
Once you've got a leak, and you've got carbon 11 steel parts around, like the r'eactor vessel head, you ought 12 to allow it.
./
13 MR. EBERSOLE:
The question is, Glenn,-is the 14 inspection tight enough to preclude actual attainment of 15 seve.re damage, to the point where we have a large measure?L 16 MR. REED:
I think there was some poor judgment 3
17 exhibited here with respect to whoever was calling the l
18 shots.
19 MR. EBERSOLE:
On that plant -- Jack, were you 20 going to say something?
I am trying-to extrapolate this 21 to what its real meaning is.
22 MR. ROSENTHAL:
The leakage here was far below the 23 tech spec.
We had an event which was reported to the 24 committee two to four months ago, involving wastage at ANO 25 1, andtof course, there was the event at Maine Yankee I
14CEJFEDERAL REPORTERS, lNC.
202-347-3700 Nationwide Coverage 800-336-6646
5150 08 08 283
.n 1
'AVbw.
1 involving the generator-hatch.
2.
So at this point,"we think this follow up with~the 3
AIT, that we should do a systematic reexamination of-where 4
we' stand with respect to what is now in-tech spec. oriented 5
towards water.
It' doesn' t address ~ the chemicals species-in 6
the water, how to trace it..And it is time now to go back r
7 and revisit the subject, look at what_ technology is in place 8
or would be reasonable to have.
9 MR. REED:
Let me.make a point.
It-is a good i
j 10 thing about borated PWRs.
If you are paying' attention and-11 your judgment is on'the ball, it is the best damn leak 12 detector you've got.
It tells you you've got a leak from when you would never find a' leak from just a little. bit of 13 i
14 vapor, so it really magnifies leaks.
When a-person has got 15 a leak, and he knows what the materials are-in the vicinity,-
16 they are not suitable'against'that leak.
They ought~to do 17 something and get rid of the leak..
18 MR. EBERSOLE:
But if the leak is covered by 19 insulation systems or other things, you don't.know it is 20 there.
i 21 DR. SHEWMON:
They knew this was there.
22 MR. REED:
They knew it was there.
Are:they 23 running their purge valves open or closed?
The containment 24 purge valves, were they open or closed?
If.they were I
(
i 25 closed, they damn.well had a lot of-indicators that they
/\\CE. FEDERAL REPORTERS, INC.
202-347-3700 Nationwide Coverage
- 800-336-6646
5150~08.09 284
'2llhAVbw 1
should be looking at something.
2 MR. ROSENTHAL:
The technology would be there to 3
ascertain whether it was done or not.
4 MR. REED:. If you.are running them o.nen, you are 5
not going to get as many indicators, but really, what the 6
closure is doing, you are going to fall on the floor.
7 MR. ROSENTHAL:
With your permission, Tom Murley 8
and Bob Gallo are here to discuss the Peach Bottom event, 9
and they-have a Commission meeting later this afternoon.
10
_DR. REMICK:
Could you give us an estimate of how
, 11 long you will require in closed session?
12 We will take a two-minute break to clear the 13 room.
14 (Whereupon, the open session was recessed, and-15 thereafter the committee entered into an unrecorded closed 16 session.)
17 18 19 20 21 22 23 24 25 l
I
/\\CE FEDERAL REPORTERS, lNC.
{
202-347-3700 Nationwide Coserage 800-336-6646
5150 08 10 285 2llhAVbw 1
DR. REMICK:
Mr. Ebersole.
2 MR. EBERSOLE:
Jack, I understand you might want 3
to cut one off.
Rather than cut it off entirely, you might 4
want to cover it just briefly yourself.
5 MR. ROSENTHAL:
We will respect your 4:00 o' clock 6
time.
7 The next is Roger Woodruf f.
8 MR. WOODRUFF I am' going to describe a recent 9
e"ent at Salem 1, which occurred during start up of the unit 10 and involved the failure of one of two feedwater 11 recirculation lines.
The cause of failure was erosion, 12 which was due to water impingement in a line that was-O'.
13 carrying two-phase coolant.
The significance that we 14 attribute to the event stems from a events that have 15 occurred in the secondary plant over a number of years and 16 which finally culminated in the tragic Surry accident of 17 last December.
18 In the Salem event, there was no injury to 19
. personnel.
The plant did not trip, it rode through the 20 event, but our concern stems from the potential hazard to 21 people, since it did involve the release of steam, and we 22 are concerned, of course, about the potential challenges to 23 the plant protection system.
24 MR. MICHELSON:
Was that a feedwater pump 25 recirculation?
ACE FEDERAL REPORTERS, INC.
202 347-3700 Nationwide Coverage 800 33 & 6646
5150 08 11 286 1llhAVbw 1
MR. WOODRUFF:
I have a diagram.
2 MR. MICHELSON:
Is it in the handout?
3 MR. WOODRUFF:
Yes, sir.
It should be.
4 MR. JORDAN:
Page 14.
5 (Slide.)
6 MR. WOODRUFF:
There is a feedwater pump 7
represented here, one of two pumps supplying water to the 8
There is a bypass line from each pump to-9 the condenser to provide minimum flow through the pumps to 10 protect them.
These two lines are in service.
The recire 11 line is a six-inch line on Unit 1, and on Unit 2, it is an 12 80-inch line.
The lines are in service during start up and 13 shut down of the plant.
During start up the flow is through 14 the line until header flowing increases to 2300 gallons'per 15 minute and during shutdown until after header flow decreases 16 to 6000 gallons per minute.
17 Flow is 37,000 gallons.
18 Design conditions.
19 (Slide.)
20 The conditions the piping is subjected to are 21 rather extreme.
At the pump, we have the normal discharge 22 pressure of the pump, and at the other end of the line we 23 have condenser vacuum.
4 24 As indicated on the diagram, there are two 25 pressure reducing devices in the line.
The PNID that I had ace-FEDERAL REPORTERS, INC.
202-347-3700 Nationwide Coverage 800 336-6646
5150 08 12 287 1llhAVbw 1
up here on the screen, indicated orifices.
They are not 2
orifice plates.
The devices for Unit 1.
The device is a 3
baffle arrangement that is supplied by the pump 4
manufacturer.
For Unit 1, they use throttle valves.
5 (Slide.)
6 The devica in Unit 1 is about 20 inches long, and 7
as I mentioned, it consists of a series of baffles.
It is 8
fabricated from stainless steel, but the line proper is 9
carbon steel.
The throttling device has carbon steel welded 10 to oither end.
Those are shop welds, so that carbon steel 11 to carbon steel welds can be made in the field.
The break 12 in the line was just downstream from the throttling device.
13 (Slide.)
14 I have a schematic diagram here of the device.
15 Flow in this direction.
Cut the thing in half.
Baffles.
l,Representedstainlesssteelmaterial,stainlesstocarbon 16 I
17 steel wold.
The stub.
A backing ring and the break here, 18 about one-half square inch.
19 20 21 22 23 24 m
j 25 ACE-FEDERAL REPORTERS, INC.
202-347-37N Nationwide Coverage m)-336-6646
.5150 09 01 288 1llhAV/bc 1
It's interesting to note that this line was 2
monitored for thinning about a month before the break 3
occurred.
The closest measurement that was taken to this 4
break was six inches away.
5 What we've seen in this line is more localized 6
thinning than was exhibited at Surry.
7 DR. SHEWMON:
Have you examined around that hole?
8 Was there thinning?
9 MR. WOODRUFF:
There was reported a strip of; 10 thinning about six inches'by a half inch.
11 MR. MICHELSON:
Ax seal, you mean?
12 MR. WOODRUFF:
I don't know the orientation.
13 DR. SHEWMON:
Is this in some turbulence shadow 14 of something upstream?
15 MR. WOODRUFF:
I don't have details here.
- But, a
~
16 if a baffling device is involved here, there may well be
' 17 some asymetric turbulence.
18 Further, the backing ring is here.
It's beer 19 hypothesized that that may.have contributed to turbulence 20 downstream.
Further examination in.the laboratory of the 21 etched surface indicates swirl marks.
22 DR. SH EWMON :
When they did this -- volumetric 23 inspections are quite uncommon.
As I understand this, they 24 aren't called for in the code.
So I'm not sure what 25 procedure would have been used.
Do you know?
ACE-FEDERAL REPORTERS, INC.
202 347-3700 Nationwide Coverage 800-33 4 6646
5150 09 02 289 rm 1(,,'AV/bc 1
MR. WOODRUFF:
No, I don't know specifically.
2 Let me say that the AEOD report on pipe break problems in 3
secondary lines came out probably '84
'85.
The industry has 4
been aware and has responded.
5 The problem is that most of the breaks that have 6
been seen have been principally in two-phase systems and.in 7
smaller diameter lines.
8 Therefore, the Surry event, the licensee was 9
taken by surprise.
We bring this event up,'which is really 10 not all that uncommon, because it involves two-phase flow.
11 Just to make you aware that we're continuing to see these 12 problems.
>v 13 MR. EBERSOLE:
What would have been the internal 14 pressure of the gradient in that that you were seeing?
15 MR. WOODRUFF:
All I can give you is the pressure 16 at normal, full power, which would be approaching a thousand 17 pounds.
18 MR. EBERSOLE:
On the backside?
19 MR. WOODRUFF:
By discharge from the main 20 feedwater pump.
21 MR. EBERSOLE:
I'm talking about on the 22 backside.
23 MR. WOODRUFF:
I don't,have a value for that.
24 MR. EBERSOLE:
In the ehd, it's a vacuum.
25 MR. WOODRUFF:
That's correct.
ACE FEDERAL REPORTERS, INC.
202 347-3700 Nationwide Coverage 800-336-6646
_w-.
'l
-5150 09 03 290 j
/
1(_fAV/bc 1
MR. EBERSOLE:
So you don't know whether it's 2
positive or negative,-even?
3 MR. MICHELSON:
All the thousand pounds is 4
across that device.
You've got.very little friction.
5 MR. EBERSOLE:
But, downstream of that is the-6 pipe diameter sufficient to have that essentially at 7
negative pressure?
8 MR. MICHELSON:
This is the test return on RHR to 9
go back into the Taurus, except that there the Taurus is 10 running at atmospheric pressure.
11 MR. EBERSOLE:
Was there significant discharge, 12 or was there a vacuum uptake?
O
\\/
13 MR. WOODRUFF:
I don't have a number for the 14 amount of water that was discharged.
15 MR. EBERSOLE:
It was charged?
16 MR. WOODRUFF:
Yes.
17 MR. MICHELSON:
How big a pipe are we talking 18 about?
19 MR. WOODRUFF:
In this case, a six-inch pipe.
20 MR. EBERSOLE:
So there was some modest pressure 21 at that point, but not much?
22 MR. WOODRUFF:
Of course there had'to be pressure 23 there to drive it to the condenser.
24 MR. MICHELSON:
What flow rate did you say?
25 MR. WOODRUFF:
The bulk flow rate is as high as ACE FEDERAL REPORTERS, INC.
-l 202 347-3700 Nationwide Coverage 800-336-6M6
y
+
. < f.
,pll~
i
-$150'09L04 t
291 ys j,
- rq r -. _
.l-
~
A y, i' l AV/bc
.1 28? feet per second.
~
. s 2
MR. MICHELSON:
It's volumetric, 2,300'gpm?
3 MR. WOODR,UFF:
I' don't-have the volumetric, but
- 4 the linear flow rate --TI'm sorry -.is:up.to 28-feet per i
5-second, with-an. average.ofilike 12'.
2 6
MR. MICHELSON:. Flow rate' velocity.doesn't mean 7'
much ir. a device like that'.
i.
O MR. REED:
.I think Jessie1was leading up.to'an 9
important point here.
You've got;alvery large-pump pumping; i
10 here and throttled way down and ba'ffled way down that:is taking condensate'whichLis-at some temperature.
11 J+
12 Certainly'at a low enough' temperature-.so it's not.
13 vapor.
But, now'you put it through;this pump.
Theres' j-14 probably a lot of energy going into tha't water because-of=
4 15 the throttling.
i 16 And now the temperature:is probably: riding in.the.-
~
17 pump.4,I don't know how much.
It's perhaps~even-rising 18 here', just like you crank - up a pressurized water reactor by; 19 running,the pumps..
1 d
20 Has anybody measured the temperatures downstream a
21 of this baffle to see whether it:was perhaps.in the flashing.
l:
22 phase?
23 MR. WOODRUFF:' I don't have tlie temperatures:
).
24' downstream.
]
}
3 25 (Slide.)
. Ace FEDERAL.REPORTERE; INC.
[
202-347-3700
' NationwMe Coverage :
[
~ 800-336-6646
i 5150 09'05 292 I
hAV/bc 1
All'I have in hand-are temperatures that are seen 2
upstream.
During startup, the temperature range is 100 to ~
3 200 F.
During shutdown, the temperature range, you know, 4
cuts in at 400 down to'100.
-5 MR. REED:
And the closer it gets to the 6
condenser, the more likely it is to turn to' vapor.
)
7 MR. MICHELSON:
That can be two-phase at room 8
temperature, dropping a thousand pounds across that device.
9
- DR. OKRENT:
Maybe it's particles of ice.
This 10 is the linear velocity for that line.
The ph in the 11 feedwater is 8.8 to 8.9 generally..The oxygen is less than 12 5.5 ppb.
We simply point these numbers out'because of the 13 experience at Surry, which addresses conditions like so and 14 would request licensees to report what they're doing in the 15 way of_ monitoring systems at those conditions.
16 MR. EBERSOLE:
It's interesting that you define 17 the bulk velocity upstream with this labyrinth.
- But, 18 downstream, where all the action is, you don't even say what 19 the hell it is.
20 MR. WOODRUFF:- Jessie, we should have the 21 numbers.
22 MR. EBERSOLE:
They may be very high, indeed.
23 MR. WOODRUFF:
They must be.
)
24 MR. MICHELSON:
Are you including RHR systems in i
(~)
\\
L/
25 your bulletin?
14CE FEDERAL-REPORTERS, lNC.
202 347-3700 Nationwide Coverage 800-336-6646
5150 09 06 293 1
hAV/bc 1
MR. WOODRUFF:
No.
RHR would be on the primary 2
side.
3 MR. ROSENTHAL:
The way we've written what is 4
still a draft bulletin, we would include safety,. balance of 5
plant, importance to safety systems of carbon steel, such 6
that the BWR RHR line looks just like that.
7 MR. MICHELSON: ooh, yes, I'll tell you where to-8 look.
9 MR. ROSENTHAL:
On-the other hand, systems such 10 as service water, which are.also typical of carbon steel, 11 also have a high oxygen concentration.
And the proposed 12 bulletin would not ask for information about such systems.
13 MR. MICHELSON:
But RHR would be included.
14 MR. ROSENTHAL:
A prime candidate.
15 DR. REMICK:
How are we doing in our 16 presentations?
17 (Slide.)
18 MR. WOODRUFF:
The licensee has_ removed a spool 19 from the length of piping that includes the stub tube and 20 part of the adjacent piping back to the stainless steel 21 portion of the throttling device and has qualified a. welder 22 and has replaced the material with carbon steel.
23 However, prior to the event, the licensee had 24 planned to replace the line with a chromium alloy steel; O'
25 that will be done during the next refueling outage.
A ace-FEDERAL REPORTERS, INC.
202 347-3700 Nationwide Coverage 800-336-6646
5150 09 07 294 1llhAV/bc 1
draft bulletin is being processed which would cover'this 2
event, the Surry event, and-others like that.
3 Thank you.
4 MR. EBERSOLE:
Thank you.:
5 MR. ROSENTHAL:' Clarence Chan is the next 6
speaker.
He'll discuss a potential event.
7 10R. CHAN:
I'm going to. talk'today about a 8
potential internal flooding scenario at Trojan that was 9
discovered around February of this year.
10 MR. MICHELSON:
Do they have a PRA?
11 MR. ROSENTHAL:
No.
12 MR. MICHELSON:
No PRA.
13 MR. CHAN:
Around February 1st, Trojan discovered 14 that their turbine building was inadequately designed to 15 handle the effects of a postulated break in their condenser-16 circulating water system expansion joint.
17 This is of significance to Trojan because the 18 emergency diesel generators and the auxilliary feedwater 19 pumps are located within the turbine building.
20 The cause of this deficiency is. attributed to a 21 design error.
The internal flooding scenario was originally 22 evaluated by the staff in its licensing review back in 1973.
23 The analyses which were performed at that time 24 were performed by Bechtel.
The initial analysis perforned 25 in January of '73.
Eight months later, Bechtel did another ACE-FEDERAL REPORTERS, INC.
202-347-3700 Nationwide Coverage 800-336-6M6
=X-__---_-_--__--_-________--__--_--__--______-_________-__---____-_-__-_--_-
_ x, -.
5150 09 08 295
-1llhAV/bc 1
analyses.
This time, the results indicated a flooding rate-2-
of about 200,000 gpm.
f 3
MR. MICHELSON:
This is from the expansion' joint f
4 on the condenser?
5 MR. CHAN:
That's corre'ct.
The' difference in-
~
6 those numbers is attributed to'the January analysis' assumed 7
a rupture of both expansion. joints.- The latter analysis 8
assumed a break in only one.
)
9 MR. EBERSOLE:
Will you further qualify that by l
10 saying what was assumed in the context of run-on of' pumps?-
j-11 MR. rJAN:
Yes.
In both of these analyses, pumps I
12 were considered to have tripped.
They were not running.
13 MR. EBERSOLE:
They were not running at all.
l 14 Just draining from the elevated pool.
i 15 MR. CHAN:
Yes, and I'll put:up a slide to show.
16 MR. MICHELSON:
Are these circumferential-17 ruptures a separation of the bellows?
i 18 MR. CHAN:
Yes, it's 360 degrees.
19 MR. EBERSOLE:
I guess it's somewhat related to a L
l 20 seismic event because a modest one would cause this ' rubber l'
21 rupture, I guess.
3 1
22 MR. MICHELSON:
Are they using rubber or metal?
23 MR. EBERSOLE:
I must call out again,-as I did at 24 the meeting, that the battery trip systems may well:have 25 been the first thing to fail, which would have vastly 4
1
/\\CEJFEDERAL REPORTERS, INC.
j 202 347 3700 Nationwide Coverage 800-336 6646 f
,,,,-.-,---n,.,.-n-,-,,.,-
--.-,-.-n--,
.,.,, ~,,,,
---,-,...,,,.----,-,,-.-r,,,~.n.r
5150 09 09 296 1llhAV/bc 1
increased the flooding.
2 MR. CHAN:
In defense of tripping the pumps, or 3
assuming that the pumps would trip, the licensee had assumed 4
that the seismic event would have locked up off site power.
5 MR. EBERSOLE:
But the first ingredient of that 6
to go is the battery trip system, and that may have been all 7
that went, in which case, they run at full 2,300 horsepower 8
each flow conditions.
9 Okay.
So it's a sequential trip problem.
Carry 10 on.
11 MR. MICHELSON:
These were rubber bellows?
12 MR. EBERSOLE:
Yes.
13 MR. CHAN:
The turbine building flood louvers or 14 relief louvers were sized for the 200,000 gpm break.
15 (Slide.)
16 The flood dikes, which were directed around the 17 diesel generator rooms and the aux feed pump rooms were 18 also sized for the 200,000 gpm break.
19 In February, in preparation for a refueling 20 outage, they were going to replacement tubes.
They noticed 21 that the openings for these louvers were partially blocked.
22 They asked Bechtel to analyze the effect of that potential 23 blockage.
It was then discovered that the 200,000 gpm 24 figure was a low figure, where, in fact, the actual flood l
s 25 rate would have been around 332,000 gpm.
ACE-FEDERAL REPORTERS, INC.
202-347 3700 Nationwide Coverage MO 3346M4
5150 09 10 297 1llhAV/bc 1
This assumed.one pump' running and the failure of 2
one expansion joint.
The flooding concern does not 3
currently exist, since the turbine building plus the wall 4
has been removed.
5 There is essentially unlimited release 6
capability.
The licensee is performing additional 7
analyses.
They plan on providing the staff a revised 1
8 flooding analysis, with additional justifications as to the 9
assumptions that they make -
pumps running versus pumps not 10 running, the size of the break.
11 MR. MICHELSON:
I guess that's a seismically 12 qualified turbine building?
13 MR. CHAN:
No, this turbine building is not 14 seismically qualified.
Only the diesel generator enclosures 1
15 and the auxilliary feedwater pumps were seismically 16 qualified.
1 17 MR. MICHELSON:
What does that mean?
The 18 generators are inside the turbine building.
You mean, the 19 turbine building can tumble down?
20 MR. CHAN:
The diesel generators are in 21 enclosures that are on one side of the turbine building.
It 22 is that portion of the turbine building, which is 23 essentially the diesel generator enclosures, but that are 24 the seismic portions.
25 The other portions are assumed not to be i
ACE-FEDERAL ReeonTens, INC.
202 347 3700 Nationwide Coverage 800 336-6646
5150 09 11 298 1llhAV/bc 1
available.
2 MR. ROSENTHAL:
We've had failures of the boot on 3
the bottom of the condenser without a seismic failure.
4 MR. MICHELSON:
I understand.
I was just 5
curious.
I knew about this arrangement.
I was just 6
curious.
I had never had the opportunity to ask if the 7
turbine building was qualified or not.
It had not been 8
clear to me.
9 MR. CHAN:
That completes my presentation.
10 MR. ROSENTHAL:
The next speaker is Eric Weiss.
11 While he's putting on the microphone, I'd like to address 12 Mr. Michelson's question earlier in respect to the PRA.
13 I checked the work that's gone on on the 14 individual plant examinations for the programs that will 15 occur.
And I'm told that the IB's consider the internal 16 flooding sequences and the goal would be that it will pick 17 up events such as the Trojan thing you've seen.
18 It is not clear to the reviewers as of this time 19 that the IB that has been proposed would in fact satisfy the 20 goal.
21 The goal clearly is to examine internal flooding 22 sequences as part of the IPE.
Now you just need a good 23 IPE.
Let me back up to our last session, where we described 24 the event at Brunswick invol.'.g loss of diesels due to loss n
25 of instrument air, due to fire damage, due to loss of off ace FEDERAL REPORTERS, INC, 202 347 3700 Nationwide Coverage 800 33MM6
5150 09 12 299 1llhAV/bc 1
site power.
2 That was discovered in the course of Brunswick in 3
fact doing a PRA.
And I'm assured by several parties that 4
the IPE, which is less extensive than a full level.one PRA, 5
would.in fact have picked up that sort of event.
~
6 So both the goal and the promise is there.
7 MR. EBERSOLE:
Jack, before we leave this, I want 8
to point out again there's no real, honest-to-goodness right c
i 9
to assume that those pumps tripped on this modest seismic 10 event.
11 MR. ROSENTHAL:
But we have a problem here one 12 way or the other.
It's clearly inadequate.
13 MR. EBERSOLE:
It's inadequate in any case, but <
14 even when they patch up that overflow vent, it may be orders 15 of magnitude too small.
I 16 There's one other problem.
How did you get those 17 pumps to trip?
It very well may be that the first thing i
18 that goes in the seismic event is those off site battery 19 sets.
20 They're just put up on wooden benches so far as I 21 know, and they may well be the first thing to go -- which 22 means the pump would run on.
23 The second thing is I'd like to bring out here 24 that this is a flooding problem in the larger sense of 25 flooding.
Anothar event that we did not choose to discuss l
/\\CEJPEDERAL REPORTERS, INC, 202-347-3700 Nationwide Coverage 800-33&MA6
5150 09 13 300 1
1llhAV/bc
-1 here is the one about leakage into the control room _at 2
Braidwood.
3 There an interesting thing came.out that we need:
4 to pursue.
That kind of-leakage which led to exciting 5
things about potential short-circuiting cables,' messing up 6
control rooms in general,. leading to a phosphate solution 7
coming down from the floor and being washed X-floors up, Lit 8
was'found to be due to a partially blocked drain in the 9
control room drain network.
10 Out of that grew I think the realization:
Who 11 the hell decides what these drain _ systems,.how big they're 12 going to be in the first place?
13 What's the so-called source term for drainage?
14 Which is above the drainage network?
And who decided how 15 big that set of drains was going to be?
16 The fact that it was partiall blocked, opening up 17 the fact of how big was it anyway.
And I think we found 18 nobody knows why, what they are or why they're big or what 19 they're supposed to deal with in the context of upstairs 20 fluid releases.
21 22 l
23 24 O)
\\_
25 ace. FEDERAL REPORTERS, INC.
202-347-3700 Nationwide Coverage 800-336-6646 1
5150 10 01 301 k()AVbw 1
MR. MICHELSON:
For the last ten years they might 2
have been blocked.
s 3
MR. EBERSOLE:
Or whether they were never big 4
enough in the first place.
I think that began our looking 5
at the cosmic or the large views.
6 MR. ROSENTHAL:
There is a multiplan action item 7
on that.
s 8
MR. EBERSOLE:
Does it get into, do you' operators 9
know why those drains are as big as they are?
Does'it bring _
10 that up?
I think we might find some interesting ---
11 MR. MICHELSON:
Are you providing for monitoring 12 of the condition of the drain lines, particularly when you I
Q-
\\-
13 have never put water or anything into them?
14 MR. EBERSOLE:
I have a feeling that the drain 15
-lines may have been specified by the civil' engineers on the 16 basis of flow squared footage without any knowledge of-the 17 liquid which they were supposed to drain, i
18 MR. MICHELSON:
And since construction days, they 19 may not have been flushed out.-
I have seen that happen 20 before.
21 MR. EBERSOLE:
So much for the flooding, general 22 category.
23 DR. OKRENT:
I would be interested when you have 24 the proposed resolution for Trojan, to see how one 25 establishes that the likelihood of flooding has been ACE. FEDERAL REPORTERS, INC.
202 347-3700
, Nationwide Coverage 800-336-6646
5150 10 02 302 1(G_,AVbw I
decreased to an acceptable level and what that level is.
2 Okay.
My question is clear.
3 MR. ~ ROSENTHAL:
Okay.
Eric Weiss of I&E has two 4
subjects to brief on.
One, Indian Point'2 involving battery 5
temperatures which is, I think, very straightforward and 6
real fast.
And then a leak, which will require somewhat 4
7 more discussion.
8 MR. WEISS:
At Indian Point 2 on January 28, it 9
was discovered that one of the station Class 1 E batteries 10 was below the minimum temperature required to deliver the 11 capacity specified in FSAR.
There were several causes.
It 12 was a very cold day.
There was inadequate room heating.
(O>
13 Louvers to that room were open to the outside and the 14 battery room was not on the licensee's freeze protection 15 program, so there wasn't much protection.
And the battery 16 loading allowed very little margin for low temperature.
17 Over the course of the years, I guess, battery loads were 18 increased to the point where there wasn't much margin to 19 allow for a drop in temperature.
20 There are several interesting significances to 21 this event, namely, that the surveillance requirements and 22 procedures do not address this problem.
In other words, you 23 can operate your plant to follow your procedurs and not know 24 that the batteries are, in effect, incapable of doing what b) 25 the FSAR says they are going to do, because you do not ACE-FEDERAL REPORTERS, INC.
202-347-3700 Nationwide Coverage 800-336-6M6
5150 10'03 303
,m 1(,'AVbw 1
monitor for this temperature.
.You have no tech spec actions 2
taken, based on this temperature.
Presumably, that has all 3
been taken care of in the design.
And of course, the 4
battery can become operable without any indication of it.
5 You have no control room indication of this capacity.
That 6
is taken care of with periodic testing.
The plant was at 96' 7
percent power when this problem was discovered and a Region 8
I inspector was in that particular area of the plant and 9
questioned the operability of the batteries.
It seemed 10 physically cold in that room and battery capacity drops 11 dramatically with temperature, although I am afraid that's 12 not as widely appreciated as it should be.
(~)
(_)
13 Electrolytes temperature in one of the four Class 14 1-E batteries was down to around 54 degrees F, and the-15 licensee consulted with the battery manufacturer and ran a 16 computer program which indicated that the minimum 17 temperature for the battery, in order to supply the 18 specified capacity had to be 65 degrees, so the licensee 19 declared the battery inoperative about 10:00 o' clock in 20 the morning and then began an orderly shutdown a few hours 21 later.
The battery capacity, as I said, degrades.
In this 22 case, it lost about 15 percent of its capacity, due to the 23 reduction in temperature.
Batteries are nominally rates at 24 about 77 degrees F.
(~)>
25 It is interesting to note that battery life ACE-FEDERAL REPORTERS, INC.
202 347 3700 Nationwide Coverage 800-336-6M6
5150 10 04 304 1llhAVbw 1
degrades as temperature increases.
That is the other side 2
of the equation that people-don't often realize.
In the 3
summer you lose life.
In the winter, you lose capacity.
4 Very low temperatures can permanently _ damage a battery,. if 5
you get down.to the point where you are starting to worry 6
about freezing and the electrolyte, although that.wasn't the
-7 case here.
8 What was the case here was'that the louvers were
~
9 open to the outside on a very cold wintry day, and they used 10 the 2 x 4 to close those louvers and then added some 11 portable heaters to the room.
But of course, that doesn't 12 bring the temperature in the electrolyte up very quickly.
13 MR. MICHELSON:
Were_those improved heaters?
14 MR. WEISS:
I think they were just space-heaters, 15 as you commonly find at a utility, large industrial grade 16 space heaters.
Presumably, you don't have to worry about 17 hydrogen when you've got that much ventilation in-the room, 18 but who knows.
19 (Slide.)
20 The licensee first attempted to raise the 21 temperature with a discharge.
He attempted to get the 22 electrolyte temperature up with a discharge and then 23 successfully used an equalizing charge to raise the 24 electrolyte temperature.
Ended about 2145 hours0.0248 days <br />0.596 hours <br />0.00355 weeks <br />8.161725e-4 months <br />.
They 25 terminated the shutdown at 49 percent power, once the 4
Ace-FEDERAL REPORTERS, INC.
202-347 3700 Nationwide Coverage 800-336-6646
i 5150 10 05 305 1llhAVbw 1
electrolyte temperature got above 65 degrees F.
2 DR. MARK:
It would help me to understand this a 3
bit.
The electrolyte temperature at 65 degrees F.
My car 4
starts in the morning, when it was 0 all night.
What's 5
wrong with it?
6 MR. WEISS:
Your car battery has sufficient margin 7
in it to accommodate the drop in temperature.
You don't, of 8
course, buy a battery for a nuclear power plant with more 9
margin than you need.
You design some margin in it for 10 temperature.
You design some margin in it for age.
You put 11 margin in for a variety of reasons, perhaps for some future 12 loads you plan to put on.
E.'
13 As the temperature goes down, battery capacity 14 goes down.
15 MR. EBERSOLE:
What's is the design point for your 16 battery for your car?
17 MR. WEISS:
I presumably could take your car up to 18 Alaska.
Maybe it wouldn't start up there, but maybe the 19 locals have a little more cranking capacity in their battery 20 or perhaps they put battery heaters in their cars.
21 DR. MARK:
No, no, no.
It goes down to 0 and sits 22 there all night, and in the morning, I expect it to start 23 and it does.
24 MR. MICHELSON:
But it has lots of surplus i
25 capacity.
ACE. FEDERAL REPORTERS, INC.
202 347-3700 Nationwide Cmerage MXh336-6M6 l
5150 10 06 306 1llhAVbw 1
MR. EBERSOLE:
It was designed for that purpose.
2 DR. MARK:
Why are these things so delicate?
3 MR. EBERSOLE:
They are not designed for that 4
purpose.
You get back to the design aiming point, the 5
criterion.
6 MR. WYLIE:
But you are supposed to design, so 7
that it doesn't get down to this.
8 MR. WEISS:
That is right.
9 MR. EBERSOLE:
Somebody is supposed to hae an 10 architect that keeps them warm.
11 MR. WEISS:
And when you do a 50.59 review, 12 because you put additional loads on the battery, you should 13 take into account the temperature effects that went into the 14 original design, not just look at the total nameplate 15 capacity of the battery and say, I've got plenty left and 16 add loads on over the course of the years, and get to the 17 point where I don't have any margin left.
18 MR. WYLIE:
How did they find that?
19 MR. WEISS:
They found this, because the Region I 20 inspecter was there and said, gee, it's cold in this 21 room.
Do you have enough capacity to last?
And of course, 22 the licensee didn't know.
So he called the battery vendor.
23 MR. WYLIE So they don't monitor that.
24 MR. WEISS:
They don't normally monitor that.
t 25 You do look at temperature of the electrolyte for other
~
ACE. FEDERAL REPORTERS, INC.
202-347-3700 Nationwide Cmcrage 80lb33 H M 6
i i.
l51501007 307 1llhAVbw-1 purposes.
You look at the temperature of the electrolyte l
2 for compensating for specific _ gravity, because you-are i
3 required to have a certain specific gravity that's 4
temperature and level compensated, but there~:is no meter in
~
l l
5 the control room that says the battery electrolyte
(_
6 temperature is such, and therefore, it is an op.
And there.
7 is no tech spec action statement that even asks to_look at l
L 8
it.
9 MR. EBERSOLE:
That was an astute inspector.
He t
l 10 should get a medal for that.
l i
11 MR. WYLIE:
Indian Point was designed before 12 the SRP, I think, came out; is that' correct?
13 DR. OKRENT:
Yes.
14 MR. WYLIE:
Okay.
But the standard review plan-15 provides for the review of design of the battery 16 installations, as I recall.-
Does the staff go back and look-(
17 at the old plants, after the standard review plan came'out?
18 MR. EBERSOLE:
I don't think so.
19 MR. WYLIE:
So presumably, this hadn't been looked 20 at in a lot of plants.
21 MR. WEISS:
I would be very surprised, if I would 22 go to a nuclear power plant and ask anybody on_the operating 23 staff, what temperature does your battery come off and get 24 an answer.
It should be in the design of a plant.
25 MR. EBERSOLE:
So what is the notice that is going
- ace. FEDERAL REPORTERS, INC.
202 347 3700 Nat.onwide Coverage 800 3 % 6646 L
5150 10 08 308 2
hAVbw 1
to go out?
2 MR. WEISS:
The notice should cause them to 3
rethink this issue and look at it.
4 MR. JORDAN:
Probably a notice that we should put 5
out in about October or November of next year.
6' DR. MARK:
Now that notice will or won't it 7
include, keep it heated up to 65 degrees?
8 MR. WEISS:
No.
That is a function of capacity.
9 DR. MARK:
Be sure that the temperature doesn't go 10 below what the battery will live with?
11 MR. ROSENTHAL:
Right.
12 (Slide.)
()
13 MR. WEISS:
The next event I would like to cover 14 very'briefly is the Vogtle hydrogen leak.
Vogtle, on 15 February 20, had a packing leak on a small hydrogen line.
16 Hydrogen leakage came from lines in safety-related areas 17 outside of containment.
And we had a concern that this 18 might be generic.
There is no installed hydrogen detection 19 in this area.
So slow leaks can go undetected.
There are 20 excess slow check valves in these lines that prevent large 21 leaks, but wondered if their set points were quite right.
22 I will go on to that later.
The case here was 23 that there was a hydrogen leak on a small, what I would 1
24 call garden variety blow valve that is no special packing, 25 not a diaphragm valve, no bellow seals.
I am sure you are
/\\CE. FEDERAL REPORTERS, INC.
(
'02-347-3700 Nationwide Coverage 800 336-6646
k
'f j-5150'10 09
-309 b
-1hVtnt'
'l-
_ aware that hydrogen would be hard to-contain in.any-i
[
2-
. case,-particularly on such:a valve, but the area.near:the 3
3L leak had little. ventilation. 'The plant:is~not: started up.
4 4 --
.It has not gone critical, and they'have,been going through 4
1 i
5.
some HVAC. fluid. balancing problems. -The hydrogen valve was:
)
i 6-repositioned on January 26,Jand it-is believed that:at;that l-7 time, the leak began..
Although there-isino definitive l:
j 8
evidence of it.
j.
9 What happened on February 20th was that a-chlorine-f-
.10 detector tripped.
When no toxic gas was fodnd, the shift.
11 supervisor directed that the health physicists should take 12 other samples, look for anything.
j 13 this vertical pipe case near the--center of the auxiliary s
).-
14 building.
l-j 15 The concentration was 20 percent of the. lower i
j-16 flammability limit which translated to about 1.2. percent i
{'
17 hydrogen by volume.
Interestingly enough, at the NRC, we l
18 were told over the red phone that it was 20 percent hydrogen 4
[
19 by volume.
We followed this with some interest.
20 (Laughter.)-
l 21 One of the current estimates, and they are kind of f
22
-shaky about the total amount of hydrogen involved, was-5000-23 standard cubic feet of hydrogen at about 3:00 in the.
j.
24 morning, the first thing they did was they isolated the-iO j
25 hydrogen skid that was supplying the hydrogen to the. plant, i
i l
ace-FEDERAL REPORTERS, INC,
)
202 347 3700 Nationwide Coverage 800-336-6646 j
4
i 5150 10 10 310 l
1(O_,'A v b w -1 even-before they knew where-the leak was.
At 3:25 in.the
/
2 morning, the source of the leak was identified, mainly, this 3
valve packing on the one-inch schedule carbon steel line to 4
the volume control.
5 It actually turns over to a schedule 40 stainless, 6
by the time it gets there.
But here it was scheduled 80.
7 The line comes from a hydrogen skid outside the turbine i
8 building.
It's a cryogenic source of hydrogen, much larger 9
than one would get, obviously, from bottled gas.
That is 10 because they are using it for a variety of purposes, only to 11 cool the main generator and provide a cover gas in the 12 volume control tank, but also they have an unusual waste gas 13 system there that uses hydrogen.
14 At 3:37 in the morning, they started venting of 15 the hydrogen header to the turbine building roof.
At 3:41, 16 they declared an unusual event and propped some doors open 17 in the auxiliary building to allow the hydrogen to migrate 18 out.
19 At 4:04 in the morning, no hydrogen was reported.
4 20 At 5:36, the unusual event was terminated.
21 The licensee is examining the use of diaphragm 22 valves as a potential corrective measure here, and also i
23 looking at the basis for the excess flow of check valve set 24 points.
It is interesting to note that when you do HVAC 25 flow balancing, one ordinarily has in mind, heat loads in ACE FEDERAL REPORTERS, INC
}
202 347 3700 Nationwide Coverage 300 336-6646
~
-5150 10.11 311 1llhAVbw 1
the. room.
You don't think, necessarily'about the hydrogen 2
line that is running over through the corner of the room 3
that may have a leak off of one of those valves.
4 What is the maximum credible leak rate and does 5
that match up against the HVAC flow balance?
In other 6
words, maybe one should.look at the HVAC flow rates, in 7
terms of what is the potential hydrogen concentration inLthe l
8 room, not just what are the heat loads in the room.
9 MR. EBERSOLE:
You mean especially when those 10 ventilation flow rates are depreciating?
11 MR. WEISS:
That is right.
Presumably, you're 4
12 balancing a complex HVAC system for accident and normal 13 operating heat loads.
You are not balancing for hydrogen 14 leaks that are the maximum credible based on'your excess 15 flow tech valve settings.
16 MR. EBERSOLE:
You could be protected by hydrogen 17 explosions and fires, just because the HVAC system was 18 working the way it should.
19 MR. WEISS:
Absolutely.
20 MR. MICHELSON:
But then, of course, if you lose 21 off-site power, or whatever, what do you get?
A hydrogen 22 explosion?
i 23 MR. EBERSOLE:
The hydrogen keeps on leaking.
I i
24 MR. MICHELSON:
The first thing you know, you've 25 got a conflagration going on somewhere.
1
/\\CE. FEDERAL REPonTens, INC.
202-347 37(X)
Nationwide Coverage 800-336-6646
5150 10 12 312 1llhAVbw 1
DR. MOELLER:
Excuse me on that one.
Why did the 2
chlearine detector trip?
3 MR. WEISS:
I don't know why they tripped.
4 DR. MOELLER:
That wasn't anything really to do 5
with the hydrogen.
6 MR. WEISS:
As far as I am concerned, it was 7
lucky, but maybe somebody else has a more deep understanding 8
of how they work, that could correlate the two.
9 DR. MOELLER:
Down lower, why do you have to 10 supply hydrogen to the hydrogen recombiners?
11 MR. WEISS:
This is an unusual waste gas system 12 that they have at Vogtle.
It is designed to minimize
'_/
13 gaseous releases, and they combine hydrogen with oxygen and
~
14 turn it into water, right.
15 16 17 18 19 20 21 22 23 24 25 ACE-FEDERAL REPORTERS, INC.
202 347 37(X)
Nationwide Coserage m).11MM6
5150 11 01 313 1llhAV/bc 1
DR. MOELLER:
But, usually, you don't supply 2
hydrogen to it.
It's to remove hydrogen.
3 MR. WEISS:
This is not the hydrogen combiner 4
that you and I are familiar with.
I don't know a lot about 5
it, but it's an unusual feature of this off gas system that 6
they can minimize off site releases by consuming hydrogen 7
from this cryogenic source.
8 One of the things I haven't mentioned so far, 9
lots of people have asked, well, why didn't they know about 10 this from the inventory in the hydrogen skid?
Being a 11 cryogenic source, you have a certain amount of gassing 12 that's necessary to keep it cool.
_J 13 That masks'any small leak.
My point here simply 14 was that they have a need for a lot of hydrogen at this 15 facility.
And so they have a need for a cryogenic skid.
16 It's interesting to note also that a number of 17 boilers are retrofitting into the plant cryogenic sources of 18 hydrogen for water chemistry control.
r 19 So, very old plants may be getting big sources of 20 hydrogen on site.
21 MR. MICilELSON:
Vogoll boilers?
22 MR. WEISS:
No, a Westinghouse PWR.
23 MR. POSENTilAL:
The reason it's being briefed is 24 that we are seeing wide uso now of hydrogen.
25 MR. MICilELSON:
And you're going to see wider use ACE-Fronari. REi>onTEns, INC.
202 347 37(X)
Nationwide Coverage mxk31MM6
5150 11 02 314 1llhAV/bc 1
pretty soon.
2 MR. ROSENTHAL:
That may be a problem with the 3
specific event.
4 MR. MICHELSON:
How much hydrogen are they using 5
for this recombinor?
Because that's the only unusual 6
feature, isn't it?
Other plants don't consume that kind of 7
volume of hydrogen.
Is this a real big pipo going to the 8
system?
9 MR. EBERSOLE:
Is it just to swooten up the fire 10 process?
11 MR. MICHELSON:
I'm trying to got an answer.
12 MR. WEISS:
I wish I were more knowledgeable of 13 the system.
I'm told it's a very unusual waste gas system.
14 And that's as much as I know about it.
15 MR. MICHELSON:
Did you go back to look at the 16 fire protection report to soo what kind of fire protection 17 and explosion provisions they've mado?
18 MR. ROSENTHAL:
No.
And, in fact, that's why one 19 of the reasons for selection of this event was the 20 recognition of the growing use of hydrogon for people that 21 have boon well aware of the uso of hydrogen on generators.
22 And a concern that, in fact, fire protection may 23 not have boon adequately addressed.
So, we'll be following 24 up on it, of courso.
m
- i 25 MR. MICHELSON:
At this plant, are the hydrogon ace-FilonnAL RitronTrins, INC, 202 :i47 3700 Nationwide Cmerage km336 (M6
5150 11 03 315 1llhAV/bc 1
lines uniquely identified?
Can you walk up to a pipe and 2
say it's a hydrogen line?
3 I've been in several plants where there's no 4
- way, tne superintendant was thinking to show'me the 5
hydrogen line', but it'took a long time and another guy 6
before we finally figured out which one it was.
They're all 7
localized.
8 MR. ROSENTHAL:
I wish we had a sweeter story to 9
bring you.
We did talk to some of the fire protection 10 reviewers, and they expressed concern over these issues.
11 MR. MICHELSON:
If you'd take the water line out, 12 that's red.
The fire hydrant lines.
But you can't pick out
(
13 a hydrogen line, a source of explosive gases.
i i
14 And besides that, you might want one day to pack i
15 that valve.
If you get into the wrong valve, you're going j
16 to have a lot of hydrogen.
And you'll have a potential 1
17 explosion.
18 MR. EBERSOLE:
Carson?
19 DR. MARK:
You quoted the hydrogen concentration.
20 After it was corrected from 20 percent, what was the 21 corrected value as you gave it?
22 MR. WEISS:
The correct value was 20 percent of g
23 the lower flammability limit, which means 1.2 percent 4
24 hydrogen by volume.
25 DR. MARK:
This is in air?
i l
/\\CE FEDERAL REPORTERS, INC.
202 347 3700 Nationwide Coverage 800-336-(M6
5150 11 04 316 1llhAV/bc 1
MR. WEISS:
In air.
2 DR. MARK:
Twenty percent.
Okay.
So you say the 3
flammability limit is --
4 (Slide.)
5 MR. WEISS:
It's 20 percent of this, you see.
6 It's interesting to note.
First, the story came'in it was 7
20 percent hydrogen.
Then it came in, it was 20 percent of 8
the lower explosive limit.
And then, you know, after a day 9
or two, then it got down to 20 percent of the lower 10 flammability limit.
1 11 DR. MARK:
So it was in fact no hazard?
12 MR. WEISS:
It was no hazard.
13 DR. MARK:
In fact, it wasn't known there was a 14 hazard?
15 MR. WEISS:
We sometimes bring you stories, 16 events that have generic significance even when the plant 17 safety-significant specifics of the event was not known 18 about.
19 This caused us to think about the larger issue.
20 DR. MARK:
I'm not arguing against that.
The 21 fact that it wasn't known and should have been there was a
~
22 hazard.
23 MR. MICHELSON:
You might find when you look in 24 the fire protection aspect of this kind of a problem, our D
25 fire protection staff has not really focused on explosion ACE. FEDERAL REPonTens, INC.
202 447-3700 Nationwide Coverage 800-336-6646
~
n 5150 11 05 317 lhV/bc l'
forming gases within the building, or fire protection._
~ features.
That's why we' lacked the detection arrangements 3~
that are!needed for this..
4 We lack the color-coding ofLthe piping that's 5-needed.
There's a whole raf t of: problems that have :been 6
lying there for a long time.
7 And of course,:this.was aimild event.- -I: hope 8
we'd learn.
9 MR. HERNAN:
One of'the questions that_came up at
~
10 the meeting on Tuesday was:is there'a generichissue1the.
11 staff is working on.
I want,to report to the. committee on 12 that.
(
There'is a generic issue wh'ich resulted'from an 13 14 AEOD report issued about two or three years Lago.-
It's 15 generic issue number 106.
It's entitled Piping In Use In 16 Highly Combustible Uses.
17 The issue'is-scheduled for'prioritization:in June 18 1987.
19 MR. MICHELSON:
The work started about 1981, as I 20 recollect.
21 MR. HERNAN:
I'm not sure when it' started.
The 22 process hasn't been fast, but it-is on schedule. - And we 23 have a prioritization date.
So we don't'know;the-relative-24 priority at this point.
25 MR. MICHELSON:
We may burn a plant'down before ace FEDERAL REPORTERS, INC.
202 347-3700 Nationwide Coverage 800-3.1$6646
i
'~5150 11'06*
'318-lhAV/bc l'
~we get it prioritized.
~
2 MR. WEISS:
I might also' mention that:there was a-3 NUREG prepared for AEOD.on safety implications t associatedJ
'4 with>in plant pressurized storage and distribution systens j
5-of nuclear power plants.
Ha.ve you read'the' fire: code, i
6 MR. MICHELSON:
7 industrial codes on handling of combustible gases to see 8
what we really.ought to be doing in a nuclear plant?
It's-i 9
very interesting.
]
j 10 They're real believers if we-don't do what-the.
i
)
11 industrial code would bar.
f 12 MR. REED:
Well, it's the insurance companies.
13 MR. MICHELSON:
I don't know if-they're wised up i
t 14 to it or not.
15 DR. REMICK:
Where'do we stand, Jessie?
16 MR.- EBERSOLE:
Jack, I believe.you and:Ed have 17 some general observations to make.
1 1
18 MR. JORDAN:
I'd like to make just a general
)
i 19 comment, to, first of all, thank the:ACRS for the years of i
I j.
20 support they've given IND,-listening to'our horror stories,1
'l 4
21 trying to bring the real world back to you.
4 l-22 There's also been a return to IEs.
We ' ve. been 23~
the coordinator for these kinds of presentations.. NRR has 1
I 24 been a participant as well.
This is a turnover in this
(
j 25 particular meeting from I&E being the coordinator to NRR.
)
j l
ace-FEDERAL REPORTERS, INC.
202 347-3700
- Nationwide Coverage 800-3M-6646
,i L
1
..., _. _ _., _ _, _ _,. _... ~ _.
_ ~.
4 L '
1
'5150 11'07 319 AV/bc 1
Since IEE is no longer going to be'.in existence, t.
2 as we mentioned yesterday in the. discussion'with Partlow we
[
i
- 3 had, Ernie Rossi is the division director.directly 4
responsible.
5-
-William Landon is here, who is the-branch chief 6
who will be following events.-
So it.seems'to be;true in the.
wholereorganizationweare-havingthiscross-fertiIization 7
8 of people.
And during this reorganization,-this^ transfer,'
9 Ernie has been in both NRR and I&E.
In fact, Ernie'was the i
10 presenter for many of the issues before' Jack Rosenthal' i
11 came.
l i
' 12 So.the-one thing I'd like to-add to that.is,I-13 would expect to see,-I would expect that you should see'AEOD' 14 representatives in:these discussions.- And he'll-have an-15 interest in giving you a compiled view-of events as well.
P 16 So we'd like to participate in the future'under 17 the coordination of.NRR.
/ 18 Wayne, would you like to say anything?:
[
19 MR. LANDON:
I don't think'so.
i
- i. :
20 MR. EBERSOLE:
Jack, the last thing.I can think 1
{.
21 of is I commented-on those so-called SMS programs.-
It's an-22 effort that,I don't think many of the committee members.know--
l 23 about, to go back and sweep up what's really being done to_a' i
l r
24 variety of issues, to see what's happening lin the field.
4 25 And the.one I picked;in particular_was.the Mach.I I
ACE. FEDERAL REPORTERS, INC.,.
}
~ 202-341-3700 Nationwide Coverage
'800-336-6646 -
.j
' I.
.a --. -..
.e-J
._.___..-,.,u.
u __.,
4
-5150 11108 320
lllhAV/bc 1
containment closures,.with a statement of my own particular 2
interest on what's really happened ~to those sawed-off square 3
.downcomers; hoping, with the low frequency condensation 4
resonance problem.
p 5
Do you have anything to say about that?-
a 6
MR. ROSENTHAL:
Mr. Michelson and Mr. Ebersole 7
had asked about SIMS and-tis and I can do this in about 8
three minutes or less.
First'of all, the NRC has gone to3a 9
SIMS, which is a safety issue management system.
It's just 10 an automated tracking system.
11 It fits together TMI action plan-items, generic 4
12 issues, generic letters, multi-plant action items, and tries
- p v-13 to make some order.
It's a management:toolifor-tracking all?
f 14 these things.
~
15 MR. MICHELSON:
Is this computerized?
i j
16 MR. ROSENTHAL:
It's a computerized tracking 17 system.
Now, along that line, there= were 'an>rms ' multi-plant i
18 action items.
There are lots of multi-plant action items.;
19 Some were classified as-high priority.
20 And +he goal here is to issue ~ temporary 21' instructions to the regions that actually conduct 22 inspections, the idea being that if you'd like to confirm or 23 verify that what the licensee has' promised to do orfbeen-24~
required to do has actually been done inLthe field, often,-
l 25 an'NRR SER would be based on a promise-to install something, r
ACE-FEDERAL REPORTERS, INC.
i l
202-347-3700 -
Nationwide Coverage 800-336-6646 -_
l i
l t
5150 11 09 321 A
lis_jAV/bc 1
let's say cable separation, and now it would be appropriate 2
to go out to see that that was literally done.
3 It's a manpower-intensive exercise to go to 108 4
plants, depending on what the action item is, and actually 5'
look or do an audit of the actual implementation.
6 I have a quick list of the tis that are now being 7
worked on, temporary instructions to do actual inspections.
8 Instrumentation following the course of an accident, 9
flooding of equipment important to safety, which does 10 address the drain problem;.a vent interfacing LOCA based on 11 1981 orders.
12 There is' work on scram discharge valves.
There's 13 one on natural circulation cool-down which focuses on 14 training procedures.
And a demonstration or test or-15 reference to it.
16 There's one on inspection of'BWR stainless steel 17 piping, stress corrosion cracking.
And there is one on the 18 Mach I containment program, which addresses holding down the 19 torus, et cetera, and does address the downcomer 20 arrangement.
And that's the extent of my knowledge.
21 What I recommend, if the committee is interested 22 in more detailed presentations, that the work will be going 23 over to NRR and that they might well want to hear about it.
24 MR. EBERSOLE:
Jack, what I was getting at is I
O k/
25 know about all the T-quenchers that were put on the ACE-FEDERAL REPORTERS, INC.
202-347-3700 Nationwide Coverage 800L336-6M6
5150 11 10 322 G
1(_,AV/bc 1
dischargers, but my impression is that there's an analytical-2 proof -- I put that in quotes -- that you wouldn't suffer 3
major condensation discharge, oscillations leading to-4 mechanical problems for those major downcomers on large 5
6 Now, large LOCAs have been marching away from us 7
except in the PWR case, which is where these things are.-
I 8
just wonder if we have in fact finally put to rest those 9
square-cut major downcomers in this context.
10 MR. ROSENTHAL:
In conjunction with having tied 11 down the torus.
That is my impression.
You'd really'have 12 to bring in.--
(~
\\
13 MR. EBERSOLE:
It's a sweep-up problem.
Have we 4
14 done it?
15 DR. OKRENT:
I'm wondering whether there exists 16 some systematic process, I guess, within the NRC staff 17 whereby the things that I&E, let's say, works on and puts 18 out bulletins on, and so forth, is called sharply to the 19 attention of other parts of the NRC staff, like, for 20 example, people who are making generic. estimates of risk for 21 light water reactors, to give you an' example.
22 Who issue statements that core melt frequencies 23 in their sample plans are between 10 to the minus 4, 10 to 24 the minus 5 per year.
I think, within the last few months, 25 we've heard of a couple of cases that, in my opinion, are ACE FEDERAL REPORTERS, INC.
202-347-3700 Nationwide Coverage 800-336-6646
_.. ~ _,.
5150 11.11 323
.l()AV/bc 11 probably at one in a thousand or greater ~per. year,-and that i-2 it's not uncommon to see an individual vent between 1:andi L,
3-1,000 and 1 in_10,000.
That's:more common.
4' There seems to be a disconnect..someh'ow.
I don't; 5
know whether it's fair to ask people making these 6
presentations to answer it, but I'm interested to know-7
_ somehow -- maybe it's EDO, if nobody else --'how this kind.
8 of information is made compatible with the assessments 9
coming-out of the wings, what the feedback is, and so a
I 10 forth.
11 MR. JORDAN:
I think, Dr. Okrent, perhaps:our.
12 best feedback, in addition to having distributed the written 13 information notices and the events, has been the_ weekly:
l 14 meetings that the offices have-held, which includes NRR, 15 AEOD and I&E looking at the major-events during alweek.
16 So that has. reviewed and.provided-feedback to the 17 division level'and down to the branch personnel of:the 18 things that are in front of us and that keep-occurring.
19 So, during those sessions, there are frequent i
20 discussions of, well, I thought we'd put=that one to bed, 21 why are we still having.it?
And didn't you consider that in
~
4 22 your PRA?
23 So those things are happening within the staff at 24 a verbal' level, and there's paper to support it.
So it's a 8- - Q) 25
-session.like this one, only it happens every week, and s
j ACE-FEDERAL REPORTERS, INC.
202-347-3700 Nationwide Coverage :
800-336-6646 :
m
,9+y-p.
-g,e--y.
m g
e-,_
y,w.-
p--*
yy y s,w-.
-gy, w
w-,
p*m sm m
,emeeme-9 W-y er
.=
~
.i,,. '
~
a
[ 5150 11:12.
324
!<l(
AV/bc-
~
-l
' covers'three or four-events.
2 So I think that's-the most direct feedback.
1
~
'3 MR. ROSENTHAL:
We'have what are'now promises.in j
4 t<enns of ' safety. goal implementation where, through the 1
5 Trends Branch in AEOD, for-one, and I would intend-to do 1-6 that, is to look at events and bounce the events off of the-7 PRAs to see if_the promises and. reality' jog.
8 We may.not do analytic work on each and.every--
9 event.'
But when we see four station. blackouts of-short 10 duration in a two-year period, we know that's not.a' 10 to 11 the minus 1.
12 The events, the Brunswick event, I-found 13 interesting; because of'my background, I recommended that 14
.they be discussed.'
We've-gone out of our way to present:
~
15 those to the PRA practitioners to remind them of events.
16 And that goes~on at the~ staff level, i
.i 17 But I think the place to look is,'one, in-safety 18 goal implementation, where we-can'really. bounce operating
19 experience off:against PRAs; and,_two, the goal ~:that AEOD, i
20 my future branch's goal, would be to be one of the places in i
l 21 the agency where we can evolve operating; experience,"PRAs l
22 analysis.
23 So we'll be-doing that.
24 0
25 ace-FEDERAL REPORTERS, INC.
~202-347-3700 Nationwide Coverage -
800-336-6646
)
5150 12 12 325 l.
P 1
DR. OKRENT:
I am pleased that the kind ofc future Y_')Tbur 2
activity you are speaking about I have on more than.one 3
occasion noted.
I have failed all too often to see 4
recognition of these events in statements made by the 5
representatives of this agency about the level of safety 6
implications of certain studies, and'so forth.
7 They just seem-to ignore that at-Robinson or 8
Trojan before that existed.
9 DR. REMICK:
Dade has aJguestion.
10 DR. MOELLER:
A question or a' comment.
I am 11 reminded by what Dr. Okrent said.
I am-reminded of 12 questions that I had.
I am sure the input or the recording (3
13 of these events that you have made factors into a number.of 14 things, your I&E notices and your AOR reports to Congress, 15 and so forth.
16 It seems to me though as a person who hears these 17 month after month -- and they are interesting -- is anyone 18 trending them or is anyone sitting down and looking at the 19 last five years of experience and saying, okay, where are we 20 headed or what have we learned from all this.
21 I hear them independently one at a time, but is 22 there a broader message here, and is anyone searching out 23 those messages?
24 MR. JORDAN:
That is the role of AEOD.
We are
()
25 publishing trends, patterns and compiling events.
So there ACE FEDERAL REPORTERS, INC.-
202-347-3700 Nationwide Coverage 800-336-6646 1
i 1
~ 5150.12-12 326
- l i -f*Nbur
.11 is a large-volume of that: material.
-(
2 DR.iMOELLER: ~ I am familiar'with what.they are
.3 doing.
4 Would you say that they are,accomplishingxwhat:I.
5 am asking for?. In other words, look attthom for:the11ast 6
five yearc, let's say, and see what the. trends have been'and 4
f 4
7
.what the lessons are?-
8 DR. OKRENT:
In an integral? fashion.
9 MR. MICHELSON:
Are you reading'the trends and 10 pattern studies from AEOD or just..the case studies?
I 11 DR. MOELLER:
I read-mainly.theicase studies.
l-12 MR. MICHELSON:
You. won't find 1them in there.'
{}
13 MR. JORDAN:
Perhaps the presentation-to.the'ACRS 14 on those recent studies would be useful.
~
15 MR. MICHELSON:
We have a: subcommittee that'is-16 going to do this.
17 DR. REMICK:
Carson, and.then we'goLon break.--
1 18 DR. MARK:
You spoke of the weekly discussions.
19 They sound fine.
j_
20 What happens as a consequence?
You are not the 21 people, the people in that room where you meet that week?
22 You are not the people who need to see theLinformation.- The 23 people who need the information are out-in Oregon'or Arizona 24 or somewhere.
7
-(])
I 25 Does it get to them?
In what way does it get to ACE FEDERAL REPORTERS, INC.
202-347 3700 '
Nationwide Coverage
.-800-336-6646 "
i 5150'12'12 327 T'"ibur 1
them?
U 2
MR. JORDAN:
In terms of the utility people <nr 3 -
the regional people?
)
4 DR. MARK:
The guys who have their hands on the 5
levers are the ones who need the thoughts that'come up in-6 your weekly. meetings, who observe that this happens, that it 7
shouldn't happen.
Other people are_the ones who need that 8
information.
9 MR. JORDAN:
I agree.
The output'of those weekly 4
10 meetings is a decision that some other activity needs to be 11 taken by the agency.
If it is putting it in the USI stack, 12 if it is proposing the tech spec generically or the generic
{}
13 letter, bulletin, or information' notice, that would then be 14 communicated directly to the utilities or that it is an 15 activity that Research ought to follow up on or AEOD or'do a 16 case study or trended pattern on.
17 So it is a way of identifying whether the staff 4
18 needs people to work in that area and whether communication 19 ought to go further than it has already progressed.
2 20 Normally, at those meetings people make a 21 proposal on what they are doing, and then there is an 22 argument or discussion about whether_or not they are in that 23 area.
So the division directors from the of fices and the 24 office directors are there.
()
25 DR. MARK:
So if it seems significant enough or j
ace-FEDERAL REPORTERS, INC.
202-347-3700 Nationwide Coverage 800-336-6646 -
.~
5150 12 12.
328
"*Vbur-1 broadly relevant, it might come directly from that meeting d.
2 or as a result of that probably.
That-information notice 3
goes out to everybody.
4 MR. JORDAN:
Yes,= sir.
5 DR. MARK:
May I just observe that this is a:
6 problem?
7-Okay.
And of course many of them' don't' warrant 8
that.
9 MR. JORDAN:- That~is correct.
10 MR. MICHELSON:
The problem is if it.doesn't~
11 warrant that, Carson, then how does~the person out in'the-
~
12 field hear about it?
Is he just to hear about the top _ cut?L
{}
13 There is a lot of - stuf f in. between that 'is pretty 14 important, but the agency: internally couldn't decide how 15 important, and th'erefore theyididn't tell anybody'else.
16 DR. MARK:
I was worried:about'just that-17 possibility.
18 MR. MICHELSON:
That is why the study that AEOD 19 does was very good because it indicated how else the~
20 information is fed back, but it turns _out the utilities in_
21 many cases aren't paying any attention, and I think the 22 committees might be interested. in reviewing that report 23 sometime.
24 Dr. Moeller brought it up a year ago, and we '
({}
25 haven't reviewed it yet.
ACE FEDERAL REPORTERS, INC.
202 347-3700
' Nationwide Coverage 800 336- % 56
b
-5150jl2:12L 329' bur 1
DR. REMICK:. Gentlemen,1we are running into our i
2 break.'
I am going to-rule he~re'that we take aboutLa six-:
3 minute break, returning at'4:15'.
4 We-have.had a? request to~.. rearrange the last two-4 5
items.- So we will take u'p the. appointment of the new ACRS.
}~
6' member as our first item of business'at 4:15..
7-(Recess, to go into unrecorded session.)'
h
[
8 DR. REMICK:
Dave. Okre'nt..
f I
9 DR. OKRENT:
Let me' ramble ~a-littlecif:I can,uMr.-
10 Chairman, to review how possibly we gotito discussing the 11 question of safety features of: foreign reactors the: last'few L
12 months'at'a Commission meeting which-was probably somehow t
]
)
13 related to backfitting or some other subject.' _
[
14 I posed the question to.the Commissioners that I' 15' thought that the NRC would have'to-at some time--in the:notx j-16 too distant future 1 consider what -is happening in other:
~
17 advanced nuclear power generating lcountriesiand:at least 18 make conscious decisions as to-whether.they-were interested 19 in some of the things being done or'not,'and in fact, not,xI-l 2 0. -
suppose, to anyone's surprise,..the Chairman?of-th'e
-- i L
21 Commission said,.well, why doesn't the ACRS:look at"this.
22 So the question came-up,-well, how should we look 23 at'this, and I think Ray or somebody from'on~our..staffLsaid, 24 why don't we have our fellows or fellows and engineers work.-
,- ()
25 up' background information in this~ area?
1
/\\CE FEDERAL REPORTERS, INC.
I 202-347-3700 Nationwide Coverage.
800-336-6646
. -2
,n_,.
.. a...a. _,,.,,, _ u _ c,,- -...;
.5150 12-12
-330
- E bur 1
In' fact, I thought.maybe we'shouldLask the staff.
2 They have developed what I'think is~a fairly good summary of-3t
. that 'now. -There will probably be. a draf t1three_ and a" draf t'-
']
4 4
four year,: I suppose, before they are done, _ but at -least'it-e.
5-gives in one reading period a pe'rspective 'which is helpful.
t 6
Last time I' suggested that maybe ~the-~ committee
.7 could-take the next st'ep[by seeing whether there were 8
particular features ~that members-thought we should pursue.in-1 4
j '
some f ashion, whatever the f ashion :is.
9 10 Thi have' had a couple of suggestions in that z
11-regard.
Glenn provided!a suggestion.-
1-12 MR.~. REED:
Which you _ have heard before.'
(}
13 DR. OKRENT:
Which we-knowlhe has an interest _in.~
14
- Dade, I' guess, yesterday provided a1su'g'gestion in-15 the area of containm'ents.-
1 j
16-I' have' been trying l to think inf the meantime,,ish 3-r 17 there some process-that we want to recommend. either toi q
a 18 ourselves or to the Commission be. followed 'with _ regard to o
l i
A 19 this matter.
20 For example, in principle, we could say'to'.the 21 Commission, well, we think'the staff should. study all these 1
.l
- j' 22 and come in with their recommendations or we'couldLset?up j
23 some kind of a task within thefcommittee, and s'o forth!
24 To some extent, my thinking has txnsn interrupted -
-().
25 in that regard by the meeting we had today because the.
4 ACE-FEDERAL-REPORTERS,'INC.
202-347-3700
.. Nationwide Coverage
. 800-336-6M6 r
-.,-..,me r
r-s
,._u.,4._
,,____m
,,..,,_v....
,,s,,,
r
,m,
--*e-w
->~ *-E,-
v m e-e = m =
- i- =
--~ !
5150 12.12 331 bur.
1 Commissioners raised this question-about, well, you know, 2
you wrote this letter about improving the safety of future 3
reactors, but why not look at these features in some-of the 4
foreign reactors?
What do you have to say about all that?
5 That is not quite how they worded it.
6 DR. SHEWMON:
They said, would you accept 7
anything out there as what we should. build?. The answer is, 8
no, we want to-improve all of them.
9 DR. OKRENT:
Then I don't think we 'gave them an 10 answer.
11 DR. SHEWMON:
I bit my tongue.
12 (Laughter.)
{}
13 DR. OKRENT:
So in a sense, before I could make a 14 suggestion for how we might throw the ball in somebody 15 else's court, it has been thrown into our court, it seems to
~
16 me.
17 Again, for example, since you are so fond or.seem 18 to be so fond of -- or somebody seems to be 'so fond within 19 the NRC of national academy groups, we can.ask the National 20 Academy as a panel to review this matter and.come up with i
21 recommendations.
22 That would be another point, but I think in i
23 effect they have asked us to do more :than we have, and. so I 24 would suggest that we use whatever time we have today for
()
25 seeing what our committee -- how we could proceed in general ace FEDERAL REPORTERS, INC.
202-347-3700 Nationwide Coverage 800-336-6646
- ~--
- 5150 12L12
-332 s
u 1
in view of the meeting we'have.
k_)7 bur r^'
2 DR..REMICK: :Letume ask a' question. fDo we~know
~
-3 of any in'dividual~or~ organization.that might-be 4
knowledgeable about.U.S. reactors but!would have some in -
5 depth knowledge'of what severaliother. countries are doing?
6-Would there.be some kind'of a-presentation lof making that 7-comparison in a knowledgeable, technical manner?
I 8
It seems like we get little-bits.of-information,
.9 but do we_know of any. individual orfgroup that might:
10 possibly know?
11 DR. LEWIS:
I understand what you are.saying.1 It-l 12 is not enough to say that the Mercedeslis.a-good car.
i 13
-DR.
REMICK:
I assume nobody knows.-
14 DR. OKRENT:' I don't~know.
I tried to=think of i
15 that.
16 DR. SIESS:
I have another question.: I want to j
17 get oriented here on the-agenda.
We1 discussed.with the j
18 Commissioners today improvements for: future-reactors.
N o w,.
j 19 what we are talking-about nowlis notifor' future reactors.
20 If I look at the first let' er I 'see ?in here about t
21 filter systems in Sweden and Germany,. and so = forth, or-some -
- 22 of the things the French are doing.about AC' current,-we are 1
1 23 talking about possible fixes for existingioperating plants.-
r 24 That-is the difference.
They might end.up in future-t
- ( )-
25 reactors,.but they weren't on our listLfor future reactors.
i
/\\CE FEDERAL REPORTERS, INC.
202-347-3700 Nationwide Coverage 800 336-6646
. _ _.. _ -. _, _. =. _,.~,-
.~.
t
' 5150 12 12' 333'-
i
~
' bur l
' Vent filters weren't on-our list for future reactors.
2 Somebody'might wonder why.
3-MR. WARD:
There was a general ~ thing about-i 4
containments.
5
- DR. SIESS: -It was very: general, though', you see.
6 Now, the Commission raised a question' pretty muchlin the 7
context of our list.
kt does give us an opening.
I just 8
want to be sure we are1 talking about things that they are 9
doing'to operating reactors that we.might want to do if our:
~
i 10 safety goals are'not met, or maybe'-iftthey are met, to ease 11 public perception.
12 MR.. WARD:
Is what you-are saying that you might
(~ }
13 have expected that we do'a systematic' review of'what is-14 being done in foreign reactors before we put out that. letter 15 we put out in January?
16 DR. SIESS:= I am -just trying.to get ' the
~
17 framework.
That letter was on future. light water reactors.
f 18 What we are talking about now is looking at foreign reactors 19 for fixes to existing ~ reactors.
20 MR. WARD:
Oh, are we?
21 DR. SIESS:
Otherwise, what is the difference, 22 you see?
23 DR. OKRENT:
Can I comment on that?
I thinkJthe-24 Commission question seemed to mix the two together in my y( )
25 mind.
Maybe I am wrong, but we were in fact in this part of l
+
/\\CEJFEDERAL REPORTERS, lNC.-
202-347-3700 Nationwide Coverage -
800-336-6646
-,,_.a.
u.
u.,_,-
-...:.=-
.,u.-
- 5150112512"
- 334.
- bu r :
1-the agenda going to talk-about-what-is being done:in.'other 2-countries now and whether;any.of it~should'be recommended-
'3' for existing' reactors.
4-But-they asked us to look at wh'at was the
~
5 relation-between what we'recommende'd for' future reactors and' 6
what was going on in existing'_ reactors' abroad.
7' So what I have been trying-.to sayjis:I don't
~
8 think we can hand theiproblem~toisomeone;else.
In.effect,
~
9 we now probably.need'to look at;it_from.both: points.-
~
10 DR. SIESS:
Th'eir question'was~I thought more:
11-specific than that.
It was obvious from.my letterJinLthe N 12 plus 2 and a couple'of other things that we._ referenced-13 foreign reactors, and.they-said,--well, some of these things:
14' these foreign reactors are doing, do-you'ihave :any -reactor,
15 out there in mind'that should be the way~we want:to go?
~
16 That was the way itlwas expressed.- ~Is therevan 17 example you can give us of a foreign reactor:that-i 18 incorporates not all 12 of these~,.but an-appropriate' mix-of.
19 them, and we said not necessarily.-
j.
20 I think that was what they asked.
.I think'.that 21 ought to be a part of.their follow-up-to thatiletter.
I am-l l
22 not sure it is that helpful.
It wouldn't help me-to'know-l 23 that some foreign: reactor did this.
That.is'in reacto'r.
f 24' design.
t 25l How many of these get in there and;what the.
1 ACE-FEDERAL REPORTERS, INC.'
d
-202-347-3700 Nationwide Coverage 800-336-6646
- 5150 12112 335 lbur 1
trade-offs are I am not competent on.
I just'want to know 2
we are talking about backfits to existing reactors to meet a
-3 safety goal or not to meet one-or something else.
4 The only example I see here now is the~ vent 5
filters.
6 DR. REMICK:
I think Dave says originally we 7
started out as kind' of backfits on existing plants, but it 8
is open now' based on the discussion today.
9 DR. SIESS:
It is a bit confusing if you don't 10 keep it simple.
11 MR. REED:
I think what was being asked is they.
12 are asking do we know of the best mix for going forward with~
{ 13 advanced reactors, and what would be -- could we put 14 together an objective evaluation of these particular 15 characteristics that should be put together. 16 Now, I want to mention something in history. 17 Perhaps you can conclude something from history. In the l 18 year 1955 the Board of Directors of Yankee Atomic Electric, j 19 which had just been formed, sat around the table trying tx) 20 make a decision on what would be done in New England'with' 21 respect to the first nuclear reactor. 22 They listened to Alvin Weinberg trying to sell 23 homogeneous, Sam Untermeyer trying to sell them a boiler, Al 24 Simpson trying to sell them PWR, and they wentithrough the () 25 whole gamut of these people, and what I am sure they j i ACE-FEDERAL REPORTERS, INC. 202-347-3700 Nationwide Coverage 800-336-6646 l
5150i12 12i 336 f"ybur 1-concluded _was, oh, well,'each one was prejudiced to his own \\) 2 . contraption. 3 I don't'think that the. prejudice to a person's ~ ^ 4 . contraption has gone away, and-I think-this bus'iness, in' 5 order to go. forward and._get _to the right, -.most saf e,- best, ~6 .most economical solution, somehow'.has to weed _out-the-~ ~ ~ 7 prejudice to now nations-- and EEP I'think~is--a perfect-8 example _-.to nations or anybody and even to:the 9 manufacturers in our own nation because they are..still: 10' prejudiced.to their own contraptions.- 11 i i 12 1 O 14 l-15 16 i 17 l 18 I 19 20 21 l 22 1 23 24 iso 25 y I ACE-FEDERAL REPORTERS, INC. 202-347-3700 Nationwide Coverage - 800-336-6646 -. + -,
5150 13 01 337 1llkAV/bc 1 Now, who can best objectively tell the 2 Commissioners, all right, you ought-to do this. You do it 3 for both advanced reactors to try to. revive the industry; or 4 maybe it will be so_important, you will put a little bit 5 into something that's existing. 6 In my opinion, you can't put together a group of 7 people-and get that objectivity and make your decision. And 8 the Yankee folks, I think, finally decided that in the end, 9 too. In fact, I convinced them. I went and told them I was 10 the dumbest guy in the business, I didn't know anything, but 11 I'd listened to all the greats trying to brainwash me with 12 respect because I served time at Argonne, Idaho, St. Louis, r(_ 13 everywhere. And I made an operator's foolish judgment based 14 on the state of the art at the time. 15 Now, I believe this committee as a body is_the 16 best committee as a body to~ listen to_the stories and make 17 judgnents. And they didn't do so bad in this letter that-18 went out, in my opinion, even though I wasn't here at the 19 time, on advanced PWRs. 20 Now, there's a meeting coming up with the 21 Italians. Somebody's in the meeting with the Italians, 22 right? Whoever that is, they ought to really explore that 23 situation and get this guy that's written the Italian paper 24 on the improved Italian reactors and.try to get that 25 information. And maybe meet in small groups with the French ~ 14CE FEDERAL REPORTERS, lNC. 202-347-3700 Nationwide Coverage 800-336-6646 -
-5150~13 02' 338 1hAV/bc 1 again. 2 The Germans, I think, are very good. And then 3 come together and get the. objective'best paths that lie 4 ahead. 5 MR. WARD: Could I make a comment there?- Jessie 6 might be interested in this, too.. But, a cou'ple of years. i 7 ago, I visited with some NR' team that visited several 8 European reactor sites.' Included was a one-day meeting with 9 the Italian State Architect Engineering outfit. And they 10 were telling me at that time they had just made a decision 11 to go ahead with their new standardized plant, which I guess 12 they finally authorized, which is a Westinghouse style PWR. 13 We asked them and tried-to sort of press the 14 point why they made the decision for the PWR instead of the } 15 BWR, the boiler. And they answered us at some length. 16 It wasn't just a casual answer. They said they 17' had made what they thought was a fairly careful study of the 18 pros and cons, safety, costs, a number of different things. 19 They regarded it as a toss-up. They went with 20 the PWR because the French had and because the Germans j 21 seemed-to be going down that road, and they thought they'd 22 be in a better situation in the long haul if they had the 23 same type of plant there. 24 But that's what it was based on.- d 25 MR. EBERSOLE: Almost a sociological judgment. ace FEDERAL REPORTERS, INC. 202-347-3700 Nationwide Coverage 800-336-6646
5150 13 03 .339 i(s,)AV/bc 1 MR. WARD: I don't know necessarily that they're 2 right. 3 DR. SHEWMON: 'It seems to me we could waste a 4 fair amount of effort, assuming that there is one solution, 5 and that that is best. Really, there's a. lot of different. 6 ways to optimize things. Part of it comes up to what 7 company is behind it. And what do they want to stand 8 behind. 9 The other thing is that if you start saying, gee, 10 I like that aspect of this plant and this aspect of another 11 one, and that aspect of another one, I have-the impression 12 we may end up with a camel here. You've still got to get 13 back to somebody integrating the system and making sure'he 14 has the batteries. 15 MR. EBERSOLE: By the way, Dave, you never got 16 the French to pursue the same question, but I suspect their 17 answer is about the same. It's more of a political 18 decision. 19 MR. REED: I disagree with that.- 20 MR. WARD: You might disagree with that. I'm 21 just telling you what we asked the. Italians and how they 22 responded. I think I'm remembering it accurately. 23 MR. EBERSOLE: The metallurgical' reason is a very. 24 good one. I'm wondering now whether it's a good reason. I 25 don' t know.whether this hydrogen business is going to i ACE FEDERAL REPORTERS, INC. 202-347-3700 Nationwide Coverage 800-336 6646 _ ~_
.5150 13 04 340 1llkAV/bc~ 1 improve or not, but it's beginning to look a little better. 2 I think even you, yourself, said if you could erase that, 3 then you would recognize that you are going to have to make 4 steam to make electricity, and the best.way to do'it is to 5 put some pins on a plate over the water. 6 MR. REED: I didn't tell you about the fact that 7 I wrote a report to the Yankee board-of directors in some 8 confusion after listening to all.the experts at the time. 9 And my report was the only two that could be considered, one 10 was a BWR, the other was a PWR, and I condemned the BWR at 11 the outset for about six reasons. 12 The metallurgical was number one. Compatibility 13 in the community for radiological reasons-was another. 14 MR. EBERSOLE: That was the era when they 15 operated on open cycle gases. 16 MR. REED: They still discharge a lot fore 17 radioactivity. 18 MR. EBERSOLE: With the cryogenic systems, they 19 don't do that. 20 MR. REED: You add the hydrogen and now you've 21 got it all over the plant, and you can't even go into the 22 gatehouse. There are about six, basic, fundamental 23 reasons. j l 24 MR. EBERSOLE: I thought you were talking about ("N s/ 25 the discharge from the dissolution of water. t /\\CE-FEDERAL REPORTERS, INC. 202-347-3700 Nationwide Coverage 800-336-6646
5150 13 05 341 1 AV/bc 1 MR. REED: Hydrogen 16, 2 MR. EBERSOLE: But that's long gone. 3 MR. REED: No, it's not. 4 DR. MOELLER: It's still there. 5 MR. REED: You've just aggravated it. 6 MR. EBERSOLE: What do you mean? 7 MR. REED: As soon as you put in the hydrogen, 8 you just increase the radioactivity throughout the whole BWR 9 envelop. 10 MR. EBERSOLE: Internally, sure, I agree with 11 you. 12 DR. REMICK: There's something that says that 13 appeals to me. Those topics are a good outline of things, } 14 As we do talk to foreign groups, to try to determine how 15 they handle those individual things from an unbiased 16 standpoint and how they handle them. 17 What's the philosophy? I think we should use 18 that letter, and we should talk to groups starting with the 19 Italians. We're talking about a mecting with the U.K. and 20 Canada, but use that letter as a subject list of comparing 21 philosophies of the countries; hopefully, without bias. 22 Dave? 23 DR. OKRENT: Just as a point of information, I'm 24 pretty sure that when the French began their program, they [ 25 were considering building both PWRs and BURS. In fact, v ACE. FEDERAL REPORTERS, INC. 202-347 3700 Nationwide Coverage 8%336-6M6
h 5150113'06 342 1 V/bc1 1-there was a pretty large investment in the PWR design, which' ~ 2 was lost. Why they'didn't build any BWRs, I don't know. 3 MR. REED: Well, I can tell you,-the ch'iof 4 engineer ~and two other guys -- very,.very smart guys from 5 Electricite de France and from'their nuclear whatever it 6 was, made the United States circuit. They visited all the '7 companies and they visited many utilities. 8-One utility was the Wisconsin Electric Power 9 Company. I'm sure they visited others. These people were a 10 very sharp' threesome and they made their'docision from that 11 U.S. circuit trip. 12 And I thought they.made a very,.very_ smart (} 13 decision. 14 DR. REMICK: It was very unbiased. 15 MR. REED: Well, look at their-success. 16 MR. WYLIE: Didn't the Italians, did they have-i 17. both BWR and PWR previous experience? 1 18 MR. REED: Yes. 19 MR. WARD: -Yes, they' re building a big - PWR, six 20 dual unit PWR plant right now. 21 MR. WYLIE: I think it's interesting that you 1 22 asked that question. The Commission asked whether the 23 plants are closer to this. A great number of these features 24 are on the German plants. In fact, the first two bullets () 25 that were previously released, I consider those two the /\\CE FEDERAL REPORTERS, INC, 202-347-3700 Nationwide Coverage. 800 336-6646 u
5150 13-07 343 1 AV/bc 1 most important aside from the electrical, which they:also 2 have. 3 DR. REMICK: There is the other side: What'do we 4 have that they don't? On those things, we always focus on 5 what we can add. 6 .DR. SIESS: I was reading this item about the~ 7 French on safety improvements. I noticed off site emergency 8 planning. That must be something we had that they didn't. i. 9-MR.' WYLIE: You know, it's not so much what you 10 have that they don't hear as to how they went about their. 11 design, which we're gravitating toward. I don't know why. 12 But, like G.E. says, yes, we: meet the principle (} 13 of this, and that's a BWR. Westinghou'se.has gone halfway. 14 They haven't gone all the way. 15 DR. REMICK: What concerns me is we always-seem 16 to be out of phase. I remember a trip _which I made to 17 Germany getting a very definite decision' technically they' 18 thought that was correct, but economically, they were.very 19 concerned about it, that they had gone too far in Germany. 20 In the same way on the Japanese trips, their preventive 21 maintenance program was very good, but they were. concerned 22 that they had gone too far. 23 And, therefore, for economic reasons felt that 24 they should relax also. 1 1 (} 25 MR. WYLIE: You mean on the maintenance program? 1 ACE FEDERAL REPORTERS, INC. 202 347-3700 Nationwide Coverage 800-336-6646 ..=
s ^5150 13-08 344 1 AV/bc 1 DR. REMICK: It sounds awfully' good in foreign 2 countries, but I'm sure you get the impression from the 3 amount of conversations that if they had their druthers, 4 they'd go a little bit more in our direction,.too. 5 MR. WYLIE: They may wish they had, too.- 6 MR. REED: Don't you think though if you're going 7 to survey other people who have a reputation ~in design -- 8 and that's what you're talking about, to pass. improvements 9 in design -- don't you think you wouldn t include the 10 Japanense? The Japanese are' people-oriented.. I don't.think 11 they're very design-oriented. 12 In fact, they have all their designs done still 13 by General Electric and Westinghouse. 14 MR. WARD: I think that's an over-generalization. 15 MR. REED: The whopper and the big G.E. Japanese 16 advance. 17 DR. REMICK: I think Chet has a good point. The 18 quality of their equipment-is important. 19 MR. REED: Is that the question we were asked.by 20 the Commission? 21 DR. REMICK: I think it's more than just design. ~ 22 DR. SIESS: That was tossed out by one person, 23 and I'm not sure what he'was looking for. If he-was looking 24 for an example, there were many. references in that foreign-() 25 practice. The N plus 2. There are a lot of things that are ACE-FEDERAL REPORTERS, INC. 202-347-3700 Nationwide Coverage 800-336-6646
.... ~ - -. 5150 13f09' 345~ 'li DAV/bc' l' -being done dif ferently 'in other countries:..in' th'e sense - of ~ h' 2 doing more. We're not nea'rly as aware of the things they're 4 3 -doing less, I don't'believe. -4,
- I-think-it's of considerable interest to know i
And the idea l 5 what they're doing and why they're doing it. L 6 that if.we're going to decide'.that, we'could;make a list of 7 these things, it ought"to be looked at.: 8 But why don't we just -tell: the Commission-~that ) 9 they ought to-look at it? I think theres ' a feeling that. 10 the staff looked at welds. Well, the staffLlook.at welds ~ 11 was not completely objective. L 12 In the first place, it's-hard for them--to 13 appraise something and say it's -a real safety : improvement in i 14 an official NRC document without' opening the. door.to 3 I 15 interventions, I guess, and other accusations. 16 I think.they tried to do an objective job, but I 17 don't really think it was. I think somebodp ought to do~'it, ~ 18 but how do you gd about doing it? I don.'t-think we can do-19 it. It's just not constituted that way. 20 You asked was there any organization.- ~ 21 DR.JREMICK:- That's=right. 22 DR. SIESS: I: don't know. The national ~ labs do { 23 this kind of thing allithe time. They-act as consultants. j 24 for subcontractor.to somebody. Somebody' mentioned the 25 Academies. -They can assemble a group of experts if they get I i ACE FEDERAL REPORTERS,-INC. 202 347-3700 Nationwide Coverage - 800-336-6646 - 4 ' -.-.a u. .,.. _ = ,, - - - +
7 ) Y f5150Ll'3910) .346 i-il V/bc ' ll the right advice-on assembling them. I have not gotIth$t F 2 much faith:in national research council committees.. IE 3. haven't served'on very many.: 4 ButIlookatthemandotheylookfor;--what[do-i P 5 they call it? - irepresentation of all groups, for example.- 6 They have a number of constraints:on them. And I don'.t 7. think the quality of their committees is; uniformly. good,' 4 L l 8 especially the ones that are more or7 ess-ad. hoc. 1 h ~ 9. The standing committees may'endtup better.- f 10 DR. LENIS: ' It.dependstvery much on 'how the 1 4 11 committee gets appointed, as you;said. -Typically,' you get.a i i 12 good committee if they have enough sense;to g'et-a good? 13 chairman and let him appoint the: committee. -They get:aibad-14 committee if they start off with a bad chairman.; i 15 But the Academy is, in my experience, not? - t j 16 particularly good except in specific cases with a. good ~ e 17 subject, good chairman, and he gets'to put together_the i 18 committee. i I 19 Actually, since-I've interrupted you for a. 20 moment, one thing that troubles me about this whole- ~ 21 conversation, and that is that.we are-talking almost 22 entirely about'the addition of features, leav'ingJaside the ~ 23 question of whether we want to enhance safety. 24 We always think of other countries-in-terms of-2 25 features they have that we don't have.- It seems it's-r } a ace FEDERAL REPORTERS,'. INC. 202-347-3700- . Nationwide Coveragen , 800 336-6646-e.e. -,ggm-g g q~. g*.- .gw -'gm ,--ec.. .-m.ee--g u. gew--e.nrp g.+-+ .e9. pq% g y,1-+ .mr- -4 m v g-s wyg gtg--j-+9.- g +g g+8--'T-p3'd T9*ye*wWdher-q-$p
W ~ L 5150 13 l'1 347 1 AV/bc 1 usually gadgets they have that we don'tihave. -There's more 2-to safety than additional features. 3 And I don't have anything constructive to.say, 4 but'I'm worried about the' narrowness of the focus.- 5 MR. REED: Isn't simplication in the' focus, too? 6 I thought it was from what we talked about. 7 Maybe we'll throw.'out some-features and are 8 looking hard at certain things that are-now being looked 9 hard at. Maybe we don't need them. And maybe we can get-10, rid of some barriers. 11 DR. SIESS:. Are you talking-future or present? ? 12 MR. REED: Future, we have to concentrate on. 13 And then there might be some backfitting'in special cases. 14 Now, Chet, I like what you just'said. 15 DR. SIESS: I don't nat; to tihrow out' anything on 16 existing reactors because histort.'has>s' aid that)if you~ add / 17 things on, you don't take anything off. 18 DR. OKRENT: No, we've.taken off some suppo ts. ,) 19 Pipe supports. 20 I MR. REED: Here'Q a " Jught. I've been impressed 21 by the people working on a-45 at. Los Alamos. They're going 22-to be wrapping up someday. Is it possible, following up on 23 what Cl.at said, that maybe a team could come out of A-45 24 that could put together something we could review? 25 MR. WARD: You know -- - ACE FEDERAL REPORTERS, INC. 202-347-3700 Nationwide Coverage 800-336-6646 J
L5150 13112 348 'lr#AV/bc l-DR. SIESS: That's. prevention. .Q ~ .2 MR. WARD:- At our June meeting,1 hopefully, we're-3 going to'need to spend a good bit ofetime reviewing whatever. 4 the. staff comes up with from A-45.- .5 I think, unless Ron Hernan ~ tells us :something 6 different, they claim they're going to come to us and,Jat-7 the June meeting, I'm bringing this up because I thin % it- -8 somehow'meses with this. I'm not sure'how. 9 But I think it does. '10 MR. EBERSOLE: Glen, how do you say you endorse 11 simplification.when you can look at a plant that takes steam 12 out of.-- {} 13 MR. REED: Do you want to argue'BWRs'and PWRs? 14 DR. SIESS: Jessie, we're talking about-existing-15 plants, and'the BWRs are there. Let's don't' talk - 'this.is 16 why I wanted to get some ground'onlthe. existing plants. 17 MR. WYLIE:- They'll be ~ there in the future. e 18 DR. SIESS: I know they'll'be there in the 19 future. 20 MR. EBERSOLE: The plants that you're talking 21 aoout, the ABWR, exists. 22-DR. SIESS: It makes a difference to me whether 23 we're talking about looking to foreign. practice, possible 24 backfits to; existing plants, like the French did with their ( }- 25 pump seal problem, like the Germans are proposing -- 14CEJFEDERAL REPORTERS, INC. L 202-347-3700 Nationwide Coverage 800-336-6646
h 5150-13;13-349 ' I-TAV/bc 1 incidentally, a backfit the Germans'are making is to their f i-U ~ 2 BWRs. If you want something we've been doing, theyl 3 weren ' t..- 4 The filter. systems,: the' seal ~ problems, the decay 1-5 heat removal, the dedicated decay: heat removal, the partial-6 backfits -- some of the plants were backfitted to that'- 7 several years ago.,They're not current. 8 These are the issues-we're talking about. 9 10 11 12 ,i O 14 15 16 17 18 19 20 21 22 23 24
- O 25 i
ACE-FEDERAL REPORTERS, INC. 202-347-3700 Nationwide Coverage 800-336-6646
O 5150 14 01 350 1 DAVbw 1 MR. EBERSOLE: The sticks to the seal problem is 2 no more than a patch on the deficiency. 3 DR. SIESS: That is what you are going to do. The 4 discussion is going in entirely different ways, whether we 5 talk about operating plants or future plants. 6 MR. EBERSOLE: I think all these improvements, 7 every one that we have looked at, is it really an 8 improvement, or is it a patch on a existing deficiency which 9 ought to be there. 10 DR. SIESS: A patch can be an improvement. } 11 MR. EBERSOLE: It also could just be another patch l 12 on a system that shouldn't be there in the first place. 13 DR. SIESS: If we want improvements, we don't care 14 if they are done by patches or some other ways. It's got to 15 be an improvement. 16 MR. EBERSOLE: I will never believe a patch is 17 better than a system that doesn't solve the problem in the 18 first place. 19 DR. SIESS: There's 119 plants out there. 20 DR. REMICK: Dave Ward. 21 DR. SIESS: Mr. Chairman, can we decide on 22 something to talk about? I think they are different. I ('; 23 think our approach has got to be different. 24 DR. REMICK: Do you want a soft blow to those who 25 want to focus on new Mants aM those whq maybe think we ACE-l*EDERAL KEPORTERS,1NC. 202-347-3700 Nationwide Coverage 800 336 6646
E '5150 14 02. 351 l Vbw '.1 should focuston existing plants?: 2 DR. SIESS:' We just wrote a. letter on new plants. g 3 I'm trying to see how this. relates to that. 4 DR. REMICK: That:is one possibility. 51 . Basically, isn't that the question we were asked } 6 this morning, which of these. things are-being incorporated 7 by foreign countries? 8 DR. SIESS: I guess you could say that.~ ButJ 9 that's a pretty slim hook to' hang-this on. ~ 10 DR. REMICK: You want us-to talk about existing 11 plants; is that it? 12 DR. SIESS: We started on this. 13 DR. OKRENT: It is probably'my-fault for bring up 14 what happe,d at the Commission meeting. I think Chet'is 15 right, we ought to, at least for some period of time, all be 16 talking about existing plants..That was the original. 17 topic. At some point, maybe the planning committee will 18 decide whether we do anything because of.the discussion that i 19 we had with the Commissioners. 20 DR. SIESS: We can always go back-and say we wrote 21 a letter, for example, which we are not proposing. We 22 talked about vented filters. We.can say this is a'way'of 23 meeting such a requirement we had about containments.in our 24 improved letter. We can use that on them in future plants. O 25 We will put the same patch on, then we will put on the old i ACE. FEDERAL REPORTERS, INC. 202-347 3700 Nationwide Coverage. 800-336 6646 1 .m n n,. - -,.... ~.
5'150'14 03 352 1 AVbw 1 ones.. 2 But I think the discussion will be, shall we say, 3 more focused in our time frame. 4 DR. REMICK: Are you sure? 5 DR. LEWIS: You realize you can't' focus a light, 4 6-unless it is coherent. l 7 DR. OKRENT: Why don't we stay with existing 8 plants. -9 DR. REMICK: Dave Ward? 10 MR. WARD: Okay. I've'got no objection to 11 existing plants, but I have lost track, if I ever had' track, 12 of what we are talking about. 13 (Laughter.) {} 14 I mean, are we wanting to identify, I guess, i 15 safety features in foreign nuclear power plants that might 16 be applicable to improving our existing plants?. Is that 17 sort of the subject? 18 Now it seems to me that I have got a certain 19 sympathy with what Hal was saying. We tend to look at 20 gadgets, and so forth, more than anything else, as different f 21 national programs have, for one reason or another, have 22 adopted different gadgets. There is a tendency to say that 23 the Europeans are doing this and that. Separate nations in 24 Europe are doing very different things. The French have not () 25 gone to M plus 2. The Frondh have gone with the bunkered ACE FEDERAL REPORTERS, INC. 202 347 3700 Nationwide Coverage 800-336-MA6
5150 14 04 353 1 AVbw I systems. 2 DR. SIESS: I am sorry. 3 DR. REMICK: We tend to ignore those countries who 4 aren't doing any of it or little of it and just assume they 5 must not know what they are doing. We look at those who 6 are adding. 7 MR. WARD: It seems to me rather than the gadgets, 8 if somehow we can understand the strategy that they have 9 developed, and I am afraid they don't understand their 10 strategies. 11 DR. SIESS: Well, look. Let me try the way I look 12 at it. We are worried about station blackout. Now the N 13 French have come up with a fairly simple solution to station 14 blackout. I don't know whether we could do it, whether wo 15 want to do it. I am assuming it might be necessary, but why 16 not look at what the French did and why they did it. If we 17 find it is simpler for economic reasons, investment reason, 18 or what, the RSK has got uneasy feelings about containments, 19 and they are seriously considering, according to this 20 " Nucleonics Week" article, requiring vent filters for all 21 containments. 22 MR. WARD: They told us they were going to do 23 that. 24 DR. REMICK: They said technically their position [^' 25 hadn't changed, but it had.
- l n_,_..
ACE-FEDERAL REPORTERS, INC. 202-347 3700 Nationwide Coverage 800-3364M6
5150 14 05 354 1 AVbw 1 DR. SIESS: The thing is, why are they doing it 2 and would it be useful for us to do the same thing? If they 3 are doing it for nontechnical, political reasons, would the 4 same reason apply here, or do we agree with them that there 5 is not a technical reason? 6 DR. OKRENT: I'm sorry. I have to interject a 7 question. I don't remember hearing the German delegation 8 saying that they were going to a filtered vent for 9 nontechnical reasons. 10 DR. REMICK: They indicated their position has not 11 changed. I don't know whether this was at the formal 12 session or prior to the formal session. I was told their ') 13 position had not changed, but they still thought they had to l 14 proceed. 15 DR. SIESS: Fine. Let's find out. 16 DR. REMICK: This was at Wingspread. 17 DR. OKRENT: I am referring ot the same meeting, 18 and I thought that what they, in fact, were saying, in a 19 sense, a little bit proudly, was that they have arrived at a 20 decision that they would have this filtered venting 21 provision for PWRs and announced in public, early in April, 22 before Chernobyl. That is what he said, I think. 23 DR. SIESS: I have a different recollection, 24 though. They were talking about that metal filter they were (^ 25 putting in, and said there was political pressure. They ACE FEDERAL REPORTERS, INC. 202-347-3700 Nationwide Coverage 800-336-6M6
5150 14 06-355 1 AVbw I were doing it, and they didn't.want to advertise it, and 2 they didn't want to do it everywhere. 3 The point is, we do.have different pressures.' than-4 their reasons. And I think their reasons are important. 5 We've got people who are perfectly capable'of examining the 6 fixes, technically, and if we let safety out, looking.at 7 those among.others, there are several areas that are of-8 considerable interest. Station blackout, decay heat 9 removal. They got into it from a different direction. They. 10 were worried about sabotage and airplane crashes and'came up-11 with something that serves them in other ways, as well. But 12 there are some of these issues that confront us that they 13 think they've got solutions to. {} 14 I would go further. The Japanese are doing 15 something to get quality operation, and in their equipment, 16 they are not doing it with paper. And there were some 17 comments in this article here about the quality of the 18 German plant. And the word " quality assurance" comes in, 19 but they come about quality of the inspectors and their-20 maintenance people. Quality quality, not paper. I think 21 there are things we should look at that other countries are 22 doing, which appear to be improvements and see whether they 23 really are, why they do it and how they do it. Because some 24 of the things they do, we can't do within our regulatory () 25 approach. ACE-FEDERAL REPORTERS, INC. 202-347 3700 Nationwide Coverage 800-3364M6
w e - e a a a .+w a +-. uas a + -. m. u u - ;5150 14 07. -356 1 AVbw 'l. DR.JLEWIS: Maybe we should.get IAEAnto do a-~ study 2 of the comparative safety of different-countries' nuclear [ 3 programs. Would we trust lthat? [ 4 DR. SIESS: Well,.nobody's1 bee'n kille'd'exceptLin i p 5 Russia.- 6 DR. LEWIS: . To steal one.of our' member's' thunder,- whom I. won'.t' identify, its might be, you1getimore mileage by.' ? 7-l 8 giving aptitude tests to all the operators than by adding )_ 9 any' gadget alone. I think somebody mentioned that-'once'.: ^ i I, 10 (Laughter.) 11-DR. SIESS: In-the?. German plant,.inften' years, 1-12 only 28 people have'left. 13 DR. REMICK: And you' heard about Peach Bottom. 14 DR. SIESS : - Well, they go,on' to say some other:- 15 things. 16 DR. REMICK: No turnover;is not necessarily good. i 17 DR. SIESS: It says that one. man = is not. rotated 18 from one task group, meaning that the people.know exactly. 1 19 who is responsible for what. The decision not-to shuffle i-1 20 personnel around has led to a deeper background 21 comprehension of the ' Staf f,. and ' they don ' t.. have any ' mistakes - p i l 22 in operation. 23 That wasn't the way it was at Chernobyl. I. I j 24 suspect.that if we had two nuclear Navy people on the 1 l 25 Commision, they might not ag ee-.with that, because the i Ace-FEDERAL REPORTERS, INC. } 202-347-3700 Nationwide Coverage 800-336-6646 Ia-, _, _ ~ -. .-._.a._,.--..._..a. ..__.,_-a..,.-----._..
5150 14 08 357 1 DAVbw 1 Navy likes everybody to be trained in everything. But they 2 think it is good, at least as plant manager. 3 DR. OKRENT: I would like to reinforce something 4 that was in Chet's recent set of comments. That is that we 5 look at what country's are doing to get quality. There may 6 be some things to be learned there and not necessarily 7 impossible to do. 8 DR. LEWIS: I would supprot that. That is a 9 tangible subject one could look into. 10 DR. OKRENT: It is not instead of these other 11 things, but I don't want to lose that suggestion. I think 12 it is an important one. ("x 13 MR. LEWIS: That may in the end be the highest v 14 leverage I have, and it is at lest isolatable. 15 DR. SIESS: There ought to be some way we can get 16 either a balanced or an impartial group to look at some of 17 these things. We could send a letter suggesting some 18 things, and they should pick up on it. It is not just what 19 they are doing, it is why they do'it, and how they do it. 20 MR. LEWIS: You know, over in that other 21 five-sided building, I sometimes recommend that there be a 22 principle that the Air Force be used to evaluate Navy 23 programs and vice versa, and everyone laughs when I say it, 24 but there is a need for something like that. '] 25 DR. SIESS: Is there any international group that ace-FEDERAL REPORTERS, INC. ll 202-347-3700 Nationwide Coverage 800-336-6646
5150 14.09 358 1 AVbw I would be willing to do this?
- 2 DR. SHEWMON:..The-IAEA.
3 DR. OKRENT: No. 4 MR. MICHELSON: _Its problem is, it's very; 5 political and doesn't want-to step on any country's toes or 6 anybody's ideas. 7 DR. SIESS: There are people from CDGB and RSK who 8 could get together. 9 DR. REMICK: Dave, how.much are we helping.you? 10 DR. SIESS: How about having the NRC Commission 11 organize an international workshop on this? If people came I 12 in and talked about the safety features, maybe something {} 13 would come out of that. 14 MR. LEWIS: Or DOS. Have DOE do it. 15 DR. SIESS: Yes. Then the Commission could-16 commission somebody to summarize its report. 17 MR. LEWTS: That would actually collect facts, 18 which is not a bad way to begin. f 19 DR. SIESS: They would require some 20 interpretation. 21 MR. LEWIS:- Facts, of course, make it harder to 22 come to conclusions, but it is a good way to begin. 23 DR. SIESS: That would provide a data base. 24 MR. LEWIS: That is better than facts. /'N 25 MR. WARD: It seems that it-is lacking some focus, i (_/ ACE-FEDERAL REPORTERS, INC. 202-347-3700 Nationwide Coverage 800-336-6646
~ 5150 14-10 -359 1 AVbw-1 though. Maybe that is not' a bad idea, but'it is a'little ~2 scattershot. 3 DR. SIESS: I think some thought would have to be 4 given to how you. focus it and about who you' ~ invited, I-5 think. But it is not just us in: members of this committee. 6 There are intervenor types, and I think somebody really_ 7 ought to investigate.it and know, if possible, how they>do 8 it. It might be. easier to have somebody_ talk then the why. 9 I got a mailing from the NII in England, describing how they-10 managed to negotiate things with CDGB, and it was pretty 11 frank. 12 I don't know. I am just looking for some way to 13 get something going. } 14 DR. OKRENT: Let me follow up again with a_ comment 15 on what Chet's been saying.- It's. conceivable to me that one 16 could have some kind of international workshop on how one is 17 or should achieve quality over'various aspects of the plant, 18 because that would bring in a certain group of people. To 19 try to bring it in over the entire plant,'I think, would 20 have disparate people and subjects much of the time. 21 DR. SIESS: Would that need about three or four q 22 issues? That would cover a lot. 23 DR. OKRENT: Still leaving'those other things to 24 be addressed. (~)/ 25 DR. SIESS: I don't know why they couldn't be s_ ace FEDERAL REPORTERS, INC. 202-347-3700 Nationwide Coverage 800-336-6646 w -
5150 14 11 360 1 AVbw I addressed the same way and even by the same workshop. We 2 could have a series of workshops. I thin if somebody 3 developed a pretty good data base, it wouldn't be too 4 difficult for people to get in there and draw some 5 conclusions. 6 If we just handed this to an academy committee, I 7 don't know how they would start to gather the data. 8 MR. REED: I think there are two subjects now, 9 obviously, on the table. One has to do with quality, people 10 and their performance, and the other has to do with the 11 design issue. I thought that Dave Ward was going to make a 12 statement that he supported the fact that the Los Alamos '} 13 team, spinning out of the A-45 work, might be a group that 14 could do something contributory and get some improvements 15 together. 16 MR. WARD: That is not a bad idea, Glenn, I kind 17 of like it. 18 We are going to hear from them and kind of devote 19 a good bit of time to it in the June meeting, perhaps 20 following on and maybe something will develop out of that, 21 because, see, that is talking about this subject. It is 22 talking exactly about this subject in a somewhat more 23 restricted sense, decay heat removal systems, and they 24 supposedly have looked hard at what the Europeans are doing [ 25 and other countries are doing. They have analyzed them in ACE-FEDERAL REPORTERS, INC. 202-347-3700 Nationwide Coverage 800-336 4 46
5150 14 12 361 1 AVbw 1 what is hopefully a systematic way and what plants in this 2 country are like and tried to use a risk assessment 3 methodology to be objective about it. It may be, there is a 4 pattern there which could be expanded somehow. 5 DR. OKRENT: Is this Sandia or Los Alamos? 6 MR. WARD: That's Sandia. I don't know, maybe we 7 will be so unhappy with what they have done for A-45, that 8 they are the last people in the world we would want to do 9 something else. 10 DR. SIESS: Some years ago, the Commission sent 11 John Stevenson to go to Europe to make a report on 12 containment design practices and quality assurance. I (^') 13 thought he did a fairly objective job. Is it possible that 14 by contracting it out to somebody that is outside the 15 establishment, they could get not one person, but an expert 16 in each of two or three areas and get a fairly objective 17 accumulation of data that we could review, for example, for 18 example? 19 DR. SHEWMON: This is on quality control and 20 quality assurance? 21 MR. WARD: I think there is a larger question. 22 DR. SHEWMON: Chet, would this be on quality 23 assurance and quality control? 24 DR. SIESS: This is just an example. They wanted () 25 somebody to look at how they did things over there, in terms Ace FEDERAL REPORTERS, INC. 202-347-3700 Nationwide Coverage 80rb336-6M6
~- ~
- 5150-14 13
-362 .,1 AVbw. 1 of construction. 4 J2 DR. SHEWMON: This group would then-be-on. safety d-3 . features? 4 4 DR. SIESS: You get one. expert.on one and one 5 expert on another. The point was that they went outside of 6 the establishment to get somebody that is fairly' 7' knowledgeable and'didn't'then represent the-NRC,'as such. ~ 8 If I can put my hands on the report -- 9 MR. REED: I wouldn't' support that" suggestion.for. 10 this kind of overall encompassing designLimprovement i 11 situation. I think you've got to have1 people who have been 12 in the business and in'the' gutters, preferably, of business. ! {} 13 LDR. SIESS: This is a man that had been in'the 14 business, and he was being asked to.look'at it. 4 i 15 MR. REED: Sure, he had been in the containment i i 16 business, but we.are talking about -- 4 j 17 DR. SIESS: I am not talking about sending him, I' j 18 am talking about sending somebody, that. is an expert in the - 19 area, who is not on the NRC Staff. There'must be.someone 20 out there. Get an AE to do it. 21 MR. REED: I think you'll find prejudice in'AEs, 22 just like there were prejudices many years ago. I J 23 DR. SIESS: And I see some prejudices on,this 24 committee. T 25. -MR. REED: No, I am an objective-person. That.is ACE-FEDERAL REPORTERS, INC. 202-347.-3700 Nationwide Coverage. 800-336 6646
b 5150 14.14-363 1 AVbw 1 exactly the way I introduced myself. 2 DR. SHEWMON: That means you_ don't have any 3 prejudices?- 4 MR. REED: I'm objective; no prejudices.. Bitter 5 experience has taught me the facts. 6 (Laughter.) 7 MR. WYLIE: You lie, tool 8 (Laughter.) 9 MR. WARD: He's objective; he's just made up his 10 mind. 11 MR. REED: Facts, you know. Bitter experience 12 tells you things. 13 DR. SHEWMON: Do we have any other " great" issues 14 to take up this evening? 15 DR. REMICK: No, I sure don't. I was about ready 16 to question. We have another 18 minutes, do we want to 17 spend it in this enjoyable fashion or break early? 18 DR. SIBSS: I haven't objected to anything, and I 19 have done all I can do to offer suggestions. So I think I 20 have been very good tonight. 21 DR. REMICK: Dave, I don't know where this leaves 22 you. I dons't now much guidance. There is a couple ideas 23 that were thrown out. 24 DR. SIESS: Do you think we could develop enough 25 ideas for our next meeting with the Commission to tell them ace. FEDERAL REPORTERS, INC. 202-347 3700 Nationwide Coverage sn33M/46
~ '5150 1<4415 -364 1 AVbw .1 a couple of things and ask<them for.some help? - I just-don' t-2 believe in going upLto the Commission with options. That is 3 the' Staff's jobs,'not ours.. 4 'DR. REMICK:- Ron? 5. MR. HERNAN: I'want'to confirm =with Dave'and the 6 rest of the committee.that we do: plan to Leome down in May to 7 give a presentation on A-45. - Even ' before that, we-will.im' 8l coming to the subcommittee and the: full committee on A-44, 9 which is station blackout.' The subcommittee meeting is now 10 scheduled for May 8, I think. 'So the May full committee. 11 meeting will. deal with A-44. Also in June, we plan'to come-12 'down with the generic issue on reactor coolant pump seals,- } as well as an update on the aux feedwate'r pump : issue. 13 14 So it seems that all these, things'are coming 15 together at about the same time. When~is'that last meeting? The one on 16 MR. WARD: 17 aux feed? 18 MR. HERNAN: The aux ' feed will be a full committee 19 update. I don't know if a subcommittee' meeting has been 20 scheduled for that. 21 DR. REMICK: Dave? 22 DR. OKRENT: I think, unless there are someinew 23 ideas that members want to put on the table, we have 24 probably done as well as one should expect'for a Friday (} 25 afternoon. In fact, I think it's not been without some ACE FEDERAL REPORTERS, INC. '202 347-3700 Nationwide Covcrage 800-336-6646
- : 5150 il 4.16 - 365 1 AVbw l' progress, and I think we have to come back to this subject. 2 'I'will try 3. DR. REMICK: I'have'an'important' announcement to 4 make.. -5 Two members.apparently'are having their:50th ' 6i. -birthday this month, Paul Shewmon and Dave Okrent. 7 DR. OKRENT: -50th! 8 (Laughter.) 9 DR. SHEWMON:.That's right order of magnitude. 10 MR. WARD: Close enough. 11 DR. REMICK: Congratulations, both of you. -12 The-meeting is adjourned. 13 (Whereupon, at 5:45 p.m., the. meeting was' 14 adjourned.) 15 16 17 18 19 20 -l 21 22 23 24 C:) 25 /\\CEJFEDERAL REPORTERS, INC.. 202-347 3700 Nationwide Coverage 800-336-M46 { l 1
CERTIFICATE OF OFFICIAL REPORTER O -g This is to certify that the attached proceedings-before-the UNITED STATES NUCLEAR REGULATORY COMMISSION in the matter of: NAME OF PROCEE6ING: ADVISORY COMMITTEE ON REACTOR SAFEGUARDS 324TH GENERAL MEETING j 2 DOCKET NO.: PLACE: WASHINGTON, D. C. DATE: FRIDAY, APRIL 10, 1987 I were held as herein appears, and that this is the original transcript thereof for the file of the United States Nuclear Regulatory Commission. s l (sigt) f - (TYPED) DAVID L. HOFFMAN Official Reporter YehorYer s Akibat[o'n "* O
1 O AGENDA FOR ACRS MEETING Meeting on April 10,.1987 1:30 p.m. Friday Room 1046 H-Street i Washington, D.C. RECENT SIGNIFICANT EVENTS Presenter /0ffice Date Plant Event Telephone Page-3/16/87-Turkey Boric Acid Corrosion on Reactor A.- Herdt, Reg II 2 Point 4 Vessel Head Due To RCS Leakage 242-5585 t 3/16/87 Salem Erosion-Induced Break on Steam R. Woodruff, IE 12 Generator Feedwater Recirculation 27205 O Line 1/28/87 Indian Battery Below Minimum Temperature E. Weiss, IE' 19 Point 2 for Required Capacity 29005 3/9/87 Trojan Potential Internal Flooding of T. Chan, NRR 21 ESF Equipment 27136 2/20/87 Vogtle Hydrogen Leak Inside Auxiliary E. Weiss, IE 23 Building 29005 i i General Comments J. Rosenthal, IE 24193 E. Jordan, IE 24848 i I f l O l l
4 b --lO 1 ) I 1 1 TURKEY POINT 4 1 'l BORIC ACID CORROSION ON O \\ REACTOR VESSEL UPPER HEAD i i MARCH 13, 1987 i t J i l O 2
~ O PROBLEM: BORIC ACID CORROSION OF EQU R VESSEL (RV) UPPER HEAD i' h
- t SIGNIFICANCE:
- j
~ ii O 1 POTENTIAL. DEGRADATION OF RC 1 + E TO EQUIPMENT ON THE RV HEAD CAUSE: SMALL LEAXAGE FROM AN INSTRU i!O i \\- w. -e, .,,-_--..--a.-,---e-,-. --e m --,-,---,,-.v,---,-
OVERVIEW QF EVENT ? ' O UNIT COMING OUT OF REFUELING dVTAGE - SMALL LEA e LOWER CONO-SEAL DURING AUGUST 1986 INSPECTION. LICENSEE CONSIDERED NEGLIGIBLE WITHIN TECH SPEC LIMITS. INSPECTION AGAIN IN OCTOBER 1986 SHOWED LEAK TO STILL BE NEGLIGIBLE. STILL WITHIN TECH SPEC LIMITS. ANOTHER INSPECTION PLANNED WITHIN SIX M
- ON 3/13/87, WESTINGHOUSE NOTIFIED FP&L THAT EXPECTED COR 1
WERE HIGHER THAN HAD PREVIOUSLY BEEN CALCULATED. THIS WAS BASED ON A 1 j CORROSION PROBLEM ON THE RV HEAD OF A FOREIGN REACT lO
- REACTOR WAS IN HOT SHUT 00WN ALREADY FOR PE i
TAKEN TO COLD SHUTDOWN AND RV UPPER HEAD INS l o CORROSION ON CRDM SHROUD, RV BOLTS (28 0F 58), RV KA0 WOO AND CRDM COOLING DUCTS
- ABOUT 500 LBS. OF BORIC ACID CRYSTALS ON RV HEAD l
. AIT SENT TO SITE ON MARCH 19, 1987 4
- lO I
I - u turn.mii 1 e 1 1 7- = a e*-aE'iwsios we. eat = ... a n-nn* a I = 1 ....r ,.e ... a. .= ... e. crn ...r 8 %m. , ~ ~ ~ is ~ l r ,.1._ l t a ar r.q _ 4_ wum o j
,,,,
i \\ .I i,c i a kl M [ x $5hhh h"" [m".1 ~ N --g .n m ,M-.. ) 6 l } .,? t j A i i .I 3 !' O y E I +j /,, " ', ' f~q g l 4 3. I )1lRW51-t 1 --i 7 ji l I. I t n 8 5 ,3 _ j t .e 1 m ) ll J
- E se. l, L
'a .,f i .pj i es s d i uryumer russiT. ~ qal g m <,f y f I s l l l 4 a. _u s,rn _ i\\ f M4 ~ 'f6@j~ E 7 9 i e 7 .g N.sw /ers YAM isosin ov \\ y,. ~ / / / / / // 4 l z i y" \\ ) l (
- O I
il l 3 P 3' i L 1 k
- lp"l.:4}
1 l r..j,,,,'r,, M
- 4.,1 i
~ ~, = E 4 f a O C E NE R AL. NO T E S 4, [ J .., g. p g.. .m.-. m oto,n m... ..gg. 8 't ' 'aW,"43'5 #50'** "' '"""*" %= { N E "' r.,,LO.'t'0*,2',fe* "'" 'OMJ (3tM 1.M4 664 ten rpiei.g. e sg 3 as 4 e PG4 64dn4 ............ se48 R 4 2 6
- A110P andif I
b e.,.,,.
,a-
- +a
-a ,,a, ,a s a - + - '-- l r _.. m. I I I l o i I I I l l k5 d W N. != ;,= = = h$ ' ZI % {Zl = @ l20 llll :::
- l l
. = = e = 4 l0 ' : . =P' ::l = = =
- l ::: = :=l =
= = 0 %l C ZI =l 0 l = ~
:::
= 2 ' = =
,Ol ll'l'l = ' = Oi 3 0 : 0; l Cl ;Ol 1
- =l.=
l l =
- =
O Cl l Z! ll Z O
- A
- =
- A
= 0 r- =;,
- =
.m. m w n J l$ l'U i i i 1} k bo 3 O t o" Grgy PW3 W% sd,y i.,gn,B.yM l '}2., 'q, ~. . m.m t f w. ? =5!h P2hm$[$d,c s. ~ l . - [5.' 9 q 4 E!!l?I&g. $6 1 .i Ql"?*M_ ?.' ?.'Jy, @lieMi{. /,. of(t' WS QL 9[ ~ p$m t-A e p-{ 41 @g i pp..r# e p-r i pva?f;:lijP j gv 4l .sp $p i r i
- f. [. k,
,Ig L r t .y E $. s } N.. a. # " ~ e.
- s.. -
Y. e;, e ga![ i$$gd$ .my.m a .i
- i. h y
m.,#.y m', [ m. A $k&}f-[h, I Q 9 a$! ). h d, y fcz.g),/ p c. f( hf' ( ( i.5 wt --g;. _ - }r:;..y,g :'$jp ~ Q '" ' '3'. -
- i..
s........r.. w.. wm/ y%. a .y ~ -...., - - - - - -. - - -. - - -.,, - , -.. ~, -. _..., -,. - - -,. -. -, -. _.. - - -... - -. -.. - _... -. - -.. -. - -. - -..,.
p y s -s a u ._s 4 I I i
- ~O I
I i L ga: s ege ns: s s;
=u:s s
- =
5 =;==_=
- =u i
= 4
== l = l:::::: + w a
- W =0 O
1 = O! A 3 6;:: 3== l-l t = 0
!=
- w:\\~ w
~ m x ~ ~ 3lO;3.O 0 lllll = 0 l 3 % @ E 3 JO 0 i c ,ia l s gj:; u. ' I' O 4 i I 7 w i s _ u m L5 I l}l 3 m
- w. y
~~^ .. " - _~r lMMd( YE }i l ; 4 nwii.w;m+ 1 1 j 0!EEMill2JW4 a m y ,jipetuns - s..fg,[, t f l l 3 { .g ne / nex I dk 25 '24j i 26 O 1 7 ---,...__.-..-,,---.---,l.. -,.,,.-_.,,--.,,,..,-.--.,.,,,.--,,,,-,,..-,-,-.___-_..r.,,
t I ~ \\ l e 1 O N CONTRO R TV.) WECHANISW DAMPER' COOLER .p C (g r 1 I l _ REACTOR SFtflotNG i l t 4 E '# N M /_____ 0, .j CRAN 5 MAIL i d d l 1 amn l ) I 4 ,( b'= ~* tO k.-- ggROUD ( 1
- 1.,
f x / X i )
- CAC10R
= WW l
- O FIG F a li"
l
- O THERMOCOUPLE PENETRATION AND CONDUrr SEAL ASSEMBLY i
l _ SPLif ANO ,'",,,",,"" I ;
- CKING RINGS h f JACXING SCREWS - -
= PORT COLUMN - lj r -- SEAL ACAPTER l h( ,,m m. at y$s m -, UPPER CONOSEAL - J fLi SEAL Plug - /;
- 4.. :a 4g ot i@
h
- 3. M.
=,,,!g,%, meMuocouPts DIM 8L38 cePs4 PORT EXTENeioN Mii . f p ElDl M.I (h7 W h 1 LowsR ff.:; t 1
- coNosEAL w:
1 g!; 4 cuups .f h.,f w '~ ( l l l PORT COLUMN-d' LowsR PORT EXTENSION w 1 y.u a. f HEAD PENETRATION g J: 1 REACTOR \\ -.~.~ . i
- l YESSEL HEAD
. e k n,C J e. i' FIGURE V
l 1 ,l ils ,!' !ll.f, -l-[,< [b c$~J,b l,!!~,'C I i J ll nth ] o !i 'l f I, "=== g .! v % v i s ~/ /(: s l N c -[ g@@O-3 9*G,. t - - ~ ~ ~, q -g ~ Il m y9 mg / h' 7 C N, y e / &+ Q:57\\ g rl ,g ,/ l r .e [,GG$Gl)*'e d .x e l m =j l-N 3 \\ \\fl i j e 11! r s !!i , x Si v! ja s (./ \\ !;l $ al \\ ,x \\ r I: \\ gli x ei a I!.!! 's,,... .O JO
([) LICENSEE FOLLOWUP ACTIVITIES LICENSEE ASSESSED DAMAGE REACTOR HEAD TO BE REMOVED CONO-SEAL. DESIGN ($) CLEANUP REPLACEMENT OF DAMAGED PARTS STUDS CRDM SHROUD OTHER EQUIPMENT (2) //
O SALEM 1 FAILURE OF FEEDWATER RECIRCULATION LINE-MARCH 16,1987 R. WOODRUFF, IE PROBLEM DURING STARTUP, ONE OF TWO LINES FAILED CAUSE EROSION CAUSED BY WATER IMPINGEMENT O SIGNIFICANCE POTENTIAL HAZARD TO OPERATOR SAFETY POTENTIAL FOR CIIALLENGES TO PLANT PROTECTION SYSTEM i
- o l
/a
RECIRCULATION LINES PROTECT THE FEEDWATER PUMPS DURING OPERATIONS REQUIRING LOW FLOW CONNECT THE PUMP DISCHARGE LINES TO THE CONDENSER ARE IN SERVICE DURING: STARTUP UNTIL HEADER FLOW INCREASES TO 2300 GPM SHUTDOWN AFTER HEADER FLOW DECREASES O TO 6000 GPM FULL FLOW IS 37,200 GPM USE THROTTLING DEVICES BECAUSE OF THE LARGE PRESSURE DROP BETWEEN THE PUMPS AND THE CONDENSER ARE FABRICATED FROM 6-INCH A106B CARBON STEEL PIPE WITH NOMINAL 0.432-INCH WALL' 9 O ^ /3 4
4 m a O' O O RECIRCULATION LINE FEEDWATER PUMP 12 (1OF2) FEEDWATER HEADER 7 ( VALVE 32 VALVE 31 O x CONDENSER 11 ( 10F 3 ) 4 o O !Y
O THROTTLING DEVICE THROTTLING DEVICE IS 20 INCHES LONG,AND CONSISTS OF A SERIES OF BAFFLES FABRICATED FROM STAINLESS STEEL WITH CARBON STEEL STUBS BREAK WAS 1/2 SQ INCH AND LOCATED IN THE DOWNSTREAM STUB O. OPERATING TIME WAS 96 HOURS / YEAR / PUMP MINIMUM MEASURED WALL THICKNESS ON THE OTHER LINE WAS 0.360 INCH O /5
4 THROTTLING DEVICE P REMOVED gg.pu4 >:uovu wg: zwwwww +:ow :.o:muo <uucxua -xwns, rss/sMasa s. h M3 i$.. P!g L l m
- ss2 s/As wssss&ss w
- ss ;>
s-wwmmmumsww - -effeese<<ee<<efem n INW83 STAINLESS STEEL A106B CARBON ST O J I l 2
O. ' SALEM 1 FEEDWATER RECIRCULATION LINE 1 FEEDWATER PROPOSED PARAMETERS SALEM 1 IE IN EULK VELOCITY 0-28 FPS ?> 10 FPS ($) TEMPERATURE i' STARTUP 100 - 200 F 195 - 440 F ~. SHUTDOWN 400 - 100 F PH 8.8 - 8.9 <(- 9,2 i i OXYGEN 5 PPB <' 600 PPB f e j77 -1
4 O FOLLOWUP LICENSEE REPLACED THE FAILED STUB WITH ANOTHER OF THE SAME MATERIAL LICENSEE IS PLANNING TO REPLACE THE PIPING AND STUBS WITH CHROMALLOY NRC IS PROCESSING A BULLETIN WHICH WOULD COVER THIS EVENT O /8
2/9/87 INDIAN POINT 2 - BATTERY BELOW MINIMUM TEMPERATURE O FOR REQUIRED CAPACITY JANUARY 28, 1987, - (E. WEISS, IE) PROBLEM: STATION CLASS 1E BATTERY #21 BELOW TEMPERATURE REQUIRED TO DELIVER REQUIRED CAPACITY [Al$1: COLD WEATHER INADE0VATE ROOM HEATING LOUVERS OPEN TO OUTSIDE BATTERY ROOM NOT ON LICENSEE'S FREEZE PROTECTION PROGRAM BATTERY LOADING ALLOWS LITTLE MARGIN FOR LOW TEMP \\ SIGNIFICANCE: SURVEILLANCE REQUIREMENTS AND PROCEDURES DO NOT ADDRESS THIS PROBLEM O* BATTERY CAN BECOME INOPERABLE WITHOUT OPERATOR'S KNOWLEDGE DISCUSSION: PLANT AT 96% POWER l REGION I INSPECTOR NOTES COLD CABLE SPREADING ROOM AND QUESTIONS OPERABILITLQF.BATIERIES. ELECTROLYTE TEMP 54*F ON 1 0F 4 CLASS 1E BATTERIES LICENSEE CONSULTED WITH BATTERY MANUFACTURER WHO RAN COMPUTER PROGRAM INDICATING THAT MINIMUM TEMPERATURE FOR BATTERY #21 i SHOULD BE 65'F 1000 HRS - LICENSEE DETERMINES BATTERY IN0FERABLE 1620 HRS - PLANT BEGINS ORDERLY REDUCTION OF POWER BATTERY CAPACITY DEGRADES AS TEMP DECREASES BATTERY LIFE DEGRADES AS TEMP INCREASESL VERY LOW TEMPERATURES CAN PERMANENTLY DAMAGE BATTERY LICENSEE CLOSED LOUVERS WITH 2X4 AND ADDED PORTABLE HEATERS TO ROOM /7
f 2/9#87 '"D'AN POINT 2,(CON'T.) O LICENSEE FIRST ATTEMPTED TO RAISE TEMPERATURE WITH DISCHARGE AND THEN SUCCESSFULLY USED EQUALIZING CHARGE TO RAISE ELECTROLYTE TEMPERATURE 2145 HRS - PLANT TERMINATES SHUTDOWN AT 49% POWER WHEN ELECTROLYTE AT 65'F FOLLOW-UP; IE PREPARING INFORMATION NOTICE O l 0
TROJAN - POTENTI AL INTERNAL FLOODING OF ESF E0ll!PMENT "^"C" 8' - " '"*"' """) O PROBLEM: POTENTIAL FLOODING OF EDG ROOMS AND AFW PUMP ROOMS DUE TO POSTULATED CIRCULATING WATER LINE' BREAK \\ CAllSE: DESIGN / ANALYSIS ERROR SIGNIFICANCE: POTENTIAL DEGRADATION OF SAFETY-RELATED EQUIPMENT DISCl!SSION: INTERNAL FLOODING SCENARIO EVALUATED BY STAFF IN ORIGINAL LICENSING PEVIEW eROUND FEB. 1, 1987,. OPENINGS.FOR GROUND LEVEL LOUVERS USED FOR FLOOD CONTROL IN TURBINE BUILDING WERE FOUND OBSTRUCTED Q* BECHTEL ANALYSIS TO DETERMINE EFFECTS OF OBSTRllCTION REVEAL DEFICIENCY OF LOUVER RELIEF CAPACITY IN ORIGINAL FLOODIPG ANALYSIS LEAKAGE RATE INTO EDG AND AFW PUMP ROOMS CURRENTLY UNKNOWN - TIME TO EXCEED FLOOD HEIGHT UNKNOWN - MAXIMUM FLOOD LEVEL UNKNOWN FLOODING CONCERN CURPENTLY DOES NOT EXIST SINCE TURBINE FUILDING WEST WALL HAS BEEN REMOVED FOR OUTAGE RELATED ACTIVITIES FOLL OW-!!P: LICENSEE TO CORRECT DEFICIENCIES REGION V TO FOLLOW-UP IE IS CONSIDERING AN INFORMATION NOTICE O 2/ c
O .-W1 s 'O t 's 3 "S o 9 $d w o V W g ~ 1 ?c 0 p O ~ r t ts
- 1 I
1 3e w l i Q xxwV d g "$ 'fr 73 O o s
- ix I
o-a2 t 2 "i s o -co a 0 E i 4 %b 3 %x N 3 k s 4 t sm O Ad a>
r OTHER EVENT OF INTEREST 3/2/87 V0GTLE - HYDROGEN LEAK IN AUXILIARY BUILDING FEBRUARY 20,1987- (E. WEISS, IE) O PROBLEM: VALVE PACKING'ON'SMALL HYDROGEN LINE LEAKED INSIDE AUX BLDG SIGNIFICANCE: HYDROGEN LEAKAGE FROM LINES IN SAFETY RELATED AREAS OUTSIDE-CONTAINMENT MAY BE A GENERIC CONCERN i NO INSTALLED HYDROGEN DETECTION, SO. SLOW LEAKS MAY GO UNDETECTED (EXCESS FLOW CHECK VALVES PREVENT LARGE LEAKS) CAUSES: PACKING LEAK ON SMALL GLOBE VALVE AREA NEAR LEAK HAS LITTLE VENTILATION (HVAC FLOW BALANCING PROBLEMS) CIRCUMSTANCES: UNIT IN COLD SHUTDOWN (UNIT HAS NOT G0NE CRITICAL) HYDROGEN VALVE REPOSITIONED 1/26/87-CHLORINE DETECTORS TRIP 2/20/87 N0 T0XIC GAS FOUND, SO SHIFT SUP DIRECTS FURTHER SAMPLING 0309 HPs DISCOVERED HYDR 0 GEN IN VERTICAL PIPE CHASE NEAR CENTER OF Al'X BLDG CONCENTRATION 20% OF LOWER FLAMMABILITY LIMIT (LFL) ROOM A-24 1.2% H BY VOLUME 2 CURRENT ESTIMATE IS 500 TO 1000 SCF HYDROGEN 0319 ISOLATED HYDR 0 GEN SKID 0325 SOURCE OF LEAK IDENTIFIED (VALVE PACKING ON 1 INCH SCHEDULE 80 CARBON STEEL LINE TO VOLUME CONTROL TANK) LINE IS FROM LIQUID HYDROGEN SKID OUTSIDE TURBINE BUILDING ~ (CAPACITY IS 335,000 SCF) SKID IS USED TO SUPPLY HYDROGEN T0: 1. MAIN GENERATOR 2. VCT 3. HYDROGEN REC 0MBINERS IN WASTE GAS SYSTEM 0337 VENTING 0F HYDR 0 GEN HEADER TO TURBINE BUILDING ROOF-0341 UNUSUAL EVENT DECLARED, DOORS TO AUX BUILDING PROPPED OPEN 0404 N0 HYDROGEN REPORTED 0536 UNUSUAL EVENT TERMINATED FOLLOWUP: LICENSEE EXAMINING: O - USE OF DIAPHRAGM VALVES IN THIS APPLICATION - BASIS FOR EXCESS FLOW CHECK VALVE SETP0 INT IE CONSIDERING AN INF0 NOTICE-23 t}}