ML20202J334

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Final Deficiency Rept Re out-of-date Design Criteria for DHR & Core Flooding Sys.Initially Reported on 830405.Caused by Deferral of Paperwork.All Design Criteria Documents Reviewed & Revised to Incorporate Outstanding Design Input Memos
ML20202J334
Person / Time
Site: Bellefonte  Tennessee Valley Authority icon.png
Issue date: 03/24/1986
From: Gridley R
TENNESSEE VALLEY AUTHORITY
To: Grace J
NRC OFFICE OF INSPECTION & ENFORCEMENT (IE REGION II)
References
NUDOCS 8604150616
Download: ML20202J334 (2)


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y . 4S TENNESSEE VALLEY AUTHORITY CHATTANOOGA. TENNESSEE 37401 SN 1578 Lookout Plage e dMhrch24,196

, BLRD-50-438/83-28 BLRD-50-439/83-23 1 U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission Region II Attn: Dr. J. Nelson Grace, Regional Administrator 101 Marietta Street, NH, Suite 2900 Atlanta, Georgia 30323

Dear Dr. Grace:

BELLEFONTE NUCLEAR PLANT UNITS 1 AND 2 - BELLEFONTE DESIGN CRITERIA NOT UP-TO-DATE - BLRD-50-438/83-28, BLRD-50-439/83 FINAL REPORT The subject deficiency was initially reported to NRC-0IE Inspector Linda Hatson on April 5, 1983 in accordance with 10 CFR 50.55(e) as NCR BLN NEB 8301. Enclosed is our final report.

If you have any questions, please get in touch with R. H. Shell at FTS 858-2688.

Very truly yours, TENNESSEE VALLEY AUTHORITY

. L Gridley Manager of Licensing Enclosure cc: Mr. James Taylor, Director (Enclosure)

Office of Inspection and Enforcement U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission Hashington, D.C. 20555 Records Center (Enclosure)

Institute of Nuclear Power Operations 1100 Circle 75 Parkway, Suite 1500 Atlanta, Georgia 30339 8604150616 860324 PDR ADOCK 05000438 5 PDR ,

An Equal Opportunity Employer

.. ,o ENCLOSURE BELLEFONTE NUCLEAR PLANT UNITS 1 AND 2 BELLEFONTE DESIGN CRITERIA NOT UP-TO-DATE BLRD-50-438/83-28, BLRD-50-439/83-23 10 CFR 50.55(e)

NCR BLN NEB 8301

_ FINAL REPORT DESCRIPTION OF DEFICIENCY Bellefonte Nuclear Plant (BLN) design criteria have not been kept up to date per the requirements of the Office of Engineering Procedure (0EP)-06 --

formerly known as the Division of Engineering Design (EN DES) Engineering Procedure (EP) 3.01 -- entitled " Design Input." The design criteria for the decay heat removal (DHR) system and the core flooding (CF) systems were not revised when system descriptions were revised by Babcock and Wilcox (B&W) and then received and approved by TVA. B&W system descriptions are used as design input by TVA. This deficiency was discovered during the INP0/TVA self-initiated evaluation and was also applicable to other Bellefonte design criteria.

Although the personnel involved were aware of the program requirement to expeditiously update the design criteria, the paperwork required to incorporate the changes apparently was deferred in favor of "high priority" work. Their priorities apparently derived from a perception that the essential design information was available to designers in an interim design criteria document referred to as a Design Input Memorandum (DIM). DIMS are routinely distributed to holders of controlled copies of design criteria.

While DIMS are, therefore, theoretically available to design personnel, some designers use personal copies of design criteria that are uncontrolled.

This deficiency was determined to be potentially applicable to other TVA plants. A potential generic condition evaluation memo was prepared and sent to Browns Ferry, Seoucyah, and Watts Bar Nuclear Plants. Any deficiencies found will be documented and dispositioned in accordance with Office of Engineering Procedure (OEP) 17 " Corrective Action." l l

SAFETY IMPLICATIONS 1 Any design changes (as reflected in system description revisions) in safety-related systems designed by B&W could possibly not be reflected in the I latest revision of the appropriate TVA design criteria. Thus, possible design l

defects -- such as a result of the use of inadequate design criteria to make '

design evaluations and/or procedure design documents -- could exist in safety-related systems that could subsequently adversely affect the safety of the plant.

CORRECTIVE ACTION All safety-related and nonsafety-related TVA design criteria documents have been reviewed and have been revised -- where necessary -- to ensure that outstanding design input memorandums (DIMS) have been incorporated into the design criteria. (This was done for all design criteria where the oldest DIM was more than one year old--reference OEP-06 section 5.1.2.4.)

J To prevent recurrence of the cited deficiency, the Bellefonte Engineering Project uses a management commitment tracking program for scheduling and tracking all outstanding DIMS by each discipline project engineer to ensure compliance with the requirements OEP-06.

In addition, TVA has established engineering program directives and procedures which require that designers document their design inputs and that checkers, reviewers, and approvers verify the adeqc=cy and correctness of design inputs. Specifically, OEP-6 " Design Input," Section 2.0 " Policy," states that

" Design input for all structures, systems, and components will be identified,

, documented, and preserved; the selection of design input will be reviewed and approved." Section 2.0 further states that " Design criteria documents will be prepared for all designs and will identify the effective revision of all

design inputs and the portions of each design input that are applicable to each design." Design verification is performed in accordance with OEP~10

" Review" and is defined to be "a detailed check to ensure correctness, technical adequacy, and proper use of design input." Section 3.3.1 requires that each reviewer consider the following questions during his review: "Does the document conform to the general project design concept, including criteria....?" and "Is the document based on input of the correct revision level?" These procedures should ensure that appropriate design inputs are used and that verification reviews corroborate that appropriate design inputs are used for all TVA designs.

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