ML20205Q481
| ML20205Q481 | |
| Person / Time | |
|---|---|
| Site: | Fermi  |
| Issue date: | 04/14/1986 |
| From: | Advisory Committee on Reactor Safeguards |
| To: | Advisory Committee on Reactor Safeguards |
| References | |
| ACRS-2397, NUDOCS 8605280367 | |
| Download: ML20205Q481 (26) | |
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SUMMARY
/ MINUTES ACRS REACTOR OPERATIONS SUBCOMMITTEE WASHINGTON, D. C.
FEBRUARY 12, 1986 A meeting was held by the Reactor Operations Subcommittee. Notice of the meeting was published in the Federal Register on January 21,1986(Attachment A). The schedule of items covered in the meeting is in Attachment B.
The list of attendees is in Attachment C.
A list of the meeting handouts is in Attachment D.
The handouts are filed with the office copy.
H. Alderman was the designated ACRS Staff Member. The meeting was convened at 1:30 p.m.
Principal Attendees ACRS NRC J. Ebersole, Subcommittee Chairman J. Giitter, IE W. Kerr M. Wegner, IE C. Michelson R. Kiessel, IE D. Moeller E. Licitra, NRR G. Reed C. Requa, NRR D. Ward G. Vissing, NRR I. Catton, Consultant (part-time)
E. Weiss, IE J. Stefano, NRR-E. Greenman, Reg. III R. Hernan, NRR
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MINUTES / REACTOR OPERATIONS 2
FEBRUARY 12, 1986 Opening Statement - Subcommittee Chairman J. Ebersole Mr. Ebersole noted that the subcommittee will discuss recent operating events and would be briefed on the 50-54(f) improvement program on Fermi and on the Technical Specification Inprovement Program. Mr. Ebersole asked the subcom-mittee members for comments.
Dr. Moeller requested that the report AE0D is preparing on loss of the ventilation system in the control room at the McGuire plant be discussed by the subcommittee. Mr. Michelson asked if the subcommittee should hear briefings on AE0D reports which deal with combina-tions of current events and final analysis in the longer range sense. Mr.
Ebersole suggested that this should be taken up as part of the presentation to the full Committee.
Mr. Ebersole then called upon Mr. D. Allison who is Acting Branch Chief for the Events Analysis Branch (I&E).
D. Allison, Acting Branch Chief, Events Analysis Branch, ISE Mr. Allison noted that R. Hernan who was the principal spokesman for NRR was present. He also noted that the team that has been looking at the Perry earthquake would arrive later in the day.
He stated the first presentation would be a degraded HPSI system at McGuire.
MINUTES / REACTOR OPERATIONS 3
S' FEBRUARY 12, 1986 J. Glitter, Events Analysis Branch, I&E McGuire Unit 1 - Startup with Degraded HPSI System, November 3, 1985 This incident involved the failure to repair VCT isolation valve motor operators prior to start up.
In the case of a safety injection signal the volume control tank (VCT) could not be isolated.
On November 2, a loss of instrument air caused both units to trip and safety injection in Unit 1.
The VCT isolation valves closed as required; however the valve motor operators were later found to be burned out. Prior to startup the operators manually opened the valves but did not repair the motor operators.
In a safety injection the VCT valves close and suction is taken from the refueling water storage tank. The VCT Volume is of the order of several thousand gallons whereas the volume of the refueling water storage tank is of the order of several hundred thousand gallons. The VCT has a cover gas of hydrogen and nitrogen at about 30 psig.
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If the VCT valves are open during a safety injection then suction would be i
taken from both the VCT and the refueling water storage tank. This leads to two concerns. One is the boron injected into the vessel could be lower than that assumed in the safety analysis. The second concern is that if the VCT
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MINUTES / REACTOR OPERATIONS 4
FEBRUARY 12, 1986 level was low enough, the hydrogen and nitrogen cover gases could get en-trained in the charging pump suction path and ultimately result in gas
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binding of the charging pumps.
Apparently what happened is the licensee looked at their technical specifica-tions and because they did not consider these valves to be in an ECCS flow path, they didn't think there was any problem from technical specification basis from starting up. The failure to repair the valves prior to startup was discovered by the resident inspector reviewing the shift supervisor's log.
Mr. Ebersole questioned how does the Licensee determine whether a valve in a given position is or is not in the ECCS Set. Mr. Giitter responded that he didn't know what the logic was.
The Licensee ran tests consisting of starting the charging pumps with the VCT valves open. They then sent an operator out to close the VCT valves manual-ly.
In three trials the times were 19.4 minutes, 18 minutes and 15 minutes.
The Licensee concluded there wouldn't be any gas binding of the charging
. umps in less than 18.5 minutes.
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Mr. Reed commented that tests of how long it would take an operator to close the valve didn't have any relevance to the issue. The operator could fall in the stairway and kill himself while en route.
MINUTES / REACTOR OPERATIONS 5
FEBRUARY 12, 1986 Followup actions include: valve operator repair. The design of other motor operator valves in the plant were reviewed. Mr. Giitter noted that an enforcement conference was scheduled for February 28th when all the issues would be discussed.
Brunswick 2, Target Rock, Two - Stage SRV Setpoint Drift, January 7,1986 -
M. Wegner I&E Carolina Power and Light reported test results from Wyle Laboratories on 11 SRV's. Six of the valves failed to lift on pressures as high as 200 psi above the setpoints. Two of the SRV's were satisfactory and three SRV's lifted outside the tolerance band. These test results were significantly different from other licensees results that were recently reported to the NRC.
The two stage Target Rock safety relief valves had been proposed as a so-lution to the problems encountered with the three stage valves. Concern regarding the two stage valves were raised when all 11 of the Hatch 1 SRV's failed to open at pressures well above their setpoints following a scram.
Subsequently, three of the valves opened at 1180 psig and the other valves were manually opened later in the transient.
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The principal causes of the setpoint drift were determined to be galling in the labyrinth seal area, and corrosion induced seat to disc bonding.
MINUTES / REACTOR OPERATIONS 6
FEBRUARY 12, 1986 The recommended solutions were an enhanced maintenance program and a replace-ment disc of a material whose oxide film would be less likely to bond to the oxide film of the seat.
i Ms. Wegner pointed out that the maintenance program has been in effect at i
most of the plants for at least one fuel cycle. Most of the plants have had at least one stuck valve. Mr. Reed commented that enhanced maintenance was not the answer to the question. Ms. Wegner agreed that it was not the entire answer. Mr. Reed noted the problem was the environment in which the valves l
are being asked to function and the nature of the valve.
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Mr. Churney noted the staff is monitoring the situation.
Turkey Point Units 3 and 4, Stop Check Valve Failures, November 1985 to January 1986, R. Kiessel, I&E i
Mr. Kiessel discussed a series of check valve failures that occurred at Turkey Point Units 3 and 4.
The check valves were in the steam supply system to the auxiliary feed pumps and Turkey Point has only steam driven auxiliary feed pumps.
I The safety significance of this problem is the fact that it could have prevented the auxiliary feed system from functioning properly. Of a more e
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MINUTES / REACTOR OPERATIONS 7
FEBRUARY 12, 1986 generic nature it points out what happens to check valves when they are subject to very low flow conditions.
Turkey Point became aware that the 12 check valves in question w&s inoperable in November of 1985. They ran radiographs of the other 11 and found 2 more had failed. When they opened the valves, they found that all of the valves I
were experiencing signs of mechanical damage from low flow. They replaced the stems, the disc and the disc guide in 10 of the 12 valves and went back into operation.
In January the licensee discovered that one of the valves had failed. This time they discovered that 4 valves out of the 12 had failed.
In addition to making the systems inoperable, the loose parts which were generated by this could have done damage to the turbine pumps.
The mode of failure was determined to be degradation of the disc and disc nut. The failure was due to low steam flow conditions caused by slight leakage of normally closed MOV. The low flow caused vibration and chattering breaking disc guide from disc.
Followypactionsincluded:
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The auxiliary feedwater system was inspected o
All missing guide pins located and removed
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MINUTES / REACTOR OPERATIONS 8
FEBRUARY 12, 1986 o
All valves repaired with a higher strength material used in the disc guide o
Failure analysis and metallurgical examination were performed o
The licensee considered this as an interim repair pending com-pletion of the study by its AFW enhancement Task Force o
Information Notice 86-09 " Failure of Check and Stop Check Valves Subjected to Low Flow Conditions" was issued February 3,1986.
Complications Following Turbine Trip Test from 100% Power, Palo Verde Unit 1, January 9, 1986, E. Licitra, NRR At the time of this event, Palo Verde was in the final stages of its power ascension program. They were attempting a turbine trip test from 100 percent power. A turbine trip was expected and then there would be an automatic transfer of nonessential loads to the grid. The house loads did not automatically transfer to the grid because of a frequency mismatch between the grid and the IE busses. Many of the details regarding this event, therefore it was requested that it be discussed at the next meeting.
Palisades, Loss of Off-Site Power, January 9,1986, J. Giitter, I&E This event involved loss of off-site power with one emergency diesel genera-tor out of service and only one diesel in the standby readiness mode.
I MINUTES / REACTOR OPERATIONS 9
FEBRUARY 12, 1986 At the time of this event, the unit was in cold shutdown for about 40 da.ys.
About one third of the fuel was new and two thirds was reloaded fuel, so there wasn't much decay heat at the time. The head was on the vessel but not tensioned and the vessel was drained to the flange level wh{ch is about 12 feet above the top of active fuel.
About 2:40 p.m. smoke was observed coming from the conduit on the 1A bus.
It was later found that the smoke was caused when a cable shorted to ground and heated up water that had gotten in the conduit. This appeared to be smoke.
The operators de-energized bus 1A, a non-vital 4160 volt 6us. Then because of a fear of fire they decided to de-energize the 345 KV bus which feeds three starter transformers. Before doing this, the operators started and loaded the diesel generator that was in standby readiness. The diesel generator function as required and supplied power to vital bus 10. When the 345 KV bus was de-energized it caused buses IE and IB to be de-energized.
4 The licensee declared an unusual event at 3:00 p.cn. and the NRC operations center was notified at about 3:19 p.m.
l At 4:50 p.m. there was a shift change and the second sh1ft' established backfeed to all the main buses by backfeeding from the front bus through the I
main transformers through the startup transformer down to the vital buses and to the non-vital buses.
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HINUTE5/ REACTOR 0PERATIONS 10 FEBRUARY 12, 1986 In summary, Mr. Glitter noted it was a loss of off-site power caused by l
voluntary di.sconnect and it appears that the licensee did every thing right.
i There was one subcommittee discussion regarding why this was considered a loss of off site power. Mr. Aliison stated that they would discuss the definition of loss of off site power for statistical purposes with the staff people.
f H, B. Robinson Unit 2. Rsactor Trip With loss of Off-site Power,. January 28, 1986.- G. Requa, NRR On January 28th the plant was in a closedown fer refueling in early February.
One diesel generator was out of service. A fault occurred on the emergency bus E2 which caused a spike on the instrumentation bus number 4, A false rod drop signal was received causing a turbine runback. The reactor tripped on high pressurizer pressure from 80 percent power, A loss of offsite power occurred coincident with a fast transfer to the i
startup transformer.
Dr. Kerr asked what was the significance of " loss coinciding with fast I
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transfer to the startup transformer." He asked if that meant that it actual-ly didn't transfer to the startup transformer.
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MINUTES / REACTOR OPERATIONS 11 FEBRUARY 12, 1936 Mr. Requa replied the connection was made but refused because the relay had opened.
The A diesel generator automatically started and loaded en bus El. The reactor coolant pump tripped and natural circulation was established. At this same time, a safety injectfon signal was received ar.d the P.SIV's were found closed.
Mr. Ebertole asked what sould have happened with a bus fault on E1. He asked if the emergency dies 61 generator would have been Itcked out of the bus by circuitry.
Mr. Swsc. son replieo that if it was a true bus fault then apparently it would have precluded loading the d'esal on it.
Mr. Ebersole asked wnat would have happened if the diesel generator failed to load on the bus.
Mr. Swenson replied there would be a station blatkout.
Mr. Requa noted that at 9:46 a. m., the "B" diesel generator was restored.
At this time the reactor coolant temperature was 535 degrees F.
The pressura 2000 psig, and the plant was stable.
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MINUTES / REACTOR OPERATIONS 12 FEBRUARY 12, 1986 Dr. Kerr asked what good did it do to have the B diesel generator restored if there was a bus fault on bus E2.
Mr. Swenson repifed that it was apparently not a true bus fault. The loads on that particular bus were shed. As the event progressed, they reloaded the equipment back on the bus one piece at a time.
It turned out the fault was not on the bus but on a separate piece of equipment.
In tesponse to a question by Mr. Ebersole, Mr. Requa responded that they still don't know where the fault was.
4 During t.hc event the C steam generator PORY was manually opened to balance loop temperature for natural circulation. The valve stuck open due to freezing of the instrumentation lines and another safety ejection signal was received on high steam line delta p.
The valve was closed a few minutes later by opening the air supply valve and the partial blowdown was secured.
At 12:55 p.m. the El bus was connected to the offsite power. At 4:03 the E2 bus was connected to the offsite power.
The follow-up is that the plant is in a 45 day refueling outage and the licensee is investigating the cause of the loss of offsite power. Region 2 will review their findings prior to startup.
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MINUTES / REACTOR OPERATIONS 13 FEBRUARY 12, 1986 Mr. Ebersole asked why a signal is produced caused by closure of main steam isolation valves creating a safety injection signal since the first conse-quence of that is to lose heat transfer and to cause a pressure rise in the primary loop which has nothing to do with inventory.
Mr. Requa replied that the licensee still doesn't know why they got that safety injection signal.
Mr. Ebersole asked about the second safety injection signal. He asked if that was caused by inventory shrinkage. Mr. Requa agreed.
Dr. Kerr inquired why the fast transfer failed to be successful. Mr. Requa replied that it was because there was a phase mismatch, and the C phase balance relay opened.
Arkansas Nuclear One Unit 1 - Design Deficiency in Emergency Feedwater System
- January 14, 1986, G. Vissing, NRR Mr. Vissing discussed a design deficiency which could cause a potential loss of all emergency feedwater and blowdown of both steam generators during a steam.pnebreak,withasignalfailureofoneACbus.
This deficiency was discovered by an inspection team from the Office of Inspection and Enforcement when they postulated a steam line break concurrent
MINUTES / REACTOR OPERATIONS 14 FEBRUARY 12, 1986 with a loss of the red AC power bus. The turbine driven and motor-driven emergency feedwater pumps would be lost and there would be a possible blowdown of both steam generators.
Mr. Vissing noted that this emergency feeawater system has recently been upgraded to a safety grade system and the deficiency was partially a result of that upgrade.
Mr. Vissing noted that with a steam line break, the valve (normally opened) should prevent blowdown. This valve is on the red bus. The power to the motor driven pump is also from the red bus.
With a steam line break and concurrent loss of the red AC bus, the motor operated valve would not close resulting in steam blowdown. The turbine driven pump would be inoperative, and the motor driven pumps would also be inoperative.
The licensee recognized this situation and designed a system with check valves so that with a steam line break and postulated loss of the red AC bus, they would still have steam for the turbine driven pump.
Somehow in the design modification the check valves were omitted. There was e
a subcommittee discussion on how the check valves were omitted but there wasn't a clear answer as to how this occurred.
MINUTES / REACTOR OPERATIONS 15 FEBRUARY 12, 1986 Mr. Reed pointed out that this event should be brought to the full Committee to demonstrate the vulnerability of the auxiliary feed as the only path of decay heat removal for some reactors.
Riverbend Startup Review - E. Weiss, I&E Mr. Weiss noted that this was not an event as such, but a concern regarding the number of reportable events since the o,nerating license.
The site was visited from January 28-3a, 1986. The group discussed recent events with the licensee. The group witnessed a shift turnover in the control room. A tour of the plant included the diesel generators and the feedwater system.
The NRC staff urged the licensee to upgrade their communication with other plants because there were a significant number of problems that if they were not preventable at least they could have found out earlier by having more frank discussions with their counterparts at other plants.
Some of the problems at Riverbend include:
Feedwater System. They had a vibration problem that had torn an anchor out of a wall. They had sticking of feedwater regulator valves. The operators
MINUTES / REACTOR OPERATIONS 16 FEBRUARY 12, 1986 noticed that they did not actually have real valve position indication in the control room.
Problems occurred with steam tunnel ventilation, temperature switches resis-tors and fiber optic multiplexing systems.
The staff felt that Riverbend is making good progress in resolving their problems and urged the licensee to maintain communication with the NRC.
R. Benaro, Director, PWR Licensing Division, NRC Mr. Benaro introduced the Perry Earthquake event of January 31, 1986. He introduced Mr. Edelman of Cleveland Electric Illuminating Co.
Mr. Edelman, Vice President, Cleveland Electric Illuminating (CEI)
He noted the event occurred on January 31, 1986 about 11:45 a.m.
The plant is not in operating status but is very close to receiving a license. They chose to go into the emergency procedures. CEI sent people into the plant to assess the status of the plant. Numerous plant inspections were run with the opera ing people to insure that the plant was in a safe condition. The emergency alert was downgraded from a site emergency down to an alert and after conferences with the state and the NRC the emergency was terminated about 2:30 p. m.
MINUTES / REACTOR OPERATIONS 17 FEBRUARY 12, 1986 Mr. Edelman remarked that numerous walkdowns were performed by his people.
All equipment was frozen and everything was inspected. Region III issued a confirmatory action lctter. After inspections by CEI and the NRC, the confirmatory action letter was modified which allowed CEI to go back and finish the preoperational testing.
Mr. Edelman stated that as the event started, ongoing testing and calibration was going on. They were preparing to run the division 2 diesel generator testing. A number of systems were in standby and operating mode throughout the plant. All systems remained operable during and after the event.
After the event the plant was examined for any structural damage. Mainte-nance people did walkdowns.
Plant personnel were asked to identify any abnormalities they might see.
Each abnormality was evaluated to see if it had any relationship to the earthquake.
Dr. Kerr asked about the possibility of relay chatter and whether relays had l
put things in modes of operation that were unexpected or unusual. He asked j
if the investigation included any effort to see if that sort of thing had occurred.
I Mr. Edelman replied that the investigation had looked at that and to the best of his knowledge nothing was found where that had occurred.
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HINUTES/ REACTOR OPERATIONS 18 FEBRUARY 12, 1986 Mr. Michelson asked about spurious operation of non-safety systems.
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Mr. Edelman responded that the instrument air compressor and a building heater boiler tripped and that all other equipment remained in operation.
Mr. Chen presented an extensive evaluation of this seismic event. His conclusion was that the 1986 Ohio earthquake was of such short duration, high freque,ncy, low velocity, low displacement and low energy that it really ^
didn't have any engineering significance.
E. Greenman, Region 3, Fermi Improvement Program The program is the culmination of a number of events and problems at the Fermi station.
Some of the events leading to the issuance of a 50-54 letter in December 1985 were:
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Since the time the license was issued the power at.'Fr.;rmi hos been restricted to 5 percent by a confirmatory action letter.
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The utility still hasn't operated above 5 percent. power.
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i Fermi has problems with the operation and reliabili,ty of their diesel genera 'n tors. Prioble.us have been-encountered with cracking of the turbine bypass x
lines. There was a major failure of one of the two feedwater pumps.
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MINUTES / REACTOR OPERATIONS 19
.c FEBRUARY 12, 1986 One personnel error has occurred that involved a rupture of the condensate storage tank, up near the top of that tank, and the loss of 100,000 gallons of water.
The most recent development is a finding that occurred in late January where changes, modifications, stress reports and calculation to drawings were not updated since September of 1981.
Mr. Greenman noted the 50-54 letter of December 1985 requested the utility to provide information on the adequacy of their management structures and systems to operate the plant, the actions that they had taken and planned to take to insure their readiness to restart and support power ascension, to operate the plant, and what short-term and long term actions they plan to take to improve not only their regulatory performance but their operation performance.
The Licensee has responded that the chief executive officer assumed the direct management and control to support the restart effort. The president of the company has been directed to oversee the Quality Assurance Program.
An i~ndependent overview committee has been established consisting of outside consul { ants,toindependentlymakerecommendationstothechiefexecutive officer and the board of directors. A reactor operation improvement plan has been established consisting of about 60 areas which the utility has addressed to improve all aspects of their operation.
MINUTES / REACTOR OPERATIONS 20 FEBRUARY 12, 1986 The meeting was adjourned at 6:00 p.m.
NOTE:
A transcript of this meeting is available in the NRC Public Document Room 1717 H Street, N.W., Washingtonm D. C., or can be purchased from ACR-Federal Reporters, 444 North Capitel Street, Washington, D. C. 20001,(202)347-3700.
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g~7pftW&fDUT~h Y/80 Federal Register / Vol. 51. No.13 / Tuesday January 21, 1986 / Notices cperating events and accidents which
- R. Afecting with NRC Commissioners individual one or two days before the have occurred at nuclear plants.
(tentative)-report regarding scheduled meeting to be advised of any
- H Three Mile Island Unit 2-review implementatijon of the changes in schedule, etc., whkh may of arrangements to preclude criticality of recommendations of the Panelon ACRS have ocentred.
the TMI-2 nuclear core during the Effectiveness.
Dared: January 14.1988.
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defueling of this facility.
March 13-15.1986-Agenda to be Morton W Wah
- l. ACRSSubcommittee Activities-announced.
Assistant E;recutire DirectorforPropect the members will hear the reports of its April 10-12.196S-Agenda to be A'"* "-
subcommittee. representatives of the announced.
NRC Staff, and the nuclear industry as Dated: January 15.1966.
appropriate regarding ongoing John C. Ho)fe.
- subcommittee assignments. including Advisory Committee Afonogement Off4cer.
p Doc. 86-12.63 Filed 1-17-eas 8.45 am}
Advisory Committe's on Reactor n
sf r otett o Safeguards; Subcommittee on Radiation, establishment of a nst de minimis
" " CC " "
- Westinghouse Water Reactors; levels for specified radiation exposures.
emergency core cooling systems. ACRS Advlsory Committee on Reactor practices and procedures.
Safeguards; Subcommittee on Reactor ne ACRSSubcommittee on implementation of GDC-19. Fire Operations; Meeting Westinghuse Water Reactors will hold a
, Protection with respect to the main meeting on February 12.1986. Room control room and back-up control ne ACRS Subcommittee on Reactor 1046.1717 H Street NW Washington, stations, quahfication of safety related Operations will hold a meeting on DC.
equipment. etc.
February 12.1988. Room 1046.1717 H ne entire meeting willbe open to
- J. Contamment Sump Performance-Street. NW. Washington. DC.
public attendance'he subject meeting the members will discuss proposed NRC The entire meeting will be open to The agenda for t Staff resolution of Committee public attendance.
shall be as follows-recommenations in its report of The agenda for the subject meeting Wednesday. Februar.y 22. J.9ss.-a.30 September 16.1985 regarding Proposed shall be as follows:
jf f3
,cfy
,73 Resolution of USI A-13. Containment Wednesday, February 12. ;986-J:30 e ubco ittee i review th Emergency Sump Performance.
P.M untilthe concluswa ofbusiness.
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](mb' b t at.
- K. TVA Reorganization-review The Subcommittee will review recent d
proposed changes in TVA s nuclear operating events.
San Onofre Unit 1.
organizational structure to improve the Oral statements may be presented by Oral statements may be presented by design. construction and operations of members of the public with the its nuclear plants. Proposed restart of concurrence of the Subcommittee members of the pubhc with the the Sequoyah Nuclear plant and plans Chairman; written statements will be concurrence of the Subcommittee chairman; written statements wiII be for additional TVA plants will be accepted and made available to the considered.
Committee. Recordings wdl be permitted accepted and made available to the
- L Reactor Pressure ressel only during those portions of the Cortmittee. Recordings will be permitted i
Pressurized ThermalShack-discuss meeting when a transcript is being kept, only during those portions of the l
proposed ACRS recommendations /
and questions may be asked only by meeting when a transcript it being kept, comments regarding the transients members of the Subcommittee,its and questions may be asked only by evaluated in connection with this consultants, and Staff. Persons desiring members of the Subcommittee.its matter.
to make oral statements should notify consultants and Staff. Persona desirfag
- M. Seismic Design Alar; irs-discuss the ACRS staff member named below as to make oral statements should notify proposed ACRS recomrnendations/
far in advance as is practicable so that the ACRS staff member named below as comments regarding the scope, etc. of appropriate arrangements can be made.
far in advance as is practicable so that j
the NRC program on seismic design During the initial portion of the appropriate arrangements can be made.
margins.
meeting the Subcommittee may During the initial portion of the
- N. Conduct of Afembers-discuss exchange prehminary views regarding meeting, the Subcommittee, along with proposed ACRS comments /
matters to be considered during the any of its consultants who may be recommendations regarding balance of the meeting.%e present may exchange prelirninary implementation of the conflict ofinterest Subcommittee will then hear views regarding matters to be statutes and regulations with respect to presentations by and hold discussions considered during the balance of the ACRS activities.
with representatives of the NRC Staff meeting.
'O. State ofNaclear Power Plant and otherinterested persons re8arding The Subcommittee will then hear Sofety--consider proposed ACRS this review.
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presentations by and hold discussions recommendations / comments regarding Further information regarding topics with representatives fo the NRC Staff, the state of nuclear power plant safety.
to be discussed. whether the meeting its consultants, and other interested i
g
- P.DOEProgram for Afanagement -
has been cancelled or rescheduled.the persons regarding this review.
i andDisposalof Radioactive Wastes-Chairman's ruling on requests for the Further information regarding topics l
briefing by representatives of DOE.
opportunity to present oral statements to be discussed, whether the meeting j
- Q. San Onofre Nuclear Plant Unit and the time allotted therefor can be has been cancelled or rescheduled. the g
I-review plans to restart this facility obtained by a~ prepaid telephone call to Chairman's ruling on requests for the following a loss of all AC power.
the cognizant ACRS staff member.Mr.
opportunity to present oral statements 4
- Q. Future Recctors (tentative)-
Herman Alderman (telephone 202/634-and the time allotted therefor can be discuss proposed ACRS 1414) between 815 A.M. and 5.00 P.M.
obtained by a prepaid telephone call to recommendations / comments regarding Persons planning to attend this meeting the cognizant ACRS staff member. Dr.
safety considerations for future reactors. are urged to contact the above named Richard Savio (telephone 202/6M287)
/9-M MME 9
TENTATIVE SCHEDULE 4
ACRS SUBCOMMITTEE ON REACTOR OPERATIONS
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1:30 p.m., Room 1046, 1717 H Street, NW FEBRUARY 12, 1986, WASHINGTON, D. C.
1:30 p.m.
Introductory Remarks - Subcommittee Remarks RECENT SIGNIFICANT EVENTS DATE PLANT EVENT PRESENTER /0FFICE TELEPHONE 1:40 p.m.
11/3/85 McGuire Start-Up with J. Giiter, IE 1&2 Degraded Air 492-9002 System 2:00 p.m.
1/7/86 Brunswick Target Rock Two-M. Wegner IE 2
Stage SRV 492-4511 Setpoint Drift 2:20 p.m.
1/7/86 Turkey Point Stop Check Valve R. Kiessel, IE Failures 492-8119 2:40 p.m.
1/9/86 Palo Verde 1 Reactor Trip E. Licitra, NRR 492-8598 3:00 p.m.
1/9/86 Palisades Loss of Offsite J. Giiter IE Power 492-9002 BREAK 3:20 p.m.
3:30 p.m.
1/28/86 Robinson toss of Offsite G. Requa, NRR Power 492-9798 3:50 p.m.
1/14/86 ANO 1 Design Defi-G. Vissing, NRR ciency in Emergency Feed-water System i
4:10 p.m.
1/29/86 Riverbend Review Of Start-E. Weiss, IE Up Test Program 492-9005 4:30 p.m.
1/31/86 Perry Earthquake 4:50 p.m.
Fermi 50.54(f)
G. Wright, Reg.
Improvement III Program 312-790-5695 Technical Speci-R. Hernan, NRR 5:10 p.m.
fication Improve-492-9519 ment Program 5:30 p.m.
Subcommittee Discussion 5:45 p.m.
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Febmary 12, 1986 DATE:
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ATTACHMENT D HAND 0UTS REACTOR OPERATIONS SUBCOMMITTEE MEETING FEBRUARY 12, 1986 1.
NRC Staff Presentation 2.
Perry Eathquake 3.
Review of Start-up Test Program Riverbend Station 4.
Fermi 2 Briefing 5.
Figures Depicting Target Rock Two - Stage Pilot Actuated, Safety / Relief Valve
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