ML20205A750

Forwards FSAR Change Re Impact of Main Steam Line Break on Qualification of Equipment Outside Containment

ML20205A750
Person / Time
Site:	Comanche Peak
Issue date:	10/21/1988
From:	Counsil W, Woodlan D TEXAS UTILITIES ELECTRIC CO. (TU ELECTRIC)
To:	NRC OFFICE OF ADMINISTRATION & RESOURCES MANAGEMENT (ARM)
References
TXX-88739, NUDOCS 8810260086
Download: ML20205A750 (15)

Text

-

. ~_

N l

Lo A TXX-88739 l

4 Fi e a 10110 I

-T 3

903.11 915.1 clo WELECTRIC l

October 21, 1988 i

wamc,c m L

s m w w n, n,.u m l

U. S. Nuclear Regulatory Connission Attnt Document Control Desk

?

Washington, D. C.

20555

SUBJECT:

COMANCHE PCAK STEAM ELECTRIC STATION (CPSES) l DOCKET NOS. 50-445 AND 50-446 MAIN STEAMLINE BREAKS OUTSIDE CONTAINMENT

(

ADVANCE FSAR CHAllGE i

Gentlemen:

Attached is an advance copy of an FSAR change regar< ting the imp'ct of a Main Steam Line Break (MSLB) on the qualification of equipment outside containment.

Originally, a generic analysis 1erformed by Westinghouse was used to determine temperatures in areas affected

)y a MSLB outside containment.

Subsequently, a l

CPSES plant specific analysis was performed and new temperatures wera calculated, lhe attached change includes the new temperatures and updated i

information developed in the CPSES plant specific analysis.

These changes l

along with changes to related sections will be incorporated in a future FSAR amendment.

Note that this information resolves Outstanding Issue (39) in l

Supplement 12 of the CPSES Safety Evaluation Report.

l Very truly yours, l

l W.G. 6J.

i W. G. Counsil 1

i l

Byt I

D. R. Woodlan l

Docket Licensing Manager 4

VPC/gj l

Attachment c - Mr. R. D. Martin, Region IV Resident Inspectors, CPSES (3) i I

8810260086 881021 I

PDR ADOCK 05000445 h

K PNU j

i h0 i t i

400 North O6r Street LB of Dek Tem 73XI

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• Attachmont to TXX.88739 Octoben 21. 1988 Fage 1 o f 14 CPSES/FSAR 4

14d EQUIPMENT QUALIFICATION BRANCH ENVIRONMENTAL QUALIFICATION 00140.1 Impact of MSLB on qualified equipment outside containment:

1.

TUGC0 discusses the effects of the main steam line break (MSL8) event due to a break area of 1 j

sq.

ft.

Needed are:

a.

A technical justification which supports f

that a break area of 1 sq. ft. is the worst l

1 break, from an operational standpoint, for

\\

s j

equipment necessary for break mitigation, j

j and what the worst initial power level is for the 1 sq. ft. break.

l

]-

6.

The time sequence of events of the worst

{

break.

l c.

The assumption used in the analysis of the MSL8 with superheat.

i d.

Verification that the analysis included the effects of jet impingement.

1 i

j i

e.

Identification of the safety-related I

equipment located in the area affected by a j

steam line break with superheat. This should include:

(1) The Class 1E cables located in areas l

affected by MSLS, the separation

l eetween redundant Class 1E cables or J

Class 1E and non-Class IE cables which j

are routed in the MSL8 area.

140-1 AU 19,1985

Attachrent to TXX-8873')

'Oc%obGr 21, 1988 Pa ge 2 o f 14 CPSES/FSAR (2) List of all equipment affected by the MSLS superheat condition with the required operability time. The required operability time should account for functional operability as well as any subsequent failure which could affect any other safety function, or mislead the operator.

(3) Qualification test profiles for all equipment affected inclusting the l

demonstrated operao111ty time for the MSLB with superheat.

(4) The time margin between the safety equipment performing its safety function and the critical component of this equipment exceeding its qualification temperature.

(5)

If tne time margin is less than 1 j

hour, provide the necessary justification in accordance with i

Regulatory Guide 1.89, Rev. 1.

i 2.

TUGC0 has analyzed the compartment temperature response following onset of a postulated MSLB using blow down data that incluces superheat j

effect. The results shed that in the bresk compartment, the temperature profile, whien peaks at 3500F, exceeds the original qualification envelope for about 40 seconds.

The analysis also shows that safety functions occur before the superheat effect appears, in d

140 2 1

JULY 19, 1985 l

1

Attachment to ?xx.88739 October 21, 1936 Pa ge 3 o f 16 CPSES/FSAR order to complete its review, the staff requires that TUGC0 provide a copy of the blow down a.1alysis, including the mass and energy release data, and discuss and justify the time following onset of the accident at which safety functions would be completed.

f t

i R140.1 1.a For all rooms except the creak room, 1.0 ft2 ts I

definitely the most severe case,.for more energy is released to these roors mere rapidly than any

{

of the smaller breaks.

Since these rooms do not exceed the qualification temperatures for a 1.0 ft2 oreak, they will not exceed their temperature for any smaller break.

3.

The only equipment that could be required to operate and that could be in the room where the j

break occurs are the ventilation dampers. Tnese i

dampers close on pressure differential.

Press 6re helps kaap these dampers closed. The

)

new temperature spike will not degrade the I

ability of these dampers to close and remain

)

closed.

Since none :f the remaining equipment in the 1

area where the Dreak is located is required to c9erate, the operability of this equipment will not contrioute to determining the most severe ereak from the standpoint of equipment opertoility. Therefore, oased on the impact to 4

equipment in rooms outside the break area, the most severe creak is the break tnat releases the most energy and generates the highest peak.

That oreak is the 1.0 ft2 break, i

j 140 3 i

L

{

Attachment to TXX.88739 October 21. 1988 cp$g$fg$g fage 4 of 14

[qag$ and,gner y ecles The previous environmental analyses for tr.e d o t a w % E 0 3. e in.4 e.cl er k areas clearly showed that without ha v-hoh htA O pawt.r at,fullpowerprovidedthewop super 0A d 7 e */* p cWto. Ed environ tal results. For tne su rnest poute Wilh lN studies, ty cal mass and energ data are only httGI w o r $ 4 e.p r 0 V I d e d t h &

t availaole for

' full power asas. However,itI Mi rce M e r13A l is fully reasonao I

et h.M t. Tah 14 0.1-2.

toespecttnat,forthe superneat cases, full ver will still previce f

p,vc,Jo % rw m an) tae verit environ e ai iuiti. since l

Enerp relcaw dalts,

equipment operan ty is no equired in the room with the reak, minor dev ions in the peak temper ure will not iseact a igation of the eve The validity of this expo ation will e confirmed when tne mass and ener Qeasedataarereceivedfr.weitingnouie.

D.

The time sequence based on a 1.0 ft2 break and an initial power level of 1005 is as follows:

e W h Aeufron

// O 4

Reactor Trio ddue to overpo eo (p' seconds h khJX 20.9 Feedvater Isolation.due to

- @ seconos reactor trip and 1 : Tavg) i E4 Safety injection Signal

- (9 seconds (due to low pressuriter signal) j Steamline Isolation (due to seconds low steamline pressure)

Jenerator Twee Uncovery seconds M O htr1 FeeJ w 4er I. sol 4 t800 setend5 3

%eline sequence for these events wiii ce later

[

Qorsmallerbreats. At some point as the breuj s

140 4 l

M.Y 19. 1995

j Ateachrent to Txx-83739 Octobe'r 21, 1938 cpst$/F$AA Page 5 of 14 J

(get smalleYdgteam generator tube uncovery will occur oefore Steamline Isolation because h Great is so small thaDhe tubes uncover before pressure falls below the low steaaline pressure setpoint. At lower power levels and break sizes, other events such as low steam generator level will initiate reactor trip. Such slight deviatiens in the sequence are not expected to result in a more severe event.

The most important action to mitigate the event, steamline isolation for the unaffected steam generators, will always be possfole.

c.

The mass / energy releases were calculated by i

Westinghouse using a modified version of the LOFTRAN code. The LOFTRAM code is a digital computer code which simulates the behavior of a multi-loop pressurized water reactor. LOFTRAM i

simulates the neutron kinetics, thermal-hydraulic conditions, pressurizer, steam l

generators, reactor coolant pumps, and control and protection system operattun. LOFTRAN has 4

been modified to model the heat t.*ansfer which may occur in the uncovered portion of the tune Dundle of a steam generator and to calculate the

)

resulting superheated steam mass and energy

{

)

release.

Jao b SPto ht. 4c s

The mass / energy releases are ased _on a fo2 C ES 66-Coop planF.3 conservative assumptions were made in order to result in early tute Dundle uncovery and, therefore, the earliest superheat l

initiationtime.)AFthoughthesesample i

t (mass /energyreleasesareneithergenericnor PriNry :ptem 4ernpe.rawet.5 Wera IMNms Ee/ so erser 6.cea.se. +be pNe see m dory w +

HonMer ThgreneHs ear'\\p +4e hwdle

\\ er' 1

neevery and F.tyirniles the surhed Sic'"

l eMMff fellesg Me WiL unggep,p1,g i

I

-T 4

$ttachseni,toTXX-88739 Oc tobe'r '21. 1988 -

Pa ge 6 o f 14

[

sarily Conservatise for given el y'

are represe f the ed steas 1

phenomenon a proviMj(estleate of.

(tM ects on compartment t-arature andlyses/

The environmentai analysis used to determine the 1

temperature transient one to this oretA is descrioed in FSAA Section 3.68.1.2.3.

Additional specific information is provided in the FSAA in the response to question 010.20.

d.

The NAC staff provided that for CPSES In piping tunnels that contain break exclusion regions of main steam lines, the safety related equipment in these tunnels be designed to withstand the environmental effects of a non-mechanistic crack with a flow area of one square foot.

(See NAC staff question 010.20 in the Cp5ES FSAA).

Therefore, it was assumed that jets are not generated and hence jet loads are not considered. This criterion was reviewed and acepoted in the Cp5t5 SEA (NUAEG 0791) and 55tR 6 (NUAEG 0197 Supplement No. 4) in Section i

3.6.2.

t i

c. An Equ@meni Quo \\dicdh '"* (I ' '"'**'" ('I * *** '" '** '

• i ruieue>4(sVckeJE Q fmtd in N' The Class 1E cantes located in the areas Oce m e d h b e t fl affected of the crack are those cables required pr rrsed DAM Meiefmd ta support the 3 ass it eqJipaent in tite same i

1

4. be lutliOie) Im tkt.

areas. A.ll of these cables are qualtf ted for fMirMmfoY.

the LOCA/ML4 mside eginnent for CP5ts. As such, these esbles ture exsectan is resala fully n it hs tad Lu

)

140-6 l

KIN 19. 1965 m

,y

+

p

Attachment to Txx.88739 October 21. 1938 Pa ge 7 o f 14 C75ts/F5AA r

oparational throughout this event.

The c441e separation in these areas meets the requirements,

i of Regulatory Guide 1.75.

2.

The blow down analysis and the mass and ensegy release data are cased on an analysts performed ny Westtaghouse and are"Eenresentative of a feo d /A d p

spgi4c.690splant'I(Seetheresponsetoitem1.c i

aeove.))~5tnce reasonaale margins entst in not and temperature at C75t$ for this even the repres data are adequa acceptance of the C75 A plant specific blow dow ylit will e ed fer CPSES an espected to be avallasle by anwt st of g

~

j 1

The t,x following onset at which safety l

l function would occur does not vary from the I

previous CPSES analysis of this event. The Assumption that the equipment in the breat area falls in its most adverse mode is no more severo than the assumptions made for the previous CPSES I

analysis of this event. Therefore, the safety analysts and the crack mitigation / shutdown I

analysis remain the same.

i t

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q 140 7 A7.3 19, 19 95 1

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% 3 :'

m%9 o c3 *

':3a CPSES/FSAR IAaLE 140.1-I

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(Sheet I of 53 m -+

wg WetjulNE D PU$flR Alf 0 (K8GIISTRAl[D

((M)st$iRAI[D M AASILIIY 1[ WLRAluRE Ilfr[RAI.aAE OPtAASILIIT Ilft "co Equ.'. A[af TISE PiAE PiAK II8E 8enaGla (3) muits ftSIV net rep tred

@ (33f'f (HT355'*f N/A N/A (1)

(la room with bred )

.s34 a5r 27 12 mimetes (3 $

-36gaf 30 dass Years (2)

(set le reen with bred)

MSIV sypass snot regelreJ

@<33fF 8 33f*f

"/A

"/A

@C14 (MilySP) m at t.:

o,

,,o,

,s

,,,d.,s x

{ (not sa ream Maen $deam Drain teot re p ired

@4 33f*f

%7 -31 6 R/A N/A (1)

Pet Isciatten (in read with Valves breat)

(ftSarly) 0 33L 5f 3

3 hours3.472222e-5 days <br />8.333333e-4 hours <br />4.960317e-6 weeks <br />1.1415e-6 months <br /> IMs minutes (4) 12 minutes (not se reum with bred)

Z 334

o$e feedwater Isolatlee W asautes O$8f 340ef 2 hours2.314815e-5 days <br />5.555556e-4 hours <br />3.306878e-6 weeks <br />7.61e-7 months <br /> minutes (4)

Valves (FIVs)

{

S3A S%.S*f a%8 i

feedwater Syy.ss

$ minutes G$Y 3 hours3.472222e-5 days <br />8.333333e-4 hours <br />4.960317e-6 weeks <br />1.1415e-6 months <br />

@ minutes (4)

Values (FMs7610N (ppgyfu-

• L 3 W S'!'

I 8 f eed.ater sample

@ merctes 3 hours3.472222e-5 days <br />8.333333e-4 hours <br />4.960317e-6 weeks <br />1.1415e-6 months <br /> minutes (4) la.alat s m Valves o

(,if td Sample I_V1) l (FSI M

.ns.Y a a, 3 as.

2.9 c '

onn d*f5 9 7' "?

I')

u hours 05ff S "~ T F h

(n.+ m rwa o.n, b<c4 e3 a

e CPSES/f..AR Y

IA8tE 140.1-1 (Sheet 2)

((

b REQUIRED POSIut AIED demon 5IRATED DEM00tSIRATED h

WERASILIIY TEMPERAluRE TE MERATURE UPERASILII'J IIME EQulPnth!

TIM

$AK PEAK YlE MARGlk (3) le0iES e

Turtlee Driven mot require

@<339'F (fi) 3345"F M/A N/A (1)

Austllary Feeduatar.

(in raoM u*

Pump Steam Sieply break.T valve s

(ISAFPiW)

Main Steam Pen,er hot required

@< 339sF @ 3 36.s- *F m/A m/A (1)

Opermied Re1lef (in room with Valres bred )

(MSPORVs) 12 hours1.388889e-4 days <br />0.00333 hours <br />1.984127e-5 weeks <br />4.566e-6 months <br /> h

<ss9$

58

>30 dIys

/ days (S) 3 wS*F (not an room with bred) co ni N/h gg])

8arton 5 teas Line aas.u es (

({351of)<3M*[ 4200f (2500 hourf)

(4,vs mourD

[Pravisteam giae ( $

, Pressure Transmitters (in room we haed )

isolaP. ion 33/

sigaal 12 hours1.388889e-4 days <br />0.00333 hours <br />1.984127e-5 weeks <br />4.566e-6 months <br /> (59) 2803 hours

>zzuo hours (Q

(not

.. role with bred) proVedt 3 g,,,.. J, n c,

felaLos9} Ark Rosemount Steam Line Not require N/A N/A N/A N/A (7)(Provi Pressure Iransmitters (in rous with Icontrol 72 hours8.333333e-4 days <br />0.02 hours <br />1.190476e-4 weeks <br />2.7396e-5 months <br /> h (r$4 3rl*f bred )

signal for HePF

_M68f 30 days 21 days (f)p.MSPORV (not in room y,9 jg with bred)

G+ns,g5,'4nal f-rog 5 Watertight Doors

'""~-d N/A N/A N/A N/A (d)

U/A J

w o x-

$ ?> %

• S%

Zy, CPSES/FSAR 3E l

IAstE 140.1-1 y,.

(Sheet 3) a-o REQUIRED POSIULAIED MMostSIRATED M MONSTRAIED OPERASILIIY TEMPERAIURE TEfrEdAllRE (FERAflLIIT IIM In EQulPM m!

TIE

' PEAK PEAK TIM

!WtGIN (3)

NOTES W AC Isolattos (12 minutes N/A N/A Continuous h/A (9)

Dampers s+cw re)ain (1EeChanicaW5afety lin ro=~ M @ 4 334*F @ 4co*F N/A N/A (s)

Not required valve u ssv 4 be*W i

Accessory Limit C

GWY

@3cg,p Jay aa h *tches for N5IV.

No re wre) 354 MSIV0P, MSPORW, FIV A

ane FNnPv (8'1\\

@G 34'F @ 39/*F Accessory Limit Not required N/A N/A (10)

Switches for MSDPlV, IDAFPSUP, and FW Sample IV Auxiliary Feedwater Not required h (334ef h 39fej:

N/A N/A (10)

Flow Iransmitters 72 h~cs

<. 331 f 4 oo*F foo sys w a.3s g,)

- na in,..m suiW break.h JtJLY 19, 1985

.ak

Attachttent to TXX-88739 6ctober 21. 1988,

Page 11 of 14 CPSES/FSAA TA8tE 140.1-1 (Sheet 4)

NOTES:

(1)

These valves may fail in either the open or closed position without increasing the severity of the event beyond the present analysis or decreasing the anility to mitigate the event and safely shutdown the unit.

(2)

These valves will operate to close within the first 12 minutes (the exact time depends on the break size). seyond 12 minutes (for up to 72 hours8.333333e-4 days <br />0.02 hours <br />1.190476e-4 weeks <br />2.7396e-5 months <br /> while proceeding to cold shutdorn) these valves must remain closed. The qualification testing performed on tg valves includes sufficient sargin beyond the postulated peak (HI RF for 5 minutes).to justify the operaattity of the valves for wel' beyond 72 hours8.333333e-4 days <br />0.02 hours <br />1.190476e-4 weeks <br />2.7396e-5 months <br />.

(3)

For no equipment where operabilit'y is required does the postulated accident profile exceed the demonstrated qualification profile.

(4)

These valves ope

• ate within the first 12 minutes (the exact time depends on the creak size). Operability is not required beyond then for the valves will emai$1nasafeposition.

(5) 72 hour8.333333e-4 days <br />0.02 hours <br />1.190476e-4 weeks <br />2.7396e-5 months <br /> operability time is based on shutdown and cooldown within 72 hours8.333333e-4 days <br />0.02 hours <br />1.190476e-4 weeks <br />2.7396e-5 months <br /> such that the operanilitf of these items would no longer be required.

@ lhe low steamline pressure signal or g h, negative pressure (4) rahsignalisprovidedhrn#a a7.TT;f e: M " --- m -,, es eger reeutred9 72 hcur opera.biUfy b h beed on

/

.v.- ad cocided wi%in 72, heue$ suph AAt th e cpetubd I/

ihms wou.td no lejer bt, retuired.

e (7) h

.... sitter provides an analog signal for the operation of the Hain Steam PrHtV associated with the break. $1nce the AU 19, L385

A.ttachment to TXX-88739 October 21, 1938 Page 12 of 14 TA4LE 140.1-1 (Sheet 5) operaallity of this valve is not required, the opereellity of this transmitter is not required.

(8)

These are mechanical devices that do not have an active function.

The materials have been analyzed to show that the doors will not j

lose their leak tightness.

(g)

The dampers are mechanical devices. They are mechanically closed by the pressure buildup from the Dreak and are latched in the closed position (as well as being held closed by compartment pressure). Failure of tne environmentally sensitive components due to this event will not prevent closure of the damper nor cause the damper to reopen.. Therefore, the required operatility is early in the event (such less than 12 minutes), but the dampers.

remain continuously operable in spite of the postulated environment. The materials have also been analyzed to show that the dampers will not lose their leak tightness, o ker indica 4 ion is oddabiche menifo/mq fhis even+.

Thih+lpment is not required to operate to either afligate the (10) accident or safely shutdown the plant 3 Output provides status information only to be utilized at times much later than during this l(LB high temperature periods. Analyses have been made to verify that the non-metallic parts of this equipment will withstand the postulated temperature extremes althaugh specific

. qualificattoe tests have not baen performed that envelope this scenario.

1rMe d

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l JULY 19, 1985 I

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j Attach ~ ment to TXX-88739

.0c to b'e r 21, 1588 Page 13 of 14 em Opll Mr%is;a wn sa 2 Vdve is n at,;ee d N.,

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Attachten,t to TXX-88739 0ctober 21,, 41988 Pa ge 14 o f 1 C.PSE5 /FSA%

TASLE I 40. l-2, CdMANrRE 7Eir MASS /ENFRGY RELEASE $

FUI.L 70WDt - 1.00 FT2 STEAM.INE SAr.AX TIM PLOf DTHALM SUPERHF.AT fara)

(ta/src)

(mr/tm)

( mu/ tai' O.5 2047.

1190.

i 19 0 2134.

1190.

12.0 1767.

1195.

22.0 2110.

1191.

29 5 1960.

1194.

50.0 1740.

11W.

100.0 1325.

1202.

135.0 1237.

1203 1 95.0 1218.

1203.

1.

299.0 1011.

1227.

24 319.0 541.5 1253.

52.

3 45.0 115.1 1281.

106.

373.0 70.15 1286.

120.

413.0 73 07 1285.

119.

495.0 72.89 1285.

119.

611.0 72.88 1263 117.

815.0 72.89 1W9.

113.

895.0 72 91 In8.

112.

993 0 73.00 1277.

111.

1073.0 72.99 1U7.

111.

1319 0 73 00 1276.

110, 1539.0 73.03 In6.

110.

1757.0 73 04 in6.

110.

17 99.0 73 04 1U6.

110.

e above asturation enthalpy

.Reestar Trip on High Neutron Flux at 11.0 see.

Safety IAjection on I.aw Pressuriser Pressure at 36.4 see.

Feestater Isolation at 28.9 see.

I.a# Steam Pressure Setpoint reached at 304 see.

Steamline Isolation at 311 see.

Tube Sedle Uncovery predicted at 195 see.

APW Isolation assumed at $800 see.

f

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