ML20205E385
| ML20205E385 | |
| Person / Time | |
|---|---|
| Site: | Rancho Seco |
| Issue date: | 03/20/1987 |
| From: | Fish R NRC OFFICE OF INSPECTION & ENFORCEMENT (IE REGION V) |
| To: | Julie Ward SACRAMENTO MUNICIPAL UTILITY DISTRICT |
| References | |
| NUDOCS 8703300602 | |
| Download: ML20205E385 (2) | |
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Rancho Seco Nuclear Generating Station 14440 Twin Cities Road..
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~Attentioni Mr.. Joh'n : Wa'rd
.Dep'uty General M5na'ger
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Gentlemen:
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~ By memorandum dated January 23,1987,- the Federal Emergency. Management Agency' linformed the NRC of the results of their observations of the offsite sactivities'during'.the Rancho.Seco emergency preparedness exercise'on.
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October 8,1986. 'The memorandum states that, " Based on the results.of this
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exercise, the State of California and Amador,' Sacramento, and San Joaquin,:.
" Counties demonstrated the capability to protect the health and safety,of the.
public in the event of a radiological emergency at the site." Copies of.the'
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FEMA memorandum and report are enclosed.
fneFEMAreport'identifiessomeareas.requiringcorrectiveactionandsome-
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areas are recommended for. improvement. We request that you review these'.
recommendations and:take any actions you deem appropriate to support
-improvement in the offsite preparedness at Rancho Seco.
Sincerely,
' 0@re ened g L
R. F. Fisu ir Raymond' F.' Fish, Jr.,: Chief Emergency Preparedness Section
Enclosures:
as stated cc w/o enclosures:
D. Martin, SMUD S. Elkins, FEMA, Region IX S.' Knight...QA Manager-State-of CA bec w/o enclosures:
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m I, Federal Emergency Management Agency Washington, D.C. 20472 JAN 2 3 EST MEMORANDUM FOR: Edward L. Jordan Director Division of Emergency Preparedness and Engineering Response
_ Office of Inspection and Enforcement U.S N cle r Requ atory Cmnission FBOM:
Richard W. K'rimm Assistant Associate Director Office of Natural and Technological Hazards Programs
SUBJECT:
Exercise Report for the October 8, 1986, Exercise of the Offsite Radiological Emergency Preparedness Plans for the Rancho Seco Nuclear Generating Station Attached is a copy of the final Exercise Report for the October 8, 1986, exercise of the offsite radiological emeroency preparedness plans for the Rancho Seco Nuclear Generating Station. Amador, Sacramento, and San Joaquin Counties, fully participated in the exercise, along with partial participation by the State of California. This exercise report, was prepared by Region IX of the Federal Emergency Management Agency (FEMA).
There were no deficiencies identified during this exercise. 'Ihere were, however, areas requiring corrective action and areas recomnended for inprovement. FEMA Region IX furnished a draft copy of the exercise report to the State of California and the three counties. A schedule for the corrective actions to be taken has been included in the final report. Based on the results of this exercise, the State of California and Amador, Sacramento, and San Joaquin Counties demonstrated the capability to protect the health and safety of the public in the event of a radiological emergency at the site.
If you have any questions, please contact Mr. Robert S. Wilkerson, Chief, Technological Hazards Division, at 646-2860.
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EMERGENCY PREPAREDNESS EXERCISE RANCHO SECO NUCLEAR GENERATING STATION OCTOBER 8,1986 v#
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FEDERAL EMERGENCY MANAGEMENT AGENCY REGION IX BUILDING 1d5, PRESIDIO SAN FRANCISCO, CALIFORNIA 94129 415-556-9841
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D 0FFSITE EXERCISE EVALUATION REPORT RANCHO SECO NUCLEAR GENERATING STATION'
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EMERGENCY PREPAREDNESS EXERCISE OCTOBER 8, 1986 SITE ~AND EXERCISE PARTICIPATION IDENTIFICATION Facility Rancho Seco Nuclear Generating Station Licensee Sacramento Municipal Utility District Location Community of Clay County of Sacramento State.of California Date _ of Exercise. Report
' December 8, 1986 Date,of Exercise October 8, 1986 Participants Amador County Sacramento County San Joaquin County State of California Sacramento Municipal Utility District Non-Participants None A
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OFFSITE EXERCISE EVALUATION REPORT RANCHO SECO NUCLEAR GENERATING STATION EMERGENCY PREPAREDNESS EXERCISE OCTOBER 8, 1986 TABLE OF CONTENTS Description Page Site and Exercise Participation Identification.
i Table of Contents ij Exercise Summary
.jy Exercise De. tail 1
Emergency Operations Facility 3
_0ffsite Emergency Operations Facility Liaison Area-4
-0ffsite Emergency Operations Facility Public Information Liaison Area 4
Emergency News Center 5
-News Releases 6
, Emergency Broadcast System 7
Transportation 8
Amador County Emergency Operations Center 9
. Sacramento County Emergency Operations Center 11 San Joaquin County Emergency Operations Center.
12 Unified Dose Assessment Center and Field Monitoring Teams 15 Field Command Posts - General 17 Amador Field Command Post 17 Sacramento Field Command Post 18 San Joaquin Field Command Post 19 Summary 19 ii
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-Table.cf Contents,' continued Description Page Exercise Findings Matrix 21 ATTACHMENT A -
Offsite Assistance, Review and Evaluation Activities Undertaken by the Federal _ Emer-gency Management Agency and Regional Assis-tance Committee, Region-IX 27 ATTACHMENT B -
Exercise Objectives 28 Exercise Scenario Summary 36 ATTACHMENT C -
Guidance Memorandum EX-1, Remedial Exercises 38 LATTACHMENT D -
Exercise Evaluator Roster 42 ATTACHMENT E -
Time Line Sequence of Events 43 ATTACHMENT F -
Federal Emergency Management Agency, 35 Exercise Objectives 44 Guidance Memorandum PR-1, Policy on NUREG-0654/ FEMA-REP-1 and 44 CFR.350' Periodic Requirements 48 O
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s 0FFSITE EXERCISE EVALUATION REP 0RT RANCHO SEC0 NUCLEAR GENERATING STATION
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EMERGENCY PREPAREDNESS EXERCISE OCTOBER 8, 1986 EXERCISE
SUMMARY
The ' Rancho Seco Nuclear Generating Station Emergency Preparedness -
Exercise was conducted on October 8, 1986.
The onsite (utility) exercise participation was evaluated by the United States Nuclear Regulatory Commission, Region V.
The on-
. site evaluation findings will be reported separately by that agency.
The offsite (state and local jurisdictions) exercise participation was evaluated by 28 representatives of the Federal Emergency Management Agency and Regional Assistance Committee, Region IX.
The offsite evaluation findings are the subject of this report.
The objectives and the scenario for the exercise were developed through a committee of utility, federal, state and local govern-ment representatives.
Each of the Counties of Amador, Sacramento, and San Joaquin established unique and innovative objectives and scenario activities. All of the objectives, as established, were met.
'"There were no deficiencies noted by the evaluators. Areas for corrective action, detailed later in this report, were identified by evaluators as:
- 1) a need to refine public notification pro-cedures for more expedient activation of the Emergency Broadcast System; 2) update plans and procedures to incorporate more ela-borate prescripted messages for release by the Emergency Broadcast System Stations; 3) update plans and procedures to incorporate newly developed operatiors resulting from pre-exercise drills; and 4) to change the language used for public notification of
. shelter and evacuation to identify and relate to familiar land-marks rather than mileage parameters (e.g., 2, 5, and/or 10-mile emergency planning zone, etc.).
The areas for improvement that were suggested by evaluators for consideration by the state and local offsite jurisdictions are detailed in the narrative por-tion of this report. All of the findings are considered to be correctible through training activities and/or plan modification.
It was generally agreed among the evaluators that offsite juris-diction participation in the exercise reflected an above average performance. Many of the exercise participants are to be com-mended for the outstanding manner in which they performed their assigned duties, iv m
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RANCHO SEC0 NUCLEAR GENERATING STATION EMERGENCY PREPAREDNESS EXERCISE OCTOBER 8, 1986 EXERCISE DETAIL The radiological emergency response plans and preparedness measures of the offsite jurisdictions in and around the Rancho Seco Nuclear Generating Station were evaluated by the Federal Emergency Management Agency and the Regional Assistance Committee, Region IX, during an exercise conducted at that site on October 8, 1986.
This is a report of the findings that re-suited from evaluator observations during that exercise.
Attachment A of this report reflects the Federal Emergency Management Agency and Regional Assistance Committee, Region IX, radiological emergency plans and preparedness assistance, review and evaluation activities undertaken to date.
As mentioned in the exercise summary earlier in this report, the objectives and the scenario for this exercise were developed through the cooperative
-effort of onsite and offsite representatives and provided in the final form by the Sacramento Municipal Utility District.
The objectives and the scenario were reviewed by the United. States Nuclear Regulatory Commission and the Federal Emergency Management Agency.
The United States Nuclear Regulatory Commission officially approved the objectives and the scenario for the onsite participation in the exercise. The objectives for the offsite participation in the exercise were, in accord with established procedures, scheduled for receipt by the Federal Emergency Management Agency, Region IX, on July 25, 1986. They were received from the California Office of Emergency Services on August 1, 1986. The scenario for the offsite participation was scheduled for receipt on August 25, 1986 and received on September 5, 1986..The timeliness established for submittal of the exercise objectives and scenario provide a narrow margin of time for redistribution, review and coordination of findings by the Regional Assistance Committee and Federal Emergency Management Agency, Region IX. The State Operations Center and the State Dose Assessment Center were not evaluated inasmuch as they were activated only to accommodate communi-cations required for local government exercise participation and to serve as a training vehicls for select State Officials.
The objectives reflected in the final scenario were intended for use by the State Officials being trained during the exercise. The Federal Emergency Management Agency Contractor (Idaho National Engineering Laboratory) findings relative to the scenario were discussed among the Federal Emergency Management Agency, Region IX, United States Nuclear Regulatory Commission, Region V, and Sacramento Municipal Uti-lity District staffs. Minor changes to the scenario were made and the final copy of the scenario was presented at the orientation meeting conducted on October 6, 1986. The exercise objectives and scenario summary are reflected in this report as Attachment B.
The onsite (utility) activities during the exercise were observed by repre-sentatives of the United States Nuclear Regulatory Commission, m_
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Exercise Detail, continued 2
R'egion V.
Evaluation findings relative to those activities will be re-ported separately by that agency.
Due to the need for full activation of each of the emergency operations centers for the counties participating in this exercise,to respond to a flooding emergency earlier this year, the Federal Emergency Management
. Agency / Regional Assistance Committee, Region IX, accredited the offsite radiological emergency _ res'ponse agencies with recognition for actual di-saster activation of the emergency response organization and operations and permitted sir.ulation of certain physical. activities previously planned for demonstration during this exercise.
This included prepositioning of exercise participants and visual aids. No evaluators were assigned to observe exercise participation (effected for. training purposes only) at the State Operations Center or the State Dose Assessment Center.
l The exercise was evaluated on the basis of a jurisdictional capability to implement current radiological emergency response plans and in accord with established Federal Emergency Management Agency policy, cri-teria, and guidance. The exercise evaluation criteria and process was presented and coordinated with all exercise participants to provide an understanding of the process and the responsibility. A copy of the issued Guidance Memorandum EX-1, Remedial Exercises, dated July 15, 1985, is provided as Attachment C of this report.to reflect the categories esta.
blished for exercise evaluaticn findings.
The Federal Emergency Management Agency / Regional Assistance Committee, Region IX, evaluators were provided with background materials, exercise objectives / scenario summary, past findings data, various planning docu-mentation, and other pertinent information in advance of the exercise.
An evaluator orientation to the localized sites, plans, and procedures was conducted on October 6,1986, by representatives from the State and Counties and the utility. A pre-exercise evaluator's meeting was con-ducted on October 7,1986 to address assignments, schedule, and post-exercise activities. A site tour of the facilities, as assigned, was pro-vided by onsite/offsite jurisdiction representatives. An evaluator roster
_ is prcvided as Attachment D to this report.
A timeline of emergency classification events is noted at Attachment E of this report.
The disparity in time between the two Counties of Amador and San Joaquin in comparison to Sacramento County is directly attributable to the decision-making element for Sacramento County being located within the Emergency Operations Facility.
The time lapse in activating the alert and notification system is addressed in detail in both the narrative portion of this report and the findings matrix.
Exercise evaluators participated in an exercise, Controller conducted, preliminary findings discussion immediately following the exercise at each facility location. This discussion was used to clarify any ques-tionable activities observed and to present an overview of preliminary findings, if any.
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All exercise evaluators reconvened on October 9, 1986 to discuss their findings and prepare materials for presentation at the exercise de-briefing. Preliminary findings were presented to all exercise partici-pants at an open exercise debriefing conducted at the Emergency Opera-tions Facility on October 10, 1986. A formal press conference was held in the Sacramento Municipal Utility District's Auditorium on that same day. Representatives from the Sacramento Municipal Utility District, United States Nuclear Regulatory Commission, Region V, Federal Emer-gency Management Agency, Region IX, State of California Office of Emer-gency Services, and the Counties of Amador and Sacramento presented pre-liminary exercise findings and responded to media questions.
Past findings and corrective actions were reviewed and re-examined dur-ing the exercise. No outstanding corrective actions were pending at the time of the exercise and no previous finding was noted as a defi-ciency during this exercise.
Of the 35 exercise objectives established by the Federal Emergency Management Agency, the offsite jurisdictions at this site have demon-strated 18 objectives successfully. A listing of the 35 exercise ob-jectives and a copy of Guidance Memorandum PR-1 are provided as Attach-ment F of this report.
Items 9,11,12,15,16,18,19, 23, 27, 28, 29, 30, 31, 32, 33, 34, and 35 of the list of objectives are still to be demonstrated by either State and/or local offsite jurisdictions at this site.
As stated earlier in the Exercise Summary portion of this report, no deficiencies were identified by evaluators for this exercise.
The areas requiring corrective action appear in the Exercise Matrix por-tion of this report.
The exercise observations reported by evaluators as areas for improvement are not related to Federal Emergency Management Agency guidance requirements, but are suggested as possible improvements for consideration by the local offsite jurisdictions as options.
There is no requirement for any type of response by state or local governments as a result of these suggested improvement areas.
These items were dis-cussed with exercise participants individually and collectively, as noted above. The areas for improvement are provided below by either facility or function (e.g., Amador County Emergency Operations Center or Radio-logical Field Monitoring, etc.).
Emeroency Operations Facility Operations within the emergency operations facility were observed by a representative of the United State Nuclear Regulatory Commission, Re-gion V, substituting for the Regional Assistance Committee, Region IX, member from that agency.
Exercise participation within the emergency operations facility was reported as in accord with plans and procedures developed for that purpose.
All objectives established for that facili-ty were satisfactorily met.
Briefings conducted by the utility were timely and meaningful.
Protective action recommendations and information flow were dispatched to the offsite jurisdictions expediently and effi-ciently.
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Offsite Emergency Operations Facility Liaison Area The County (Amador, Sacramento and San Joaquin) Liaison staffs were pre-positioned for the purpose of this exercise. However, all County liaison personnel were familiar with emergency response call up procedures that are described in state and local offsite jurisdiction planning documents.
All three county staffs displayed professional manners and attitude, appeared knowledgeable with plans and procedures, and were well trained.
Leadership and decision-making skills were strong and effective. Communi-cations and relations among and between the counties were excellent. All actions taken were purposeful and resulted in coordination of emergency response activities. All recommenaations were in accordance with the plan and, in the case of Amador and San Joaquin, were relayed to decision-makers for concurrence.
The area assigned to the liaisons adequately provides and supports ex-tended operations. Status boards in this area included information for:
offsite release, protective actions, situation, weather conditions, road conditions, and emergency facilities.
These status boards were all effec-tively implemented. The personnel designated as " runners" did an excellent job of keeping current information posted.
The adequacy of the emergency operations facility telecopier system be-tween all offsite facilities and the ability of the telecopier (clerical functions) to disseminate all transmissions in a timely manner were successfully used and demonstrated.
The County Liaison staffs success-fully demnnstrated their ability to establish and maintain appropriate communications links.
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County liaison participation in the limited discussions between decision-makers to determine appropriate measures for controlled recovery and re-entry demonstrated an ability to coordinate and consider appropriate actions.
The status board entries relating to classification change data should indicate the time declared by the utility and time notification is received by the County.
Offsite-Emergency Operations Facility Public Information Liaison Area In essence, the public information effort was very good.
The staff attitude was excellent in the face of some adverse working conditions and inadequate staff resources. The public information lia.ison representatives performed their job in a sincere, competent manner.
They worked consistently as a team in a relatively efficient and effective mode of operation.
The objectives for this area of activity were met.
It is obvious that the physical presence of Amador and San Joaquin County public information liaison representatives in the emergency operations facility would expedite the production of emergency information for use by the media. Their presence could possibly enhance the chances that the information is accurate and consistent with the prevailing conditions and requirements.
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The provision of additional work space and private space for conferencing by the public information liaison staffs would also upgrade the effi-ciency of the operations. Also, the improvement of the emergency operations facility public address system would enhance the total emergency operations facility functions.
Generally, the quality of releases was fair to good. Accuracy and con-sistency of information was good. On the whole, information can be im-proved through the avoidance of technical terms and amplification of what conditions imply for the public. Most releases tended to be on the lean side and did not elaborate on the reason behind the protective actions; i.e.,
precautionary, the potential risks, etc.
The timeliness of the information and the production of the news copy was accomplished promptly.
Public instruction seemed to be hampered by attempts to conform to prescripted Emergency Broadcast P> stem texts.
The utility produced nine news releases.
The State and each of the Counties released four.
Posting of releases was relatively smooth.
Public information liai-sons attended all emergency operations facility briefings.
Posting of news releases could be improved by dedicating a portion of board space per jurisdiction.
Public information liaison space is restrictive and encum-bered by too much furniture.
The round t.able in the middle of the room was used to keep press releases.
It is recommended that the news releases be posted on the walls and the round table be removed to provide more space to staff working in that area.
Emergency News Center The Emergency News Center was prepositioned.
It was well organized and professionally and efficiently operated.
It had an adequately trained staff.
News briefings were frequent.
Status of the emergency conditions were posted. News releases were available and were posted in a timely manner.
There was adequate information for the media.
The utility had extremely well trained people to role play the media.
They did this in an outstanding manner, even in an adversarial role when addressing the briefers.
The utility public information officers and technical briefers were superb.
The rumor control and security were outstanding.
News releases were re-ceived in a timely manner.
There were adequate maps and visual aids.
There was excellent closed circuit television and all news briefings were videotaped.and played back to the rumor control area. The utility briefers were most candid and even addressed their liability to persons who may have suffered monetary losses as a result of the accident.
They cited their insurance coverage and the Price-Anderson Act that requires repayment for losses.
Information was disseminated on the condition of the plant and protective actions were explained adequately and timely.
There was good real world media coverage--two newspapers, three radio
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stations'and four television stations.
The following are areas recom-mended for improvement.
.The utility news releases should be less technical (see news' release comments below).
State and county news releases can be improved (see news release comments below).
The utility should be less dominant at news briefings.
- The State shculd be more dominant at news briefings.
If Amador and San Joaquin County refuse to be represented in~ person at the Emergency News Center, a speaker phone system should be. installed at the Emergency News Center for conversations between the media and counties.
Rumor control officials' by their own admission shot.ld-improve the qualitylof their responses.
However, rumor control was the best this evaluator has observed at any exercise.
Quality of the Emergency Broadcast System messages c,an be improved and clearer copies made available to the media.
4 News briefers should. identify their county emergency declarations and what they mean.
News Releases Some examples of the technical language used in the utility news releases are:
Release #1 states "... degradation of plant safety systems."
It could perhaps simply identify an accident has occurred
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which could result in...
Very few people would know what a "... spent fuel assembly..."
was or what a "...whole bbdy exposure at the site boundary..."
means.
News Release #2. The average person would not know what was meant by "The Reactor ' tripped' at 7:50 this morning due to a reactor coolant pump vibration problem."
News Release #4. Paragraph two says "... major plant functions..."
Suggest using " plant operations" instead.
Paragraph three,
"...small packing gland leaks...".
News Release #6.
Paragraph two states "... indicating the likelihood of a release path from the decay heat removal system...".
The term "whole body radiation exposure is also too technical.
Reference to " Southern site boundary" should be better identified.
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s Other. suggested improvements to the-news releases are as follows:
u News releases should have a location of release, such as
~ Sacramento Emergency Operations Center or Liaison, etc.
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Energency Broadcast System messages did not identify the -
source of the release - by county or facility or both.
News releases'do not state at the end of the release:
"THIS IS A DRILL."
State news _ releases should identify whether they are being released from the State office, emergency operations cen-ter or emergency operations facility.
Utility should spell out the complete title instead of using SMUD (some news media may not identify with the acronym).
San Joaquin County news releases d'id not provide the county rumor control telephone number nor did they recommend lis-tening to KJ0Y, the Emergency Broadcast System station.
- . Sacramento County news release No. 3 does not give the time of the release.
~ News releases should indicate what routes should be taken during the evacuation process.
Amador County news release No. '3 does not give the evacua-tion route.
All Emergency Broadcast System station messages should identify the County by name.
The messages should identify how people without their own car or transportation, and/or disabled, can be taken to shelter.
The message should also include a tele-phone number for these people to call.
Perhaps it should refer to the public information brochure-distributed by the utility for designated routes to travel to shelter or to identify the routes.
As mentioned elsewhere in this report, the use of landmark identifiers in lieu of mileage indicators would lend itself to a broader understanding of areas to be sheltered or evacua-ted.
Emergency Broadcast System In addition-to the corrective action reflected in the Findings Matrix of this report, there were suggestions for improving the release of public
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information via the Emergency Broadcast System.
They included:
Sacramento County should update their plan to correct the telephone number used for contact to KFBK for placing them on standby.
KFBK' has four rotating tele-phone lines.
During an actual emergency, there is a strong possibility that all of these lines could be in use.
Emergency response plans should address this pro-blem by instructing the user to call the station and if
.a busy signal results to attempt to redial -- if the second attempt fails, there should be an automatic direc-tion to use the Remote Pickup Unit (RPU) (radio) to con-tact the radio station.
Further, even if the user does make contact on the initial standby call to the radio station, they should inform the radio station to activate or ensure the operability of the RPU in the event it has to be used in lieu of the telephone. At the very least, the p.lan should address use of the remote pickup unit for advising the station to free a telephone line for contact.
Controlled use of the Emergency Broadcast System Station KFBK should be addressed by the Sacramento County staff.
There should be a single source of information provided to the radio station for consistency with news releases and activities emanating from the emergency operations facility and the county emergency operations centers. At the present time, the cities within Sacramento County can contact the radio station directly to release information.
The County of Sacramento needs to arrive at some sort of an agreement with -these jurisdictions that all news releases through the Emergency Broadcast System station will be funneled through the County in order to ensure that the public is not con-fused by conflicting statements released through the radio station.
Transportation Each of the County Radiological Emergency Response Plans address air traffic restrictions in the emergency planning zones in the event of a radiological emergency at the Rancho Seco Nuclear Generating Station.
However, this element of the plans has not been demonstrated during an exercise.
j It is suggested that consideration be given to demon-strating a capability to restrict air traffic in the emergency planning zone during a radiological emer-gency at the next regularly scheduled exercise.
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- _ It is noted that Southern Pacific Railroad tracks run through the 10-mile emergency planning zone of the site.
Consideration should be given to including the samefrestriction-for railroad traffic that is provided for air traffic in the emergency planning zone during a radiological emergency at Rancho Seco Nuclear Generating Station.
Further, that the capability for restricting the railroad traffic be demonstrated at the same time the air' traffic restriction is demonstrated.
Amador County Emergency Operations Center Amador County tasked second and third level County officials to effect emergency response operations during the exercise.
The Amador County staff was enthusiastic and' fully familiar with plans and procedures.
While space requirements of _ individual staff was limited and a bit cramped, the facility appeared adequate.
Security was enforced.
Backup communications and Amateur Radio Emergency Services were in place even though traffic was light. Most of the service chiefs had clerks that
' helped support their functions.
The service chiefs were continually an-ticipating the emergency activity and were prepared to take precautionary Even though Amador County used second and third level players, measures.
it was apparent that they were well trained.
.The Emergency Services Coordinator assigned,provided briefings to the service chiefs in a ' timely manner and at regular intervals, including p' ant status and classification clarification. It appeared as if the in-formation may have been.too techni. cal as there was no interaction on these issues between the Coordinator and the Service Chiefs.
- .It is suggested that the Emergency Services Coordinator request a status report from each of the service chiefs during regular briefings to effect improved interaction.
Perhaps the use of a standard operating procedure (agenda) for the briefings would help.
Service chiefs should be encouraged to ask questions if they do not understand the information being provided in the technical area.
The status boards were kept posted at all times for the action implemented.
However, there was no indication that these actions were ever completed.
The Protective Action status board showed on four separate occasions that Sectors J, K, and L were being evacuated.
This information was being posted from the Unified Dose Assessment Center forms.
The information was incorrect -- the entire 10-mile emergency planning zone was to be evacuated.
The Situation Intelligence Office should have corrected this error.
It is suggested that status boards include completion in-formation or the item be removed when advice is received that the action is completed.
~ The message center clerks did an outstanding jot.
Datafax traffic was heavy and constant.
The logging and numbering system is too confusing.
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- The ' message form for the emergency operations center needs to be revised.
If there are two actions on one form, such_as_for radio and facsimile,-
there is inadequate space to post the time sent and/or received.
Im-proved identification is needed by players initiating messages. They were-simply showing the^ county name instead o'f County /EOC or County /FCP, etc.
- ' Suggest attention be given to improving the entire message center operations for more simplified system and improved' identification.
The runnersein charge of duplicating and distribution _ performed in an exceptional manner. Amador County could use a' copier that collates the
-material-being duplicated.
There was some mechanical difficulty with the equipment,-but it was repaired ~within a short time.
A disproportionate amount of the Emergency Services Director's time was consumed in monitoring the Unified Dose Assessment Center briefings and filling out the-briefing ffonns of the Unified Dose Assessment Center and the utility emergency operations facility.. In addition, some of the tech-nical information presented at the Unified Dose Assessment Center briefings was difficult for the decision-making staff to digest and interpret.
A staff person with technical training on radiological
. health, such as.the Radiological Officer, should assist
-the decision-making staff with monitoring the information coming from the. Unified _ Dose' Assessment Center.
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The County's media briefing room would not be adequate to accommodate the large number of reporters that could be expected in'the' event-of an emer.
gency at Rancho Seco.
The briefing room could accommodate about 50 people.
The County of Amador should designate a larger facility as
~ he primary or backup media facility.
t
-There were four media briefings conducted.
The Public Information Officer provided information as to the status lof the situation within Amador County only.
He referred the media to the news releases-posted for Sacramento, San Joaquin and the utility. He also gave them the address and the tele-phone number for the emergency news center.
The Public Information Officer zdid-not seem able to handle the questions from the media, but did tell them he would get the information. At the close of the exercise, the media let the Public Information Officer know that during an actual emergency, this procedure would-be unacceptable. The Public Information Officer was well informed in the use of plans and procedures and familiar with both.
It is suggested that the Public Information Officer be further trained in methods to employ for obtaining in-formation in a'more expedient manner prior to briefing the media.
Amador County partially met the objective to demonstrate the ability to establish traffic control and properly use survey meters (CDV 700).
Two
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Exercise Detail, continued.
11 traffic control points were activated during _ the exercise, only one of these was actually manned, the other was simulated.
The manned' control point was staffed by the California Highway Patrol and was located at the intersection of Route 104 and Ione Michigan Bar Road to prevent the Westbound traffic from entering the affected emergency planning zone (2-mile).
The officer assigned to the control point was familiar with his responsibilities and duties and was trained in traffic control.
He was equipped with the required personal dosimeter, plus a CDV 700 survey meter.
The officer was not trained in dosimetry use nor in how to properly use the survey instrument.
He was not aware of the maximum allowable dose without authorization.
He did not know how to record dosimetry readings and was unaware of what to do if decontamination was required.
The equipment needed to assist the California Highway Patrol Officer in blocking traffic (barricades, signs, etc.) were not delivered to the con-trol point by Caltrans as was expected. Adequate numbers of personnel and equipment to maintain staffing at the various control points are available to Amador County. The California Highway Patrol Officer at the technical command post was receiving updated information via radio from the field command post in Ione.
He was not maintaining a log of messages and information for his use. The plan specifies that each traffic control point will be manned with two persons; one a uniformed officer.
There was only one California Highway Patrol Officer at the demonstrated traffic control point.
It is recommended that traffic control training be improved and that Amador County include this element as an, objective during the next regularly scheduled exercise.
Sa~cramento County Emergency Operations Center The Emergency Operations Center Operations Officer at Sacramento County was exceptionally effective in his use of frequent, thorough staff briefings to the direction and control emergency operations center staff. Ten briefings were held in all. They were scheduled on an hourly basis, but with addi-tional briefings being held when there were significant changes in the emergency situation. The scheduling of each subsequent briefings during the current briefing, which followed county operating procedures exactly, helped to ensure that briefings were not delayed or forgotten as the exer-cise play accelerated.
This enabled the operations officer to keep all staff members and himself promptly and highly informed about each cchers' resources and recent actions, status of emergency facilities (e.g.,
roads and reception centers), county decisions made at the emergency operations facility requiring emergency operations center implementation,
- and problems requiring coordinated actions among service functions.
- Further, the briefings strongly reinforced his command and control of emergency operations center activities by providing him with highly visible oppor-tunities to demonstrate leadership qualities (e.g., identify and direct implementation of specific service function actions needed to deal with recent developments such as the opening of reception centers).
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i Exercise Detail, continued 12 The functioning of the Sacramento emergency operations center staff (both operational and supporting) under the leadership of the assigned Coordi-
'nator, was outstanding. Most commendable was the effort to " cross-train"
-new and older members of the staff.
Everyone used the plan as the basis for their actions.
Coordination was consistent throughout the exercise.
Particular praise is directed to the activities of the four clerical staff assigned to message flow management, duplication and delivery. That messages reached the right places is directly due to their diligent efforts. A new telecopier system is sorely needed. One individual, by modest estimate, devoted 65% of the time rewriting blurred messages or making others legible.
In Sacramento County, manning of traffic control points was simulated due to an agreement between the County and the California Highway Patrol.
Barricades.were delivered to all locations within the 2-mile emergency planning zone by County Public Works personnel. Traffic control functions for Sacramento County are the respcnsibility of the County Sheriff's De-partment and the California Highway Patrol.
The County Sheriff's Depart-ment would man the control points initially until the California Highway Patrol personnel could dispatch to the sites. Traffic control is directed from the Field Command Post in Wilton.
During the exercise the County was to have staffed one traffic. control point for demonstration purooses. This did not occur.
Emergency Personnel from the County Department of Public
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Works were dispatched to the field to deliver traffic barricades to tne preselected control points in the 2-mile emergency planning zone.
The personnel were very familiar with the area-of their assigned responsibility and were knowledgeable in their respective duties.
Traffic control point locations were accurately and quickly found and required equipment was
'dfstributed as appropriate.
Personnel from the Department of Public. Works were not adequately trained in the proper use of dosimetry.
They were outfitted with a low range and high range self reading pocket dosimeter but were unfamiliar with significance of readings, proper recording pro-cedures, who to notify in the event of an excessive exposure, and where to go for decontamination if needed.
Improved training systems need to be implemented for these assigned emergency workers.
San Joaquin County Emergency Operations Center The County received the initial notification in their 24-hour communications center. Af ter the emergency operations center became operational, the re-ceipt of utility notifications was transferred to the emergency operations center. A communicator continuously manned the emergency phones. When the Technical Support Center transmitted notifications, this communicator trans-cribed the information into the proper form.
The County emergency operations center was activated with most staff being prepositioned (no actual callout).
The emergency operations center was operational at 8:15 a.m. and fully staffed by 8:3u a.m.
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g Exercise Detail, continued 13 The County emergency operations center facility has been recently modified and does not conform to the configuration in the current county plan.
According to participants, there are plans to relocate the emergency opera-tions center to the sixth floor of the County Courthouse building.
When this move has been completed, the plan should be revised to reflect the new situation.
Although there was less space than specified in the plan, the operations were successfully demonstrated.
There were status boards in all operational areas which were maintained by a staff of dedicated personnel. There were an adequate number of phones and a technician available to assure that problems, if any, would be corrected in a timely manner.
The emergency operations center has several radio systems available to communicate with field units.
In addition, commercial phone and dedi-cated phone lines were available. Two facsimile machines were also available for incoming and outgoing hard copy messages.
The appropriate officials made protective action decisions efter listen-ing to utility emergency operations briefings, discussing options and implementation needs with the county service chiefs and finally coordi-nating the decisions with the other county decision makers.
The emergency operations center staff did an outstanding job in coordi-nating emergency activities. All service chiefs were involved in necessary activities to support the emergency response. There was ex-cellent anticipation of potential needs as the scenario events unfolded.
After the decision was made to evacuate to 10 miles, the staff did an excellent job in making plans for handling potential evacuees, setting up access control points, and arranging needed transportation in the event that the plant situation would require actions beyond the 10-mile area.
The decision to take protective actions was coordinated among the three counties as was the sounding of the sirens and wording of the Emergency Broadcast System messages were coordinated. However, the timeliness of the notification of the public was not in accordance with existing criteria (see Findings Matrix of this report).
The county prepared news releases which were transmitted to the Emer-gency News Center by facsimile.
The county was prepared to respond to media inquiries, however, no media came to the emergency operations center.
The county staff responded to scenario rumor control calls in an out-standing fashion. A competent and dedicated staff responded to in-coming calls. When additional information was required to respond to the incoming calls, the rumor control staff requested information from the appropriate service chief to accurately respond to the incoming calls.
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Exercise Detail, continued 14 Noted problem areas included:
In the initial phase of the exercise, the internal message
' flow in the emergency ' operations center experienced opera-tional problems. Copies of messages were not distributed to all appropriate officials.in a timely manner.
It is suggested that increased training be implemented to improve this area of the response operations.
Not all news releases were posted as called for in the plan. The San Joaquin news releases were approved by the emergency operations center coordinator before re-lease and were eventually posted.
News releases received from other jurisdictions were not posted. Again, in-creased trainin'g of staff assigned.to this area to assure that all news releases'(including other jurisdictions) are posted in a timely manner should be implemented.
San Joaquin County demonstrated an excellentL ability to control access to and evacuate designated areas. When questioned by the evaluator, the school officials did not know the exact number of children that boarded the buses, though they did assure the evaluator that each bus had a list of the children on board and each. child did have an emergency card.
The San Joaquin County Field Command Post staff outside the command vehicle were unaware of the situation at the plant as no status boards were used or posted. As late as 12:30 p.m. no briefings had been held.
Officers manning the Field Command Post heard various events being re-ported over the radio, but no logs were being maintained.
Equipment (CDV 700) issued to the California Highway Patrol and San Joaquin Sheriff's personnel assigned to traffic control points were literally unused. The staff were not informed of equipment use, not trained, and did not know how to call in readings.
Improved training systems need to be implemented for these assigned emergency workers.
There were so many individuals within the San Joaquin County Emergency Operations, Center that performed their tasks in an exceedingly above average manner -- from the Chairman of the Board of Supervisors to the maintenance workers who kept the pathways clear and the coffee hot --
it would be difficult to do justice here. However, the Emergency Ser-vices Coordina' tor and his immediate staff are especially noted for their attention to preparations and operations for this exercise.
The San
' Joaquin County play included a great many exercise activities that were not a part of the scenario, such as the representatives from the Pacific Gas and Electric Company, Pacific Bell, and a local meteorologist, who were all provided with unique problem-solving messages throughout the exercise.
The Amateur Radio Emergency Services were also provided an opportunity to actively participate in special assignments.
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~ Exercis'e Detail, continued 16 the' meteorologist. participate 'in briefings to discuss.the historic or specific probability of any wind shifts that
. could affect sheltering or evacuation decision-making.
- - There.is a continuing need for the field radiological moni-torin'g teams,to obtain initial training and subsequent re-t fresher courses or participate in regularly scheduled drills.
Several ' items related to training or familiarity arose during the exercise, such as:
The inventory list for the~ radiation monitoring.
. kits used by the Sacramento teams did not contain
. check sources.
It is recom,nended that check sources be available.. In addition the batteries in a. flashlight and a dosimeter' charger.were weak.
- Potassium Iodide (KI) is available for emergency workers, but the current procedures should be re-viewed to address that option.
It is suggested
'that.the XI should be available in.the monitoring kits.
It may not be possible or desirable to have a monitoring team return to the field commar.d
^
post and " runners" would not be recommended.
- Techniq0es for use and interpretation of survey instruments can only be learned by hands-on-experience.
Also, it is recommended using meter. face drawings to indicate scenario meter readings rather than reporting a controller supplied number.
Constant attention and und.erstanding of-the radiation units of measurement must be practiced (millirem per hour vs. microrem per hour).
- To conserve radio time, the data ' recording form could be used for a radio reporting format.
This application will usually prevent having to repeat data or sub-sequently having to verify data.
- Special vehicles are usually required for travel on unimproved roads during the area's rainy season.
If 4 x_4 vehicles are not routinely available, a re-source should be developed to provide them when re-quired.
- The procedure for air sampling was'followed; however, the procedures do not specify a sample volume, or flow-rate and sampling time. A three minute sample at 1.5 cubic feet per minute would probably not provide the required sensitivity. The following is offered:
a) Determine the minimum sample volume nec9ssary to provide an iodine sensitivity of 1 X 10 uCi/cc using the PRM-6 and HP-260 probe.
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Exercise Detail, continued 17 b) Purge' the silver zeolite cartridge with clean air before counting the cartridge.
c) Use a uniform counting geometry (cartridge to detector distance) to provide consistent sample measurements.
Devices could be purchased or de-veloped to accomplish.this.
- The use of anti-C's in a controlled area may be beneficial to prevent contamination of personal clothing. But the proper procedures must ba followed in undressing. Removing
- gloves before shoe covers defeats the original purpose.
- Field monitoring team members should be provided some additional or advanced training to be able to understand the significance of plant parameters (such as stack monitor measurements) reporte.d by the field. command posts.
integrated dosimeter readings should be incorporated tato the scenarios so that the emergency worker control FN;;edures can be evaluated.
This could be accomplished th Nugh drills.
- Back up instruments need to be provided in the monitoring kits or at the field command posts.
Field Command Posts - General It is suggested that the procedures for this activity be reviewed and training undertaken for the following:
KI Distribution:
KI could not have been distributed to one Amador County field monitoring team (consideration to including KI in field monitoring kits).
Emergency worker decontamination.
The awareness of need and resources were not evident. However, this was not a specific objective for this exercise.
Monitoring capability (instruments) is not present at all fiel
EXERCISE' FINDINGS MATRIX-4 6
EVALUATOR (S) FINDING NUREG REF.
' PROPOSED CORRECTIVE ACTION /DATE.
Item No. 1, continued.
the three Counties will schedule a meeting:after, January 1,.1987 to discuss reformatting of'the; Due to the' time required to complete modifications
- messages.' ReformattingLwill;takeintoconsidera-to the Emergency Broadcast System messages, in tion the 15 minute time requirement..
4 both caees, the time for sounding the sirens and releasing Emergency Broadcast System messages was San Joaquin:
San Joaquin County ~ feels'that the extended by five minutes from the originally 15 minute requirement is an arbitrary standard agreed upon time so there would be time for re-
- that.has no basis in reality... San Joaquin. County-(
wording the messages to be transmitted by the will always' act in a manner that will produce theE j
respective Emergency Broadcast stations.
most effective protection of the public possible i
and not'according to artificial time limits. _ The.
l.
In both cases, the total time elapsed.between the
"" Y " H n in the future discuss the need to-agreement on the protective actions by the meet that' objective.
i decision-makers was in excess of the 15-minute l
requirement.
[ Note: The State ~did'not comment on this cor-rective action item.]
H, i
No additional public exposure would have resulted l
from the time interval in excess of the 15-minute requirement used.to modify the. Emergency Broadcast System message. Again, both protective actions were precautionary and were based on potential exposures rather than actual exposures.
[ NOTE:
It was suggested to the state and local offsite jurisdictions during the debriefing that an alert and notification system drill, to in-clude simulation of siren activation and dissemi-nation of Emergency Broa~dcast System messages, be conducted in the early spring of 1987.
The determination to categorize this finding as a 1
corrective action was based on the successful demonstration for meeting the 15-minute timeline during the Public Information Drill conducted on July 9, 1986. This was confirmed with the FEMA Headquarters and the NRC, Region V.]'
- JURISDICTION AND/0R FACILITY ALL OFFSITE JURISDICTIONS' i
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OFFSITE EXERCISE EVALUATION REPORT RANCHO SECO NUCLEAR GENERATING STATION EMERGENCY PREPAREDNESS EXERCISE OCTOBER 8, 1986 EXERCISE FINDINGS MATRIX EVALUATOR (S) FINDING HUREG REF.
PROPOSED CORRECTIVE ACTION /DATE 2.
The content of Emergency Broadcast System E.7.
Amador:
The County of Amador agrees in concept n'essages prepared for dissemination to the public with this finding. We realize that the EBS mes-was inadequate.
Firstly, as noted above, the sages are inadequate in many senses, and therefore, messages required extensive modification for re-intend to coordinate the rewrite of all EBS mes-leasing information of the type required to fit sages with the other two counties. We believe this the particular situation (precautionary nieasures).
action should be completed by June 30, 1987.
Either a series of prescripted messages, The County of Amador disagrees with portions of addressing every conceivable situation that is this finding which assert public protection areas known to be able to arise as a result of a radio-should be " described in terms of familiar land-logical emergency at the Rancho Seco.Huclear marks and boundaries." Since we disagree with Generating Station should be developed or a more this stated interpretation, we will work closely efficient form to be completed by radio station with FEMA officials during our EBS rewrite acti-cngineers.
Secondly, the messages did not in-vities to assure that our messages meet the letter clude evacuation routes or locations (addresses) and the intent of the guidance, of reception centers.
Thirdly, protective action Sacramento: The three County Coordinators will meet areas were not described in terms of familiar af ter the first of the year (January 1987) to re-landmarks and boundaries.
Instead, the public write the prescripted EBS Messages. Appropriate was instructed to take protective actions if evacuation routes and familiar landmarks and boun-located within 2, 5, or 10-miles of the plant, daries will be reviewed and if deemed appropriate Residents and transients within these areas may will be, included in our messages.
In addition, not be aware of their distance from the plant the evaluator's findings indicate that we did not site'and therefore would not k'now whether they include the addresses of our Reception Centers, should heed the recommendations or not.
This is an incorrect finding. The Sacramento.
County emergency messages did include the addresses of both Reception Centers located in Sacramento County as well as those in Amador County.
San Joaquin: It is agreed that the EBS messages could be improved. A re-evaluation of the mes-sages will take place in January along with a re-ro evaluation of the Public Protection Areas.
JURISDICTION AND/0R FACILITY ALL 0FFSITE JURISDICTIONS e
'0FFSITE EXERCISE EVALUATION REPORT RANCHO SECO NUCLEAR GENERATING STATION EMERGENCY PREPAREDNESS EXERCISE OCTOBER 8, 1986 y
EXERCISE FINDINGS MATRIX t
EVALUATOR (S) FINDING NUREG REF.
PROPOSED CORRECTIVE ACTION /DATE 1.
Significant delays in receiving official
.E.1.
The County of Amador recognizes the inadequacy of notifications and information-from the utility' the performance of the individual assigned to the were experienced at the Amador County Emergency Sheriff's Dispatch Center with reference to this Operations Center as a result of the failure tb finding'. Since the County's existing written transfer the function (receiving primary notifi-procedures, as well as existing training modules, cation over the hotline (2-digit) phone) from the clearly indicate the correct action that should Sheriff's Dispatch Center to the Amador County have been taken, we believe this inadequacy was Emergency Operations Center. This function
~due to poor employee performance. Since.this should have been transferred to the emergency individual has indicated a self-imposed termina-operations center upon its activation at 8:00 a.m.
tion date of December 30, 1986, we believe the-However, the transfer did not occur until con-pending employee termination, as well as extant siderably later. The first primary notification training programs, have already addressed this to be received directly at the emergency opera-identified deficiency.
i tions center was at 12:35 p.m.
In addition, the notifications received at the Sheriff's Dispatch Center were not relayed promptly to the emer gency operations center. As a result, the emer-i gency operations center staff had to rely on unofficial notifications from the Amador Liaison at the emergency operations facility or await hardcopy verifications which also were considera-bly delayed.
1 4
e 9
JURISDICTION AND/0R FACILITY AMADOR COUNTY
'O
0FFSITE EXERCISE'EVALUATI N' REPORT:
,y
- RANCHO,SEC0 NUCLEAR GENERATING 1 STATION
., ~
-r EMERGENCY PREPAREDNESS EXERCISE:
OCT08ER -8,1986 EXERCISE' FINDINGS MATRIX i~
y EVALUATOR (S) FINDING NUREG REF.
PROPOSED CORRECTIVE' ACTION /DATEL
~
1.
Actual message center procedures at-the.
N.1.a.
Sacramento County Energency 0perations Center The discrepancy between actual Message' Center -
did not follow.the most recent written procedures procedures and our written procedures.will tue rectified during'our next plan" update in 1987.-
(issued January 20,1984). Actual operating procedures, which worked quite well during the exercise, directed message center. operators to relay calls requesting actions requiring imple-mentation by functional service chiefs to those
)
individuals, even if they were not identified by-name by the caller. These new procedures were established based upon experience gained during a recent flooding emergency and difficulties experienced during a recent practice drill for a nuclear power plant emergency.
Existing written procedures only call for the relaying of calls to service function chiefs if they are identified by name by the caller, with other action requests requiring a written nessage to be developed by the message center operator.
In this message, the operator would attempt to des-cribe the needed action, and give the message to the message center supervisor for numbering and distribution.
O V
' JURISDICTION AND/0R FACILITY. SACRAMENTO COUNTY.
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OFFSITE EXERCISE EVALUATION REPORT RANCHO SEC0 NUCLEAR GENERATING STATION'
~ EMERGENCY PREPAREDNESS EXERCISE OCTOBER 8, 1986 Offsite Assistance, Review and Evaluation Activities Undertaken by the Federal Emergency-Management Agency and Regional Assistance Committee,
. Region IX:
Plan Review.
The Sacramento County Draf t Emergency Response Plan was reviewed. The plan was' developed before the guidance was published and recommendations were directed to application of the newly developed criteria.
The Sacramento County Plan was adopted by the County on March 5,1984 '(without review or approval. of the Federal Emergency Management-Agency / Regional Assistance Committee, Region IX).
The San Joaquin County Radiological Emergency ~ Response Plan was offi-cially approved by the County on October 18, 1983.
It has not been submitted for review by the Federal Emergency Management Agency / Regional Assistance Committee, Region IX.
The Amador County Radiological Emergency Response Plan has not beer approved by the County, nor has it been submitted for review by tne Federal Emergency-Management Agency / Regional Assistance Committee, Region IX.
[ Portions of all of the offsite radiological emergency response plans have been reviewed by evaluators assigned to the exercises noted below.]
Public Meeting: The public meeting was conducted on September 16, 1981.
Exercises:
The Federal Emergency Management Agency / Regional Assistance Committee, Region IX, have evaluated two fullscale exercises conducted on June-23, 1982 and September 12, 1984. A limited exercise conducted on September 27, 1983 was also evaluated by the Federal Emergency Manage-ment Agency / Regional Assistance Committee, Region IX.
Evaluator findings for all of the exercises were responded to by the offsite jurisdictions and the findings either corrected cr disallowed by the offsite jurisdic-tions as being invalid.
Alert and Notification System: A siren demonstration and public telephone survey were conducted on November 2, 1985. The system was approved by the Federal Emergency Management Agency on August 29, 1986.
Public Information Technical Assistance was provided to the Sacramento Municipal Utility District and the offsite jurisdictions on March 26, 1986.
Public Information brochures have been disseminated by the Sacramento Municipal Utility District to residents within the ten-mile emergency plan-ning zone since 1982.
ATTACHMENT A e
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28 SACRNMENTO MUNICIPAL UTILITY DISTRICT RANCHO SECO 1986 EMERGENCY PREPARE 0 NESS EXERCISE
. -0BJECTIVES AND GUIDELINES General objectives and guidelines have been developed for the 1986 Emergency Preparedness Exercise scheduled to be conducted on October 8, 1986.
- Participants in this exercise include the Sacramento Municipal Utility District-(SMUD), the counties of Amador, Sacramento and San Joaquin and tne
. California Office of Emergency Services (OES).
The " extent of play" by exercise participants is listed below each objective.
If nothing is listed below the objective, all players should respond according to the Emergency Plan.
A.
EXERCISE OBJECTIVES - ONSITE 1.
Control Room Demonstrate the proficiency of Control Room staff to recognize and a.
classify an emergency condition.
A second shift of Operations staff will participate throughout.
the exercise and will interface with Technical Support Center (TSC) staff (AP 501, Recognition and Classification of Emergencies). The second shift staff will be pre-positioned.
.b.
Demonstrate timely notification to federal, state and local authorities in a timely manner.
Perform notification, AP 506, Notification / Communication.
c.
Demonstrate the transfer of responsibilities from the Control Room staff to the TSC staff.
Transfer of responsibilities to the TSC will occur at the ALERT Level. Operations staff will continue to participate.
d.
Demonstrate the ability to establish and maintain emergency communications links.
ATTACHMENT B t
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Demonstrate ~the ability to analyze current plant conditions and e.
identify projected trends and potential consequences.
f.
Demonstrate the ability to keep emergency logs.
g.
Demonstrate the ability to perform timely and appropriate protective action recommendations.
Perform AP 528, Protective Action Guide.
2.
Technical Support Center (TSC), and Plant Assembly Point (PAP) a.
Demonstrate the ability to activate and operate the TSC and PAP.
-AP 551, Activation and Operation of PAPS.
b.
Demonstrate the ability to establish and maintain emergency communication links.
c.
Demonstrate the ability to gather, assess, and disseminate information 'regarding plant conditions and the emergency response activities in a timely manner.
d.
Demonstrate the ability of the TSC and PAP staffs, in conjunction with the Control Room staff, to coordinate activities to simulate returning the unit to a safe, stable' condition.
e.
Demonstrate the ability to analyze current plant conditions and identify projected trends and potential consequences.
f.
Demonstrate the ability of the TSC and PAP staffs to direct and coordinate the deployment of radiological monitoring teams.
Teams will perform in-plant and offsite surveys and provide this information to the Chem Rad Logistics Coordinator.
Perform AP 507, Onsite Radiological Monitoring, and AP 508, Offsite Radiological Monitoring. Scme simulation of actions may be performed, such as repeated air sampling.
g.
Demonstrate the ability to perform offsite dose assessment activities and dose projections, as appropriate.
Perform AP 511, TSC Dose Calculation.
4 G
_-_--.----.-___-._--_--_-.------_-.x
71
. 30L h.
Demonstrate the ability.to perform timely assessment of radiological and plant ' conditions to support the formulation of
-appropriate protective action recommendations.
Pe'rform AP' 528,: Protective ' Action ~ Guide.
- 1. -Demonstrate the ability-to control the exposure of emergency workers.
Perform AP 515, Emergency Personnel Dosimetry.
- j. Demonstrate the transfer of responsibilities from the TSC staff to
'the EOF staff.
k.
Demonstrate the ability to keep emergency legs.
1.
Demonstrate the ability to inform plant staff of emergency events and safety information.
3.
Security a.
Demonstrate the ability to control access to the site and emergency centers.
Security will control access to the Control Room, TSC, and -
PAP.
Initial security measures will be performed with play reduced later in the exercise.
B. ' EXERCISE OBJECTIVES - 0FFSITE 1.
Emercency Ooerations Facility (EOF):
a.
Demonstrate the ability to activate and operate the EOF.
- Perform AP 506.02, Activation and Operation of the EOF and AP.554, Activation and Operation of UDAC.
b.
Demonstrate the coordination between SHUD, the counties, and the state in decisionmaking.
. Demonstrate the ability to establish and maintain appropriate c.
communications links.
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d.
Demonstrate the adequacy of facilities and displays to support emergency operations.
L e.
Demonstrate the ability to make recommendations in accordance with the Plan and to coordinate emergency activities.
f.
Demonstrate the ability at the EOF for making recommendations to the counties for decisionmaking.
- Relay that recommendation to County decisionmakers for-concurrence.
Demonstrate the ability of County Liaisons to relay county information to EOF staff.
g.
Test the adequacy of the EOF telecopter system between all offsite facilities. Demonstrate the ability of telecopier/
' clerical functions to disseminate all transmissions in a timely manner.
h.
Demonstrate the ability to prepare press releases and coordinate public information exchange between the counties, state and SMUD using available communication equipment.
Perform AP 569, Release of Information to the Public.
1.
Conduct limited discussion between.decisionmakers to determine appropriate measures for. controlled recove'ry and reentry.
2.
Unified Dose Assessment Center (UDAC):
a.
Demonstrate the ability to ccordinate radiological and environmental assessment.
b.
Demonstrate the ability to obtain data from the TSC and Radiation Monitoring teams and use the data to perform dose projections.
Perform AP 512, EOF Dose Calculation.
c.
Demonstrate the ability' to deploy and obtain field data frcm Radiation Monitoring teams.
Sacramento County -- 2 teams Amador County - 2 teams San-Joaquin County - 2 teams.
d.
Demonstrate the ability to provide input to EOF briefings (using UDAC and EOF Briefing Forms) including field data, met'eorological information, and recommendations for protective actions.
Complete UDAC/ EOF Briefing Forms as stated in AP 506.02 and AP 512.
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Demonstrate.the ability to distribute EOF Briefing Forms to
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personnel at_ the EOF and County Emergency Operations Centers (ECC) prior to briefings.
t 3.
Emergency News Center-(ENC)
- a. _ Demonstrate the ability to activate and operate the ENC.
Perform AP 556, Activation and Operation of the ENC. ENC staff will be~ pre-posttioned.
b.
Demonstrate the ability to establish and maintain appropriate communication links.
- - Receive press releases via telecopy and -post all releases.
c.
Demonstra.te the ability to schedule and conduct news conferences to include answering technical questions.
d.- Demonstrate the ability to establish and operate rumor control in a coordinated fashion.
e.
Demonstrate coordinated news conferences including all participating agencies.
4.
Security a.
Demonstrate the ability to control _ access to the EOF and ENC.
Use badging. system to maintain appropriate accountability.
5.
Amador, Sacramento and San Joaquin Counties a.
Demonstrate ability to receive notification at their ECCs from Control Room /TSC, using appropriate forms.
b.
Demonstrate the ability to activate and operate the EOCs'and Field Command Posts (FCPs).
Staff will be pre-positioned.
c.
Demonstrate the adequacy of facilities, displays and equipment to support emergency operations.
d.
Demonstrate the ability to adequately communicate with appropriate
~
locations and organizations.
e.
Demonstrate the ability of public officials to determine appropriate protective actions for the Pubile Protection Areas.
f.
Demonstrate the ability of public officials to coordinate protective actions and emergency activities.
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33 g.
After final decisionmaking is completed, demonstrate the ability of all counties to coordinate the implementation of protective actions, including scunding of strens, the activation of institutional tone alerts, and the activation of the Emergency Broadcast System (EBS), resulting in a test of the system itself.
h.
Demonstrate the ability of the counties to activate and utilize RACES.
Amador County will participate at their EOC, FCP and the EOF.
Sacramento County will participate at the EOF and limited play at the EOC.
~
1.
Demonstrate the ability of the counties to provide prompt coordination of emergency information to the media with each other, SMUD, and the State.
6.
Amador County Demonstrate the ability to set up and staff tne FCP, including a.
dosimetry issue to all personnel, maintaining security and badging of all personnel, posting of status boards and use of maps, plus proper use of all forms.
b.
Set up traffic control point (s) and issue COV 700s to all traffic control points and demonstrate their proper use.
Demonstrate the ability of two (2) Radiological Monitoring teams c.
to perform monitoring along routes.
d.
Demonstrate ability to perform the following:
Open media center.
Schedule news conferences and interviews.
Coordinate and exchange public information and press releases with other jurisdictions.
Notify the media promptly of county-specific actions.
Demonstrate the ability to provide security at the ECC and FCP.
e.
f.
Demonstrate the ability of the OES Director or Ccordinator to conduct briefings of service chiefs, and for the FCP Commander to brief FCP personnel.
7.
Sacramento County a.
Demonstrate the ability to staff and activate the EOC and FCPs.
The opening of an ERC in Sacramento County will be simulated.
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b' Demonstrate the capability to provide prompt warning to the public and special facilities - notification to the EBS stations,
~
sounding of strens, and prompt delivery of messages.
c.
Demonstrate the ability of Sacramento County to provide prompt coordination of emergency information to the media in accordance with' plans.
d.
Demonstrate the ability'to make decisions and.to coordinate emergency activities.
.e.
Demonstrate the organizational ability and resources necessary to establish appropriate access control points. Road blocks to be placed on side of road at one location.
f.
Demonstrate the ability of County plume monitoring personnel to respond in accordance with plans.
g.
Demonstrate the ability to control the radiological exposure of emergency workers.
h.
Demonstrate the ability to establish and operate rumor control in a coordinated fashion.
8.
San Joacuin County a.
Demonstrate the capability to provide prompt warning to the general public using the ESS system and strens.
Simulated broadcast of EBS messages to coincide with EBS
~
station tLst signal.
The strens will be sounded.
b..
Demonstrate the ability to provide prompt coordination of emergency information to the media according to plan procedures.
Simulated press releases.
Actual press will be given special tours, outside of the scenario, to allow them and the public to view County operations.
c.
Demonstrate the ability to establish and operate rumor control in a coordinated fashion.
d.
Demonstrate the ability of County plume monitoring personnel to respond in accordance with plans.
Two monitoring teams and support personnel will be mobilized.
Demonstrate the ability to control the radiological exposure of e.
emergency workers.
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f.
Demonstrate the organizational ability and -resources 'necessary to establish appropriate access control points.
-- One roadblock will be established.
g.
Demonstrate the ability 1to perform personnel monitoring at the
. roadblock.
- 9.
State of California a.
Demonstrate the-ability to staff the EOF with the EOF Liaison, UDAC Liaison, Radiological' Health Branch' personnel and Public Information Office (PIO) staff and for them to perform their assigned tasks.
1
- Participants will.be pre-positioned.
b.
Demonstrate-the ability to staff and activate the State Operations Center (SOC) with limited staff.
Staffing will include the Emergency Director, Chief of Staff, SOC Technical Director, PIO and State Dose Assessment Center (SDAC) staff.
c.. Demonstrate the ability to answer inquiries from the Governor'_s Office.
d.
Demonstrate the ability of 50C staff to receive, understand, and relate technical data and advise personnel of signif.lcance.
Demonstrate the ability of SOC's.taff to identify and seek e.
corrective measures to erroneous data, rumors,.and unexpected involvement from other agencies.
f.
Demonstrate the ability to mobilize and activate the SDAC.
g.
Demonstrate the ability of the SDAC staff to receive and interpret
. radiological data.
h.
Demonstrate the ability of the State PIO to establish and maintain contact with the county PI0s.
- 1. ' Oemonstrate the ability of PIOS to understand technical data and prepare coordinated press releases.
- j. Demonstrate the ability to provide prompt coordination of emergency -information to the media.
- As'noted on Page 1 of the Exercise Detail portion of this report, the objectives established for the State of California were developed for use by State Officials participating in the exercise for training purposes.
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SACRAMENTO MUNICIPAL UTILITY DISTRICT RANCHO SECO-s 1986 ENERGENCY PREPAREDNESS EXERCISE SCENARIO-1 A.
NARRATIVE'
SUMMARY
Initial conditions are that Rancho Seco has been operating at.100% power and has been at this power level for the previous. forty (40) days. Core age is'300 Effective Fuel Power Days (EFPD) on Cycle 7.
One of the Reactor Building spray pumps has failed its surveillance test run on swing shift the previous day..The problem was high vibration. Maintenance support was' called.In on midshift. The pump and motor are presently disconnected. Repairs are expected by 1600. No other major components are out of service and no testing is in progress.
Fuel is being re-arranged in the Spent Fuel Building.
i The first event is that a spent fuel. assembly is damaged and a small amount of radioactive gases are released. An ALERT should be declared.
Later,' the Control Room receives high vibration alarms on the "A" Reactor Coolant Pump (RCP). Minutes later, the "A" RCP suffers impeller and pump casing damage.
The pump-trips and causes a reactor trip.
Pump debris is carried into-the core where structural damage to many fuel rods occurs.
Gas gap fission products are released into the reactor coolant.
Letdown radiation monitors are;both in high alarm indicating fuel damage. Many rods fall to fully insert on the trip due to the damaged fuel assemblies.
The reactor is shutdown but it is questionable as to the shutdown margin tf the core.
One hour later, there is a double-ended shear of the reactor coolant cold log piping'at the discharge of the "A" RCP.
The top of the core is t
uncovered ofor a.few seconds but no cladding damage occurs from overheating i'
because the reactor ls shutdown. There is no hydrogen generation.
Some fuel cladding damage does occur as a result of the rapid depressurization of the Reactor Coolant System (RCS) and fission products are. released into i
the coolant and out the break into the Reactor Building.
The Safety Features System 191tiates. All emergency cooling pumps start and provide sufficient core cooling. A combination of failures disables all emergency i.
systems designed for Reactor Building cooling.
A SITE AREA EMERGENCY should be declared.
~
7 A few hours later, the Auxiliary Building stack monitors alarm due to a breach of containment.
Reactor Building pressure is still high so the potential exists for the release of large amounts of radioactivity to the atmosphere.
A GENERAL ENERGENCY should be declared.
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37 The release of radicactivity continues until the Reactor Building pressure has been reduced to atmospheric pressure due to the flow out the containment breach and to cooling from the normal coolers. At this point, the release stops.
Due to pump and valving problems, the RCS becomes saturated for a short time until a water supply from the Spent Fuel Pool is aligned.
Low Pressure Injection emergency sump recirculation is eventually established along with one fully operable train of long term cooling.
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c Washington, D.C. 20472 5
July 15, 1985 GUIDANCE MEMORANDUM EX-1 REMEDIAL EXERCISES Purpose This Guidance' Memorandum provides criteria and procedures for requiring and scheduling remedial exercises and other remedial actions to correct deficiencies identified in exercises to test State and local' radiological emergency response plans.
It also provides guidance for determining the extent.of participation in remedial exercises.
Background
The Federal Emergency Management Agency (FEMA) rule, 44 CFR 350, and the
-Nuclear Regulatory Commis.sion (NRC) rule, 10 CFR 50, Appendix E, require that State and local governments participate in periodic, joint exercises with utilities.
These rules require remedial exercises and other corrective measures if the results of these exercises do not give reasonable assurance that adequate protective measures can be taken in the event of a radiological emergency or the deficiencies' identified are significant enough to impact on the public health and safety.
The NRC rule (10 CFR 50, Appendix E, IV.f.4.) calls for NRC-FEMA consultation in making a determination as to whether a remedial exercise is needed.
The FEMA rule (44 CFR 350.9.c.5) leaves the determination of the participation required from State and local governments to the appropriate FEMA Regional Director.
For the purpose of exercise assessment, FEMA uses an evaluation method to apply the criteria of NUREG-0654/ FEMA-REP-1.* FEMA classifies exercise inadequacies as deficiencies or areas requir'ing corrective actions. Deficiencies are demonstrated and observed inadequacies that would cause a finding that offsite emergency preparedness'was not adequate to provide reasonable assurance that appropriate protective measures can be taken to protect the health and safety of the public living in the. vicinity of a nuclear power facility in the event of radiological emergency.
Because of the potential impact of deficiencies on emergency preparedness, they are required to be p,romptly corrected through appropriate remedial actions including remedial exercises, drills or other actions. Areas reoufring corrective actions are demarstrated and observed inadequacies of State and local government performance, and although their correction is required during the next scheduled biennial exercise, they are
'not considered, by themselves, to adversely impact public health and safety.
In addition to these inadequacies, FEMA identifies areas recommended for
- The metnod currently in use is incorporated in tne August 5,1983, memorancuni from the FEMA Deputy Associate Director of State and Local Programs and
-Support to the FEMA Regional Directors, subject: " Procedural Policy M Radiological Emergency Preparedness, Plan Reviews, Exercise Observations and Evaluation, and Interim Findings."
ATTACHMENT C A
39 ay, V
-_lmorovement, which are problem areas observed during an exercise that are not considered to adversely impact public health and safety.
While not required, correction of these would enhance an organization's level of emergency preparedness.
Guidance on Determining the Need for a Remedial Exercise The following criteria shall be used in determining the-need for requiring a
. remedial exercise.
1.
A' deficiency in one or' more of the following planning standards of NUREG-0654/ FEMA-REP-1 will require a remedial exercise.
Exceptions to this requirement may be made when correction of deficiencies can be demonstrated by other remedial actions.
Assignment of Responsibility (Organization Control) (A);
o Alert and Notification Methods and Procedures (E);
o o Emergency Communications (F);
Public Education and Information (areas related to emergency o
public information) (G);
o Accident Assessment (including field monitoring and radiological assessment) (I);
Protective Response (including evacuation and other protection o
responses and decisionmaking) (J);
Radiological Exposure Control (K); and o
Medical and Public Health Support and Services (L).
o 2.
Remedial exercise action may be required when areas requiring corrective actions collectively raise doubts as to whether adequate protective measures can be.taken in the event of an emergency.
Procedures for Reporting on the Need for and Scheduling of Remedial Actions Whan evaluation of a s int exercise indicates that there is the potential o
or need for remedial action, the following procedures will be followed.
1.
The FEMA Regional Office will immediately notify FEMA Headquarters, by telephone, of the nature of exercise inadequacies FEMA Headquarters will, in turn, notify and discuss these inadequacies with NRC Headquarters.
2.
The FEMA Regional. Office will promptly initiate a consultation process with the members of the Regional Assistance Committee (s) (RAC), the
^
State (s) and FEMA Headquarters for these purposes: (a) To classify all exercise inadequacies, (b) to specify appropriate remedial actions, including remedial exercises, drills, or other actions, for both deficiencies and areas requiring corrective actions and (c) to determine which organizations are to be involved in remedial actions.
During this period, FEMA Headquarters will continue to consult with NRC Headquarters.
k A
40 3.
Within 30 days of the exercise, the FEMA Region will transmit a letter and draft' report consisting of, at least, a summary table of the exercise inadequacies to the State (s) with a copy to FEMA Headquarters and the RAC(s). The letter and summary table will confirm the results of the consultations with the State (s). The State will be asked to use this letter and summary table 'of exercise inadequacies as a basis
- -for working with the FEMA Region in accomplishing the remedial actions.
4.
Within 60 days from the exercise, the FEMA Region will prepare and transmit copies of the exercise report to the State (s), RAC(s) and FEMA Headquarters.
If the remedial exercise or other remedial actions have been taken and evaluated prior to the end of the 60 day period, the FEMA Region will incorporate its evaluation of these actions within the exercise report. (In this case, the report will be completed and forwarded within 30 days of the remedial exercise or other remedial actions.)
5.
FEMA Headquarters will forward a copy of the exercise report to NRC Headquarters within 10 days of receipt from the FEMA Regional Office.
6.
If the remedial exercise or other remedial actions are not conducted prior to the preparation and forwarding of the exercise report, they should be completed as soon as possible but not later than 60 days after the report is forwarded to FEMA Headquarters.
7.
If the evaluation of the remedial exercise or other remedial actions are not incorporated into the exercise report, the FEMA Regional Of fice will prepare and forward an evaluation report of these remedial actions to the State (s), RAC(s) and FEMA Headquarters within 30 days of the conduct of their completion.
8.
FEMA Headquarters will forward a copy of the remedial action evaluation report to NRC Headquarters within 10 days of receipt frca the FEMA Regional Office.
Extent of Participation The extent of State and local government participation in a remedial exercise shall be determined by 'the FEMA Regional Director.
Some factors to consider in this determination include:
1.
The remedial exercise should address only those activities that are necessary to demonstrate correction of the identified deficiencies.
2.
To the extent possible, the remedial exercise participation should be limited to organizations having the deficiency (ies).
3.
When the corrective action by one organization cannot be demonstrated without involvenent of other organizations, their participation should be at a level necessary to confirm the corrective action.
This includes participation by utilities which should be arranged through the appropriate NRC Regional Administrator.
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41 Action on Inadeouately Performed Remedial Exercises
. When evaluation of a remedial exercise indicates that an organization did not adequately demonstrate correction of identified deficiencies, one' of the-following actions are to be taken.
-1.
If FEMA has not approved offsite planning and preparedness for the involved site under 44 CFR 350,-FEMA may, in consultation with NRC, require another remedial-exercise and the NRC may consider enforcement actions.
2.
If FEMA has approved offsite planning and preparedness for the involved S
site under 44 CFR 350, FEMA may initiate steps to withdraw the 350 approval or schedule another remedial exercise under the provision of 350.13~ and the NRC may consider enforcement actions.
Coordination with NRC This Guidance Memorandum has been-prepared in coordination with the NRC staff.
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a-42 0FFSITEEXERCISEEVALUATIONREPdRT RANCHO SEC0 NUCLEAR GENERATING STATION' EMERGENCY PREPAREDNESS EXERCISE OCTOBER 8, 1986 EVALUATOR ROSTER FACILITY EVALUATOR Emergency Operations Facility Kent Prendergast, RAC/NRC (Subs.)
Nicholas B. Nikas, FEMA /RIX PIO Coordination
. Joseph D. Dominguez, FEMA /RIX County Liaison Activity Anna Hart, RAC/USDA
' Amador Emergency Operations Center-Suzanne Mooney, FEMA /RIX Ken Lerner, ARGONNE Field Command Post Paul Lynch, RAC/ DOI (Subs.)
Sacramento. Emergency Operations Center John Robinson, FEMA /RIX Ken Bertram, ARGONNE Field Command-Post-Lyle Slagle, INEL-San Joaquin Emergency Operations Center Susan Elkins, FEMA /RIX Joe Keller, INEL Field Command Post Don Fingleton, ARGONNE Emergency News Center Verne Paule, FEMA /RIX l
Unified Dose Assessment Center David L. Duncan, RAC/ EPA Walt Strach, RAC/NWS Manley Wu, FEMA /RIX Radiological Field Monitoring Teams Amador County (2 teams)
Chuck Taylor, RAC/ DOE Nate Chipman, INEL Sacramento County (2 teams)
Ken Miles, RAC/FDA Brad Salmonson, INEL San Joaquin County (2 teams)
Dale Stevenson, RAC/FDA Jim Opelka, ARGONNE Communications Hal Aldrich, FEMA /RIX Stan Harter, CA-0ES Bob Krueger, CA-0ES Transportation -
Ed Henry, RAC/ DOT Pete Sill, FRPCC Bill Gasper, ARGONNE ATTACHMENT D A-
43 0FFSITEEXERCISEEVALUATIONREPdRT RANCHO SEC0 NUCLEAR GENERATING STATION:
~
EMERGENCY. PREPAREDNESS EXERCISE OCTOBER 8, 1986 TIME LINE SEQUENCE 0,F EVENTS
[ NOTE: The original direction of the scenario was based on the utility and the state.and -local offsite jurisdictions to begin at approximately 8:00 a.m.
with all facilities and staff in a prepositioned status..The utility amended the scenario just before the exercise to effect their operations beginning at 5:25 a.m., with an Alert declared at 5:40 a.m.
The state and local offsite jurisdictions maintained the 8:00 a.m. beginning point, prepositioned. These decisions were fully coordinated and approved by the Federal Emergency Manage-ment Agency, Region 'IX, and the United States Nuclear Regulatory Commission, Region V.]
EVENT Site Area General Termination Utility Declared 9:00 a.m.
10:30 a.m.
2:30 p.m.
Received at the:
, Amador' Emergency Opera-tions Center 9:10 a.m.
10:39 a.m.
2:21 p.m.
Sacramento Emergency Operations Center 9:26 a.m.*
10:40 a.m.*
2:14.p.m.*
San Joaquin Emergency Operations Center 9:10 a.m.
10:38 a.m.
2:21 p.m.
Emergency News Center 9:13 a.m.
10:43 a.m.
2:30 p.m.
- Sacramento decision-makers are located at the utility emergency operations facility.and therefore the emergency operations center notification can appear to be delayed or advanced, depending on the situation at that time.
The differential between the ~ times shown for termination of the exercise occurs as_ a result of emergency operations centers monitoring of emergency operations facility discussions and terminating in advance of the actual notification from the emergency operations facility.
ATTACHMENT E w
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44' CORRESPONDING OBJECTIVE PART(S) 0F FORM NUFIG-0634
-1.
Demonstrate ability to =obill:e ECC Sec. I E.1, E. 2 staf f and activate facilities EOF Sec. I promptly.
i MEDIA Sec. I RELCC Sec. I
))i Sec. I 2.
De=onstrate ability to fully ECC Sec.' I A.2.a, staff facilities and =aintain EOF Sec. I A.4 staffing around the clock.
MEDIA Sec. I RELCC Sec. I 3.
Demonstrate ability to =ake ECC Sec. II A.1.d, decisions and to coordinate A.2.a e=ergency activities.
4 De=onstrate adequacy of facilities ECC Sec. III G.3.a, and displays to supporr e=ergency EOF Sec. II H.2, ope rations.
MEDIA Sec. II H.3 5.
De=onstrate ability to co==unicate ECC Sec. IV F
with all appropriate locations, EOF Sec. III organi:stions, and field personnel.
MEDIA Sec. III RELCC Sec. III FA,Sec. I, II FM Sec. IV 6.
De=onstrate ability to =obilize j}i Sec. I E.2, I.8 and deploy field monitoring teams in a ti=ely fashion.
7.
De=onstrate appropriate equip =ent j}i Sec. II, III I.8, I.11 and procedures for deter =ining ambient radiation levels.
~
8.
De=ons trate appropriate equip =ent J2f Sec. II, III I.9 and procedures for =easure=ent of RADLA3 Sec. I, II airborne radiciodine concentrations as low as 10-' uC1/CC in the presence of noble gases.
9.
De=ons trate appropriate equip =ent j]f Sec. II, III I.8 and procedures for collection, RADLA3 Sec. I, II trans port and analysis of samples of soil, vegetation, snow, water, and = ilk.
ATTACHMENT F O
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45 4
CORRESPONDING OBJECTIVE PART(S) 0F FORM NUREG-0654 10.
De=onstrate ability to project ECC Sec. V I.10," J.10.m dosage to the public via plume EOF Sec. XI exposure, based on plant and field data, and to determine appropriate protective =easures, based on PAG's, available shelter, evacuation ti=a esti=stes, and all other appropriate factors.
11.
Demonstrate ability to project ECC Sec. V I.10, J.11 dosage to the public via ingestion EOF Sec. VI pathway exposure, based 'on field data, and to deter =ine appropriate protective =easures, based on PAGs and other relevant factors.
12.
De=ons trate ability to i=ple=ent ECC Sec. VII.C J.9, J.11 protective actions for ingestion pathway ha:ards.
13.
De=onstrate ability to alert the ECC Sec. VI E.6 public vichin the 10-=11e EPZ, and disseminate an initial instructional
)),6 Sec. III
=essage, within 15 =inutes.
14 De=ons trats ability to for=ulate ECC Sec. VI E.5 and distribute appropriate instructions to the public, in a
.ti=ely fashion.
15.
De=enstrate the organizational ECC Sec. VII.A ability and resources necessar7 J.9, J.10.g to =anage an orderly evacuation
)),Sec. I of all or part of the plu=e EPZ.
16.
De=ons trate the organizational ECC Sec. VII.A J.10.k ability and resources necessary FA Sec. I to deal with i= ped 1= cats to evacuation, as incle=ent weather or traffic obstructions.
17.
De=onstrate the organi:ational
~
ECC Sec. VII.A J.10.j ability and resources necessary F3,Sec. I to control access to an evacuated area.
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,0BJECTIVE CORRESFONDING PART(S) 0F. FORM NUREG 0654 18.-
Demonstrate the organi:stional ECC-Sec. VII.3 ability and resources necessary J.10.d to effect an orderly evacuation FJg Sec. II.3 of mobility-1= paired individuals within the plu=a EPZ.'
19.
Demonstrate the or ability and resour,gani stional ECC Sec. VII.3 ces necessary J.9, J.10.g' to effect an orderly evacuation jyiSec. II.A of schools within the plu=a EPZ.
20.
Demonstrate ability to continuously ECC Sec. VIII K.3.a, b monitor and control e=ergency worker exposure.
FA,Sec. IV FM Sec. V 21.
Deconstrate the a'ailty to =ake the ECC Sec. V decision, based on predeter=ined J.10.f EOF Sec. VI criteria, whether :o issue KI to e=ergency workers and/or the general population.
22.
Deconstrate the ability to supply ECC Sec. VIII and ad=inister KI, oncc the decision J.10.e.
has been =ade to do so.
FA Sec. IV W Sec. V r-23.
De=onstrate ability to effect an orderly evacuation of onsite ECC Sec. VII.3 J.2 pe rsonnel.
24 Deconstrate ability to brief the ECC Sec. IX media in a clear, accurate and G.3.a timely =anner.
MEDIA Sec. IV G.4.a EOF Sec. IV 25.
Deconstrate ability to provide ECC Sec. IX G.4.b advance coordination of infor=ation HEDIA Sec. IV released.
26.
Demonstrate ability to establish EOF Sec. II and operate ru=or control in a G.4.c coordinated fashion.
MEDIA Sec. VI 27.
Deconstrate adequacy of procedures
_RELCC Sec. II J.12 for registration and radiological monitoring of evacuees 28.
Deconstrate adequacy of facilities for mass care of evacuees.
_RELCC Sec. III J.10.h t
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.f 47 OBJECTIVE COP 3.ESFONDING PART(S) 0F FORM NUREG-3654 29.
De=onstrate adequate equipment and procedures for deconta=ination
_DECON all
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K.S.a. b of e=ergency workers, equip =ent and vehicles.
30.
De=onstrate adequacy of ambulance facilities and procedures for MEDIC Sec. III L.4-handling contaminated individuals.
31.
De=onstrate adequacy of hospital facilities and procedures for
_ MEDIC Sec. II handling contaminated individuals.
L.1 32 De=enstrate ability to identify need for, request, and obtain Federal (to be developed)
C.1.a. b assistance.
33.
De=onstrace ability to relocate to and operate the alternate EOF /EOC.
(to be developed)
H.2, H3 34 De=ons trate ability to esti= ate total population exposure.
- 35. ' De=onstrate ability to detec=ine and i=ple=ent ECC Sec. X appropriate =casures M.1 for controlled recovery and reentry.
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j Washington, D.C. 20472 GUIDANCE MEMORANDUM PR-1 POLICY ON NUREG-0654/ FEMA-REP-1 AND 44 CFR 350 PERIODIC REQUIREMENTS Purpose This Guidance Memorandum (GM) provides interpretation and clarification of requirements contained in the Federal Emergency Management Agency (FEMA) rule, 44 CFR 350, and NUREG-0654/ FEMA-REP-1, related to periodic planning and exercise activities and other requirements affected by the biennial exercise frequency and other REP program emphases.
===.
Background===
With the publication of the final FEMA rule, 44 CFR 350, on September 28, 1983, and the the Nuclear Regulatory Commission (NRC) final regulation,10 CFR 50, on July 6,1984, it has become necessary to clarify some of the requirements contained in these rules and our common guidance:.critarramcu:ent,.NUREG-0654
/ FEMA-REP-1.
Al so, as we are approaching the. ftf tti paf the.intplementat.icn f
of our joint (NRC/ FEMA) radiological emergency prepareenessMREF) prerrarO- -
it is appropriate to highlight and clarify requirements related.tc_perTodic assessments, especially those made in the -f,f f th and sixth year of a State's REP program.
Guidance The changes and program emphases related to the referenced planning standards and evaluation criteria of NUREG-0654/ FEMA-REP-1 and 44 CFR 350 are addressed to State and local governments and to Federal reviewers of plans and prepared-ness.
This guidance is divided into three 's'ections.
Section A contains planning standards, evaluation criteria and other REP program requirements that have been revised and/or clarified to facilitate compliance.
Section B includes those which remain unchanged but are highlighted here to ensure comoletion and compliance.
Section C describes the Annual Letter of Certification which is submitted by the State to the FEMA Regional Director docunenting actions taken on the requirements presented in sections A and B.
SECTION A:
THE FOLLOWING EVALUATION CRITERIA INCLUDE CHANGES FROM EXISTING
~
REQUIREMENTS PLANNING STANDARD,5 AND EVALUATION CRITERION N.
Exercises and Drills Planning Standard Periodic exercises are (will be) conducted to evaluate major portions of emergency response capabilities, periodic drills are (will be) conducted to develop and maintain key skills, and deficiencies identified as a result of exercises and drills are (will be) corrected.
(NUREG-0654/ FEMA-REP-1,p.71).
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b 49 N.I.b.
Evaluation Criterion An exercise shall include mobilization of State and local personnel and resources adequate to verify the capability to respond to an accident scenario requiring response.- The organization shall provide for a critique of the biennal 4**eet* exercise by Federal and State observers / evaluators.
The scenario should be varied from exercise to exercise gear t: jic such that the major elements of the plans and prepareaness organizations are tested within a six-year #4 ;c j :r period.
Each organization should make provisions to start an exercise between 6:00 p.m. and 4:00 a.m. 5:00 p.
2nd -idnight, 2hd 2ncther betucc- -id-!;Nt 2"'
5:00 :.~.
Once every six yea rs.- Exercises should be conducted during different seasons of tne year within a six-year period for exercising under various weatner conditions. At least one exercise over a period of six years :
- .;rci:cs should be unannounced.
Areas of Review Evaluation criterion, N.1.b., addresses several periodic exercise requirements.
All of these requirements are modified.
The most important change is to permit the testing of major planning and preparedness elements within a six rather than five-year period.
All of the remaining exercise requirements are placed within this six-year period.
Attendant Criteria In addition to meeting speci fic exercise regtrithments, State-.smt loc.al -
governments should meet the following requirenents:
1.
For those requirements related to CNe six-year compliance period for.
selected exercise activities delineated in N.1.b. above, the six-year period commences with the date of the first joint (utility and State and local governments) exercise conducted after Novemoer 3, 1980, the ef fective date of the Nuclear Regulatory Commission Final Regulations on Emergency Planning, 10 CFR Part 50 (Appendix E) (45 FR 55410, August 19, 1980).
For example, if the date of the first joint exercise was March 23, 1981, the end of the six-year period is March 23, 1987.
All of the major elements are to be tested within the six-year period on a site-specific basis except for ingestion-related elements as the
. testing of. such elements-is not tied to a particular site for State governments.
(See Attendant Criteria 3 below.)
2.
Scenarios for periodic exercises should be sufficiently varied so that all of the major elements of the plans and preparedness of offsite organizations are tested within a six-year period.
The major elements of plans and preparedness are incorporated in the 35 exercise objectives contained in the August 5, 1983, memorandum:
" Procedural Policy on Radiological Emergency Preparedness Plan Reviews, Exercise Observations and Evaluations, and Interim Findings."
3.
Implicit in evaluation criterion, N.1.b., is the requirement for eacn State which has a nuclear cower plant within its borders to fully
- To nignlignt cnanges to criteria in NUREG-0654/ FEMA-REP-1, the new language is underlined and the old language is lined through.
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50 exercise its plans and preparedness related to ingestion exposure pathway measures at least orce every six years in conjunction with a plume exposure pathway exercise for some site 4e-th2t Ofic. 1This requirement is reflected in the 35 exercise objectives and is presented in 44 CFR 350.9(c)(4).
Each State with ingestion exposure
. pathway responsibilities for two or more sites located within its borders will. fully participate at some site on a rotational basis and partially participate at the other sites once every six years.
A State which has ingestion related responsibilities for a site (s) located within its borders and which is also within the 50-mile ingestion exposure pathway of a site (s) located in a bordering State (s), shall partially participate in all of tne ingestion related exercises for those bordering State site (s).
For those States that do not have a power plant located in its borders, but are located within the 50-mile Emergency Planning Zone of a bordering State's power plant, they should fully participate in at least one exercise over a six-year period and partially participate in all others. These ingestion-related requirements represent revision of provisions contained in both NUREG-0654/ FEMA-REP-1 and 44 CFR 350.9(c)(4).
4 The definition of full participation in ingestion aspects of exercises is guided by 44 CFR 350.2(j).
Since local.szwernments are not usually required to develop and test ingestion plant and prepareness. State officials would be the emergency personnel primarily involved in the ingestion portion of exercises.
However, in some-Stater, local governments have responsibilities that require <their participation in such exercises.
The number and function of personnel needed should be sufficient for carrying out all those ingestion measures that are necessitated by a particular accident scenario.
Also, organizations fully participating in the ingestion portion of an exercise should deploy field teams to secure and analyze media samples as required by the accident scenario.
5.
The definition of partial participation in ingestion aspects of exercises is guided by 44 CFR 350.2(k).
As stated in item 4 above, State officials
. would be the emergency personnel primarily involved in tne ingestion portion of exercises.
The number and function of State personnel needed should be determined on the basis of verifying capabilities for carrying out the following responsibilities:
Direction and control and related communications for protective action decisionmaking and dissemination
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of emergency information to appropriate individuals, groups and the general public.
Organizations partially participating in the ingestion portion of an exercise will not have to deploy field teams to secure and analyze media samples as such sections can be simulated.
6.
Offsite organizations should make provision to start an exercise between 6:00 p.m. and 4:00 a.m. once every six years.
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- 7.
Offsite organizations should schedule exercises at different seasons over a six-year period to increase the likelihood for exercising under various weather conditions.
This provision can be fulfilled through the regular scheduling of exercises and in conjunction with it. ems 2 and 3 above..
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8.
'Offsjte organizations should make provision to participate in unannounced exercises at least once every six years.
An unarinounced exercise is 'a regularly scheduled exercise in which the ' knowledge of
- the exact date of the exercise is restricted to only those persons with a need to know. Although the knowledge of the exact date is restricted, a time frame of 7 days within which the unannounced exercise is to be conducted will be established and known to all*
parties involved.
9.
Items 2,3,6,7 and 8 may be combined in the same exercise or addressed in separate exercises within a six-year period.
SECTION B:
OTHER PERIODIC REOUIREMENTS HIGHLIGHTED TO CALL ATTENTION TO THE NEED FOR COMPLIANCE
- PLANNING STANDARDS AND EVALUATION CRI.TEP.IA F.
Emergency Communications
,.!" " ' ' d PynningStandard Provisions exist for prompt communications *dmong principal response organizations to emergency personnel and to the public. - (NUREG-0654/ FEMA-REP-1, p.47)
E7aluation Criteria F.3.
Each organization shall conduct periodic testing of the entire emergency communications system (See evaluation criteria N.2.a., N.2.d. and Appendix 3.)
G.
Public Education and Information Planning Standard
,Infomation is made available to the public on a periodic basis on how they will be. notified and what their initial actions should be in an emergency (e.g., listening to a local broadcast station and remaining indoors), the principal points of contact with the news media for dissemination of infomation during an emergency (including the physical location or locations) are established in advance and procedures for coordinated dissemination of infomation to the public are established.
(NUREG-0654/ FEMA-REP-1,p.49)
Evaluation Criteria G.I.
Each organization shall provide a coordinated periodic (at least annually) dissemination of infomation to the public regarding how they will be notifiec and what their actions should be in an emergency.
This infomation shall include, but not necessarily be limited to:
a.
educational information on radiation; b.
contact for additional infomation;
- Language for. sone of tne evaluation criteria has been changed to clarify intent, but the requirements are not changed.
52 c.
protective measures, e.g., evacuation routes and ' relocation centers, sheltering, respiratory protection, radioprotective drugs; and d.
special needs of the handicapped.
Means for accomplishing this dissemination may include, but not necessarily limited to:. information in the telephone book, periodic information in utility bills and publications distributed on an annual basis.
G.2..The.public information program shall provide the permanent and transient adult population within the plume exposure EPZ an adequate opportunity to become aware of the information annually.
The programs should include provision.
for written material that is likely to be available in a residence during an emergency.
Updated information shall be disseminated at least annually.
Signs or other measures (e.g., decals, posted notices or other means, placed in hotels, motels, gasoline stations and phone booths) shall also be used to
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disseminate to any transient population within the plume exposure pathway EPZ appropriate information that would be helpful if an emergency or accident occurs.
Such notices should refer the transient to the telephone directory or other sources of local emergency information and guide the visitor to appropriate radio and televison frequencies.
G.5.
Each organization shall conduct coordinated p + m.at'least annually to acquaint news media with emergency plans, informactorr concerning radiat. ion and points of contact for release of public infor=zrton.
R.
Emergency 'Fa'cilities and Eculoment Planning Standa'r'd Adequate emergency facilities and equipment to support the emergency response are provided and maintained.
(NUREG-0654/ FEMA-REP-1, p.~52)
Evaluation Criterion H.10.
Each organization shall make provisions to inspect, inventory and operationally check emergency equipment / instruments at least once each calendar quarter and after each use.
There shall be sufficient reserves of instruments / equipment to replace those which are removed from emergency kits
,for calibration or repair.
Calibration of equipment shall be at intervals recommended by the supplier of.the equipment.
N.
Exercise and Drills Planning Standard Periodic exercises are (will be). conducted to evaluate major. portions of emergency response capabil~ites, periodic drills are (will be) conducted to develop and maintain key skills, and deficiencies identified as a result of exercise and drills are (will be) corrected.
(NUREG-0654/ FEMA-REP-1,p.71) 9 9
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Drill Requirements (Evaluation Criteria)
N.2.
Defi ni tion:
A drill is a supervised instruction period aimed at testing, developing and maintaining skills in a particular operation.
A drill is often a component of an exercise. A drill shall be supe.rvised and evaluated by a qualified drill instructor.
Each organizat, ion shall conduct dri11f, in addition to the biennial annual exercise at the frequencies indicated below:
N.2.a.
Communication Drills:
Three types of communication drills are acaressed: (a) Communications with State and local governments within the plume exposure pathway emergency planning zone shall be tested monthly; (b) communications with Federal emergency response organizations and State (s) within the ingestion pathway shall be tested at least once quarterly in conjunction with the testing of plume exposure pathway measures of the State plan and (c) communications between the nuclear facility, State and local government emergency operations centers and field assessment teams shall be tested at least once every year.
Communication orills shall also include the aspect of understanding the content of messages.
N.2.c.
Medical Emergency Drills: A medical emergency _ art).1 involving a simulated contaminatec Indiv1cual that contains provisions.for participation by local support service agencies (i.e., ameulance and of fstre. medical treatment facility) shall be conducted annually.
R* diological Monitoring Drills:
Requirements are set forth for two N.2.d.
a types of raciological monitoring drills:
(a) Radiological monitoring drills related to the plume exposure pathway emergency planning zone shall be conducted at least annually and shall include provisions for communications and recordkeeping.
(b) Radiological monitoring drills related to the ingestion exposure pathway emergency planning zone shall be conducted at least annually and shall include provisions.for communications and record keeping.
N.2.e.
Health physics Drills:
Health Physics drills shall be conducted semi-annually by State governments with licensees to test response to and analysis of simulated elevated airborne and liquid samples and direct radiation measurements in the environment.
The State drills can be conducted at any site.
O.
Radiological Emercency Resoonse Training
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planning Standard Radiological emergency response ' training is provided to those who may be called on to assist in an emergency.
(NUREG-0654/ FEMA-REP-1,p.75)
Evaluation Criteria 0.1.
Each organization shall assure training of appropriate individuals.
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0.1.b.
Each offsite response organization shall participate in and receive training.
Whsre mutual aid agreements exist between local agencies such as fire, police and ambulance / rescue, the training shall also be offered to the other departments who are members of the mutual aid district.
0.4 Each organization shall establish a training program for instructing and qualifying personnel who will implement radiological emergency response plans.
The specialized initial training and periodic retraining programs shall be defined with respect to their scope and frequency and should be provided in the following categories:
a.
Directors or coordinators of response orgranizations;
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b.
Personnel responsible for accident assessment; c.
Radiological monitoring teams and radiological analysis personnel; d.
Police, security and fire fighting personnel; f.
First aid and rescue personnel; g.
Local support services personnel including Civil Defense / Emergency Service personnel; h.
Medical support personnel; and J.
Personnel responsible for transmission of emergency information and instructions.
-0.5.
Each organization shall provide for the irrietal and armua.1 retraining Fpersonnel with emergency response responsitrilities.
P.
Responsibility for the Planning Effort:sDevelopment. Periodic Review ano Distribution of Energency Plans Planning Standard Responsibilities for plan development and review and for distribution of emergency plans 'are established, and planners are properly trained.
(NUREG-0654/ FEMA-REP-1, p.78)
Evaluation Criteria P.4
,Each organization shall update its plan and agreements as needed, review ano certify it to be current on a annual basis.
The update shall take into account changes identified by drills and exercises.
P.S.
The emergency response plans and approved changes to the plans shall be forwarded to all organizations and appropriate individuals with responsibility for implementation of the plans.
Revised pages shall be dated and marked to show wnere changes have been made.
P.10.
Each organization shall provide for updating telephone numbers, call-down lists and maps in emergency procedures at least quarterly.
Appendix 3: Means For Providing promot Alert and Notification of Response
_ Organizations Ana Ine Poculation Periodic requirements related to alert and notification will be discussed and delineated in a forthcoming GM.
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55 SECTION C: ANNUAL LETTER OF CERTIFICATION 5
In order to facilitate the monitoring of REP planning and preparedness requirements as prescribed in NUREG-0654/ FEMA-REP-1 and 44 CFR 350 as delineated in this memorandun, an Annual letter of Certification shall be submitted from each State to the appropriate FEMA Regional Director.
The State submission of the Annual Letter of Certification to the FEMA Regional Director should be made by January 31 of each year and should address compliance with periodic requirements for the preceding year.
This letter shall include assurances that the requisite activities have been undertaken or completed, as appropriate, by the State and local organizations for the following functions:
1.
Public Education and Information (G):
Means of dissemination of information, dates, participants, sponsoring organizations and description of any programs condu ted to increase public and media radiological emergency planning arj response awareness.
2.
Emergency Facilities and Eouipment (H):
Type of equipment / instrument, quantity anc cates of check / test.
9 3.
Exercises (N):
Testing of all major elements, conducting exercises under various time ano seasonal conditions, unannounced exercises and testing of State (and local, as appropriate) plans for implementwgte. ingest.ta ptnway measures.
4 Drills (N):
Types, dates held and parttef pating organizatten 5.
Radiological Emergency Rescense Training (0):
Scope and purpose of training, dates nelc, numoer of partic1 pants, agencies represented and sponsors of trainings.
6.
Update of Plans and Letters of Agreement (P):
Veri fication that plans and letters of agreement nave oeen revieweo ano appropriate changes made.
Update s of plans should include telephone numbers,. call-down lists and maps.
7.
Alert and Notification ( Accendix 3):
Type of tests conducted in accordance with estaolisneo senecule, dates nela, and operability percentage achieved based on periodic testing.
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