ML20206A232

Proposed Tech Specs,Reflecting Correction to Basis of Tech Specs for Containment Cooling

ML20206A232
Person / Time
Site:	Fort Calhoun
Issue date:	03/26/1987
From:	OMAHA PUBLIC POWER DISTRICT
To:
Shared Package
ML20205T685	List: ML20205T682 ML20205T695 ML20206A232
References
TAC-65057, NUDOCS 8704070454
Download: ML20206A232 (4)

Text

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ATTACHMENT A i

2.0 LIMITING CONDITIONS FOR OPERATION 2.h Containment Cooling (Continued) component cooling heat exchangers and shutdown heat exchangers. A full-capacity diesel-generator is connected to each of the two engineered safeguards 4.16-kV buses. Three engineered safeguards 480-Volt double-ended load centers are provided; of the six transformers, three are connected to each of the two 4.16-kV buses. Two load centers are operated as two-bus-section units; the third is provided with a center bus manually transferable to either associated end section. The center

bus section supplies HPSI Pump SI-20, CS Pump SI-30 and Charging Pump CH-lc any of which can thus be supplied from either h.16-kV bus if required.- Threecomponentcoolingheatexchangegshavesufficient

- to removelh20lx 10 BTU /hr following a capacity ( ith .-accident.

,1; r;;;$ I)'The containment sprays initially take g loss-of-coolant i coolant from the safety injection and refueling water (SIRW) t l Before this supply of water is exhausted (at least 2h minutes)g.

l the spray system is transferred to the recirculation mode and the pumps take suction from the containment sump. One shutdown cooling heat ex-changer is sufficient to satisfy the spray s

+ the long-term containment cooling period.(3)ystem requirements In addition, in the during un-likely event of the component cooling water supply being lost, rav

vater can be utilized for dire cooling of the shutdown heat exchangers

! and containment cooling coils, f The containment spray system is redundant with the containment air recirculation, e ng and iodine removal system for the containment cooling function. The spray system is sized such that two of the j three spray pumps would limit the containment pressure to below the i air coolers design value following or the cooling capacity of a DBA the safety without taking credit injection system.t for f

tpi Similarly,

two cooling and filtering units or one cooling and filtering unit and both pressurecooling underunits the same havecondi',

the capability ions as twoof limiting spray pumps. the(e7ntainment

The redundant cooling equipment provided to limit the containment pressure following a DBA is divided between the independent power

supply systems. The rav vater and component cooling water pumps are j similarly distributed on the h.16-kV and 480 Volt buses to serve the above cooling groups. Each cooling group has a design capacity equal to that required to restrict the containment pressure to below the design value. In the event of a DBA, loss of normal power sources and

failure of one diesel-generator to operate, better than one full group .

vould be connected to the available diesel-generator, thus providing more than ample reserve. Any one unit removed from a given bua does not restrict the groups.which can be connected t_o one diesel-generator .

from fulfilling their design function The removal;of-two units-from -

. buses which can be connected to one dusel-generator could limit the capability of the associated cooling groups; therefore, to ensure i availability of the power supply to the redundant equipment in the l event of loss of normal power sources, the diesel-generator serving l this redundant equipment is started to demonstrate operability. During  ;

8704070454 870326 1 PDR ADOCK 05000285 i P PDR

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l 2.0 LIMITING CONDITIONS FOR OPERATION 2.h Containment Cooling (Continued) normal power operation either two air coolinit and filtering units or two air cooling units and one air cooling an' filtering unit are in

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operationto(gqmoveheatlostfrompipingancequipmentwithinthe containment. / In addition, if during th~e -; Jst-accident phase the -

component cooling water supply is lost, containment cooling could be

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maintained until repairs are effected. The component cooling system pumpsandheatexchanger,thespraypumpsandteautjovnheatex-changers are located in the auxiliary building. 9) 10 'he ~ pen:nt

ling cycter equiprrnt is seceerible for repair e Ner 2 lece-ef--

- - ' " - - ' ' - The rav vater pumps are located in the intake structure.k5)nt.

References usut (1) -F6AR, Section 9 7 5 (2) Section 6.2.3 1 usart (3) FSAR, Section 6.2.3.h as ut.

(h) FSAR, Section 9.8.2 UCA12_

(5) -FSAR, Section 6.h.5

<JAAn (6) -FSAR, Section 6.3.5 4 d2AP (7) FSAR, Section 14.16.5 (8) F , Section 9 10.2.3 (9) M Section 9.7 (10) N , Section 6.3 dSM (11) F6AR, Section 9.8 2-27

, . ATTACHMENT B Discussion, Justification, and No Significant Hazards Considerations The Safety Systems Outage Modification Inspection (SS0MI) Team conducted inspections in late 1985 and early 1986. Among findings of the team was an apparent typographical error in the basis to Technical Specification 2.4.

The basis of the Technical Specification has remained in its current state since original issue of the Operating License. Further, the statement being corrected was not included in its current form at the time when the Technical Specifica-tions were a part of the FSAR.

The statement to be changed currently reads, "Three component cooling water heat exchangers have sufficient capacity (with ample reserve) to remove 420 X 106 BTU /hr following a loss-of-coolant accident." The statement has been revised to read, "Three component cooling water heat exchangers have sufficient capacity to remove 402 X 106 BTV/hr following a loss-of-coolant accident." USAR(Updated Safety Analysis Report) section 9.7.5 (consistent with the FSAR) specifies the accident capacity of a component water heat exchanger as 134 X 106 BTV/hr, resulting in a total of 402 X 106 BTV/hr for three CCW heat exchangers. The note regarding " ample reserve" has been removed. " Ample" is a subjective term which l is better served by reference to the Updated Safety Analysis Report. Information in the USAR is definitive and allows for a determination of the Technical Specification basis, whereas "with ample capacity" does not.

In addition, the statement, "The component cooling water system equipment is accessible for the repair after a loss-of-coolant accident," has been removed from the basis. Radiation studies done after the incident at Three Mile Island indi-cate that this statement may be somewhat misleading. Further, the basis to Technical Specifications should be founded in fact rather than sweeping general-izations. Because of this, and the fact that removing the statement has no impact on the specification, OPPD has chosen to eliminate it.

Finally, the references to "FSAR" in Section 2.4 have been reworded to "USAR".

This change is simply in keeping with the current terminology. In 1982, the first annual update of the FSAR was submitted pursuant to 10 CFR 50.71(e). As various portions of the Technical Specifications are amended for other reasons, the references are updated from "FSAR" to "USAR".

No Significant Hazards Considerations Pursuant to 10 CFR 50.36(a), the licensee is required to have Technical Specifi-cations. Included is the requirement for a basis to each Technical Specification.

Although required by regulation, the bases are specifically not a part of the

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,.,e l Technical Specifications. [ Reference 10 CFR 50.36(a)] As such, significant hazards considerations pursuant to 10 CFR 50.92 are not expressly required.

However, to alleviate any potential for confusion on this matter, the following is presented.

Will the proposed change involve a significant increase in the probability or consequences of an accident previously evaluated?

No. The physical heat removal capacity of the component cooling water heat exchangers has not changed. The value appearing in the Technical Specifications is,inalllikelihood,typographicalinnagure. The actual capacity always has been 402 X 106 BTU /hr, based upon 134 X 10 BTU /hr for each of 3 component cooling water heat exchangers. This is still sufficient capacity for heat removal during normal and accident operational modes. The removal of vague statements from the basis is intended to eliminate confusion. There are no physical changes being made; nor are any operational limits being made less restrictive.

Will changes create the possibility of a new or different kind of accident from any accident previously evaluated?

No. This " correction" does not effect the physical characteristics of any existing system. Further, it does not introduce any new equipment or new modes of operating existing equipment. The changes to the basis do not reduce the Limiting Conditions in any way, thus all existing limits remain in effect.

Therefore, as this change does not impact existing equipment or its operation, the potential for a new or different kind of accident is not created.

Will this involve a significant reduction in a margin of safety?

Again, as no equipment or its limiting conditions for operation have been altered, no reduction in any margin of safety is involved.

For the above reasons, the Omaha Public Power District does not believe the proposed change constitutes a significant hazards consideration.