ML20204E509

Proposed Tech Spec Tables 3.3-3 & 4.3-2,revising Modes for Manual Automatic Actuation Logic & High Steam Pressure Rate Signals Which Initiate Steam Line Isolation

ML20204E509
Person / Time
Site:	Beaver Valley
Issue date:	07/25/1986
From:	DUQUESNE LIGHT CO.
To:
Shared Package
ML20204E498	List: ML20204E492 ML20204E509
References
NUDOCS 8608010111
Download: ML20204E509 (4)

Text

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TABLE 3.3-3 (Continu*d) .

ENGINEERED SAFETY FEATURE ACTUATION SYSTEM INSTRUMENTATION

$ MINIMUM TOTAL NO. CHANNELS CHANNELS APPLICABLE FUNCTIONAL UNIT OF CHANNELS TO TRIP OPERABLE MODES ACTION

$ 4. STEAM ISOLATION N

I a. Manual 2/ steam line 1/ steam line 2/ operating 1, 2, 3 18 l c steam line 5-rt b. Automatic 2 1 2 1,2,3 13 l r Actuation Logic T c. Containment Pressure 3 2 3 1,2,3 14

$ Intermediate-High-High o

rn w d. Low Steamline Pressure

$) (Loop Stop Valves open)

C u g4 Three Loops Operating 3/ loop 2/ loop 2/ loop 1, 2, 3# 14 g co Any loop Any loop Z

O Two Loops Operating 3/ loop 2/ loop any 2/any 1, 2, 3# 15 operating operating loop loop

e. High Steam Pressure 3/ loop 2/ loop 2/ operating 3## 37 l Rate any loop loop 8608010111 DR 860725 ADOCK 05000334 PDR i

TABLE 4.3-2 (Continu:d) .

ENGINEERED SAFETY FEATURE ACTUATION SYSTEM INSTRUMENTATION y SURVEILLANCE REQUIREMENTS

$ CHANNEL MODES IN WHICH

" CHANNEL CHANNEL FUNCTIONAL SURVEILLANCE g: FUNCTIONAL UNIT CHECK CALIBRATION TEST REQUIRED w

y 4. STEAM LINE ISOLATION N

a. Manual N/A N/A M(1) 1, 2, 3 l C

D b. Automatic Actuation Logic N/A N/A M(2) 1, 2, 3 l tt g c. Containment Pressure-- S R H 1,2,3 Intermediate-High-High

] d. Steamline Pressure--Low S R M 1,2,3 m e. Steamline Pressure Rate-high S R M 3 l

) 8 l @( 5. TURBINE TRIP AND FEEDWATER 1 U) 4 ISOLATION i m i ow i

gi a. Steam Generator Water S R M 1, 2, 3 oe Level--High-High g 6. LOSS OF POWER o

a. 4.16kv Emergency Bus N/A R M 1,2,3,4 Undervoltage (Loss of l

Voltage) Trip Feed &

Start Diesel

. b. 4.16kv and 480v Emergency N/A R M 1, 2, 3, 4 Bus Undervoltage (Degraded Voltage) l l

l l

ATTACHMENT B Proposed Technical Specification Change No. 125 No Significant Hazards Consideration Description of amendment request: Change Request No. 125 would revise the modes specified for the Manual, Automatic Actuation Logic and High Steam Pressure Rate signais which initiate Steam Line Isolation (SLI) specified in Tables 3.3-3 and 4.3-2.

Basis for proposed no significant hazards consideration determination:

These changes are proposed to reflect draft revision 5 of the Standard Technical Specifications (STS). Prior to revision 5, the STS did not contain the steam line high pressure rate signal for Steam Line Isolation. This was brought to the attention of the NRC and in cooperation with Westinghouse a common set of requirements were developed to provide guidance for plants having this signal.

It was then determined that the STS would be revised to include this signal and would be applicable in Mode 3 since this signal is bypassed above P-11 and in lower modes the total stored and decay heat energy does not represent a significant safety concern.

Based on the criteria for defining no significant hazards consideration set forth in 10 CFR 50.92(c), plant operation in accordance with the proposed amendment would not:

(1) Involve a significant increase in the probability or consequences of an accident previously evaluated because: The modes required for Manual and Automatic Actuation Logic have been revised to 1, 2, 3 to reflect the STS since SLI is not required in Mode 4. UFSAR Section 14.2.5.1.1 assumes initiation of steam line isolation by the high steam line pressure rate signal when below P-11, therefore this precludes initiation of this signal in Modes 1 and 2. The temperatures (<350 F), pressures (as defined in the temperature pressure curves) required minimum shutdown margin (>1.77%), and total stored and decay heat energy (<1% RTP) available in Mode 4 do not represent a significant safety concern. Therefore, since the STS specifies Mode 3 applicability and the Mode 4 core and RCS conditions do not represent a significant safety concern the proposed changes will not increase the probability or consequences of an accident previously evaluated.

(2) Create the probability for an accident or malfunction of a different type than previously evaluated because: The proposed changes are administrative in nature and do not physically change plant safety-related systems, components or structures, therefore, the changes will not create the possibility for a new type of accident or malfunction of a different type than any previously evaluated in the Engineered Safety Features Section 7.3 or the accident analysis of Section 14 in the UFSAR.

(3) Involve a significant reduction in the margin of safety because: The technical specification bases will not be affected by the proposed changes since no systems or components will be physically changed or their function altered in any way. The changes provide consistency with draft revision 5 of the STS between Tables 3.3-3 and 4.3-2. Therefore, the margin of safety inherent in the applicable bases will not be reduced.

Attachment B Page 2 Conclusion The proposed changes are administrative in nature and do not involve physical changes to any plant safety-related systems, components or structures, will not increase the likelihood of a malfunction of safety-related equipment, increase the consequences of an accident previously analyzed, nor create the possibility of a malfunction different than previously evaluated in the UFSAR.

The changes provide consistency with draft revision 5 of the STS between Table 3.3-3 and 4.3-2. Therefore, based on the above, it is proposed to characterize the change as involving no significant hazards consideration.

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