ML20202E567

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Forwards Request for Addl Info Re Amend Submittal ,supplemented by Submitting Approach for Addressing Certain SBLOCA Scenarios
ML20202E567
Person / Time
Site: Crystal River Duke Energy icon.png
Issue date: 11/26/1997
From: Raghavan L
NRC (Affiliation Not Assigned)
To: Richard Anderson
FLORIDA POWER CORP.
References
TAC-M98991, NUDOCS 9712080080
Download: ML20202E567 (5)


Text

_ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ __-______

Mr. Roy A. Anderson November 26, 1997 Senior Vice President Nucle:r Oper;tior,s Florida Power Corporation ATTN: Manager, Nuclear Licensing Crystal River Er,ergy Complex (SA2A) 15760 W Power Line Street Crvstal River, Florida 34428-6708

SUBJECT:

CRYSTAL RIVER UNIT ",- REQUEST FOR ADDITIONAL INFORMATION -

LICENSE AMENDMENT RELATED TO TECHNICAL SPFCIFICATION CHANGE REQUEST NO. 210, SMALL-BREAK LOSS-OF-COOLAN f ACCIDEi4T (SBLOCA)

SUBMITTAL (TAC NO. M98991)

Dear Mr. Anderson:

The purpose of this letter is to request additional information (RAI) relating to your license amendment submittal dated June 14,1997, as supplemented by letter dated September 25, 1997, regarding Florida Power Corporation's (FPC's) approach for addressing certain SBLOCA scenarios. By letter dated November 5,1997, the staff requested that FPC evaluate the change in risk associated with the proposed plant procedural changes, including the new load management strategies. By letter dated November 15,1997, FPC responded to the staffs request, however, the response did not contain the necessary information to satisfy the staffs reqitest. As a result, on November 25,1997, the staff conducted a telephone conference with FPC to further discuss this issue. Based on that conversation, the staff coduded that a more specific request is necessary.

Additionally, the staff has reviewed your submittal dated November 19,1997, which responded to the staffs RAI dated November 4,1997, and concluded that additional information is still needed to satisfy the staffs request.

The enclosure provides the details of the requested information. 'We request your response as soon as possible so that we can schedule our review effort consistent with your restart plan. If you have any questions, please call me at (301) 415-1471.

Sincerely, Original signed by L. Raghavan, Project Manager Project Directorate ll-3 Division of Reactor Projects - 1/11 Office of Nuclear Reactor Regulation g C >cket No. 50-302 , r

Enclosure:

RAI cc w/ enclosure: See next page U ggg j y

Distribution Docket File : W. LeFave T. Marsh S. Rubin J. Jaudon, Region 11 OGC i PUBLIC F. Orr T. Collins S. Lee J. Zwolinski ACRS CR-3 r/f J. Flack C. Jackson B. Boger J. Bongarra 1

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NUCLEAR REGULATORY COMMISSION WASHINGTON, D.C. 3000H001 k.....,/ November 26, 1997 Mr. Roy A. Anderson Senior Vice President Nuclear Operations Florida Power Corporation ATTN: Manager, Nuclear Licensing Crystal River Energy Complex (SA2A) 15760 W Power Line Street Crystal River, Florida 34428-6708

SUBJECT:

CRYSTAL RIVER UNIT 3 - REQUEST FOR ADDITIONAL INFORMATION -

LICENSE AMENDMENT RELATED TO TECHNICAL SPECIFICATION CHANGE REQUEST NO. 210, SMALL-BREAK LOSS-OF-COOLANT ACCIDENT (SBLOCA)

SUBMITTAL (TAC NO. M98991)

Dear Mr. r'derson:

The pui. 4e of this letter is to request additionalinformation (RAI) relating to your license amendment submittal dated June 14,1997, as supplemented by letter dated September 25, 1997, regarding Florida Power Corporation's (FPC's) approach for addressing certain SBLOCA scenarios. By letter dated November 5,1997, the staff requested that FPC evaluate the change in risk associated with the proposed plant precedural changes, including the new load management strategies. By letter c Md November 15,1997, FPC responded to the staffs request; however, the response did not contain the necessary information to satisfy the staffs request. As a result, on November 25,1997, the staff conducted a telephone conference with FPC to further discuss this issue and others. Based on that conversation, the staff concluded that a more specific request is necesRary.

Additionally, the staff has reviewed your submittal dated November 19,1997, which responded to the staffs RAI dated November 4,1997, and concluded that additional information is still needed to satisfy the staffs request.

The enclosure provides the details of the requested information. We request your response as soon as possible so that we can schedule our review effort consistent with your restart plan. If you have any questions, please call me at (301) 415-1471.

Sincerely, IdA -

L. Raghava[n, Project Manager Project Directorate 11-3 Division of Reactor Projects - 1/ll Office of Nuclear Reactor Regulation Docket No. 50-302

Enclosure:

RAI j l'

cc w/ enclosure: See next page

p-a

.t-Mr. Roy-A._ Anderson - CRYSTAL RIVER UNI 1 NO. 3-Florida' Power Corporation CC: _

1 Mr._R.- Alexander Glenn Mr. Robert E. Grazio. Director Co gorate Counsel. Nuclear Regulatory Affairs (SA2A)

Florida Power Corporation Florida' Power Corporation MAC-A5A Crystal River Energy Complex P.O. Box-14042{ 15760 W. Power Line Street St. Petersburg Florida 33733-4042 Crystal River._ Florida 34428-6708 Mr. Charles G. Pardee. Director Senior-Resident Inspector Nuclear Plant Operations (NA2C) Crystal River Unit 3 Florida Power Corporation U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Comission Crystal River Energy Complex 6745 N. Tallahassee Road 15760 W. Power Line Street Crystal River. Florida 34428 Crystal River Florida 34428-6708 >

Mr. John P. Cowan Mr. Bruce J. Hickle. Director Vice President. Nuclear Production Director. Restart (NA2C) (NA2E)

Florida Power Corporation Florida Power Corporation Crystal River Energy Complex Crystal River Energy Complex 15760 W. Power Line Street 15760 W. Power Line Street Crystal River. Florida 34428-6708 Crystal River. Florida 34428-6708 Mr. Robert B. Borsum Mr. James S. Baumstark Framatome Technologies Inc. Director Quality Programs (SA2C) 1700 Rockville Pike. Suite 525 Florida Fower Corporation Rockville Maryland 20852 Crystal River Energy Complex-15760 W. Power Line Street Mr. Bill Passetti Crystal River. Florida 34428-6708 Office of Radiation Control De)artment of Health and Regional Administrator. Region II Rehabilitative Services U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission 1317 Winewood Blvd. 61 Forsyth Street. SW., Suite 23T85 Tallahassee Florida 32399 0700 Atlanta, GA 30303-3415 i

Attorney General. Mr. Kerry Landis Department of Legal Affairs U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Comission The Capitol 61 Forsyth Street. SW., Suite 23T85 Tallahassee Florida 32304 Atlanta, GA 30303-3415 Mr.~ Joe Myers. Director Division of Emergency Preparedness Department of Community Affairs 2740 Centerview Drive Tallahassee Florida 32399-2100 L

l Chairman-

' Board of County Commissioners Citrus County-110 North Apopka Avenue

.Iverness. Florida 34450-4245

l ;. .

4 Q '

REQUEST FOR ADDITIONAL' INFORMATION - LICENSE AMENDMENT RELATED TO -

TECHNICAL SPECIFICATION CHANGE REQUEST NO. 210. SMALL BREAK LOSS OF COOLANT ACCIDENT (SBLOCA) SUBMITTAL
1. _ Provide the initiating event (IE) frequency of Loss-of-Coolant Accident (LOCA)/ Loss of Offsite Power (LOOP). Please provide the initiating frequency of a LOCA, the dependent or

- conditional probability of LOOP (i.e., the probability of a LOOP given that a LOCA has -

occurred), and the bases for these frequencies.

In a LOCA/ LOOP accident scenario, as postulated in Generic Safety lasue (GSI) 171, *ESF

. [ engineered safety features) failure from LOOP subsequent to LOCA," there is an increase in the likelihood of a LOOP given a LOCA compared to a random (independent) occurrence of the LOOP in the same period. This increased likelihood can be due to a disturbance in the grid caused by the reactor trip which occurs after a LOCA, problems due to bus transfer, or due to the increased loads on the emergency buses in response to a LOCA. To address the issues raised as part of GSI 171, NUREG/CR-6538, ' Evaluation of LOCA With Delayed LOOP and LOOP With Delayed LOCA Accident Scenarios" was published in July 1997.

This report, in part, quantitatively anolyzes LOCA/ LOOP accident sequences.

2. Given a LOCA/ LOOP initiating event, what are the plant's mitigating actions, including automatic / manual system / equipment response and operator actions? Please account for all plant and procedural changes (including operator actions and new load management strategy). What are the ass'gned failure, unavailability, and human error probabilities associated with these mitigating actions?

I

3. Based on the above parameter estimates, what is the calculated core damage frequency contribution from the LOCA/ LOOP sequences for the proposed changes?

\ -

4. Validation and verification (VN) should be conducted for operator actions associated with each of the three single failure events. If either Loss of Battery A (LOBA) or Loss of Battery B (LOBB) is not tested, justifit,ation should be provided.
5. Generally, a minimum of 80% of the operating crews should be tested (i.e., if there are six operating crews, five of the crews should be tested).' ideally, all crews should be testea on all three single failure events as a " full" crew and as a " minimum" crew. However, due to limitations in time and availability, attemative testing approaches are acceptable with adequate justification from the licensee. The objective of this testing is to assure as many crews are exposed to the required operator actions as possible, and that each single failure event is tested to demonstrate that it can be mitigated by full and minimum crew complements.

Enclosure

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6. Each event should be tested oing a full crew and a minimum crew complement. All tests should be conducted with crews ' hat are " naive"(i.e., have no immediate knowledge or expectation) to the sb% frilure being tested.

Enclosure

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