ML20206B476

Safety Evaluation Supporting Amends 220 & 202 to Licenses DPR-70 & DPR-75,respectively

ML20206B476
Person / Time
Site:	Salem
Issue date:	04/26/1999
From:	NRC (Affiliation Not Assigned)
To:
Shared Package
ML20206B467	List: ML20206B464 ML20206B476
References
NUDOCS 9904290257
Download: ML20206B476 (3)

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• .. +,o SAFETY EVALUATION BY THE OFFICE OF NUCLEAR REACTOR REGULATION RELATED TO AMENDMENT NOS. 220 AND 202 TO FACILITY OPERATING LICENSE NOS. DPR-70 AND DPR-75 PUBLIC SERVICE ELECTRIC & GAS COMPANY PHILADELPHIA ELECTRIC COMPANY DELMARVA POWER AND LIGHT COMPANY ATLANTIC CITY ELECTRIC COMPANY SALEM NUCLEAR GENERATING STATION. UNIT NOS.1 AND 2 DOCKET NOS. 50-272 AND 50-311

1.0 INTRODUCTION

By letter dated February 8,1999, Public Service Electric & Gas Company (the licensee) submitted a request for changes to the Salem Nuclear Generating Station, Unit Nos.1 and 2, Technical Specifications (TSs). The requested changes would revise TS 4.5.3.2.b for both units to allow the option of using closed and disabled automatic valves to provide the necessary isolation function when performing safety injection and charging pump tests in Modes 4, 5, and 6 (i.e., hot shutdown, cold shutdown, and refueling) for low temperature overpressurization protection.

2.0 EVALUATION Backaround The Pressurizer Overpressure Protection System (POPS) measures reactor coolant system (RCS) temperature and pressure and initiates the opening of the pressurizer relief valves during pressure transients if RCS pressure exceeds 375 psig. The POPS is armed prior to entry into a water-solid condition during startup or prior to reaching 312 *F during shutdown.

The POPS is a two-train system with each train controlling one of the two relief valves. Either POPS train has adequate relieving capacity to protect the RCS from overpressurization due to:

(1) start of an idle reactor coolant pump with the secondary water temperature of the associated steam generator s 50 *F above RCS cold leg temperature, (2) the start of an intermediate head safety injection (SI) pump and its injection into a water-solid RCS, or (3) the start of a high head Si pump (i.e., centrifugal charging pump) in conjunction with a running positive displacement charging pump and injection into a water-solid RCS.

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. In order to prevent overpressure transients from occurring when RCS temperature is below 312 *F, provisions are provided in the TSs for the control of the charging and safety injection pumps. In the note to TS 3.5.3, a maximum of one SI pump or one centrifugal charging pump shall be operable in (a) Mode 4 when the temperature of one or more RCS cold legs is s 312

• F, (b) Mode 5, or (c) Mode 6 when the head is on the reactor vessel. Further, TS surveillance requirement (SR) 4.5.3.2 provides requirements applicable to the criteria for verifying the inoperability of the pumps.

Current TS Reauirements SR 4.5.3.2 states, in part, that all Si and centrifugal charging pumps, except the required operable pump, shall be demonstrated to be inoperable either.

a. By verifying that the motor circuit breakers have been removed from their electrical power supply circuits or;

b. For testing purposes, by verifying that the pump is in a recirculation flow path and that the manual discharge valve is closed.

Prooosed TS Chance The licensee has proposed to change SR 4.5.3.2.b to allow either the manual discharge valve or disabled automatic valve (s) to be closed.

Evaluation The limitation on the maximum number of operable Si and charging pumps and the associated SR to verify the inoperablity of the other pumps provide assurance that a mass addition pressure transie'1t can be relieved by the operation of a single POPS relief valve.

The licensee proposed a change to allow the use of disabled automatic valves as an altemative to the closed manual pump discharge valve during pump testing to ensure the

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necessary flow path protection. The licensee stated that the valves would be disabled by closing the valves and either opening the associated actuator circuit breaker for motor operated valves (MOVs) or shutting the air supply for air-operated valves (AOVs) and controlling the evolution with the appropriate surveillance procedures. The licensee also stated that the disabled automatic valve provides the same level of protection and positive control as that provided by the closed manual valve, and the leakage characteristics of the proposed automatic valve is similar to the manual discharge valves.

The NRC staff reviewed the isolation adequacy of the licensee's proposed altemative. The staff found that, for the Sl flow path isolation, the licensee would use two hot leg header isolation valves and the cG !eg header isolation valve, esch of which is an MOV. To isolate the test header flow path, an AOV that fails closed on loss of control air supply would be used for flow path isolation. For the charging pumps flow path, the licensee would generally use MOVs in the injection line after the boron injection tank going to the cold legs and MOVs in the line to the regenerative heat exchanger. The licensee has evaluated the potential for hot shorts causing the spurious opening of an MOV and found it to be satisfactory. In addition, the

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. licensee's surveillance test procedures do not operate the charging and Si pumps while the RCS is in a water-solid condition.

On the basis that the automatic valve provides an equivalent flow isolation capability and adequate controls exist to maintain the valves shut and to monitor RCS volume and pressure

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during testing, the NRC staff finds the proposed change acceptable.

3.0 STATE CONSULTATION

in accordance with the Commission's regulations, the New Jersey State official was notified of the proposed issuance of the amendments. The State official had no comments.

4,0 ENVIRONMENTAL CONSIDERATION The amendments change a requirement with respect to installation or use of a facility component located within the restricted area as defined in 10 CFR Part 20 and change surveillance requirements. The NRC staff has determined that the amendments involve no significant increase in the amounts, and no significant change in the types, of any effluents that may be released offsite, and that there is no significant increase in individual or cumulative occupational radiation exposure. The Commission has previously issued a proposed finding that the amendments involve no significant hazards consideration, and there has been no public comment on such finding (64 FR 14284). Accordingly, the amendments meet the eligibility criteria for categorical exclusion set forth in 10 CFR 51.22(c)(9). Pursuant to 10 CFR 51.22(b) no environmental impact statement cr environmental assessment need be prepared in connection with the issuance of the amendments.

5.0 CONCLUSION

The Commission has concluded, based on the considerations discussed above, that: (1) there is reasonable assurance that the health and safety of the public will not be endangered by operation in the proposed manner, (2) such activities will be conducted in compliance with the Commission's regulations, and (3) the issuance of the amendments will not be inimical to the common defense and security or to the health and safety of the public.

Principal Contributor: P. Milano Date: April 26,1999