ML20202J736
| ML20202J736 | |
| Person / Time | |
|---|---|
| Site: | Waterford  |
| Issue date: | 02/18/1998 |
| From: | Ewing E ENTERGY OPERATIONS, INC. |
| To: | NRC OFFICE OF INFORMATION RESOURCES MANAGEMENT (IRM) |
| Shared Package | |
| ML20202J740 | List: |
| References | |
| W3F1-98-0027, W3F1-98-27, NUDOCS 9802230207 | |
| Download: ML20202J736 (19) | |
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W3F1-99-0027 A4.05 PR February 18,1998 U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Cc/ ' mission ATTN: Document Control Desk Washington, D.C. 20555 Stibject:
Waterford 3 SES Docket No. 50-382 License No. NPF-38 Updated Final Safety Analysis Report - Revision 9 Supplement Gentlemen:
By letter dated January 29,1998, (W3F1-98-0021) Waterford 3 submitted Revision 9 to the Waterford 3 Steam Electric Station Unit 3 Updated Final Safety Analysis Report (UFSAR) in accordance with 10CFR50.71(e) and 10CFR50.4(b)(6).
Subsequent to that submittal, Waterford 3 identified a text flow condition affecting the following pages: 9.5-111,9.5-171, 9.5-181, 9.5-225,15.4-3 and Table 10.4.9A-1 (pages 1 of 7 through 7 of 7).
Those pages have bean corrected. El ven copies of the corrected pages are enclosed along with revised instuctions and a reprinied List of Effective Pages.
To update your copy of the UFSAR, p!sase remove the affected pages and insert the enclosed replacements.
i 093 9802230207 980218
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Updated Final Safety Analysis Report - Revision 9 Supplement W3F198-0027 Page 2 February 18,1998 Should you require further information, please contact me at (504) 739-6242 or T.J. Gaudet at (504) 739-6666.
Very truly yours, h
AAN Ar E.C. Ewing Director Nuclear Safety & Regulatory Affairs ECE/LLB/ssf Enclosures cc:
(w/ Enclosures)
E.W. Merschoff, NRC Region IV C.P. Patel, NRC-NRR NRC Resident inspectors Office (w/o Enclosures)
J. Smith N.S. Reynolds e
WSES FSAR UNIT 3 q
RAB 78 N./
1.
Part height 1 hour1.157407e-5 days <br />2.777778e-4 hours <br />1.653439e-6 weeks <br />3.805e-7 months <br /> rated walls with Class B fire doors constructed to isolate:
Auxiliary Panel 3 (A/B) from Auxiliary Panel 2(SB) a)
Walls constitute a complete 1 hour1.157407e-5 days <br />2.777778e-4 hours <br />1.653439e-6 weeks <br />3.805e-7 months <br /> barrier separation (including doors and teals) up to the height of the wall which extends well above the height of the safe shutdown equipment, b)
Detection and automatic suppression protection provided throughout the zone for all redundant equipment. An ionization smoke detection system is provided, c)
Overhead interference makes construction of complete 1-hour wall not feasible.
d)
Since part height walls adjoin 3-hour boundary walls on t'oth sides of the fire zone, there is no postulated fire capable of radiating two redundant auxiliary relay panels simultaneously, with the exception of the cabirret tops which protrude approximately 1 foot above the top of the walls. The relays are inside these cabinets and are therefore not exposed to the direct radiative affects of a fire. Due to re;stricted access in this zone, it is not postulated that a significant accumulation of combustibles would occur to support a fire of sufficient magnitude. At least one safe shutdown cable / conduit train is provided with a 1 hour1.157407e-5 days <br />2.777778e-4 hours <br />1.653439e-6 weeks <br />3.805e-7 months <br /> wrap where essential redundant trains occur in each subzone of RAB 7, 2.
Enclosure of essential redundant cable tray and conduit in the same 1 hour1.157407e-5 days <br />2.777778e-4 hours <br />1.653439e-6 weeks <br />3.805e-7 months <br /> wrap for the following systems controlled from the auxiliary control panel (LCP-43):
Shutdown Cooling System Chemical and Volume Control System
- a)
Regulatory Guide 1.75 separation criteria provides reasonable assurance that an Intemal tray or conduit fire will not propagate to a redundant tray or conduit.
1)
This separation between one cable tray and a redundant cable tray or conduit within the same fire wrap is accomplished by providing the subject cable tray with either a metal tray cover or a 1/2 inch blanket cover (i.e.,30 minute fire rating). Where access and spatial separation between cable trays allow, a 1-1/2 inch blanket tray cover (i.e.,1-hour fire rating) is preferrea over a 1/2 inch
- blanket, b)
One-hour wrap provides sufficient protection to redundant cabling until actuation of automatic suppression system or arrival of fire brigade.
O 9.5-111
WSES-FSAR-UNIT 3 RAB 78 3.
Lack of documented hourly fire rating based on ASTM E 119 for gap sealed walls.
a)
The gap sealed walls in this zone have sprinklers and detectors on both sides.
RAD 7C l
1.
Description of Fire Zone:
a.
Building: REACTOR AUXILIARY Elev: +35.00 Ft. MSL b.
Space Name: RELAY ROOM (Isolation Panel) c.
Figure No.: 9.5.121 Approximato Coordinates: Cols 11 A, H-J d.
Floor Area: 150 sq ft e.
Subspaces Within the Fire Zone: None I
II.
Essential Equipment Within the Fire Zone:
a.
Isolation Panel b.
In situ Combustible Material Loadings:
In situ combushble materials consist of, but are not limited to, cable insulation. The calculated fire duration does not exceed the fire resistance rating of the boundary barriers.
l IV.
Sources of Radioactive Materials:
None V.
Fire Control; a.
Physical Containment:
Fire Zone Boundary Barriers:
Fire zone boundary design ratings are 1 hour1.157407e-5 days <br />2.777778e-4 hours <br />1.653439e-6 weeks <br />3.805e-7 months <br /> between zones and 3 hours3.472222e-5 days <br />8.333333e-4 hours <br />4.960317e-6 weeks <br />1.1415e-6 months <br /> for the envelope perimeter.
Essential "A," "AB," and "B" train cable trays, conduits, cable air drops, and junction boxes required for safe shutdown are protected with one-hour fire rated barriers.
Each compartment within the isolation Panel is separated by a sheet metal wall sandwiched by 1/16 inch thick inorganic fiber insulation boards forming a fire retardant barrier, 2.
HVAC Penetrations Through Boundary Barriers:
Dud Dud Penetraticn Size Fire Safety-Non-Safety-Location Function Onches)
Damper Related Related Eas: Wall R
24x12 Yes (FD-51)
X O
9.5-112 Revision 9 (12/97)
WSES-FSAR UNIT 3 RAB 23 b)
Protection of floor side (RAB 23) of hatch is accomp,1shed by area wide smoke detection and automatic fixed suppression; additional modifications would be physically cumbersome to traffic f'ow during maintenance outages.
c)
Low probability of a flammable liquid spill in vicinity of the hatch due to strict administrative controls.
d)
There are no credible sources of ignition in the hatch vicinity, e)
The design of the hatch is such that only limited seepage of a liquid past the hatch-to-floor fitting can occur, thus acting as a flame arrester, f)
Smoke detection and automatic fixed suppression coverage below the hatch provide adequate compensation for any fire hazard associated with seepage past the hatch fitting.
6.
Exception from 20' separation for redundant diesel fuel oil storage and day tank piping:
a)
Subject piping is located in corridor south of diesel generator rooms (RAB 15 and
- 16) with a minimum separation of approximately 7 feet.
b)
Negligible combustible loading in corridor, c)
Smoke detection and automatic fixed suppression in this corridor, d)
Piping meets seismic Category I and Safety Class 3 design and construction
\\
criteria.
e)
Construction criteria and heat dissipating capability of Schedule 80 pipe filled with liquid provide adequate protection from radiative and convective effects of a postulated fire until actusilon of smoke detection and automatic fixed suppression or arrival of the fire brigade.
7, Lack t'f a docurnented hourly fire rating based on ASTM E-119 for Stairwell Enclosure 7 at Column 3A, Stairwell Enclosure 6 at Column 8A and Stairwell Enclosure 10 at Column 8A.
a)
The interiors of the stairwell enclosures contain negligible combustible loading, b)
For Stairwell Enclosures 6 and 10, the gap sealed walls have sprinklers and detectors on one side of the enclosure walls.
c)
For Stairwell Enclosure 7, the gap sealed walls have sprinklers and smoke detectors on one side of the north and east enclosure walls. The south er.ci6ture wall has no sprinklers on either side; however, the adjacent corridor and Boric Acid Ooncentrator Rooms have a very low combustible loading and contain no essential safe thutdown equipment or cables.
9.5-171
WSES-FSAR-UNIT 3 RAB 23A 1.
Description of Fire Area:
a.
Building: REACTOR AUXILIARY Elev: 15.00,-4.00, +21.00 and
+35.00 Ft. MSL b.
Space Name: RADIOACTIVE PIPE CHASE c.
Figure No.: 9.5.13,9.5.14, Approximate Coordinates:
9.5.1 5,9.5.1-13, Cols, 2A-BA, L 9.5.1 14, and 9.5.121 d.
Floor Area: 380 sq ft e.
Zones Within the Fire Area: None ll.
Essential Equipment Within the Fire Area:
a.
In situ Combustible Material Lordings:
In situ combustible materials consist of, but are not limited to, cable insulation. The calculated fire duration does not exceed the fire resistance rating of the boundary barriers.
l IV.
Sources of Radioactive Materials:
Radioactive materic!s may be present in waste and boron management, fuel pool, blowdown, safety injection and CVCS System piping.
V.
Fire Control:
a.
Physical Containment:
1.
Fire Area Boundary Baniers:
Fire area t ounoary design rating is 3 hours3.472222e-5 days <br />8.333333e-4 hours <br />4.960317e-6 weeks <br />1.1415e-6 months <br />.
2.
HVAC Penetrations Through Boundary Barriers:
Dud Dud Penetration Size Fiie Safety-Non-Safety-
} ocation Furiction (Inches)
Damper Related Related East Wall S
10x10 Yes X
North Wall E
10D Yes (FD-48A)
X East Wall E
6D Yes (FD-47A)
X
~
All piping'and ' tray pen'etfations are sealed.
~
3.
Ingress and Egress:
Normalingress and egress is not provided for this fire area. Access is only provided via removable block walls.
O 9.5-172 Revision 9 (12/97)
WSES-FSAR UNIT 3 p
RAB 27 1.
Description of Fire Area a.
Building: REACTOR AUXILIARY Elev: +7.00 Ft MSL b.
Space Name: MECHANICAL ELECTRICAL, HVAC EQUIPMENT &
HEALTH PHYSICS ENVELOPE c.
Figure No.: 9.5.1 10 Approximate Cootdinates: Cols,8A-12A, G-L d
Floor Area: 7,503 sq ft e.
Subspaces Within the Fire Area: Communications Equipment Room 4
(371 sq ft) l&C Room (442 sq ft)
HVAC E:,uipment Room (1,683 sq ft) 11.
Essential Equipment Within the Fire Zone:
a.
Air Handling Units AH-30 (3A SA) AH-30 (3B-SS; i
b.
CWS Control Valves - 3AC-TM137A, 3AC-TM1618 c.
Intake Dampers D-50(SA), D-50(SB) d.
Ill.
In situ Combustible Material Loadings in situ combustible materials consist of, but are not limited to, cable insulation and ordinary combustible material. The calculated fire duration does not exceed the fire resistance rating of the boundary barriers.
IV.
Sources of Radioactive Materids:
None V.
Fire Control; a.
Physical Containment:
1.
Fire Area Boundary Barriers:
A 3-hour fire boundary is provided for the envelope perimeter.
All vertical ccble trays are provided with firebreaks at approximately 15 foot intervals. Essential "B" train cable trays, conduits, cable air drops, and junction boxes required for safe shutdown are protected with one-hour fire rated barriers.
2.
HVAC Penetrations Through Boundary Barriers:
9.5-181 Revision 9 (12/97)
WSES-FSAR-UNIT 3 RAB 27 Duct Dea Penetration Size Fire Safety-Non-Safety-Lowtion Function (Inches)
Damper Related Related East Wall S
22x24 Yes X
East Wall OAl 10x52 Yes X
East Wall OAl 48x20 Yes X
E st Wall E
16x14 Yes X
Celling R
40x18 Yes (FD-10)
X Celling R
46x18 Yes (FD-17)
X West Wall S
24x24 Yes X
Ceiling S
16D Yes (FD-29)
X Ceiling S
16D Yes (FD-25)
X Ceiling S
16D Yes (FD-26)
X Ceiling S
160 Yes (FD-27)
X Ceiling S
16D Yes (FD-28)
X cloor S
8x6 Yes X
i All piping and tray penetrations are sealed.
3.
Ingress and Egress Ingress and egress for this fire area are provided through two "B" label fire doors (DIOl and D107) to enclosed stairs at columns K 12A and J 11 A. These stairs lead to fire zone RAC 8C at El. 21 ft. and fire area RAB 30 at El.-4 ft. In addition, an access door, AD101, located on the east wall leads to fire area RAB 3A, b.
Detection:
lonization smoke detectors are provided for this fire area, including pipe chase and cable riser shaft, c.
Fire Protection:
Primary:
A pre-action automatic sprinkler system is provided for this entire fire area, including the area above the drop ceiling. No sprinkler protection is provided for the communications equipment subspace. Portable fire extinguishers are provided in accordance with the G ;idelines of NFPA 10. Specific types and locations of portable fire extinguishers are indicated on General Arrangement drawings.
Secondary:
Class 1 hose stations installed in accordance with the guidelines of NFPA 14 are available for use in this zone. Specific locations of hose stations are indicated on General Arrangement drawings.
O 9.5-182
In situ Combustible Material Loadings:
In situ combustible mateitals consist of, but are not limited to, cable insulation, charcoal and lubricating oil. The calculated fire duration does not exceed the fire resistance rating of the boundary barriers.
IV.
Sources of Radioactive Materials:
Sources of radioactive materials are present within the various components located in the Reactor Contalrunent Building during normal operation and station shutdown periods.
V.
Fire Control:
i n.
Physical Containment:
1 1.
Fire Area Boundary Barriers:
Fire area boundary design rating is 3 hours3.472222e-5 days <br />8.333333e-4 hours <br />4.960317e-6 weeks <br />1.1415e-6 months <br />.
Vertical cable trays are provided with firebreaks at approximately 15 foot i'.tervals.
The conduits for one division of Shutdown Cooling System isolation Valves are wrapped wherever there is less than a 20 foot separation between redundant cables. The Shutdown Cooling System Isolation Valves' electrical penetrations are protected by radiant energy shields.
2.
HVAC Penetrations Through Boundary Barriers:
/
,\\
All penetrations are protected with containment isolation valves. All piping and tray V
penetrations are sealed.
3.
Ingress and Egress:
Ingress cnd egress for t';e Reactor Containment Building are provided at the locations described belv a)
A petonnel lock (center !!ne located at EL +11.00 ft msl and 18 degrees east of Column 7A) which discharges into fire area RAB 32 at EL. -4.00 ft mst.
b)
A 14 ft diameter equipment and maintenance hatch (center line EL. located at +26.5 ft mst and 7-1/2 degrees north of Column 0) which discharges into a walkway providing access to the Cooling Tower Area and Fuel Handling
- Building, c)
An escape lock (center line located at EL. +25.00 ft msl and 371/2 degrees west of Coluinn 7A).
O 9.5-225 Revision 9 (12/97)
WSES-FSAR UNIT 3 RCB d)
Access to the containment Shield Building (annulus) is provided through an access lock (center line EL. at +25-00 ft msl and 521/2 degrees west of Column 7A). Both of the locks mentioned in items 3 and 4 discharge into a walkway providing ingress to the cooling towers and Fuel Handling Building at EL. +21.00 ft msl.
b.
Detection:
lonization smoke detectors are provided for the electrical penetration area, the cable assemtiy area (EL. +21.00 ft msl), and for the cable trays on either side uf the reactor at approximate floor Elevation +46 ft msl. This also provides partial area detection for th3 reactor and the steam generators. Continuous thermistor wire detectors are provided for the reactor coolant pump areas. Charcoal filter enclosures are provided with thermistor wire heat detectors. Photoelectric smoke detectors are provided for the annulus and are located on the duct of the annulus negative pressure system.
c.
Fire Protection:
Primary:
A multicycle automatic sprinkler system is provided for the protection of the reactor coolant pump lube oil systems. A manually activated water spray system is provided over charcoal beds in filter units E 13 (3A SA) and E-13 (3B-SB).
Seconday:
Class 1 hose stations installed in accordance with the guidelines of NFPA 44 are available for use in this area. Portable fire extinguishers are provided in accessible locations 'n accordance with the guidehnes of NFPA 10. Specific types and locations of portable fire extinguishers and hose stations are indicated on General Arrangement drawings, d.
Smoke Venting:
The normal ventilation system may be used for smoke removal. Portable smoke elector equipment is provided for use by the fire bngade.
e.
Drainage:
Adequate drainage of watar used for fire extinguishment will be provided by the containment sump pumps. The pumps discharge into the waste tanks.
VI.
Analysis of Effects of Potential Fires:
In the Reactor Containment Building, in situ combustible materials include moderate amounts of charcoal in filter enclosures, lubricating oil in RCP pumps, and cable insulation. Transient materia's are administratively controlled to limit the aTJunt of such materials to that required for operations and maintenance purposes.
O 9.5-226 i
l
N N
p N
j WSES-FSAR4 NET.3 TABLE 10 4 9A-1 (Sheet 1 of 7)
EVALUATK)N OF THE WATERFORD SES UNIT NO.3 EMERCENCY FEEDWATER SYSTEM VER$US THE REQUIREMENTS OF STANDARD REV'EW Pt.AN (SRP110 4 9 AND DRANCH TECHPPCAL POSITION fBTFi ASB 10-1 A.
sip 144 ;
FSAR ACCEPTAn, CDITERIA COMPUANCE REFERENCE l
Acceptateyof thedeognof the Auc.ary Feeduseter System, l
se described in the appecenre Sehey Aredyeis Report (SAR),
le bened on specWie ger.oraf dmaign creerie and roguentary guides. usted below are the specine creerte se they ressee to the AFS.
Generaf Decl pt CreerW,2, as reteesd to structures The EFS to deesgnated sesamte Colagory L EFS
- to4932, 1.
i housing the eyePom and the synee'n Realf being r=Pma pumps their corttrais, and the Condensate Storage 92.53.3, of 4 A.,L.u the eMects of nelural phencmene audi Pool are located inside the RAB and are thue Table 3 2-1 as senhquehee, tormdoes, hurftcenes, and floods.
protected from see ruimted phenomene such so NRC Q 371-11 tomadose, hurncarme and fiaanen The EFS
% volves and Sie Turtune Sesem Seply Vseves are located h the open area on top of the RAB and are preenc>d by the RA8 weno from noodho and direct tomado and m whde. Adehonal meheup uuter for the EFS may be ablehad from the Wet Cootng Tosser (WCT)
)
bee *m, which are doesgneted seismic Category i 1
I and doesgned to mehstand the eGects of tomadoes, hunteense and soods.
2.
General Demon Creerion 4, volth reaped to strJctures The EFS pumps, their coreois, and the Condensate
- 104932, houemg the system and the system Roolf being cer=Ne Storage Pool rgre located inside the RA8 and are 3.5, of withetending the eGects of odemmi enleelles and are thus protected earn enter ist missese,1he EFS Tsbie 3 5-3 tilemelpy generated mise 5es, pipe vehip, and jet lootsgart and W forces W unh pipe breaks. TurtWne Steem D.M Veswee located in the open aree on top of the RA8 and ero protoceed kom tM e by gralMg bolosed above me gefuse.
l The EFS is designed to witheted the e# scia of 19493 hitemesy genersped russies. This er**=* to hw 3.5 h Secuan 3 5 and sumn nired for the EFS h Table 3.5-3.
9 0
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en
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l WSES4SAR4DET4 TABLE to 4 9A-1 (Sheet 3 of 7)
Renmon g(1297)
FSAR ACCEPTANCE CRITERIA COMPLIANCE REFEREMCF_
b.
Redundersy of componerte so that wuler saddert The EFS to demoned to perform to49 conomons the se8 sty function can be performed as enfety funcbons soeurneg soeummg a single aceve componert tegure. (Tfus e single aceve-may be concident weh the lose of oWene power teBure concufort wEh e loss for certain everte.)
of offeDe power. The turtme etven EFS pump or both motor driven pumps together have been demiped to prende 100% of the flowrnecessary for reesdual heet removalover the entee range of reactor opershon eclueng at postuented demon beeis accederte However, a has been de err uned a
that under rechebe conehone, any one EFS pump can supply adequase flow for decay heet for9avelto are (400 gpm required) or boah (450 gpm total requeed) steem generators c.
The r=f=heny to isolete componerte. - '_, _..
The EFS isoinhan vapues em to49 or opng if required so that the eyeesm aufsty powered from Redundert Class 1E funcbon we be mentained de buses to ensure that the emergency feedweser flow to the afloded steem generator would l
be shut off, and at least one path l
would remem open to admt emer-gency feedwater to the irtect steem generator stun regured.
l esaurreng e omgie aceve resure.
6.
General Doogn Creerion 45, as reisted to doelp Provtsions have been made h the 66
[
prov6eens made to permit periode innervice in-"
design and layout of the EFS to l
apw* ion of eyelem componente and : -- '.-
ageurihr cargeance vWth the inser** Inspechan requeemente of ASME Code Secuan XI.
The hearvice mopocson program we be e@ meted to the NRC et inest ok morthe prior to !! ret a
(
f 4
j i
WSES FSARA JT-3 TABLE to 4 9A-1 (Sheet 4 of 7)
FSAR ACCEPTANCE CRITERtA COMPUANCE REFERENCE 7.
General Desgn Creerlon 46, as reisted to deeign The EFS shes undergo preopgerssonal 14112208 primsauns made to permt approprtste funchanni tests to ensure ts atzety to teatrg of the system and componerts to assure struc-funchon as antanded. A descriphon urnsintegreyand.neek-ughtnese operstdutyand of this test is contained h Secean 4..
w of actt%.w c. and c=r=*4ty of 142122 es the integrated system to fundian as irdended durmg normet, shutdown and seeksent conditone The EFS shas etso undergo pertosc Techmcal Spednesten funceanal teshng of the sysfem and 4.7.12.
Es -we;e to ensure the system func$ons as antended These tests ehet be conduded h accordance with the eurvestance requrements of the pimrt techrucal Ww:~...
8.
Reguistory Gude 126 as related to the questy grow The doeign and fabncahon of the EFS 322 closedication of system w.w meet the requiremerts of Regidatory Table Guide 126. The safe *y class 2 and 3 32-1 portons of the EFS meat the Reguistory Gude 126 Quavy Grote B and C standards rompedfwWy 9
Reguistory Gude 129. es reisted to the solemic denigre The EFS meets the reguremerts of Regululary 1049 closernconan of system-w A Guide 129 R is deognated as Sear me 321 Ca egory I and win thus pertar n me design Table s
fundtone fonowtng the SSE. The partiriert 3.2-1 questy ooeurance requiremeres of Appendte B to 10CFR50 a e appeed 10 Reguistory Guide 1.62. as reisted to design provisions The EFS meets the requremeresof Regulefory 7.31.1.6 rnede for manual inittsbon of each potecewe action.
Guide 1.62. The operator may manuspy bihmee 73112 the Ernergency Feedwater Actumeon Sipal(EFAS) -
-a%
from en eessy accesetWe hr=nrwi in the y
d contrai rcom (RTG Board) Monumi hiliation oms ensure that protecttwe acnon goes to cargiellan.
11.
Regulatory Guide 1.102. es reisted to the protecnon cf he Weserford 3 Nuclear Plurt leiend Structure 24 to M
structures, systems, and m ww;e importart to eefety (NPIS) is a reefortro bom structure weh seed TectrucalSpedReseen from the effects of flooding enterter wens and is flood protected w to elevanan 3r475 ee;
+30 fL MSL Thrs is sumcsert to a:commodate at gi the Design Basrs Flood i6ntitled in Reguameory Guide
.M
[hiM 159. The techrr al spec (caten requiremerts<f Reputatory Guide 1.C2 postban C2 are therefore opeensi e.
O e
TABLE to 4 9A-1 (Shed 5of 7)
FSAR REFERENCE COMPLtANCE ACCEPTANCE CRITERIA h due h the nature of pesarmel flooeng. Tectrucal $44. 3/47.5 wNeh meets the reert of that Roguestory Guwe paseon has been esentenhed. h regardis poe6an C3 of the guide E has been desernrwd that as roars houses smeer reassed structures can esfuey sesre the enesamurr. possue pondeg rurvedeg tem the PMP. See e%e tem I above.
12.
Roguentory Guide 1.117, as ruimmed to the protocelon of The EFS is protected from the eneds of tomado se descreed in sem 2 abow.
structures. eyesems, and componenes importerd to eewy from the eMaces of homedo missess 13.
Branch Technical Poemon A38 3-1 and MEB St. es The EFS is protected from the eReds of pipe reameed to breeks in high and moeurste energy piping rupeure as descreedin semIsepovo.
syneems outende ceneminmort.
The EFS toelf is used only for emergency 36 shutdoum of the roedor when the Main 36A Fecenseer System is Irwerseve. There8ere in accordance weh the APCS 8 3-1, E is not analytod as a tugh enegy synneret However, the EFS has been anefyred as a moderate encryr syenem h accordance weh the Brancit Techrucas Poseon MEB 3-1.
14 Branch Techrucui Poemon AS810-1, as related to See part B similiary feedweser purry N and power supply awreny l
l
O TABLE 10 4 9A-1 (Sheet 6 of 7)
B.
BTP AS810-1 (DESIGN GUIDEUNES FOR AUXIUARY FEEDWATER SYSTEM PUMP DRNE AND POWER SUPPLY DIVERSITY FOR PRESSURIZED WATER REACTOR PLANTS)
FSAR BRANCH TECHNICAL POS! TION COMPUANCE REFERENCE 1.
The ouidnery feedweler system shoukiconsist of at The EFS corsses of two motor drtvert purge, to 49 least two fusa:specay, independent systems that each weh a design flow cepedly of Jos opm l
include diverse power sources.
(45 gum recircuistion ecluded and powered from g
separese, redurulert Class 1E 416 KV buses, and one 780 gym (90 gym recrf Aseson br*M turtune drteen purm. The turtune I
l driven pump or both motor diven pwgs together 2.
Other powered componeres of the ausslery feedwater have tiesn designed to provtde 100% of tie flous syneem shondd eleo use the concept of seperuse and noosenery for reesdual heet removal over 9te muRiple sources of motive energy An energie of ertire range of postulekd deuiyt basis the required dhersey would be two seperses sisd-ocx:iderts. However a has been determmedihet llery feedwater traine, each capable of removing tmder te corxNhons, any one EFS pwg can the ofterheet load of the roector system, having simply me=M flow for decoy host removal one train powered from either of two oc sources to one (400 ppm requeed) or beeh (450 pm total and the other treet whoey powered by seeem and requeed) steem generators.
de electric power.
The turbine dnven purm, system sessey contress, and twtune steem siopsy vehee are powered from the SA,15 Claes 1 E 125V de bus. The EFS isoiselon vueves are eleo fmB-open and powered from cause 1 E 125 cr buses.
This ensures that flove to the depresourtrod senerr generator con be terminseed and et least one palh to the wect steem generseer oss tue aveReble soeuming any srigle ocese Segure.
3.
The piping errengemert, tieth keelse and discharge The pipeig errengemert is designed to perme me t').4 g I
for each train should be designed to permR the pumps to sicpfy feedweser to any combinshon of pumps to supply feedweser to any comtuneben of assem eesem generators. Waterfont 3 uses the crocoowr generators This errengement should tolse Irdo ar==1t piping scheme This is desertsed in FSAR hrean L
pipe failure, acthe mmponent fedure, power suppey 10.4.g and shown in the schemeuc of Figure 10 44 fagure, or control system fedure that coidd proport The EFS exceeds this BTP criterte in Wist the pW l
system function. One errengemert that wondd be sacept-Enos to each steem generator are N by four l
l ebie iri crossover piping cortnining valves that een be pneumancesy operewd fee open i-amm vehen.
L opers sed by remose manuar conens from the cortml room.
The power diversey des gned beo the system is using the power eversey principes for the veeve opers-senmartred above. The design of the EFS thus eneuse tors and eduanon systems that m ew eve t of a single feswe R can stepsy weser to one or both seeem generseers, and that muser j
could be prevented from entering the rupswed Ene j
dwmg the postusased main seamm feedeuter ane teeset
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WSES FSAR UNIT 3 O
a).4.1.1.4 15 Barrier Perfomance Mathematical Model The mathematical model used for evaluation of barrier performance is identical to that described in Subsection 15.4.1.1.3.
b)
Input Parameters, Initial Conditions and Results in Subsection 15.4.1.2.4, it was determined that the most adverse CEA withdrawal event, in terms of degradation in barrier performance, is one initiated from low power conditions such that the reactivity addition rate combined with the natural plant feedback mechanisms result in a new steady state, not tripped condition.
The fuel pertormance conditions of the CEA withdrawal from suberttical conditions is combined with barrier performance and its associated steam releases to determine the radiological consequences.
15.4.1.1.5 Radiological Consequences The radiological consequences due to steam releases from the secondary system are less severe than those from the inadvortent opening of the atmospheric dump valve, Subsection 15.1.1.4.
15.4.1.2 Uncontrolled CEA Withdrawal from Low Power Conditions 15.4.1 2.1 Identification of Causes and Fregt.incy Classification The estimated frequency of a control element assembly (CEA) withdrawal from low power conditions classifies it as a moderate frequency incident as defined in Reference 1 of Sectico 15.0. An uncontrolled withdrawal of CEAs is assumed to occur as a result of a single failure in th6 control elenient drive mechanism (CEDM), Control Element Drive Mechanism Control System (CEDMCS), Reactor Regulating System, or operator error. This analysis was done for Oycle 2.
O 15.4 3
WSES-FSAR UNIT.3 15 4.1.2.2 Sequence of Events and Systems Operation The withdrawal of CEAs from low power conditions adds reactivity to the reactor core, causing both the core power level and the core heat flux to increase with corresponding increases in reactor coolant temperatures and Reactor Coolant System (RCS) pressure. The withdrawal of CEAs also produces a time dependent redistribution of core power. These translent variations in core ther'nal parameters retutt in the approach to specified fuel design limits and to RCS and se:ondary system pressure limits, thereby requiring the protective action of tne Reactor Protection System (RPS).
The reactivity insertian rate accompanying tiie uncontrolled CEA withdrawal it, dependent primarily upon the CEA wtthdrawal rate and the CEA worth since, at lower power conditions, the normal reactor feedback mechanisms do not occu' until power generation in the core is larDe enough to cause changes ir;'he fuoi and moderator temperatures. The reactivity insertion rate determines the rate of approach to the fuel design limits. Depending on the Initial conditions and reactivity insertion rate, the uncontrolled CEA withdrawal translent is terminated by either a vMiable overpower trip, high pressurizer pressure inp, a low departure from nue'.nte boiling ratio (DNBR) trip or a high local power density trip. The secondary system pressure increases followin;) reactor trip and is limited by the steam generator safety valves.
Table 15.4 3 gives the sequence of events for the limiting CEA withdrawal transient at low power (104 percent power) discussd iri Subsection 15.4.1.2.3.
15.4.1.2.3 Core and System Performance a)
Mathematical Mod 91 The nuclear steam supply system (NSSS) response to a CEA withdrawal from low power conditions was simulated the CESEC computer program described in Section 15.0. The thermal margin on DNBR in the reactor core was simulated using the TORC computer program with the CE 1 CHF correlation described in Chapter 4.
b)
Input Parameters and Initial Conditlens The input parameters and initial conditions used te analyze the NSSS response to a CEA withdrawal from low power conditions are discussed in Section 15.0. In particular, those parameters which were unique to the analysis of fuel performance discussed below are listed in Table 15.4 4.
The initial conditions and NSSS characterist'es assumed in this radiological release analysis have been identified as a limiting set of conditions allowed by the limiting conditions for operation (LCOS) in terms of providing the nearest and most rapid approach to the fuel design limite. These initial conditions are as follows:
i 15.4 4