ML20205B700
| ML20205B700 | |
| Person / Time | |
|---|---|
| Site: | Wolf Creek  |
| Issue date: | 03/23/1999 |
| From: | Thomas K NRC (Affiliation Not Assigned) |
| To: | |
| Shared Package | |
| ML20205B706 | List: |
| References | |
| NUDOCS 9903310337 | |
| Download: ML20205B700 (7) | |
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UNITED STATES g
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NUCLEAR REGULATORY COMMISSION WASHINGTON, D.C. 30006 0001 4.....,o i
WOLF CREtd; NUCLEAR OPERATING CORPORATION i
WOLF CREEK GENERATING STATION DOCKET NO. 50-482 4
AMENDMENT TO FACILITY OPERATING LICENSE Amendment No.122 License No. NPF-42 1.
The Nuclear Regulatory Commission (the Commission) has found that:
A.
The application for amendment to the Wolf Creek Generating Station (the facility)
Facility Operating License No. NPF-42 filed by the Wolf Creek Nuclear Operating Corporation (the Corporation), dated May 15,1997, as supplemented by letters dated June 30, August 5, August 28, September 24, October 16, October 23, November 24, December 2, December 17, and December 21,1998 and January 15,1999 complies with the standards and requirements of the Atomic Energy Act of 1954, as amended (the Act) and the Commission's rules and regulations set forth in 10 CFR Chapter I; B.
The facility will operate M conformity with the application, as amended, the
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provisions of the Act, Lad the rules and regulations of the Commission; C.
There is reasonable assurance: (i) that the activities authorized by this amendment can be conducted without endangering the health and safety of the public, and (ii) i that such activities will be conducted in compliance with the Commission's regulations; D.
The issuance of this license amendment will not be inimical to the common defense and security or to the health and safety of the public; and i
E.
The issuance of this amendment is in accordance with 10 CFR Part 51 of the Commission's regulations and all applicable requirements have been satisfied.
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9903310337 990323 PDR ADOCK 05000482 P
2 2.
Accordingly, the license is amended by changes to the Technical Specifications as indicated in the attachment to this license amendment and Paragraph 2.C.(2) of Facility Operating License No. NPF-42 is hereby amended to read as follows:
2.
Technical Soecifications The Technical Specifications contained in Appendix A, as revised through Amendment No.
122, and the Environmental Protection Plan contained in Appendix B, both of which are attached hereto, are hereby incorporated in the license. The Corporation shall operate the facility in accordance with the Technical Specifications and the Environmental Protection Plan.
3.
The license amendment is effective as of its date of issuance.
FOR THE NUCLEAR REGULATORY COMMISSION Satn @M Kristine M. Thomas, Project Manager Project Directorate IV-2 Division of Licensing Project Management Office of Nuclear Reactor Regulation
Attachment:
Changes to the Technical Specifications Date of Issuance:
March 23, 1999 I
t ATTACHMENT TO LICENSE AMENDMENT NO. 122 FACILITY OPERATING LICENSE NO. NPF-42 DOCKET NO. 50-482 Replace the following pages of the Appendix A Technical Specifications with the attached pages. The revised pages are identified by Amendment number and contain marginal kras i
indicating the areas of change. The corresponding overleaf pages are also provided to i
maintain document completeness.
REMOVE INSERT 3/4 7-11 3/4 7-11 B 3/4 7-4 B 3/4 7-4 i
PLAW, SYSTEMS I
3/4.7.3 COMPONENT COOLING WATER SYSTEM QMLjg CONDITION FOR OPERATION 3.7.3 At least two independent component cooling water loops shall be OPERABLE.
APPLICABILITY: MODES 1,2,3, and 4.
ACTION:
4 With only one component cooling water loop OPERABLE, restore at least two loops to OPERABLE status within 72 hours8.333333e-4 days <br />0.02 hours <br />1.190476e-4 weeks <br />2.7396e-5 months <br /> or be in at least HOT STANDBY within the next 6 hours6.944444e-5 days <br />0.00167 hours <br />9.920635e-6 weeks <br />2.283e-6 months <br /> and in COLD SHUTDOWN within the following 30 hours3.472222e-4 days <br />0.00833 hours <br />4.960317e-5 weeks <br />1.1415e-5 months <br />.
SURVEILLANCE REQUIREMENTS 4.7.3 At least two component cooling water loops shall be demonstrated OPERABLE:
a.
At least once per 31 days by verifying that each valve (manual, power-operated, or i
automatic) servicing safety-related equipment that is not locked, sealed, or
. otherwise secured in position is in its correct position. In addition, an ANALOG 4
CHANNEL OPERATIONAL TEST of the surge tank level and flow instrumentation
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which provide automatic isolation of the non-nuclear safety-related portion of the system shall be perfoaned at least once per 31 days; b.
At least once per 18 months, by verifying that:
l 1)
Each automatic valve servicing safety-related equipment or isolating the non-nuclear safety-related portion of the system actuates to its correct position on a Safety injection and on a simulated High Flow and Low Surge Tank Level test signal, and 2)
Each OPERABLE Component Cooling Water System pump starts i
automatically on a Safety injection and Loss-of-Power test signal.
l c.
At least once per 18 months during shutdown, by performing a CHANNEL CALIBRATION of the surge tank level and flow instrumentation which provide automatic isolation of the non-nuclear safety-related portion of the system.
WOLF CREEK-UNIT 1 3/4 7-11 Amendment No.122
PLANT SYSTEMS 1
3/4.7.4 ESSENTIAL SERVICE WATER SYSTEM LIMITING CONDITION FOR OPERATION 3.7.4 At least two independent essential service water (ESW) loops shall be OPERABLE.
APPLICABILITY:
MODES 1, 2, 3, and 4.
ACTION:
With only one ESW loop OPERABLE, restore at least two ESW loops to OPERABLE status within 72 hours8.333333e-4 days <br />0.02 hours <br />1.190476e-4 weeks <br />2.7396e-5 months <br /> or be in at least HOT STANDBY within the next 6 hours6.944444e-5 days <br />0.00167 hours <br />9.920635e-6 weeks <br />2.283e-6 months <br /> and in COLD SHUTDOWN within the following 30 hours3.472222e-4 days <br />0.00833 hours <br />4.960317e-5 weeks <br />1.1415e-5 months <br />.
SURVEILLANCE REQUIREMENTS 4.7.4 At least two ESW loops shall be demonstrated OPERABLE:
At least once per 31 days by verifying that each valve (manual, a.
power-operated, or automatic) servicing safety-related equipment that is not locked, sealed, or otherwise secured in position is in its correct position.
In addition, at least once per 31 days, an ANALOG CHANNEL OPERATIONAL TEST of the differential pressure instrumentation for automatic isolation of the ESW to the air compressors shall be perfomed; b.
At least once par 18 months during shutdown, by verifying that:
1)
Eacn automatic valve servicing safety-related equipment or isolating the non-nuclear safety-related portion of the system actuates to its correct position on a Loss-of-Power or Safety Injection test signal and on a simulated High Differential Pressure test signal, and 2)
Each Essential Service Water System pump starts automatically on a Safety Injection, Low Suction Pressure (AFW pumps), and Loss-of-Power test signal.-
+
c.
At least once per 18 months during shutdown, by performing a CHANNEL CALIBRATION of the differential pressure instrumentation for automatic isolation of ESW to the air compressors.
WOLF CREEK - UNIT 1 3/4 7-12
l PLANT SYSTEMS BASES 3/4.7.1.5 MAIN STEAM LINE ISOLATION VALVES The OPERABILITY of 'the r.N steam line isolation valves ensures that no more than one steam generator all blowdown in the event of a steam line rupture. This restriction is required to: (1) minimize the pcsitive reactivity effects of the Reactor Coolant System cooldown associated with the blowdown, cnd (2) limit the pressure rise within containment in the event the 4
steam lir,e rupture occurs within containment. The OPERABILITY of the m in steam holation valves within the closure times of the Surveillance Requirements are consistent with the assumptions used in the safety analyses.
3.4.7.1.6 STEAM GENERATOR ATMOSPHERIC RELIEF VALVES The operability of the main steareline atmospheric relief valves (ARV's) ensures that reactor decay heat can be dissipated to the atmosphere in the event of a steam generator tube rupture and loss of offrite power and that the Reactor Coolant System can be cooled down for Residual Heat Removal System operation. The number of required ARV's assures that the subcooling can be achieved, consistent with the assumptions used in the steam generator tube rupture analysis, to facilitate equalizing pressures between the Reactor Coolant System and the faulted steam generator. For cooling the plant to RHR initiation conditions, only one ARV is required.
In this case, with three ARV's operable, if the single failure c' one ARV occurs and another ARV is assumed to be associated with the faulted steam generator, one ARV remains available for required heat removal.
I Each ARV is equipped with a manual block valve (in the auxiliary
, building) to provide a positive shutoff capability should an ARV develop leakage. Closure of the block valves of all ARV!s because of excessive seat leakage does not endanger the reactor core; consistent with plant accident and transient analyses, decay heat can h dissipated with the main steamline i
safety valves or a block valve can be opened manually in the' auxiliary building and the ARV can bs used to control release of steam to the astmosphere.
For the steem generator tube rupture event, primary to secondary leakage can be tersiinated b) depressurizing the Reactor Coolant System with the pressurizer power operated relief valves.
3/4.7.1'.7 MAIN FEEDWATER ISOLATIDN VALVES The OPERABILITY of the main feedwater isolation valves:- (I) provides a pressure boundary to permit atuxiliary feedwater addition in the event of a main steam or feedwater line break; (2) limits the RCS cooldown and mass and energy releases for secondary line breaks inside containment; and (3) mitigates steam generator overfill events such as a ferdwater malfunction, with protection provided by feedwater isolation via the steam generator high-i high level trip signal. The OPERABILITY of the main feedwater isolation valves within the closure times of the surveillance requirements is consistent with the assumptions used in the safety analysis.
1 3/4.7.2 DELETED
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WOLF CREEK - UNIT 1 8 3/4 7-3 Amendment No. 40,89
PLANT SYSTEMS BASES 3/4.7.3 COMPONENT COOLING WATER SYSTEM The OPERABILITY of the Component Cooling Water System ensures that sufficient cooling capacity is available for continued operation of safety-related enuipment during normal and accident conditions. The redundant cooling capacity of this system, assuming a single failure, is consistent with the assumptions used in the safety analyses. Each independent CCW loop contains two 100% capacity pumps and, therefore, the failure of one pump does not affect the OPERABILITY of that loop. Surveillance Requirement 4.7.36. verifies proper operation of the CCW valves and pumpo on an actuation signal. The CCW System is a normally operating system that cannot be fully actuated as part of routine testing during normal operation. The 18 month Frequency is based on the need to perform this surveillance under the conditions that apply during a unit outage and the potential for an unplanned transient if the Surveillance were performed with the reactor at power.
3/4.7.4 ESSENTIAL SERVICE WATER SYSTEM The OPERABILITY of the Essential Service Water System ensures that sufficient cooling capacity is available for continued operation of safety-related equipment during normal and accident conditions. The redundant cooling capacity of this system, assuming a single failure, is consistent with the assumptions used in the safety analysis.
3/4.7.5 ULTIMATE HEAT SINK The limitations on the uitimate heat sink level and temperature ensure that sufficient cooling capacity is available either to: (1) provide normal cooldown of the facility or (2) mitigate the effects of accident conditions within acceptable limits.
The limitations ors minimum water level and maximum temperature are based on providing a 30-day cooling water supply from the Essential Service Water pumps to safety-related equipment without exceeding its design basis temperature and is consistent with the recommendations of Regulatory Guide 1.27, " Ultimate Heat Sink for Nuclear Plants," March 1974.
3/4.7.6 CONTROL ROOM EMERGENCY VENTILATION SYSTEM The OPERABILITY of the Control Room Emergency Ventilation System ensures that: (1) the ambien ir temperature does not excesc the allowable temperature for continuous-duty rating fo.
- equipment and instrumentation
- :ooled by this system, and (2) the control room will remain habitable for operations personnel during and following all credible accident condihons. Operation of the system with the heaters operating to maintain low humidity using automatic control for at least 10 continuous hours in a 31-day period is sufficient to reduce the buildup of moisture on the chamoal adsorbers and HEPA filters. The OPERABILITY of this system in conjunction with control room design provisions is based on limiting the radiation exposure to personnel occupying the control room to 5 roms or less whole body, or its equivalent. This limitabon is consistent with the requirements of General Design Criterion 19 of Appendix A,10 CFR Part 50. ANSI N510-1975 and N510-1980 will be used as procedural guides for surveillance testing. Surveillance testing provides assurance that system and component performances continue to be in accordance with performance specifications for Wolf Creek Unit 1, including applicable parts of ANSI N509-1976.
WOLF CREEK - UNIT 1 B 3/4 7-4 Amendment No.119:30;89,122
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