Text

Proposed Tech Spec Changing NUREG-1305 to Combined Tech Specs for Units 1 & 2
	ML20206B954
Person / Time
Site:	South Texas
Issue date:	11/07/1988
From:	; HOUSTON LIGHTING & POWER CO.
To:	;
Shared Package
ML20206B935	List: ML20206B954; ST-HL-AE-2854, Application for Amend to License NPF-76,changing Tech Specs, NUREG-1305,for Unit 1 to Combined Tech Specs for Units 1 & 2.Change Administrative in Nature Only.Fee Paid;
References
	RTR-NUREG-1305 NUDOCS 8811160059
	Download: ML20206B954 (32)
	v • d • e

.

Attachment Al PROPOSED REVISION TO TECHNICAL SPECIFICATION 3.4.9.3 AND BASES PAGE 3/4 4-14 NL.88.304.01 fff 0 '.

u h

)

P

e REACTOR COOLANT SYSTEM OVERPRESSURE PROTECTION SYSTEMS f.

SURVEILLANCE REOUIREMENTS

~

4.4.9.3.1 Each PORV shall be demonstrated OPERABLE by:

a.

Performance of an ANALOG CHANNEL OPERATIONAL TEST on the PORV actuation channel, but excluding valve operation within 31 days prior to entering a condition in which the PORY Is required OPERABLE and at least once per 31 days thereafter when the PORV is required OPERABLE; b.

Performance of a CHANNEL CALIBRATION on the PCRV actuation channel at least once per 18 months; and c.

Verifying the PORV block valve is open at least once per 72 hours8.333333e-4 days 0.02 hours 1.190476e-4 weeks 2.7396e-5 months when the PORV is being used for overpressure protection.

4.4.9.3.2 The RCS vent (s) shall be verified to be open at least once per

~

12 hours1.388889e-4 days 0.00333 hours 1.984127e-5 weeks 4.566e-6 months

when the vent (s) is being used for overpressure protection.

The. p oslJove displaceme n +

cha be dernonsfra+ed keperable ** a+ leos +jn3 pun >p Y W 9. 3. 3.

shall o nee per-(

31 claLjs, eccep-l when the reaclor vessel heacl is or +he purnp is req uired Scr hydrosfahc rernoyed bo+h cen+cdugal cIveg+ inn puenps

+eshog,eoe ha4 ht.rno4 circud a re, i nop ra ble,

by veci/ yin 4 +cpen posihon. 3r c

brea kes are sicured in th

Except when the vent pathway is provided with a valve which is locked, sealed, or othenvise secured in the open position, then verify these valves open at least once per 31 days.

\\

is

.tn s nT A Mh SOUTH TE S - UNIT 1 3/4 4-38

INSERT A The provisions of 3.0.4 and 4.0.4 are not applicable for entry into MODE 4 from MODE 3 for the positive displacement pumn declared inoperable pursuant to Spcification 4.4.9.3.3 provided that the positive displacement pump is declared IN0pERABLE within 4 hours4.62963e-5 days 0.00111 hours 6.613757e-6 weeks 1.522e-6 months af ter entry into MODE 4 from MODE 3 or prior to the temperature of one or more of the RCS cold legs decreasing below 3250F, whichever comes first.

INSERT B, The positive displacement pump may be energized for testing provided the discharge of the pump has been isolated from the RCS by a closed isolation valve with power removed f rom the valve operator, or by a manual isolation valve secured in the closed position.

REACTOR COOLANT SYSTEM BASES

]

LOWTEMPERATUREOVERPRESSUREPROTECTION(Continued)

%e

'# g overshoot beyond the PORY Setpoint which can occur as a result of time delays P"f "

in signal processing and valve opening, instrument uncertaint s, and single failure.

To ensure that mass and heat input transients more evere than those assumed cannot occur, Technical Specifications require locko of all high head safety injection pumps while in H0DE 5 and H0DE 6 with the r ctor vessel head on.

All but one high head safety injet ion pump are require to be locked out in MODE 4.

Te:;hnical Specifications also require lockout a all but an2 charging pump while in MODES 4, 5, and 6 with the reactor vessel haad insta11cd and disallow start of an RCP if secondary temp /'eritereismo7'e.than50*Fa 6-Y"*'

" M'1 / "'/""

primary temperature. Th e.

fDP ce de us" m

J.~

as e e J.. w l t "t> <

m *r* "

~

The Maximum Allowed PORV Setpoint for the COMS will be updated based on the results of examinations of reactor vessel material irradiation surveillance specimens performed as required by 10 CFR Part 50, Appendix H, and in accordance with the schedule in Table 4.4-5.

3/4.4.10 STRUCTURAL INTEGRITY The inservice inspection and testing programs for ASME Code Class 1, 2, and 3 components ensure that the structural integrity and operational readiness of these components will be maintained at an acceptable level through%ut the life of the plant.

These programs are in accordance with Section XI of the dy ASME Boiler and Pressure Vessel Code and applicable Addenda as required by 10 CFR 50.55a(g) except where specific written relief has been granted by the Commission pursuant to 10 CFR 50.55a(g)(6)(i).

Components of the Reactor Coolant System were designed to provide access to permit inservice inspections in accordance with Section XI of the ASME Boiler and Pressure Vessel Code, 1974 Edition and Addenda through Winter 1975.

3/4.4.11 REACTOR VESSEL liEAD VENT 5 Reactor vessel head vents are provided to exhaust noncondensible gases and/or steam from the Reactor Coolant System that could inhibit natural circulation core cooling.

Ihe GPERABILITY of at least two reactor vessel head vent paths ensures that the capability exists to perfom this function.

i The valve redundancy of the reactor vessel head vent paths serves to mini-aize the probability of inadvertent or irreversible actuation while ensuring that a single failure of a vent valve, power supply, or control system does not prevent isolation of the vent path.

The function, capabilities, and testing requirements of the reactor vessel head vents are consistent with the requirements of Ites II.B.1 of NUREG-0737, "Clarification of THI Action Plan Requirements," November 1980.

'N h

SOUTH TEXAS - UNIT 1 B 3/4 4-14

Attachment B NO SIGNIFICANT HAZARDS EVALUATION FOR NINOR CHANGES TO T11E ADNINISTRATIVE SECTION OF THE TECHNICAL SPECIFICATIONS NL.88.304.01

611gchment B NO SIGNIFICANT HAZARDS EVALUATION FOR MINOR CHANGES TO THE ADMINISTRATIVE SECTION OF THE TECHNICAL SPECIFICATIONS BACKGROUND During the STP Unit 2 licensing review, the Staff identified a number of enhancements or clarifications required in the Administretive section of the Technical Specifications. Since HL&P intends that the Technical Specifications be applicable to both units (i.e., Combined Technical Specifications) HL&P submits this amendment request to ensure that the changes encompass both units. As demonstrated below, the changes are minor and no significant hazards consideration exists.

PROPOSEQ CBANGES The first change inyOlves modification of wording to Section 6.5.1.2 to further define the composition of the Plant Operations Review Committee (PORC). Specifically, the change will require that if the Technical Services Manager does not meet the qualifications of a Radiation Protection Manager as defined in Regulatory Guide 1.8 (Personnel Selection and Training - Revision 1-R), the PORC will be augmented by a member who meets those qualifications.

The second change involves modifying Section 6.5.2.6 to better define the quorum requirements for the Nuclear Safety Review Board (NSRB).

Specifically, the change will indicate that a majority of the NSRB members (or alternates) must be present for a quorum to exist.

The third change involves specifying in Section 6.5.3.1.a. the minimum approval authority for plant procedures.

Specifically, procedures other than station administrative procedures shall be approved by the Plant Manager, Plant Superintendent or the responsible department head prior to implementation.

The fourth change involves specifying in Section 6.5.2 that procedures will be reviewud periodically as required by administrative procedures.

DETERMINATION OF SIGX1FICANT HAZARDS Pursuant to 10CFR50.91, this analysis provides a determination that the proposed changes to the Technical Specifications do not involve any significant hazards consideration as defined in 10CFR50.92.

1) The proposed changes do not involve a significant increase in the probability or consequences of an accident previously evaluated.

The changes are administrative in nature only. No changes to the plant, either from a hardware or an operational standpoint, are made as a result of these changes.

NL.88.304.01

Attachment B (Cont'd) l NO SIGNIFICANT HAZARDS EVALUATION FOR MINOR CHANGES I

TO THE ADMINISTRATIVE SECTION OF THE TECHNICAL SPECIFICATIONS

2) The proposed changes do not create the possibility of a new or different kind of accident from any accident previously evaluated.

The changes are administrative in nature only. No changes to the plant, either from a hardware or operational standpoint, are made which could create the possibility of a new or different k'ind of accident.

3) The proposed changes do not involve a significant reduction in the margin of safety. The changes involved are administrative in nature only. No changes to the plant, either from a hardware or, operational standpoint, are made which could reduce the margin of safety.

CORCLUSION The Commission has provided guidance concerning the application of the standards for determining whether a significant hazards consideration exists.

s This guidance includes examples (51 FR 1750) of types of amendments that are considered not likely to involve significant hazards considerations. The subject of this change is directly related to one of these examples,-

specifically e.(i), which states:

A purely administrative change to the technical specifications for example, a change to achieve consistency throughout the technical specifications, correction of an error, or a change in nomenclature.

In addition, since the subject changes create additional limitations, the changes are related to example e.(ii), which states:

A change that constitutes an additional limitation, restriction, or control not presently included in the technical specification, e.g. a more stringent surveillance requirement.

Pi ed on the above guidance and the preceding analyses, Houston Lighting

& Power Company concludes that the proposed amendment does not involve a significant hazards consideration.

NL.88.304.01

t 611achment B1 i

PROPOSED REVISIONS TO TECHNICAL SEEQIflCATIONS 6.5.1.2.

6.5.2.6.

6.5.3.1.a. and 6.8.2 NL.88.304.01

I o

s.

AD*lINISTRATIVE CONTROLS 6.4 TRAINING 6.4.1 A retraining and replacement training program for the unit staff shall be maintained under.the direction of the Training Manager and shall meet or exceed the requirements and recommendations of Section 5.5 of ANSI N18.1-1971 and Appendix A of 10 CFR Part 55 and the supplemental requirements specified in Sections A and C of Enclosure 1 of the March 28, 1980 NRC letter to all licensees,'

and shall include familiarization with relevant industry operational experience.

6.5 REVIEW AND AUDIT 6.5.1 PLANT OPERATIONS REVIEW COMITTEE(PORC)

FUNCTION 6.5.1.1 The PORC shall function to advise the Plant Manager on all matters related to nuclear safety.

COMPOSITION

6. 5.1. 2 The PORC shall be composed of the:

Member:

Plant Superintendent Member:

Technical Services Manager Member:

Plant Operations Manager Member:

Plant Engineering Manager Member:

Maintenance Manage.-

C-.

Member:

Quality Engineering Manager The PORC Chairman shall be appointed in writing from among these_. members by the Plant Manager, except for the Quality Engineering Manager.tINSfa7 9,/

e

'~p ALTERNATES 6.5.1.3 All alternate members shall be appointed in writing by the Plant Manager to serve on a temporary basis; however, no more than two alternates shall participate as voting members in PORC activities at any one time.

MEETING FREQUENCY 6.5.1.4 The PORC shall meet at least once per calendar month and as convened by the PORC Chairman or his designated alternate.

QUORUM 6.5.1.5 The quorum of f.he PORC necessary for the performance of the PORC responsibility and autho.ity provisions of these Technical Specifications shall consist of the Chahwan or his designated alternate, and three other members including alternates.

s SOUTH TEXAS - UNIT 1 6-7

O O

THSERT C-6:)

' drl' n l Se e v o ces M a n < p,.

E cloes ne+

nee +

+- L e_

g u,( ; p, e v fredeeSto, M< u y e r l

R ackh4-ion o-f q

t do n G uts<

/. r gep ete /i4 < J

{fevusael Selee.kson su a t-,

2 e a rs'o, 1-4 ),

m as wi/I c omp o siha~

ponc.

r Mas per.

. gen

-p,,.

a(ro melude de

e/A Mysics I

l I

i l

f I

I r

i l

r

~.

i O

ADMINISTRATIVE CONTROLS EN COMPOSITION t

)

6.5.2.2 The NSRB shall be composed of the following, and other members appointed in writing by the Group Vice President, Nuclear Chairman General Manager, NSRB Member:

General Manager, South Texas Project Management Member:

Vice President, Nuclear Plant Operations Member:

General Manager, Nuclear Assurance Member:

General Manager, South Texas Project Operations Support ALTERNATES 6.5.2.3 All alternate members shall be appointed in writing by the Group Vice President-Nuclear to serve on a temporary basis; however, no more than two alternates shall participate as voting members in NSRB activities at any one time.

CONSULTANTS 6.5.2.4 Consultants shall be utilized as deterhined by the NSRB Chairman to provide expert advice to the NSRB.

MEETING FREQUENCY 6.5.2.5 The NSRB shall meet at least once per calendar quarter during the h

initial year of unit operation following fuel loading and at least once per 6 months thereafter.

Qerik of QUORUM 6.5.2.6 The quorum of the NSRB necessary for the perfo mance of the NSRB review and audit functions of these Technical Specific ions shall consist of the Chairman or his designated alternate and at least NSRB members including alternates. No more than a minority cf the quorum shall have line responsibility for operation of the unit.

REVIEW 6.5.2.7 The NSRB shall be responsible for the review of:

a.

The safety evaluations for:

(1) changes to procedures, equipment, or systems; and (2) tests or experiments completed under tha provision of 10 CFR 50.59, to verify that such actions did not constitute an

'unreviewed safety question; b.

Proposed changes to procedures, equipment, or systems which involve an unreviewed safety question as defined in 10 CFR 50.59; U

SOUTH TEXAS - UNIT 1 6-10

o ADMINISTRATIVE CONTROLS AUDITS (Continued) g.

The Radiological Environmental Monitoring Program and the results thereof at least once per 12 months;,

~

h.

TheOFFSITEDOSECALCULATIONMANUhLandimplementingproceduresat

~1 east once per 24 months; i.

The PROCESS CONTPOL PROGRAN and implement.ing procedures for processing '

and packaging of radioactive wastes at itast once per 24 months; j.

The performance of activities required by the Quality Assurance Program for effluent and environmental m<nitoring at least once per 12 months; and k.

Any other area of unit operation considered appropriate by the NSRB or the Group Vice President-Nuclear.

RECORDS 6.5.2.9 Records of NSRB activities shall be prepared, approved, and dis-tributed as indicated below:

Minutes of each NSRB meeting shall be prepared, approved, and a.

forwarded to the Group Vice President-Nuclear within 14 days following each meeting; b.

Reports of reviews encompassed by Specification 6.5.2.7 shall be m

prepared, approved, and forwarded to the Group Vice President-Nuclear u

within 14 days following completion of the review; and Audit reports encompassed by Specification 6.5.2.8 shall be forwarded c.

to the Group Vice President-Nuclear and to the management positions responsible for the areas audited within 30 days after completion of the audit by the auditing organization.

6.5.3 TECHNICAL REVIEW AND CONTROL ACTIVITIES 6.5.3.1 Activities that affect nuclear safety shall be conducted as follows:

Procedures required by Specification 6.8, and other procedures that a.

affect nuclear safety, and changes thereto, shall be prepared, re-viewed, and approved.

Each such procedure, or change thereto, shall be reviewed by an individual / group other than the individual / group who prepared the procedure, or change thereto, but who say be from the same organization as 1.he individual / group % prepared the pro-cedure, or change thereto.

Procedures other than station adminis-trative procedures shall be approved a 4;;iinct;d in ritS-by the Plant Manager, The Plant Manager shall approve station administra-tive procedure security plan implementing procedures, and emergency plan implementiry procedures.

Temporary changes to~ procedures, which clearly do not hange the intent of the approved procedures, shall be Pled S upers.provedhri to taplement of the plant staff.

av 6e Art +*htion by two member

k(le"**

ap dende ed ked ye, p sie atps.nen+ rm

,-12 h

%7 SOUTH TEXAS - UNIT 1 6

ADMINISTRATIVE CONTROLS SAFETY LIMIT VIOLATION (Conti'ued) n a.

The NRC Operations Center shall be notified by telephone as soon as possible and in all cases within 1 hour1.157407e-5 days 2.777778e-4 hours 1.653439e-6 weeks 3.805e-7 months .

The Group Vice President-Nuclear and the NSRB shall be notified within 24 hours2.777778e-4 days 0.00667 hours 3.968254e-5 weeks 9.132e-6 months ; b.

A Safety Limit Violation Report shall be prepared.

The raport shall be reviewed by the PORC.

This report shall describe:

(1) applicable circumstances preceding the violation, (2) effects of the violation upon facility components, systems, or structures, and (3) corrective action taken to prevent recurrence; c.

The Safety Limit Violation Report shall be submitted to the Commission,.

the NSRB, and the Group Vice President-Nuclear within 14 days of the violation; and d.

Operation of the unit shall not be resumed until authorized by the Commission.

6.8 PROCEDURES AND PROGRAMS 6.8.1 Written procedures shall be established, implemented, and maintained covering the activities referenced below:

a.

The applicable procedures recommended in Appendix A of Regulatory Guide 1.33, Revision 2 February 1978; b.

The emergency operating procedures required to implement the rdautre-ments of NUREG-0737 and Supplement 1 to NUREG-0737 as stated in Generic

^

Letter No. 82-33; c.

Security Plan implementation; d.

Emergency Plan implementation; e.

PROCESS CONTROL PROGRAM implementation; f.

OFFSITE DOSE CALCdLATION MANUAL implementation; g.

Quality Assurance Program for effluent and environmental monitoring; and h,

Fire Protection Program implementation.

6.8.2 Each procedure of Specification 6.8.1, and changes thereto, shall be reviewed and approved prior to implementation and reviewed periodically as set forth in Specification 6.5.3/ og d m orfmhe r rece 4 vet.r*.

h 6.8.3 The following programs shall be established, implemented, and maintained:

a.

Primary Coolant Sources Outside Containment A program to reduce' leakage from those portions of systems outside containment that could contain highly radioactive. fluids during a serious transient or accident to as low as practical levels.

The systems include the containment spray, Safety Injection, containment hydrogen monitoring, post-accident sampling and primary sampling.

The program shall include the following:

SOUTli TEXAS - UNIT 1 6-14

Attachment C N') SIGNIFICANT HAZARDS EVALUATION FOR ADDITION OF SEAL INJECTION ISOLATION VALVES CHARGING HEADER PRESSURE _IXIERLOCK NL.88.304.01

l Attachment C NO SIGNIFICANT HAZARDS EVALUATION FOR ADDITION OF SEAL INJECTION ISOLATION VALVES CHARQ1]IG HEADER PRESSURE INTERLOCK l

l BACKGROUND Westinghouse-designed plants typically provide Reactor Coolant Pump (RCP) seal injection from the Chemical and Volume Control System (CVCS).

In addition, the charging pumps also perform a Safety Injection (SI) function when required. As a consequence, subsequent to Phase "A"

isolation, seal injection flow to the RCP's is continued without interruption.

However, at the South Texas Project Electric Generating Station (STPEGS) the design is such that there are separate charging and safety injection pumps. Since it is preferable that seal f.'.ow to the RCP's continue following a containment isolation, the STPEGS design incorporates an interlock which allows the seal injection isolation valves to remain open as long as charging header pressure is maintained. This interlock ensures that the seal injection isolation valves will close on low charging header pressure coincident with a Phase "A" isolation signal.

Low CVCS charging header pressure is indicative of loss of seal injection flow and therefore initiation of containment isolation of ?.he associated penetrat. ions is required. The charging header pressure interlock is provided from a 6 sgle channel. The charging pump discharge pressure is measured by pressure transmitter PT-204 which provides input to Protection Set III.

Closure signals are sent to the isolation valves via actuation Train B.

The design is described in more detail in STPEGS FSAR section 7.6 6 7.

The Technical Specifications (NUREG-1255) issued with the Operating License were developed using the Standard Technical Specifications for Westinghouse plants. The Standard Technical Specifications do not contain this isolation function and it was not identified during technical specification development for STPEGS as a unique feature of comparable importance to other containment isolation functions listed in the Standard Technical Specifications.

PROPOSED CHANGE The proposed change would incorporate the RCP Seal Isolation Charging Header Pressure Interlock into the Technical Specifications by specifically addressing the operability and surveillance requirements for the charging header pressure interl ck circuit which provides the trip signal if the charging header pressure is low.

NL.88.304.01

i Attachment C (Cont'd) j NO SIGNIFICANT HAZARDS EVALUATION FOR ADDITION OF SEAL INJEC110N ISOLATION VALVES CHARGING HEADER PRESSURE. INTERLOCK The proposed change to the Technical Specifications incorporates the surveillance requirements in the appropriate tisbles. The action statement indicated in the Instrumentation Table (Table 3.3-3) was developed considering that both Phase "A" isolation and the low charging header pressure interlock trip signals must exist before containment isolation will occur.

Therefore, if the charging header pressure interlock circuit is inoperable, the operability of the seal injection isolation valves themselves can be maintained by placing the charging header pressure interlock in the tripped condition. This action must be accomplished within one hour. The safety i

design basis is fulfilled by this action, i.e., achieving containment isolation on Phase "A" Isolation concurrent with the assumed loss of charging header pressure. Once this action is taken, the safety basis in fulfilled, and seven (7) days are allowed for restoration before the specification-required shutdown must be initiated.

The instrumentation trip setpoints (Table 3.3-4) were developed with the use of the Sensor Measurement and Test Equipment Accuracy an. Rack Measurement and Test Equipment Accuracy from WCAP-11273 Rev. 1,"Westinghouse Setpoint Methodology for Protection-South Texas Project". The nominal trip setpoint is established at 561 psig based on a safety analysis limit of 400 psig for minimum RCS pressure for RCP operation. This assures that seal injection flow will be provided until the RCP's are shutdown at the same time. it allows for operation margin to assure that premature isolation will not take place.

Since this particular function provides an interlock function only, the entry for the Response Time Table (Table 3.3-5) is indicated as "Not Applicable". No actuations occur as a result of the trip of thiJ interlock that are not already adequately response-time-tested as a part of Phase "A"

testing. The entry for Table 3.3-5 is provided for completeness.

The surveillance requirements are indicated in Table 4.3-2.

The charging header pressure interlock trip signal is transmitted to a specific master relay and corresponding slave relay via the Solid State Protection System (SSPS) (Train S).

However, no logic functions are performed in the SSPS.

The actuation logic (i.e., continuity) is tested via the master relay test. Therefore, the actuation logic test is indicated as "Not Applicable."

The frequency of the master relay actuation and slave relay tests (i.e.,

quarterly) is consistent with existing requirements in that the relays are involved with only one of the three trains. The remaining surveillances are consistent with existing requirements.

Since RCP Seal Injection Isolation is a portion of the overall containment isolation function, it has also been added to specification 4.6.3.2 for the cold shutdown or refueling mode tests to be performed once per 18 months.

NL.88.304.01

Attachment C (Cont'd)

NO SIGNIFICANT HAZARDS EVALUATION FOR ADDITION OF SEAL INJECTION ISOLATION VALVES CHARGING HEADER PRESSURE INTERLOCK DETERMINATION.OF SIGNIFICANT HAZARDS Pursuant to 10CFR50.91, this analysis provides a determination that the proposed amendment to the Technical Specificatione does not involve any significant hazards consideration as defined by 10CFR50.92.

1) The proposed amendment does not involve a significant increase in the probability or consequences of an accident previously evaluated.

No hardware changes are required as a result of this change.

The proposed amendment will provide the containment isolation function assofisted with this interlock with the same technical specification status as other containment isolation functions.

2) 'The proposed amendment does not create the possibility of a new or different kind of accident from any accident previously evaluated.

No hardware changes are made which would create any new failure or accident seqaences. Conditions could exist wherein the plant was in the proposed action statement and a spurious or actual Phase "A"

isolation could occur. The STPEGS Emergency Operating Procedures (EOP's) address this scenario adequately in that continued operation of the RCP's is not allowed if seal injection flow is lost Rnd Component Cooling Water flow is not available to the RCP thermal barrier. The EOP's also provide guidance to the operators to attempt to restore seal injection as soon as possible.

3) The proposed amendment does not involve a significant reduction in the margin of safety. The proposed changes include the Seal Injection Isolation Yalve Interlock function in the Technical Specificatscas to clarify plant response to a failure of this l

circuit.

There is no change in the margin of safety. The proposed action stLtement maintains plant conditions which satisfy safety

[

analysis assumptions and allowr for an orderly response to an i

inoperable circuit.

[

i

{

l l

i NL.88.304.01

_. =_- __-_-_-_ _ ______________

Attachment C (Cont'd) i NO SIGNIFICANT HAZARDS EVALUATION FOR ADDITION OF SEAL INJECTION ISOLATION VALVES CHARGING HEADER PRESSURE INTR 9f-OCK CONCLUSION The Commission has provided guidance concerning the application of the i

standards for determining whether a significant hazards consideration exists.

This guidance includes examples (51 FR 7750) of types of amendments that are considered not likely to involve significant hazards considerations. The subject of this proposed change is directly related to one of.hese examples, specifically e.(ii), which states:

j l

A change that constitutes an additional limitation, restriction, or i

control not presently included in the technical specifications, e.g.,

a I

more stringent surVeillanca requirement.

I Based upon the above guidance and the preceding analyses. Houston f

Lighting '& Power Company concludes that the proposed amendment does not t

'.nvolve a significant hazards consideration.

I I

i f

I l

i I

1 l

l l

1 i

t r

l l

bl.88.304.01

Attachment C1 PROPOSED REVISIONS TO TECHNICAL SPECIPietTION TABLES 3.3-3.

3.3-4.

3.3-5. 4.3-2 and SPECIFICATION 4.6.3.2 i

i

?

I NL.88.304.01 l

.2*

l m

s g

TABLE 3.3-3 (Cv linued)

~

x ENGINEERED SAFETY FEATURES ACTUATION SYSTEM INSTRUMENTATION "J

?,

MINIMUM TOTAL NO.

CilANNEL3 CIWiNELS APPLICABLE FUNCTIONAL UNIT OE CHANNELS TO TRIP OPERABLE MODES ACTION Eg 3.

Containment Isolation (Continued) b.

Containment Ventilation Isolation 1)

Automatic Actuation Logic 2

1 2

1,2,3,4 18 2)

Actuation Relays **"

3 2

3 1,2,3,4 18

~

R 3)

Safety Injection ***

See Item 1. above for all Safety Injection initiating functions and requir'ements.

~. -

G 4)

RCB Purge Radioactivity-High

~

l 2

1,2,3,4,5

,6 18 5)

Containment Spray-Sg.It6n 2. above for Containment Spray manual initiating functions Manual Initiation and requirements.

S 6)

Phase "A" Isolation-See Item 3.a. above for Phase "A" Isslation manual initiating Manual Isolation functions and requirements.

N c.

Pha;e "3" Isolation D

1) Automatic Actuation 2

1 2

1,2,3,4 (14 Logic b

2) Actuation Relays 3

2 3

1,2,3,4

1'43

3) Containment Pressure--

4 2

3 1,2,3 17

[

High-3

4) Contain ent Spray-Manual InitL tion See Item 2. above for Containment Spray manual initiating functionspnLtgquirements I NSERT A

j t_

l

M e

>)

L ON t.

3,

-~

~

N' 8

6 42 J

.P J 'E a4 k

t

-2 t.

. c H4l' 4

.s 3

d el e

u o

t~f

.dm

(

k 4 i t

2 j

M c

b 4,(

ct Q O h o

o oc r

"a

\\

M. 1 ty 2

9 s

m

J i

h{

$N

,1 r

i s

H>

Fl

)

1 s

.4-

__s a

t 0

x s

U o.

C d

r e

4 "o d

H M' H m

L TABLE 3.3-3 (continued)

ACTION STATEMENTS (Continued)

ACTION 26 - With the number of OPERABLE channels one Icss than the Minimum Channels OPERABLE requirement, declare the affected Auxiliary Feedwater Pump inoperable and take ACTION required by Specification 3.7.1.7 ACTION 27 - H0 DES 1, 2, 3, 4:

With tihe number of OPERA 8LE channels one less

than the Minimum Channels OPERABLE requiren nt, restore the inoporable channel to OPERABLE status within 48 hours5.555556e-4 days 0.0133 hours 7.936508e-5 weeks 1.8264e-5 months or be in at least HOT STANDBY within the next 6. hours and in' COLD SHUT 00W withinithe following 30 hours3.472222e-4 days 0.00833 hours 4.960317e-5 weeks 1.1415e-5 months .

MODES S and 6:

With the number of OPERA 8LE channels less than the Minimum Channels OPERABLE requi:ement, restore the inoperable Channel to OPERABLE status within 48 hours5.555556e-4 days 0.0133 hours 7.936508e-5 weeks 1.8264e-5 months or initiate and main-tain operation of the Control Room Hakeup and Cleanup Filtratinn

'[

System (at 100% capacity) in the rectreulation and makeup fil' tionsmode.

ACTION 28 - MODES 1, 2, 3, 4:

With the number of OPERABLE channels less than the Minimum Channels OPERABLE requirement within 1 hour1.157407e-5 days 2.777778e-4 hours 1.653439e-6 weeks 3.805e-7 months isolate the Control Rooin Envelope and maintain ope, ration of the venti-14tionsysteminthefilteredrecircuptionmode.

H0 DES 5 and 6:

With the number or OPERABLE channels less than "th*c' Hin,imum Channels OPERABLE requirement, within 1 h'our initiat:

and caintain operation of the Control Room Makeup s.nd Cleanup Filtration System-(at 100% capacity) in the recirculation and makeup filtration mode.

ACTICM 29 - MODES 1, 2, 3, 4:

With the number of OPERABLE channels one less than the Minimum Channals OPERABLE requirement, restore the ineperabia channel to CPERABLE status within 48 hours5.555556e-4 days 0.0133 hours 7.936508e-5 weeks 1.8264e-5 months nr either initiata and reintain operation of the FHB exhaust mir filtration syste (at 100X capacity) or be in at least HOT STANDBY within the.next 6 hours6.944444e-5 days 0.00167 hours 9.920635e-6 weeks 2.283e-6 months and in COLD SHUTDOWN within the following 30 hours3.472222e-4 days 0.00833 hours 4.960317e-5 weeks 1.1415e-5 months .

/CTION 30 - With irradiated fuel in the spent fuel pool:

With the number of OPERABLE channels less than the Minimua Channels OPERABLE requirement, fuel.aovement within the Spnt fial pool or crane operation wi.th loads over the sper.t fuel pool say proceed provided the FHB exhaust air filtration systzus is in operation and discharging through at least one train of HEPA filters and charcoal adsorbers, he.k 5l-S e t-

' N O 9

SOUTH TEXAS

'JNIT 1 3/4 3-28 3bc.

i

. s.o,

.m.

O

" M W.o.;j-l,P '

a, ".'

. f,ggf$i!.

I Q,%., ?,O :.ct:, g..

., Wc i

.,' y ;

t 1

p,a

':. '.f.%' ': s 7, e

~

v

.i -

l[.'{/j' p{l,'.

\\

Innere [

'A 9:

4 tv.,;u.3 4 s

.< 1; With the'Chargin5 Header. Pressure channel inoperable:

. s s,v,

7:D 7;' /

~ a)

Place the Charging Header Pressure channel in the tripped condition

' e,L %. ;,,'

f within one hour and.

.OW/, ',

b) Restore the Charging Header Pressure channel to operable status t

within 7 days or be in at least Hot standby within the ne,xt 6 hours6.944444e-5 days 0.00167 hours 9.920635e-6 weeks 2.283e-6 months

'3-and in Cold Shutdown within the following 30 hours3.472222e-4 days 0.00833 hours 4.960317e-5 weeks 1.1415e-5 months .

t e

i M

I n

i i

L i

s i

f t

t I

t

?

1 i

t t

t h

t t

(

I L3/SMH/NL f

f l

, ~ - -, - -,, -., - - -

.,.-,n--,-_.-nn.,-,---.

~

8 TABLE 3.3-4 (Continued) m

~

M ENGINEERED SAFETY FEATURES ACTUATION SYSTfM INSTRtMENTATION TRIP SETPolNT5 C-e TOTAL SENSOR GROR

$ FUNCTIONAL UNIT Att0WANCE (TA).1 15)

TRIP SE1 POINT Att0WABLE VAIDE.

3.

Containment '.5 elation x

0 a.

Phase "A" Isolation

~

1) Manual *nitiation N. A.

N.A.

M.A.

N.A.-

N.A.

2) Automatic Actuation Logic M.A.

'. A.

N N.A.

W.A.

M.A.

3) Acication Relays N.A.

N.A.

M.A.

4) Safety Injectien See Ites 1. above for all Safety injection Trip Setpoints and Allowable Values.

b.

Contairment Ventilation Isolation u

)

1) Automatic Actuation M.A.

N.A.

logic w

2) Actuation Relays M.A.

N. A.

N.A.

~

3) Safety Injection See item 1. above for all Safety Injection Trip Setpoints and Allowable Values.

4) RCB Purge 3.1x10 1.8x10-1.3x10

<5x10-* ###

<6.4x10 4 Radioactivity-Nigh pCi/cc pCi/cc pCi/cc pCi/cc pCi/cc

5) Containment Spray -

See Ites 2. above for Containment Spray manual initiation Trip Manual Initiation Setpoints and Allowable Values.

6) Phase "A" Isolation -

See Item 3.a. above for Phase "A" Isolati'on manual initiation Manual Initiation Trip Se.tpoints and Allowable Values.

c.

Phase "B" Isolation

~

1) Automat!: Actuation N.A.

M.A.

N.A.

L6gic

.s

2) Actuation Relays N.A.

N.A.

M.A.

3) Containment Pressure--

3. 6 0.71

2. 9

< 9.5 psig

< 10.5 psig Nigh-3

~

4) Containment Spray-See item 2. above for contai9nt Spray manual initiation Trip Manual Initiation Setpoints and Allowable Values.

EN SFRT C.

9 I

j.e,'*

e

,T.

y i

e-4" 4

A}

N ~J

%e O.

d.

d h

D a =g e

~

a.

v o

e f.

2 N

i.D tL M

4 1

o r

2

~

-4H f

t

.z.

,)

6 U

dw H"

a

=

j p

ceD m

Z

'h M?

5

&, r i

c..

._f Y

f r

3 4 7

.9 3

g

=

d

'?

~5 H

A.a j

p i '.*

r

'& \\

Ng 4

y

.,g N

$ f s.!

O x

1

+

C d

w

"' H 9

m_

TABLE 3.3 5 (Continued)

ENGINEERED SAFETY FEATURES RESPONSE TINES INITIATING SIGNAL AND FUNCTION RESPONSETIMEIj_SECON05 12.

Loss of Power (Continued) c.

4.16 kV E5F Bus Undervoltage

< 65 (Sustained Degraded Voltage)

~

13.

RCB Purge Radioactivity-Hign a.

Containment Ventilation Isolation (48-inch lines) 173(2) b.

Containment Ventilation Isolation (18-inch lines) 1 23(2)

~

14 Deleted

15. Deleted 3

16.

T,yg - Low Coincident with Reactor Trip

]

Fee 6<ater Isolation N.A.

17.

Control Roca Intake Air Radioactivity - High Control Roca Ventilation

[

1 78(2) 18.

Spent Fuel Pool Exhaust Radioactivity - High FHB HVAC Emergency Startup i 42(2) i 1.

Clso[ig lkster Passo re - L.ow N.4.

i SOUTH TEXA5 - UNIT 1 3/4 3-40 Aw ndment No. I I

3.-

o ;

TABLE 4.3-2 (Continued) y, o

C.

ENGINEERED SAFETY FEATURES ACTUATION SYSTEM INSTRUMENTATION SURVEILLANCE REQUIREMENTS "rn x

DIGITAL OR TRIP y,

ANALOG ACTUATING H00ES.

CHANNEL DEVICE MASTER SLAVE FOR WHICH e

CHANNEL CHANNEL CHANNEL OPERATIONAL OPERATIONAL ACTUATION RELAY RELAY SURVEILLANCE 5

FUNCTIONAL UNIT CHECK CALIBRATION TEST TEST LOGIC TEST TEST TEST IS REQUIRED a

~

3. Containment Isolation (Continued)

3) Safety Injection See Item 1. above fo',all Safety Injection Surveillance Requirements.

4) RCB Purge Radioactivity-High 5

R H

N.A.

1,2,3,4,5*,0

5) Containment Spray -

See Item 2. above for Containment Spray manual initiation Surveillance Manual Initiation Requirements.

t.

6) Phase "A" Isolation-See Item 3.a. above for Phase "A" Isolation manual initiation w1 Manual Initiation Surveillance Requirensnts.

't'

c. Phase "B" Isolation g

~. -

1) Automatic Actuation

-N.A.

N.A.

M(1)

N.A.

1,2,3,4 Logic

2) Actuation Relays N.A.

N.A.

N. A.

N.A.

M(6),

Q 1,2,3,4

3) Containment 5

R H

N.A.

N.A. '

N.A.

M.A.

1,2,3 Pressure--High-3 p

4) Containment Spray-See Item 2. above for Containment Spray manua finitiation Surveillance Requirements.

Manual Initiation

4. Steam Line Isolation b

a. Manual Initiat'lon N.A.

N.A.

R N. A.

N.A.

1, 2, 3

b. Automatic Actuation N.A.

N.A N.A N.A.

M(1)

M(6)

Q 1, 2, 3 D

Logic anst Actuation W

Relays

c. Steam'Line Pressure-S R

H N.A.

N.A.

3 Negative Rate-High

d. Containment Pressure -

S R

H N.A.

N.A.

1, 2, 3 High-2

g.**.

Q'

['

~

=

g A

4 I

z N

l i

d 2

3 e

W,, 'k

-.=

e i

N l l

I 25 2

M j 'i H

3 1

N N

h M(M f

I

~

l y

O 4

i u

o 3

N

'~

b w

a W

h l

M

.I 'E 4

6 i

3

a j

z 9,

i-J 7

.i s

i a

l

-c

~k 4 f

a O

I 7

N i

.e

-5

?

i t

P

+

4 I

f b '"

?

A n.

U 0

l l

' c$.

M n

. 4 A

Q O

u W H f

6 L'

t f

-e I

i l

(

=.

6 CONTAINMENT SYSTEMS 1,

3/4.6.3 CONTAINMENT ISOL'ATION VALVES LIMITING CONDITION FOR OPERATION 3.6.3 The containment isolation valves shall be OPERABLE with isolation times less than or equal to the required isolation times.

APPLICABILIH:

MODES 1, 2, 3, and 4.

ACTION:

With one or more of the isolation valve (s) inoperable, maintain at least one isolation valve OPERABLE in each affected penetration that is open and:

Restoretheinoperablevalve(s)toOPERABLEstituswithin4 hours, a.

or i

b.

Isolate each affected penetration within 4 hours4.62963e-5 days 0.00111 hours 6.613757e-6 weeks 1.522e-6 months by use of at least one deactivated automatic valve secured in the isolation position, or c.

Isolate each affected penetration within 4 hours4.62963e-5 days 0.00111 hours 6.613757e-6 weeks 1.522e-6 months by use of at least one closed manual valve or blind flange, or t

+

d.

Be in at least HOT STANDBY within the next 6 hours6.944444e-5 days 0.00167 hours 9.920635e-6 weeks 2.283e-6 months and in COLD' SHUTDOWN within the following 30 hours3.472222e-4 days 0.00833 hours 4.960317e-5 weeks 1.1415e-5 months .

i 1

E!EVEILLANCE RE0VIREMENTS 4.6.3.1 The isolation valves shall be demonstrated OPERABLE prior to returning l

the valve to service af ter maintenance, repair or replacement work is performed t

on the valve or its associated actuator, control or power circuit by perform-ance of a cycling test, and verification of i. solation time.

4.6.3.2 Each isolation valve shall be demonstrated OPERABLE during the COLD SHUTOOWN or REFUELING MODE at least once per.18 months by:

a.

Verifying that on a Phase "A" Isolation test signal, each Phase "A" isolation valve actuates to its isolation position; b.

Verifying that on a Containment Ventilation Isolation test signal, each purge and exhaust valve actuates to its isolation position; and c.

Verifying that on a Phase "B" Isolation test signal, each Phase "B" isolation valve actuates to its isolation position.

l 4.6.3.3 The isolation time of each power-operated or automatic valve shall be determined to be within its limit when tested pursuant to Specification 4.0.5.

(%se 'A' Itdsk, led sQusl,codede,f el

%; fyiq & es r

a.

i.o ca. ps) 6.ier remwe sy I, M g. d.

c g e el isjedic% vglVt 4 cjo. ch 5.Me P '" f'*'

f SOUTH TEXAS - UNIT 1 3/4 6-1B t

Attachment D NO SIGNIFICANT HAZARDS EVALUATION FOR REVISING THE UNIT 1 TP.CHNICAL SEIFICATIONS TO THE UNITS 1 AND 2 COMR11ET) TECHNICAL SPECIFICATIORS NL.88.304.01

e i

ATTACHMENT D j

NO SIGNIFICANT HAZARDS EVALUATION FOR REVISING THE UNIT 1 TECHNICAL SPECIFICATIONS TO THE UNIT 1 AND 2 COMBINED TECHNICAL SPECIFICATIONS RACKGROUND i

The South Texas Project Electric Generating Station Unit 1 operating license includes the Technical Specifications for the operation of Unit 1.

Houston Lighting & Power (HL&P) expects to receive the license for Unit 2 in the near future. At that time. HL&P will receive Technical Specifications l

that are applicable for both units, i.e., the Combined Technical Specifications. However, to implement these Technical Specifications on Unit 1, the Unit I license must be amended. The changes that occur as a result of this amendment request are administrative in nature only. All other material or safety-related changes have been or are being addressed as i

separate amendments to the Unit 1 license.

i l

h DETERMINATION OF SIGNIFICAN? HAZARDS I

L 4

l Pursuant to 10CFRSO.91, this analysis provides a determination that the proposed amendment to the Unit 1 Technical Specifications does not involve any significant hazards considoration as defined by 10CFR50.92.

i d

1) The proposed amendment does not involve a significant increase in the probability or consequences of an accident previously evaluated. The proposed change is administrative in nature only. No changes, either

[

from a hardware or operational standpoint, are made that could affect the probability or consequences of any accident previously evaluated.

All material changes to the Technical Specification are considered as separate amendments.

1

2) The proposed amendment does not create the possibility of a new or

[

different kind of accident from any accident previously evaluated.

i The proposed change is administrative in nature only. No changes,

}

either from a hardware or operational standpoint, are made that could i

cause a different kind of accident from any previously evaluated.

i I

3) The proposed amendment does not involve a significant reduction in

[

the margin of safety. The proposed change is administrative in nature only. No changes, either from a hardware or operational standpoint, are made this proposed amendmenti therefore, the margin f

of safety is not reduced.

l 4

[

t I

1 i

+

f L

1 NL.88.304.01

}

w

ATTACHMENT D (Cont'd)

NO SIGNIFICANT HAZARDS EVALUATION FOR REVISING THE UNIT 1 TECHNICAL

$PICIFICATIONS TO THE UNIT 1 AND 2 COMBINED TECHNICAL SPECIFICATIONS CONCLUSION TLe commission has provided guidance concerning the application of the j

standardh for determining whether a significant hazards consideration exists.

j This guidance includes examples (51 FR 7750) of types of amendments that are considered not likely to involve significant hazards considerations. The i

subject of,*.his proposed change is directly related to one of these examples, specifically e(1), which states:

A purely administrative change to technical specifications for example, a change to achieve consistency throughout the technical specifications, correction of an error, or a change in now nclature.

i Based on the above guidance and the preceding analyses. Houston Lighting

& Power Company contends that the proposed amendment does not involve a significant hazards consideration.

1, e

J

)

4 i

l

)

4 l

l J

1 1

}

l i

i NL.88.304.01 I

__ _ _ _, _

ML20206B954

Text

Navigation menu

Search