ML20205C120
| ML20205C120 | |
| Person / Time | |
|---|---|
| Site: | Catawba  |
| Issue date: | 08/06/1986 |
| From: | DUKE POWER CO. |
| To: | |
| Shared Package | |
| ML20205C103 | List: |
| References | |
| NUDOCS 8608120253 | |
| Download: ML20205C120 (12) | |
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Duke Power Company Catawba Nuclear Station, Unit 1 Proposed License Amendment to Facility Operating License NPF-35 License Condition (20)
Transamerica Delaval, Inc. (TDI)
Diesel Generators 8608120253 860006 PDR ADOCK 05000413 P
PDR a
(1) Requested Amendment Amend Facility Operating License NPF License Condition (20) to read:
Duke Power Company shall implement the TDI diesel requirements as specified in Attachment 1. is hereby incorporated into the license.
The current Attachment I would be replaced by a revised Attachment I which follows. It is also requested that the Staff's Safety Evaluation Report on Operability / Reliability of Emergency Diesel Generators Manufactured by Transamerica Delaval, Inc., which was transmitted to Duke Power Company by Dr.
K. N. Jabbour's letter of July 2,1986, be added as a reference.
(2) Discussion On August 14, 1984, the NRC Staff issued a Safety Evaluation Report (SER) on the Transamerica Delaval, Inc. (TDI) diesel generators at Catawba Unit 1.
This SER was later included as Appendix G in Supplement 4 to the Catawba SER.
In the SER the Staff concluded that the TDI diesel engines at Catawba Unit I would provide a reliable standby source of onsite power in accordance with
. General Design Criteria (GDC)17 through the first refueling outage.
This finding was based upon the NRC Staff's and their consultant's (Pacific Northwest Laboratory (PNL)) review of (1) the then current status of the TDI Owners Group Program in resolving the TDI diesel engina issue; (2) actions taken by Duke to enhance and verify the reliability of the 1A and IB engines; (3) the enhanced maintenance and surveillance program as modified in the SER; and (4) changes to the Technical Specifications to limit future testing of the engines to 5750 KW (185 psig BMEP). These conclusions were subject to the license condition that Duke implement the TDI Owners Group recommendations by the first refueling.
On July 2,1986, the Staff transmitted a final SER which addressed the operability / reliability of TDI diesel generators. Therein the Staff concluded that implementation of the TDI Owners Group and PNL recommendations concerning, among other thin,qs, quality revalidation inspections, component modifications and repit' r%at, load restrictions and operating precautions, will establish the adeq_acy of the TDI diesel generators for nuclear standby service as required by GDC-17. The Staff further concluded that the continued reliability / operability of the TDI engines for the life of the Catawba facility would be ensured by implementation of the maintenance / surveillance program discussed in Section 2.3 of the final SER.
By letter dated August 1, 1986, Duke Power Company committed to implement the maintenance / surveillance program as recommended by the Staff's final SER.
(3) Safety Analysis It is Duke Power Company's conclusion that the proposed change to the TDI diesel generator license condition for Catawba Unit I would not involve any adverse safety considerations. As noted above, the Staff concluded in both the preliminary and final SER's, that the TDI diesel generators at Catawba Unit I would provide a reliable source of onsite power in accordance with GDC-17.
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(4) Analysis of Significant Hazards Consideration As required by 10 CFR 50.91, this analysis is provided concerning whether the proposed amendment involves significant hazards considerations, as defined by 10 CFR 50.91.
Standards for determination that a proposed amendment involves no significant hazards considerations are if operation of the facility in accordance with the proposed amendment would not:
(1) involve a significant increase in the probability or consequences of an accident previously evaluated; (2) or create the possibility of a new or different kind of accident from any accident previously evaluated; or (3) involve a significant reduction in a margin of safety.
The proposed amendment would not involve a significant increase in the probability or consequences of accidents previously evaluated because implementation of the proposed license condition would not have any effect on any previous */ analyzed accidents because there are no changes to any of the assumptions used in the analysis. The proposed changes to the TDI diesel generator license condition will likewise not affect any previously evaluated accidents in that the diesels will still be capable of performing their intended safety functions if called upon.
.The proposed amendment would not create the possibility of a new or different kind of accident than previously evaluated since no new mode of plant operation and no physical modifications are required to be performed to the facility. In addition, no changes to margins of safety are involved since the proposed diesel generator requirements are intended to maintain and enhance the reliability of the diesel generators.
Based upon the proceeding analysis, Duke Power Company concludes that the proposed amendment does not involve a significant hazards consideration.
l l
1 i
1 I
ATTACHMENT 1 TO LICENSE NPF-35 TDI DIESEL ENGINES REQUIREMENTS 1
Duke Power Company shall comply with the following requirements related to the TDI diesel engines for Catawba Unit 1.
(1) Changes to the maintenance and surveillance program of the TDI diesel engines, as identified in Section 2.3 of the Staff's Safety Evaluation Report on Operability / Reliability of Emergency Diesel Generators Manufactured by Transamerica Delaval, Inc., shall be subject to the provisions of 10 CFR
.l 50.59.
The frequency of the major engine overhauls referred to in the license conditions below shall be consistent with Section IV.1.
" Overhaul Frequency" in Revision 2 of Appendix II of the Design Review / Quality Revalidation report which was transmitted by letter dated May 1,1986, from J. George, Owners Group, to H. Denton, NRC.
(2) Connecting rod assenblies shall be subjected to the following inspections at j
,each major engine overhaul.
(a) The surfaces of the rack teeth should be inspected for signs of fretting.
If fretting has occurred, it should be subject to an engineering evaluation for appropriate corrective action.
(b) All connecting-rod bolts should be lubricated in accordance with the engine manufacturer's instructions and torqued to the specifications of the manufacturer. The lengths of the two pairs of bolts above the crankpin should be measured ultrasonically pre-and post-tensioning.
(c) If connecting-rod bolt stretch was measured ultrasonically during reassembly following the preservice inspection, the lengcha of the _ two pairs of bolts above the connecting rod should be remeasured ultrasonically before the link rod box is disassembled. Alternatively, the breakway torque should be measured. If bolt tension determined by either method is less than 93% of the value at installation, the cause should be determined, appropriate corrective action should be taken, and the interval between checks of bolt torque should be reevaluated.
(d) All connecting-rod bolts should be visually' inspected for thread damage (e.g., galling), and the two pairs of connecting-rod bolts above the crankpin should be inspected by magnetic particle testing (MT) to verify the continued absence of cracking. All washers used with the bolts should be examined visually for signs of galling or cracking, and replaced if damaged.
(e) A visual inspection should be performed of all external surfaces of the link rod box to verify the absence of any signs of service induced distress.
(f) All of the bolt holes in the link rod box should be inspected for thread damage (e.g., galling) or other signs of abnormalities. In addition, the bolt holes subject to the highest stresses (e.g., the pair immediately above the crankpin) should be examined with an appropriate nondestructive m
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. method to verify the continued absence of cracking. Any indications should f
1 be recorded for engineering evaluation and appropriate corrective action.
(3)
(a) Cylinder blocks shall be inspected for " ligament" crac}s, " stud-to-stud" cracks and " stud-to-end" cracks as defined in a report by Failure Analysis Associates, Inc. (FaAA) entitled, " Design Review of TDI R-4 and RV-4 Series Emergency Diesel Generator Cylinder Blocks" (FaAA report no.
FaAA-84-9-11.1) and dated December 1984.
(Note that the FaAA report l
specifies additional inspections to be performed for blocks with "known" or " assumed" ligament cracks.) The inspection intervals (i.e.,
frequency) shall not exceed the intervals calculated using the cumulative damage index model in the subject FaAA report.
In addition, the inspection method shall be consistent with or equivalent to those identified in the subject FaAA report.
(b) In addition to inspections specified in the aforementioned FaAA report, blocks with "known" or " assumed Ligament cracks" (as defined in the FaAA report) should be inspected at each refueling outage to determine whether or not cracks have initiated on the top surface exposed by the removal of two or more cylinder heads. This process should be repeated over several refueling outages until the entire block top has been inspected.
Liquid-penetrent testing or a similarly sensitive nondestructive testing technique should be used to detect cracking, and addy current should be used as appropriate to determine the depth of any cracks discovered.
(c) If inspection reveals cracks in the cylinder blocks between stud holes of adjacent cylinders (" stud-to-stud" cracks) or " stud-to-end" cracks, this condition shall be reported promptly to the NRC staff and the affected engine shall be considered inoperable.
The engine shall not be restored to " operable" status until the proposed disposition and/or corrective actions have been approved by the NRC staff.
(4) The following air roll test shall be performed as specified below, except when the plant is already in an Action Statement of Technical Specification 3/4.8.1, " Electric Power Systems, A.C. Sources":
The engines shall be rolled over with the airstart system and with the cylinder stopcocks open prior to each planned start, unless that start occurs within 4 hours4.62963e-5 days <br />0.00111 hours <br />6.613757e-6 weeks <br />1.522e-6 months <br /> of a shutdown. The engines shall also be rolled over with the airstart system and with the cylinder stopcocks open after 4 hours4.62963e-5 days <br />0.00111 hours <br />6.613757e-6 weeks <br />1.522e-6 months <br />, but no more than 8 hours9.259259e-5 days <br />0.00222 hours <br />1.322751e-5 weeks <br />3.044e-6 months <br /> after engine shutdown and then rolled over once again approximately 24 hours2.777778e-4 days <br />0.00667 hours <br />3.968254e-5 weeks <br />9.132e-6 months <br /> after each shutdown.
(In the event an engine is removed from service for any reason other than the rolling over procedure j
prior to expiration of the 8-hour or 24-hour periods noted above, that engine need not be rolled over while it is out of service. The licensee shall air roll the engine over with the stopcocks open at the time it is returned to service.) The origin of any water detected in the cylinder must be determined and any cylinder head which leaks due to a crack shall be replaced. The above air roll test may be discontinued following the first refueling outage subject to the following conditions:
(a) All cylinder heads are Group III heads (i.e., cast after September, 1980).
I l
This report was transmitted to H. Denton, NRC, from C. L. Ray, Jr., TDI L
h.crf>cp nn o50/3_
. (b) Quality revalidation inspections, as identified in the Design Review / Quality Revalidation report, have been completed for all cylinder heads.
(c) Group III heads continue to demonstrate leak free performance. This should be confirmed with TDI prior to deleting air roll tests.
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(5) Periodic inspections of the turbochargers shall include the following:
(a) The turbocharger thrust bearings should be visually inspected for excessive wear after 40 non-prelubed starts since the previous visual inspection.
(b) Turbocharger rotor axial clearance should be measured at each refueling outage to verify compliance with TDI/Elliott specifications. In addition, thrust bearing measurements should be compared with measurements taken previously to determine a need for further inspection or corrective action.
(c) Spectrographic and ferrographic engine oil analysis shall be performed quarterly to provide early evidence of bearing degradation. Particular attention should be paid to copper level and particulate size which could.
signify thrust bearing degradation.
(d) The noz le ring components and inlet guide vanes should be visually inspected at each refueling outage for missing parts or parts showing distress.
If such are noted, the entire ring assembly should be replaced.
(This item is not consistent w1th SER Section 2.1.3.24 and will be revised by the NRC.)
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Duke Power Company Catawba Nuclear Station, Unit 2 Proposed License Amendment to Facility Operating License NPF-52 License Condition (11)
Transamerica Delaval, Inc. (TDI)
Diesel Generators q
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m (1) Requested Amendment It is requested that the current Attachment I to FOL NPF-52 be replaced by a revised Attachment I which follows.
It is also requested that the Staff's Safety Evaluation Report on Operability / Reliability of Emergency Diesel Generators Manufactured by Transamerica Delaval, Inc., which was transmitted to Duke Power Company by Dr. K. N. Jabbour's letter of July 2,1986, be added as a reference.
(2) Discussion The Transamerica Delaval, Inc. (TDI) diesel generators at Catawba Unit 2 were discussed in Supplements 5 and 6 to the Catawba SER. In Supplement 5 the Staff concluded that the TDI diesel engines at Catawba Unit 2 would provide a reliable standby source of onsite power in accordance with General Design Criteria (GDC)17 through the first refueling outage. This finding was based upon the NRC Staff's review of their consultant's (Pacific Northwest Laboratory (PNL)) findings and Duke's actions to implement the Owners Group recommendations. This conclusion was subject to the license conditions, procedures and programs detailed in SSER 5, Section 8.3.1.1.3 A through D.
,On July 2, 1986, the Staff transmitted a final SER which addressed the operability / reliability of TDI diesel generators. Therein the Staff concluded that implementation of the TDI Owners Group and PNL recommendations concerning, among other things, quality revalidation inspections, component modifications, and replacement, load restrictions and operating precautions, will establish the adequacy of the TDI diesel generators for nuclear standby service as required by GDC-17. The Staff further concluded that the continued reliability / operability of the TDI engines for the life of the Catawba facility would be ensured by implementation of the maintenance / surveillance program discussed in Section 2.3 of the final SER.
By letter dated August 1, 1986, Duke Power Company committed to implement the maintenance / surveillance program as recommended by the Staff's final SER.
(3) Safety Analysis It is Duke Power Company's conclusion that the proposed change to the TDI diesel generator license condition for Catawba Unit 2 would not involve any adverse safety considerations. As noted above, the Staff concluded in both the preliminary and final SER's, that the TDI diesel generators at Catawba Unit 2 would provide a reliable source of onsite power in accordance with GDC-17.
(4) Analysis of Significant Hazards Consideration As required by 10 CFR 50.91, this analysis is provided concerning whether the proposed amendment involves significant hazards considerations, as defined by 10 CFR 50.91.
Standards for determination that a proposed amendment involves no significant hazards considerations are if operation of the facility in accordance with the proposed amendment would not:
(1) involve a significant increase in the probability or consequences of an accident previously evaluated; (2) or create the possibility of a new or different kind of accident from any accident previously evaluated; or (3) involve a significant reduction in a margin of safety.
. The proposed amendment would not involve a significant increase in the probability or consequences of accidents previously evaluated because implementation of the proposed license condition would not have any effect on any previously analyzed accidents because there are no changes to any of the assumptions used in the analysis. The proposed changes to the TDI diesel generator license condition will likewise not affect any previously evaluated acciden;:o in that the diesels will still be capable of performing their intended safety functions if called upon.
The proposed amendment would not create the possibility of a new or different kind of accident than previously evaluated since no new mode of plant operation and no physical modifications are required to be performed to the facility.
In addition, no changes to margins of safety are involved since the proposed diesel generator requirements are intended to maintain and enhance the reliability of the diesel generators.
Based upon the proceeding analysis, Duke Power Company concludes that the proposed amendment does not involve a significant hazards consideration.
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ATTACHMENT 1 TO LICENSE NPF-52 TDI DIESEL ENGINES REQUIREMENTS Duke Power Company shall comply with the following requirements related to the TDI diesel engines for Catawba Unit 1.
(1) Changes to the maintenance and surveillance program of the TDI diesel engines, as identified in Section 2.3 of the Staff's Safety Evaluation Report on Operability / Reliability of Emergency Diesel Generators Manufactured by Transamerica Delaval, Inc., shall be subject to the provisions of 10 CFR 50.59.
The frequency of the major engine overhauls referred to in the license conditions below shall be consistent with Section IV.1.
" Overhaul Frequency" in Revision 2 of Appendix II of the Design Review /Qvslity Revalidation report which was transmitted by letter dated May 1, 1986, from J. George, Owners Group, to H. Denton, NRC.
(2) Connecting rod assemblies shall be subjected to the following inspections at
-each major engine overhaul.
(a) The surfaces of the rack teeth should be inspected for signs of fretting.
If fretting has occurred, it should be subject to an engineering evaluation for appropriate corrective action.
(b) All connecting-rod bolts should be lubricated in accordance with the engine manufacturer's instructions and torqued to the specifications of the manufacturer. The lengths of the two pairs of bolts above the crankpin should be measured ultrasonically pre-and post-tensioning.
(c) If connecting-rod bolt stretch was measured ultrasonically during reassembly following the preservice inspection, the lengths of the two pairs of bolts above the connecting rod should be remeasured ultrasonically before the link rod box is disassembled. Alternatively, the breakway torque should be measured. If bolt tension determined by either method is less than 93% of the value at installation, the cause should be determined, appropriate corrective action should be taken, and the interval between checks of bolt torque should be reevaluated.
(d) All connecting-rod bolts should be visually inspected for thread damage (e.g., galling), and the two pairs of connecting-rod bolts above the crankpin should be inspected by magnetic particle testing (MT) to verify the continued absence of cracking. All washers used with the bolts should be examined visually for signs of galling or cracking, and replaced if damaged.
(e) A visual inspection should be performed of all external surfaces of the link rod box to verify the absence of any signs of service induced distress.
(f) All of the bolt holes in the link rod box should be inspected for thread damage (e.g., galling) or other signs of abnormalities.
In addition, the bolt holes subject to the highest stresses (e.g., the pair immediately above the crankpin) should be examined with an appropriate nondestructive L
F
+
. method to verify the continued absence of cracking. Any indications should be recorded for engineering evaluation and appropriate corrective action.
stud-to-stud" Cylinder blocks shall be inspected for " ligament" cracp, " Failure (3)
(a) cracks and " stud-to-end" cracks as defined in a report by Analysis Associates, Inc. (FaAA) entitled, " Design Review of TDI R-4 and RV-4 Series Emergency Diesel Generator Cylinder Blocks" (FaAA report no.
FaAA-84-9-11.1) and dated December 1984.
(Note that the FaAA report specifies additional inspections to be performed for blocks with "knavn" or " assumed" ligament cracks.) The inspection intervals (i.e.,
frequency) shall not exceed the intervals calculated using the cumulative damage index model in the subject FaAA report. In addition, the inspection method shall be consistent with or equivalent to those identified in the subject FaAA report.
(b) In addition to inspections specified in the aforementioned FaAA report, blocks with "known" or " assumed Ligament cracks" (as defined in the FaAA report) should be inspected at each refueling outage to determine whether or not cracks have initiated on the top surface exposed by the removal of two or more cylinder heads. This process should be repeated over several refueling outages until the entire block top has been inspected.
Liquid-penetrant testing or a similarly sensitive nondestructive testing technique should be used to detect cracking, and eddy current should be used as appropriate to determine the depth of any cracks discovered.
(c) If inspection reveals cracks in the cylinder blocks between stud holes of adjacent cylinders (" stud-to-stud" cracks) or " stud-to-end" cracks, this condition shall be reported promptly to the NRC staff and the affected engine shall be considered inoperable. The engine shall not be restored to " operable" status until the proposed disposition and/or corrective actions have been approved by the NRC staff.
(4) The following air roll test shall be performed as specified below, except when the plant is already in an Action Statement of Technical Specification 3/4.8.1, " Electric Power Systems, A.C. Sources":
The engines shall be rolled over with the airstart system and with the cylinder stopcocks open prior to each planned start, unless that start occurs within 4 hours4.62963e-5 days <br />0.00111 hours <br />6.613757e-6 weeks <br />1.522e-6 months <br /> of a shutdown. The engines shall also be rolled over with the airstart system and with the cylinder stopcocks open af ter 4 hours4.62963e-5 days <br />0.00111 hours <br />6.613757e-6 weeks <br />1.522e-6 months <br />, but no more than 8 hours9.259259e-5 days <br />0.00222 hours <br />1.322751e-5 weeks <br />3.044e-6 months <br /> af ter engine shutdown and then rolled over once again approximately 24 hours2.777778e-4 days <br />0.00667 hours <br />3.968254e-5 weeks <br />9.132e-6 months <br /> after each shutdown.
(In the event an engine is removed from service for any reason other than the rolling over procedure prior to expiration of the 8-hour or 24-hour periods noted above, that engine i
need not be rolled over while it is out of service. The licensee shall air j
roll the engine over with the stopcocks open at the time it is returned to service.) The origin of any water detected in the cylinder must be determined and any cylinder head which leaks due to a crack shall be replaced. The above air roll test may be discontinued following the first refueling outage subject to the following conditions:
(a) All cylinder heads are Group III heads (i.e., cast after September, 1980).
l IThis report was transmitted to H. Denton, NRC, from C. L. Ray, Jr., TDI Owners Grou Q v letter dated December 11 1984.
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.. (b) Quality revalidation inspections, as identified in the Design Review / Quality Revalidation report, have been completed for all cylinder heads.
(c) Group III heads continue to demonstrate leak free performance.
This should be confirmed with TDI prior to deleting air roll tests.
(5) Periodic inspections of the turbochargers shall include the following:
(a) The turbocharger thrust bearings should be visually inspected for excessive wear after 40 non-prelubed starts since the previous visual inspection.
(b) Turbocharger rotor axial clearance should be measured at each refueling outage to verify compliance with TDI/Elliott specifications. In i
addition, thrust bearing measurements should be compared with measurements taken previously to determine a need for further inspection or corrective action.
(c) Spectrographic and ferrographic engine oil analysis shall be performed quarterly to provide early evidence of bearing degradation. Particular attention should be paid to copper level and particulate size which could signify thrust bearing degradation.
(d) The nozzle ring components and inlet guide vanes should be visually inspected at each refueling outage for missing parts or parts showing distress.
If such are noted, the entire ring assembly should be replaced.
(This item is not consistent with SER Section 2.1.3.24 and will be revised by the NRC.)
(6) Main bearing No. 7 of emergency diesel generator 2 B shall be disassembled and inspected at each refueling outage, both visually and with liquid penetrant, to verify that the bearings are free of distress. Subsequent to reassembly, run-in testing shall be performed in accordance with manufacture's recommendations.
(7) Operation beyond the first refueling outage shall require staff approval based on the staff's final review of the Owners Group generic findings and of the overall implementation status of Owners Group recommendations at Cattwba Unit 2.
This will include staff review of implementation status relative to open items identified in Sections 8.3.1.1.2(A) and 8.3.1.1.2(C) of SSER #5.
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