ML20205C555
| ML20205C555 | |
| Person / Time | |
|---|---|
| Site: | Perry  |
| Issue date: | 08/08/1986 |
| From: | Hiatt S OHIO CITIZENS FOR RESPONSIBLE ENERGY |
| To: | NRC ATOMIC SAFETY & LICENSING APPEAL PANEL (ASLAP) |
| References | |
| CON-#286-281, CON-#386-281 ALAB-841, LBP-85-35, OL, NUDOCS 8608120360 | |
| Download: ML20205C555 (23) | |
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UNITED STATES OF AMERICA NUCLEAR REGULATORY COMMISSION g g II #0:56 Berore the Atomic Sorety and Licensing s o p enunL a l E6Er o gnQ[ Sd; a 'y'f, '(Y
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' THE CLEVELAND ELECTRIC ) Docket Noi! 50-440 OL ILLUMINATING CO. ET AL. > 50-441 OL
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(Perry Nuclear Power Plant, )
Units 1 and 2) )
PETITION FOR RECONSIDERATION OF ALAB-841 Susan L. Hiott CCRE Representative 8608120360 360808 PDR ADOCK 05000440 G PDR DS*3 - ___.
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TABLE OF CONTENTS i is i TABLE OF CITATIONS ......................................
1 I. INTRODUCTION .........................................
I .............. 1 II. DEGRADED CORE ACCIDENT HYDROGEN CONTROL III. RELIABILITY OF TRANSAMERICA DELAVAL DIESEL GENERATORS i ...................................... 16 19 IV. CONCLUSION ..........................................
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TABLE OF CITATIONS Court Cases Helville v. Americon Home Assurance Co., 443 F.SuPP 1064 (E.D. Penn. 1977) ................................. 12 I Muncie Aviation Corp. v. Party Doll Flaet, 519 F.2d 1178 12 (5th Cir. 1975) ...................................
sage v. Rockwell International Corp.. 477 F.SuPP 1205 (D. NeW Hampshire 1979) ............................ 12 union or Concerned Scientists v. N R C_. 735 F.2d 1437 4-6 (D.C. Cir. 1984) .................................
NRC Cases cleveland Electric Illuminating Co. (Perry Nuclear Power Plant, possim Untes 1 and 2). ALAB-841, 24 NRC __ ...........
Perry. LBP-85-35. 22 NRC 514 (1985) ................ possim Long Island Lighting Co. (Shorehom), CLI-86 __. 24 NRC __
(July 24, 1986) ................................... 6 Pacific Gas and Electric (Diablo Canyon Nuclear Power Plant, Unses 1 and 2), ALAB-580, 11 NRC 227 (1980) ...... 15 l
l NRC Regulations 10 CFR 2.743(c) ....................................... 11 10 CFR 2 APPendsx A ................................... 12 10 CFR 50.44 (c) (3) (iv)-(vii) ........................ 1-14 10 CFR 50.46 and Appendix K ........................... 6 Statutes Atomic Energy Act. Sections 189(o) and 192 ............. 4 Administrative Procedure Act ........................... 6 Ntscellaneous 50 Fed. Re9. 3499 ..................................... 10 Attorney Generol's Manual on the APA .................. 12 NUREG-0545 ............................................ 12
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UNITED STATES OF AMERICA NUCLEAR REGULATORY COMMISSION Before the Atomic Safety ond Licensing Appeal Board In the Matter of )
)
THE CLEVELAND ELECTRIC ) Docket Nos. 50-440 OL ILLUMINATING CO. ET AL. ) 50-441 OL
)
(Perry Nuclear Power Plant, )
Units 1 and 2) )
PETITION FOR RECONSIDERATION OF ALAB-841 I. INTRODUCTION On July 25. 1986 the Atomic Safety and Licensing Appeal Board issued ALAB-841. offirming the Concluding Portial Initial Decision ('PID*) of the Licensing Board (LBP-85-35. 22 NRC 514 (1985!) in the Perry operating license proceeding. Pursuant to 10 CFR 2.771. Intervenor Ohio, Citizens for Responsible Energy
('OCRE*) respectrully requests the Appeal Bocrd to reconsider ALAB-841 (to the extent it is challenged herein).
II. DEGRADED CORE ACCIDENT HYDROGEN CONTROL The major issue litigated by OCRE in this proceeding concerned Applicants' compliance with 10 CFR 50. 44 (c) (3) (iv)-
(vii). which' requires BWPs utilizing Mark III containments to install a system capable of controlling, without loss of contornment integrity or functioning of essential equipment therein, the hydrogen gas which 15 produced by the reaction of
=irconium fuel rod clodding with steam in a degraded core occident. This rule, however, is less than clear in many of its I
provisions. Consequently, o dispute ensued between OCRE. on one
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i 2-hand. and Appliconts and the NRC Stoff on the other, os to the i
proper scope of the preliminary analysis (required by Section (vii) of the rule for full power licensing) and whe ther the scenarios approved'by.
the storf occurately described the behavior of the reactor system during and following the postulated degraded core occident (Section (vi) (B) (3)) and provided a sufriciently severe challenge to the hydrogen control system, o distributed igniter
]
system, selected by Applicants.
In its PID the Licensing Board claimed no need to resolve the dispute os to the proper scope of the preliminary analysis (PID at 25), but the Board in fact did resolve it by finding in fover of Applicants. The Licensing Board similarly found consideration of a station blockout scenario, which presents o for more severe challenge to containment integrity than the scenarios utili ed by A p p l i c a n't s , to be oppropriately deferred to the final analysis. The Board odditionally ruled that the availability of containment sprays (on important heat transfer mechonssm reducing the severity of hydrogen deflagrations) was somehow beyond the scope of the issue.
PID or 43-44.
ALAB-841 offirmed the PID, although utilizing different reasoning on some points than the Licensing Board.
Unfortunately. OCRE rinds that its concerns raised in its Appellate Brief have not been appropriately resolved. In fact, ALAB-941 oppears to set forth on even harsher standard for litigation under the Commission's hydrogen control rule, o
stondord which effectively eliminates any meaningful challenge by intervenors to on applicant's hydrogen control system and supporting analyses.
ALAB-341, ofter erroneously claiming that OCRE maintained**
that the final analysis had to.be completed prior to full power operation, held that the hydrogen control rule only requires o satisfactory preliminary analysis for full power operation.
ALAB-841 at 7, 10, footnote 23. The relevant portion of 10 CFR 50.44 (c) (3) (vii) (B) reads:
Complet'ed r i n o 1 ~ o n a l y s'e s ornot e necessory for~o s~ torr determination that a plant is safe to operate at full power provided that prior to such operation on applicont has provided a preliminary analysis Which the staff hos determined provides a satisfactory basis for o decision to support interim operation at full power until the final onolysis hos been completed.
(Emphasis added.)
Thus, o truly literal reading of this section does not in any Way infringe upon the licensing board's Jurisdiction to hear the issues placed before it by the porties. Had the Commission Wished to preclude its hearing boards from considering final anoylses, the Words 'stoff determinotion' would have been replaced by " determination by the stoff, or in the case of a contested proceeding, the presiding officer.' This section of the rule oppears to have been Written With uncontested cases in mind. The interpretation presented in ALAB-841, however, would engrove this 'stoff determination' O T. Stone, thereby elevating the $ toff from o party in the proceeding to the trier of fact.
As discussed an OCRE's Appellate Brief (October 21, 1985) at 5-6, this represents a radical departure from years of f4RC precedent w
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. 4. .
t holding that the NRC Staff does not occupy a favored position f
but is in fact on equal party to the proceeding with the opplicant and intervenors.
It must therefore be concluded that the hydrogen rule does-not bor consideration of the final analysis by a licensing boord. Moreover, OCRE's Appellate Brief clearly established that, if on intervenor raises issues which, according to the Stoff, are more appropriately left for the final analysis, the i
licensing board's obligation to hear and consider those issues is mondatory and not discretionary.
As. illumed by Section 192 of the Atomic Energy Act and its legislative history, it is the intent of Congress that l
Proceedings conducted under Section 189 (o) of the Atomic Energy Act be for the final, full-term, forty-year operating license..
See OCRE Appellate Brief at 9-10.s Section 192. The fact that Congressional authority was required for the NRC to issue temporary operating licenses prior to the completion of a hearing on the final operating license demonstrates without a doubt the illegality of considering anything less than issues i material to the final full-term OL, if those issues were placed into controversy by a Party. Likewise nullified i s the
- reasonable assurance of safety in the interim
- standard employed by the Licensing Board (PID at 25-26, 33, 37, 46).
This view is corroborated by the D.C. Circuit Court of Appeals. In Union or Concerned Scientists v. NRC, 735 F.2d 1437 (1984) (*UCS*) the Court held that removing a material issue from the licensing hearin9 Violated Section 189 (o) of the Atomic J
,y.- -- y-.m-.,
6' Energy Act. Once o proceeding is initiated, the hearing 'must encompass all materici factors bearing on the licensing decision ,
raised by the requester." Id. ot 1443.
Section (vii) of the rule establishes that Perry will not be ollowed to operate indefinitely Without submitting a completed final analysis. Thus, the final analysis is material to final, full-term licensing, Consequently, had OCRE insisted that the finol analysis be subjected to the Licensing Board's scrutiny, the Licensing Board would have been obligated to consider it.
However, contrary to the ossertion of the Appeal Board, OCRE did not insist that Applicants submit their final analysis before full power operation} rather. OCRE, in its proposed findings, recognizing the unfairness of requiring that ongoing experimental programs be completed prior to licensing, set forth a reasonobleness test, boloncing roirness to Applicants on one hand, with fairness to intervenor on the other. OCRE Proposed Findings, June 13, 1985, at 51-53. The issues deemed opproprtate _ for consideration now, under OCRE's reasonobleness test, were thereby made issues " Poised by the requester
- On Which the Board was obligated to articulate a reasoned, fair decision supported J
by evidence in the record ofter opPlying the correct burden of proof (i.e., on the Applicants). That the Licensing Board failed to fulfil this obligation is grounds for reversal.
The cramped interpretation of 10 CFR 50. 44 (c) (3) (vi) (B) (3) set forth in ALAB-841 (pp. 13-15) similarly departs from the requirements of law. While the Appeal Board majority would noe 90 50 for os to erect on insurmountable barrier to intervenor
_4 challenge of the
- occident scenarios accepted by the NRC stoff" (1), the hurdle to be Jumped is indeed steep. Citing the
' extraordinarily remote" likelihood of occurrence of accidents (1) Dr. Johnson would preclude consideration or scenarios other than those opproved by the Staff as on impermissible challenge to the rule. OCRE must respectfully object to this interpretation. As demonstrated by the legislative history of the rule (discussed inrro), it was never intended that the stoff's. Judgement be insulated from odjudicatory scrutiny. Dr.
Johnson's interpretation would also elevate the NRC staff from on equal party to the procee' ding to a trier of fact whose discretion is unreviewable, clearly contrary to years of NRC precedent and the findings of the D.C. Circuit Court of Appeals:
' Congress vested in the public, os well as the NRC staff, o role in ossuring safe operation or nuclear power plants.' UCS, supra, at 1447. Dr. ,
Johnson's rigid reading of the hydrogen rule is also undermined by the Commission's July 24 ruling in the Shoreham case, in which it stated that the NRC's rules were intended to be flexible.
Dr. Johnson's analogy with the ECCS rule is misplaced.
Unlike the hydrogen rule, the ECCS rule is highly prescriptive in its anolytical requirements, specifying in the regulation itself the sources of heat to be considered in the LOCA onalysis, approved heat transfer'models, and other assumptions and phenomeno to be modeled in the analysis. 10 CFR 50.46 and Appendix K to 10 CFR'50. These requirements are the result of a rulemaking proceeding conducted in accordance with the Administrative Procedure Act. The hydrogen rule does not approach this level of precision, containing instead the vague, brood acceptance criterion of stoff opproval. Dr. Johnson's opprooch would essentially codify a vague, subjective and unspecified standard which is opt to change with the stoff8 5 whims without the benefit of the notice and comment provisions of the APA.
Finally, OCRE finds most disturbing Dr. Johnson's assertion that technicol and scientific expertise and judgement are "not amenable to on adjudicotory hearing." The Court in UC5 found otherwise (decisions exempted from formal hearing procedures are opPropriately those resting solely on inspections or tests evoluoted in terms of preestablished, objective acceptonce criterio. U05 at 1449-1451). Since most or the issues raised by intervenors in licensing proceedings involve technical and scientific Judgement, Dr. Johnson's thesis, c r.P r i e d to its logical conclusion, would eliminate public porticipation in the licensing pr7 cess. (It would also obolish the role of Appeal l
Board judges.)
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_7 yielding hydrogen, the majority has held that on.intervenor must do more than ollege the existence of accident scenarios other than those approved by the Stoffs it must 0150 establish that, obsent consideration of these scenarios, the analysis could'not s
fulfil its intended purpose. Then, without explanation, it is stated that "no such demonstration was made here."
Assuming for the moment that the stondord set forth is legal and proper (on assumption discredited infro), OCRE did meet its requirements. We first stort with the " intended purpose
- of the i onolysis. It is clear froc 10 CFR 50. 44 (c) (3) (iv) ( A) and (vi)(B) that the purpose of the analysis is to Justify the hydrogen control system (be it igniters, inerting, or some other plan; the rule, contrary to ALAB-841 at 6, does not mandate controlled ignition) selected by the BUR Mark III or PWR ice condenser opplicant. If inert.in's is not used, the analysis must show that containment integrity will be maintained and certain systems and compnnents will survive the hydrogen burn i
environment. Section (vi) (B) (5) .
If the inclusion of on occident scenario does not support or justify the hydrogen control system, such that the duol criterion of containment integrity and equipment survivability is not met, then the stondord of ALAB-841 is fulrilled. And OCRE indeed advanced such a scenario. As noted by the Licensing Board, o station blackout occident would disable the igniters'by interrupting their power supply, allowing hydrogen to occumulate to high concentrations, the ignition of which, by the restoration of power to the igniters or by a rondom source.
. . would lead to high pressures. PID 00 36, 105-106. The resultant pressures, around 100 psi 9, greatly exceed Applicants' estimates of the Perry contosnment capability. This scenario thus results in the ,,
failure to meet the containment integrity requirement of the rules therefore the threshold for challenging the Stoff's selection of accident scenarios hos been surmounted. The station blackout scenario olone demonstrates the deficient nature of the hydrogen igniter system used by Applicants. The Licensing Board should not have evaded the force of the facts by citing the purportedly lou probability of occurrence of this occident (based on Applicants' unsubstantiated overments), the ovoilability of containment venting (i.e., o deliberate breach of containment integrity) and deferring the mother to the Staff for post-heoring resolution as part of the final analysis. PID at 36-37.
Although having met the threshold estoblished in ALAB-841, OCRE believes that it sets on inappropriate standard. While not quite dectoring the Stoff's discretion to be beyond challenge, ALAB-841 does imply that the 'stoff's brood discretion' occupies on elevated fortress less susceptible to attack than uould usually be the cose. While not quite elevating the staff from equal party to trier of fact, this does give the staff an exalted position never before contemplated in NRc practice.
The fact is that the hydrogen rule never intepded to insulate tne stoff's discretion from the scrutiny of the boards or porties. The Attachment to OCRE's Appel10te Brief (clearly a port of the legislative history of the rule) contains the
_9-statement *(W)e have to have at least sufficient objective standards 50 that the stoff's Judgement con be tested in a challenge before the Licensing Board, if necessary' in a discussion of the ramifications of the ' accepted by the stoff*
s*
Provision. The rule oppears to hcVe incorPoroted this recommendation by adding the substantive requirement that the scenarios describe the behavior of the reactor system during and following a degraded core occident. Section (vi) (B) (3) .
The standard set forth in ALAB-841 also appears to have been derived from the Appeal Board's belief that degraded core occident scenarios are so "extraordinorily remote' and ' divorced from reality" that the consideration of more than the events opproved by the Stoff is o meaningless exercise. There also appears to be o concern that opening the door to additional scenarios would deluge the heori'ng process with requests for the consideration of "ev(ry one of these sequences.' Neither point hos o rational basis.
OCRE is omo:ed that anyone, in the Wake of the events at THI-2 and Chernobyl, still regards occidents generating large amounts of hydrogen to be ' divorced from reality.' This is apparently on opinion not shared by the Commission, which estimated, in response to questions posed by Rep. EdWord Markey in April 1985, that the cumulative probability of a nuclear core meltdown occident within the next 20 years is'45 Percent.
In fact, this Worn and tired ' accidents Won't hoppen" refrain could in itself be considered on impermissible challenge to the hydrogen rule. Which postulates a degraded core occident
-/O-resulting in o 75% metal-water reaction. Many utility commenters on the hydrogen rule likewise contended that such accidents are improbable. Their comments were rejected. See 50 Fed. Reg. 3499.
OCRE.monifestly did not desire the consideration of every possible degraded core scenario. A careful reading of OCRE's proposed findings would establish that OCRE did not merely allege that other scenarios exists OCRE sought to include the most bounding scenorios, such as station blockout and unavailability of containment sprays. If the hydrogen control system functions properly in the bounding scenarios, then there is no need to consider the multiplicity of less challenging scenarios. However, ir the system only fulfils its function for the most benign events. then it has not met its purpose ond.
indeed, is of little usefulness.
It is claimed that the record does not establish that the staff Octed copriciously in opproving the two scenarios for the preliminary analysis. ALAB-841 at 15. Aside from the rock that such a finding is more oppropriately reserved for the actions of a trier of fach, and not for the actions of a party to the proceeding, OCRE respectfully differs with the Appeal Board's chorocteritotion of the record. The record instead shows that Applicants and the Stoff agreed upon the scope of the preliminary analysis and the chosen scenarios 50 as to exclude the more difficult and controversial matters from adjudication.
i See Applicants' Ex. 8-2 and 8-3: Notorrancesco I at 9:
l Notorrancesco II ot 6s SSER 6 ot 6-12. The Staff octually required less at Perry I
-y-l ror the 'reliminary analysis than it did at Grand Guir, the supposeo model for the scope or Perry's preliminary analysis. l See, e.g., Tr. 3740-3746; OCRE's proposed findings at 52-53, 78.
OCRE's criticisms or the CLASIX-3 containment response computer code are disposed or in ALAB-841 by: (1) claiming that the Licensing Board should not have admitted OCRE Ex. 21, NUREG/CR-2530s (2) citing the arridovie or Dr. Marshall Bermons
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ond (3) arrirming the Licensing Board's acceptance or CLASIX-3 on the grounds that the code predicted conservative Pressures and temperatures when compared with large scale experiments.
OCRE respectfully dirrors with these rindings.
The Licensing Board was correct in admitting OCRE Ex. 21.
It is significant that Applicants, the party with the most to lose from its admission, raised no objection. Tr. 3691.
NUREG/CR-2530, outhored by Sandia National Laboratory researchers, extensively referenced and documented. and based largely upon exp6Pimental programs at Sondia, is clearly the most credible, reliable, scholorly, and comprehensive analysis or the distributed igniter system contained in the record. (2)
The Appeal Board apparently believes that lock of sponsorship or OCRE Ex. 01 by a witness has voided its admissibility. Sponsorship is not a requirement for odmissibility in NRC proctices rather, the only criterio to be met for admission or documentory evidence are relevance, materiality, and reliability. 10 CFR 2.743(c). There con be no (2) While Ex. 21 was indeed relied upon extensively by OCRE in 4 its criticisms of CLASIX-3 and its input assumptions, it was not the only basis for these criticisms. See, e.g., OCRE Ex. 20, which also contains a strong criticism or the CLASIX-3 code and octually states that it should not be used.
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doubt that NUREG/CR-2530 meets all three roctors. OCRE Would ;
respectrully point out that the Federal Rules or Evidence are not opplicable to NRC proceedings. 10 CFR 2 Appendix A, Port V. d.
('7 ) . The' Attorney General's Monuoi on the Administrative Procedure Act. Section 7(c), similarly states that '(i)t is clear that the technical rules or evidence Will not be opplicable to' administrative hearings.' (See also NUREG-0545. "Seminor "eport on the Public Hearing Process for Nuclear Power Plants.* pp. 41-62.)
Moreover. NUREG/CR-2530 would be admissible in rederal court proceedings bound by the Rule's or Evidence. Muncie Aviation Corp. v. Party Doll Fleet. 519 F.2d 1178 (5th Cir. 1975)
(Federal Aviation Administration advisory circulars are admissible on a preliminary rinding or relevoney. necessity, and inherent trustworthiness) Helville v. American Home Assurance Co.. 443 F.Supp 1064 (E.D. Penn. 1977) (FAA cirWorthiness directives admissible os reports or public agencies 'contain sufficient circumstantial guarantees or trust-Worthiness to Juskiry their use at tric1'): Sage v. Rockwell International 1
Corp.. 477 F.Supp 1205 (D. New Hampshire 1979) (U.S. Navy report ,
l on airpione crash admissible os trustworthy). NUREG/CR-2530, being a product of the Sandio National Laboratory ( W h i.c h the.Licensi.ng Board noted r.o r its expertise in the field or hydrogen combustion, Tr. 3687). is inherently trustworthy and thus would even be admissible in rederal court.
The arridovit or Dr. Marshall Berman should not have been relied upon to discredit NUREG/CR-2530. ALAB-841 at 17.
o '
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l r l footnote 37. An arridovie prepared in order to ovoid appearance !
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at the hearing, aside from the obvious deficiency or the l
inomility to cross-examine the orriont (3), is clearly not as credible os the thoroughly documented and referenced OCRE Ex.
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21.
Nor did Dr. Berman's arridovit discredit the HECTR coleulations, as implied in rootnote 37. While it is true that some HECTR calculations presented in OCRE Ex. 21 used the 10%
ignition limit. HECTR cases A-1, B-3, and B-4'used the some input porometers os three CLASIX-3 cases run for Grand Guits in oil cases HECTR predicted higher pressures than CLASIX-3. (See Appendsx C to OCRE's proposed findings.)
The Board's acceptance or the CLASIX-3 onalysis due to supposed conservatism when compared to large-scale experiments should not have been orrirmed. ALAB-841 at 16-17. The large-scale experiments were not representative or the comportmentalized Mark III containment. As thoroughly explained in OCRE's proposed findings (pp.39-40s based on OCRE Ex. 21),
the compartmentalization model in CLASIX-3 appears to be the cause of the low predicted pressures.
Unfortunately, acceptance of the low CLASIX-3 pressure Acceptonce predictions has led to further errors in ALAB-841.
of Applicants' onolyses or containment capacity (ALAB-841 at 21-
- 23) is apparently predicated on the assumption that the maximum (3) In contrast, Appliconts had the opportunity to cross-examine the Storr witnesses on NUREG/CR-2530, and Starr counsel had the opportunity for redirect on the document as Well. If, os the Licensing Board round, there was no genuine scientific disagraement between the NRC Starr and Sandio, the Starr Witnesses Were the oppropriate ones to answer questions on the document.
. . _y-burn pressure will not exceed 21 psig, as predicted by CLASIX-3.
If the higher burn pressures Predicted by HECTR were accepted instead, the limiting penetrations would have little or no margin (4). Similarly, acceptance of the pressure qualification of the vacuum breakers, mixing compressors and check volves (ALAB-841 at 24-25) is inappropriate if higher burn pressures are likely.
The deficiencies in CLASIX-3 oiso invalidate the equipment survivability onolysis, as the burn temperatures calculated thereby are used for this analysis. See OCRE's proposed findings at 45.
OCRE respectfully submits that the Appect Board should not have dismissed as irrelevant the containment vessel out-of-tolerance condition (ALAB-841 at 23, footnote 49). Application of the proper burden of proof would require Applicants to offirmatively demonstrate thrQugh on oppropriate ondlysis that this condition is insignificont. Similarly (though not discussed in ALAB-841), Appliconts should have been required to demonstrate, through on onalysis available for scrutiny by the Board and parties, that the defective welds in the containment vessel would not impair its strength at internal pressures of at least 50 psig. See OCRE's proposed findings at 22-25. The Licensing Board's (4) Speaking of morgin, regarding the analysis of P205, while the rule does permit the use of actual material Properties. it also requires suitable margins to be incorporated to account for uncertointies in material properties, modeling techniques, It construction tolerances, etc. 10 CFR 50.44 (c) (3) (iv) (B) .
is not apparent that ApPliconts incorporated any such morgins in their analysis of P205. See Applicants' Ex. 8-4.
o * -/6-acceptance of a witness 8 ipse dixik overments that such on analysis had been performed, when the analysis itself was unavailable (Tr. 3315) is manifestly in error. See OCRE's Appellate Brief at 13-14s Pacific Gas and Electric (Diablo Canyon Nuclear Power Plant, Units 1 and 2), ALAB-580, 11 NRC 227,.229-30,.. (1989) (o licensing, board. f t,nding express.ing ,,
approval of on unseen document is null and void).
OCRE is pleased that the Appeal Board has. directed the Staff to give further consideration to the issues of containment heat removal and gosification and pyrolysis of electrical cable insulation in the final analysis. ALAB-841 ok 16-21. However, as discussed in OCRE's proposed findings (pp. 50-53), these matters should have been considered in the preliminary analysis.
Furthermore, os discussed supro, os issues material to final, full-term licensing of Perry, once OCRE Poised them, the Board was obligated to fairly consider them. (5)
It is CCRE's sincere belief that the view of the evidentiary escord presented in its proposed findings and description of errors in LBP-85-35 on the hydrogen issue presented in its appellate brier are correct. OCRE respectrully contends that the evidentiary record, when viewed in light of the paramount importance of safeguarding the health and safety of the public, and when applying the correct burden of proof, on the a -
(5) OCRE respectfully suggests that the complex nature of Mark III containment accident behavior renders the simple calculations of containment heat removal capability given io footnote 41 (which assumes that the heat of combustion is added directly to the suppression pool, when in fact it is Odded to the containment atmosphere) inapplicable. OCRE would recommend that the Appeal Board peruse Mr. John M. Humphrey's ' Discussion Report on Mark III containment Interface Issues,' June 30, 1983, PDR Accession No. 8309060583, for useful insights into this matter.
I
e e
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Appliconks, demands denial of the Perry operating license on this issue. OCRE therefore urges the Appeal Board to reconsider its arrirmation of LBP-85-35 with respect to hydrogen control.
III. RELIABILITY OF TRANSAMERICA DELAVAL DIESEL GENERATORS Engine Foundation Chock Plates In its preriled testimony on Issue M16 in the Perry proceeding (regarding the reliability of the PNPP Transomerico Delaval stondby diesel generators) the NRC Starr expressed concern, as did OCRE in its Response to Applicants' Motion for Summary Disposition or Issue M16 (February 27, 1985, Pp. 47-49),
that there is insufficient contact *between the engine base and the foundation chock plates. Starr Testimony, fr. Tr. 2281, at 54-55. Under cross-examination by Appliconts' counsel, starr witness B.J. Kirkwood amplified this concern. Tr. 2417-2419.
The Lacensing Board chose to ignore Mr. Kirkwood's testimony in rover or rebuttal testimony presented by Applicants. PID at 74, 75, 121:
Tr. 2496-2497.
It is stated in ALAB-841 that Mr.-Kirkwood did not really reject the TDI evoluotio9b r the surriciency of contact areo (contoined in Ex. 56 or OCRE's Response to Applicants' Motion for Summary Disposition or Issue M16), but merely required additional information before taking a position. This additional information was purportedly supplied by Applicants' rebuttal witness, Mr. Christiansen (Tr. 2496-2497). ALAB-841 at 31-32. OCRE respectrully suggests that a careful examination of the heoring transcript and Ex. 56 to OCRE's summary disposition response will yield a dirrerent conclusion.
-n-In his cross-examination of the Staff witnesses, Mr. Silberg first oscertained that Mr. Kirkwood was familiar with Ex. 56 to CCRE's summary disposition response and the TDI calculations l therein. Tr. 2416-2417. When asked by Mr. Silberg if those calculations provided the evoluotion the Stoff was seeking, Mr.
Kirkwood replied. *Not to me. It is not sufficient.' Tr. 2417.
He also voiced the desire for additional background information, particularly as to why TOI was willing to accept less than the sPecified 85% contact. Id. Mr. Silberg then established that this 85% specification was not a TDI requirement, but was specified by the PNPP orchitect-engineer, Gilbert Associates. Tr.
2417-2418. When Mr. Silberg then asked a leading question in on ottempt to get Mr. Kirkwood to state that, other than the GAI 85% contact specification, he had no basis for questioning the
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adequacy of the calculations in'Ex. 56, Mr. Kirkwood replied:
The only basis I have in addition to what has been provided here is my own experience in being responsible for installations os a design engineer for clients, where I would expect to have o
! better contact in general than that, at least to have some basis on which to judge it, and that it be fully evoluoted if it does j not meet that particular instances as to whether there could be some deleterious consequences, and were not to be accepted blindly without further investigation.
Upon hearing this unfovorable onswer, Mr. Silberg terminated this line os questioning. Tr. 2418-2419.
Applicants presented Mr. Christionsen os o rebuttal witness on this point. Tr. 2496-2497. When asked if the "further l
rigorous evoluotion' desired by the Stoff in its prefiled testimony had been performed, Mr. Christiansen referred to the TDI calculations 'ottoched to the non-conformance," i.e., OCRE's
.j8-Ex. 36. Id. Since Mr. Christiansen's rebuttal testimony only referenced the calculations in Ex. 56, it did not contain anything of Which Staff Witness Kirkwood was not already oWore.
Thus, the only "rebuttol' testimony on this point was o u reference to thF some analysis which Mr. Kirkwood had already found to be unacceptable.
Contrary to the implication in ALAB-841, the TDI calculations in OCRE's Ex. 56 to its summary disposition response Weie not provided to satisfy the Stoff's requirement set forth in its testimony. Rother, the TDI calculations Were performed in October 1982 in response to a field question generated by Applicants' contract personnel due to the discovery of the Unit 1 engines' non-conformance With the GAI 85% bearing requirement. See Ex. 56. In October 1982 the abroad pattern of deficiencies
- fremming "from inadequocies in desisn, manufacture, and QA/QC by TDI' Estoff Ex. 1, fr. Tr. 2284, at 1) were os yet unknown. Since the revelation of these problems.
however, TDI hos become suspect.
The unreliable and untrustworthy nature of TDI's activities is the basis for the Owners' Group program, the NRC Staff TDI Task Group, and or OCRE's Issue M16. It is 111o91 col and inconsistent to perform design reviews and quality revolidations of TDI engine components, on the premise that TDI connot be trusted to have done the job right in the first instance, while accepting at face value a TDI calculation sanctioning chock plate surface contact areas for less than specified by GAI.
The only reliable evidence in the. record on the Perry engine Foundation is that of Mr. Kirkwood, Who, based upon his
- _ fq -
extensive engineering experience with diesel generators, round the condition unocceptable. (6) The Licensing Board's conclusion on the roundation was unsupported by reliable evidence in the record and should have been reversed.
IV. CONCLUSION For all of the foregoing reasons, OCRE respectrully requests that the Appeal Board reconsider its decision in ALAB-841 on the entire issue or hydrogen control and on the matter or the TDI diesel generator roundation chock plates. OCRE seeks the relier or reversal of the Licensing Board's PID, LBP-85-35, and i resultant denial of the Perry operating license until such time that Applicants comply With the NRC regulatory ston,dords and meet their burden of proor.
The cotostrophic accident at Chernobyl demonstrates that more is at stake in this proceeding than Applicants' investment in the Perry racility, namely, the population of Northeast Ohio.
These people deserve o better licensing decision than LBP 35. OCRE Proys that the Appeal Board is moved to reconsider.
Respectfully submitted, b
Susan L. Hiott
_0CRE Representative ,
8275 Hunson Rd.
Mentor, OH 44060 (216) 255-3158 i
! DATED:_ _# _61'5_T- _0_- _I_9_5_b i
(6) It is or no comfort to OCRE that the Storr in SSER 8 oecepted Applicants' evoluotion of the roundation. ALAB-841 at 32, rootnote 73. It appears that neither Mr. Kirkwood nor any or the other PNL consultants Were responsible for this finding.
See SSER 8, Appendix E. "NRC Starr Contributors,' from Which Mr.
KirkWood's nome is obsent.
s n
.e *i e DOLKEitp*
USNRc CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE
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