ML20199E395

Forwards Request for Addl Info Re Emergency Operating Procedures Tech Specs Change Request Notice 210.Questions Pertain to Operator Actions Described in Eops,Involving Mitigation of Certain Small Break LOCA Scenarios

ML20199E395
Person / Time
Site:	Crystal River
Issue date:	11/19/1997
From:	Pardee C FLORIDA POWER CORP.
To:	NRC OFFICE OF INFORMATION RESOURCES MANAGEMENT (IRM)
Shared Package
ML20199E400	List: 3F1197-48, Rev 3 to EOP-13, EOP Rules ML20199E395 ML20199E402 ML20199E409 ML20199E426 ML20199E446
References
3F1197-48, TAC-M98991, NUDOCS 9711210186
Download: ML20199E395 (13)

Text

,

Florida l Power l C'2"L9 .

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November 19,1997.

3F1197 48 U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission Attention: Document Control Desk Washington, DC 20555 0001

Subject:

Request for Additional Information Related to Emergency Operating Procedures Technical Specifications Change Request tiotice (TSCRN) 210 (TAC No. M93991)

Referances: 1. FPC Letter to NRC (3F0697-10), dated June 14,1997

2. NRC Letter to FPC PN1197-04), dated November 4,1997

3. FPC Letter to NRC (3F0997 31), dated September 17,1997

Dear Sir:

The enclosure to this letter and attachments comprise Florida Power Corporation's (FPC) response to the request for additional information (RAll contained in Reference 2. These questions pertain to operator actions described in emergency operating procedures (EOPs) involving mitigation of certain small break Loss of Coolant Accident (LOCA! scenarios.

In addition to the information requested in Reference 2, FPC's notes from the October 22, 1997 meeting-in Rockville, Maryland indicate that the NRC staff is interested in FPC's position regarding the assessment required to be performed of completed EOPs to determine the need int additional operator 1:aining and/or simulator validations. Also, the staff requested er'

• a -I simulator validation information relative to the subject operator actions. This info. .on is included in our enclosed responae and the attachments.

Two new regulatory commitments are established by this letter and are reflected in Attachment O. Please contact Mr. David F. Kunsemiller, Manager, Nuclear Licensing at (352)563-4566 if you have any questions.

Sincerely, g b

Charles G. Pardoa

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Ye-N Director, Nuclee.r Plant Operations CGP/TWC Attachments cc: Regional Administrator, Region 11 Senior Resident inspector lM]ll$ll$${ll,l!}l r . o M nNRR Project Manaaer _ 9711210186 971119 PDR ADOCK 05000302 P PDR t,MYul AL MIVhN ENERGY COMPLEX: 15760 W. Power Line street . Crystal River, Florida 34428-6708 . (352)795-6486 A Florida Progress Company

2 U.S. Nucitar Regulatory Commissi:n Enclosure -

 ' 3F1197 48                                                                            Page 1 of 2
                                                                                                        -1 REQUEST FOR ADDITIONAL IN, ARMATION                                        1 EMERGENCY OPERATING PROCEDURES
  ' 1.-   ' FPC stated that high pressure injection (HPI) flow throttling would be used when in recirculation mode (low-pressure injection taking suction from containment sump and feeding HPl pumps). -The staff questioned whether FPC has been approved to use flow throttling ano requested that FPC provide a reference to the staff's approval for the use of flow throttling.

FPC Resoonst: In response to the NRC Confirmatory Order for Crystal River Unit 3 dated April 14, 1980, FPC letter to NRC dated May 23,1980 submitted HPl usage guidelines for small break or overcooling transients. FPC's submittat discusses added flexibility for HPl throttling to lessen th ; possibility for reactor coolant system (RCS) overfill. NRC letter to FPC dated November 16,1381 refers to FPC letter dated May 23, 1980 and recognizes the use of HPl throttling above the low pressure engineered safety feature actuation system (ESFAS) setpoint if there is adequate subcooling.

2. The staff rcquested all the applicable EOP steps for all the operator actions required for the small break LOCA scenarios included in the submittal.

FPC Response:

            /sttachments A and B of this submittal are updated tables 3A and 3B of Attachment F from the TSCRN 210 submittal (Reference 1) with the corresponding steps that appear in Crystal River's emergency operating procedures (EOPs) for the operator actions required for mitigation of small break LOCA scenarios. Attachment C is a matrix of the results of two simulator runs performed on November 7 and November 12,1997 which encompass a majority of the required operator actions for TSCRN
          - 210. Additional simuletor runa are expected to be performed during the second week of NRC :nspection 97-12 to be conducted the week of December 8,1997.

Results will be availablu for NRC staff review if necessary.

3. The staff requested that FPC submit a p<oposed final version of the EOPs applicable to TSCRN 210 to ensure the staff's approval of the opeator actions are based on EOPs that will be in place at restart.

FPC ReSAQnst: Copies of EOPs used in the mitigation of small break LOCAs are provided as Attachments D through N of this submittal. EOP 2, EOP-3, EOP-4, EOP 13, and EOP-14, Enclosures 2,7,11,17,18 and 19 are proposed final versions. EOP-8 is

          - being final: zed. The proposed final version will be provided no later than November 26,1997.

U.S. Nucirr R:gulatory Commission Enclosura .

         ; 3F1197 48                                                                                           Page 2 of 2 Also, ouring the October 22,1997 meeting described in Reference 2, the NRC staff was interested in FPC's position regarding the need for any additional training required to be performed on the final versions of EOPs. " Draft" versions o, the procedure revisions were provided for the NRC staff's review in Reference 3.: The proposed final versions, attached, and' draft versions previously provided, are essentially the same as the draf t versions used for operator training and annual
                  - exams. The procedures are at the point in the completion process which involves -                       "

review by the Plant Review Committee (PRC). When all EOPs are in their final form -

                                                                                                                            )

(i.e., have PRC review and are ready for issuance), meetings will be held with representatives of FPC operations, training and the EOP group staffs. The differences between the "as trained" eind "as issued" versions for each procedure will be identifivi, and a training assessment performed. The purpose of the. assessment will be to identify any additional training needs, the appropriate , setting for the training (classroom, simulator, classroom and simulator, or an Operations Study Book entry), the rieed for additional evaluations and whether or not the training is required. Based on the results of the assessment, training will be developed and conducted prior to restart (Mode 4).

. 1.ist of Attachments Attachment A - Table of Operator Actions Less Than 20 Minutes Attachment B - Table of Operator Actions After 20 Minutes Attachment C - Simulator Validations Attachment D - EOP 2, " Vital System Status Verification," Revision 4 Attachment E EOP 3, " inadequate Subcooling Margin," Revision 5 Attachment F - EOP-4, " inadequate Heat Transfer," Revision 4 Attachment G - EOP-8, "LOCA Cooldown," Revision 5(P)

Attachment H - EOP-13, " Rules," Revision 3 Attachment I - EOP 14, Enclosure 2, "PPO Post Event Actions," Revision 2 Attachment J - EOP-14, Enclosure 7, "EFP 2 Management," Revision 2 Attachment K - EOP-14, Enclosure 11, "EDG A Load Management," Revision 2 Attachment L - EOP-14, Enclosure 17, " Control Complex Emergency Ventilation," Rev. 2 Attachment M - EOP-14, Enclosure 18, " Control Complex Chiller Startup," Revision 2 Attachment N - EOP-14, Enclosure 19, ."ECCS Suction Transfer," Revision 2 Attachment O - List of Ramlatory Commitments

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4 U.S. Nuc!scr Regulatory Commission Attachment A'- 3F1197-48 . Page 2 Table 3A Operator Actions Less Than 20 Minutes OA Operator Action Time ' Basis Prior NRC Reference , Reviews 4 leolate RCP sealinjecbon (USQ6) 20 rrunutes Required to No FPC letter to NRC dated 2/28/79, answers a prevous maximize HPI question of whether or not it was necessary to isolate I flow to reactor - any flow paths in the makeup system after a LOCA_- - (As a contingency acDon, if power is lost to FPC refers to RCP seal injecteon and normal makeup i MUV-27 (normal makeup) and MUV-18 (RCP and refers to a Gilbert Associates report that . seal injection), transfer to an energized bus condudes adequate HPl flow is achieved without I i and close valves) these knes isorated. NRC letter to hcensees with .- ~ B&W desgned systems (Genenc Letter 8&OS) dated 5/29/86 states the cooling water sources supportog , the RCP with the potential of being isolated are seat injechon seal bleedoff, component coohrq water to ' seal Ime coolers, and h w mni cooling water to RCP motors and oil coolers The need to isolate  ! RCP Seal Injection was discovered in 1995 to be q necessary due to descovery that operators relied on -  ; non-Peg Guide 1.97 instrumentation to measure this ] flow when determerung HPI pump ruruut flow limits'  ; (see LER 95-026). Seal injechon isolation was also ;- .i determmed necessary du.ing Refuel 10 in.1996 upon discovery that worst case instrument error may result  ; in inadequate HPl flow (see LER 96-006). FPC letter H dated July 7.1997 (NOV 96-07) descusses the add.tional need for closure of RCP seal controlled , bleed +ff (CBO) valves after 90 seconds if seal 'I injection has not been restored. See OA-2." I I See EOP- 3 Step 3.8

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U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission Attachment A Page 3 3F1197-48 Table 3A Operator Actions Less Than 20 Minutes Operator Action Time Basis Prior NRC Reference OA Review 5 Ensure adequate HPl flow (USQ6)(rsotate a 20 rrunutes Required only Partial FPC letter to NT dated 10/27/89 states HPI must be broken enjectron fine using new isolation for break in HP1 successfu!!y balanced to support SBLOCA rnedgaton line as described in various B&W topical reports accepted cnteria) by NRC. Subsequent FPC letter dated 10/31/89 states that mittgaton strategy employed from the late 1970's through the reviews done in response to NUREG 0737 reled on balancing HPI flow for breaks in HPl injecten lines. These letters relate to LER 89-037, issued in November 1989 reporting a design basis condition in which instrumentation used for balancing HPl flow was inadequate. NRC letter dated 12/20/89 confirmed verbal concurrence to resume power operabon with the HPl instrumentaton problems One condition was operator acton for HPI ' flow balancing. NRC letter dated 2/17/95 from Gary Holahan to Ed Jacks (BWOG Operator Support Committee) states staff has completed its rev% of BWOG response to NUREG 0737 ftem I.C.1 regarding EOP Guidelines and is finalizing an SER on the topic. Balancing HPI fic*s was a past of the ATOG/TBD guidelines irwipviatw! into FPC procedures. FPC issued LER 96-007 on 3/15/96 to report another design basis conditson involving HPl fbw instrumentation. The flow deficiencies desenbed therein were addressed by revised SBLOCA analyses provided by F~amatome Technologies in April 1996 which required ' solation of the affected HPI line versus balancing. Most recent FTI analyses have provided new isolaton cnteria. See EOP - 3. Step 3.6

U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission Attachment A 3F1197-48 Page 4 Table 3A Operator Actions Less Than 20 Minutes OA Operator Action Time Basis Prior NRC Reference Review 6 Ensure adequate EFW flow (USOS) 20 msnutes Rarse OTSG Yes B&W (Taylor) letter to NRC (Baer) dated 5/1/78 levels to ISCM provides topical report 10104, "B&Ws ECCS (EFIC was inrtiated in OA2; therefore, setpoint (90%) Evaluation Model," which notes operator acbon is ensuring EFW flow is a confirmation step only) necessary during early stages of the accident to mitigate consequences and meet 10 CFR 50.46. This step manually raises OTSG levels to the Auxiliary feedwater is assumed to be available. NRC Inadequate Subcooling Margin, ISCM level letter to FPC dated 7Ait79 provxles a SER for actions taken in respmse to Commission Order dated 5/16/79. The SER states that a generic review of B&W analyses entitled "Evaluatson of Trar.sient Behavior r; Small RCS Breaks in the 177 Fuel Assembly Plant" resu!!ed in a principle finding that reconfirms SBLOCA analyses demonstrate a combination of heat removal by the steam generator O.7d the HP1 system combined with operator actxm to er'sure adequate core cooling. These results are applicable to CR-3 considering the ability to manua:ty start the .edundant EFW pumps and HPI pumps from the control room, assummg failure of automatic EFW actuabon. NRC letter to FPC dated 8/30/85 provides a SER for NUREG 0737 item li.K.3.30,"SBLOCA Methods." Sechon Ill.5.a of the SER states "the timing of operator action to raise the secondary system water level to 95% was found not to be entical_" See EOP - 3. Step 3.9

U.S. Nucl=:r Regulatory Commission Attachment 8 - 3F1197-48 Page 1 Table 3B Operator Actions A*ter 20 Minutes OA Operator Action Failure Cycle 11 Only Basis Reference Scenario 7 Ensure Control Complex Ventilatm is running in LOBA No To assure control room EOP - 3, Step 3.12 requires concurrent emergency mode LOBB operator dose is not exceeded pakin.ance of EOP 14. Enclosure 17 EFP-2 and to provide control complex " Control Complex Emergency Venidata cooling Required to be Sys,em.* accomplished within 30 minutes 8 If at any time BWST is < 20 ft, transfer ECCS pump LOBA No To ensure sufficent source of EOP - 3. Step 3.13 directs pc,b n e w suction to RB sump LOBB borated water for injecbon by of EOP - 14. Enclosure 19 *ECCS EFP-2 HPl!LPl. Depending on break Suctm Transfer.* size, action may be required between 25 minutes and 1-1/2 hours 9 If 'B' DC power is lost, crosstie EFP-2 to A train (EFV-12) LOBB EFP-1 can only provide flow EOP - 3. Step 3.16 directs performance Yes for a specfic time penod, then of EOP-14. Enc;osure 11, *EDG A Load AND EFP-2 must be aligned to Management,* (Steps 11.6 and 11.7) ensure sufficient margin is Secure EFP-1 maintained on the 'A' EDG for later adding of Control Cor '. dex Chiller 10 Put EFIC in manual permissive LOBB Yes Required to prevent cychng of EOP - 3. Step 3.9 estabhshes the limited duty motors on the apphcability of EOP - 13. Rule 3, *EFW AND EFW block valves Control.* Also EOP - 3. Step 3.16 directs performance of EOP - 14 Close EFW block valves (deenergized after dosure) Enclosure 11, *EDG A Load Management

• Step 11.4 requires the normal EFP-2 discharge path to be isolated 11 Manage EDG load in order to extend EFP-1 operatton by EF P-2 Yes Defense in Depth action for EOP - 3. Step 3.16 and EOP - 8 Step postulated single failure of the 3.7 direct performance of EOP-14,

    . Shutdown SWP-1 A & RWP-2A after venfying                                        loss of EFP-2. These actions     Enclosure 11,*EDG A Load redundant pumps are operating and plachg                                        extend the time EFP-1 is         Management * (Steps 11.12,11.13 switches in Pull-to-Lock to prevent reactuation of                              available for OTSG cooling        11.14).

pumps (EDG loading) e Place EFP-1 Trip Defeat Switch in defeat position to prevent automatic trip of EFP-1 on RCS pressure of  ! 500 psig

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k i U.S. Nucl::ar Regulatory Commis>. n Attachment B 3F1197-48 ' Page 2 Tatde 3B Operator Actions After 20 Minutes OA Operator Action Failure Cycle 11 Only Basis Reference Scenario 12 Venfy Control Complex Chdier is runrung LOBA No Required within 80 rrunutes to EOP - 3. Step 3.17 and EOP - 8. Step LOBB ensure contros complex 3.8 provide instruebons to concurrently EFP-2 instrumm.id.06 remains within perform EOP - 14. Endosure 18. analyzed temperature ranges

• Control Complex Chiller Startup" i for instrument accuracy 13 Isolate the R83 sump by placing RB sump pumps in Pull- LOBA No Required to isolate unneeded EOP - 8. Steps 3.11 and 3.12 to-Lock, dosing RB sump pump discharge valves, and LOBB penetration flow paths. These

, dosing waste gas header isolation valves EFP-2 penetrations go to the waste ' gas header and the , Miscellaneous Waste Storage tank. Isolating the RB sump

• penetratic i will maintain i inventory in the containment j for possible ECCS pump  ;

suchon for long term recirculation 14 If only EFP-2 is supplying feedwater to the OTSG, the LCBA No To maintain EFP-2 as an EOP - 8. Step 3.17 directs use of EOP-RCS cooldown will be stopped prior to reaching an EFP- available rwrce of feedwater 14. Endosure 7.*EFP-2 Management *: 2 operationallimit. Manage operation of EFP-2 by and opera.o the pump within - (see Steps 7.14, 7.15. and 7.16) dosing ASV-5 and ASV-204 on low OTSG pressure analyzed regions. Use of This may involve entry into EOP-4 and (Cyde EFW) and restart EFP-2 when pressure FWP-7 provides additional retum to EOP - 8.' increases. resources available to operators during a LOOP (Mitigation strategy indudes operation of diesel backed FWP-7 as a Defense in Depth actnn. Isolation valves located in the interme 1iate building may be opened to allow use of FWP-7) 15 If EFP-2 is not operating when in a LOOP condition with EFP-2 Yes if EFP-2 is not available, steps EOP - 3. Step 3.16 derects psium.-6c.e inadequate subcooling. limit cooldown prior to EFP- must be taken to ensure EFP- of EOP- 14. Enclosure 11 *EDG A Load 1/LPl. 1 operates as long as needed Management * (see Step 11.14) 16 Establish RCS Cooldown using TBVs or ADVs LOBA No initiates RCS cooldown to EOP - 8. Steps 3.18 and 3.19. LOBB achieve end point of event EFP-2 (start of decay heat) t

I' U.S. Nuclear 'Regulatory Commis ion - ' Attachment' O 3F1197-48 Page 3 Tatde 38 - Operator Actions After 20 Minutes ' , OA Operator Acton Failure Cycle 11 Only . Basis - Reference Scenario 17 Penodscally re-evaluate HPI Inne break cntena on RCS LOBA No Requwed for spec.3c HPI kne . EOP-3, Step 3.22 transabons to EOP-recessurization LOBB~ pinch areas to ensure a 4 on inadequate heat transfer. EOP -4,'

                                                                   ' EFP-2                   broken line will be isolated if .'     Step 3.58 is an *1f at any time' step and ~

isolabon cntena is not met requwes closure of the affected HPt lins ! early in the event while in - on ISCM EOP-3 h, 1 1 i - e

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U.S. Nuciser R:gulatory Commission Attachment C 3F1197-48 Page 1

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Simulator Validations ' OA# ACTION EOP1 STEP REQUIRED TIME VALIDATED TIME ' VALIDATED TIREE Scenario 88 Scenario 111 hr: min:sec tr. min:sec 1 TRIP RCPS < 2 MIN. COP-3 STEP 2.1 < 2 MNUTES 00:00:23 00:00:20 2 MANUAL HPL'RBBC EOP-13 RULE 1 < 10 MNUTES 00:00:42 00:01:39 3 ENSURE 4 HPl VALVES OPEN EOP-3 STEP 3.3 < 10 MINUTES C0:02:57. - 00:02:56 4' ISOLATE RCP SEAL INJECTION EOP-3 STEP 3.8 < 20 MINUTES 00:08:37 00:08:51 ! 5 ISOLATE BROKEN HPI LINE EOP-3 STEP 3.6 < 20 MINUTES 00:07:12 00:07:34 6 ENSL9E EFIC ACTUATES EOP-3 STEP 3.10 < 20 WNUTES 00:09:05 00:09:32 7 START CONTROL COMPLEX EOP-3 STEP 3.12 DIRECTS USE OF EOP- < 30 MNUTES - 00:22:44 00:22:00 VENTILATION 14. ENCLOSURE 17 8 TRANSFER BWST TO RB SUMP EOP-3 GTEP 3.13 DIRECTS USE OF EOP- >20 WNUTES Not validated by this Discontmuod 14, ENCLOSURE 19 scenario due to size sceneno at 02:12-00 + , of break with BWST >40 ft  : 9 CROSS TIE EFP-2 TO A-TRAIN AND EOP-3 STEP 3.16 DIRECTS USE OF EOP- > 20 MINUTES 00:32:57 N/A for this scenario SECURE EFP-1 14. ENCLOSURE 11 (STEP 11.7) f 10 PLACE EFIC IN MANUAL PERMISSIVE EOP-3 STEP 3.16 DIRECTS USE OF EOP- > 20 MNUTES 00:32:57 ' N/A for this scenario AND CLOSE EFW BLOCK VALVES 14 ENCLOSURE 11 (STEP 11.4) 11 MANAGE EDG LOADS: EOP-3 STEP 3.16 DIRECTS USE OF EOP- > 20 MMUTES . N/A for this scenano 00:29:49 S/D SWP-1 A & RWP-2A 14, ENCLOSURE 11 EFP-1 TRIP DEFEAT (STEP 11.12;11.13;11.14) 12 START CONTROL COMPLEX CHILLER EOP-3 STEP 3.17 DIRECTS USE OF EOP- < 80 MNUTES 00:47:12 00:42:32 14 ENCLOSURE 18 . 13 STOP RB SUMP PUMPS EOP-8 STEP 3.11:3.12 > 20 MINUTES Not validated by this 00:45:37 . 14 IF ONLY EFP-2 IS AVAILABLE THEN EOP-8 STEP 3.17 DIRECTS USE OF > 20 MINUTES Not validated by this N/A for this scenano STOP COOLDOWN BEFORE REACHING EOP-14, ENCLOSURE 7 (STEP 7.16) scenario

• OPERATIONAL LIMIT OF EFP-2

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U.S. Nuclear Regulotory Commission  : Attachment C 3F1197 ' L Page 2

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Sunulator Validations . OA# ACTION EOPISTEP- REQUIRED TIRIE - VAUDATED TIINE . VAUDATED TIRE Scenado SS Scenedo 111 hr min:sec ' ' hr:miresec ! 15 IF EFP-2 IS NOT OPERATING, Uts!T EOP.3 STEP 3.15,IN CONJUNCTION WITH >20RAINUTES Not validated try Weis intadock was . COOLDOWN PRIOR TO EFP-1/LPI EOP-14. ENCLOSURE 11,IS A PERFORGE scenerlo defeated 00:29:14 INTERLOCK STEP WHICH ROUST BE COREPLETED tesfore cooldown was i PRIOR TO PROCEEDING TO COOLDOWN iratiated , GUIDANCE IN EOP4. 16 : ESTABUSH COOLDOWN USING TBVs EOP4 STEP 3.18,3.19 >20 ANNUTES Not vm tpy this 00:50:03 AND ADVs scenario l 17 PERIODICALLY RE-EVALUATE HPl UNE EOP-4 STEP 3.58 >20 REINUTES Not validated try this . Not validated try this BREAK ISOLATION CRITERIA ON RCS scenario ' scenerlo REPRESSURIZATION ,

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               , Validated 1117197 with one operator at the controls and one operator reading the procedures.                                          "

EOP.03, Draft R was used.. - Scenario ended when EOP4 was entered. Scenario 88 was used (SBLOCA & Loss of 'B' DC Bus).

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+ Validated 11112/97 with one operator at the controls and one operator reading the procedures. = EOP43, Draft R and EOP48, Draft P were used. Scenario ended at 2 hours,12 minutes at EOP4, Step 3.35 - RCS pressure g 650 psig. , Scenario 111 was used (SBLOCA & EFP-2 Failure). i 2 L 1 i 4 __..a-u__ ~ , <r- - W g '  % :Wi ==v-(- e v

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