ML20203N627

Discusses Plant Readiness for Exceeding 5% Power.Region III Will Recommend Issuance of Full Power OL Pending Continued Favorable Insp Observations & Successful Completion of Util Maint/Mod Outage.Related Info Encl

ML20203N627
Person / Time
Site:	Perry
Issue date:	10/02/1986
From:	Norelius C NRC OFFICE OF INSPECTION & ENFORCEMENT (IE REGION III)
To:	Bernero R Office of Nuclear Reactor Regulation
References
NUDOCS 8610090326
Download: ML20203N627 (8)

Text

,

po OCT 2 1986 MEMORANDUM FOR: R. Bernero, Director, Division of Boiling Water Reactor Licensing FROM: Charles E. Norelius, Director, Division of Reactor Projects, Region III

SUBJECT:

CLEVELAND ELECTRIC ILLUMINATING COMPANY (CEI)

PERRY UNIT 1 STATUS OF PREPAREDNESS TO EXCEED 5% POWER This memorandum is to provide you information on the preparedness of Perry Unit 1 to exceed 5% power. This includes a summary of all pertinent activities since issuance of my last status letter dated August 7, 1986.

Enclosure 1 is a description of the current plant status and operational summary. Enclosure 2 is a summary of significant inspection activities.

Enclosure 3 is a brief summary of significant event reports that resulted in issuance of LERs by the licensee.

The licensee is currently performing initial Nuclear Heatup Testing. Their testing program is proceeding at a much slower pace than originally scheduled.

Problems associated with plant equipment, particularly the Reactor Core Isolation Cooling and associated Leak Detection Systems, are the primary reason for the delays.

Reportable events, since the Commission's Full Power Briefing conducted on September 5,1986, continue to occur at a rate that is comparable to other recently licensed BWR facilities at the same stage of plant startup.

However, the rate remains higher then we would like it to be. A decline in the percent of reportable events directly attributable to personnel error has been observed over this time frame. This may be due in part to improved personnel performance, and in part due to the number of equipment problems experienced as plant equipment is subjected to operational conditions for the first time. A review of the reportable events attributable to personnel error has not disclosed any systematic weaknesses in operator training and/or qualifications. Instead, these events were reflective of the generally limited experience gained to date in operations of the Perry facility.

The licensee expects to complete Nuclear Heatup by October 10, 1986, and will then begin an outage. The duration of the outage is currently unknown, and will be dependent on the maintenance items and modifications required as a

(

8610090326 861002 PDR P

ADOCK 05000440 t \

PDR

i 4

R. Bernero 2 OCT 2 1986 result of problems identified during Nuclear Heatup Testing. There are currently no Region III open items or license conditions that require licensee or Regional actions prior to issuance of a full power license. In addition, all allegations have been reviewed from a technical standpoint, and no outstanding issues exist. (Three remain under 01 review.)

Region III is currently performing augmented inspections of Plant Operations personnel performance in order to better assess the licensee's capability to operate safely above 5% power. To date, inspector observations have generally been favorable. Pending continued favorable inspector observations of 4 operations activities, and upon successful completion of testing and the maintenance / modification outage, Region III will recommend issuance of a full power license.

If you have any questions concerning this matter, please contact me or Mr. R. C. Knop of my staff.

00rtstgal Si>

J rd by C.E. br.:llus" Charles E. Norelius, Director Division of Reactor Projects

Enclosures:

1. Plant Status and Operational Summary

2. Significant Inspection Activities

3. Significant Event Reports i

cc w/ enclosures:

J. Taylor, IE J. Partlow, IE 4 J. Stefano, NRR A. B. Davis, RIII SRI, Perry J. Hind, RIII C. Paperiello, RIII E. Greenman, RIII F. Jablonski, RIII J. Harrison, RIII C. Hehl, RIII R. Warnick, RIII M. Phillips, RIII R. Knop, RIII D. Danielson, RIII J. Muffett, RIII J. Creed, RIII J R. Greger, RIII ~

M. Schumacher, RIII M. Ring, RIII

W. Snell, RIII J. McCormick-Barger, RIII

$'S RIII RI I RIII RI4I Y

Knop /jp

<8 cCormick-Barger RFl0

.Warnick CAN N To elius 10/ */86 10/.:t/86 '10/ R/86 10/v/86 tp i

Enclosure 1 Plant Status and Operational Summary The licensee received their license (restricted to 5% power) on March 18, 1986, and began loading fuel on March 21, 1986. Fuel loading was completed on April 24, 1986. Initial criticality occurred on June 6, 1986. The

~

licensee completed Non-Nuclear Heatup on August 9, 1986, and began Nuclear Heatup on August 31, 1986. Due to numerous equipment problems, Nuclear

Heatup has progressed slower than anticipated and is not expected to be

completed prior to October 10, 1986. The licensee will then enter an outage '

4 with a duration dependent upon maintenance and modifications identified

, during Nuclear Heatup.

j All Region III open items, required to be resolved prior to exceeding 5%

power, have been addressed by the licensee, reviewed by Region III inspectors l and closed or appropriately deferred until later milestones.

Approximately 84 NRC notifications per 10 CFR 50.72 have been initiated by the licensee due to events at the plant since license issuance. From these j notifications 52 Licensee Events Reports (LERs) have been received by the

Region with more expected due to the 30 day time delay between event and l LER issuance. Operator error was found to be responsible for nearly 50% of the notifications during the first few months of plant operations, which prompted an NRC management meeting with the licensee.on June 5,1986.

Subsequent to the management meeting, improvement in operation personnel performance has been apparent. A reduction in NRC notifications caused by operator error from near 50% to approximately 30% has occurred.

4 4

b j

Enclosure 2 Significant Inspection Activities At the time of the Perry full power license briefing of the Commission, 4

held on September 5,1986, the licensee had very little actual operating experience with the plant. This was primarily due to delays caused by equipment problems and the charcoal fire event. To assure that the licensee's operations personnel are capable of safe and orderly plant operations, Region III has implemented an augmented inspection effort at Perry to review operations activities. This effort is ongoing and is closely monitoring the licensee's operations activities in such areas as:

shift turnovers; control room decorum; operator adherence to procedures;

operator recognition of and response to alarms; licensee review and

analysis of abnormal indications; Technical Specification compliance; and other operations related activities.

l During this augmented inspection effort, resident inspectors from several i Region III sites and regional personnel have and are continuing to cover I

portions of all shift activities at the Perry site on a near daily bases.

To date, the licensee has been operating at less than 4% power and less then 150 psig due to problems with the Reactor Core Isolation Cooling (RCIC) and 1

the associated Leak Detection Systems. Results of inspector observations have been generally favorable with only minor enhancement type comments.

1

)

)

l i

Enclosure 3 Significant Event Reports Since the license issuance, on March 18, 1986, there have been 52 LER's submitted to Region III. The LER descriptions provided below were taken from the LER abstracts provided by the licensee. LER 86-001-0 through LER 86-029-0 were summarized in the August 7, 1986, revision of this status report and therefore not included here.

LER 86-030-0 On June 30, 1986, one vacuum relief valve in the Containment Vacuum Relief System opened due to a slight vacuum caused by operation of the Containment Vessel and Drywell Purge System.

LER 86-031-1 On June 30 and , July 6,1986, a division of the Diesel Generator Building Ventilation System was discovered running unexpectedly. It is believed that the cause of these actuations was a spurious signal generated in the diesel generator control tachometer resulting from fluctuations in the control tachometer power supply.

LER 86-032-1 On July 5 and 12,1986, while in the shutdown cooling mode of operation, unexpected Residual Heat Removal (RHR) System isolations occurred due to an improper surveillance test instruction (SVI) in one case and operator error performing the SVI in the other.

LER 86-033-0 On July 11, 1986, the High Pressure Core Spray Diesel Generator auto started on a reactor vessel water level low signal while filling a reactor vessel level reference leg. The event was caused by a deficient SVI.

LER 86-034-0 On July 11, 1986, the "A" RHR System outboard containment isolation valve automatically isolated. The cause of the event was a personnel error where a Nuclear Steam Supply Shutoff System Reactor Coolant System pressure relay was improperly deenergized.

LER 86-035-0 j On July 14, 1986, the Reactor Water Cleanup (RWCU) System automatically ,

isolated while discharging water to the main condenser in normal operation. '

Cause of the isolation was due to a technician error while performing a SVI. I

LER 86-036-0 On July 18, 1986, an unexpected full scram occurred during the performance of a channel functional surveillance test on the scram discharge volume channel D level instrument. A loose connecting bolt in a Reactor Protection system auxiliary contact mechanism was identified as the cause of the event.

LER 86-037-0 i

On July 19, 1986, the RHR System automatically isolated while in the shutdown cooling mode. The event was caused by a fault in one of the RHR equipment area switch modules.

1 2

LER 86-038-0 On July 19 and 20, 1986, the standby train of the Annulus Exhaust Gas f Treatment System (AEGTS) automatically started. The cause of the auto

! start has been identified as a failure to recognize the out of specification I actuation reset on the AEGTS "B" train differential pressure switch.

]'

LER 86-039-0 On July 24 and 28, 1986, RWCU outboard containment isolation occurred due

to indicated high differential flow. The cause of the isolations have been identified to be flow control valve problems and the physical placement of the blowdown flow element.

LER 86-040-0 On July 28 and August 1, 1986, a total of three separate main steam line leak detection differential pressure trip units were discovered reading downscale. The inoperable channels were not placed in the tripped condition within one hour as required by Technical Specification 3.3.2 due to the operators misunderstanding of the Technical Specification action statement.

Additionally, during troubleshooting, and unexpected MSL high flow isolation occurred. The causes of the events have not been identified.

LER 86-041-0 On July 31, 1986, the Division 3 Diesel Generator and the HPCS pump auto-started. The event was caused by fluctuations in the output of the reserve battery charger.

LER 86-042-0 On August 1 and 19, 1986, a Diesel Generator Building Ventilation System supply fan auto-started. The cause is believed to be the same as reported in LER 86-031 (intermittent signals generated from the DG control tachometer due to system noise).

2

LER 86-043-0 On August 5, 19865, the RWCU System automatically isolated while in normal operation. The event was caused by personnel error while operating the system.

LER 86-044-0 On August 6, 1986, an Electrical Protection Assembly (EPA) trip (supply breaker with voltage / current / ground protective devices) resulted in the loss of Reactor Protection System Bus "A" causing a half scram. The cause of the EPA trip has been isolated to failing capacitors in an EPA electronic process control board.

LER 86-045-0 On August 11, 1986, it was discovered that channel checks were not being performed on scram discharge volume water level transmitters (as required by Technical Specifications) while the plant was in Operational Conditions 2 and 5.

LER 86-046-0 On August 13 and 14, 1986, independent sample analysis and release rate calculation / discharge line valving verifications were not performed prior to commencing liquid rad waste batch discharge releases as required by Technical Specification 3.3.7.9.

LER 86-047-0 On August 16, 1986, train "A" of the Control Room Heating Ventilation and Air Conditioning (CRHVAC) System momentarily started in the emergency recirculation mode during performance of a Diesel Generator surveillance test. The cause was due to an inadequate CRHVAC System operating procedure and Diesel Generator surveillance instruction which did not require the start of the CRHVAC trains prior to starting the Diesel Generator.

LER 86-048-0 On August 19 and 20, 1986, while in the shutdown cooling mode of operation, unexpected RHR System isolations occurred. The cause of the isolations were attributed to inadequate surveillance instructions in two cases and a poor jumper connection in the third case.

LER 86-049-0 Between 0300 August 18 and 0800 August 19, 1986, gaseous effluent vent stack flow estimates were not performed once per four hours as required by Technical Specifications. '

i

)

3

LER 86-050-0 4

On August 20, 1986, a control room operator misread an electrical diagram and directed the opening of the breaker supplying power to the "B" Reactor Protection System causing a full scram.

. LER 86-051-0 <

q On August 18, 1986, it was discovered that the RHR containment upper pool t

cooling isolation valves did not receive a reactor vessel high pressure isolation signal as stated in the FSAR. The isolation signal had been

changed to a high drywell pressure isolation signal but the associated

. FSAR and Technical Specifications had not.been updated to reflect the change.

- LER 86-052-0

, On August 26, 1986, during a surveillance instruction (SVI) review it was discovered that high drywell pressure isolation actuation instrumentation i

SVIs did not meet the Technical Specification requirements. The high j drywell pressure SVIs did not verify actuation of isolation relay contacts.

i l 1

)

4 j

i i

i i

i f

4

- v- .. y-rm., ._y.-,. , . - .- .m.-- ,_,,y ..,_. , - , , ,-,__,...,,,,,._yr,,. ,mm,_...,y,. , -,- - . - . , , . , , _ -,