ML20205T504
| ML20205T504 | |
| Person / Time | |
|---|---|
| Issue date: | 03/18/1988 |
| From: | Cain C NRC OFFICE OF INSPECTION & ENFORCEMENT (IE REGION IV) |
| To: | Bangart R NRC OFFICE OF INSPECTION & ENFORCEMENT (IE REGION IV) |
| Shared Package | |
| ML20205T301 | List: |
| References | |
| FOIA-88-203 NUDOCS 8811140270 | |
| Download: ML20205T504 (18) | |
Text
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J March 18, 1988 r
MEMORABUM FOR: Richard L. Bangart, Director Division of Radiation Safety and Safeguards, Region IV FROM: Charles L. Cain, Chief Nuclear Materials Licensing Section, Region IV
SUBJECT:
COPNENTS REGARDING O! REPORT AND LETTER On March 15, 1988, I received from Jerry Everett a copy of a letter, that I had never before seen, addressed to Ben B. Hayes, Director, Office of Investigations, from Eugene T. Pawlik, Director, Office of Investigations Field Office, Region III. This letter was dated January 27, 1988, 49 days earlier.
The copy I was given included none of the attachments. I telephoned Pawlik on 9
March 15 and requested a copy of Attachment 2 of the letter. This attachment j was identified in the letter as "Report of Interview with Charles Cain on r 12/18/87." I was provided a copy of the attachment on March 16. I also received on March 15 a telecopy of a letter of the same date from Senator John Glenn to Chairman Zech which references the 01 letter.
The purpose of this letter is to describe the nature of the interview which r occurred on December 18, 1987, in the Region IV law library and to respond to certain statements and inferences in the OI letter and the subject attachment.
DuringtheinterviewIsawmgroleasthatofhelpingtheinvestigators identify possible "straw man responses of the licensee that might become obstacles in the case. I viewed myself as a friendly witness and am now :
disappointed to learn that my statements may have damaged the OI case. !
lef t the interview room in December confident that I had helped with the case, not Cestroyed it. Nor did the interviewers at that time air any feelings of
- disappointment with what I had to offer.
I also nad expected my statements to be a nonbinding personal opinion since !
10 CFR 20.6 wakes clear that "no interpretation of the meaning of the l regulations in this part by any of ficer or employee of the Commission other i than a written interpretation by the General Counsel will be recognized to be !
binding upon the Commission." At no time during the interview did the :
investigators indicate that thev were seeking from me an official agency :
interpretation of the regulation. ;
I understand that Region IV management was not informed by O! of the interviews i until they received a copy of the O! letter.
[
The tone of the letter infers that Region III O! is disappointed that its [
case against the Air Force may have been damaged by a certain revelation of :
the truth in regard to the case. To that extent the letter reveals a lack of i objectivity of those publicly responsible to investigate and bring forward the !
truth. ;
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l 8811140270 881017 I PDR OAFFNEY98-203 FDIA PDR k)l// '
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L Faced with that truth, concerning initial event reportability, the writer then t charges that those interviewed withheld information, until that time, that was pertinent to the investigation which had been ongoing since October 1986. To the contrary, I have brought to the attention of my management on various occasions since 1980 the ambiguous nature of 10 CFR 20.403. This issue was discussed again locally after the Wright-Patterson incident. surfaced in late October 1986.
There are other serious errors in both the letter and the attachment which I wish to identify, as well as other comments I wish to make.
First, the letter infers that I stated that the b'right-Patterson incident '
never escalated to a point which was reportable under Section 20.403. This is '
not true. Certainly there was a point which should have triggered a report in accordance with 20.403(b)(3) and (b)(4). The licensee clearly failed to report the incident. The interview proceeded in the following manner:
- 1. The date of the first opening of a drum on September 18, 1986, was identified by the interviewers, and I was led through the four criteria in Section 20.403(b) and asked whether I thought that the licensee would have i.
clearly recognized the requirement for reportability under the identified criteria on that date. I stated that the licensee may have had reason to conclude that the incident was not reportable at that time under any of t the four criteria.
l 2. As I recall, several intermediate dates before the second spill on October 6, 1986, were reviewed in a manner similar to the above.
Finally, I was asked the same questions in regard to event reportability for October 6, 1986.
l The letter draws the conclusion that 1 Stated that the event was not reportable under any of the four criterit. In truth, my statements did not address the stance that the NRC woulC have taken. They were directed at how the licensee might have interpreted them.
Certainly, a million counts per minute of An-241 contamination is not i "minor," but the high levels of contamination within the building never '
triggered the threshold in (b)(2), since there was no release offsite to unrestricted areas. Everyone that I have spoken to within the agency agrees that (b)(2) was never triggered on any data during the event. The !
letter quotes me out of context at this point.
The licensee may have thought that (b)(3) was not triggered, since there
, was never an operational loss of the facility in that it was intended for i storage only. However, I do not believe this is the interpretation that !
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NRC would have taken. In regard to (b)(4), although 1 am not fully aware of the resources that had been brought to bear on the problem by that date, the licensee may have considered decontamination costs as not includable under "damage to property" in the regulation. Again, I believe f NRC would have disagreed.
- 3. Discussion of possible reportability dates after October 6, 1986, were never discussed.
Se.ondly, the letter's statements that I viewed the USAF as an atypical NRC licensee and as an "ally" is true to the extent that the Air Force has been invited to and has attended NRC coJnterpart workshops, meetings, and training courses that otherwise have been limited to NRC employees only. The attitude toward this licensee of those within NRC that established and issued the broad license has been more in line with the manner in which NRC would deal with an Agreement Stati: Air Force permit reviewers have received the same headquarters training as NRC license reviewers and have been supplied with a set of our own internal guidance directives and standard review plans. This we have done with no other NRC licensee, except the U.S. Navy, which has been issued a similar broad license.
Thirdly, there ire a large number of minor but readily verifiable errors in the documents. Identification of these errors may appear petty, but I believe
' they add credence to my statements which question the accuracy of the O!
documents.
In the second paragraph of the attachment, it is stated that I have "seven
! years experience working with NRC." It also states that "during 1978, he began working with the NRC:RIV." I identified r.o leave of absence during the interview and none has been taken. Clearly, the number should have been 9 the end of 1987.
years Officerby' with General Electric, I actually was a radiation safety officer forRather four years.
The attachment also states that I was "later qualified as a Health Physicist" while employed by NRC. We never discussed such issues, and certainly no such qualification criteria exists either then or now. I believe that my l qaalifications as a health physicist were the basis for wy hire by NRC.
The letter states that "Inspection Report No. 030-28542/86004(ORSS) was formally issued on April 28, 1987." A telephone call on March 16 to the Region
!!! project inspector for the Wright-Patterson case revealed that this report had not been issued or released, i
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4 In conclusion. I am disappointed in the manner in which the interview findings wert handled by 01. I can make no apology for the statements actually voiced by me during the interview but could wish that they had been more accurately reported and more appropriately used, kke*N k. kMw Charles L. Cain, Chief Nucitar Materials Licensing Section cc:
R. D. Martin J. M. Montgomery W. L. Brown W. L. Fisher R. J. Everett i
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, Transcript of September 19, 1986 lioEnvirormentalEngineering(BEE) Group ,
meeting chaired by Lt' Col. Maynard G. Moody, Director of BEE, which containt, references to Bldg. 4060 and/or the radia* ion program caused by the release of An-241.
Side A (Cooy
- Counter -
. 54 Lt. Col. Moody: So what's happening?
Alt buu Unknown: You want to tell everybody'the big thing? ,
Lewis: You have a good perspective of it.
Moody: The rest Of them don't.
Lewis: I mean, I wanted Vig A o tell it.
(Laughter) -
1 I
Vic Ovnn: They ruined my butiding, that's what they did.
N s Lewis: Yesterday now ...I'll tell it...(laughter). We ag. ,4ha 1. A have an...(laughter) A.a lot of stuff going l
around.... We've been trying to get a shipment
- x. .
l Case No. 3-86-012 1 n /M.
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. .. p Leute(cont'd): of radioactive waste--we had some drums that we did .
g tiot know what was in them--and the process of moving from one building to another, and this thing...and changing the records from one system to another, we did not have an accurate inventory of everything that was in these drums, so we went over yesterday with the intention of checking one )f the drums out or some of the drums out, fird rat what was in it and 77 we opened the. wrong barrel, we got some contamination in building 4060. Now, at a result of that, we're going to have to get to work and clean it up and I guess...ah...the contaminition is configed to that ene building and its isolated...sh...we're going to get to work on it as soon as we can get stuff together and see how much if not all of it we in get cleaned up. And we're going to, in the meantime, get rid of whatever we can get rid of, instead of waiting any longer, g2 Nody: Well, we hope we can clean it up one time and get rid of it and not contaminate it when we open the next barrel.... ,
Lewis: -
Yes.
Moody:- Or recentaminate it.
Case No. 3-86 012 2 l
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Lewis te.:.. .Y. aughter). '
Post?: What's the chance of the next barrel or one of these -
., barrels being worse than that one?
Lewis: I don't think it would be.
(Laughter) haa Sem If it is I den't want it any worse than....
Lewis: Well...it isn't all that bad, but 1...it surprised me that we ran in to that. -
Posth How...(unintelligible)...we open the barrels and if there is that material in it, and keep it from spreading like it did?...(unintelligible). '
GLe A m s - f. ' N l<- b.' U"4La .
Moody: Why we gotta open the b\rrels? The bsrre)...
(wnir.tilitiible)..,7 i fear af N e 4 A
- l. % b.'4. ,
Lewis: That would be question number one, we weren't certain -
what wd in them.
Moody: Why do we have to be certain what's in them? Why a uskled can't we just say stond radioactive waste?
Case No. 3-86-012 3
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That's....
Lewis:
N : Go ahead. ,
Lewis: ,
They... places that receive the stuff now.
Moody: There's only one, isn't there? ',
4 Lewis: Yeah. ;
Moedy: ...(unintelligible). . . South Carolina.
Lewis: Yeah...Barnwell... Barn...they want a listing of what you're throwing away and we could have tried that.
which would have bees. the best route to take.... ,
POSY Q ama: Ah...m try that with any of the other barrels? ,
Foody: That's what I was wondering?
1 l
Lewis: Why don't wet Moody: We try it Gith one barrel and see if M can get away with it and if we don't...you know...let's assume we clean everything up good...let's get rid of the stuff weknowwhatwe'vegot,(that'sprobablygoingtotake us six months.\.(unintelligible)...and after we got
$ g$ .b Case No. 3-86-012 4
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Moody (cont'd) rid of that, go with one barrel of what we don't know and try and fake it and see if we can'make it. You know, fake it conservatively.
Lewis: And ah....
Moody: '
If that works, then go one at a time. I'f it doesn't work, then fully protect yourself ar.d open the barrels one at a time. -
t Lewis: Well, fortunately, we were suited out and...ah...we V
confirmed the contamination, that's one thing, one plus .I feel...
Moody: .
We get that sucker rautside .the building then it'll be serious because we got to tell them then.
Postt: There is no requirements for telling them?
i 141 Moody: Beats me. I don't know, but l's not going to ask... l at this point. If we can clean it up ourselves and i i
get it decontaminated...what the hell? jf we can't get it decontaminated, we'll tell, face whatever consequences come. I don't know.
lLT Utak *h
"" :2:
Someone might ask the question, r.ake the com.ent, how rach did get outside? l
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l Case No. 3-86 012 ,
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149 Moody: What we know from monitoring outside the building...
, ah...does not make it above the accep' table background
...is that a true statement?
Lewis: (unintelligible)
Moody: Is that 200 count per minute...and 500 is acceptable. '
or did you say 175 was acceptable?
- m. .te ,w ! trying to... counts per minute...but what did !
say in this area?
Sp llek,v.s
.Duan4: 2 300 disintegrations per minute, which would equate out to 150 counts per minute per 100 squar:.
ceritimeters, and 60% of 150 we're talking'about...
(unintelligible).
I b99 L'n t e:-r Okay, but that is true, but the one factor we do not know what the source is, now that's all based on plutonium. Now... plutonium is usually a worse...
well, I don' t know. . . .
Lewis: Plutonius would be....
Unknown: Worst case $ttuation...so. _.sh.. I would think if Dw_s) we are being more conservative by limiting the...!
don'tthinkatthispoint...(fadestounintelligible).
Case No. 3-86-012 6
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165 Moody: What do you get when you put dewn the check source on PECIS.
a (uni-te"!;1ble). 04 O Lewis: All we get is.. 23,000.. 20,000.
[tk t.e4
-. .? ; No, you get 1,500 counts per minute en the times M scale, so you're looking at approximately...
Lewis: 15,000.
171 Sver : 15,000.
173 Moody: I don't think I'd be awfdl scared at 200 counts a4 %t d e sa, pe r minute...h:-3-t:11?;ible)...you car. to out of the check source at 15,000 counts per minute...
(unintelligible)...ssyouknow.
N,e;thINCM I guess what I'm questiening is that's what..F h b s(uninte114t
<a N- so.aik4t %). .! wonder if it wouldn't be a wise move to take some soil scnples?
Moody: ! think we did...didn't we?
Lewis: We have one, we can get a couple more ar.3 enter the ground.
. Case No. 3-86-012 . 7
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Moody: I think you're right though. awe ought to start out next time.-each time we go there...we ought to monitor outside.. 4calatelligiMa}.
ga+ s a g . .d g et alt .
(Unintelligible).
Moody: We'd like to be able to...if all else fails....
Lewis: Yeah.
Meedy: 50....
"* " ""^ '
- p 4 .*s) eeco - e d *S***
Du n AJ 4'" a^* : ! think./ a. (u'n;n.;g-1 1' ! $1 e) . . .va cuum the . . .Ra ndy brought this up....
190 .'c ody: Yep, alright, that's the last phase if all else f ails...alrcst finished...that'll be son-of-a-bitch...
(univ.telligible).
gg -
Cac ye,w % \p m s ge4
- N*P' ' f-due:ar C i.i.aellisi M ).
For radioactive use?
Post: ,
,A41 Don't tell them for what...! want a Hep vacuum.
202 Moody: You know, you say we can't deconta'ninate it, then we best not get their vacuum cleaner...but if we can l
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l Case No. 3-86-012 .
8
'. l. c , .* 1 Moody (cont'd) decontaminate it successfully...! assume we can if we can decontaminate our instruments.'..then, ah...
l you know we get the Hya vacuum cleaner. throw the
.. .Qi hn.s-es in the bag, clean the darn thin'g. give it back to them and we haven't done anybody any hars. ;
I Post: (Unintelligible).
(Unintelligible). i l
l 207 Moody: We had some toxic particles...but we're not i gonna...we're not'gonna say where...that's a... ,
fair statement. i i
hkus I need your help on this since you....
i 6t: .
Post: 16 gallon or 1 gallen back pack.... !
I i (Unintelligible). \"bk.lel 3w 1 l. . -
We hope the bigger you can getgetthel..r it alla, Moody:
l in o,ie sve11 swoop. f 4 I 1
Post: Okay, i I
%eed 1
-Who n: Who's responsible for that building?
t Case No. 3-86-012 9
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% bad -
t.ewis (Uniate144,41a, laughter).
Moody: We own the building...we have the only keys...so there's no way nobody's gonna get in and ah, L. ty said it's even worse than that,'[it's inside a munitions area and they got to let us inside there to start with so...it's fairly well controlled. .
Post: If we...if we did borroir it and ah...they wouldn't need to never find out...(unint 111gible).
Qt p.tt.0$f$ gas.***~'" M 228 Moodyt: Harryt..an, and others. Aoffice should kt ow but wiu gc+ b P nbi 4. .A.W.
nobodyelse...andhesays...(unintelligible).
Post: , What kind of time frame we talking about, this i Monday?
w ,a d a .t .yes.
Moody: Absolutely, at the latest. If you can spare his Wak semegeveralls, a couple of sets wMit you're at it...(unintelligible). A+ "2*M "U'-
f%e. a.sb i,N M a. % % =.4. e . .w w s .J+ t
- i. 7 oik
$ wen. Yeah, onesftowb9 % ca
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Moodyi: Doesn'tmatter,anything...(uninte111gible).
c.o=^.m.(f,5 .
(Unintelligible),
m ,g 5 o m,.n . Ag Wf <.<.~ b.+La w 1, ..
Case No. 3-86-012 ( u.o.'of4.N0 '10kls)
%)idtg ef l As 4 .'$3 s , 4 d aJ c u we d*d+ " " " ' '
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Lewis: We'll have that...
AL,u 4= w. Jim'11 take care of that.
Moody: (Uni,ntelligible). Te(( % lt% ls 36 4 b n.< a.h bp *daett j p::st?ar a Anyone...! think we have two clean ones, b'ut we need one that operates to check, i
gm.G One just suddenly died on you?
Duca) .
& answn: It died... Mark had it...and they said is this thing working? It should be able to pick up, cause I was -
e,hecking my hand, it wouls to up to e hundred, maybe a hundred fif ty with my gloves of f, then all of a l i
sudden.... !
Moody: ut of my shower you asshole.
(Unintelligible laughter, chatter). i
, . j Pos4 l
.Gou: Maybe ycu burned out the thing...(unintelligible. l laughter). I i
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bO 'JP -:y I 4
Just wait until your hair starts turning gray. l t
then you're really in trouble. '
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l Case No. 3-86-012 11 i
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Lewist Look at eine.
@,k.e a 14- s bfs.
m g 4,. to k KiurJ ou3 you A A al' (Unin % . u u <.telligible,groupchatter).
262 Moody: Please ah...everybody...let's keep this confidential within this office until we cannot successfully solve I the problem or untti we find but we can't handit it i
and we gotta go ask for help, don't tell your roomate, girlfriends.
4 Wingo: It'll be on Channel 2.
mo od i A+'s ' t , - c ,Lc,a 4 y = w f .' t o d No M (Chatter). .
. Moody: It don't want Mark Allen saying 'how'come you didn't '
tell me about this.'
k th aa. i. .' u ., 1 tr ' t t M e .a Out cac k^ "7.
hd41 Un _ We follcwed News Chant.el 7 in the rain gate...
(laughter)...we thought he was leading us over.
272 Moody: What else is going on?
?
There are no further coments regarding the
- radiation problem' until' l Side 8. !
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Case No. 3-86-012 12 6
p *Ido d * ,
$1de I (0n original tape, this side is A).
Moody: Please erase...please erase the fint section on there about this...about our'ah. .. radiation problems.
Wingot ! don't keep any'of them...!'ve only got two tapes anyway.
Moody: Still', hate to have that get into enemy hands...
right. so...(unintelligiblei...see my log book after I come back from St. Louis. What's going on?
Lewis: In the world of health physics?
No further discussion on the tape regarding the ' radiation problem."
Case No. 3 86 012 ,
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trooks Air Force lase CONvsAsAt:0N sueA ct Ameritive 241 contamination incident telephone conversation sv==aAn y Onthemerr.ingofOctcler 16. 1986. ! was requested by Jerry to return a telephone call to Capta< a Donovan of the Air Force. Af tse several unsucessfull attempts to contact Captain Donovan. I finally reached him befcre noon. We discussed the Wright patterson americim 241 contamination incident. In his conversation he indicated ne had contacted Region !!! the dav before (10/15) to 'get a list of any MC licens,that ees located in close proxtetty of Wrir 'atterson AF8 authorized for curie cuantities of americium 241. At this time he r=> <d to me that the contamination incident was growing by leaps and bounds and that the amount of cantamination already discovered muld be above any avthorization for americim authorized by NAC's old license to Wright Patterson or the Air Force I. mad License permit to same. He indicated that he thought that this saterial had somehow gotten on the Air Force property without consent or the Air Forces knowledge, and the Air Force planned to get to the bottom of this little mystery. ,
After talking with Captain Donovan. I was then able to relay this infomation to Jerry.
Jerry then briefed me in the ongoing problem and instructed se to et back in touch with Captain Donovan and get a comp 1ste update. I tried the rest the af terncon to letcould back not in touch I told Jerry that reachwith theCaptain Donovan, Air Force. The next but was day not able I was off ontoCV5.
do so.
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